FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 05-30356 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No. v. 

CR-04-00301-016-

ADRIAN GARCIA, MJP

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 05-30391 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No. v. 

CR-04-00301-003-

IVAN TORRES, MJP

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-30415

v. D.C. No.

MIGUEL PLASCENCIA-ALVARADO,  CR-04-00301-007-

also known as Esteban Garcia- MJP

Morales also known as Angel OPINION Caloca,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

14993
Argued and Submitted

July 25, 2006

Submission Withdrawn October 31, 2006

Resubmitted November 1, 2007

Seattle, Washington

Filed November 19, 2007

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Kim McLane Wardlaw and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

14994 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
COUNSEL

Mary Anne Royle, Vancouver, Washington, for defendantappellant Adrian Garcia. 

Nancy L. Talner, Seattle, Washington, for defendant-appellant

Miguel Plascencia-Alvarado. 

Jeffrey E. Ellis, Law Offices of Ellis, Holmes & Witchley,

PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for defendant-appellant Ivan Torres. 

John L. Lulejian (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

and James M. Lord, Assistant United States Attorney, Seattle,

Washington, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal requires us to consider several allegations of

sentencing error. Initially, we must decide whether we have

jurisdiction to review a sentence that is imposed in accordance with a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) and that is not contingent upon the

advisory Sentencing Guidelines. We also must determine

whether a district court commits plain error by failing to

explicitly set the maximum number of non-treatment related

drug tests to which the defendant will be exposed as a condition of supervised release. Finally, we must evaluate whether

a district court commits plain error by imposing a financial

disclosure condition on a defendant who has been convicted

of a drug trafficking offense and has a history of drug use. We

hold that we do not have jurisdiction to review a sentence

within the range agreed to in a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, and that the district court did not commit plain error by

imposing either condition.

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 14997
I. Background

Because the issues on appeal are exclusively related to sentencing, we need not recount detailed facts of the underlying

criminal offenses to which the defendants pled guilty. Rather,

we explain only those facts relevant to our resolution of the

defendants’ allegations of sentencing error. 

Adrian Garcia, Ivan Torres and Miguel PlascenciaAlvarado were all involved in a large-scale drug trafficking

conspiracy in the Western District of Washington. After being

charged with various crimes, all three entered into Rule 11

written plea agreements. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).1

Garcia pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute less than 500

grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and

841(b)(1)(C); Plascencia-Alvarado pled guilty to conspiracy

to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C); and Torres pled guilty to

conspiracy to distribute less than five grams of methamphetamine and less than 50 grams of a mixture containing

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and

841(b)(1)(C), as well as witness tampering in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2). In accordance with their respective plea

agreements, Garcia was sentenced to 48 months imprisonment

and Plascencia-Alvarado was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. Torres was sentenced to 66 months imprisonment,

also pursuant to his plea agreement, and is subject to various

1Rule 11(c)(1)(C) provides in part: 

An attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney . . .

may discuss and reach a plea agreement . . . . If the defendant

pleads guilty or nolo contendere to either a charged offense or a

lesser or related offense, the plea agreement may specify that an

attorney for the government will . . . agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the

case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines,

or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply

(such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court

accepts the plea agreement). 

14998 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
supervised release conditions. Garcia and PlascenciaAlvarado appeal their sentences, and Torres appeals the district court’s imposition of certain supervised release conditions. 

A. Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado

Garcia’s and Plascencia-Alvarado’s plea agreements are

nearly identical in all material respects. In both plea agreements, the defendants accepted that the maximum statutory

penalty for their offenses is 20 years imprisonment, waived

their right to a trial and agreed that the district court “will consider the factors set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), including the sentencing range calculated under

the United States Sentencing Guidelines” but “is not bound by

any recommendation regarding the sentence to be imposed, or

by any calculation or estimation of the Sentencing Guidelines

range offered by the parties, or by the United States Probation

Department.” Most importantly, Garcia agreed that “the

appropriate sentence of imprisonment to be imposed by the

Court at the time of sentencing should be within the range of

twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) months,” and PlascenciaAlvarado agreed that the appropriate sentence in his case was

“fifty-four (54) to ninety (90) months.” In light of these stipulated sentencing ranges, the parties acknowledged that “the

Court retains full discretion to impose a sentence within the

range agreed to above.” (Emphasis added.) 

