Japan:

Legal Responses to the Great East 

Japan Earthquake of 2011

September 2013

The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center

(202) 707-6462 (phone) • (866) 550-0442 (fax) • law@loc.gov • http://www.law.gov
This report is provided for reference purposes only. 

It does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official 

opinion of the United States Government. The information provided 

reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing. 

It has not been updated.
Contents

I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1

II. Actions Taken Under Pre-earthquake Emergency Measures ............................................ 3

A. Disaster Response Basic Law ................................................................................................... 4

B. Disaster Rescue Law ................................................................................................................. 6

C. Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness................................. 7

D. Electricity Shortage and Measures Taken Pursuant to TEPCO Power Supply Contract ....... 11

E. Food Sanitation Law and Related Measures .......................................................................... 13

III. Victim Support ................................................................................................................... 16

A. Tracking Evacuees ................................................................................................................. 16

B. Financial Grants ..................................................................................................................... 18

C. Special Loans ......................................................................................................................... 18

D. Loans for Lost Houses and Existing Business Debts ............................................................. 19

E. Tax Relief ............................................................................................................................... 20

F. Unemployment Benefits ......................................................................................................... 21

G. Job Creation ........................................................................................................................... 21

H. Shelters/Emergency Housing ................................................................................................. 22

I. Special Treatment Concerning Administrative Obligations .................................................... 24

J. Relief Donations ...................................................................................................................... 25

IV. Removal of Debris .............................................................................................................. 25

A. General Waste Management Measures .................................................................................. 25

B. Contaminated Waste Management and Decontamination ..................................................... 27

V. Nuclear Crisis at Fukushima ............................................................................................... 30

A. Act to Support Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Daily Lives .......................................................... 30

B. Compensation for Nuclear Damage ....................................................................................... 31

C. New Nuclear Regulatory Authority and New Regulations .................................................... 35

VI. Reconstruction .................................................................................................................... 37

VII. Public Finance Measures .................................................................................................. 39

VIII. Miscellaneous Special Laws ............................................................................................ 41
IX. Preparation for the Next Disaster – Japan’s Disaster Management System ................ 44

A. Disaster Response Basic Law ................................................................................................ 44

B. Special Act on Large-Scale Earthquake Response and Related Laws ................................... 45

C. New Law on Tsunami Measures ............................................................................................ 46

D. Other Measures for the Prevention and Mitigation of Damage ............................................. 47

X. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................... 48

Map

Japan’s Nuclear Power Plants Highlighting Those Affected by the 2011 Earthquake and

Tsunami........................................................................................................................................... 2

Tables

1: Indices Relating to Limits on Food and Drink Ingestion (Excerpts)........................................ 13

2: Limits for Radioactive Cesium in Food.................................................................................... 16
Japan:

Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 

2011

Sayuri Umeda 

Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY The Great East Japan Earthquake brought the starkest crisis since the desolation of the 

Second World War. During the emergency period just after the earthquake, the Japanese 

government tried to do everything it could under existing disaster response systems. 

However, because large areas were affected and some municipalities lost functions, the 

existing systems, which placed the responsibility on each affected municipality to take 

action, did not work well in some parts of the country. The national government therefore 

made exceptions and stepped in, assuming financial responsibilities for local governments.

Many issues arose as a result of the earthquake, such as food safety concerns and disaster 

debris management and disposal. The nuclear crisis caused by the earthquake also created 

long-lasting radiation problems. A new system was created for local governments outside 

of the disaster area to accept and process debris. The government also established new 

standards for radiation levels in foods.

In addition to utilizing existing systems and programs, exceptions were made and new 

systems were created to support disaster victims and ease their hardship, with many laws 

being amended or new laws created to address the situation. A reconstruction agency was 

created to coordinate various reconstruction efforts. Based on post-earthquake 

assessments of the effectiveness of the existing nuclear regulatory authority, a new nuclear 

regulatory agency and new standards for nuclear power plants were created.

Japan has used the experience to better prepare for future disasters. Laws and regulations 

were amended, and a new tsunami countermeasure law was enacted.

I. Introduction

A magnitude 9.0 earthquake, known as the Great East Japan Earthquake, struck off the Pacific 

Coast of Japan’s Tohoku region on March 11, 2011, shaking the region. It caused a tsunami with 

devastating consequences and a nuclear crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plants. In an 

opinion piece published on the one-year anniversary of the earthquake, then Prime Minister 

Yoshihiko Noda said it “triggered the starkest crisis [Japan] has faced in a generation.”

1 He

1

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, Op-ed., A Year After the Earthquake, Building a New Japan, THE WASHINGTON 

POST(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/prime-minister-yoshihiko-noda-japan-has-maderemarkable-progress/2012/03/07/gIQA7AX61R_story.html.

The Law Library of Congress 1
Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

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compared the level of crisis caused by the earthquake to “the ashes and desolation of World 

War II.”

2

Map: Japan’s Nuclear Power Plants

Highlighting Those Affected by the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami

Source:WikimediaCommons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nuclear_plants_Japan_in_2011.svg.

2

Id.
Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

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The Japanese government utilized then-existing emergency systems and resources after the 

earthquake. Some systems did not work well because the scale of destruction from the 

earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster combined were more than such systems were designed 

to address. In the wake of the disaster, Japan has enacted and amended many new laws to 

support victims’ daily lives, clear huge mounds of debris, and reconstruct destroyed areas. 

Nuclear power plant safety has been reexamined. Further, Japan has enacted or amended laws to 

prepare for and address similar large-scale earthquakes in the future. It is expected that certain 

parts of Japan will experience huge earthquakes because these earthquakes happen periodically 

on a long cycle.

3

The Great East Japan Earthquake also had a tremendous impact on the Japanese economy. 

Industrial production activities and exports have decreased because of the damage to stock 

mainly in the affected region, supply chain disruptions, and power constraints.

4

II. Actions Taken Under Pre-earthquake Emergency Measures

After the tsunami washed away coastal areas, it was hard to know who had survived, who was 

missing, and who had died. Power plants were paralyzed, power lines were gone, and roads 

were disrupted everywhere. The Japanese government undertook extensive efforts to save lives 

and assist survivors.

5

The damage was not limited to the Tohoku area. The tremor intensity 

level of Tokyo was five under the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) seismic intensity scale.

6

Just after the earthquake, Tokyo, the nation’s capitol, was paralyzed by the damage from the 

earthquake and a lack of electricity. More than five million people in the Tokyo metropolitan 

area were estimated to have been stranded at their workplace or elsewhere on March 11, 2011.

7

In addition, the nuclear power plant accident caused by the earthquake and tsunami created 

another crisis of radiation exposure. Various emergency measures were taken based on the 

following laws:

3

Jisjin wa naze okiru no? [Why Do Earthquakes Occur?], SHIZUOKA PREFECTURAL EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS 

EDUCATION CENTER, http://www.e-quakes.pref.shizuoka.jp/manabu/why/b-03.htm (last visited June 28, 2013).

4

Seisaku suishin shishin – nihon no saisei ni mukete [Policy promotion guidelines – Toward Japan’s

Reconstruction], Cabinet Decision, May 17, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2011/__icsFiles/

afieldfile/2012/03/12/0517shishin.pdf (copy and paste link into browser).

5

See Message from the Prime Minister (Provisional Translation), PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET 

(Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/110313_1950.html.

6 TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, MEASURES TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT TOOK AND ITS

LEARNINGS FROM THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE 16 (Sept. 2011), http://www.bousai.metro.tokyo.jp/

japanese/tmg/pdf/230914taiouhonsatu.pdf (in Japanese). Regarding the seismic intensity scale, see Tables

Explaining the JMA Seismic Intensity Scale, JMA, http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/Activities/inttable.html (last visited

June 28, 2013). Japan’s seismic intensity scale differs from the Richter scale used to measure earthquake intensity 

in the United States.

7

5 Million Stranded in Tokyo Area After Quake, YOMIURI NEWSPAPER (Nov. 25, 2011) (on file with author).
Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

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A. Disaster Response Basic Law

The Disaster Response Basic Law

8 was enacted in 1961 for comprehensive and well-planned 

disaster management after a huge monsoon hit the middle part of Japan in 1959. 9It was 

amended twice in 1995

10

based on the experiences of the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake,

11

and 

again in 2010.

12

Pursuant to this Law, the Central Disaster Management Council, which is under the jurisdiction 

of the Cabinet Office, established the Basic Disaster Management Plan.

13 Based on the Basic 

Disaster Management Plan, all designated government organizations and designated public 

corporations established Disaster Management Operation Plans.

14 Also, each prefectural and 

municipal disaster management council established a Local Disaster Management Plan, 

reflecting local circumstances.

15

These plans described comprehensive and long-term disaster 

reduction issues, such as establishment of disaster management systems, disaster reduction 

projects, disaster recovery, and rehabilitation.

16

These plans were available at the time of the 

Great East Japan Earthquake. Under the Disaster Response Basic Law, in times of an 

extraordinary disaster with repercussions for the national economy and public welfare that are 

serious and far-reaching, the Prime Minister may declare a state of emergency involving the 

whole or part of the affected area by issuing a Cabinet Notice of Disaster Emergency Situation, 

which requires implementation of these plans.

17

8

Saigai taisaku kihon hō [Disaster Response Basic Law], Act No. 223 of 1961, 1997 English translation available 

on the Asian Disaster Reduction Center’s website, at http://www.adrc.asia/documents/law/DisasterCountermeasures

BasicAct.pdf.

9

Saigai taisaku kihon hō no gaiyō [Summary of the Disaster Response Basic Law], Cabinet Office,

http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/pdf/090113saitai.pdf (last visited June 28, 2013).

10 Act Nos. 110 and 132 of 1995.

11 The Great Hanshin Earthquake struck a stretch of the southern part of Hyogo Prefecture on January 17, 1995. It

was rated at a magnitude of 7.3 on the Japan Meteorological Agency scale (6.9 on the United States Geological

Survey scale). Six thousand four hundred people died and 240,956 houses collapsed. Great Hanshin Earthquake

Restoration, KINKI REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BUREAU, MINISTRY OF LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT,

http://www.kkr.mlit.go.jp/en/topics_hanshin.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).

12 Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, as amended by Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 34, para. 1.

13 Id.

14 Id. art. 36.

15 Id. arts. 40, 42. See also Structure of Basic Disaster Management Plan, CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF

JAPAN, http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/keikaku/english/disaster_management_plan.html(last visited

Aug. 13, 2013).

16 CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN 11 (Feb. 2011), http://www.bousai.

go.jp/1info/pdf/saigaipanf_e.pdf.

17 Disaster Response Basic Law art. 105, as amended by Law No. 132 of 1995.
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Just after the Great East Japan Earthquake, Prime Minister Naoto Kan established the 

Headquarters for Emergency Disaster Response and held the first meeting within one hour

18

based on the Disaster Response Basic Law.

19 The Prime Minister is the manager and all 

ministers are members of the Headquarters.

20

The Headquarters coordinates national agencies 

and local governments, and oversees implementation of emergency measures.

21 Under the 

Disaster Response Basic Law, prefectures can ask the national government to dispatch ministry 

officials to assist with emergency measures.

22 Municipal governments can arrange for the short 

stay in other municipalities of residents who cannot stay in their homes.

23 A municipal 

government can request that a prefectural government supply emergency supplies, and a 

prefecture government can request the same from the national government.

24

The government tried to “do everything it could do” after the earthquake, including dispatching 

Self-Defense Forces teams, police emergency units, fire fighters, and emergency medical 

teams.

25 Designated shelters were opened up in accordance with local government disaster 

plans.

26 The government sent food, water, blankets, medicine, and toiletries to shelters.27

However, the Prime Minister did not declare a state of emergency.

28 When an emergency notice 

is issued, the Cabinet is authorized to issue cabinet orders if the Diet is closed or the House of 

Representatives is dissolved in order to control sales and the transfer of necessities and decide 

prices of goods or services that are necessary for emergency measures and the stability of 

people’s daily lives.

29 When the earthquake hit Japan, the Diet was in session. Therefore, 

issuance of an emergency notice would not have made a practical difference.

The Disaster Response Basic Law states that, when a natural disaster is designated as an 

especially severe one by the Cabinet, the national government may grant money to local 

governments to pursue projects to restore destroyed areas and help victims in accordance with

18 Press Release, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Public Relations Office, Headquarters for Emergency Disaster

Response for the 2011 Tohoku – Pacific Ocean Earthquake (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/

foreign/kan/actions/201103/11touhoku_jisin_e.html.

19 Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, as amended by Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 28-2.

20 Id. art. 28-3.

21 Id. art. 28-4.

22 Id. art. 29.

23 Id. arts. 86-2, 86-3.

24 Id. art. 86-7.

25 Kanbō chōkan kisha happyō [Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release], Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,

Kinkyū saigai taisaku honbu ni tsuite [Regarding Headquarters for Emergency Disaster Response] (Mar. 11, 2011),

http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201103/11_p3.html.

26 Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 42.

27 Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Dai 8 kai me no kinkyū saigai

taisaku honbu [The 8th Emergency Measures Headquarters Meeting] (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/

tyoukanpress/201103/13_p4.html.

28 Disaster Response Basic Law art. 105, as amended by Law No. 132 of 1995.

29 Id. art. 109, para. 1.
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other laws enacted for this purpose.

30

To that end, the Act on Special Financial Aid to Respond 

to Severe Disasters was enacted in 1962.

31

The day after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the 

Cabinet decided to apply this Act to the disaster, and a Cabinet Order was issued on March 13,

2011.

32

The Cabinet usually waits for reports on damage from a disaster before it decides to 

apply the Act. The earthquake, however, was obviously so severe that the Cabinet made a swift 

decision without waiting for reports from areas hit by the disaster.

33

The Cabinet decided to 

provide financial support for construction to restore infrastructure, farmlands, and cattle farming 

and aquaculture, as well as small- and mid-size enterprise insurance.

34

B. Disaster Rescue Law

Prefectures, in place of the national government, are supposed to conduct rescue activities under 

the Disaster Rescue Law.

35 Rescue activities under this Law include providing shelter, food, and 

water; providing or lending clothes, bedding, and other necessities; providing medical services; 

rescuing people from dangerous places; the initial repair of houses; etc.

36 Cash can be provided 

to persons in need of support, instead of goods and services, when the prefecture governor 

decides it is appropriate in a specific situation.

37 Designated government agencies can order 

businesses to hold or provide goods that are necessary to rescue activities in accordance with a 

disaster management plan.

38

A few days after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government realized that this earthquake 

was so large-scale and destructive that the system provided under the Disaster Rescue Law did 

not fit the situation.

39 Under the Law, prefectures and municipalities take primary responsibility 

for rescue activities and are responsible for rescue costs.

40 Prefectures are financially prepared

30 Id. arts. 96–99, as amended by Act No. 41 of 2012.

31 Gekijin saigai ni taisho suru tame no tokubetsu no zaisei enjo tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Financial Aid

to Respond to Severe Disasters], Act No. 150 of 1962, last amended by No. 67 of 2012, art. 1.

32 Cabinet Order on Designation of Measures Applied for the Great East Japan Earthquake, Cabinet Order No. 18

of 2011.

33 CABINET OFFICE, BŌSAI HAKUSHO [DISASTER PREVENTION WHITE PAPER] 2011, ch. 3, § 1, http://www.bousai.

go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/1b_1h_3s_1.htm.

34 Id.

35 Saigai kyūjo hō [Disaster Rescue Law], Act No. 118 of 1947, last amended by Law No. 65 of 2010, art. 2.

36 Id. art. 23, para. 1.

37 Id. art. 23, para. 2.

38 Id. art. 23-2. Disaster management plans have been established under the Disaster Response Basic Law.

39 Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Dai 8 kai me no kinkyū saigai

taisaku honbu, dai 6 kai me no genshiryoku saigai taisaku honbu, dai 1 kai me no denryoku jukyū kinkyū taisaku

honbu, dai 2 kai no keizai jōsei ni kansuru kentō kaigō ni tsuite (Fukuyama naikaku kanbō fuku chōkan) [Regarding

8th Emergency Disaster Headquarters Meeting, 6th Nuclear Disaster Headquarters Meeting, First Emergency

Headquarter on Supply and Demand of Electricity Meeting and 2nd Conference on Economy Situation Meeting

(Vice Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuyama)] (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/

201103/13_p4.html.

40 Disaster Rescue Law art. 33.
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by reserving 5% of general-purpose local taxes for the Disaster Rescue Fund. 41Some 

municipalities, however, were almost entirely destroyed by the tsunami and therefore could not 

conduct rescue activities. Also, the burden of costs for local governments was more than 

expected. The national government usually refunds half of such costs, but if the ratio of the cost 

per the prefecture’s specified tax revenues goes up, the national government refunds up to 90% 

of the costs.

42 On March 13, 2011, the national government announced that it would take the 

initiative for rescue activities not covered by the Disaster Rescue Law and assume all financial 

responsibilities for such rescue activities.

