alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2020050DE.01002501.xml

| 24.2.2020 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 50/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.2.2020

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 50/25

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EU) 2019/2022 der Kommission vom 1. Oktober 2019 zur Festlegung von Ökodesign-Anforderungen an Haushaltsgeschirrspüler gemäß der Richtlinie 2009/125/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates, zur Änderung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1275/2008 der Kommission und zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1016/2010 der Kommission

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 315 vom 5. Dezember 2019
  )

Auf Seite 270: Artikel 4 Nummer 3 Buchstaben a und b erhalten folgende Fassung:

| „(3) | Wurden die in der technischen Dokumentation enthaltenen Angaben für ein bestimmtes Modell






  a) | anhand eines Modells ermittelt, das in Bezug auf die bereitzustellenden Informationen dieselben technischen Merkmale aufweist, aber von einem anderen Hersteller hergestellt wird, oder |
| --- | --- | --- |

„(3)

Wurden die in der technischen Dokumentation enthaltenen Angaben für ein bestimmtes Modell

a)

anhand eines Modells ermittelt, das in Bezug auf die bereitzustellenden Informationen dieselben technischen Merkmale aufweist, aber von einem anderen Hersteller hergestellt wird, oder

| b) | durch Berechnung anhand der Bauart oder durch Extrapolation auf der Grundlage der Werte eines anderen Modells des gleichen oder eines anderen Herstellers oder beides,“. |
| --- | --- |

b)

durch Berechnung anhand der Bauart oder durch Extrapolation auf der Grundlage der Werte eines anderen Modells des gleichen oder eines anderen Herstellers oder beides,“.

Auf Seite 280: Anhang III Nummer 1 Buchstabe b Ziffern i und ii erhalten folgende Fassung:

| „i) | bei Haushaltsgeschirrspülern mit einer Nennkapazität ps ≥ 10 und einer Breite > 50 cm:
  SPEC = 0,025 × ps +1,350 |
| --- | --- |

„i)

bei Haushaltsgeschirrspülern mit einer Nennkapazität ps ≥ 10 und einer Breite > 50 cm:

SPEC = 0,025 × ps +1,350

| ii) | bei Haushaltsgeschirrspülern mit einer Nennkapazität ps ≤ 9 oder einer Breite ≤ 50 cm:
  SPEC = 0,090 × ps +0,450

  Dabei gilt: ps ist die Anzahl der Maßgedecke.“ |
| --- | --- |

ii)

bei Haushaltsgeschirrspülern mit einer Nennkapazität ps ≤ 9 oder einer Breite ≤ 50 cm:

SPEC = 0,090 × ps +0,450

Dabei gilt: ps ist die Anzahl der Maßgedecke.“

---
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Re: Annual Statement of Compliancefor Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates Series 2016-LC25

 

 

Per the Pooling and ServicingAgreement dated as of December 1, 2016 (the "Agreement"), theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asCertificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies asfollows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "ReportingPeriod"):

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo'sactivities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under theAgreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of suchofficer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

February 27, 2017

 

  

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### In the Matter of Jason R.G., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 420]

*657In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals are from (1) an order of disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Freundlich, J.), entered February 24, 2005, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 20, 2005, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of menacing in the second degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for a period of two years, and (2) an order of protection of the same court dated February 14, 2005. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order dated January 20, 2005.

Ordered that the appeal from the order of protection is dismissed as abandoned, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The Family Court determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant displayed a deadly weapon with the intent to place the complainant in reasonable fear of physical injury. We agree.

At the fact-finding hearing, the complainant testified that on November 19, 2004, he was walking home with his friend Vincent B. when he observed the appellant standing across the street with Douglas B. The complainant testified that he saw Douglas hand the appellant a knife which the appellant concealed under his sleeve. The appellant then crossed the street and began walking alongside the complainant and Vincent. When the appellant grabbed the complainant, the complainant ran down the street and the appellant chased him, threatening to kill him. The appellant caught up to the complainant and a scuffle ensued. When the complainant broke free, the appellant reached his hand into his clothing where the complainant believed the knife to be sheathed while continuing to threaten him. The complainant, believing that the appellant was reaching for the knife and would kill him, ran and knocked on the front door of a nearby residence, and the appellant fled.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency *(cf. People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the appellant displayed a deadly weapon with the intent to place the complainant in reasonable fear of physical injury. Under the circum*658stances, the presentment agency established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of menacing in the second degree *(see*Penal Law § 120.14 [1]; *Matter of Nicholas M.,*11 AD3d 545 [2004]). Adams, J.P., S. Miller, Ritter and Lifson, JJ., concur.
[802 NYS2d 121]

#### In the Matter of Daniel S. Lieberman (Admitted as Daniel Scott Lieberman), an Attorney, Respondent. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner.

