Department of Homeland Security
 

Free and Secure Trade Program – 


Continued Driver Eligibility 


OIG-12-84 May 2012
 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

 

              

        

   

       

         

     

          

               

           

                             

                          

                      

                     

                          

                      

                     

                       

                       

                       

                        

                     

                  

             

                       

                     

                      

               

                             

             

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

 Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

MAY 21 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR:	 Kevin K. McAleenan

Acting Assistant Commissioner

Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

FROM:	 Anne L. Richards

SUBJECT:	 Free and Secure Trade Program – Continued Driver

Eligibility – For Official Use Only

Attached for your action is our final report, Free and Secure Trade Program – Continued

Driver Eligibility – For Official Use Only. We incorporated the formal comments from the

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the final report.

The report contains three recommendations aimed at improving CBP’s processes to

ensure continued driver eligibility in the Free and Secure Trade program. Your office

concurred with all three recommendations. As prescribed by the Department of

Homeland Security Directive 077‐1, Follow‐Up and Resolutions for the Office of

Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this

memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your

(1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion

date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other

supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the

recommendations. Until your response is received and evaluated, the

recommendations will be considered open and unresolved.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a

redacted version of the report on our website.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Mark Bell, Deputy Assistant

Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254‐4100.

Attachment
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 1 

Background ......................................................................................................................... 2 

Results of Audit ................................................................................................................... 3 

Improvements Are Needed To Ensure the Continued Eligibility of Drivers in the 

FAST Program and To Monitor the Program’s Effect on Border Security Risk ....... 3 

Recommendations .................................................................................................. 9 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ............................................................ 9 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ................................................. 12 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .................................... 14 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report ..................................................... 17 

Appendix D: Report Distribution ............................................................................. 18 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CJIS Criminal Justice Information Services 

CPIC Canadian Police Information Centre 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FAST Free and Secure Trade Program 

FY fiscal year 

III Interstate Identification Index 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-12-S4 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary 

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Free and Secure Trade program is a 

border accord initiative among the United States, Canada, and Mexico, designed to 

ensure security and safety of interborder commerce while enhancing the economic 

prosperity of each country. Under the program, participants who meet certain eligibility 

criteria are considered low risk and receive expedited border processing. This enables 

CBP to redirect security efforts and inspections to commerce that is high or unknown 

risk while ensuring the movement of legitimate, low-risk commerce. We reviewed the 

Free and Secure Trade Program to determine whether the program’s continued 

eligibility processes ensure that only eligible drivers remain in the program. 

The Free and Secure Trade program’s continued eligibility processes do not ensure that 

only eligible drivers remain in the program. CBP is hampered in its ability to ensure that 

Mexican citizens and residents in the program are low risk because 

and Mexico does not share the southern border 

Free and Secure Trade program with the United States to vet and continuously monitor

drivers’ eligibility. Also, the program’s Continuous Vetting process does not assess all 

violations and criminal information that may render drivers ineligible to participate in the 

Free and Secure Trade program. The information excluded from this process is reviewed 

every 5 years. As a result, ineligible drivers may be actively enrolled in the program, 

exposing the agency to increased risk of compromised border security. In addition, CBP 

has not implemented a process to assess the effect of the program on border security. 

CBP should determine whether Free and Secure Trade participation has increased or 

decreased border security risk at land ports of entry and, if needed, establish control 

processes to mitigate any additional risk. 

We made three recommendations intended to improve CBP’s processes to ensure 

continued driver eligibility in the Free and Secure Trade program. CBP management 

concurred with all three recommendations. 

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Background 

The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program was initiated after September 11, 2001, as a 

border accord initiative among the United States, Canada, and Mexico to ensure the 

security and safety of interborder commerce while enhancing the economic prosperity 

of each country. The program goal is to promote free and secure trade by using 

common risk management principles, supply chain security, industry partnership, and 

advanced technology to improve the efficiency of screening and clearing commercial 

traffic at our shared borders. 

The supply chain security requirements associated with the FAST program are layered, 

meaning that to be considered a FAST shipment, all participants (i.e., importers, 

highway carriers, commercial drivers, Southern border manufacturers) have to meet 

certain eligibility criteria. FAST participants who meet the program’s eligibility 

requirements are considered low risk and receive expedited clearance through 

designated FAST lanes at land ports of entry, fewer selections for inspections at the 

border, and front-of-the-line privilege when selected for secondary inspections. Drivers 

using the FAST lane must carry qualified cargo from a Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism1

–approved importer and possess a FAST commercial driver 

identification card. The FAST program enables CBP to redirect security efforts and 

inspections to commerce that is high or unknown risk. 