43

The number of earthquake and tsunami victims who were evacuated to shelters reached 40,146 at 

its peak. The Emergency Disaster Headquarters established the Disaster Victims’ Lives Support 

Special Headquarters for specialized administration of distribution of food and goods to such 

victims on March 20, 2011.

44

The Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Special Headquarters was 

transformed into the Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team on May 9, 2011.

45

C. Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

Just after the earthquake, a fifteen-meter (approximately forty-nine foot) tsunami disabled the 

power supply of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant reactors. The emergency core cooling 

systems stopped working due to a lack of electricity. Then Prime Minister Kan declared a 

nuclear emergency and established the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.

46

Later that 

night, he directed two municipalities near the Fukushima Plant to order residents who lived 

within three kilometers (approximately 1.86 miles) of the plant to evacuate.

47

These measures were based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency 

Preparedness that was enacted after the Tōkaimura Criticality Accident in 1999.

48

That accident 

“was caused by bringing together too much uranium enriched to a relatively high level, causing a

41 Id. arts. 37, 38.

42 Id. art. 36.

43 Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, supra note 39.

44 Hisaisha seikatsu shien chīmu: taisaku no keika (Jimu kiroku) [Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team: Timeline

of Measures(Administrative Records)] 1 (July 22, 2011), http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/3-info/3-ugoki/jimu.pdf.

45 Hisaisha taisaku shien chīmu ni tsuite [Regarding Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team], CABINET OFFICE,

GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-gaiyo.html.

46 Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Genshiryoku kinkyū jitai sengen

ni tsuite [Regarding Declaration of Nuclear Emergency Situation] (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/

tyoukanpress/201103/11_p3.html.

47 Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Genshiryoku saigai taisaku

tokubetsu sochi hō no kitei ni motoduku jūmin e no hinan shiji ni tsuite [Regarding the Evacuation Order for

Residents Based on Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness] (Mar. 11, 2011),

http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201103/11_p4.html.

48 Genshiryoku saigai taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency

Preparedness], Act No. 156 of 1999, last amended by Act No. 118 of 2006, English translation available on Japanese

Law Translation (maintained by the Ministry of Justice), at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/

detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=106.
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‘criticality’ (a limited uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction), which continued intermittently for 20 

hours.”

49 Two workers from the Tōkaimura Plant died.50 This law aimed to

(1) take swift initial actions after a nuclear disaster,

(2) coordinate national and local government activities,

(3) enhance the emergency management system of the national government, and

(4) make nuclear business organizations responsible for a disaster.

51

Based on the Act, a nuclear operator must establish an on-site organization for nuclear 

emergency preparedness and place a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager at each nuclear 

site.

52 When a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager finds or is notified that a radiation 

dose above 5 millisieverts (mSv

53) per hour54

has been detected near the border of an area where 

a nuclear site is located, or that a certain level of radiation is detected somewhere else as 

specified in the Cabinet Order, he or she must immediately notify the competent ministers, the 

competent prefectural governor, the competent mayor of the municipality, and the neighboring 

prefectural governors of the finding.

55 When a minister finds that a nuclear emergency situation 

has occurred, he or she must immediately report necessary information concerning the situation 

to the Prime Minister.

56

The Prime Minister must then immediately give the public a nuclear 

emergency notice.

57

The Act obligates the competent ministers to report abnormal levels of

radiation and make a recommendation to the Prime Minister. Upon recommendation, the Prime 

Minister issues a directive to the prefecture governor(s) and heads of municipalities in the 

affected area.

58

49 Tokaimura Criticality Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (July 2007), http://world-nuclear.org/info/Safetyand-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Tokaimura-Criticality-Accident/.

50 Id.

51 Genshiryoku saigai taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō [Special Measures Law to Counter Nuclear Disaster],

Genshiryokiu bōsai kiso yōgo shū [Basic Dictionary on Nuclear Disaster Prevention], Kankyō bōsai N netto

[Environment & Disaster Prevention N Net], http://www.bousai.ne.jp/vis/bousai_kensyu/glossary/ke21.html (last

visited June 28, 2013).

52 Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness arts. 8, 9.

53 A sievert is a weighted measure of the absorbed quantity of various types of radiation. It is often expressed in

millisieverts (1/1000 of a sievert) in connection with exposure by humans. See Radiation Doses, CANADIAN 

NUCLEAR SAFETYCOMMISSION, http://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/readingroom/radiation/radiation_doses.cfm(last

visited Aug. 13, 2013).

54 Genshiryoku saigai taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō shikō rei [Enforcement Order of Act on Special Measures

Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness], Cabinet Order No. 195 of 2000, art. 4, para. 1.

55 Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, art. 10, last amended by Law No. 118 of

2006. Act No. 47 of 2012 amended the persons/entities to whom the situation is to be reported from “competent

minister” to “the Prime Minister and the Nuclear Regulatory Committee.” See also Enforcement Order of Act on

Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Order No. 195 of 2000, art. 4, para. 4.

56 Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness art. 15, para. 1, last amended by Law No.

118 of 2006.

57 Id. art. 15, para. 2.

58 Id. art. 15, para. 3.
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Soon after the earthquake, then Prime Minister Kan, as head of the Nuclear Emergency Response 

Headquarters, issued the following directives:

March 12: Residents who live within a ten-kilometer radius of the Fukushima Daini Power 

Plant,

59

and residents who live within a twenty-kilometer radius of the Fukushima 

Daiichi Power Plant were ordered to evacuate the area.

60

March 15: Residents who live between a twenty-kilometer and a thirty-kilometer radius from 

the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant were ordered to stay inside of buildings.

61

As the situation at the power plants changed, the directives changed as well.

62 On April 21, 2011, 

the Prime Minister issued a directive that designated the area within a twenty-kilometer radius of 

the Fukushima Daiichi Plant as a “warn-off” area and directed the heads of local governments to 

restrict people other than emergency workers from entering the area without the municipalities’ 

permission.

63 On the same day, the area near the Fukushima Daini Plant where residents had 

been directed to evacuate was shrunk from within ten kilometers to within eight kilometers from 

the plant.

64

On April 22, 2011, the government cancelled the directive that had asked residents in an area of 

between a twenty-kilometer radius and a thirty-kilometer radius from the Fukushima Daiichi 

Power Plant to stay inside of buildings.

65

Instead, the government set new designated areas. 

One was a “planned evacuation area” where the total accumulation of radiation per year is 

expected to reach 20 mSv, in which residents were required to evacuate within one month. The 

other addressed “areas prepared for emergency evacuation” where the possibility of radiation 

exposure cannot be eliminated, depending on the situation of the power plant, and the 

government has asked residents to be ready to evacuate at any time.

66

59 Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Mar. 12, 2011, 17:39 [time designation], http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/

kikikanri/jisin/20110311miyagi/20110312siji21.pdf.

60 Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Mar. 12, 2011, 18:25, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kikikanri/jisin/20110311

miyagi/20110312siji11.pdf.

61 Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Mar. 15, 2011, 11:00, http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20110315012/20110315012-

2.pdf.

62 See Kako no hinan shiji ni tsuite [Past Evacuation Directives], METI, http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/

hinan_history.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013). See also Hinan shiji to no keii [History of Evacuation Directives,

etc.], FUKUSHIMA PREFECTURE, http://wwwcms.pref.fukushima.jp/download/1/01240331.pdf (last visited

Aug. 13, 2013).

63 Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Head of Fukushima First and Second Nuclear Plants Disaster Headquarters,

Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/20110421110001shiji.pdf; Act on Special Measures Concerning

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Act No. 156 of 1999, last amended by Act No. 118 of 2006, art. 20, para 3.

64 Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Apr. 21, 2011, 11:00, http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/shiji_0421_

002.pdf.

65 Shiji [Directive], Head of Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Disaster Headquarters, Apr. 22, 2011, 9:44,

http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110422004/20110422004-3.pdf.

66 Id.; Nuclear Disaster Victim’s Lives Support Team, “Keikakuteki hinan kuiki” oyobi “Kinkyūji hinan junbi kuiki”

no settei ni tsuite [Regarding Designation of “Planned Evacuation Area” and “Prepared for Emergency Evacuation”]

(Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110422004/20110422004-2.pdf(in Japanese).
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On June 16, 2011, the government decided that residents would be notified of the locations 

where the total accumulation of radiation per year was expected to reach 20 mSv.

67 Because 

residents do not stay in the same location all the time, the actual radiation accumulation per 

resident would be lower than the level where broader areas were subject to radiation. Therefore, 

evacuation from the specified locations was recommended, but not required by the 

government.

68

The designation of “areas prepared for emergency evacuation” was cancelled on 

September 30, 2011, when the government recognized that the possibility of accidents inside the 

nuclear plants was low.

69

The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters confirmed that the nuclear reactors had reached 

a state of cold shutdown in December 2011,

70

and Prime Minister Noda announced that the 

nuclear crisis was under control. 71 As the Fukushima disaster came under control, the 

government adopted an annual effective radiation dose of 20 mSv as a limit on exposure to 

radiation for residents and decided to review the designation of restricted areas.

72 As a result of 

that review, on March 30, 2012, certain areas within a twenty kilometer radius of the Fukushima 

Daiichi Nuclear Power Plan were removed from the warn-off zone.

73 At the same time, the 

government reclassified the planned evacuation area (the area where evacuation was directed). 

The government designated the areas in which the radiation level was below 20 mSv per year as 

“areas prepared for cancellation of the evacuation directive (Hinan shiji kaijo junbi kuiki).” In 

these areas, cancellation of the designation of “planned evacuation area” is expected in the near 

future, after infrastructure is restored and decontamination of locales with radiation has 

progressed.

74

The government also designated a “restricted residential use area” in which the radiation level is 

between 20 and 50 mSv per year. Residents of that area are permitted to stop by their houses or 

other places within the area if they have a reason to go there, but they must leave after the

67 Nuclear Disaster Headquarters, Regarding Measures for Specified Spots Where the Total Accumulation of

Radiation per Year is Expected to Reach 20 mSv (June 16, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/06/20110616

007/20110616007-2.pdf(in Japanese).

68 Regarding “Planned Evacuation Areas” and “Specified Spots Where Evacuation Was Recommended”, METI,

http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/06/20110616007/20110616007.html (in Japanese; last visited June 28, 2013).

69 Nuclear Disaster Headquarters, Regarding Cancellation of Areas Prepared for Emergency Evacuation (Sept. 30,

2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/09/20110930015/20110930015-2.pdf(in Japanese).

70 Summary of the 22nd Meeting of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.kantei.

go.jp/jp/singi/genshiryoku/pdf/gensai_gaiyo_22.pdf(inJapanese).

71 Press Conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/

statement/201112/16kaiken_e.html.

72 Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Regarding Basic Ideas on Review of Warn-Off Area (Keikai kuiki)

and Emergency Evacuation Preparation Areas (Hinan shiji kuiki) upon Completion of Step 2 and Future Agenda, at

1–4 (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/111226_01a.pdf (in Japanese).

73 Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Regarding Decision Based on the Review on Designation of the

Warn-Off Zone and of Emergency Evacuation Preparation Areas (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/

earthquake/nuclear/pdf/20120330_02a.pdf(in Japanese).

74 Regarding Notions on Activities in the New Evacuation Directive Areas, Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Lives Support

Team(Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/20120330_02h.pdf.
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purpose of the visit is achieved.

75

The government further designated those areas in which the 

radiation level is over 50 mSv per year and in which the level is not likely to go below 20 mSv 

per year as “difficult-to-return-home” areas. Entry to such areas is more restricted and protective 

equipment is required for entry.

76

Since July 2012, the government has allowed certain kinds of businesses to operate in the 

“restricted residential use area.” Such businesses include (1) businesses that are essential for 

keeping or creating employment, such as local manufacturing businesses; and (2) businesses that 

are required while the reconstruction plan is implemented, such as banks, gas stations, and trash 

removal services.

77

Employers must pay special attention to employees’ radiation exposure and 

minimize such exposure, however.

78

In addition to the required or recommended evacuations, many persons voluntarily evacuated 

areas due to their fear of a high amount of radiation exposure.

79

D. Electricity Shortage and Measures Taken Pursuant to TEPCO Power Supply Contract

A large number of electricity generating stations sustained damage from the Great East Japan 

Earthquake, including the Fukushima nuclear power plants. Therefore, it was expected that the 

supply of electricity would fall short of demand in the Tohoku region and Tokyo metropolitan 

area.

80

The Prime Minister established the Emergency Headquarters on Supply and Demand of 

Electricity on March 13, 2011, to address this contingency.

81 A planned power outage was 

discussed in the Headquarters’ first meeting.

82

The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 

implemented planned power outages in areas near Tokyo on March 14, 2011, in order to avoid

75 Id.

76 Id. The current map of designated areas is available on METI’s website, at http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/

nuclear/pdf/130807/130807_01f.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).

77 Regarding Exceptional Business Continuing and Reopening in the Restricted Residential Use Areas, Nuclear

Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team & Nuclear Disaster On-Site Headquarters (June 18, 2012), http://www.meti.

go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/20120618_01a.pdf(inJapanese).

78 Id.

79 Fukushima kennai ni okeru jishu hinan no genjo [State of Voluntary Evacuees in Fukushima], FUKUSHIMA NO 

SHINRO [PATH OF FUKUSHIMA] (Aug. 2012), http://fkeizai.in.arena.ne.jp/pdf/cyousa/cyousa_2012_08_1.pdf.

80 Message from the Prime Minister, supra note 5.

81 Announcement, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Denryoku jukyū ni kansuru kentō kaigō no kaisai nit

suite [Concerning Establishment of Conference on Supply and Demand of Electricity] (Mar. 13, 2011, last amended

Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/electricity_supply/kousei.pdf.

82 Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Kongo no denryoku jukyū oyobi keikaku teiden ni tsuite [Regarding

Supply and Demand of Electricity and Planned Power Outage From Now On] (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.

go.jp/jp/singi/electricity_supply/0313_electricity_supply_01_00.pdf(copy and paste link into browser).
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massive blackouts in its service area.

83 This measure was taken based on the power supply 

contract between TEPCO and its customers.

84

The government could have taken similar actions based on the Electricity Business Law, but did 

not do so. That Law states that, when a shortage of electricity supply adversely affects the 

national economy and the public’s living standard, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry 

may restrict the use of electricity supplied by an electricity utility firm by limiting power usage 

or peak load, by specifying the purpose of use or the date and time when power usage should be 

stopped, or by restricting the receipt of electricity from an electric utility firm by limiting the 

capacity for receiving electricity.

85

Experts explained that it would take too much time to 

implement restrictions on electric power use by businesses and residences based on the 

Electricity Business Law.

86

The government did impose restrictions on large businesses from July to September 2011. Large 

electricity customers who had contracted for a supply of 500 kilowatts or more and concluded 

electricity supply-demand contracts directly with TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power Company 

were required not to exceed 85% of their maximum electric power use per hour over the previous 

year (a 15% reduction of maximum use, compared with the previous year).

87

E. Food Sanitation Law and Related Measures

Within a few days of the onset of the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plants, government 

tests detected higher radiation levels in spinach and milk that were produced near the nuclear 

plants.

88

There were no legally binding standards for levels of radiation in food in Japan at that 

time. The Food Sanitation Law, however, has a provision that prohibits the sale, use, or supply 

of foods that are poisonous or harmful for human consumption. 89 On March 17, 2011, the 

Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) issued a notice that specified provisional 

standard values for radiation levels in food. 90 The MHLW tentatively adopted the Indices

83 TEPCO Begins Power Blackouts, JAPAN TODAY (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/

view/tokyo-power-outages-to-start-later-than-planned-trains-reduce-services.

84 Keikaku teiden, kiki taiō, tōden makase [Planned Power Outage, Response to Crisis, Left to TEPCO], YOMIURI 

NEWSPAPER (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/special/jishintokeizai/jtk110315_10.htm.

85 Denki jigyō hō [Electricity Business Law], Law No. 170 of 1964, last amended by Act No. 47 of 2012, art. 27,

translated in http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=51.

86 YOMIURI NEWSPAPER, supra note 84.

87 Denki jigyō hō ni motoduku denryoku shiyō seigen no hakko ni tsuite [Regarding Implementation of Restriction of

Electric Power Use Based on the Electric Business Act], METI (June 30, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/

setsuden/pdf/seigenrei.pdf. See also Regarding Putting into Effect the Restriction of Electricity Use Based on 

Article 27 of the Electricity Business Act, METI, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/electricity/

restriction.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).

88 Fredrik Dahl, Japan Mulls Fukushima Food Sale Ban: IAEA, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.

com/article/2011/03/19/us-japan-nuclear-food-idUSTRE72I1X120110319.

89 Shokuhin eisei hō [Food Sanitation Law], Law No. 233 of 1947, amended by Law No. 49 of 2009, art. 6, item 2.

90 Press Release, MHLW, Handling of Food Contaminated by Radioactivity (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.

jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001558e-img/2r98520000015apy.pdf; Handling of Food Contaminated byRadioactivity,
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Relating to Limits on Food and Drink Ingestion that was a part of the Nuclear Safety 

Commission of Japan’s (NSC’s) regulatory guideline, Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear 

Facilities.

