alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1054

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that the corporate

income tax shall apply to certain Government-sponsored enterprises.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 24, 1995

Mr. STARK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

that the corporate income tax shall apply to certain

Government-sponsored enterprises.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. APPLICATION OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX TO

4 CERTAIN GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTER5 PRISES.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 11 of the Internal Reve7 nue Code of 1986 (relating to tax imposed on corpora8 tions) is amended by adding at the end the following new

9 subsection:
2

HR 1054 IH

1 ‘‘(e) APPLICATION OF TAX TO CERTAIN GOVERN2 MENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES.—

3 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a specified

4 Government-sponsored enterprise, the taxes imposed

5 by subsection (a) and section 55 plus a surtax of 10

6 percent of such taxes shall apply for the taxable year

7 unless the requirements of paragraph (2) are met

8 for such year.

9 ‘‘(2) REQUIREMENTS.—

10 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A specified Govern11 ment-sponsored enterprise meets the require12 ments of this paragraph for any taxable year

13 if—

14 ‘‘(i) not later than the time prescribed

15 for filing the return of tax (determined

16 without regard to extensions) for such tax17 able year, such enterprise makes a pay18 ment in lieu of taxes to the District of Co19 lumbia of not less than 5 percent of such

20 enterprise’s taxable income (determined

21 without regard to such payment) for such

22 taxable year,

23 ‘‘(ii) the headquarters of such enter24 prise is located in the District of Columbia

25 throughout the taxable year, and
3

HR 1054 IH

1 ‘‘(iii) the number of employees em2 ployed by such enterprise in the District of

3 Columbia is not substantially less than

4 such number as of December 31, 1994.

5 ‘‘(B) PHASEIN OF REQUIREMENT.—In the

6 case of the first taxable year beginning after

7 the date of the enactment of this subsection,

8 subparagraph (A)(i) shall be applied by sub9 stituting ‘2.5 percent’ for ‘5 percent’.

10 ‘‘(3) SPECIFIED GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED EN11 TERPRISE.—For purposes of this subsection, the

12 term ‘specified Government-sponsored enterprise’

13 means the Federal National Mortgage Association,

14 the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and

15 the Student Loan Marketing Association.’’

16 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

17 subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after

18 the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
#### In the Matter of Anthony Campisi, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[803 NYS2d 268]

*731Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

A correction officer observed petitioner in his cell with an altered heating mechanism, consisting of a large coffee can with a hot element and wire going into a plug device, which he apparently used as a hot pot. Petitioner initially refused the officer’s order to turn over the item, but ultimately complied and then made a threatening comment as the officer left the area. As a result of this incident, petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with refusing a direct order, making threats, possessing an altered item and altering an electrical device. He was found guilty of all charges following a tier III disciplinary hearing and the determination was upheld on administrative appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. Substantial evidence, consisting of the misbehavior report and the hearing testimony, supports the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Roncini v Goord,*18 AD3d 1086, 1087 [2005]; *Matter of Jamison v Goord,*8 AD3d 860, 860 [2004]). Petitioner’s claim of retaliation presented a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve *(see Matter of Brown v Goord,*19 AD3d 833, 834 [2005]; *Matter of Jamison v Goord, supra*at 860). Moreover, we find no merit to petitioner’s assertion that the misbehavior report was deficient inasmuch as it contained the necessary information *(see*7 NYCRR 251-3.1 [c]) and was sufficiently particular to enable him to prepare a defense *(see Matter of Sepe v Goord,*1 AD3d 667, 667 [2003]; *Matter of Witherspoon v Goord,*284 AD2d 681 [2001]). Petitioner’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive and do not warrant annulment of the determination.

Mercure, J.R, Peters, Mugglin, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. VICTOR BERRELLEZA-VERDUZCO, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-30262 D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00062-RSL-3
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 11, 2014 Seattle, Washington Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Victor Berrelleza-Verduzco appeals the di strict court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his motion to substitute counsel at sentencing. Berrelleza-Verduzco argues this court s hould vacate his plea and sentence because the district court did not address the “package deal” provision interlocking 

# FILED
JAN 23 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.Berrelleza-Verduzco’s written plea agreemen t with four other co-defendants when reviewing the agreement in open court. Berrelleza-Verduzco argues this raises concerns about the voluntariness of his plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). While the prosecution did not comply withits duty to orally alert the district court that Berrelleza-Verduzco’s plea wa s part of a package deal with codefendants, United States v. Caro , 997 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1993), BerrellezaVerduzco failed to establish that this amounts to plain error. United States v. Vonn , 535 U.S. 55, 62–63 (2002). 1 Berrelleza-Verduzco has not alleged sufficient facts to support a conclusion that, but for the deficient colloquy that failed to inquire into the package deal provision, it was reas onably probable that Berrelleza-Verduzco would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial. United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004); United States v. Davila , 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (2013).Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying BerrellezaVerduzco’s motion to substitute counsel. The conflict between client and attorney

1 Berrelleza-Verduzco argues that he should benefit from the standard of review applied in United States v. Caro —harmless error. However, since 1993, the Supreme Court has toughened the standard of review for Rule 11 errors, making it harder to show cause to vacat e convictions and withdraw guilty pleas. See Vonn , 535 U.S. 55; United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74 (2004); United States v. Davila , 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013). -2-did not involve threats or an inability to pay counsel, the court gave BerrellezaVerduzco the option of a delay for further consultation with his attorney, and the judge’s inquiry into Berrezella-Verdu zco’s complaint was sufficient. Cf. United States v. Rivera-Corona , 618 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). AFFIRMED.

