alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 10.11**AMENDED AND RESTATED AMERICAN COLOR GRAPHICS, INC.SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLANAmended and Restated Effective as of July 1, 2005
 

 
TABLE OF CONTENTS       PageARTICLE I         ELIGIBILITY  1 1.1 In General  1 1.2 Participants  2      ARTICLE II         RETIREMENT BENEFITS  2 2.1 Vested Retirement Benefit  2 2.2 Vesting of Retirement Benefit  3 2.3 Lump Sum Payment Election  3      ARTICLE III         SURVIVOR BENEFITS  5 3.1 Post-Retirement Survivor Benefit  5 3.2 Pre-Retirement Survivor Benefit  5      ARTICLE IV         CONDITIONS RELATED TO BENEFITS  6 4.1 Administration of Plan  6 4.2 Grantor Trust  7 4.3 No Right to Company Assets  7 4.4 No Employment Rights  7 4.5 Company’s Rights to Terminate and Amend  8 4.6 Protective Provisions  8 4.7 No Right of Offset  8 4.8 No Third Party Rights  8      ARTICLE V         MISCELLANEOUS  9 5.1 Nonassignability  9 5.2Withholding  9 5.3 Gender and Number  10 5.4 Notice  10 5.5 Validity  10 5.6 Non-Uniform Determinations  10 
i

 
       Page5.7 Enforceability  10 5.8 Applicable Law  11      ARTICLE VI         DEFINITIONS  11 
ii

 
AMENDED AND RESTATED AMERICAN COLOR GRAPHICS, INC.SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLAN     The purpose of this Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (the “Plan”) is to provide afurther means whereby American Color Graphics, Inc. and its successors (the “Company”) mayattract, retain and encourage the productive efforts of a key group of officers and seniorexecutives who render valuable services to the Company and its subsidiaries, constituting animportant contribution toward the Company’s continued growth and success. The Plan provideslifetime or lump sum pension benefits to participants who qualify for such benefits (generallydescribed in Article II) and may also provide benefits to a surviving named beneficiary followinga qualifying participant’s death (generally described in Article III).     Capitalized terms used within Articles I through V of the Plan without definition have themeanings specified in Article VI.     The Plan is hereby amended and restated effective as of July 1, 2005 to read as follows:ARTICLE I
#### § 601.527 Other provisions applied to representation in alcohol, tobacco, and firearms activities.

The provisions of paragraph (b) of § 601.505, and of §§ 601.506 through 601.508 of this subpart, as applicable, shall be followed in offices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

[34 FR 6433, Apr. 12, 1969, as amended at 34 FR 14604, Sept. 19, 1969; 45 FR 7259, Feb. 1, 1980]
§ 1023.210 Anti-money laundering program requirements for brokers or dealers in securities. A broker or dealer in securities shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5318(h)(1) if the broker-dealer implements and maintains a written anti-money laundering program approved by senior management that: ( a ) Complies with the requirements of §§ 1010.610 and 1010.620 of this chapter and any applicable regulation of its Federal functional regulator governing the establishment and implementation of anti-money laundering programs;
( b ) Includes, at a minimum: ( 1 ) The establishment and implementation of policies, procedures, and internal controls reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the applicable provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act and the implementing regulations thereunder;
( 2 ) Independent testing for compliance to be conducted by the broker-dealer's personnel or by a qualified outside party;
( 3 ) Designation of an individual or individuals responsible for implementing and monitoring the operations and internal controls of the program;
( 4 ) Ongoing training for appropriate persons; and
( 5 ) Appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence, to include, but not be limited to: ( i ) Understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile; and
( ii ) Conducting ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(5)(ii), customer information shall include information regarding the beneficial owners of legal entity customers (as defined in § 1010.230 of this chapter); and
( c ) Complies with the rules, regulations, or requirements of its self-regulatory organization governing such programs; provided that the rules, regulations, or requirements of the self-regulatory organization governing such programs have been made effective under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the appropriate Federal functional regulator in consultation with FinCEN.
[81 FR 29457, May 11, 2016]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andrew Gentile, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 199]