91

The NSC issued this guideline in 1980 in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident 

in the United States and updated it in 1998 and 2000.

92

The following table reflects selected 

parts of the Indices.

Table 1: Indices Relating to Limits on Food and Drink Ingestion (Excerpts)

Nuclide Index Values Relating to Ingestion Limits in Guidelines for Coping with 

Nuclear Facility Disasters (Bq

93/kg)

Radioactive iodine Drinking water 300

(Representative radio- Milk, dairy products 300

nuclides among mixed

radio-nuclides: 131I): Vegetables (except root 

vegetables and tubers)

2,000

Radioactive cesium Drinking water 200

Milk, dairy products 200

Vegetables 500

Grains 500

Meat, eggs, fish, etc. 500

Source: Data excerpted from Nuclear Safety Commission, Genshiryoku shisetsu tō no bōsai taisaku ni tsuite

[Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities] 23 (June 1980, last amended Aug. 2010),

http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/anzen/sonota/ houkoku/bousai220823.pdf.

Food Safety Dept. Notice No. 0317-3 (Mar. 17, 2011), MHLW, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852

000001558e-img/2r98520000015av4.pdf.

91 Nuclear Safety Commission, Genshiryoku shisetsu tō no bōsai taisaku ni tsuite [Emergency Preparedness for

Nuclear Facilities] 23 (June 1980, last amended Aug. 2010), http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/anzen/sonota/

houkoku/bousai220823.pdf.

92 Shinichi Suga and Ryushi Ichikawa, Bōsai shishin ni okeru inshokubutsu sesshu seigen shihyō no kaitei ni tsuite

[On the Revision of Control Index Levels on the Ingestion of Food and Water in the Guidelines for Radiological

Emergency Preparedness and Countermeasures in Japan], 35 HOKEN BUTSURI 4, 449 (2000), https://www.jstage.jst.

go.jp/article/jhps1966/35/4/35_4_449/_pdf.

93 A “becqueral” (Bq), one of several units used to measure radioactivity, “represents a rate of radioactive decay

equal to 1 disintegration per second.” Glossary, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/becquerel-bq.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012).
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Based on the general power to implement emergency measures in cases of nuclear disaster, the 

Prime Minister, as head of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, issued instructions to 

governors of the relevant prefectures on March 21, 2011, concerning restrictions on the 

distribution of food items with radiation levels exceeding the provisional limit values.

94

First, 

the government instructed that spinach and one other leafy vegetable produced in Fukushima and 

three more prefectures, and raw milk produced in Fukushima prefecture were not to be 

distributed. Many more instructions have followed. 95Some of these restrictions were later 

cancelled when the detected radiation levels at three consecutive weekly examinations proved to 

be lower than the upper limit.

96

At the same time, the government started deliberations on permissible radiation levels in various 

foods. Establishing these standards is a complicated and time-consuming process involving 

government councils and different agencies, and conformity with various related regulations 

is required:

• On March 20, 2011, the MHLW requested that the Food Safety Commission conduct an 

assessment of the effect of radioactive nuclides in food on human health.

97 When setting 

standards for food safety under article 6, item 2 of the Food Sanitation Law, the MHLW must 

consult with the Food Safety Commission.

98

The Food Safety Commission submitted its 

Risk Assessment Report on Radioactive Nuclides in Foods to the MHLW on October 27, 

2011. 99The Food Safety Commission concluded that more than 100 mSv of the extra 

cumulative effective doses (cumulative effective dose of radiation during a person’s lifetime) 

of food could increase the risk of negative effects on health.

100

This mSv level was much 

lower than the assumption that the tentative indices were based on, which had indicated that 

more than 500 mSv of the extra cumulative effective doses would be harmful to humans.

101

94 Press Release, MHLW, Shokuhin no shukka seigen ni tsuite [Regarding Distribution Restriction on Foods] (Mar.

21, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000015p8a.html; Act on Special Measures Concerning

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Law No. 156 of 1999, amended by Law No. 118 of 2006, art. 20, para. 3.

95 The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has compiled all restrictions and cancellations on its website,

http://www.maff.go.jp/noutiku_eikyo/mhlw2.html (in Japanese; last visited Aug. 29, 2013).

96 Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Kensa keikaku, shukka seigen to no hinmoku kuiki no settei kaijo no

kangae kata [Regarding Basic Policy on Examination Plan, and Establishment and Cancellation of Distribution

Restriction], http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000017tmu-att/2r98520000017ts1.pdf. The basic policy

was amended in June and August 2011. Amended policies are available on the MHLW website, at

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001h0ni-att/2r9852000001h0tr.pdf(June2011),and

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001lbnq-att/2r9852000001lbu3.pdf (Aug. 2011).

97 Shokuhin chū no hōshasei busshitsu no aratana kijunchi ni tsuite [Regarding New Indices of Radioactive

Substancesin Food], MHLW, at 14, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/iyaku/syoku-anzen/iken/dl/120117-1-

03-01.pdf.

98 Shokuhin anzen kihon hō [ Food Safety Basic Law], Law No. 48 of 2003, art. 24, para. 1, item 1.

99 FOOD SAFETY COMMISSION, ABSTRACT, RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT ON RADIOACTIVE NUCLIDES IN FOODS (Oct.

2011), http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/emerg/abstract_risk_assessment_report.pdf.

100

Id.

101 Shokuhin no shin kijunchi nenkan 1 miri sīberuto ni hikisage e [Reduce the Limit in Food to 1mSv per Year],

SANKEI NEWSPAPER (Oct. 28, 2011) (on file with author).
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• The Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare asked the Pharmaceutical Affairs and Food 

Sanitation Council to draft the standards of permissible levels of radioactive nuclides in 

foods, based on the Food Safety Commission’s conclusion, on October 28, 2011.

102

The 

Radioactive Nuclides Countermeasures branch of the Council issued draft standards on 

December 22, 2011.

103

• The Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare then asked the Radiation Council of the Ministry 

of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) whether those standards 

were appropriate under the Law Concerning Technical Standards of Radiation Hazards 

Prevention. 104 Any government agency must ask the Council’s opinion before they set 

technical standards that relate to radiation hazards. 105Though some members of the 

Radiation Council stated during the meetings that the new standards were too strict, the 

Council determined on February 17, 2012, that the new standards were appropriate.

106

• Since all consultation with other agencies was complete, the Radiation Council and the 

Pharmaceutical Affairs and Food Sanitation Council moved to adopt the draft standards that 

were drafted by its branch committee and submitted them to the Minister of Health, Labor 

and Welfare on February 24, 2012.

107

• The MHLW implemented all necessary amendments to its Ordinance and Notifications on 

standards for milk and milk products and for food and food additives on March 15, 2012, and 

announced it would make the new standards effective on April 1, 2012.

108

The new upper 

limits of cesium in foods are as follows:

102 Food Sanitation Law, Act No. 233 of 1947, amended by Act No. 49 of 2009, art. 11, para. 1; Shigeki Yamamoto,

Yakuji •shokuhin eisei shingikai, shokuhin eisei bunkakai hōshasei busshitu taisaku bukai hōkoku ni tsuite

[Regarding a Report from Radioactive Nuclides Countermeasures Branch, Food Sanitation Sub-council,

Pharmaceutical Affairs • Food Sanitation Council] (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/

2r98520000023nbs-att/2r98520000023ng2.pdf.

103 Shokuhin chū no hōshasei bussitsu ni kakaru kikaku kijun no settei ni tsuite [Regarding Establishing Standards of

Radioactive Nuclides in Foods], Radioactive Nuclides Countermeasures Branch, Food Sanitation Sub-council,

Pharmaceutical Affairs • Food Sanitation Council] at 2 (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/

2r98520000023nbs-att/2r98520000023ng2.pdf.

104 Press Release, MHLW, Shokuhin chū no hōshasei busshitsu ni kakaru kijun chi no settei ni kansuru hōshasen

shingikai e no shimon ni tsuite [Regarding a Request for Advice from the Radiation Council Concerning Indices of

Radioactive Nuclidesin Foods] (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001z9vp.html.

105 Hōshasen shōgai bōshi no gijutsu teki kijun ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning Technical Standards of

Radiation Hazards Prevention], Act No. 162 of 1958, art. 6.

106 Shokuhin no hōshasen ryō shin kijunchi an [New Indices of Radiation Levels in Foods], SANKEI NEWSPAPER 

(Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with author).

107 Kōsei rōdō shō, Iyaku shokuhin kyoku, Shokuhin anzen bu [Food Safety Sec., Pharmaceutical Affairs and Food

Sanitation Dept., MHLW], Shokuhin chū no hōshasei busshitsu no kikaku kijun no settei ni tsuite [Regarding

Establishment of New Standards on Radioactive Nuclides in Foods ], MHLW (Feb. 24, 2012),

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000023zsw-att/2r98520000023zzb.pdf.

108 Food Safety Dept. Notice No. 0315-1 (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shinsai_jouhou/dl/

tuuchi_120316.pdf.
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Table 2: Limits for Radioactive Cesium in Foods

Category Limit (Bq/kg)

Drinking water 10

Milk 50

General Foods 100

Infant Foods 50

Source: Department of Food Safety, Pharmaceutical & Food Safety Bureau, MHLW, New Standard Limits for

Radionuclidesin Foods, at 3, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/dl/new_standard.pdf(provisional

translation; last visited July 8, 2013).

The Japanese standards are well below maximum levels allowed by international safety 

standards, as fixed by the Codex Alimentarius international standards body.

109

III. Victim Support

Laws to support disaster victims were also enacted, and the government implemented various 

measures to support disaster victims’ daily lives. The followings measures reflect some of 

those efforts:

A. Tracking Evacuees

Many residents who lived in the area hit by the disaster were required to move, temporarily or 

for a long period of time, due to destruction of houses and neighborhoods or radiation levels. In 

order to distribute grants and donated items or provide administrative notice to residents who 

were evacuating, municipal governments needed to know their whereabouts. In Japan, 

administrative services are provided through municipal governments for their residents. 

Residents must report any changes to their specified information to the municipal governments, 

and municipal governments must register all resident addresses in the “resident basic books.”

110

The system, however, was not made for tracking evacuees. There were also evacuees who did 

not know whether or when they would be able to return home, and therefore did not report their 

change of residence. An evacuees’ information management system was needed. The Ministry 

of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) built such a system to enable the municipal 

governments that were affected by the nuclear disaster to track and locate their former residents

109 Codex Secretariat, Fact Sheet on Codex Guideline Levels for Radionuclides in Foods Contaminated Following a

Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (May 2, 2011), http://www.fao.org/crisis/27242-0bfef658358a6ed53980a

5eb5c80685ef.pdf.

110 Resident Basic Book Act, Act No. 81 of 1967, amended by Act No. 102 of 2012, art. 3.
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who had evacuated from their hometowns in March 2011.

111 The MIC sent a notice to local 

governments and instructed them on how to report evacuees on April 12, 2011.

112

Concerning nuclear disaster victims, in August 2011, the Diet enacted the Act on Exceptions of 

Administrative Matters for Nuclear Disaster Evacuees.

113

The Act established a special 

procedure that enables a local government in whose jurisdiction a nuclear disaster evacuee 

resides to cover specified administrative services for another local government in whose 

jurisdiction the evacuee is registered in the resident basic book. Upon request of the local 

government for the jurisdiction where an evacuee resides, the MIC may issue a notification 

specifying what administrative matter the local government for the place of the evacuee’s 

residence may cover.

114

Local governments do not have to negotiate and make agreements one 

by one. Examples of matters that can be covered by these agreements include elderly living 

assistance, vaccines for children, and nursery school enrollment.

115

The government reported that the total number of evacuees was 124,594 as of June 15, 2011,

116

and 91,552, as of July 20, 2011. 117These numbers did not include evacuees who secured 

residences, such as rental houses. In November 2011, the government counted the number of 

these evacuees as well and reported the number of total evacuees as approximately 330,000.

118

Currently, the Reconstruction Agency is reporting the number of evacuees monthly.

119 As of

111 Seiji Kanda, Doing Right by the Evacuees, ASAHINEWSPAPER (Mar. 9, 2013), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/

special/prometheus_futaba/AJ201303090015?page=3.

112 Regarding Cooperation by Local Governments in order to Make Evacuees’ Original Municipalities Know the

Whereabouts of Those Who Evacuated Due to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Notice), So-gyo-ju No. 62 (Apr. 12,

2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000110312.pdf(in Japanese).

113 Higashi nihon daishinsai ni okeru genshiryoku hatsudensho no jiko ni yoru saigai ni taisho suru tame no hinan

jumin ni kakaru jimu shori no tokurei oyobi jusho iten sha ni kakaru sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Exceptions of

Administrative Matters on Evacuees and Measures on Evacuees Who Moved Residences in Response to Disaster

Caused by Nuclear Plant Accident after the Great East Japan Earthquake (Act on Exceptions of Administrative

Matters for Nuclear Disaster Evacuees)], Act No. 98 of 2011.

114 Local Autonomy Administration Dept., MIC, Summary of the Act on Exceptions of Administrative Matters on

Nuclear Disaster Evacuees(Aug. 2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000124807.pdf (in Japanese).

115See, e.g., Regarding Designated Municipalities and Exceptional Administrative Matters Based on the Act on

Exceptions of Administrative Matters on Nuclear Disaster Evacuees, MIC (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.soumu.

go.jp/menu_kyotsuu/important/48479.html.

116 Cabinet Office, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide] (June 15, 2011),

http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-hisaisha/pdf/6-hinansha.pdf.

117 Cabinet Office, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide] (July 20, 2011),

http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-hisaisha/pdf/6-hinansha_110720.pdf.

118 Great East Japan Reconstruction Headquarters Secretariat, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of

Evacuees Nationwide] (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/20111124hinansha.pdf.

119 Reconstruction Agency, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide],

http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/post.html (last visited July 8, 2013).
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August 2013, about two and half years after the earthquake, the number of evacuees was 

approximately 290,000.

120

B. Financial Grants

Pursuant to Japanese law, the eligible family-member survivors of a person who died from a 

disaster of a certain scale can receive condolence money.

121

The amount may vary depending on 

the municipality because municipalities determine the details of disaster condolence money.

122

Payments are typically 5 million yen (about US$50,000) or less.

123 Disaster victims who are 

disabled by a disease or injury caused by the disaster may also receive condolence money.

124

Households that sustained damages to their houses can also receive money from the prefectures. 

There had been arguments as to whether public money should be granted for personal property 

losses caused by natural disasters. The Diet reached the conclusion that it is permissible to 

provide such payments because houses are one of the basics of people’s lives, it is important to 

promote recovery from the loss of houses, and reconstruction of houses is important for the 

area.

125 A household that has lost a house and rebuilds it can receive up to 3 million yen (about 

US$30,000).

126 A designated public corporation processes the grants. 127

The national 

government pays for half of each grant.

128

C. Special Loans

Where a head of household is injured and needs treatment for his or her injury for more than one 

month, or where a house is destroyed entirely or in part, a disaster victim support loan is 

available for a family if it satisfies applicable annual income limit requirements. 129 The

120 Reconstruction Agency, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide] (Aug. 22, 2013),

http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-1/20130822_hinansha.pdf. Number of evacuees are

reported monthly on the Reconstruction Agency’s website, at http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/post.html.

121 Saigai chōikin no shikyū tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others], Law

No. 82 of 1973, last amended by Law No. 86 of 2011, art. 3.

122

Id.

123 CABINET OFFICE, HISAISHA SHIEN NI KANSURU KAKUSHU SEIDO NO GAIYO (HIGASHI NIHON DAISHINSAI HEN)

[SUMMARY OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS CONCERNING DISASTER VICTIM SUPPORT (FOR GREAT EAST JAPAN

EARTHQUAKE)] 9 (June 30, 2012), http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/pdf/kakusyuseido.pdf.

124 Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others art. 8.

125 Toshiaki Yagi, Hisaisha no seikatsu saiken shien o meguru rongi to rippo no keii [Discussions and Legislative

Process on Supports on Reconstruction of Disaster Victim’s Livings], RIFARENSU [REFERENCE], Nov. 2007, at 46,

http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/publication/refer/200711_682/068202.pdf.

126 Hisaisha seikatsu saiken shien hō [Disaster Victims’ Living Reconstruction Support Act], Act No. 66 of 1998,

last amended by Act No. 100 of 2011, art. 3. See also SUMMARY OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS CONCERNING DISASTER 

VICTIM SUPPORT, supra note 123, at 22.

127 Disaster Victims’ Living Reconstruction Support Act art. 6.

128 Id. art. 18.

129 Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others, Act No. 82 of 1973, last amended by Law No. 86 of

2011, art. 10.
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maximum loan amount is 3.5 million yen (about US$35,000).

130 Usually, the loan term is ten 

years and loan interest does not accrue for the first three years. The no-interest term can be 

extended for up to five years.

131

For the victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake, special 

legislation extended the loan term to thirteen years, and interest does not accrue for the first six 

years. This can be extended for up to eight years.

132

Emergency loans for low-income residents were extended for the victims of the Great East Japan 

Earthquake.