-3-
IB

Union Calendar No. 95

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 96

[Report No. 104–188]

Disapproving the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favorednation treatment) to the products of the People’s Republic of China.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 16, 1995

Mr. WOLF (for himself, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. BAKER of California, Mr. BARTON

of Texas, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky,

Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. DICKEY, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. EVANS,

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. MARKEY,

Ms. PELOSI, Mr. ROHRABACHER, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. STARK, and Mr. TRAFICANT)

introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

JULY 17, 1995

Additional sponsors: Mr. HALL of Ohio, Ms. MCKINNEY, Mrs. SCHROEDER,

Mr. FUNDERBURK, Mrs. SEASTRAND, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. ABERCROMBIE,

Mr. YATES, Mr. DELLUMS, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. LIPINSKI,

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. ROSE, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. STOCKMAN, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. DORNAN, and Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi

JULY 17, 1995

Reported adversely from the Committee on Ways and Means, committed to

the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
2

•HJ 96 RH

JOINT RESOLUTION

Disapproving the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment

(most-favored-nation treatment) to the products of the

People’s Republic of China.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the Congress does not approve the extension of the

4 authority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act of

5 1974 recommended by the President to the Congress on

6 June 2, 1995, with respect to the People’s Republic of

7 China.

Union Calendar No. 95

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 96

[Report No. 104–188]

JOINT RESOLUTION

Disapproving the extension of nondiscriminatory

products of the People’s Republic of China.treatment (most-favored-nation treatment) to the

JULY 17, 1995

Reported adversely from the Committee on Ways and

printedHouse on the State of the Union, and ordered to beMeans, committed to the Committee of the Whole
1

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT HOUSTON 

EX PARTE § 

 § CAUSE NO. 14-14-00835-CR

CHIDIEBELE GABRIEL OKONKWO § 

APPELLANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION 

TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS: 

 Chidiebele Gabriel Okonkwo, appellant, moves to extend the time to file his 

brief, and would show as follows: 

I.

Appellant was charged with forgery in cause number 09-DCR-52539 in the 

434th District Court of Fort Bend County. He pled not guilty before the Honorable 

James Shoemake. A jury convicted him on July 16, 2010, and the court assessed his 

punishment at three years in prison, probated for three years, on October 22, 2010. 

 This Court reversed the conviction in a published opinion issued on December 

20, 2011. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed this Court’s judgment and 

affirmed the conviction in a published opinion issued on May 15, 2013. Okonkwo v. 

State, 357 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2011), rev’d, 398 S.W.3d 

689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 

 Appellant filed a habeas corpus application pursuant to article 11.072 of the 

ACCEPTED

14-14-00835-CR

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

1/2/2015 1:58:22 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/2/2015 1:58:22 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
2

Code of Criminal Procedure on May 23, 2014. The trial court denied relief on 

September 23, and appellant timely filed notice of appeal on October 17. His brief is

due on January 2, 2015.

II.

This Court may extend time to file a brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b) and 

38.6(d). Appellant has not previously requested an extension of time to file his brief. 

Appellate counsel was out of town over the Christmas holiday; and his secretary 

unexpectedly quit in mid-December, which has bogged down all administrative 

matters. Thus, he needs more time to finalize the brief. He requests that the Court 

grant a 15-day extension of time to file the brief.

CONCLUSION

Appellant requests that the Court grant this motion.

Respectfully submitted,

/S/ Josh Schaffer

Josh Schaffer

State Bar No. 24037439

McKinney, Suite 3100

Houston, Texas 77010

(713) 951-9555

(713) 951-9854 (facsimile)

josh@joshschafferlaw.com

Attorney for Appellant

CHIDIEBELE GABRIEL OKONKWO
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I served a copy of this motion on Gail McConnell, assistant district attorney 

for Fort Bend County, by electronic mail on January 2, 2015.

/S/ Josh Schaffer

Josh Schaffer

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

I conferred with Gail McConnell, assistant district attorney for Fort Bend 

County, on January 2, 2015, and she does not oppose this motion.