Appeal from a judgment of the Herkimer County Court (Patrick L. Kirk, J.), rendered July 20, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]) and assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [1]), defendant contends that County Court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on the defense of justification (§ 35.15 [1]). We conclude that the court properly denied that request. “The rule is that the jury must be instructed on all claimed defenses which are supported by a *reasonable view*of the evidence—not by any view of the evidence, however artificial or irrational” *(People v Butts,*72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]; *see People v Odinga,*143 AD2d 202, 204 [1988], *lv denied*73 NY2d 858 [1988]; *see also People v McManus,*67 NY2d 541, 549 [1986]; *People v Watts,*57 NY2d 299, 301 [1982]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant *(see People v Reynoso,*73 NY2d 816, 818 [1988]; *McManus,*67 NY2d at 549), we conclude that there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support the defense of justification *(see generally Watts,*57 NY2d at 301).

We reject the further contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to pursue the defenses of insanity and intoxication. Where, as here, those defenses would be inconsistent with the defense advanced by defense counsel, i.e., that defendant was justified in his actions *(see e.g. People v Baptiste,*306 AD2d 562, 569-570 [2003], *lv denied*1 NY3d 594 [2004]; *People v Rizzo,*
      *1076301 AD2d 682, 683 [2003], *lv denied*99 NY2d 631 [2003]), we will not “second-guess whether [the] course chosen by defendant’s counsel was the best trial strategy, or even a good one, so long as defendant was afforded meaningful representation” *(People v Satterfield,*66 NY2d 796, 799-800 [1985]). We conclude that defendant was afforded meaningful representation *(see generally People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). Present—Scudder, J.P., Martoche, Pine, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Swift Energy
Managed Pension Assets Partnership 1989-C, Ltd.'s balance sheet and statement of
operations  con- tained in its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 1998 and
is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         175,422
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  47,727
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               223,149
<PP&E>                                         2,303,899
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,000,729)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 526,319
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3,951
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     522,368
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   526,319
<SALES>                                        51,317
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               56,742
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  27,624<F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                6,162
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            6,162
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   6,162
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
<FN>
<F1>Includes  lease  operating  expenses,  production  taxes  and  depreciation,
depletion and  amortization  expense.  Excludes general and  administrative  and
interest expense.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.2





ICONIX
BRAND GROUP, INC.




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF




THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Iconix Brand Group, Inc. (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the period March 31, 2010 (the “Report”), I, Warren Clamen,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to the best of my knowledge:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/
      Warren ClamenWarren
      ClamenExecutive
      Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:
      May 5, 2010
§ 20.6091-1 Place for filing returns or other documents. ( a ) *General rule.* If the decedent was domiciled in the United States at the time of his death, the preliminary notice required by § 20.6036-1 in the case of the estate of a decedent dying before January 1, 1971, and the estate tax return required by § 20.6018-1 shall be filed with: ( 1 ) The service center serving the location in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death, if the instructions applicable to the estate tax return provide that the return shall be filed with a service center, or
( 2 ) Any person assigned the responsibility to receive returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office serving the location in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death, if paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply. Paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply if the return is made by hand-carrying or if the instructions applicable to the preliminary notice or to the return do not provide that it shall be filed with a service center.
( b ) *Non-U.S. domiciliaries.* If the decedent was not domiciled in the United States at the time of his death, the preliminary notice required by § 20.6036-1 in the case of the estate of a decedent dying before January 1, 1971, and the estate tax return required by § 20.6018-1 shall be filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Philadelphia, Pa. or as designated on the return form or in the instructions issued with respect to such form. This paragraph applies whether or not the decedent was a citizen of the United States and whether or not the return is made by hand-carrying.
[T.D. 7238, 37 FR 28722, Dec. 29, 1972, as amended by T.D. 7302, 39 FR 796, Jan. 3, 1974; T.D. 7495, 42 FR 33726, July 1, 1977; T.D. 9156, 69 FR 55745, Sept. 16, 2004]
#### § 1024.600 General.