The FAST program has two processes—Continuous Vetting and Renewal—to ensure 

continued driver eligibility and maintain border security. Continuous Vetting involves a 

search of U.S. law enforcement databases every 24 hours to ensure the low-risk status 

of enrolled drivers. Renewal combines searches of law enforcement databases with inperson interviews, document reviews, and fingerprint identification every 5 years. 

The FAST program is divided between the northern border, FAST North, and the 

southern border, FAST South. As of June 2011, 80,177 drivers were actively enrolled in 

the FAST program. Of these, 68,528 are enrolled in FAST North and 11,649 in FAST 

South. FAST North is a joint program between the United States and Canada. To 

participate in the FAST North program, applicants must be approved by the United 

States and Canada. The FAST South program is not shared with Mexico. FAST South 

applicants must be approved only by CBP. 

1 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary government-business initiative to build 

cooperative relationships that strengthen and improve the overall international supply chain and U.S. 

border security.

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Regarding the verification of eligibility criteria, drivers in the FAST program must be 

citizens or permanent residents of the United States, Canada, or Mexico; be 18 years old 

or older; possess a valid driver’s license issued by the United States, Canada, or Mexico; 

and have a current address and primary residence in the United States, Canada, or 

Mexico. Additionally, to ensure their low risk, CBP vets FAST drivers using multiple law 

enforcement databases. These databases include TECS (not an acronym), the National 

Crime Information Center (NCIC), and the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC). 

CBP may deny an applicant participation in the FAST program for the following reasons: 

• False or incomplete information in the application;

• Convictions, pending charges, or warrants for criminal acts; 

• Pardons from any country for offenses that violate program requirements; 

• Violations of customs, immigration, or agricultural laws or regulations; 

• Active investigations by any Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency; 

• Inadmissibility to the United States under immigration laws and regulations; 

• Inability to satisfy CBP of low-risk status; 

• Found ineligible by a country participating in the program. 

The FAST program is one of CBP’s trusted traveler programs. CBP trusted traveler 

programs provide expedited travel for preapproved, low-risk travelers through 

dedicated lanes and kiosks. The cost of the FAST program in fiscal year (FY) 2010 was 

approximately $1.4 million, in addition to costs associated with functions shared by 

other programs (i.e., salaries).

Results of Audit 

Improvements Are Needed To Ensure the Continued Eligibility of Drivers in the 

FAST Program and To Monitor the Program’s Effect on Border Security Risk 

The FAST continued eligibility processes do not ensure that only eligible drivers 

remain in the program. CBP is hampered in its ability to ensure that Mexican 

citizens and residents in the program are low risk because 

and Mexico does not share the Southern 

border FAST program with the United States to vet and continuously monitor 

FAST drivers’ eligibility. Also, the program’s Continuous Vetting process does not 

assess all violations and criminal information that may render drivers ineligible to 

participate in the program. The information excluded from this process includes 

certain TECS, NCIC, and CPIC law enforcement data and is reviewed only every 5 

years at renewal. As a result, ineligible drivers may be actively enrolled in the 

program, exposing CBP to increased risk of compromised border security. In 

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addition, CBP has not implemented a process to assess the program’s effect on 

border security risk. CBP should determine whether FAST participation has 

increased or decreased border security risk at land ports of entry and, if needed, 

establish control measures to mitigate any additional risk. 

CBP Cannot Ensure the Low Risk of Mexican Citizens and Residents in the FAST 

Program 

CBP’s inability to assess the low-risk status of citizens or residents of Mexico in 

the FAST program for offenses committed in Mexico increases the risk of CBP’s 

border security mission being compromised by drivers in the program. 

In developing the FAST program, Canada, Mexico, and the United States agreed 

to coordinate, to the maximum extent possible, their processes for border 

clearance of commercial shipments. Canada joined the FAST North program 

with the United States. As part of the initial application and renewal processes, 

Canada Border Services Agency officers interview and approve both U.S. and 

Canadian northern border applicants. If the Canada Border Services Agency 

renders any northern applicant ineligible for the program, CBP will also deny the 

applicant without the need to obtain further details. In addition to the 

application process, the Canada Border Services Agency continuously removes 

FAST North drivers from the program. CBP also removes from the program 

drivers who have been removed by the Canada Border Services Agency without 

the need for details. Our review of 235 FY 2010 Fast North driver revocations 

and 112 FY 2010 FAST North denied renewal applications showed that the 

Canada Border Services Agency determined 160 (68 percent) of the FAST North 

revocations and 13 (12 percent) of the FAST North denied renewal applications. 