At sentencing, the district court accepted Garcia’s plea

agreement and calculated the advisory guidelines range.2 In so

doing, the court, over Garcia’s objection, attributed to him

“the amount of cocaine that the Garcia arm of this organization was responsible for,” which was nearly five kilograms.

The district court also granted Garcia a three-point reduction

2During sentencing, the district court acknowledged that its guidelines

calculation “appear[ed] academic . . . because [the court was] going to

accept the 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.” 

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 14999
for acceptance of responsibility, and adjusted downward the

Presentence Report’s criminal history calculation. After

rejecting Garcia’s request for a two-point reduction for his

minor role in the offense, the district court arrived at a guidelines recommended range of 97 to 121 months. However,

because the district court had accepted the plea agreement,

Garcia was ultimately sentenced to 48 months imprisonment.3

Garcia appeals this sentence, arguing that the district court

erred in calculating the guidelines range because it applied the

wrong burden of proof with respect to the drug quantity attributed to Garcia. Had the district court applied the correct evidentiary standard, Garcia argues, it would have arrived at a

lower guidelines calculation and he would have received a 24-

month sentence. 

As with Garcia, the district court accepted PlascenciaAlvarado’s plea agreement and calculated his advisory guidelines range to be 108 to 135 months imprisonment.

Plascencia-Alvarado argued to the district court that he should

receive a 54-month sentence (at the low end of the plea agreement stipulation) because of various equities he believed were

in his favor, including his relationship with his young daughter. He further claimed that other similarly situated defendants

received comparable sentences. The district court rejected

these arguments and sentenced Plascencia-Alvarado to 60

months imprisonment (still at the lower end of his plea agreement’s stipulated range).4

 Plascencia-Alvarado appeals this

sentence as unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors. 

3

In justifying its sentence at the high end of the stipulated range, the district court explained that the sentence was lower than the guidelines range,

was “consistent with others who were” involved in similar offenses arising

out of the conspiracy, reflected the quality of Garcia’s cooperation with

the government and served to deter others from criminal conduct. 

4The district court judge explained that Plascencia-Alvarado’s sentence

reflected his role in the conspiracy, was comparable to that imposed upon

others charged with similar conduct and accounted for his contrition and

lack of prior drug trafficking offenses. 

15000 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
B. Torres

Torres’ plea agreement stipulated to a fixed sentence of 66

months and acknowledged “that the Court retains full discretion with regard to the imposition of a term of supervised

release, the conditions of supervised release, fines, forfeiture

or restitution.” At sentencing, the district court accepted the

Rule 11 plea agreement and sentenced Torres to the agreed

upon term. The district court also imposed several conditions

of supervised release, including that Torres (1) “shall submit

to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment

and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined

by the court;” (2) “shall submit to mandatory drug testing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)”

(drug testing condition); and (3) “shall provide his probation

officer with access to any requested financial information,

including authorization to conduct credit checks and obtain

copies of defendant’s Federal Income Tax Returns” (financial

disclosure condition). Although Torres did not object to these

conditions at sentencing, he now argues that the district court

erred in imposing them. 

II. Analysis

A. Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado5

As an initial matter, the government argues that we lack

jurisdiction to review these defendants’ sentences because

they each received a sentence within the range stipulated to in

their plea agreements.6 That is, because the defendants

5Because both Garcia’s and Plascencia-Alvarado’s challenges implicate

the same dispositive issue, we address their claims jointly. 

6Neither Garcia nor Plascencia-Alvarado expressly waived the right to

appeal the district court’s sentence. Cf. United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d

921, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights

is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses his right to

appeal on the grounds raised, and if the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Plea agreements are contracts between a defendant and the

government, and we generally construe ambiguous language in favor of

the defendant.” (internal citations omitted)). 

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 15001
received the benefit of their plea bargains, they may not now

challenge the sentences. 

