alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Opinion filed July 28, 2016

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-16-00085-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF D.F.M. AND Z.M.C., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 318th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. FM 58,607

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of the mother and the fathers of D.F.M. and Z.M.C. The mother filed a notice 

of appeal. We dismiss the appeal.

The mother’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a 

supporting brief in which he professionally and conscientiously examines the record 

and applicable law and concludes that the appeal is frivolous. The brief meets the 

requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a 

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable 

grounds to be advanced. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–08 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2008); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). 
2

In light of a recent holding by the Texas Supreme Court, however, an Anders motion 

to withdraw “may be premature” if filed in the court of appeals under the 

circumstances presented in this case. See In re P.M., No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 

1274748, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016). The court in P.M. stated that “appointed 

counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the 

standards for an Anders brief.” Id.

Appellant’s counsel provided Appellant with a copy of the brief and the 

motion to withdraw and informed Appellant of her right to review the record and file 

a pro se response to counsel’s brief. In compliance with Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 

313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), counsel provided Appellant with a form motion 

to file in this court to obtain access to the reporter’s record and the clerk’s record. 

We conclude that Appellant’s counsel has satisfied his duties under Anders, 

Schulman, and Kelly. We note that Appellant did not file in this court the pro se 

motion for access to the appellate record. Nor did she file a pro se response to 

counsel’s Anders brief. 

Following the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have 

independently reviewed the record, and we agree that the appeal is without merit and 

should be dismissed. See Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409. However, in light of P.M., 

we deny the motion to withdraw that was filed by Appellant’s court-appointed 

counsel. See P.M., 2016 WL 1274748, at *3. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied, and the appeal is dismissed. 

PER CURIAM

July 28, 2016

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.
<PAGE>
                                                                EXHIBIT 10(m)(8)


Date

Ms./Mr. XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
City, State, Zip

Dear XXXX:

In the Change of Control Agreement entered into between you and EDO Corporation
in ______, it states that the Agreement would expire as of December 31, 20__. It
goes on to state however, that the Agreement may be renewed each year by mutual
consent of the Company and the Executive by the issuance of a letter of
notification and agreement to that effect.

This letter is to advise that the Company does hereby again extend the
cancellation date to December 31, 20__. (see page 2, General, item 2 and 3). All
other terms and conditions of the Agreement remain in place as presented in the
above referenced document.

Please sign both copies of this letter as an indication of your acceptance of
this extension of the time period the Agreement is in effect. Please return one
copy to me by XXXXX, 20___ and keep the other copy for your records.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.


                              S/_________________________________
                                    Patricia D. Comiskey, for
                                    EDO Corporation

                              S/________________________________
                                    Name ("Executive")


date:___________
Exhibit 32.2

             STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
             SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

The undersigned, Deborah A. McLaughlin, is the Chief Financial Officer and
Chief Operating Officer of Slade's Ferry Bancorp. (the "Company"). This
statement is being furnished in connection with the filing by the Company of
the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended March
31, 2005 (the "Report").

By execution of this statement, I certify that:

      1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
            or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
            78m(a) or 78o(d)); and
      2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of
            operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods
            covered by the Report.

This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so
that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not
intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Date:  August 15, 2005                 /s/ Deborah A. McLaughlin
       ----------------------------    ------------------------------------
                                       Deborah A. McLaughlin
                                       Executive Vice President
                                       Chief Financial Officer/
                                       Chief Operations Officer


<PAGE>  36
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 151 (Friday, August 7, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39717-39718]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-18974]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Proposed Collection; Comment Request

    Upon Written Request; Copies Available From: Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Office of Investor and Advocacy, Washington, DC 
20549-0213.

Extension:
    Form T-4, OMB Control No. 3235-0107, SEC File No. 270-124.

    Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission

[[Page 39718]]

