alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Birch Branch, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert Lazzeri,
Chief Financial Officer and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge,:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d),as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Date:    November 7, 2008
                                           /s/ Robert Lazzeri
                                           ------------------
                                           Robert Lazzeri
                                           Chief Financial Officer and Director
www.gpo.gov

### §1748. Limitations of actions

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any action to contest the constitutionality of this part shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within one hundred and eighty days after December 31, 1982. An action to contest the constitutionality of this part may only be brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

(Pub. L. 97–399, §9, Dec. 31, 1982, 96 Stat. 2016.)
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

J. JESUS LOPEZ-CERVANTES, a.k.a.

Jesus Lopez Cervantes, a.k.a Jesus

Cervantes-Lopez,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-71167

Agency No. A075-128-451

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 14, 2013** 

Before: SCHROEDER, GRABER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

J. Jesus Lopez-Cervantes, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order summarily affirming a decision

of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his application for cancellation of removal

FILED

AUG 16 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 12-71167

in the exercise of discretion. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We

dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s denial of cancellation of removal in

the exercise of discretion. See Bermudez v. Holder, 586 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir.

2009) (per curiam). Moreover, Lopez-Cervantes’s contention that the agency

failed to consider his evidence is not a sufficiently colorable constitutional claim or

question of law to trigger our jurisdiction. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey,

552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To be colorable in this context, the violation

need not be substantial, but the claim must have some possible validity.” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-02-1998
<CASH>                                          36,098
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,350
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    499,528
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               588,694
<PP&E>                                         647,849
<DEPRECIATION>                               (222,123)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,020,186
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          563,677
<BONDS>                                        271,128
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           169
<OTHER-SE>                                   (313,695)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,020,186
<SALES>                                        529,573
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               529,573
<CGS>                                          390,344
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  390,344
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               159,714
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,479
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (30,964)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (30,964)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (30,964)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.83)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.83)
        

</TABLE>
No. 96-10905

- 1 -

 

* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10905

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JORGE EDUARDO DAVALOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:96-CR-10-2

- - - - - - - - - -

February 24, 1997

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jorge Eduardo Davalos was convicted of conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. On

appeal, Davalos challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his convictions. 

To prove the possession with intent to distribute charges

against Davalos, the Government was required to prove knowing 

possession of the illegal substances with intent to distribute.
United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1158 (5th Cir. 1993),

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2150 (1994). To prove the conspiracy

count, the Government was required to show an agreement to

violate the drug laws and that the defendant knew about it and

voluntarily joined and participated in it. United States v.

Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,

506 U.S. 898 (1992).

We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found

that the evidence established guilt of these crimes beyond a

reasonable doubt. United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 766 (5th

Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992). 

AFFIRMED.
#### Huron Group, Inc., et al., Respondents, v George E. Pataki, as Governor of State of New York, et al., Defendants, and Town of Cheektowaga, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 465]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph G. Makowski, J.), entered July 16, 2004. The judgment, inter alia, granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and declared subparagraph 11 (a) (2) of the August 18, 2002 Nation-State Gaming Compact null and void.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in decision at Supreme Court *(Huron Group, Inc. v Pataki,*5 Misc 3d 648 [2004]). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Kehoe and Pine, JJ.
V

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1031

For the relief of Oscar Salas-Velazquez.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 23, 1995

Mr. RAMSTAD introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

For the relief of Oscar Salas-Velazquez.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION. 1. WAIVER OF GROUNDS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF

4 REQUESTS FOR CLASSIFICATION AND AD5 JUSTMENT OF STATUS.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 204(c) of

7 the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney Gen8 eral may not disapprove a petition for classification of

9 Oscar Salas-Velazquez under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) of

10 such Act, or an application for adjustment of the status

11 of Oscar Salas-Velazquez under section 245 of such Act,

12 on any ground relating to a determination that the mar-
2

•HR 1031 IH

1 riage of Oscar Salas-Velazquez and Jennifer Christine

2 Brady was entered into for the purpose of evading the im3 migration laws.

4 (b) WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY.—Notwithstanding

5 subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section 212(a)(6) of

6 the Immigration and Nationality Act, Oscar Salas7 Velazquez may not be considered to be within a class of

8 excludable aliens at any time on or after the date of the

9 enactment of this Act on any ground relating to—

10 (1) a determination that the marriage of Oscar

11 Salas-Velazquez and Jennifer Christine Brady was

12 entered into for the purpose of evading the immigra13 tion laws; or

14 (2) the deportation of Oscar Salas-Velazquez on

15 February 9, 1995.

Æ
#### § 19.915 Agent or representative.

