*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-50392

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ARTURO SOLIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-95-CR-111 (1)

 

August 8, 1997

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Arturo Solis, TDCJ # 514142, appeals his conviction for

possession of an unregistered destructive device, possession of an

unidentifiable destructive device, and possession of a firearm by

a felon. A jury found that Solis, who was incarcerated in the

administrative segregation division of a Texas maximum security

prison, injured a fellow inmate by giving him a package that

exploded when he tried to open it. We find no reversible error.
2

Many of Solis’s claimed errors require us to apply the abuseof-discretion standard. The trial court did not depart from its

wide discretion in handling trial matters. The amount of time

provided to Solis for inspecting photographs of his cell and items

seized from the cell was within the boundaries of discretion and in

any event did not prejudice Solis. See United States v. Deisch, 20

F.3d 139, 154 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court’s decision not

to subpoena defense witnesses was a legitimate exercise of

discretion in light of Solis’s failure to explain how those

witnesses were necessary to his defense. See United States

Butler, 988 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 956,

114 S. Ct. 413, 126 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1993). The court used its sound

discretion to limit Solis’s cross-examination of prosecution

witnesses on the issue of whether the device could be characterized

as a “firecracker.” See Bradford v. Whitley, 953 F.2d 1008, 1013

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 829, 113 S. Ct. 91, 121

L. Ed. 2d 53 (1992). And the admission of evidence of Solis’s gang

activity was within the court’s discretion because it had a bearing

on Solis’s motive for the attack. See United States v. Leahy, 82

F.3d 624, 636 (5th Cir. 1996).

Because Solis did not raise certain objections at trial, we

must review portions of his appeal for plain error under Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(b). Before trial, Solis moved for appointment of a

handwriting expert in an effort to show that the signature of the

foreman of the grand jury was a forgery. The district court denied
3

the motion, and Solis did not raise 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) or

otherwise object. He complains that a long list of prosecutorial

remarks were beyond the pale, but he did not raise those complaints

with the trial court. He also mounts a due process challenge to

his conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) on the theory that his

incarceration made it impossible to comply with the statute’s

registration requirements. We have held that the impossibility of

compliance does not render a registration requirement

unconstitutional. United States v. Ridlehuber, 11 F.3d 516, 526-27

(5th Cir. 1993). We have also rejected Solis’s argument that

§ 5861(d) is beyond Congress’s constitutional powers; the statute

is a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, so infirmities in the

commerce power are beside the point. Id. at 526. Finally, Solis

contends that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did

not require a finding of knowledge that the device was unregistered

and because they went beyond the indictment. The National Firearms

Act does not require the mens rea that Solis suggests, United

States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc),

and we cannot find any basis for the claim that the jury charge

went beyond the indictment. None of these points of error rises to

the level of plain error, and in any event none seriously affected

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.

See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37, 113 S. Ct. 1770,

123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993); United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160,
4

162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1196, 115

S. Ct. 1266, 131 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1995).

We cannot review Solis’s claim that the district court

improperly restricted his opening and closing arguments because he

failed to include the relevant portions of the trial transcript in

the record. See United States v. Narvaez, 38 F.3d 162, 167 (5th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1087, 115 S. Ct. 1803, 131

L. Ed. 2d 729 (1995).

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

state, we cannot say that the convictions rest on insufficient

evidence. The jury could conclude from the prosecution’s case that

the package was a “destructive device” within the meaning of 26

U.S.C. § 5845, that Solis possessed it, that it was not registered

and did not have the required serial number, and that parts of the

device moved in interstate commerce. See United States v. Price,

877 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dickey, 102

F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 1996).

Because the prosecution introduced the victim’s medical report

at trial, it did not suppress the report under Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1050

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1008, 115 S. Ct. 530, 130

L. Ed. 2d 433 (1994), and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1179, 115 S. Ct.

1165, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1120 (1995). Furthermore, Solis has not

established that any tardy disclosure caused him prejudice. See

id.
5

The multiple punishments under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and

5861(i) do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because each

violation involves an element that the other does not. See

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76

L. Ed. 306 (1932).

Finally, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) does not require the

district court to make specific findings on each contested matter

at sentencing. It was proper for the court simply to reject

Solis’s objections and to adopt the factual findings in the presentence report. United States v. Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 421 (5th

Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED.