UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CHUKWUMA E. AZ U BUKO ,

Plaintiff ,

v. PARKING OFFICER NO. 241 , et al. ,

Defendant s
. Civil Action No. 20

- 3 383 ( RDM )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Chukwuma E. Az u buko , proceeding pro se , brought this action against t wo defendants, “ Parking Officer No. 241 ” and “Parking Clerk

– City of Boston,” alleging discrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, as
well as a number of federal laws and Massachusetts state laws. Dkt. 1 at 1

– 2. According to Plaintiff, on June 9, 2020, he “woke up and noticed a parking v iolation affixed to his car’s windshield for parking [in] an alleged ‘loading[] zone.’” Id. at 1. Plaintiff wrote to the defendant parking clerk “to nullify the malicious and discriminatory citation,” a hearing
ensued , and the Hearing Officer dismissed t he ticket and gave Plaintiff a warning not to park in the loading zone

. Id. at 1, 13. Plaintiff now asks this Court “to order [a] moratorium on parking citations in the City of Boston” and seeks compensatory and punitive damages “in the amount of $1 [mil lion] and $1.5 [million].” Id. at 3

– 4. Complaints by pro se litigants are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even a pro se litigant, however, must comply with the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch , 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires2

that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to rel ief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requirement “ensure s that the opposing party will receive ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Jones v. Changsila , 271 F. Supp. 3d 9 , 21 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). “Where a complaint is insufficiently focused, it places an undue burden on the defendant to answer or move[,] and it invites unnecessary delay and confusion in the proceedings.” Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors , 109 F. Supp. 3d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2015). In addition, Rule 12(b)(6) entitles an opposing party to dismissal if the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqb a l , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl

. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Plaintiff ’s complain t fails to comply with Rule s 8 and 12(b)(6) because it does not allege any facts that would allow the Court to discern the substance of Plaintiff ’s claims or to
determine whether, if true, his allegations would entitl e him to relief

. See Brown v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 164 F. Supp. 3d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2016). The Court will, therefore,
sua sponte dismiss th e complaint without prejudice. S ee Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. , 42 F. Supp. 3d 102, 109 n.3 (D .D.C. 2014). A separate order will issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date : December 9 , 2020