*Agent or representative* means any person who acts on behalf of, or who is authorized to commit, a participant in a covered transaction.
Editorial Note on Part 10
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear by T.D. 9359, 72 FR 54544, Sept. 26, 2007.

§ 10.36 Procedures to ensure compliance. ( a ) Any individual subject to the provisions of this part who has (or individuals who have or share) principal authority and responsibility for overseeing a firm's practice governed by this part, including the provision of advice concerning Federal tax matters and preparation of tax returns, claims for refund, or other documents for submission to the Internal Revenue Service, must take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has adequate procedures in effect for all members, associates, and employees for purposes of complying with subparts A, B, and C of this part, as applicable. In the absence of a person or persons identified by the firm as having the principal authority and responsibility described in this paragraph, the Internal Revenue Service may identify one or more individuals subject to the provisions of this part responsible for compliance with the requirements of this section.
( b ) Any such individual who has (or such individuals who have or share) principal authority as described in paragraph (a) of this section will be subject to discipline for failing to comply with the requirements of this section if— ( 1 ) The individual through willfulness, recklessness, or gross incompetence does not take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has adequate procedures to comply with this part, as applicable, and one or more individuals who are members of, associated with, or employed by, the firm are, or have, engaged in a pattern or practice, in connection with their practice with the firm, of failing to comply with this part, as applicable;
( 2 ) The individual through willfulness, recklessness, or gross incompetence does not take reasonable steps to ensure that firm procedures in effect are properly followed, and one or more individuals who are members of, associated with, or employed by, the firm are, or have, engaged in a pattern or practice, in connection with their practice with the firm, of failing to comply with this part, as applicable; or
( 3 ) The individual knows or should know that one or more individuals who are members of, associated with, or employed by, the firm are, or have, engaged in a pattern or practice, in connection with their practice with the firm, that does not comply with this part, as applicable, and the individual, through willfulness, recklessness, or gross incompetence fails to take prompt action to correct the noncompliance.
( c ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable beginning June 12, 2014.
[T.D. 9668, 79 FR 33693, June 12, 2014]
#### § 1010.301 Determination by the Secretary.

The Secretary hereby determines that the reports required by this chapter have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.
# L_2019259EN.01000101.xml

| 10.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 259/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 259/1

---

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2019/1689

of 29 May 2019

correcting the Romanian language version of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on settlement discipline

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (1) and in particular Article 6(5) and Article 7(15) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | The Romanian language version of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 (2) contains an error in Article 42 as regards the entry into force of the act. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Romanian language version of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 (2) contains an error in Article 42 as regards the entry into force of the act.

| (2) | Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 should therefore be corrected accordingly. The other language versions are not affected, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 should therefore be corrected accordingly. The other language versions are not affected,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

(does not concern the English language)

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 29 May 2019.

For the Commission

The President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  
  OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 1.

1

(2)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 of 25 May 2018 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on settlement discipline (OJ L 230, 13.9.2018, p. 1).

2

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Andre K. CANTEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 01-1552.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 5, 2002.

Daniel H. Murphy, II, Pelham, NY, for Appellant.

Joshua A. Levine, Assistant United States Attorney (James B. Comey, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Christine H. Chung, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), New York, NY, for Appellee.

Present WALKER, Chief Judge, JACOBS, and LEVAL, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of said district court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Cantey was convicted after a jury trial of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), and theft of a firearm from a federally licensed firearm dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). He appeals, arguing that his trial counsel provided him with constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to present his argument that the theft had been committed by Linda Robinson.