133

Special treatment and exceptions were also made for public loans for single 

mothers. For example, the deadline for repayment of loans by single mothers was extended for 

those who were victims of the earthquake.

134

For reconstruction or repair of houses damaged by designated large-scale disasters, the Japan 

Housing Finance Agency (JHFA) provides low-interest-rate loans for disaster victims.

135

The 

JHFA is the only Japanese government-owned financial institution that specializes in securitizing 

housing loans. Even if their houses were not physically damaged, nuclear disaster victims are 

eligible for the loan, if their houses are located within the area where the government directed 

residents to evacuate.

136

D. Loans for Lost Houses and Existing Business Debts

Individuals or businesses that had debts may need new loans for living or business expenses after 

the earthquake, while their old debts still exist and assets that served as collateral for the loans 

are gone. For example, some lost houses still have housing loans. If the owners borrow money 

for a new house, they will have two loans. This is called the “double debts” problem in Japan. 

In June 2011 the government recommended that “the national and local governments, lenders 

and borrowers share the pain.” 137 Acting on that recommendation, financial institutions 

established a committee to determine how to provide relief for disaster victims with debts. In 

July 2011 the committee issued Guidelines for Individual Debtor Out-of-Court Workouts, which

130 Enforcement Order of Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others, Order No. 374 of 1973, last

amended by Order No. 57 of 2010, art. 7, para. 1.

131 Id. art. 7, para. 2.

132 Act on Special Financial Supports Responding to the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 40 of 2011. See also

Regarding Special Measures on Disaster Support Loans Implemented by Act on Special Financial Supports

Responding to Great East Japan Earthquake, Sha-en 0502, No. 1 (May 2, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/

houdou/2r9852000001bd6k-img/2r9852000001be2t.pdf(inJapanese).

133 Regarding Exception of Welfare Loan, Sha-en 0502, No. 3 (May 2, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/

shinsai_jouhou/dl/110502.pdf (in Japanese). See also Disaster Rescue / Life Support, MHLW, http://www.mhlw.

go.jp/shinsai_jouhou/saigaishien.html (in Japanese; last visited Apr. 16, 2013).

134 Notice Regarding Single Mother Welfare Loan System – For Victims of Great East Japan Earthquake, Hokkaido,

http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/hf/kms/boshikafujishin.htm (in Japanese; last visited Apr. 16, 2013).

135 Incorporated Administrative Agency Japan Housing Finance Agency Act, Act No. 82 of 2005, art. 4.

136 Riyō jōken / Yūshi taishō [Conditions /Eligibility], JHF (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.jhf.go.jp/shinsai/joken.html.

137 Nijū saimu mondai e no taiō hōshin [Policy on the Double Debts Problem], at 1 (June 17, 2011),

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/20110617taiouhousin.pdf(translation byauthor).
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provide guidance on how financial institutions may release or reduce individuals’ debts in 

accordance with an out-of-court debt workout.

138

E. Tax Relief

Various measures to reduce the tax burden on disaster victims were implemented. Regarding 

local taxes, disaster victims could deduct the loss from the disaster from taxable income in the 

previous tax year (ending in December 2010). Also, victims could carry forward such losses for 

five years, rather than the usual three years. The areas where the tsunami reached were 

exempted from real estate tax. An exemption from the Car Acquisition Tax was created for 

those situations where a new car is the replacement for a car damaged or lost during the disaster. 

In addition, disaster victims could delay local tax payments.

139

These were temporary measures, 

but they were extended through fiscal year 2012.

140

Concerning national taxes, the Act on Reduction, Exemption, and Moratorium of Tax for 

Disaster Victims exempts or reduces the income taxes of persons who suffered severe damage to 

their houses or other assets and whose annual taxable income is less than 10,000,000 yen (about 

US$100,000).

141

Some businesses severely damaged by the disaster may be eligible for reduced 

alcohol tax, tobacco tax, oil tax, or other taxes, or the deadline for payment of taxes may be 

extended.

142

In addition, a special law was enacted after the earthquake, the Act on Exceptional 

Treatment of Disaster Victims Concerning National Taxes, which extended the due date for 

disaster victims’ income tax payments. 143The losses resulting from the earthquake are 

deductible from the disaster victim’s income or profit and the tax deduction limit for donations 

was increased.

144

138 Research Committee for the Guidelines for Individual Debtor Out-of-Court Workouts, Guidelines for Individual

Debtor Out-of-Court Workouts, at 7 (July 2011), http://www.kgl.or.jp/guideline/pdf/guideline2.pdf

(unofficial translation).

139 Act on Partial Amendment of the Local Tax Law, Act No. 30 of 2011; Act on Partial Amendment of the Local

Tax Law and Act on Special Financial Support in order to Handle a Disaster of Nuclear Accident Caused by the

Great East Japan Earthquake, Act. No. 96 of 2011. See also Misako Takenouchi, Higashi nihon dai shinsai ni

kakaru chihōzei zaisei jō no taiō [Great East Japan Earthquake Measures Concerning Local Tax], RIPPŌ TO CHŌSA 

No. 318, 12 (July 2011), http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2011pdf/2011

0701012.pdf.

140 Act on Partial Amendment of the Local Tax Law, Act No. 120 of 2011.

141 Saigai higaisha ni taisuru sozei no genmen, chōshū yūyo tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Reduction, Exemption and

Moratorium of Tax for Disaster Victims], Act No. 175 of 1947, last amended by Act No. 13 of 2009, art. 2.

142 Id. arts. 7 & 8.

143 Higashi nihon daishinsai no hisaisha ni kakaru kokuzei kankei hōritsu no rinji tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on

Exception on National Tax-Related Laws Concerning Great East Japan Earthquake], Law No. 29 of 2011

(Apr. 27, 2011).

144 National Tax Agency, Shinsai tokureihō to no kaisetsu [Explanation of Act on Exceptional Treatment of Disaster

Victims Concerning National Taxes], FINANCE, June 2011, at 23, http://www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/finance/

201106d.pdf.
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F. Unemployment Benefits

Based on the Act on Special Financial Aid to Respond to Severe Disasters,

145

the MHLW issued 

a notification that people who cannot work and receive payment because their workplace is not 

functioning may be entitled to receive unemployment benefits even though they are not 

technically unemployed because they have not yet lost their jobs.

146

In addition, the length of 

time for which those who lost their jobs because of the disaster can receive benefits was 

extended by sixty days,

147

from 150 to 210 days. For victims who lived in the areas that were hit 

by the tsunami or nuclear disaster, the period was extended by ninety days.

148

Media tracked whether people who received the extended unemployment benefits were 

employed or not. More than half did not get jobs, even though the number of job openings itself 

is high.

149

Some did not look for jobs, and some were waiting for their former employer to 

reopen or for job openings in positions similar to those they had previously.

150

G. Job Creation

Many disaster victims lost their jobs. The MHLW implemented various measures to help 

victims find new employers. 151For example, the government granted 900,000 yen (about 

US$9,000) to small- or medium-sized companies that hired a job-seeking disaster victim by 

September 30, 2012. 152 The national government also tapped into the existing Employment

145 Gekishin saigai ni taisho suru tame no tokubetsu no zaisei enjo tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Financial

Aid to Respond to Severe Disasters], Act No. 150 of 1962, last amended by Act No. 31 of 2003, art. 25.

146 Regarding the Exception of Employment Insurance Resulting from Designation of Severe Disaster, MHLW,

Shoku 0313 No. 1 (Mar. 13, 2011), available at http://www.jassa.jp/member/2010/110323sankou_2.pdf

(in Japanese).

147 Act on Special Financial Supports Responding to the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 40 of 2011, art. 82.

See also, Regarding enforcement of the Act on Special Financial Supports Responding to the Great East Japan

Earthquake, Employment Security Bureau, MHLW, Circular Shoku-Hatsu 0502, No. 6 (May 2, 2011),

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001bd6k-img/2r9852000001bd88.pdf (in Japanese).

148 Re-extension of unemployment benefit periods for coastal areas of three prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima),

EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SECTION, EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT, MHLW (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/

stf/houdou/2r9852000001pgxa.html(in Japanese).

149 Shitsugyo teate kireta hito no 6wari cho, shushoku dekizu hisai 3ken [More than 60% of People Whose

Unemployment Benefit Expired Did Not Get Jobs: 3 Prefectures Hit by Disaster], ASAHI NEWSPAPER (Sept. 1,

2012), http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201208310176.html. See also Higashi nihon dai shinsai: hisaichi

no shitsugyō teate enchō shūryō [Great East Japan Earthquake: Extension of Unemployment Benefit in Disaster

Area Ended], MAINICHINEWSPAPER (Sept. 28, 2012), http://mainichi.jp/feature/20110311/news/20120928dd

m041040184000c.html.

150

Id.

151 Higashi nihon daishinsai kanren jōhō, Koyō/Rōdō [Information Relating to the Great East Japan Earthquake,

Employment/Labor], MHWL, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shinsai_jouhou/koyou.html (last visited July 8, 2013).

152 Heisei 24 nen gyosei jigyo rebyu shito, Jigyo bango 921 [2002 Agency Business Review Sheet, Business No.

921], MHLW, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/jigyo_shiwake/gyousei_review_sheet/2012/h23_pdf/0921.pdf. See also

Hisaisha koyo kaihatsu joseikin no goannai [Introduction of Grant for Disaster Victim Employment Support],

MHLW, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/josei/kyufukin/dl/c-top120517.pdf(last visited July 8, 2013).
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Creation Fund, which distributes funds to local governments that hire the unemployed for a 

limited time to create jobs and decrease unemployment numbers.

153 While the fund has been 

criticized as a waste of public money by some,

154

it was expanded in May and November 2011 in 

order to add funds to employ disaster victims.

155

H. Shelters/Emergency Housing

During the Great East Japan Earthquake, houses were damaged, collapsed, or were washed away 

by the tsunami. Even if the damage to a particular house was not so severe, the area where the 

house was located was in some cases unsafe to live in. Many people needed shelter or places to 

stay. Places that serve as emergency shelters—usually schools or community centers—are 

designated in the local Disaster Management Plans (see Part II(A), above).

156 A week after the 

earthquake, the total number of public emergency shelters was 2,182, and the number of 

evacuees in these shelters and in hotels and inns was 386,739. In June 2011 (three months after 

the earthquake), the number of the shelters was 1,459 and the numbers of evacuees in these 

shelters, hotels, and inns was 88,361. Among them, 41,143 evacuees were in shelters.

157

Public houses (housing for public servants’ families and public rental houses for low-income 

families) within the three prefectures that were hit hard by the earthquake were provided for 

disaster victims. In addition, local governments outside of these prefectures provided their 

public houses for disaster victims voluntarily or upon the request of the affected prefectures.

158

With regard to nuclear disaster victims, the national government requested that local 

governments provide them with public houses as well.

159 The national government also rented

153 Koyō sōshutsu no kikin ni yoru jigyō [Business Run by Fund to Create Employment], MHLW,

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/koyou/chiiki-koyou3/ (last visited July 8, 2013).

154 There are blogs and Internet posts that criticize the fund for not creating long-term jobs. For example, Yoshiko

Kanoh, a municipal councilor, mocked the use of the fund as baramaki (free distribution or waste) in her blog in

2009 (before the earthquake). Yoshiko Kanoh, (Uchide no koduchi) kara ken ni, sara ni 100 oku en [Further 10

Billion Yen to Prefecture from (Magic Hammer)], KANOH YOSHIKO NO “SHITEN” [KANOH YOSHIKO’S “VIEW”],

(June 4, 2009, 7:02 AM), http://kanou-miyashiro.blog.so-net.ne.jp/2009-06-04.

155 Business Run by Fund to Create Employment, MHLW, supra note 153. See also Heisei 23nendo Koseirodosho

daiichiji hosei yosan (an) no gaiyo [Summary of MHLW Budget First Amendment of 2003 Fiscal Year],

http://www.mhlw. go.jp/wp/yosan/yosan/11hosei/dl/hosei01.pdf (last visited July 7, 2013).

156 Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, amended by Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 42, para. 2. See also

Iga city, Hinanjo no shitei henkō gaiyō [Summary on Change of Designations of Emergency Shelters], at 1,

http://www.city.iga.lg.jp/kbn/Files/1/52311/attach/3-1.pdf(last visited July 10, 2013).

157 Disaster Victims Support Team, Hinanjo seiktsusha no suii [Change of Numbers of Evacuees Who Are in

Shelters], at 3 (July 2011), http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-hisaisha/pdf/5-hikaku.pdf.

158 See, e.g., Regarding Rental of Houses Run by Aomori Prefecture for Great East Japan Earthquake Victims,

AOMORIPREFECTURALGOVERNMENT (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pref.aomori.lg.jp/life/sumai/kennei

zyuutaku2.html (in Japanese).

159 Regarding Summary of the Press Release Concerning Provision of Public Houses for Great East Earthquake

Victims, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.pref.ehime.jp/h40100/1194239_2299.html (in Japanese).
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its employee housing

160

to disaster victims.

161 An independent administrative organization, the 

Urban Renaissance Agency (UR), also rented houses to them, in some cases free of charge.

162

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) established the Public 

Housing Information Center for Disaster Victims on March 21, 2011.

163

These were emergency 

measures and rental terms were relatively short, typically ranging from six months to two years. 

However, as nuclear disaster victims cannot return to their homes for a more extended period of 

time, some rental terms have been extended.

164

The construction of temporary houses started a week after the earthquake.

165

Just fifteen minutes 

after the earthquake, the MLIT requested the Japan Prefabricated Construction Suppliers and

Manufacturers Association to prepare for the construction of temporary houses.

166

Three days 

later the Minister of the MLIT asked the Japan Federation of Housing Organizations to develop a 

plan to build 30,000 temporary houses in two months. 167Temporary house construction is 

authorized under the Disaster Rescue Law,

168

and construction contracts were made between 

prefecture governments and construction companies. 169 However, for the construction itself, 

many government agencies and local governments are involved. 170 Prefectures apply for a

160 In Japan, national and local governments provide rental houses for their employees. National government

employee houses are established and managed based on the National Government Employee Housing Act, Act No.

117 of 1949.

161 Ministry of Finance, Higashi nihon daishinsai e no taio [Responses Against Great East Japan Earthquake], at 5,

http://www.mof.go.jp/about_mof/councils/fiscal_system_council/sub-of_national_property/proceedings_np/

material/zaisana230628g.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).

162 Summary of Projects Done by Urban Renaissance Agency Concerning Great East Japan Earthquake, UR, July 1,

2013, at 1, http://www.ur-net.go.jp/saigai/pdf/torikumi.pdf (in Japanese).

163 Press Release, MLIT, Establishment of the Public Housing Information Center for Disaster Victims (Mar. 21,

2011), http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/press/house03_hh_000048.html.

164 See, e.g., Regarding Extension of Rental Terms of City Public Housing for Great East Japan Earthquake Victims,

HiroshimaCity (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1346822684179/

files/siryou5.pdf.

165 Housing Dept., MLIT, Regarding Commencement of Construction of Temporary Emergency Housing (Mar. 18,

2011), http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000138109.pdf(in Japanese).

166 House Production Div., Housing Dept., MLIT, Regarding Our Business on Construction of Temporary Houses

After the Great East Japan Earthquake, at 4, http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/ 000170090.pdf (last visited

July 11, 2013).

167

Id.

168 Disaster Rescue Law, Act No. 118 of 1947, amended by Law No. 65 of 2010, art. 23.

169 From Occurrence of Disaster to Construction / Delivery, JAPAN PREFABRICATED CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIERS &

MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.purekyo.or.jp/measures/index.html (in Japanese; last visited

July 11, 2013).

170 MLIT, Regarding Our Business on Construction of Temporary Houses After the Great East Japan Earthquake,

supra note 166, at 4–10.
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government subsidy through the MHLW, which has jurisdiction over the Disaster Rescue 

Law.

171 MLIT has general jurisdiction over construction.

Some temporary houses are popular, such as those that are located in a big city, but some are 

unpopular, such as those that are constructed far from the area where the disaster victims lived. 

Some cities did not have suitable lands to build temporary houses. For example, Kesennuma city 

is located on the ria coastline, and has little flat land that is suitable for temporary houses.

172

The 

construction of approximately 10,000 temporary houses was completed by May 11, 2011, and 

approximately 30,000 by June 11, 2011.

173

Temporary houses are exempt from certain requirements under the Building Standards Law but 

must not be used for more than two years.

174

The government agency that built the houses can 

extend the term year by year if the safety of the houses is confirmed and the disaster was severe 

and has long-term effects. 175 A year after the earthquake, in April 2012, the government 

announced that the term would be extended by one year. In April 2013, the MHLW issued a 

circular stating that the term can be extended further upon the discretion of local governments.

176

I. Special Treatment Concerning Administrative Obligations

.