First Department,

October 6, 2005

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Thomas J. Cahill, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee,*New York City *(Eileen J. Shields*of counsel), for petitioner.

*92
      *Harvey Fishbein*for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Respondent Daniel S. Lieberman was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on August 8, 1994 and, at all times relevant to the complaint under investigation, maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.

The Departmental Disciplinary Committee now moves for an order: accepting respondent’s affidavit of resignation and striking his name from the roll of attorneys, effective May 26, 2005, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.11; and directing respondent to make reimbursement to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection, or restitution to his client pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (6-a) in the sum of $4,290.

Respondent’s affidavit complies with section 603.11 in that he states: his resignation is submitted freely, voluntarily and without coercion or duress, and that he is fully aware of the implications of submitting his resignation; he is aware that the Committee is investigating complaints of professional misconduct against him; and if charges were brought predicated upon those complaints, he would be unable to successfully defend himself *(see*22 NYCRR 603.11 [a] [1]-[3]). Specifically, respondent acknowledged that several checks, totaling approximately $15,000, had been dishonored from his escrow account and that for a period dating back approximately two years, he frequently wrote checks to himself from his escrow account without regard to whether that amount was due him at the time, and in amounts which often exceeded what he was entitled to from settlement proceeds. Respondent has since repaid all of his clients, except a former client to whom he owes $4,290, voluntarily suspended his law practice, and transferred all of his open cases to other counsel. Moreover, since respondent has specifically admitted his misconduct and has identified the client and a specific amount owed, he is directed to make reimbursement in that amount to the Lawyers’ Fund or restitution to his client.

Accordingly, respondent’s name should be stricken from the roll of attorneys in the State of New York and respondent required to make monetary restitution to his former client or reimbursement to the Lawyers’ Fund, in the amount set forth in his affidavit.

*93Tom, J.P., Sullivan, Ellerin, Nardelli and Williams, JJ., concur.

Respondent’s resignation accepted, and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, nunc pro tunc to May 26, 2005. Respondent directed to make reimbursement to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection or restitution to his client, as indicated.
#### In the Matter of Donna L. Baker-Kelly, Respondent, v Duane C. Baker, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 213]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County (Robert J. Rossi, J.), entered September 16, 2004 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4. The order denied respondent’s objections to the order of the Support Magistrate.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent contends that Family Court erred in denying his objections to the order of the Support Magistrate, who ordered an upward modification of respondent’s child support obligation. According to respondent, the Support Magistrate violated the principles of law of the case and res judicata by modifying the child support obligation because his child support obligation was first determined by judgment of divorce dated December 23, 1992, and subsequently was recalculated by order dated October 12, 1995, based on the provisions of a “stipulation for compromise and settlement” signed by the parties. Contrary to respondent’s contention, the court retains jurisdiction to modify a prior order with respect to child support upon a showing that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred to warrant a modification *(see generally*Family Ct Act § 451; *Matter of Brescia v Fitts,*56 NY2d 132, 140-141 [1982]; *Matter of Rosenthal v Buck,*281 AD2d 909, 909-910 [2001]). We conclude that petitioner established the necessary substantial change in circumstances. Also contrary to the contention of respondent, the Support Magistrate properly considered his present income in determining whether petitioner was entitled to an upward modification of child support (see *generally Brescia,*56 NY2d at 141; *Cynoske v Cynoske,*8 AD3d 720, 722-723 *1097[2004]). In addition, we reject the contention of respondent that the Support Magistrate erred in using the Child Support Standards Act to calculate the new support obligation *(see*Family Ct Act § 413; *see generally Michael N. G. v Elsa R.,*199 AD2d 81 [1993]). We have examined respondent’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are lacking in merit. Present—Green, J.P., Hurlbutt, Scudder, Kehoe and Gorski, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000856143
<NAME>                        CELLMETRIX, INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                 JAN-1-2000
<PERIOD-END>                   JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                         9,000
<SECURITIES>                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                  22,000
<ALLOWANCES>                   (15,000)
<INVENTORY>                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>               59,000
<PP&E>                         28,000
<DEPRECIATION>                 (13,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                 7,058,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          5,842,000
<BONDS>                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>          0
<PREFERRED>                    5,000
<COMMON>                       1,635,000
<OTHER-SE>                     (774,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>   7,058,000
<SALES>                        20,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               20,000
<CGS>                          9,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                  9,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               1,428,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>             416,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                (1,833,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            (1,833,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                0
<CHANGES>                      0
<NET-INCOME>                   (1,833,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                  (.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                  (.17)


