alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2019051EN.01000601.xml

| 22.2.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 51/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.2.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 51/6

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/303

of 21 February 2019

on the minimum selling price for skimmed milk powder for the 33rd partial invitation to tender within the tendering procedure opened by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2080

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1),

Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1240 of 18 May 2016 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to public intervention and aid for private storage (2), and in particular Article 32 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2080 (3) has opened the sale of skimmed milk powder by a tendering procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2080 (3) has opened the sale of skimmed milk powder by a tendering procedure.

| (2) | In the light of the tenders received for the 33rd partial invitation to tender, a minimum selling price should be fixed. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In the light of the tenders received for the 33rd partial invitation to tender, a minimum selling price should be fixed.

| (3) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee for the Common Organisation of the Agricultural Markets, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee for the Common Organisation of the Agricultural Markets,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the 33rd partial invitation to tender for the selling of skimmed milk powder within the tendering procedure opened by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2080, in respect of which the period during which tenders were to be submitted ended on 19 February 2019, the minimum selling price shall be 163,10 EUR/100 kg.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 21 February 2019.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Jerzy PLEWA

Director-General

Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 206, 30.7.2016, p. 71.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2080 of 25 November 2016 opening the sale of skimmed milk powder by a tendering procedure (OJ L 321, 29.11.2016, p. 45).

3

---
#### § 19.410 May I approve a participant's use of the services of an excluded person?

After entering into a covered transaction with a participant, you as an agency official may not approve a participant's use of an excluded person as a principal under that transaction, unless you obtain an exception under § 19.120.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric J. Bullis, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 125]

Crew III, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Eidens, J.), rendered September 19, 2003, *836which revoked defendant’s probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment.

In 1999, defendant was convicted in Schenectady County of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to five years probation. Following his arrest in Orange County for driving while intoxicated in July 2003, a violation of probation petition was filed against defendant. In full satisfaction thereof, defendant admitted to failing to notify his probation officer of his arrest. County Court thereafter revoked defendant’s probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment of 1 to 3 years, prompting this appeal.

Initially, defendant’s contention that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel is not preserved for our review due to defendant’s failure to move to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v McKoy,*303 AD2d 842, 842-843 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 564 [2003]; *People v Wright,*295 AD2d 806, 806-807 [2002]). Were we to address this argument, we would find it to be without merit. Counsel secured an agreement wherein it was only necessary for defendant to admit failing to report his arrest to the probation department, thereby avoiding any prejudice to defendant’s position in the prosecution for driving while intoxicated pending in Orange County, and there is nothing in the record that casts doubt upon counsel’s effectiveness *(see People v McKoy, supra*at 843; *People v Wright, supra*at 806-807).

Nor are we inclined to modify the sentence imposed in the interest of justice. We will not disturb the sentence imposed by a trial court absent a clear abuse of discretion or the existence of extraordinary circumstances *(see People v McKoy, supra*at 843; *People v Sawinski,*294 AD2d 667, 669 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 701 [2002]), neither of which is present here. Moreover, County Court made no sentencing promises to defendant, the sentence imposed was within the permissible statutory range and defendant was aware, prior to making his admission, that it was not likely that this sentence and the sentence imposed upon his conviction in Orange County would run concurrently.

Peters, Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ, concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1101

To abolish the Board of Review of the Metropolitan Washington Airports

Authority, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 1, 1995

Mr. MORAN (for himself, Mr. DAVIS, and Mrs. MORELLA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure

A BILL

To abolish the Board of Review of the Metropolitan

Washington Airports Authority, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ABOLITION OF BOARD OF REVIEW AND RELAT4 ED AUTHORITY.

5 (a) ABOLITION OF BOARD OF REVIEW.—Section

6 6007 of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of

7 1986 (100 Stat. 1783–379) is amended—

8 (1) by striking subsections (f) and (h);

9 (2) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub10 section (f); and
2

•HR 1101 IH

1 (3) by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection

2 (g).

3 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

4 (1) RELATIONSHIP TO AND EFFECT OF OTHER

5 LAWS.—Section 6009(b) of the Metropolitan Wash6 ington Airports Act of 1986 (100 Stat. 1783–384)

7 is amended by striking ‘‘or by reason of the author8 ity’’ and all that follows through the end of the sub9 section and inserting a period.