Mutual funds are subject to the special standards of diligence; prohibitions; and special measures requirements set forth and cross referenced in this subpart. Mutual funds should also refer to subpart F of part 1010 of this chapter for special standards of diligence; prohibitions; and special measures contained in that subpart which apply to mutual funds.
IA

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 27

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States barring

Federal unfunded mandates to the States.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. CONDIT, Mr. BLUTE, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. LOBIONDO, Mr.

FRELINGHUYSEN, and Ms. DANNER) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States barring Federal unfunded mandates to the States.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
2

•HJ 27 IH

1 States within seven years after the date of its submission

2 for ratification:

3 ‘‘ARTICLE—

4 ‘‘SECTION 1. Except as provided in section 2, no obli5 gation imposed by or pursuant to an Act of Congress upon

6 a State shall be enforceable against that State unless the

7 Federal Government provides to the State the money

8 needed to pay the State’s cost of complying with the obli9 gation, and no condition imposed by or pursuant to an

10 Act of Congress on the receipt of Federal assistance by

11 a State shall be enforceable against that State unless the

12 condition is directly and substantially related to the spe13 cific subject matter of the assistance. For the purposes

14 of this article, a State includes any subdivision or instru15 mentality of any of the several States.

16 ‘‘SECTION 2. Congress may, by separate Act of Con17 gress addressed solely to a single Act of Congress impos18 ing an obligation or making a condition for assistance that

19 would otherwise not take effect by reason of section 1,

20 make an exception to section 1 of this article with respect

21 to that obligation or condition. However, any Act of Con22 gress making such an exception shall not take effect unless

23 agreed to by two-thirds of the members of each House.’’.

24 ‘‘SECTION 3. A judicial order enforcing this article

25 may direct that an obligation or condition is not enforce-
3

•HJ 27 IH

1 able against a State, but shall not direct that the Federal

2 Government provide to the State money needed to pay the

3 State’s cost of complying with the obligation.

4 ‘‘SECTION 4. Section 1 of this article applies only

5 with respect to an obligation or condition that first takes

6 effect after the date of the ratification of this article.’’.

Æ
§ 1023.620 Due diligence programs for private banking accounts. ( a ) Refer to § 1010.620 of this chapter.
( b ) [Reserved]
#### § 128.22 Periodic reports.

Respondents shall file reports weekly, monthly and quarterly on the value of such items as outstanding foreign exchange contracts, dealing positions, derivative foreign currency instruments, and other assets and liabilities denominated in the currencies specified on the forms. Notice of periodic reports will be published in accordance with § 128.1(c).
§ 19.335 What information must I provide before entering into a covered transaction with the Department of the Treasury? Before you enter into a covered transaction at the primary tier, you as the participant must notify the Department of the Treasury office that is entering into the transaction with you, if you know that you or any of the principals for that covered transaction: ( a ) Are presently excluded or disqualified;
( b ) Have been convicted within the preceding three years of any of the offenses listed in § 19.800(a) or had a civil judgment rendered against you for one of those offenses within that time period;
( c ) Are presently indicted for or otherwise criminally or civilly charged by a governmental entity (Federal, State or local) with commission of any of the offenses listed in § 19.800(a); or
( d ) Have had one or more public transactions (Federal, State, or local) terminated within the preceding three years for cause or default.
#### Patrick V. Cleary et al., Respondents, v Harris Hill Golf Center, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[804 NYS2d 202]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Nelson H. Cosgrove, J.), entered October 8, 2004. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the motion of defendant Harris Hill Golf Center, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.