In addition to the denials and revocations completed by the Canada Border 

Services Agency, Canada allows CBP access to the CPIC to vet FAST applicants 

during initial application and for renewals. A review of 112 FY 2010 FAST North 

denied renewal applications showed that 12 applications were denied because 

of violations identified by CBP in the CPIC. 

This type of cooperation is not in place between the United States and Mexico 

for the FAST South program. Although an arrangement existed between Mexico 

and the United States for cooperating to the maximum extent possible when 

implementing the program, FAST South is not a joint program between the two 

countries, and they do not share information for vetting and continuously 

monitoring FAST South drivers’ eligibility. For the southern border, the vetting 

and continuous monitoring of FAST drivers are completed exclusively by CBP. 

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CBP does not
 

CBP Does Not Continuously Monitor All Available Information That Could 

Render a Driver Ineligible 

The Continuous Vetting process process in place for recurrent

monitoring of FAST drivers’ eligibility. This process is designed to screen only for 

subjects deemed of law enforcement interest in TECS and the NCIC 

may render a driver 

ineligible to participate in the program. The databases available to CBP to vet 

FAST drivers for violations and criminal information, such as TECS, the NCIC, and 

the CPIC, are

 CBP thoroughly checks all of these databases for all of types of 

information that could render a driver ineligible at the initial application and the 

5-year renewal. Information excluded from the Continuous Vetting process is 

not verified during the 5-year period between applications. For example: 

•	 The NCIC is a U.S. computerized index of criminal justice information 

(e.g., criminal history information, and information on fugitives, stolen 

properties, and missing persons) maintained by the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. The Continuous Vetting process screens 

•	 The CPIC is a Canadian computerized system with tactical information 

about crimes and criminals (e.g., stolen property, wanted persons, 

criminal history information) maintained by the Royal Canadian Mounted 

Police. Information in this system could make a driver ineligible for the 

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FAST program. CBP vets applicants in the CPIC at the time of initial 

application and every 5 years at renewal. 

 

•	 TECS is a law enforcement and antiterrorism database, principally owned 

and managed by CBP. TECS includes information on temporary and 

permanent enforcement, inspection, and intelligence records relevant to 

the antiterrorism and law enforcement mission of CBP and other Federal 

agencies. The Continuous Vetting process monitors records of subjects 

deemed to be of law enforcement interest that have been entered or 

updated within the previous 24 hours. 

We tested a sample of 136 FY 2010 applications denied at the point of renewal, 

of which 123 (90 percent) were denied by CBP. CBP denied 30 renewal 

applications for offenses committed up to 5 years before the renewal point. In 

all these cases, the derogatory information that rendered these drivers ineligible 

was available either in TECS, the CPIC, or the NCIC, but this information was not 

part of the Continuous Vetting process, and CBP did not remove these drivers 

until their 5-year renewal application was processed. These drivers remained in 

the FAST program for up to 5 years before they were deemed ineligible by CBP. 

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Table 1 shows the types of violations that made drivers in our sample ineligible 

for the program. 

Table 1: Reasons for Drivers’ Ineligibility 

Reason 

Criminal Violations 

Customs, Agricultural, and 

Immigration Violations
 

Links to Drug Smuggling or Terrorism 

Total

Number of Drivers 

16 

8 

6 

30
 

Not removing ineligible drivers from the FAST program until their 5-year renewal 

occurs exposes CBP to additional risk of compromised border security. For 

example, five drivers denied at renewal had close links to drug smugglers or 

were suspected drug smugglers, including a driver listed in TECS as a broker of 

drug shipments between the United States and Canada. Information rendering 

these drivers ineligible was available in TECS for 6 to 55 months prior to these 

drivers’ renewal point; however, they were not removed from the program until 

this derogatory information was reviewed during their 5-year renewal process. 

Another driver had close family ties to an individual on the United States 

Government consolidated terrorist watch list, making the driver ineligible for the 

FAST program. The driver remained in the FAST program for more than 3 years 

after this information was available in TECS. 