/S/ Josh Schaffer

Josh Schaffer
|    |                                                                                                                              |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the annual report on Form 10-K of Phillips Edison Grocery Center REIT III, Inc.; and |

|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |

|                                                                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                 |
| /s/ Jeffrey S. Edison                                                                           |
| Jeffrey S. EdisonChairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer) |
Exhibit 35.11  LOGO

CommercialMortgageServicing D1050-084, 8th Fl
401 South Tryon Street Charlotte, NC 28202
1-800-326-1334 ANNUAL
STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of November 1, 2016, by and
among J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, Midland Loan Services, A Division of PNC Bank, National Association, as Special Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Wilmington Trust, National Association, as Trustee, and Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Operating Advisor and as Asset Representations Reviewer, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2016-C4 (the Agreement). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement. Pursuant to Section 11.09 of this Agreement, I, Leslie Hayton, Managing Director of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:  1.
A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2018 through December 31,
2018 (the Reporting Period), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and  2.
To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations
under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has
executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February 2019. LOGOLeslie Hayton
Managing Director
Wells Fargo Bank  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.


LOGO
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                         164,357
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  277,727
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (42,968)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      16,085,741
<DEPRECIATION>                             (7,098,755)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,425,813
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          133,145
<BONDS>                                      9,850,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,422,668
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,425,813
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,649,872
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,415,680
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          (21,093,507)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             585,258
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             20,742,441
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         20,742,441
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<NET-INCOME>                                20,742,441
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   124.87
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   124.87
        

</TABLE>
Drusilla Hufford

Environmental Protection Agency Stratospheric Protection Division 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Mail Code 6205J Washington, DC 20460

7/2 /20 13

Ms. Hu fford,

On behalf of Heating, Air

- conditioning and Refrigeration Distribut ors International (HARDI) I would like to thank you and your department for your continued willingness to engage stakeholders on a variety of issues, including the dev elopment of the 2015

- 2019 HCFC Allocation Rule. HARDI vales its relationship with the EPA and looks forward to continuing to serve as a resource for the agency

. In regards to the 2015

- 2019 HCFC Allocation rule, HARDI would like to make the following

recom mendations which we believe will be helpful as EPA continues to draft this important regulation.

 HARDI asks that EPA and OMB work to move this regulation as swiftly as possible. A swift rulemaking would allow businesses to better plan for the future and a llow for more communication throughout the supply chain on the phase

- down of HCFC

- 22.

 HARDI recommends that the 2015 allocation level for HCFC

- 22 begin at a level, no higher than 40 million pounds and then proceed on a straight

- line , or as close to a straight line as possible,
decline through the completion of this rule (2019).

 In the 2012

- 2014 All ocation rule, EPA stated that it may address the issue of “Dry

- ship” condensing units in the 2015

- 2019 allocation rule . HARDI does not believe that EPA needs to
address the issue in this rulemaking, as sales of these products continue to fall and do not represent a substantial pro blem in regards to the phase

- down of HCFC

- 22

. Again, we thank you for your efforts on this issue and your continued willingness to engage
stakeholders

. HARDI look s forward to participating and serving as a resource as the 2015

- 2019 HCFC Allocation rule is developed and completed.

Regards,

Jonathan Melchi
Director of Government Affairs
HARDI
#### Sergio Sayers, Appellant, v Arif E. Hot et al., Respondents.

[805 NYS2d 571]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings *454County (Johnson, J.), dated June 3, 2004, which granted the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motions are denied, and the complaint is reinstated against the defendants.

The defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The defendants’ motion papers never addressed the plaintiff’s claim, clearly set forth in his bill of particulars, that he sustained a medically-determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevented him from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted his usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the accident. The accident happened April 17, 2000, and the plaintiff was out of work until October 2000. The defendants’ physicians conducted their independent examinations of the plaintiff some 372 years after the incident. Neither expert related their findings to this category of serious injury for the period of time immediately following the accident. Where a defendant does not meet this initial burden, the court “need not consider whether the plaintiffs opposition papers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact” *(Jones v Jacob,*1 AD3d 485, 486 [2003]; *see Taylor v Ellis,*5 AD3d 471, 472 [2004]). Accordingly, the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment should have been denied. Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Mastro, Spolzino and Lunn, JJ., concur.
#### Joseph Morelli *v.*City of Hartford

*Thomas P. Heslin,*for the appellee (defendant).

*Carmen Morelli,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

Argued October 1

decided October 1, 1963

The motion by the defendant to dismiss the appeal of the plaintiff from the Superior Court in Hartford County is granted.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Trevor Beaton, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 444]

Appeal by the de*395fendant from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrero, J.), rendered May 14, 2003, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding that he had violated a condition thereof, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his previous conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree. The defendant’s notice of appeal from an amended judgment of the same court rendered February 28, 2003, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the amended judgment rendered May 14, 2003 (see CPL 460.10 [6]).

Ordered that the amended judgment rendered May 14, 2003, is affirmed.

The defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal (see *People v Beaton,*303 AD2d 593 [2003]), precludes review of his present claim that the sentence was excessive (see *People v Gorovoy,*309 AD2d 764 [2003]; *People v Bennett,*269 AD2d 401 [2000]). Cozier, J.P., Santucci, Luciano, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.