10 (2) SEPARABILITY.—Section 6011 of the Met11 ropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986 (100

12 Stat. 1783–385) is amended by striking ‘‘Except as

13 provided in section 6007(h), if ’’ and inserting ‘‘If ’’.

14 (c) PROTECTION OF CERTAIN ACTIONS.—Actions

15 taken by the Airports Authority and submitted to the

16 Board of Review pursuant to section 6007(f)(4) of the

17 Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986 before

18 April 1, 1995, shall remain in effect and shall not be set

19 aside solely by reason of a judicial order invalidating cer20 tain functions of the Board of Review.

21 (d) AMENDMENT OF LEASE.—The Secretary of

22 Transportation shall amend the lease entered into with the

23 Airports Authority under section 6005(a) of the Metro24 politan Washington Airports Act of 1986 to secure the
3

•HR 1101 IH

1 Airports Authority’s consent to the amendments made by

2 this Act.

3 SEC. 2. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS IN OTHER LAW.

4 Any reference in any Federal law, Executive order,

5 rule, regulation, or delegation of authority to the Board

6 of Review of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Au7 thority or the provisions of law repealed under this Act

8 is hereby repealed.

Æ
#### § 15.737-18 Representation.

A respondent or proposed respondent may appear in person or he/she may be represented by counsel or other representative. The Director may be represented by an attorney or other employee of the Department.
§ 36.3121(l)(2)-1 Effective period of agreement. ( a ) *In general.* An agreement entered into as provided in § 36.3121(l) (1)-1 shall be in effect for the period beginning with the first day of the calendar quarter in which the agreement is signed by the district director or director of the service center, or the first day of the calendar quarter following the calendar quarter in which the agreement is signed by the district director or director of the service center, whichever is specified in the agreement. In no case, however, shall the agreement be effective for any calendar quarter which begins prior to January 1, 1955.
( b ) *Amendment of agreement.* If an amendment on Form 2032 Supplement (filed by a domestic corporation to include in its agreement services performed for a foreign subsidiary not previously named therein) is signed by the district director or director of the service center, within the quarter for which the agreement is first effective or within the first calendar month following such quarter, the agreement shall be effective with respect to the subsidiary named in the amendment as of the date such agreement first became effective. However, if the amendment is signed by the district director or director of the service center after the last day of the fourth month for which the agreement is in effect, such agreement shall be in effect with respect to the subsidiary named in the amendment for the period beginning with the first day of the calendar quarter following the calendar quarter in which the amendment is signed by the district director or director of the service center.
[T.D. 7012, 34 FR 7694, May 15, 1969]
Fw: draft non-Hg case study technical support memo 

 RobertJ Wayland 

 to: Cortney_Higgins 

 03/03/2011 04:25 PM 

 Cc: Bill Maxwell 

Cortney - 

Here's another memo. 

thanx! 

bob 

----- Forwarded by RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US on 03/03/2011 04:24 PM 

----- 

From: Dave Guinnup/RTP/USEPA/US 

To: Bill Maxwell/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA 

Cc: Lydia Wegman/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Ted Palma/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Mark 

Morris/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA 

Date: 03/03/2011 04:23 PM 

Subject: draft non-Hg case study technical support memo 

this is ready to go to OMB 

Inhalation case study memo 3_1_2011.docx 

Dave Guinnup 

Leader, Air Toxics Assessment Group 

Health and Environmental Impacts Division 

Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards 

US EPA (C539-02) 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 

(919)-541-5368 voice 

(919)-541-0840 FAX
#### Dahms v. Martino

*James Peck,*for defendant.

June 3, 1953.

Forrest, J.,

This matter comes before us upon a writ of certiorari issued to Francis X. Walsh, one of the justices of the peace of this county to return to this court his record wherein he recorded judgment to plaintiff. One of the contentions of defendant is that the record of the case, as certified to this court, contains a fatal procedural error in that the summons was in assumpsit and in accordance with the affidavit of the justice of the peace attached to the transcript it is stated:

“In Action of Dahms v. Martino *Action in Assumpsit was changed to Action in Trespass on the return date*viz: November 18, 1952 at 10.00 A. M. (before hearing the testimony of the Plaintiff).” (Italics supplied.)