Controls Are Needed To Monitor and Mitigate the Effect of the FAST Program

on Border Security Risk 

CBP has not implemented a process to assess the effect of the FAST program on 

border security risk. Without a robust risk assessment process, it is uncertain 

what effect the program has on border security risk at land ports of entry and 

whether current control measures are sufficient to compensate for any 

additional risk resulting from benefits provided to FAST participants. 

The FAST program facilitates the clearance of known low-risk commerce at the 

ports of entry, allowing CBP to concentrate its resources on commerce of high or 

unknown risk. FAST benefits include reduced number of examinations, which 

means that FAST shipments receive fewer selections for inspections at the 

border and expedited border processing. These benefits make the program 

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attractive to drug smugglers. Media coverage has emphasized the vulnerability 

of FAST drivers to the influence of drug-trafficking organizations. For example, a 

CBS News article claimed that benefits provided to FAST program participants 

(i.e., faster border processing, reduced number of inspections) attract drug 

smugglers, who often threaten drivers or offer them bribes to coerce 

participation in smuggling activities.2

CBP’s Consolidated Trusted Traveler Handbook requires that Port Directors at 

each port of entry monitor FAST compliance rates. Compliance rates are 

calculations to determine adherence to U.S. laws at the border. If the FAST 

compliance rate is found to be equal to or lower than the compliance rate for 

non-FAST commercial traffic, Port Directors are required to take immediate 

remedial action to address the difference. Such remedial actions could entail 

increasing the number of referrals for additional inspections or implementing 

other control measures. For example, in 2006 the Otay Mesa, California, port of 

entry noticed an increase in violations and seizures related to FAST participants 

and implemented a control measure that examines selected FAST shipments. 

This control is still in place at this port and at the Calexico, California, port of 

entry, under the same field office. 

Our survey of the 24 land ports of entry with FAST enrollment centers showed 

that none of these ports is currently implementing the handbook requirement to 

monitor compliance rates. The handbook requirement to monitor the risk of the 

FAST program at the land ports of entry is not clear on how the compliance rate 

will be calculated, and clarification has not been provided to the field. More 

than half of the surveyed land ports of entry agreed that data are available to 

calculate and monitor FAST violation rates. 

Any FAST participant (i.e., importers, highway carriers, commercial drivers, 

Southern border manufacturers) who does not comply with established eligibility 

criteria could increase border security risk. It is important that CBP address 

weaknesses in ensuring the continued low risk of drivers in the FAST program 

and regularly monitor the risk that the program represents to border security so 

that it can implement remedial actions as needed. 

2 “Drug Smugglers Aided By U.S. Truck Program,” CBS News, November 23, 2009.

www.oig.dhs.gov S OIG-12-S4 
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Recommendations 

We recommend that the Customs and Border Protection’s Assistant 

Commissioner for Field Office Operations: 

Recommendation #1: 

Coordinate with the Department of State and the Mexican government to 

 to determine the eligibility of Mexican 

participants in the FAST program. 

Recommendation #2:

Develop and implement a process to recurrently verify the eligibility status of 

enrolled drivers by screening for derogatory information available to CBP that 

could render a driver ineligible for FAST.

Recommendation #3:

Develop and implement a process for land ports of entry to assess and 

continuously monitor the effect of the FAST program on border security risk and 

implement remedial actions as needed. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP submitted formal comments to our report. A copy of the CBP response is 

included as appendix B. We also received sensitivity and technical comments 

from CBP, and we have made changes to the report based on these comments. 

CBP concurred with all recommendations and offered intended corrective 

actions with projected completion dates. Our analysis of the CBP response to 

the recommendations follows. 

Recommendation #1: Coordinate with the Department of State and the 

Mexican government to to determine 

the eligibility of Mexican participants in the FAST program. 

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Management Response: CBP’s Office of Field Operations, in coordination with 

CBP’s Office of International Affairs, will approach Mexican officials and discuss 

the possibility

OIG Analysis: CBP comments are responsive to this recommendation. However, 

it will remain open and unresolved until CBP provides documentation supporting 

the implementation of Mexican vetting to the FAST screening process or a 

substitute control. 

Recommendation #2: Develop and implement a process to recurrently verify 

the eligibility status of enrolled drivers by screening for derogatory information 

available to CBP that could render a driver ineligible for FAST. 

Management Response: The 24-hour vetting process was developed to identify 

high-risk members with an active want or warrant and/or a subject record in 

TECS. This process ensures that wanted criminals will be revoked from a Trusted 

Traveler program even before attempting to make entry into the United States. 