When a severe disaster hits an area and infrastructures are paralyzed, it is difficult or impossible 

for affected people to comply with the deadlines for various things that were scheduled before 

the disaster. After the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Diet enacted the Special Measures 

Act on Protection of Rights and Interests of Designated Disaster Victims, which extends the due 

dates of administrative actions by victims and exempts them from the application of certain 

regulations. 177The Great East Japan Earthquake was designated as a disaster to which this 

Law applied.

178

171 Disaster Rescue Law art. 36. See also Ryōichi Higure, Jūtaku gyōkai ga ōkyū kasetsu jūtaku no kensetsu ni

chakushu [Housing Industry Started Construction of Temporary Houses], TOYO KEIZAI (Mar. 16, 2011),

http://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/6302.

172 Yahari jimpto de naito ...? Kasetsu jutaku, rinken wa funinki [Must Be Within Local Area? Temporary Houses in

Adjacent Prefecture Unpopular], YOMIURIONLINE (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/2011

0816-OYT1T00654.htm.

173 Housing Dept., MLIT, Temporary Houses: Numbers of Houses Under Construction / Completed (graph) (Mar.

11, 2012), http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000143900.pdf(in Japanese).

174 Kenchiku Kijun hō [Building Standards Law], Act No. 201 of 1950, last amended by Act No. 20 of 2013, art. 85.

175 Tokutei hijō saigai no higaisha no kenri rieki no hozen tō o hakaru tame no tokubetsu sochi ni kansuru hōritsu

[Special Measures Act on Protection of Rights and Interests of Designated Disaster Victims], Act No. 85 of 1996,

art. 7.

176 Regarding Extension of Temporary Houses Built After the Great East Japan Earthquake, Fuku-hon No. 564, Shaen-so-hatsu 0402 No.1 & Koku-ju-shi No. 4827 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852

000002yvh8-att/2r9852000002yvkv.pdf(in Japanese).

177 Special Measures Act on Protection of Rights and Interests of Designated Disaster Victims, Act No. 85 of 1996,

art. 1.

178 Cabinet Order on Designation of Disaster Caused by 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake as Designated Disaster

and Measures Applied, Order No. 19 of 2011 (Mar. 13, 2011).
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J. Relief Donations

Relief donations that were collected by major organization in Japan, such as the Japan Red Cross 

and the Central Community Chest of Japan, were distributed to prefectures. The Relief Donation 

Allocation Committee was established on April 7, 2011, to determine the allocation of donations 

among prefectures. Committee members consist of three academic experts, representatives from 

four organizations that collect donations, and representatives of the prefectures. The MHLW is 

involved in the Committee.

179

Prefectures distribute to residents donations that national 

organizations have collected, in addition to donations that prefectures received themselves.

180

To help disaster victims spend money that has been distributed out of relief donations to ease 

their day-to-day hardships, the Diet enacted the Act on Prohibition of Attachment of Distributed 

Relief Donation That Was Collected in Relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake.

181 Under 

this Act, creditors of disaster victims cannot take a relief donation that has been granted to 

those victims.

IV. Removal of Debris

A. General Waste Management Measures

After the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, the MHLW established the Guidelines on Disaster 

Waste Disposition Management in 1998. The Guidelines promoted the establishment of an 

emergency system of waste management by local governments.

182 However, the damage from 

the Great East Japan Earthquake was greater than the Guidelines anticipated. The Great East 

Japan Earthquake and tsunami generated approximately 20 million tons of debris along the coast. 

In addition, the tsunami brought between 13 and 28 million tons of sand and dirt to land. Of that 

sand and dirt, 10 million tons needed to be removed. 183 The amount of waste in Miyagi 

prefecture alone is nineteen times larger than the amount of waste that the area usually generates 

in a year.

184

179 Press Release, MHLW, Regarding Establishment of Relief Donation Distribution Committee (Apr. 7, 2011),

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000018en2-img/2r98520000018eoj.pdf (in Japanese).

180 Koichiro Ito, Nisseki no gienkin haibun, naze osoi? [Why Does It Take Such a Long Time for Japan Red Cross to

Distribute Contributions?], SANKEINEWSPAPER (July 17, 2011), http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/

110717/dst11071718010020-n1.htm.

181 Higashi nihon daishinsai kanren gienkin ni kakaru sashiosae kinshi tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Prohibition of

Attachment of Distributed Relief Donation That Was Collected in Relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake], Act

No. 103 of 2011 (Aug. 30, 2011).

182 Water Environment Div., Environmental Health Bureau, MHLW, Guidelines on Disaster Waste Disposition

Management (Oct. 1998), http://www.env.go.jp/recycle/waste/disaster/earthquake/gl-main.pdf(in Japanese).

183 MOE, Schedule for Processing of Disaster Debris from Great East Japan Earthquake, Aug. 7, 2012, last amended

on May 7, 2013, at 2, http://kouikishori.env.go.jp/news/pdf/20130507c.pdf (in Japanese).

184 Higashi nihon daishinsai to gareki shori [The Great East Japan Earthquake and Waste Management], at 1, JIJI 

PRESS (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.jiji.com/jc/v4?id=saigai-haikibutsu0001.
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Removing huge amounts of debris was not easy. If the government landfills and incinerates 

debris, it may rapidly reduce the volume of debris to be processed. However, waste disposal is 

strictly regulated in Japan. The Ministry of Environment (MOE) collected information on 

disaster waste immediately after the earthquake and started to coordinate support with other local 

governments in areas that were not so severely damaged. 185The Japanese government also 

implemented emergency waste disposal measures.

186

For example, on March 31, 2011, an MOE 

ordinance was amended to ease the thirty-day advance notice requirement that is imposed when 

an industrial waste management facility deals with nonindustrial waste.

187 Although dumping 

waste in the ocean is prohibited, the MOE amended its notifications in April and June 2011, so 

that rotten seafood in destroyed storage facilities could be discarded in the ocean.

188

The MOE 

also issued guidelines on how to deal with collapsed building, cars, ships, and other private 

property.

189 Disaster debris was gathered at tentative storage places designated by local 

governments where the debris was sorted out to be processed or stored.

190 While the guidelines 

do not have legally binding effect, they provide much-needed guidance to local governments.

The MOE issued the Master Plan on disaster waste, the Guidelines on Treatment of Disaster 

Waste Generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake, on May 16, 2011.

191

The Guidelines set 

forth a system to promote disaster waste treatment/disposal, and related financial measures, 

treatment methods, and schedules. Local governments made plans to treat disaster waste in 

accordance with the Guidelines. 192The treatment of debris from the Great East Japan 

Earthquake and tsunami is expected to be completed by March 2014.

193

185 Kazuhiro Kaneko, Higsahi nihon dai shinsai ni okeru saigai haikibutsu no gaikyō to kadai [States and Issues of

Disaster Waste Created by the Great East Japan Earthquake], RIPPŌ TO CHŌSA No. 316, May 2011, at 65, 70,

http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2011pdf/20110501065.pdf.

186 Saigai haikibutsu taisaku [Responses to Disaster Waste], MOE, http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/#haikibutsu (last

visited July 15, 2013).

187 Enforcement Ordinance of the Law on Waste Disposal and Clean-Up, Ministry of Health and Welfare Ordinance

No. 35 of 1971, art. 12-7-7, as amended by Ministry of the Environment Ordinance No. 6 of 2011.

188 Emergency Disposal into the Ocean, MOE Notification Nos. 44 & 48 of 2011 (Apr. 7 & June 17, 2011),

http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/an23_44b.pdf and http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/an23_48b.pdf.

189 Guidelines on Removal of Collapsed Buildings and Others Caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE

(Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/sisin110326.pdf.

190

Id.

191 MOE, Higashi nihon dai shinsai ni kakaru saigai haikibutsu no shori hōshin (masuta puran) [Guidelines on

Treatment of Disaster Waste Generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake (Master Plan)] (May 16, 2011),

http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/haiki_masterplan.pdf.

192 Schedule of Treatment and Disposal of Disaster Waste Generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE

(Aug. 7, 2011, last amended on May 27, 2013), at 1, http://kouikishori.env.go.jp/news/pdf/20130507c.pdf

(in Japanese).

193 Progress on Treatment of Debris by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.env.go.

jp/en/recycle/eq/ptd20130222.pdf.
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In August 2011, Japan enacted the Comprehensive Disaster Waste Management Act in order to 

quickly and adequately manage disaster waste.

194 Under this law, the national government may 

process disaster waste, instead of local governments. The national government supports the local 

government’s waste disposal financially.

195

In addition, this law enabled the national 

government to request that local governments outside the disaster area accept disaster waste and 

manage it at the national government’s expense.

196

The quantity of disaster waste was more than 

the affected local governments could deal with. Initially, disaster waste was not treated at the 

expected speed because only a small number of local governments were willing to voluntarily 

accept such waste.

197 Residents outside of the affected areas are afraid of the possibility that the 

waste has a higher radioactive level than normal and therefore oppose the acceptance of disaster 

waste in their localities.

As of early March 2012, only 6% of about 23 million tons of waste had been handled. Then, the 

national government decided to utilize the system established by the Comprehensive Disaster 

Waste Management Act. On March 16, 2012, Prime Minister Noda sent letters asking 

prefectures and the largest cities that had not yet accepted disaster waste to accept and manage 

it.

198 According to the MOE, “Iwate and Miyagi prefectures have requested other prefectures to 

cooperate in the disposal of a part of their debris (0.69 million tons). . . . 65 projects in 15 

prefectures [had] already started and treated 0.25 million tons of debris” as of March 2013.

199

B. Contaminated Waste Management and Decontamination

Dealing with disaster waste in Fukushima was even harder because of possible radiation. Based 

on the Nuclear Safety Commission’s advice,

200

the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 

(METI), the MOE, and the MHWL issued guidelines on tentative treatment of disaster waste in 

Fukushima on May 2, 2011.

201 The guidelines stated that

194 Saigai haikibutsu no shori ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi ho [Special Measures Act on Disaster Waste Management],

Act No. 99 of 2011.

195 Summary of Special Measures Act on Disaster Waste Management, MOE, http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/

attach/law23_99a.pdf (in Japanese; last visited May 15, 2013).

196 Id. art. 6.

197 Shōten – dai shinsai kara 1nen/mienu “deguchi” fukkō kobamu / gareki kōiki shori susumazu [Focus – 1 Year

After the Great Earthquake / Solution Not Seen Yet and Reconstruction Disturbed / No Progress on Wide Area

Debris Disposal], KAHOKU ONLINE NETWORK (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.kahoku.co.jp/spe/spe_sys1071/20120

304_01.htm.

198 Ukeire yosei bunsho hassō: seifu [Written Requests for Acceptance Sent: National Government], YOMIURI 

ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/eq2011/information/20120317-OYT8T00268.htm.

199 Progress on Treatment of Debris by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE, supra note 193.

200 Regarding Background of Release of “Regarding Tentative Policy on Securing Safety Concerning Disposal and

Treatment of Waste That Is Connected to Tokyo Electric Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident”,

Nuclear Safety Commission Secretariat (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/info/20110603_a_dis.pdf

(in Japanese).

201 Fukushima ken-nai no saigai haikibutsu no tōen no toriatsukai ni tsuite [Regarding Tentative Treatment of

Disaster Waste in Fukushima], MHWL, METI & MOE, May 2, 2011, at 5 & 6, http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/

saigaihaikibutsu.pdf.
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(1) disaster waste located in areas where evacuation was directed or expected were to be left 

alone, and not moved;

(2) disaster waste located in areas near the coastline and middle part of Fukushima, excluding 

the areas above, will be collected and taken to a tentative storage area, but not processed 

until surveyed; and

(3) disaster waste that is located in areas other than 1 and 2 above are to be processed and 

disposed of.

The MOE established a policy on disposal/treatment of disaster waste in Fukushima on June 23, 

2011, based on advice from the NSC and the Disaster Waste Safety Evaluation Committee. The 

policy stated that it was desirable to incinerate or recycle disaster waste, if possible, in order to 

reduce landfill because the landfill capacity in Japan is limited. It also stated that the safety of 

residents and waste disposal workers has priority. It set criteria for facilities that incinerate waste 

that may contain low-level radiation, including criteria for how to treat ashes and the monitoring 

of radiation levels, among other things.

202

The Diet enacted the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution 

in August 2011. 203This Act established the basic approach for the disposal of waste 

contaminated by radioactive materials. Based on the Act, areas that were most contaminated by 

radioactive materials were designated as “the area where countermeasures against contaminated 

waste are implemented (countermeasures area).”

204

The MOE released the Waste Disposal Plan 

in the Countermeasures Area in June 2012.

205 Disaster waste near the coast was moved to 

temporary storage sites by the end of 2012.

206 Disaster waste was sorted and some of it burned 

to reduce the volume. Some waste has been recycled. Strict safety standards are set for all of

202 MOE, Fukushima ken nai no saigai haikibutsu no shori no hōshin [Policy on Disposal/Treatment of Disaster

Waste in Fukushima] (June 23, 2011), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/fukushima_hoshin110623.pdf.

203 Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials

Discharged by the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku District – Off the Pacific Ocean

Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011 (on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive

Pollution), Act No. 110 of 2011.

204 Id. art. 11.

205 Id. art. 13. MOE, Waste Disposal Plan in the Countermeasure Area (June 2012), http://www.env.go.jp/press/

file_view.php?serial=19845&hou_id=15180 (in Japanese).

206 Waste Disposal Plan in the Countermeasure Area, supra note 205, at 2.
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these processes.

207 The government has plans to establish final disposal places for waste,208

but 

there are many problems involved in finding the sites and building facilities.

209

Under the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution, the 

national government has established a system to monitor and record contamination levels of 

various places and let the public know the results. 210 Managers of sewer and storm drain 

facilities and incinerators must monitor radioactive levels of dirt, ashes, and other byproducts of 

incineration. When the radioactive level of this waste is more than the level that the MOE has 

set, it is designated as special waste.

211

The national government manages treatment and 

disposal of this designated waste.

212

The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution also has a 

section on decontamination.

213 Based on the Act, the Minister of Environment can designate two 

types of areas. One is “the special decontamination area” where decontamination is 

implemented by the national government. 214Eleven municipalities in Fukushima prefecture 

where the annual cumulative dose of radiation could be more than 20 mSv were designated. The 

other is the “intensive contamination survey area,” where decontamination is implemented by 

each municipality with financial and technical support from the national government. 215

According to the MOE, “[a]s of December 1, 2012, 104 municipalities in 8 prefectures, in which 

over 1 mSv/y of additional exposure dose were observed, were designated under the Act.”

216

The national government prepares a decontamination implementation plan, 

217 and

207 Id. at 3.

208 Shitei haikibutsu no kongo no shori no hōshin ni tsuite (gaiyō) [Policy on Designated Waste Disposal

(summary)], MOE (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/rmp/attach/memo20120330_waste-shori_gaiyo.pdf.

See also Shitei haikibutsu shori jōhō saito [Designated Waste Disposal Information Site], MOE,

http://shiteihaiki.env.go.jp/ (last visited July 16, 2013).

209 Shitei haikibutsu no saishu shobunjo kohochi no sentei ni kakaru keii no kensho oyobi kongo no hoshin

[Examination of Process to Select Candidates of Final Disposal Places of Designated Wastes Disposal and Its New

Policy], MOE (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/rmp/attach/waste_fds-candidate_20130225-2.pdf.

210 Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution, Act No. 110 of 2011, art. 8.

211 Id. art. 16.

212 Id. art. 19.

213 Id. ch. 4, § 3.

214 Id. art. 25.

215 Id. art. 32.

216 Measures for Decontamination of Radioactive Materials Discharged by TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Accident, MOE, http://josen.env.go.jp/en/ (last visited July 15, 2013). See also Press Release, MOE, (Notice)

Regarding Designation of Contaminated Waste Countermeasures Area, Special Decontamination Area and Intensive

Contamination Survey Area Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive

Pollution (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.env.go.jp/press/press.php?serial=14598 (in Japanese).

217 Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution art. 36.
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decontaminates the area in accordance with the plan.

218

The MOE issued standards for 

decontamination and safety standards for the process.

219

Among the special decontamination areas, decontamination has been completed in one city. In 

other municipalities, preliminary decontamination was mostly complete as of July 2013, and all 

municipalities had established decontamination plans. Five municipalities had started 

decontamination, and three municipalities were negotiating decontamination contracts.

220

In an 

“intensive contamination survey area” outside Fukushima, schools, nurseries, parks, and other 

places where children stay have priority for decontamination. In a third progress report on 

decontamination issued in June 2013, the MOE reported that decontamination of schools and 

nurseries was almost completed. Regarding decontamination of parks and sports facilities, 80% 

of the projects have been ordered, and 80% of ordered works have been completed. Regarding 

farm and farm animal lands, 60% of projects were ordered and completed. However, only a 

quarter of the decontamination of roads and houses was completed.

221

V. Nuclear Crisis at Fukushima

As noted above, within hours of the earthquake and ensuing tsunami, government officials 

became aware of the tsunami-related damage to the Fukushima Daiichi plant, declared a nuclear 

emergency, and began evacuating affected individuals. Similar measures were undertaken with 

regard to the area surrounding Fukushima Daini plant soon thereafter.