</TABLE>
§ 31.3401(f)-1 Tips. ( a ) *Tips considered wages.* Tips received after 1965 by an employee in the course of his employment are considered to be wages, and thus subject to withholding of income tax at source. For an exception to the rule that tips constitute wages, see §§ 31.3401(a)(16) and 31.3401(a)(16)-1, relating to tips paid in a medium other than cash and cash tips of less than $20. For definition of the term “employee,” see §§ 31.3401(c) and 31.3401(c)-1.
( b ) *When tips deemed paid.* Tips reported by an employee to his employer in a written statement furnished to the employer pursuant to section 6053(a) (see § 31.6053-1) shall be deemed to be paid to the employee at the time the written statement is furnished to the employer. Tips received by an employee which are not reported to his employer in a written statement furnished pursuant to section 6053(a) shall be deemed to be paid to the employee at the time the tips are actually received by the employee.
[T.D. 7001, 34 FR 1001, Jan. 23, 1969]
#### § 1021.314 Structured transactions.

Refer to § 1010.314 of this chapter for rules regarding structured transactions for casinos.
Re:
Accounts Payable Agreement


 


 


In order
to move forward with ASYMs $10,000,000 financing, we have agreed to settle with you on the following:


 


 


I, _______________ acknowledge
I have an accrued payable from the Company in the amount of $____________. I agree to settle the outstanding for $__________ cash
and ________ shares. The cash will be paid out following the full funding of $1,000,000 from ASYM expected on or about July 15th
and the shares will be restricted.


 


Agreed to this 18th
of June 2012.


 


 


 


 


 


By: _______________________
#### § 1010.420 Records to be made and retained by persons having financial interests in foreign financial accounts.

Records of accounts required by § 1010.350 to be reported to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall be retained by each person having a financial interest in or signature or other authority over any such account. Such records shall contain the name in which each such account is maintained, the number or other designation of such account, the name and address of the foreign bank or other person with whom such account is maintained, the type of such account, and the maximum value of each such account during the reporting period. Such records shall be retained for a period of 5 years and shall be kept at all times available for inspection as authorized by law. In the computation of the period of 5 years, there shall be disregarded any period beginning with a date on which the taxpayer is indicted or information instituted on account of the filing of a false or fraudulent Federal income tax return or failing to file a Federal income tax return, and ending with the date on which final disposition is made of the criminal proceeding.
exv10w9wii



 






Exhibit 10.9(ii)




Amendment to Employment Agreement



This Amendment to Employment Agreement is made and entered into effective as of May 8th,
2006 (the “Effective Date”) by and between TopSpin Medical (Israel) Ltd., of 2 Yodfat St., North
Industrial Zone, Lod, Israel (the “Company”) and Yoav Venkert (I.D 57253007) of 14 Hateena
St., Zichron Yaacov, Israel (“Employee”) .



WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee entered into a certain Employment Agreement dated as of June
3, 2004 as amended (the “Employment Agreement”); and



WHEREAS, the Company and the Employee wish to amend the Employment Agreement in the manner provided
below.



NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual promises herein made, and in
consideration of the representations, warranties, and covenants herein contained, the parties agree
as follows:





	1.	 	All terms not otherwise defined herein, shall have the meaning ascribed to them
in the Employment Agreement.
	 
	2.	 	As of the Effective Date, Employees Salary shall be increased to NIS 40,500 per
month.
	 
	3.	 	As of the Effective Date, Employee’s Salary shall be adjusted in a manner that it
shall be linked to the increase of the Consumer Price Index as known at the date of
payment quarterly.
	 