The continuous vetting process was not meant

CBP’s ability to 

 

CBP’s Office of Field Operations will 

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OIG Analysis: This recommendation will remain open and unresolved until CBP 

provides OIG documentation supporting the implementation of corrective action 

plans for the use of information available in NCIC, CPIC, and TECS to ensure the 

continuous eligibility of drivers in the FAST program. 

Recommendation #3: Develop and implement a process for land ports of entry 

to assess and continuously monitor the effect of the FAST program on border 

security risk and implement remedial actions as needed.

Management Response: One of the Beyond the Border initiatives is to “enhance 

facilities to support trusted trader and traveler programs.” In this initiative, a 

review of the FAST program will be conducted by CBP and Canada Border 

Services Agency. As part of the review, CBP and Canada Border Services Agency 

will analyze FAST and determine if future infrastructure investments are 

warranted. CBP will determine the best options to build and monitor the 

outcome of the FAST program while facilitating known low-risk “trusted traveler 

members.” 

OIG Analysis: CBP comments are responsive to this recommendation. However, 

this recommendation will remain open and resolved until CBP provides 

documentation describing the steps planned to assess and continuously monitor 

the effect of the FAST program on border security risk and implement remedial 

actions as needed; and provides documentation supporting their implementation. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-12-S4 
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Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This 

is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the 

Department. 

This report provides the results of our work to determine whether the CBP FAST 

program’s continued eligibility process ensures that only eligible drivers remain in the 

program. To accomplish our audit objective and gain an understanding of internal 

control that is significant within the context of the audit objective, we reviewed CBP 

policies, procedures, management directives, standard operating procedures, and plans 

to ensure the continued eligibility of drivers in the program. 

We interviewed CBP personnel responsible for the FAST program at the Vetting Center 

in Williston, Vermont, and three enrollment centers and ports of entry in Champlain, 

New York; Otay Mesa, California; and El Paso, Texas. We also observed operations at 

the Vetting Center and the enrollment center and port of entry in Champlain, New York. 

We tested a random sample of 294 hits from a population of 1,774 hits for FY 2010 from 

the daily 24-hour vetting process to determine the appropriateness and timeliness of 

decisions made and actions taken by CBP personnel. We tested a sample of 382 active 

FAST drivers who are Canadian residents against the CPIC database to determine 

whether any derogatory information that occurred after the driver’s last application 

that would make drivers ineligible has not been detected by CBP. We reviewed a 

statistical sample of 136 records from the population of FY 2010 denied FAST renewal 

applications to determine whether the derogatory information that resulted in denials 

was available and should have been acted upon before the application renewal stage. 

We reviewed a statistical random sample of 264 records for FY 2010 FAST driver 

revocations to determine what prompted the revocations and evaluate any differences 

in reasons and avenues for revocations between FAST North and FAST South. 

We interviewed officials and personnel from various offices, including the Trusted 

Traveler Program Office, Headquarters Cargo, Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism, the Vetting Center, and Project Planning Analysis and Evaluation to 

determine whether the FAST program risk is being monitored. We surveyed 24 land 

port directors and performed followup interviews with selected land ports and 

respective field offices to determine whether the risk of the FAST program is being 

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monitored at the ports of entry and remedial actions are being implemented if needed. 

We did not review whether FAST participants are receiving program benefits. 

To assess the reliability of data, we (1) reviewed documentation related to the systems, 

(2) made inquiries of knowledgeable agency officials about the systems, (3) reviewed 

the data for obvious inconsistency errors, and (4) reviewed documentation related to 

data sources for sampled records. We relied on computer-generated data from TECS. 

Based on our assessment, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of our report. 

We conducted this performance audit between May and October 2011 pursuant to the 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-12-S4 
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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

•

1100 Penn\yh.m!..t A\'t nur: }>,rw 

\\'.!.shlngton, IX: 20129 

" J': u.s. Customs and 

Border Prottction , , 

March 8, 20 12 

Charles K, Edwards 

Acting Inspector General 

Department of Homeland Security 

245 Murray Drive, SW. Building 410 

Washington. DC 20528 

Re: The Office of Inspector General's Draft Report Entitled, "Free and Se<:ure Trade 

Program. Continued Driver Eligibility· For Official Use Only" 

Dear M r. Edwards: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Office of Inspector 

General's (DIG's) draft report entitled "Free and Secure Trade Program· Continued Driver 

Eligibility. For Official Usc Onl y," (project no. OI0-II-024·AUD-CBP), U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) appreciates the OIO's work in planning and conducting ils 

review and issuing this report, 

The report contains three recommendations directed to CBP Assistant 

Commissioner Office of Field Operations (OFO), A summary o rCBP actions and 

corrective plans to address the recommendations is provided below: 

RecommendA tion #1: Coordinate with the Department of State and the Mexican 

government to to detennine the eligibility of 

Mexican participants in the Free and Secure Trade program (FAST). 