[1] 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) grants appellate courts limited

jurisdiction to review a defendant’s challenge to a district

court’s sentence. See United States v. Barron-Rivera, 922

F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1991). To entertain either Garcia’s or

Plascencia-Alvarado’s claim of sentencing error, we must find

that some provision of § 3742(a) applies, thus establishing our

jurisdiction. Specifically, the statute provides in relevant part:

(a) Appeal by a defendant. A defendant may file a

notice of appeal in the district court for review of an

otherwise final sentence if the sentence — 

(1) was imposed in violation of law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; or 

(3) is greater than the sentence specified

in the applicable guideline range to the

extent that the sentence includes a greater

fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or

supervised release than the maximum

established in the guideline range . . . ; or

(4) was imposed for an offense for which

there is no sentencing guideline and is

plainly unreasonable. 

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Garcia asserts that we may review his

sentence for guidelines calculation error under either

§ 3742(a)(1) or (2), whereas Plascencia-Alvarado relies only

on § 3742(a)(1) to argue that we have jurisdiction to determine whether his sentence is unreasonable.7

 We conclude that

7There was some discussion at oral argument regarding the applicability

of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c), which provides that “[i]n the case of a plea agree15002 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
we are without jurisdiction to entertain either Garcia’s or

Plascencia-Alvarado’s appeal. 

[2] Section 3742(a)(1) allows us to review a sentence “imposed in violation of law.” We have held that where a defendant is given the minimum sentence permitted by the statute

of conviction, see United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527,

528 (9th Cir. 1997), or a sentence within the statutory maximum, see United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843-44

(9th Cir. 1996), such a sentence is not illegal, and therefore

does not violate the law. In this case, our jurisdiction is not

established under § 3742(a)(1) because both Garcia and

Plascencia-Alvarado received sentences well within the statutory maximums. Therefore their sentences were not “imposed

in violation of law.” 

[3] More recently, we held that § 3742(a)(1) confers jurisdiction to review sentences imposed within the advisory

guidelines range if the defendant challenges the sentence as

unreasonable under the § 3553(a) factors, because unreasonable sentences are “imposed in violation of law.” United

States v. Plouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A

sentence that is within the Guidelines range . . . may be unreasonable and thus imposed in violation of law pursuant to

§ 3742(a)(1).”). Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado invoke

Plouffe to argue that jurisdiction properly lies because their

sentences failed to satisfy § 3553(a) either because the guidelines range was improperly computed, see § 3553(a)(4), or

ment that includes a specific sentence under rule [11(c)(1)(C)] of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure — (1) a defendant may not file a notice

of appeal under paragraph (3) or (4) of [18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)] unless the

sentence imposed is greater than the sentence set forth in such agreement.”

Because neither Garcia nor Plascencia-Alvarado asserts that § 3742(a)(3)

or (4) applies, we need not explore whether § 3742(c), which by its terms

refers only to a plea agreement providing for a specific sentence, applies

to cases such as this where the plea agreement provides for a specific sentencing range. 

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 15003
because the other factors were not properly weighed. However, Plouffe is inapplicable to the sentences in this case.

Plouffe considered only appeals of sentences imposed within

and pursuant to the applicable advisory guidelines range.

Plouffe, 445 F.3d at 1129-30. In reasoning that we have jurisdiction to review even within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness, Plouffe relied on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), which held that the reasonableness (and therefore

legality) of a sentence must be evaluated in light of all of the

§ 3553(a) factors, not just the guidelines calculation. Plouffe,

445 F.3d at 1130 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46). 

[4] Unlike Plouffe, Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado were

not sentenced pursuant to the guidelines. Their sentences were

within the range they agreed to in their Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea

agreements, and although each agreement contemplated that

the district court would calculate the guidelines range, it did

not condition the sentence on a properly calculated range. We

have already held that such stipulated sentences need not

comport with the guidelines, as they are “not based on the

[g]uidelines.”8 United States v. Pacheco-Navarette, 432 F.3d

967, 971 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We conclude that, where a defendant was sentenced after pleading guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement that included a specific sentence stipulation that

did not exceed the statutory maximum and was not contingent

upon the Guidelines, remand is not required to comport with

Booker and [United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc)].”); see also United States v. Cieslowski, 410

F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A sentence imposed under a

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea arises directly from the agreement

itself, not from the Guidelines, even though the court can and

should consult the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept

the plea. As Booker is concerned with sentences arising under

8Because Garcia’s Rule 11(c)(1)(C) stipulated sentence was not conditioned by a requirement that it comport with the guidelines, and was not

contingent upon them, his argument that we have jurisdiction under

§ 3742(a)(2) must also fail. 