*581The case of Fahnestock v. Bushey & Co., 5 Lanc. 57, is strikingly similar. In that case the summons was issued in assumpsit and the justice of the peace amended the caption “so as to read an action of trespass” and then the case was proceeded with as though it were an action in trespass and judgment given to plaintiff. On appeal to the court of common pleas of that county the judgment was reversed and set aside. Although that case is antiquated, the reason of the principle upon which it was decided still applies. Let us assume that plaintiff here had two claims against defendant, one for goods sold and delivered, which defendant does not dispute and the other consisting of damages arising from an automobile collision, which defendant does dispute; when he is served with a summons in assumpsit he naturally concludes that it is issued on the former claim and he defaults in appearance and answer, feeling that it would be futile to attend the hearing. Whereas, if he knew the proceedings were being changed to trespass he would have appeared and defended.

This is a practical application of the reason lying back of such decision. It might be argued that if that were the case defendant should have stated it as being the basis , for his appeal. However, the question here is whether the record itself discloses any error and, accordingly, neither plaintiff nor defendant can go dehors the record. Accordingly, such an argument could not be interposed by defendant. Furthermore, a judgment on an action before a justice of the peace sounding in assumpsit where the proof is in trespass will not be sustained: Simms v. Griest, 67 D. *&*C. 88, 90 (1949).

And now, June 3, 1953, the judgment entered by the justice of the peace in this case is reversed and set aside.
§ 16.46 Compromise or settlement. ( a ) Parties may make offers of compromise or settlement at any time.
( b ) The reviewing official has the exclusive authority to compromise or settle a case under this part at any time after the date on which the reviewing official is permitted to issue a complaint and before the date on which the ALJ issues an initial decision.
( c ) The authority head has exclusive authority to compromise or settle a case under this part at any time after the date on which the ALJ issues an initial decision, except during the pendency of any review under § 16.42 or during the pendency of any action to collect penalties and assessments under § 16.43.
( d ) The Attorney General has exclusive authority to compromise or settle a case under this part during the pendency of any review under § 16.42 or of any action to recover penalties and assessments under 31 U.S.C. 3806.
( e ) The investigating official may recommend settlement terms to the reviewing official, the authority head, or the Attorney General, as appropriate. The reviewing official may recommend settlement terms to the authority head, or the Attorney General, as appropriate.
( f ) Any compromise or settlement must be in writing and signed by all parties and their representatives.
Editorial Note on Part 10
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear by T.D. 9359, 72 FR 54544, Sept. 26, 2007.

§ 10.35 Competence. ( a ) A practitioner must possess the necessary competence to engage in practice before the Internal Revenue Service. Competent practice requires the appropriate level of knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the matter for which the practitioner is engaged. A practitioner may become competent for the matter for which the practitioner has been engaged through various methods, such as consulting with experts in the relevant area or studying the relevant law.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable beginning June 12, 2014.
[T.D. 9668, 79 FR 33693, June 12, 2014]
Allen C. Isbell

 Attorney at Law

BOARD CERTIFIED CRIMINAL LAW 2016 MAIN ST., SUITE 110 

BOARD CERTIFIED CRIMINAL APPELLATE LAW HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002 

COLLEGE OF THE STATE BAR, MEMBER (713)236-1000 

FAX (713)236-1809 

December 18, 2015

Clerk,

First Court of Appeals

301 Fannin

Houston, Texas 77002

Re: No(s). 01-15-00483-CR; WILLIE McDOWELL vs. The

State of Texas; Trial Court No(s). 1439664;

Dear Sir/Madame:

Please be advised that after careful review of the record, I will not be filing a

Supplemental Brief in the above mentioned matter.

I am sending a true and correct copy of this letter to the District Attorney's

Office, Appellate Division, and to Mr. Willie McDowell, appellant.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and advise time and date for filing. 