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that his attorney’s “performance was deficient ... [by] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). *558In this case, Cantey cannot show that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, let alone that it resulted in prejudice. The argument that Cantey now advances would have been a dangerous argument to present at trial, because a jury would likely have considered the case as presenting a choice between the defense’s theory, which was contradicted by the testimony of every witness that testified on the matter including the defendant, and the prosecution’s theory. Moreover, Can-teas theory that it was Robinson who took the gun was scarcely exculpatory. To the contrary, it would have strongly suggested Cantey’s guilt on the theory that he aided and abetted or procured her theft, given the evidence that Cantey entered the store with Robinson, asked to see the gun, and later bought ammunition for it at another store. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that defense counsel’s trial strategy was deficient.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jermaine Underwood, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[803 NYS2d 473]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Mario J. Rossetti, A.J.), rendered September 9, 2002. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed *(see People v Hidalgo,*91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]). Present—Hurlbutt, J.R, Scudder, Gorski, Smith and Lawton, JJ.
#### Town of Grafton, Respondent, v Jack B. Cox et al., Appellants.

[805 NYS2d 665]

Carpinello, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Monserrate, J.H.O.), entered January 3, 2005 in Rensselaer County, upon a decision of the court in favor of plaintiff.

Defendants are the owner and former owner of real property located in the Town of Grafton, Rensselaer County, which has been the site of an unlicensed automobile junkyard for over three decades. By this action, plaintiff sought to enforce the provisions of the General Municipal Law and its own local ordinance which prohibit such unlicensed use *(see*General Municipal Law § 136; Code of Town of Grafton ch 150). After a bench trial, Supreme Court found defendants to be in violation of these laws, enjoined the continued use of the premises as a junkyard and imposed monetary penalties. We now affirm.

*907Testimony at trial, as well as numerous photographs and a videotape admitted into evidence, established beyond peradventure that the subject property is littered with hundreds of abandoned and derelict cars, trucks, buses and construction equipment in various states of disassemblage and disrepair, as well as thousands of old tires, batteries, discarded household appliances and assorted accumulations of trash, dismantled auto parts and other refuse. Town officials further established that defendants never applied for, and thus were never granted, the requisite license for this use of the property. Defendant Jack B. Cox, who began the junkyard operation in the mid 1970s, likewise confirmed at trial that neither he nor his daughter, defendant Jennifer L. Cox, ever applied for such a license.

Given this evidence, we reject defendants’ argument that plaintiff failed to demonstrate its entitlement to a permanent injunction prohibiting them from operating a junkyard on the property. To the extent that defendants argue that it would be inequitable to find them in violation of the subject laws because plaintiff improperly imposed onerous preconditions on a license application, namely, site plan approval and the removal of all junk from the property, we note the following. While Jack Cox did apply for site plan approval, he ultimately abandoned this application and transferred title to his daughter. Having failed to complete that process, he has waived any challenge to the alleged preconditions. Since Jennifer Cox never submitted an application for site plan approval upon becoming title owner of the subject property, she too cannot be heard to complain.

Defendants also attack the civil penalties on a number of grounds, all of which are without merit. Considering the longstanding and extensive condition of the property, the penalties were not excessive. Nor are we persuaded that the prior Justice Court criminal prosecution of Jack Cox precludes the instant action on double jeopardy grounds (see *Hudson v United States,*522 US 93 [1997]). Defendants’ remaining contentions have been considered and are similarly rejected.

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Peters and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 12, 2019

No. 04-19-00594-CV

IN THE MATTER OF A.S.,

From the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018JUV00095

The Honorable Arcelia Trevino, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The clerk’s record in this appeal shows that the juvenile court waived its exclusive 

original jurisdiction and transferred Appellant’s case to a criminal district court. The trial court 

signed the order on June 15, 2019.

The waiver of jurisdiction and discretionary transfer to criminal court order is an 

appealable order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(c)(1)(A); see In re T. S., 548 S.W.3d 711, 720 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). The appeal is accelerated and “has precedence 

over all other cases.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(h). 

Appellant’s notice of appeal was due on July 5, 2019. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). A 

motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal was due not later than July 22, 20109. See 

id. R. 26.3. 

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on September 3, 2019. Appellant’s notice of 

appeal appears to be untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 

617 (Tex. 1997) (“[O]nce the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Rule 

[26.3] has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction.”).

We ORDER Appellant to SHOW CAUSE in writing within TEN days of the date of this 

order why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. If Appellant fails to 

respond within the time provided, this appeal will be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c).

All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending further order of this court.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 12th day of September, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court