15004 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
the Guidelines, it is inapplicable in this situation.” (internal

citation omitted)). Consequently, we hold that we do not have

jurisdiction to review a sentence that was imposed pursuant to

a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and was not contingent on

the guidelines, where the defendant claims only that there was

some error in the district court’s calculation of the guidelines

or application of Booker.

9

See United States v. Silva, 413 F.3d

1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Silva’s only plausible argument

[that the court has jurisdiction] is that his sentence was

imposed in violation of law because it was given under a

mandatory sentencing scheme. But this argument fails for the

simple and obvious reason that Silva received the specific

sentence he bargained for as part of his guilty plea.”). We

therefore dismiss Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado’s appeals

of their sentences. 

B. Torres

Torres challenges the district court’s imposition of both the

drug testing and financial disclosure conditions. As to drug

testing, Torres argues that the district court erred in failing to

specify the maximum number of non-treatment drug tests,

thereby impermissibly delegating that authority to Torres’

probation officer. See United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d

876, 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a probation officer

may not decide the . . . extent of the punishment imposed,”

because “[u]nder our constitutional system the right to . . .

impose the punishment provided by law is judicial” (alteration

9As in Pacheco-Navarette, we do not here address “whether or to what

extent a plea agreement containing a stipulation of a particular Guideline

range or a sentence otherwise based or contingent upon the Guidelines

must comport with the Guidelines, as that situation is not before us.” 432

F.3d at 971 n.3. Furthermore, because we lack jurisdiction to review Garcia’s and Plascencia-Alvarado’s sentences, we do not address the applicability of Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), United States v.

Carty, 453 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc granted, 462 F.3d

1066 (9th Cir. 2006), or United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006), reh’g en banc granted, 462 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 15005
in original) (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted)). Torres also argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the financial disclosure condition because

it is not “reasonably related to the crime of conviction.” 

We generally defer to the district court in imposing supervised release conditions and review them for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 998 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir.

1993). Because Torres did not object to the conditions of his

supervised release before the sentencing court, however, we

review for plain error. See Stephens, 424 F.3d at 879 n.1. We

conclude there was no error, much less plain error, in the district court’s sentence. 

1. Drug Testing Condition

[5] The district court directed Torres to “submit to one drug

test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least

two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court”

and to “submit to mandatory drug testing pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).”

10 Although

recitation of this boilerplate drug testing language established

the minimum number of drug tests to which Torres would be

subject, it does not appear to establish a maximum number of

such tests. However, as we held in Stephens, “the [sentencing]

courts [have] the responsibility of stating the maximum number of [drug] tests to be performed or to set a range for the

permissible number of tests.” 424 F.3d at 883 (concluding

that “while the district court itself determined the minimum

1018 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5) applies to drug testing conditions of probation,

whereas § 3583(d) applies to a condition of supervised release. Both statutory sections provide that courts shall order 

as an explicit condition of [probation or supervised release,] that

the defendant refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to [a] drug test within 15 days of release on

[probation or supervised release] and at least 2 periodic drug tests

thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled

substance. 

15006 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
number of tests to which [the defendant] would be required to

submit, the court erred when it failed to state the maximum

number of non-treatment drug tests the probation officer

could impose”). Unlike in Stephens, where the district court

expressly delegated the authority to set a maximum number

of non-treatment drug tests to the probation officer, id. at 878,

in this case the district court made no such delegation. Nonetheless, because the district court did not set a maximum, Torres reasonably argues that the probation officer could be

understood as having this authority, which would clearly violate Stephens. 