If you have any questions, please call.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Allen C. Isbell

Allen C. Isbell

ACI/mr

ACCEPTED

01-15-00483-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

12/18/2015 12:15:43 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 12/18/2015 12:15:43 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
§ 25.200 General rules. ( a ) To qualify for a loan prepayment at par pursuant to subsection (a) of the Act, a Borrower must have an Eligible FMS Loan or an Eligible FMS Advance.
( b ) A Borrower may prepay the Total Permitted Prepayment Amount in portions using more than one closing; however, all prepayments of the Total Permitted Prepayment Amount must have a Closing Date that is not later than September 30, 1991.
( c ) A Borrower may prepay all or a portion of the Total Permitted Prepayment Amount; however, if a Borrower selects to prepay any Permitted P&I Prepayment Amount of an FMS Advance, the Borrower must prepay the entire Permitted P&I Prepayment Amount of such FMS Advance.
( d ) If the payment billings of an FMS Loan have been consolidated in accordance with the terms of the respective loan agreement, and if any principal payments have been made on account of the FMS Loan, then the outstanding principal balances of any Eligible FMS Advances shall be determined in accordance with the principal of “first disbursed, first repaid,” that is, advances on account of the FMS Loan shall be deemed to have been repaid in the chronological order in which they were disbursed.
March 30, 2011 

MEMORANDUM 

SUBJECT: Incorporation by Reference of Previous Utility Rulemaking Dockets in the Toxics 

Rule Docket, EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234

FROM: William H. Maxwell 

 OAQPS/SPPD/ESG 

TO: Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234 

The following dockets are incorporated by reference into the subject current rulemaking docket: 

 Docket Number A-92-55; Electric Utility Hazardous Air Pollutant Emission 

Study 

 E-Docket Number OAR-2002-0056 and Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR2002-0056; Revision of December 2000 Clean Air Act Section 112(n) Finding 

Regarding Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (“Section 112(n) Revision 

Rule”); and Standards of Performance for New and Existing Electric Utility 

Steam Generating Units (“Clean Air Mercury Rule”)
#### Anthony L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. THE CITY OF SEQUIM, a municipal corporation; Byron Nelson, Jr., Chief, individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief of the City of Sequim and his marital community; Bill Thomas, individually and in his capacity as Mayor of Sequim, and his marital community; Clallam County, a municipal corporation; W.J. Hawe, Sheriff, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 01-35371.

D.C. No. CV-00-05354-JKA.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 7, 2002.

Decided June 20, 2002.

Before BRUNETTI, TROTT and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

*945ORDER *

Because the district court’s judgment below leaves open a counter-claim, and because the record is devoid of any certification as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1291; *Island Serv. Co. v. Perez,*255 F.2d 559, 560-61 (9th Cir.1957). Accordingly, this matter is dismissed.

DISMISSED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### § 11.2 Policy.

Blind vendors licensed by State licensing agencies designated by the Secretary of Education under the provisions of the Randolph-Sheppard Act (20 U.S.C. 107 *et seq.*) shall be given priority in the location and operation of vending facilities, including vending machines, on property controlled by the Department of the Treasury, provided the location or operation of such facility would not adversely affect the interests of the United States. Treasury bureaus shall ensure that the collection and distribution of vending machine income from vending machines on Treasury-controlled property shall be in compliance with the regulations set forth in 34 CFR 395.32. Blind vendors shall also be given priority on Treasury-controlled property in the operation of cafeterias according to 34 CFR 395.33.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 22

- 712

_____________________________
K ENNETH L AND ,
Petitioner
,

v.

F LORIDA C OMMISSION ON O FFENDER R EVIEW , Respondent

.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

— Original Jurisdiction

.

September 23, 2022

P ER C URIAM

. The Court denies the petition for writ of certiorari on the merits.

K ELSEY , J AY , and M.K. T HOMAS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Kenneth Land, pro se
, Petitioner

. No appearance for Respondent

.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 116 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
                               H. R. 116

To limit State authority to regulate certain activities on vessels, and 
                          for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

 Mr. Bilbray introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To limit State authority to regulate certain activities on vessels, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``California Cruise Industry 
Revitalization Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION OF CERTAIN STATE AUTHORITY OVER VESSELS.

    Section 5(b)(2) of the Act of January 2, 1951 (15 U.S.C. 
1175(b)(2), commonly referred to as the ``Johnson Act'' is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
                    ``(C) Exclusion of certain voyages and segments.--
                Except for a voyage or segment of a voyage that occurs 
                within the boundaries of the State of Hawaii, a voyage 
                or segment of a voyage is not described in subparagraph 
                (B) if it includes or consists of a segment--
                            ``(i) that begins and ends in the same 
                        State;
                            ``(ii) that is part of a voyage to another 
                        State or to a foreign country; and
                            ``(iii) in which the vessel reaches the 
                        other State or foreign country within 3 days 
                        after leaving the State in which it begins.''.
                                 <all>
```