	4.	 	All other terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement shall remain unchanged
and in full force and effect.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the date first above
written.




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	TopSpin Medical (Israel) Ltd.	 	 	 	Yoav Venkert	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:
	 	/s/  Erez Golan   /s/ Eyal Kolka 	 	 	 	/s/  Yoav Venkert	 	 
	Name:

	 	Erez Golan & Eyal Kolka 

	 	 
	 	
Signature: 

	 	 
	Title:
	 	CEO & CFO
#### Linda Kane, Respondent, v Matthew Rudansky, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 93]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated August 27, 2002, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Donovan, J.), dated July 15, 2004, which granted the plaintiffs motion for fees paid by her to the Law Guardian in the principal sum of $5,893.81, and an attorney’s fee and related expenses in the sum of $30,904.48, (2) a money judgment of the same court dated August 6, 2004, which, upon the order, is in favor of the Law Guardian and against him in the principal sum of $5,893.81, and (3) a money judgment of the same court dated September 13, 2004, which, upon the order, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sum of $30,904.48.

*350Ordered that the order and the money judgments are reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion for fees paid by her to the Law Guardian, an attorney’s fee, and related expenses. Although such fees and related expenses are entrusted to the sound discretion of the court, they are nonetheless to be controlled by the equities of the case and the financial circumstances of the parties *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 237 [b]; *State of New York ex rel. Gerstein v Gerstein,*302 AD2d 447 [2003]; *Celauro v Celauro,*295 AD2d 388, 389 [2002]; *Kavanakudiyil v Kavanakudiyil,*203 AD2d 250, 252 [1994]; *Maimon v Maimon,*178 AD2d 635 [1991]; *Borakove v Borakove,*116 AD2d 683 [1986]).

With regard to the relative merits of the parties’ claims, the Supreme Court erroneously concluded that the defendant’s prior motion to compel compliance with the divorce stipulation’s visitation schedule was frivolous *(see Levy v Levy,*4 AD3d 398 [2004]; *Kwong-Yu Lee v Oi Wa Chan,*245 AD2d 270 [1997]; *Borakove v Borakove, supra).*In addition, the Supreme Court failed to consider the financial circumstances of the parties. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a hearing to consider the parties’ relative financial positions.

We note that the mother failed to file a statement of net worth with her application as required by 22 NYCRR 202.16 (k) (2). The new determination should be made only after receipt of a statement of net worth from both parties *(see*22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2]; *Cole v Cole,*283 AD2d 602 [2001]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Co vello, JJ., concur.
#### Alene Gallier, Appellant, v Donald Watnick et al., Respondents.

[804 NYS2d 274]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the *616plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bayne, J.), dated September 13, 2004, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell down interior stairs in a home owned by the defendants. In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact that a proximate cause of her fall was a dangerous or defective condition on the stairs which the defendants either created or of which they had actual or constructive notice *(see Vera v Fishman,*14 AD3d 550 [2005]). Crane, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### § 25.6165-1 Bonds where time to pay tax or deficiency has been extended.

If an extension of time for payment of tax or deficiency is granted under section 6161, the district director may, if he deems it necessary, require a bond for the payment of the amount in respect of which the extension is granted in accordance with the terms of the extension. However, such bond shall not exceed double the amount with respect to which the extension is granted. For provisions relating to form of bonds, see the regulations under section 7101 contained in part 301 of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Administration).

[T.D. 6600, 27 FR 4987, May 29, 1962]
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 112

JOINT RESOLUTION

Providing for the appointment of Louis Gerstner as

Smithsonian Institution.a citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 112

JOINT RESOLUTION

Providing for the appointment of Louis Gerstner as a citizen

regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That, in accordance with section 5581 of the Revised Stat4 utes of the United States (20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on

5 the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, in

6 the class other than Members of Congress, occurring by

7 reason of the resignation of Ira Michael Heyman of Cali-
2

•HJ 112 EH

1 fornia on May 27, 1994, is filled by the appointment of

2 Louis Gerstner of Connecticut. The appointment is for a

3 term of six years and shall take effect on the date on which

4 this joint resolution becomes law.

Passed the House of Representatives November 7,

1995.

Attest:

Clerk.