[6] In United States v. Maciel-Vasquez, 458 F.3d 994 (9th

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2097 (2007), the defendant

challenged a drug testing condition of supervised release that

required him to “participate in outpatient substance abuse

treatment and submit to drug and alcohol testing as instructed

by the probation officer.” Id. at 996 (internal quotation marks

omitted). We observed that this condition would be permissible if imposed incidental to a drug treatment program, but

would be improper under Stephens if it were to be understood

as granting “the probation officer authority to require testing

apart from any treatment program.” Id. However, we refused

to determine the purpose of the drug testing because the

defendant did not object at sentencing and could not establish

any plain error. Id. Unlike in Maciel-Vasquez, the government

here concedes that “the Probation Office may conduct only

the minimum three tests allowed for in the order.” Indeed, it

is clear that district courts that seek to impose more than the

statutory minimum of three drug tests must explicitly do so at

sentencing. See United States v. Lewandowski, 372 F.3d 470,

471 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Given the government’s

concession, we construe the district court’s supervised release

condition as implicitly limiting the maximum number of drug

tests to three. Torres must submit to at least and at most “one

drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and . . .

two periodic drug tests thereafter.” Should the probation

office believe more drug tests are necessary, it would have to

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 15007
request a modification from the district court. Any such modification would of course have to comply with Stephens. Thus

construed, there is no error in the district court’s drug testing

condition. 

2. Financial Disclosure Condition

[7] District courts are encouraged to impose a financial disclosure condition when they require a defendant to pay restitution. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(3) (instructing that where

“the court imposes an order of restitution, forfeiture, or notice

to victims, or orders the defendant to pay a fine,” it should

also impose “a condition requiring the defendant to provide

the probation officer access to any requested financial information”). However, a district court may impose such a condition even without ordering restitution, so long as the condition

satisfies certain criteria.11 First, it must be “reasonably related

to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States

v. Gallaher, 275 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2001); see also

United States v. Brown, 402 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2005)

(“[T]he Guidelines recommend a financial disclosure special

condition where the court imposes a fine or restitution. By its

own terms, however, this policy statement does not preclude

a court from requiring financial disclosure in other ‘appropriate’ situations.” (internal citation omitted)). Second, it must

“involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary. . . .” United States v. Fellows, 157 F.3d 1197, 1204

(9th Cir. 1998). Finally, the condition “must be consistent

with pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.” Id.

[8] The financial disclosure requirement imposed on Torres

satisfies all three criteria, and the district court did not commit

plain error by imposing the condition. Torres was involved in

11Moreover, contrary to Torres’ argument otherwise, the condition need

not “be related to the offense of conviction.” United States v. Wise, 391

F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004). 

15008 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
a large scale drug conspiracy as a drug supplier. Torres also

has a history of drug abuse. Clearly, if Torres is receiving or

spending significant funds in suspicious ways, the probation

office would have reason to believe he has reengaged with

drug trafficking or use and would so report to the district

court. Requiring Torres to disclose financial information, at

the very least, reflects appreciation of “the nature and circumstances of the offense and [his] history and characteristics”

and serves “to protect the public from further crimes.” 18

U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). And the probation office’s

monitoring is no greater than necessary to achieve these ends.

[9] We join our sister circuits in concluding that certain

defendants who have been convicted of drug trafficking

offenses may properly be required to disclose the details of

their personal finances as a condition of supervised release.

See Brown, 402 F.3d at 137 (affirming financial disclosure

condition imposed on defendant convicted of drug trafficking

in part because “given this particular defendant’s personal

characteristics and history, the financial disclosure requirement is an effective monitoring — and hence deterring —

device” and because “monitoring [the defendant’s] finances

will . . . serve to protect the public from ‘further crimes of the

defendant’ ”); United States v. Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d

93, 107 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming financial disclosure condition imposed on a similarly situated defendant because it is

related to the characteristics of the defendant and deters future

criminal conduct), overruled on other grounds by U.S. v.

Padilla, 415 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States

v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming financial disclosure condition because “the district court understood that money and greed were at the heart of [the

defendant’s] drug distribution offenses and believed that monitoring [the defendant’s] financial situation would aid in

detecting any return to his former lifestyle of drug distribution”). Therefore the district court did not plainly err in

imposing this condition. 

UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 15009
III. Conclusion

Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado were sentenced to a term

that was within the range they agreed to in their Rule

11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, which was not contingent upon

the guidelines. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(1) or (a)(2) to review challenges

to their sentences. Torres’ supervised release drug testing condition, as construed by this court, is not improper, nor is the

financial disclosure condition. 

Garcia’s and Plascencia-Alvarado’s appeals are DISMISSED. Torres’ sentence (including the conditions of supervised release) is AFFIRMED. 

15010 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA