* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 25 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS TAYLOR DORAN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. DR. PAUL ROBINSON, President of Sandia Labs,Defendant - Appellee. No. 03-2038 (D.C. No. CIV-02-1403-WPJ/DJS) (D. New Mexico)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , MURPHY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

After examining the brief and appellate record, thi s panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Since he acts pro se, we construe Mr. Doran’s plead ings liberally.

Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).

2 Sandia National Laboratories is a federally owned f acility managed and operated by private contractor Sandia Corporation. Dr. Robinson, at the time of suit, was president of Sandia Corporation and direc tor of Sandia National Laboratories.

3 In support of his claims, Mr. Doran variously cites to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Aug. 8, 1945); U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, art. VI (M arch 5, 1970); and Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Convention (Dec. 7, 1 979). -2- Mr. Douglas Doran, acting pro se 1 , appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his § 1983 in forma pauperis complaint because it was frivolous

. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Mr. Doran filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 againstDr. Paul Robinson, President of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia). 2 He alleges Dr. Robinson, acting under color of state law, violated his const itutional rights by designing nuclear weapons at Sandia, which he terms a “crime against peace.” (ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 1.) In a second count, Mr. Doran character izes the work of Sandia as a hostile act leading to the “crime of indiscriminate attack.” 3 (Id. ) He claims Sandia caused him unnecessary distress, worry, and concern for his family and their good health. For relief, he requested person al and publicized assurances from Dr. Robinson that nuclear weapon design at San dia would cease. The district court dismissed his complaint as frivolous , and later denied a request for4 After the district court dismissed his complaint, M r. Doran filed a pleading

the court correctly construed as a motion for an extension of time in which to file either a motion to reconsider or a motion to amend the complaint. In an Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the district c ourt denied the motion because there were no grounds to reconsider its ruling, andamendment of the complaint would have been futile. We review motions to reconsider and to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Thompson v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 58 F.3d 1511, 1514-15 (10th Cir. 1995) (motion to reconside r); Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (motion to ame nd complaint). The district court did not abuse its d iscretion in denying Mr. Doran’s motion.

5But see Wardell v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 03-1039, 2003 WL 21640973 (10th Cir. July 14, 2003) (unpublished decision) (applyin g abuse of discretion standard but suggesting 1996 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 may require de novo review of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals); Basham v. Uphoff, No. 98-8013, 1998 WL 847689, at *4 n.2 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 1998) (unpubli shed decision) (applying abuse of discretion standard but questioning its continue d application and suggesting de novo review might apply in light of 1996 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which removed discretion of district court to dismiss fri volous complaints and replaced it with requirement to do so). In this case, undereither a de novo or abuse of discretion standard, we reach the same result. -3- reconsideration. 4 From these orders Mr. Doran appeals. A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint at any time if the court determines the action is frivolou s. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Traditionally, we have reviewed the dismissal of a frivolous complaint for abuse of discretion; we discern no abuse. See Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1997). 5 “[A] district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis action as frivolous if the claim [is] based on an indisputabl y meritless legal theory or if it is founded on clearly baseless factual contentions.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). Frivol ous claims include those-4-

“describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, clai ms with which federal district judges are all too familiar.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Doran alleges Dr. Robinson was acting under col or of state law, and yet identifies no state law involved in Dr. Robinso n’s activities. Even liberally construed as a complaint against a federal official in his official capacity, Mr. Doran cites to no waiver of sovereign immunity thatwould enable the action. See Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, M r. Doran fails to allege facts establishing Dr. Robinson per sonally caused a constitutional violation. “Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation .” Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997). If his claim is that Dr. Robinson supervised others who committed the violation(s), he has failed to al lege facts establishing an “affirmative link exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation or his failure to supervise.” Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Apart from the paucity of facts alleged in his comp laint, Mr. Doran fails to state a cognizable legal theory justifying relief. The only constitutional provision to which he cites as a basis for relief is Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States-5-

Constitution, which provides that the Constitution, laws passed in furtherance thereof, and treaties lawfully made “shall be the s upreme Law of the Land . . . .” This allusion begs the question of what explicit co nstitutional violation Dr. Robinson is alleged to have committed against Mr. D oran. After a careful review of the record, we adopt the reasoning in the district court’s orders, AFFIRM the decisions of the district court, and dismiss t he appeal as frivolous.

Entered by the Court: TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN United States Circuit Judge