222

A. Act to Support Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Daily Lives

The nuclear accident caused an ongoing problem of radiation. As mentioned above, some people 

were forced to vacate their houses and lands due to contamination and still cannot return. These 

nuclear disaster victims needed special support, separate from victims who suffered directly from 

the earthquake and tsunami. In June 2012, the Diet enacted the Act to Support Nuclear Disaster 

Victims’ Daily Lives.

223

This Act established the philosophy and framework of government 

support for nuclear disaster victims. Under the Act, the government must establish a basic policy 

to support nuclear disaster victims.

224 The concrete measures and details were determined by

218 Id. art. 38.

219 Id. arts. 40, 41.

220 Josen tokubetsu chiiki ni okeru shinchoku jōkyō [Progress in Decontamination Special Area], MOE,

http://josen.env.go.jp/area/index.html (last visited July 15, 2013).

221 Press Release, MOE, Osen jōkyō jūten chōsa chiiki ni okeru josen no shinchoku jōkyō chōsa (dai 3 kai) no kekka

ni tsuite (oshirase) [Regarding Survey Results on Progress of Decontamination of Priority Areas (Third) (Notice)]

(June 7, 2013), http://www.env.go.jp/press/press.php?serial=16745.

222 See discussion, supra, Part II(C).

223 Tokyo denryoku genshiryoku jiko ni yori hisai shita kodomo o hajime to suru jūmin tō no seikatsu o mamori

sasaeru tame no hisaisha no seikatsu shien tō ni kansuru sesaku no suishin ni kansuru hōritsu [Law on Promotion of

Measures Concerning Disaster Victims’ Daily Life Support in Order to Protect and Assist Residents Who Suffered

from the Tokyo Electric Company's Nuclear Accident, Especially Children], Law No. 48 of 2012, June 27, 2012.

224 Id. art. 5, para. 1.
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Cabinet orders and ministry ordinances. The Act states that those measures must reflect disaster 

victims’ opinions.

225

Under the Act, the government must implement the necessary measures to suppress radiation 

released from the soil, with priority given to areas in which children and pregnant women stay or 

pass by, such as their houses, schools, and daycare and school commuting routes.

226

In the areas 

where evacuation is no longer recommended, the government must implement measures to make 

medical services available to residents, help children who missed school due to the disaster catch 

up on the grade-appropriate curriculum, secure the safety of food prepared in the home and by 

lunch services at schools, etc.

227

The government is also obligated under the Act to support 

people who moved out of the evacuation area or who returned to it, by assisting them in finding 

places to live and jobs, among other things.

228

However, more than one year after the measure’s enactment, the government still has not 

established a basic policy for supporting nuclear disaster victims, and concrete measures have 

not been implemented. One of the reasons for the delay is there has not been a consensus on the 

definition of areas that should be covered by the Act. One possible criterion may be an area 

where there is more than 1 mSv of radiation per year. If this criterion were adopted, the area 

would include 101 municipalities over eight prefectures and a large number of people would be 

supported. However, the government may not be able to afford such an expansive program.

229

B. Compensation for Nuclear Damage

Since Japan started nuclear power development in the late 1950s and 1960s, various laws 

relating to nuclear power have been enacted. In 1961, the Act on Compensation for Nuclear 

Damage was enacted.

230

This Act imposes nuclear operator no-fault liability

231

and does not 

allow liability to be shared with others.

232

This Act ensures that nuclear operators secure basic 

funds for the smooth implementation of compensation for nuclear damages. In order to 

undertake reactor operation, a nuclear operator must provide financial security for the

225 Id. art. 5, para. 3.

226 Id. art. 7.

227 Id. art. 8.

228 Id. arts. 9 & 10.

229 Masato Wakabayashi, Sakunen seiritsu no genpatsu jiko hisaisha shien hō, senryō kijun ya chiiki, fumeikaku

[Nuclear Accident Victim Support Act Enacted Last Year, Criterion and Areas to Be Covered Undecided], KAHOKU 

SHINPŌ (May 5, 2013), http://archive.is/tv2GJ.

230 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Act No. 147 of 1961, English translation including amendments

through 2009 available on the OECD website, at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/JapanNuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.

231 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Act No. 147 of 1961, amended by Act No. 47 of 2012, art. 3.

232 Id. art. 4.
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compensation of nuclear damages.

233 This financial security must involve one of the following 

measures and be approved by the MEXT:

• Conclusion of a liability insurance contract for nuclear damage with insurance companies 

and an indemnity agreement for compensation of nuclear liability with the government

• A deposit of money

• Other measures equivalent to the above

The financial security amount for specific types of nuclear operation is designated within the 

range that is specified in the cabinet order. For reactor installations whose thermal output 

exceeds 10,000 kilowatts, the amount is 120 billion yen (about US$1.2 billion) per site.

234

The 

government may enter into an indemnity agreement for compensation of nuclear liability with 

nuclear operators, in preparation for a situation where the operators run short of money despite 

insurance or deposits. In such a case, the government assists the nuclear operator, and the 

operator later returns the money based on the Act on Indemnity Contract for Damages by 

Nuclear Operation (Indemnity Act).

235

The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage states that a Dispute Reconciliation Committee 

for Nuclear Damage Compensation (Reconciliation Committee) may be established as an 

organization attached to the MEXT.

236

The Reconciliation Committee was established on April 

11, 2011.

237

This Committee is in charge of mediating reconciliation of any dispute arising from 

compensation for nuclear damage and sets guidelines that establish the scope of the nuclear 

damage and other matters to help operators reach a voluntary settlement of the dispute.

238

The 

Committee issued several different guidelines as they discussed specific matters. The 

Committee issued the first guidelines on April 28 and the second guidelines on May 31, which 

were supplemented on June 20, 2011. The Committee then released interim guidelines that 

incorporated the first and second guidelines on August 5, 2011. These interim guidelines have 

been supplemented three times.

239

The second supplement of the interim guidelines issued in 

March 2012 provided that “6 million yen should be given in a lump sum to each person who is 

not allowed to return to his or her home, located in a ‘difficult-to-return’ zone . . . for at least five

233 Id. art. 6.

234 Enforcement Order of Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Cabinet Order No. 44 of 1962, amended by

Order No. 235 of 2012, art. 2.

235 Act on Indemnity Contract for Damages by Nuclear Operation, Act No. 148 of 1961, amended by Act No. 47

of 2012.

236 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage art. 18.

237 Cabinet Order on Establishment of Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation,

Cabinet Order No. 99 of 2011.

238 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage art. 18.

239 Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō shinsakai [Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage

Compensation], MEXT, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/index.htm(last visited

Sept. 16, 2013).
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years.”

240

These people may also receive the full value of their homes and lands as calculated 

before the nuclear accident.

241

The latest supplement, issued on January 30, 2013, expanded 

compensation for business entities in the agriculture, forestry, and fishery industries, and for 

processing and distribution industries if they lost income due to harmful rumors, such as false 

rumors concerning contamination of products by radiation.

242

To mediate reconciliation of disputes relating to compensation for damage caused by the nuclear 

accident, “the Center for Dispute Resolution for Compensating Damages” was opened under the 

auspices of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee on August 28, 2011.

243 By December 2011, 

about 130 mediators and thirty researchers had been appointed. As of December 2012, the 

number of mediators was 205 and the number of researchers ninety-one. In FY2011 (September 

to December), 521 cases were filed, and in 2012, 4,542 cases were filed. By the end of 2012, 

1,862 cases had been concluded. Among them, reconciliations were completed in about twothirds of cases.

244

Because the total payment for nuclear damage compensation would be larger than the existing 

system could deal with, the Diet enacted a new law that established the Nuclear Damage 

Compensation Facilitation Corporation.

245

The Corporation receives contributions from nuclear 

operators and reserves funds in preparation for nuclear damage compensation. When a nuclear 

operator is in need of assistance in order to compensate nuclear damage, the Corporation may 

grant financial assistance, such as providing funds, share subscriptions, a loan of funds, and 

acquisition of bonds, etc. In order to raise the funds necessary for financial assistance, the 

Corporation may issue government-guaranteed bonds and borrow funds from financial

240 TEPCO to Seek Billions More for Fukushima Compensation, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Mar. 21, 2012),

https://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201203210049. See also Dispute ReconciliationCommittee

for Nuclear Damage Compensation, Second Supplement to the Interim Guidelines on Criteria for Determining

Nuclear Damage Indemnification Coverage Caused by TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Plants

(Regarding Damage Relating to Government Review on Evacuation Areas) at 4 (Mar. 16, 2012),

http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houkoku/

(in Japanese).

icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/03/16/1318795.pdf

241 Second Supplement to the Interim Guidelines, supra note 240, at 12–13.

242 Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation, Third Supplement to the Interim

Guidelines on Criteria for Determining Nuclear Damage Indemnification Coverage Caused by TEPCO Fukushima

Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Plants (Damages to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Industries and the Food

Industry Caused by Harmful Rumors) (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/

detail/ icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/02/12/1329116_7.pdf (in Japanese). See also Press Release, TEPCO, Revision of

Compensation Eligibility Criteria for Damages to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Industries and the

Processing and Distribution Industries Caused by Harmful Rumors (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.tepco.co.jp/

en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1225847_5130.html.

243 Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō kaiketsu senta [Center for Dispute Resolution for Compensating Damages],

MEXT, http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329118.htm(last visited July 16, 2013).

244 REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES OF CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR COMPENSATING DAMAGES – REGARDING

STATUS IN 2012 (Feb. 2013), http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/

2013/03/05/1329118_010.pdf(in Japanese).

245 Genshiryokuu songai baisho shien kiko ho [Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation

Establishment Act], Act No. 94 of 2011, English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.

go.jp/law/detail_main?vm=02&id=2082.
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institutions. When the Corporation needs to receive special government aid for giving financial 

assistance to a nuclear operator, the Corporation and the nuclear operator jointly prepare a 

special business plan and obtain approval from the government. The special business plan 

includes the forecast of the total amount of compensation, measures for implementing prompt 

and appropriate compensation for damages, the contents and the amount of financial assistance, 

and measures for rationalization of management, among other things.

246

The Corporation and 

TEPCO established the first special plan on October 28, 2011. Since then, the plan has been 

amended several times. Financial support for TEPCO has been provided since 

November 2011.

247

Because the payment of full compensation would take time due to the large number of victims 

and the complex nature of the damage, TEPCO and the government decided to offer provisional 

payments to certain victims, such as evacuees.

248

TEPCO announced on April 15, 2011, that it 

would pay one million yen (about US$10,000) to evacuated households of two or more people 

and 750,000 yen (about US$7,500) for the evacuation of single households, 249and started 

payment on April 26, 2011. 250TEPCO also made provisional payments to farmers and 

fishermen through their cooperatives starting on May 31, 2011. 251TEPCO made additional 

provisional payments in July. TEPCO paid 100,000, 200,000 or 300,000 yen (about US$1,000, 

2,000, or 3,000) per person, depending on the length and method of evacuation.

252 However, 

provisional payments of compensation by TEPCO did not cover some disaster victims. The Act 

on Emergency Measures Against Damage from the 2011 Nuclear Accident was enacted on 

August 5, 2011.

253

This Act enabled the national government to make provisional compensation 

for damage caused by the nuclear accident, in place of TEPCO. After the payment, the

246 Cabinet Secretariat, Outline of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act (Aug. 2011),

http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20111012_nuclear_damages_2.pdf.

247 Tokubetsu jigyō keikaku [Special Business Plan], Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund,

http://www.ndf.go.jp/gyomu/tokuji_index.html (last visited July 18, 2013).

248 Heisei nijūsan nen genshiryoku jiko ni yoru higai ni kakaru kinkyū sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Emergency

Measures on Damage Caused by Nuclear Accident in 2011], Act No. 91 of 2011. See also Regarding Provisional

Payment Based on Act on Emergency Measures on Damage Caused by Nuclear Accident in 2011, MEXT,

http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329401.htm(in Japanese; last visited

Sept. 9, 2013).

249 Press Release, TEPCO, Regarding Payment of ‘Provisional Compensation’ for Damages for Evacuees (Apr. 15,

2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/11041502-j.html (in Japanese).

250 Tokyo denryoku, hinan jūmin e no hoshōkin karibarai o kaishi [TEPCO Started to Pay Provisional

Compensation], NEWS24 (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.news24.jp/articles/2011/04/26/06181681.html.

251 Press Release, TEPCO, Regarding Status of Payment of Provisional Compensation for Damages for Evacuees

(May 31, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/11053104-j.html (in Japanese).

252 Press Release, TEPCO, Regarding Payment of ‘Additional Provisional Compensation’ for Damages for Evacuees

(July 5, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/11070501-j.html (in Japanese).

253 Act on Emergency Measures Against Damage from the 2011 Nuclear Accident, Act No. 91 of 2011.
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government can claim the amount of payment against TEPCO. The government paid provisional 

compensation to sightseeing businesses in Fukushima and three other neighboring prefectures.

254

C. New Nuclear Regulatory Authority and New Regulations

The nuclear regulatory authority at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake was the Nuclear 

and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) under the jurisdiction of METI. The NISA was criticized 

for failing to ensure the safety of nuclear plants after the earthquake. Critics claimed this was 

because the NISA was placed under METI, which promotes nuclear power.

255

The then ruling 

Democratic Party of Japan called for separating the NISA from METI to ensure that it could 

actually wield watchdog authority without the constraints of vested interests.

256

The Cabinet 

released the Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in Charge of Nuclear Safety 

Regulation in August 2011, which stated that a new nuclear regulatory agency would be created 

as an affiliated organization of the MOE in view of the separation of nuclear regulation and 

promotion.

257 Acting on this policy, the Cabinet then established the Advisory Committee for 

Prevention of Nuclear Accident to deliberate on the proposed nuclear safety regulatory 

organization and ways to further strengthen nuclear safety regulations.

258

At the beginning of the regular Diet session in 2012, two bills were introduced: one was 

submitted by the Cabinet, and the other was submitted by two opposition parties. Later, the 

ruling party, two opposition parties, and independent members cooperated and submitted another 

bill, and the previous two bills were withdrawn. The independence of the new agency was more 

enhanced than in the Cabinet bill.

259

The Diet enacted a new law to create an independent 

Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) for nuclear plant safety in June 2012.

260

The NRA is an 

external branch of the Environment Ministry, but was established based on a different provision 

of the National Government Organization Act than the usual external branches to ensure 

its independence.

261

254 Genpatsu baisho kuni no karibarai uketsuke kaishi [Nuclear Compensation, Open for Application for Provisional

Payment from the State], NHK “KABUN” BLOG (Sept. 21, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www9.nhk.or.jp/kabunblog/200/95821.html.

255 Nuke Regulatory Reform Easier Said than Done, JAPAN TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/

news/2011/06/24/national/nuke-regulatory-reform-easier-said-than-done/.

256 Kazuaki Nagata, Time to Give Nuke Watchdog Teeth, JAPAN TIMES (June 21, 2011), http://www.japantimes.

co.jp/news/2011/06/21/reference/time-to-give-nuke-watchdog-teeth/.

257 Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation, Cabinet Decision (Aug.

15,2011),http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/kakugi_en_110815.pdf.

258 Advisory Committee for Prevention of Nuclear Accident, NUCLEAR REGULATION AUTHORITY,

http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/outline/03_01.html (last visited July 18, 2013).

259 Genshiryoku kisei, Dokuritsusei takai shin soshiki ni [Nuclear Regulatory, More Independence to New

Organization], NEW KŌMEITO (June 14, 2012), https://www.komei.or.jp/news/detail/20120614_8341.

260 Genshiryoku kisei iinkai secchi hō [Nuclear Regulatory Authority Establishment Act], Act No. 47 of 2012. See

also Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in Charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation, Cabinet Decision, Aug.

15,2011,http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/kakugi_en_110815.pdf.

261 Kokka gyōsei soshiki hō [National Government Organization Law], Act No. 120 of July 10, 1948, art. 3.
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At the same time, the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material 

and Reactors was amended in order to adjust to the regulatory authority change and tighten 

nuclear reactor regulation.

262 Under this Act, the operators of nuclear reactors are obligated to 

prepare measures to prevent serious accidents.

263

The operational period of nuclear reactors is 

forty years, with a one-time possible extension of up to twenty years.

264

The task of developing 

new safety standards under the Act was delegated to the NRA.

The NRA was established in September 2012, 265and adopted the new safety standards on 

nuclear power plants on June 19, 2013.

266

The new standards were implemented on July 8, 

2013.

267

The new standards require operators to make much tougher assumptions regarding 

earthquakes and tsunamis that may hit their facilities. The 2006 Anti-Seismic Guidelines 

prohibit the construction of nuclear reactors above fault lines that have been active since the 

Tarantian Age (126,000 to 11,700 years ago).

268

This prohibition was upgraded from a 

“guideline” to a “standard.” Faults are regarded as active if the possibility that they may have 

moved cannot be ruled out. The new standard added a provision that when no judgment can be 

made as to whether a fault line was active during the period, geological and other research must 

be conducted for any signs of fault movement up to 400,000 years ago.