It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted and the complaint against defendant Harris Hill Golf Center, Inc. is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by Patrick V Cleary (plaintiff), a volunteer fireman responding to a fire, when he fell into an excavation pit on property adjacent to a golf course owned by Harris Hill Golf Center, Inc. (defendant). According to plaintiffs, defendant was negligent in failing to guard or warn plaintiff against that hazard. Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. Under the circumstances of this case, defendant had no duty to guard or warn plaintiff against the hazardous condition of a property that it did not own or control and over which it exercised no special use *(see Kaufman v Silver,*90 NY2d 204, 207-209 [1997]; *Brown v Congel,*241 AD2d 880, 881 [1997]). “[A]s a general matter, an owner owes no duty to warn or to protect others from a defective or dangerous condition on neighboring premises, unless the owner had created or contributed to it ... . The reason for such a rule is obvious— person who lacks ownership or control of property cannot fairly be held accountable for injuries resulting from a hazard on the *1143property” *(Galindo v Town of Clarkstown,*2 NY3d 633, 636 [2004]). We have considered the cases relied upon by plaintiffs, i.e., *Leone v City of Utica (66*AD2d 463 [1979], *affd*49 NY2d 811 [1980]), *Scurti v City of New York*(40 NY2d 433 [1976]), *Gayden v City of Rochester*(148 AD2d 975 [1989]) and *Licato v Eastgate*(118 AD2d 904 [1986]) and conclude that they are distinguishable from the case herein. Present—Green, J.P., Scudder, Kehoe, Martoche and Hayes, JJ.
# L_2020051DE.01001501.xml

| 25.2.2020 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 51/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.2.2020

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 51/15

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EU) 2019/2021 der Kommission vom 1. Oktober 2019 zur Festlegung von Ökodesign-Anforderungen an elektronische Displays gemäß der Richtlinie 2009/125/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates, zur Änderung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1275/2008 der Kommission und zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 642/2009 der Kommission

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 315 vom 5. Dezember 2019
  )

Seite 257, Anhang II Buchstabe C Nummer 4 Absatz 1:

Anstatt:

„Elektronische Displays, außer Fernsehgeräte, mit mehreren wählbaren Eingangsquellen, schalten in der Normalkonfiguration in den Bereitschaftszustand, vernetzten Bereitschaftsbetrieb oder einen anderen Zustand um, in dem die Leistungsaufnahmeanforderungen für den Bereitschaftszustand bzw. vernetzten Bereitschaftsbetrieb nicht überschritten werden, wenn an keiner Eingangsquelle mindestens 10 Sekunden lang kein Video-Eingangssignal erkannt wird; bei digitalen interaktiven Whiteboards und Broadcast-Displays beträgt diese Wartezeit mindestens 60 Minuten.“

muss es heißen:

„Elektronische Displays, außer Fernsehgeräte, mit verschiedenen wählbaren Eingangsquellen, schalten in der Normalkonfiguration in den Bereitschaftszustand, vernetzten Bereitschaftsbetrieb oder einen anderen Zustand um, in dem die Leistungsaufnahmeanforderungen für den Bereitschaftszustand bzw. vernetzten Bereitschaftsbetrieb nicht überschritten werden, wenn mindestens 10 Sekunden lang an keiner Eingangsquelle ein Eingangssignal erkannt wird; bei digitalen interaktiven Whiteboards und Broadcast-Displays beträgt diese Wartezeit mindestens 60 Minuten.“

---
#### In the Matter of Tyler S., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Maria S., Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 254]

In a child protective proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of disposition of *565the Family Court, Kings County (Elkins, J.), dated September 10, 2004, as, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated August 16, 2004, made after a hearing, found that she neglected her child.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Family Court Act § 1046 (b) (i) requires that a finding of neglect of a child be supported by a preponderance of the evidence *(see Matter of Tammie Z.,*66 NY2d 1 [1985]). We conclude that the finding of neglect with respect to the child was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit. Adams, J.P., Luciano, Mastro and Lunn, JJ., concur.