COP R

liiili esponse: l

Concur

. . CBP's OFO. in coor. dination with CBP's Office o;:,f.ln. 'iem. ' iitonal 

1 discuss the possibililY 01 1 

ComplClion ~lc : December 3 1, 2012 

FOR OFFICIAL US[ ONLY 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

2 

c~o mm nd ation #2: Develop and implement a process 10 recurrently verify the 

eligibility status of enrolled drivers by screening fo r derogatory information available to 

CBP that could render a driver ineligible for FAST. 

C UP Response: Concur. The 24-hour vClling proces.c; was developed to identify high·risk 

members with an active want or warl1lnt and/or a subject record in TEeS. This process 

ensures wanted criminals will be revoked from a Trusted Traveler 

• • I 0 ••• " •• • • 

Completion ODI C: December J 1, 2012 

Reco nlnu:nda lion #3: Develop and implement a process for land pons of entry to asses.c; 

and continuously monitor the effect of the FAST program on border security risk and 

implement remedial actions as nceded 

CIW I~ e$ ponse: Concur. One or the Beyond the Border initiatives is to "en.hance 

facili ties to support trusted trader and traveler programs. ~ In this initiative, a review of the 

FAST program will be conducted by CBP and Canadian Border Services Agencies 

(CBSA). As pan of the review, CBP and CBSA will analY7.e FAST and detennine if 

future infrastructure investments art warranted. CBP will determine the be_~t options to 

build and monitor the outcome of FAST program while facilitating known low risk 

''trustcd traveler members." 

Completion D3te: December 31. 2012 

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tI'!If: rtlUJtd 10 Ih. p .. bl~ or oth.r pU$(Jopnr' .. -hI' do not h.,-. II ... Iid ~ .... d·to,know- wilhout prior app.o~.1 of 

In I .. Ihodud DIIS (Jffidll. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-12-S4 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report

1 

Wilh regard 10 the sensitivity of Ihe dran report, CBP has identified information 

within the report requiri ng restricted public access based on a designation of "For Official 

Use Only" as il exposes vulnerabllilies in the FAST program, which could be exploited by 

persons seeking to do harm. Accord ingly. CSP's sensitivity and technical commentS w; 1I 

be provided separately as an attachment to this leiter. 

We look forward 10 working with you on fut ure reviews. If you have any 

questions, please have a member of your slafT conlact Kathryn Oapkins, Audit Liaison. 

Office of Internal Affairs at (202) 344-2 102. 

Sincerely. 

---a;;;}.. 

~o~~ Assistant Commi ssioner 

Office of Imernal Affairs 

FON. on' l e lA!. USE Oi'l'LV 

WAH-NINe: Th i, dO(Umenl h FQIt O" IAL US£ONLY (FOUO). II tonlaln$ in form. don Ihll nlm)' bt tUmpl 

from publir rtlUll undrr thl Frudom of InformUlon Arl (5 U.S,C. 551), It is to br (onlroltrd,Jlorrd, hmndlrd, 

Irl nsmllttd. dlstribUltd, and ditpOStd of In U(ordanrt ",'llh I>II S policy relaling to FOUO in formalion and i~ nOI M 10 br ",Inu n 10 Iht public or oll'ltr ptrs.onnrl ... llo do nOI lin', a ", lid MlM'td_IO-knaw " 'ilhoul priar pl' 1 ar 

In IIulhorlud OilS offitM, 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-12-S4 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Alex Best, Director 

Yeseira Diaz, Audit Manager 

Gloria Medina-Ortiz, Auditor 

Gary Crownover, Program Analyst 

James Diaz, Program Analyst

Barry Russell, Referencer 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-12-S4 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

 

 

 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Assistant Commissioner, CBP, Office of Field Operations 

Assistant Commissioner, CBP, Office of Internal Affairs 

Deputy Director, CBP, Office of Management and Liaison

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1S OIG-12-S4 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

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our OIG Office of Public Affairs at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@dhs.gov. For 

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@dhsoig. 

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