The new standards require plant operators to install filtered vent systems on boiling water 

reactors, in order to release radioactive steam inside reactor containers in the event of a serious 

accident. However, a five-year grace period is granted to operators of pressurized water reactors 

with large containment vessels. The standards also require power companies to build second 

control rooms, which would serve as backups to existing control rooms if a severe accident were 

to render them unusable. A five-year grace periods was provided for implementation of this 

standard as well.

269

In addition, the formulation of new safety standards for test and research 

reactors and nuclear fuel facilities is also underway with an enforcement deadline of 

December 2013.

262 Kaku genryō busshitsu, kaku nenryō busshitsu oyobi genshiro no kisei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on the Regulation

of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors], Act No. 166 of June 10, 1957, last amended by

Act No. 47 of 2012, English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=

02&vm=02&id=1941.

263 Id. arts. 43-3-5 & 43-3-6.

264 Id. art. 43-3-31.

265 Japan Gets a New Nuclear Safety Body, Now Needs to Write Rules, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Sept. 20, 2012),

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201209200081.

266 2013 Nuclear Regulatory Authority 11th Meeting Minutes, June 19, 2013, at 22, http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/

kisei/data/20130619-kisei.pdf (in Japanese).

267 “Genshiryoku kisei iinkai secchihō no ichibu no shikō kijitsu o sadameru seirei” ga kakugi kettei saremasita

[Cabinet Decision Made on “Order to Set Implementation Date of Act on Nuclear Safety Agency Establishment”],

NRA,June 21, 2013, http://www.nsr.go.jp/law/130621_02seirei_kakugi.html.

268 Nuclear Safety Commission, Hatsuden yō genshiro shisetsu ni kansuru taishin sekkei shinsa shishin [Guidelines

on Anti-seismic Architectonics Examination Concerning Nuclear Power Plants] § 5 (Sept. 19, 2006),

http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/shinsashishin/pdf/1/si004.pdf. For additional information on the Tarantian Age,

see John P. Rafferty, Tarantian Stage, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACADEMIC EDITION,

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1352430/Tarantian-Stage (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).

269 Nuclear Agency Adopts New Power Plant Safety Standards, JAPAN NEWS (June 20, 2013) (on file with author).
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The NRA also established the Nuclear Disaster Response Guidelines on June 5, 2013.

270 Based 

on the Guidelines, the NRA released new Manuals for distribution and administration of iodine 

tablets on July 19, 2013.

271

It expanded the recommendation for iodine tablets in case of nuclear 

disaster to people of all ages living within thirty kilometers of a nuclear plant. Previously, the 

government recommended the tablets for people under forty years of age. The previous 

guidelines were established in 2002 by the NRA’s predecessor, the Nuclear 

Safety Commission.

272

VI. Reconstruction

The Diet enacted the Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake in June 

2011. 273The Act set the policy for reconstruction, enabled the government to issue 

reconstruction bonds and establish special zones for reconstruction, and authorized the 

establishment of the Headquarters for the Reconstruction at the Prime Minister’s Office and the 

future establishment of the Reconstruction Agency. The Headquarters for the Reconstruction 

was established immediately after the legislation was enacted.

274

The Headquarters then issued 

the Basic Policy on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake on July 29, 2011, 

based on the Basic Act.

275

The Basic Policy “presents the overall vision of the measures directed 

toward full-fledged reconstruction” and “sets out concrete measures to be implemented, the 

project cost, and financial resources, based on the local opinions as well.” 276The term of 

reconstruction was estimated at ten years, but reconstruction activities will be more intense for 

the first five years.

277

Twenty-five trillion yen (about US$250 billion) has been budgeted for the 

first five years.

278

270 Genshiryoku saigai taisaku shishin [Nuclear Disaster Response Guidelines], Oct. 31, 2012, last amended June 5,

2013, http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/bousai/data/130605_saitaishishin.pdf.

271 Manuals for Distribution and Administration of Iodine Tablets, NRA (July 19, 2013), http://www.nsr.go.jp/

english/e_news/2013/0719.html.

272 Recommendation for Iodine Tablets in Case of Nuclear Disaster Expanded to All Ages, THE MAINICHI (July 20,

2013), http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130720p2a00m0na007000c.html.

273 Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 76 of 2011, English translation

available on the Reconstruction Agency’s website, at https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/

Basic_Act_on_Reconstruction.pdf.

274 Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Prime Minister in Action: Headquarters for the

Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake (June 28, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/

actions/201106/28fukkou_honbu_e.html.

275 Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 76 of 2011, art. 3; Press Release,

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Prime Minister in Action: Headquarters for the Reconstruction from the

Great EastJapan Earthquake (July 29, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/actions/201107/29KAIGI_

fukkou_e.html.

276 Prime Minister in Action (July 29, 2011), supra note 275.

277 Basic Policy on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Headquarters for the Reconstruction from

the Great East Japan Earthquake decision on July 29, 2011, modified by the decision on Aug. 11, 2011, at 3,

http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/110811kaitei.pdf.

278 Progress Report, RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/

2013/03/2nd-anniversary-report.html.
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In December 2011, the Act on Special Zones for Reconstruction after the Great East Japan 

Earthquake

279 was enacted, as directed by the Basic Act.280 Because conditions of areas—such 

as the degree of damage from the disaster, existing industry, and the pace of recovery—vary 

from area to area, reconstruction plans are best planned by the local governments.

281

The special 

zones system provides a framework and measures can be taken following consultations between 

the national and local governments. The special zones system offers a range of measures to 

support reconstruction efforts. Regulations and statutory procedures, such as eligibility 

requirements for public housing and granting special permits for certain business establishments, 

may be eased. Land-use restructuring may be facilitated. A range of tax breaks to stimulate 

investment and employment in the afflicted areas may be implemented. Special grants may be 

provided for reconstruction projects.

282

The Reconstruction Agency was created in February 2012,

283

eleven months after the Great East 

Japan Earthquake, and the Reconstruction Headquarters was abolished. The Agency’s mission 

has been to accelerate structural reconstruction and revitalization in the affected areas, by 

supporting implementation of government policies and coordinating reconstruction strategy and 

initiatives among national government agencies and local governments.

284 Coordination of 

reconstruction efforts include continued efforts towards the removal of debris, rebuilding 

infrastructure and housing, issues surrounding the Fukushima crisis, advancing decontamination, 

improving food safety, boosting local industry and the economy, and promoting investment and 

tourism. 285 According to the Agency’s Progress Report at the second anniversary of the 

earthquake, the reconstruction is being carried out as planned.

286

Because the Fukushima nuclear disaster is different from the tsunami disaster, the Diet enacted a 

special act for the reconstruction of Fukushima, the Act on Special Measures for Fukushima 

Reconstruction and Revitalization, at the end of March 2012. 287The Act obligates the 

government to construct infrastructure and public facilities, clean public facilities to make them 

functional, provide medical exams for residents, give tax breaks to residents and firms, and 

restore industries in Fukushima.

279 Higashi nihon dai shinsai fukkō tokubetsu kuiki hō [Act on Special Zones for Reconstruction from Great East

Japan Earthquake], Act No. 122 of 2011, last amended by Act No. 55 of 2013.

280 Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake art. 10.

281 See Fukko tokku seido [Special Zones System for Reconstruction], PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET,

http://www.kantei.go.jp/fukkou/organization/reconstructionzones.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).

282 Our Mission,RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/2013/03/about-us-ourmission.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).

283 Fukkō chō secchi hō [Act on Establishment of Reconstruction Agency], Act No. 125 of 2011.

284 About Us, RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/about-us.html (last visited

Aug. 16, 2013).

285 Progressto Date, RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/progress-todate.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).

286 Progress Report, supra note 278.

287 Act on Special Measures for Fukushima Reconstruction and Revitalization, Act No. 25 of 2012.
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VII. Public Finance Measures

Post-earthquake emergency, recovery, and reconstruction measures cost huge amounts of money. 

At the beginning, a reserve fund became the source of money. The Constitution of Japan states 

that “in order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund may be 

authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet.”

288

Japan’s fiscal 

year runs from April 1 to March 31.

289

Expenses for emergency measures from March 11 to 

March 31, 2011, were covered by the 2010 reserve fund. A total of 67.8 billion yen (about 

US$678 million) was used.

290 Reserve funds totaling 5.03 billion yen (about US$50.3 million) 

from FY2011 were allocated for expenses for emergency measures, such as building shelters, on 

April 19, 2011.

291

The government also used the supplementary budget system to make money available for postearthquake measures. When something unexpected happens after the budget has been approved 

by the Diet, the Cabinet may formulate and submit a supplementary budget to the Diet.

292

The 

first 2011 fiscal year supplemental budget was approved by the Diet on May 2, 2011. Four 

trillion yen (about US$40 billion) was allocated for recovery from the disaster. The financial 

source was created by reducing the national child allowance

293

and suspending the project to 

eliminate highway tolls, among other things.

294

The second FY2011 supplementary budget was approved by the Diet on July 25, 2011. Two 

trillion yen (about US$20 billion) was allocated for recovery from the disaster. This spending 

was covered by the surplus from the 2010 budget.

295

The third FY2011 supplementary budget 

was approved on November 21, 2011. The total amount authorized in the third supplementary 

budget was 12 trillion yen (about US$120 billion), the second biggest supplemental budget in

288 KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN], 1946, art. 87, English translation available on the Ministry of Justice’s

website, at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=174.

289 Zaisei hō [Public Finance Law], Act No. 34 of 1947, last amended by Act No. 152 of 2002, art. 11.

290 Ministry of Finance, General Budget Reserve Fund General Records on Spending and Each Ministry and

Agency’s Records on Spending for Fiscal Year 2011 (No. 2) (For Submission to the 177th Diet Session), at 3,

http://www.bb.mof.go.jp/server/2010/dlpdf/DL2010e1013.pdf(inJapanese).

291 MIC, Q&A Concerning Measures to Counter the Great East Japan Earthquake (Local Government

Administration and Finance), at 12 (June 10, 2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000117828.pdf

(in Japanese).

292 Public Finance Law art. 29.

293 The Democratic Party of Japan promised to provide a monthly child allowance of 26,000 yen (about US$260) for

each child aged fifteen or younger to all child-rearing families during the 2009 Lower House election campaign. It

began providing half the amount in fiscal year 2010. Child Allowance Devoid of Principle, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 29,

2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/03/29/editorials/child-allowance-devoid-of-principle/.

294 Ministry of Finance, Explanation of 2011 Fiscal Year Supplementary Budget (Apr. 2011, 177th Diet Session),

at 1, http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/budget/fy2011/sy230428/sy230428b.pdf(in Japanese).

295 Ministry of Finance, Explanation of 2011 Fiscal Year Second Supplementary Budget (July 2011, 177th Diet

Session), at 1, http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/budget/fy2011/sy230715/sy230715b.pdf

(in Japanese).
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Japan’s history.

296 Of that amount, 9 trillion yen (about US$90 billion) was for expenses for 

disaster relief, disposal of disaster waste, additional public works, disaster-related public 

financing programs, local allocation tax grants, Great East Japan Earthquake Reconstruction 

grants, reconstruction from the nuclear disaster, national disaster prevention, and other 

measures.

297

The financial source was created by cutting 164.8 billion yen (about US$1.648 

million) of previously-authorized expenses, allocating 18.7 billion yen (about US$ 187 million) 

of additional non-tax revenues, and issuing 11.55 trillion yen (about US$115.5 billion) of 

reconstruction bond issues.

298

Japan also enacted laws to create funds for recovery and reconstruction. The Act on Special 

Measures to Secure a Source of Funds Necessary to React to the Aftermath of the Great East 

Japan Earthquake

299 was enacted at the same time that the first 2011 fiscal year supplemental 

budget was approved. This Act made it possible to transfer certain funds in the special account 

to the general account, and to transfer highway tolls that are managed by the Japan Expressway 

Holding and Debt Repayment Agency to the national treasury.

The Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for Reconstruction 

from the Great East Japan Earthquake

300 was enacted at the same time that the third FY2011 

supplemental budget was approved. The Act authorized the government to transfer money 

between specified special accounts, created special income and corporate taxes, and allowed for 

the issuance of reconstruction bonds, among other things.

301

The Act also imposed a temporary 

tax increase of 2.1% on the standard national income tax starting January 1, 2013, which will 

expire on December 31, 2037. 302The corporation tax will be increased by 10% for three 

years.

303

The revenue from these special taxes is solely to be used for reconstruction from the 

Great East Japan Earthquake.

304

296 Dai3ji hosei yosan, seiritsu . . . fukkō kanren 9chō en chō [The Third Supplementary Budget Approved . . . Over 9

Trillion Yen for Reconstruction Related Expenses], YOMIURI ONLINE (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/

politics/news/20111121-OYT1T00762.htm.

297 The Outline of the 3rd Supplementary Budget of FY2011 (Provisional Translation), Ministry of Finance,

http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/budget/fy2011/11sb03.pdf.

298 Id. See also Ministry of Finance, Explanation of 2011 Fiscal Year Third Supplementary Budget (Oct. 2011,

179th Dietsession), at 1, http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/budget/fy2011/sy231028/sy231028b.pdf.

299 Higashi nihon daishinsai ni taisho suru tame ni hitsuyō na zaigen no kakuho o hakaru tame no tokubetsu sochi ni

kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Measures to Secure a Source of Funds Necessary to React to the Aftermath of the

Great East Japan Earthquake], Act No. 42 of 2011.

300 Higashi nihon daishinsai kara no fukkō no tame no sesaku o jisshi suru tame ni hitsuyō na zaigen no kakuho ni

kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for

Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake], Act No. 117 of 2011.

301 See Yukihiro Oga & Kenya Ozawa, Concerning Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources

Necessary for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, FAINANSU [FINANCE], Dec. 2011, at 32,

http://www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/finance/201112e.pdf.

302 Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for Reconstruction from the Great East

Japan Earthquake arts. 8, 9 &13.

303 Id. arts. 42, 43, 45 & 48.

304 Id. art. 72, para. 1.
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VIII. Miscellaneous Special Laws

In addition to those measures discussed above, the Diet has enacted numerous other laws and 

regulations concerning the Great East Japan Earthquakes. Among the enacted measures, thirtyfour bills were submitted by the Cabinet.

305 Bills that were submitted by Diet members also 

became law. In addition, 141 Cabinet Orders have been issued.

306

The initial legislation addressed temporary emergency measures, such as postponing elections 

and providing special exceptions to taxation, land use, and construction regulations. In addition, 

existing laws were amended to make the national government share more of the financial 

burdens of local governments for recovery from the disaster. Later, legislation shifted to 

recovery and reconstruction. The following are some of the special measures enacted by the Diet 

after the Earthquake:

305 Bills Submitted by the Cabinet and Cabinet Orders Concerning Great East Japan Earthquake (List of [Bill]

Names), CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU, http://www.clb.go.jp/contents/diet_sinsai/law_sinsai.html (in Japanese;

last visited Aug. 16, 2013).

306

Id.
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• Government employees’ salaries were reduced to cope with the national financial 

burden for recovery from the disaster.

The Diet enacted a law to cut members’ salaries by 3 million yen (US$30,000) per member 

per year soon after the earthquake.

307

Then Prime Minister Naoto Kan voluntarily returned 

his salary to the national treasury starting in June 2011.

308

The Cabinet submitted bills to the 

Diet to reduce the salaries of public servants (including the Prime Minister and other 

Ministers), public prosecutors, and judges in June 2011.

309

The two bills to reduce public 

prosecutors’

310

and judges’ salaries

311

became law the following year. The original bill to 

reduce public servants’ salaries did not become law, but a similar bill submitted by Diet 

members was passed by the Diet.

312 The reduction will end in March 2014.

• The Oil Stock Act was enacted to address post-earthquake disruptions in the oil and 

liquefied petroleum (LP) gas supply chain.

Six among twenty-seven oil refineries stopped working, and refinery capacity went down by 

about 70%.

313

The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry released oil stock (oil reserves) 

based on the emergency provision of the Oil Stock Act.

314 Under the 1974 Agreement on an 

International Energy Program (IEP), Japan and other IEP member countries are required to 

“hold oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports and – in the event of a major 

oil supply disruption – to release stocks, restrain demand, switch to other fuels, increase 

domestic production or share available oil, if necessary.”

315

The Oil Stock Act was enacted 

in response to the 1974 IEP Agreement. The Act restricts the circumstances in which the 

government may decrease the oil stock. The Act has a provision that allows the government 

to release the oil stock when the supply chain to Japan is disrupted, but not when the supply 

chain is disrupted only to a part of Japan.

316 METI planned to amend the Oil Stock Act in

307 Act on Special Reduction of Diet Members’ Salaries to Support Recovery and Reconstruction from the 2011

Pacific Tohoku Earthquake, Act No. 11 of 2011.

308 Kan Prime Minister Stated “The Government Is Also Responsible” for Nuclear Accident, Returns His Salary,

SPORTSNIPPON (May 11, 2011), http://www.sponichi.co.jp/society/news/2011/05/11/kiji/K2011051100079

4010.html (in Japanese).

309 Cabinet Bill Nos. 78, 79 & 80 of 177th Diet Session.

310 Act on Partial Amendment of the Law on Prosecutors’ Salaries, Act No. 5 of 2012.

311 Act on Partial Amendment of the Law on Judges’ Salaries, Act No. 4 of 2012.

312 Act on Amendment and Special Exceptions on Public Servants’ Salaries, Act No. 2 of 2012.

313 Yasumitsu Nawata, Saigai ji ni okeru sekiyu / sekiyu gasu tō no antei kyōkyū kakuho [Securing Stable Supply of

Oil and Gas During Disaster], RIPPO TO CHOSA, No. 327, at 52 (Apr. 2012), http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/

annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2012pdf/20120402050.pdf.

314 Sekiyu no bichiku no kakuho to ni kansuru hōritsu [Securing Oil Stock Act], Act No. 96 of 1975, art. 7, para. 1.

315 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, IEA RESPONSE SYSTEM FOR OIL SUPPLY EMERGENCIES 2012, at 3,

http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EPPD_Brochure_English_2012_02.pdf.

316 Oil Stock Act art. 7, para. 3, amended by Act No. 55 of 2001.
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late 2011. The bill was submitted to the Diet in early 2012

317

and passed in the late summer 

of 2012.

318

The 2012 amendment made it clear that the government can release the oil stock 

when the supply chain is disrupted only in a part of Japan.

319

The 2012 amendment also 

established a system to make oil wholesalers cooperate with each other during the disaster

320

and a system that made large gasoline stations serve as hubs for gasoline distribution.

321

• In order to provide legal aid to disaster victims, the Act Concerning Special Legal Aid 

by the Japan Legal Support Center to Assist Victims of the Great East Japan 

Earthquake was enacted in March 2012.

322

After the Great East Japan Earthquake, many people in the Tohoku region of Japan have 

faced various legal problems, such as how to exercise the right to succession from quake 

victims and the need to obtain special relief from housing loans for destroyed houses and 

damage stemming from the nuclear disaster. The Japan Legal Support Center (JLSC), a 

public corporation, previously loaned legal fees to people whose income or assets were 

below a set amount. 323The new Act removes these income and asset limitations for 

earthquake victims.

324

It also expands the types of procedures that JLSC services cover. 

Whereas regular legal aid, as covered under the Comprehensive Legal Support Act,

325

is 

available to cover civil, family, or administrative legal procedures, the Special Act 

additionally covers a procedure to claim damages directly from TEPCO, which is held 

responsible for the nuclear disaster, as well as alternative dispute resolution procedures 

relating to the nuclear disaster.

326

The Special Act also stipulates coverage of legal aid 

procedures carried out under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies, such as complaints 

based on the denial of welfare or special tax deductions or exemptions.

327

317 Cabinet Bill No. 27 of 180th Diet Session. See also Regarding a Bill to Amend the Securing Oil Stockpile Act in

Order to Deal with Oil Shortage During Disasters, METI (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/

02/20120210002/20120210002.html(in Japanese).

318 Act to Partially Amend the Act on Securing Oil Stockpile to Cope with Oil Shortage During Disaster, Act No. 76

of 2012.

319 Oil Stock Act, Act No. 96 of 1975, amended by Act No. 76 of 2012, art. 7, para. 3.

320 Id. arts. 13 & 14.

321 Id. art. 27, para. 1, item 5.

322 Higashi Nihon dai shinsai no hisaisha ni taisuru enjo no tame no Nihon Shihō Shien Senta no gyōmu no tokurei

ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Special Legal Aid by the Japan Legal Support Center to Assist Victims of the

Great East Japan Earthquake (Special Legal Aid Act)], Act No. 6 of 2012, art. 1.

323 The JLSC was established under the Comprehensive Legal Support Act [Sōgō hōritsu shien hō], Act No. 74

of 2004.

324 Special Legal Aid Act art. 3.

325 Sōgō hōritsu shien hō [Comprehensive Legal Support Act], Act No. 74 of 2004.

326 Special Legal Aid Act art. 3. See also Press Release, JLSC, “Higashi Nihon dai shinsai hisaisha enjo tokurei hō

(Shinsaitokurei ho)” ni tsuite [Regarding “Special Act on Legal Aid for Victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake

(Earthquake Victim Special Act)”] (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.houterasu.or.jp/cont/100483827.pdf.

327

Id.
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IX. Preparation for the Next Disaster – Japan’s Disaster Management System

Japan is an earthquake-prone country, “located in the Circum-Pacific Mobile Belt where seismic 

and volcanic activities occur constantly.”

328

The Japanese disaster management system “has 

been developed and strengthened following the bitter experiences of large-scale disasters and 

accidents.”

329 That system was again enhanced following the Great East Japan Earthquake.

A. Disaster Response Basic Law

As stated above, the Disaster Response Basic Law is Japan’s basic disaster management law.

330

However, the Disaster Response Basic Law did not provide a system for local governments to 

cooperate with each other in a systematic way when a disaster that leaves serious damage over 

several prefectures occurs. The experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake prompted the 

government to establish such a system. In June 2012, the Law was amended

331

to obligate

managers of emergency measures for local governments to share information with other local 

and national governments. If a municipal government loses its ability to function, the prefecture 

can collect necessary information instead of the municipal government.

The amendment also enabled the national government to coordinate municipal governments’ 

assistance to each other and the scope of assistance was broadened. After the earthquake, the 

national government provided food and goods without the legally required request of municipal 

governments, because some municipal governments were not functioning well enough to submit 

requests. The amendment added provisions that enable the national and prefectural governments 

to supply goods to municipal governments on their own initiative. Further, provisions were 

added to enable the national and prefectural governments to coordinate with municipal 

governments to take in disaster victims regardless of their jurisdiction over such victims.

332

The Disaster Response Basic Law was amended again in 2013 to further prepare for large-scale 

disaster. Where a local government’s ability to function is paralyzed immediately after a disaster, 

the national government can conduct certain emergency measures usually carried out by local 

governments, such as removing objects from the roads and destroying buildings in order to help 

emergency rescue teams reach victims. Before the amendment, shelters or evacuation sites were 

designated in local emergency plans, but not directly prescribed by law. The amendment added 

provisions for shelters and evacuation sites and required local governments to designate qualified 

buildings and sites. Further, the amendment obligated municipal governments to prepare lists of

328 CABINET OFFICE, DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN, supra note 16, at 1.

329 Id. at 5.

330 Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, last amended by Act No. 54 of 2013.

331 Act to Amend Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 41 of 2012.

332 Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Saigai taisaku kihon hō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu no gaisetsu

[Summary of the Amendment of the Disaster Rescue Basic Law], Shobō no ugoki [Fire Management Updates]

(Aug. 2012), http://www.fdma.go.jp/ugoki/h2408/2408_06.pdf.
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people who may need special assistance, such as the elderly and disabled, and provide those lists 

to firefighters and other officials.

333

The Disaster Rescue Law was amended in 2013 at the same time as the Disaster Response 

Rescue Law was amended. The amendment added provisions that establish a system for the 

national government to reimburse the costs of emergency rescue operations incurred 

by prefectures.

334

B. Special Act on Large-Scale Earthquake Response and Related Laws

The Special Act on Large-scale Earthquake Response was enacted after the Izu-Oshima 

Earthquake in 1978, 335in order to prepare for the anticipated Great Tōkai Earthquake. The 

Special Act established a system for the observation and prediction of earthquakes, and enhanced 

the disaster prevention system.

336

This Act was not specifically amended after the Great East 

Japan Earthquake. Based on the Act the Prime Minister has designated areas where large-scale 

earthquake are likely to cause severe damage as “enhanced earthquake response areas.” 337

Within the enhanced earthquake response areas, the national government provides extra 

subsidies for costs that the local governments need in order to make roads, ports, schools, and 

hospitals resilient to large-scale earthquakes based on the Act on Special Financial Measures for 

Urgent Earthquake Countermeasure Improvement Projects in Enhanced Earthquake Response 

Areas.

338 The local governments can also issue special bonds for these projects.339

The government has enhanced monitoring of earthquake-related information and surveys in the 

area.

340

The Japan Meteorological Agency continually monitors anomalies relating to 

earthquakes. 

341 When anomalies are observed that are interpreted as indicating that an 

earthquake is expected to occur, the Prime Minister issues a warning.

342 The national and local

333 Cabinet Office, New and Old Articles of the Bill to Amend Disaster Response Basic Law and Others,

http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hourei/pdf/hourei_taisyou.pdf (in Japanese; last visited Aug. 16, 2013). See also

Cabinet Office, Saigai taisaku kihon hō tō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu no gaiyō [Summary of the Amendment of

the Disaster Rescue Basic Law], http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hourei/pdf/hourei_gaiyou.pdf (last visited

Aug. 16, 2013).

334 Disaster Rescue Law, Law No. 118 of 1947, arts. 20 & 21, amended by Act No. 54 of 2013.

335 Daikibo jishin taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō [Special Act on Large-scale Earthquake Response], Act No. 73 of

1978, last amended by Act No. 41 of 2012.

336 Id. art. 1.

337 Id. art. 3, para. 1.

338 Jishin bōsai taisaku kyōka chiiki ni okeru jishin taisaku kinkyū seibi jigyō ni kakaru kuni no zaiseijō no tokubetsu

sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Financial Measures for Urgent Earthquake Countermeasure Improvement

Projects in Areas Needing Intensified Measures], Act No. 63 of 1980, last amended by Act No. 12 of 2010, art. 4.

339 Id. art. 5.

340 Special Act on Large Scale Earthquake Response art. 4.

341 Japan Meteorological Agency Organization Ordinance, MLIT Ordinance No. 3 of 2001, arts. 19–21.

342 Special Act on Large Scale Earthquake Response art. 9.
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governments establish earthquake response plans for the area.

343

Training and emergency 

response practices are conducted. Currently, areas expected to be affected only by the Great 

Tōkai Earthquake are designated under the Act.

344

As more studies have been done on other expected large earthquakes, the Diet has enacted 

special laws for two expected earthquakes. In 2002, the Act on Special Measures for Promotion 

of Tōnankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management was enacted.

345 Based on this Act,346

the Prime Minister in 2003 designated areas where disaster prevention measures are needed 

because of a high possibility of severe damage in the event of Tōnankai and Nankai earthquakes 

as “countermeasures promotion areas.” The local governments in these areas are obligated to 

prepare for the expected earthquakes. The national government is providing financial support for 

such preparation. The national government established the Tōnankai and Nankai Earthquake 

Countermeasures Basic Plan in 2004.

347

Also in 2004, the Diet enacted the Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Disaster 

Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima 

Trenches. 348“Countermeasures promotion areas” were designated and the Countermeasures 

Basic Plan for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches was 

established. The relevant organizations have their own plans based on the Basic Plan.

349 Both 

acts obligate the government to enhance monitoring and surveying systems relating to the 

earthquakes. When the government is able to predict these earthquakes with more accuracy, the 

areas will be designated as “enhanced earthquake response areas” under the Special Act on 

Large-scale Earthquake Response, and these acts will be abolished.

C. New Law on Tsunami Measures

When the tsunami caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake hit Japan’s East Coast in March 

2011, Japan had various laws concerning earthquakes, but there was no law that primarily 

addressed tsunami countermeasures. The largest nonruling coalition at that time, comprised of 

the Liberal Democratic Party and the Kōmei party, had submitted a bill concerning promotion of 

countermeasures against tsunamis in June 2010, 350after observing the damage caused by a

343 Id. arts. 5–7.

344 CENTRAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, JISHIN BŌSAI TAISAKU KYŌKA CHIIKI NO SHITEI NI TSUITE

[REGARDING DESIGNATION OF ENHANCED EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE AREA] (May 12, 1979), http://www.bousai.

go.jp/kaigirep/chuobou/kyoka-area1.html. See also Jishin bōsai taisaku kyōka chiiki [Enhanced Earthquake

Response Area], IFINANCE, http://www.ifinance.ne.jp/bousai/words/bswd370.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).

345 Tōnankai • Nankaijishin ni kakaru jishin bōsai taisaku no suishin ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special

Measures for Promotion of Tōnankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management], Act No. 92 of 2002.

346 Id. art. 3.

347 CABINET OFFICE, DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN, supra note 16, at 28.

348 Nihon kaikō • Chishima kaikō shūhen kaikō gata jishin ni kakaru jishin bōsai taisaku no suishin ni kansuru

tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in

the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches], Act No. 27 of 2004.

349 CABINET OFFICE, DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN, supra note 16, at 29.

350 House of Representatives Bill No. 28, 174th Diet Session, 2010.
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tsunami generated by the 2010 earthquake in Chile, which hit that country’s shores on February 

27, 2010. However, the bill was never discussed in the Diet in 2010. After the earthquake, the 

same sponsors reintroduced the 2010 bill and the Diet passed it in June 2011.

351

This law, the 

Act on Promotion of Tsunami Countermeasures, is the basic law on tsunami countermeasures. It 

sets forth basic policies, enhances tsunami research systems, implements tsunami education and 

tsunami evacuation training, and establishes necessary facilities to cope with tsunamis.

Further, in December 2011 the Act on Making Local Areas Resistant to Tsunamis was enacted in 

order to implement concrete measures, on the basis of the Act on Promotion of Tsunami 

Countermeasures. 352The new law promotes the comprehensive construction, use, and 

preservation of areas in order to prevent or mitigate damage from tsunamis. Based on this 

Act,

353

the MLIT established the Basic Guidelines on Promotion of Making Areas Resistant to 

Tsunamis in January 2012.

354

This law also prescribes that the prefecture governors conduct surveys and determine which 

areas are expected to be hit by tsunamis. The Act facilitates counter-tsunami city planning by 

municipal governments and requires that they make counter-tsunami plans.

355

It also clarifies 

prefectural and municipal government responsibilities for the installment, improvement, and 

maintenance of counter-tsunami facilities, such as levees, and makes it easier for them to carry 

out these responsibilities by restricting the rights of private parties. The governors may 

designate “tsunami warning areas.”

356

In such areas, the building of facilities that accommodate 

people who have difficulty evacuating in an emergency, such as hospitals, nurseries, and schools, 

must satisfy special requirements, such that these facilities will not be destroyed by tsunamis and 

will have higher floors to accommodate people who cannot evacuate.

357

The governor can also 

designate “tsunami special warning areas” where construction and changes in the use of 

buildings can be restricted.

358

D. Other Measures for the Prevention and Mitigation of Damage

After the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Diet enacted the Act on Special Measures for 

Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures.

359 Based on this law, prefectures must have a Five-Year

351 Tsunami taisaku no suishin ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Promotion of Tsunami Countermeasures], Act No. 77

of 2011.

352 Tsunami bōsai chiiki dukuri ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Making Local Areas Resistant to Tsunami], Act No. 123

of 2011.

353 Id. art. 3.

354 Tsunami bōsai chiiki dukuri no suishin ni kansuru kihon teki na shishin [Basic Guidelines on Promotion of

Making Areas Resistant to Tsunamis], MLIT Notification No. 51 of 2012 (Jan. 16, 2012).

355 Act on Making Local Areas Resistant to Tsunami, Law No. 123 of 2011, art. 10.

356 Id. art. 53.

357 Id. art. 56.

358 Id. art. 72.

359 Jishin bōsai taisaku tokubetsu sochihō [Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures], Act

No. 111 of 1995, last amended by Act No. 51 of 2012.
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Plan on Urgent Earthquake Disaster Management Projects, and prepare and strengthen facilities 

to protect people from earthquake disasters. 360The national government provides additional 

subsidies for such projects.

361 Also, prefectures are required to strengthen surveys that help 

predict earthquakes.

362

X. Concluding Remarks

The Great East Japan Earthquake created a crisis of proportions that Japan has not seen since the 

Second World War, presenting a variety of challenges generated by the earthquake itself and the 

ensuing tsunami and nuclear power plant meltdowns. The Japanese government immediately 

responded under then existing emergency response systems, which were already quite robust 

given Japan’s unique geology, but was also forced to enact a number of new laws and 

regulations to expand those systems due to the sheer magnitude of the disaster.

Among other innovations, the government created a new system to process debris that involved 

local governments far removed from the disaster area. A reconstruction agency was created to 

coordinate various reconstruction efforts and a new tsunami countermeasures law was enacted. 

Based on post-earthquake assessments of the effectiveness of the existing nuclear regulatory 

authority, a new nuclear regulatory agency and new standards for nuclear power plants were 

created. New standards for acceptable radiation levels in food were also promulgated.

Japan has used the experience to better prepare for future disasters. As then Prime Minister 

Yoshihiko Noda said on the one-year anniversary of the earthquake, “[o]ur goal is not simply to 

reconstruct the Japan that existed before March 11, 2011, but to build a new Japan. We are 

determined to overcome this historic challenge.”

363

360 Id. arts. 3 & 4.

361 Id. art. 4.

362 Id. art. 7.

363 Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, supra note

1.