(``Commission'') is soliciting comments on the collection of 
information summarized below. The Commission plans to submit this 
existing collection of information to the Office of Management and 
Budget for approval.
    Form T-4 (17 CFR 269.4) is used to apply for an exemption pursuant 
to Section 304(c) (15 U.S.C. 77ddd (c)) of the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939 (15 U.S.C. 77aaa et seq.) and is transmitted to shareholders. Form 
T-4 takes approximately 5 hours per response to prepare and is filed by 
3 respondents. We estimate that 25% of the 5 burden hours (1 hour per 
response) is prepared by the filer for a total reporting burden of 3 
hours (1 hour per response x 3 responses). The remaining 75% of the 
burden hours is attributed to outside cost.
    Written comments are invited on: (a) Whether this proposed 
collection of information is necessary for the performance of the 
functions of the agency, including whether the information will have 
practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the 
burden imposed by the collection of information; (c) ways to enhance 
the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; and (d) 
ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology. Consideration will 
be given to comments and suggestions submitted in writing within 60 
days of this publication.
    Please direct your written comments to Charles Boucher, Director/
CIO, Securities and Exchange Commission, C/O Shirley Martinson, 6432 
General Green Way, Alexandria, Virginia 22312; or send an e-mail to: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d18183908e9cb0b8bdb3bea991a2b4b2ffb6bea7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="451517041a08242c29272a3d053620266b222a33">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: August 3, 2009.
Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-18974 Filed 8-6-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Summary Employment Arrangement - M. Greene


     

    Exhibit
      10(l)

     

    
       

      Mike
        Greene 

      Employment
        Arrangements 

       

      Since
        March 1, 2006, TXU Corp. (the “Company”) has employed Mike Greene, who is
        the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of TXU Power on an
        at-will
        employee basis. The Company pays Mr. Greene an annual salary equal to
        $507,000, and Mr. Greene is eligible to participate in all compensation and
        benefit plans of the Company in which similarly situated executives are eligible
        to participate, which currently include the TXU Corp. Executive Annual Incentive
        Plan, the TXU Corp. 2005 Omnibus Incentive Plan, the TXU Corp. Salary Deferral
        Plan, the TXU Executive Financial Advisement Program, the Executive Physical
        Examination Program, the TXU Second Supplemental Retirement Plan, the TXU
        Corp.
        Executive Change in Control Policy and the TXU Corp. 2005 Executive Severance
        Plan. Additionally, Mr. Greene participates in the TXU Deferred and Incentive
        Compensation Plan and the TXU Split Dollar Life Insurance
        Program.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of American Biogenetic Sciences, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2006 (the“Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof, I, Richard Rubin, CEO, CFO and Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

1. TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ Richard Rubin

CEO, CFO and ChairmanDated: May 12, 2006

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to American Biogenetic Sciences, Inc.and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.
§ 19.625 What is the scope of a suspension or debarment? If you are suspended or debarred, the suspension or debarment is effective as follows: ( a ) Your suspension or debarment constitutes suspension or debarment of all of your divisions and other organizational elements from all covered transactions, unless the suspension or debarment decision is limited— ( 1 ) By its terms to one or more specifically identified individuals, divisions, or other organizational elements; or
( 2 ) To specific types of transactions.
( b ) Any affiliate of a participant may be included in a suspension or debarment action if the suspending or debarring official— ( 1 ) Officially names the affiliate in the notice; and
( 2 ) Gives the affiliate an opportunity to contest the action.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 25 Introduced in House (IH)]

                                     

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 25

    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
providing that no person may be elected to the House of Representatives 
 more than three times, and providing that no person may be elected to 
                       the Senate more than once.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

Mr. Crane introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
providing that no person may be elected to the House of Representatives 
 more than three times, and providing that no person may be elected to 
                       the Senate more than once.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article --

    ``Section 1. No person may be elected to the House of 
Representatives more than three times, and no person who has been a 
Member of the House of Representatives for one year of a term to which 
some other person was elected may be elected to the House of 
Representatives more than two additional times.
    ``Section. 2. No person may be elected or appointed to the Senate 
of the United States more than one time, and no person who has been a 
Senator for three years of a term to which some other person was 
elected or appointed may be elected to the Senate of the United States.
    ``Section. 3. Only elections occurring after ratification of this 
article shall be considered for purposes of sections 1 and 2.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos Biblioni, Also Known as Carlos Bibiloni, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 445]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Berry, J.), rendered June 25, 2003, convicting him of promoting prison contraband in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention on appeal, he was not denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 *(see People v Anderson,*66 NY2d 529 [1985]; *People v Miller,*298 AD2d 409 [2002]). Further, the People established a sufficient chain of custody for the so-called “shank” entered into evidence *396during trial *(see People v Julian,*41 NY2d 340 [1977]; *People v Connelly,*35 NY2d 171 [1974]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Cozier, Ritter and Dillon, JJ., concur.
#### GEORGE W. EVANS v. THE UNITED STATES.

[44 C. Cls. R., 649 ; 45 C. Cls. R., 169; 226 U. S. R., 567.]

*On the elaimMvPs appeal.*

The Secretary of the Interior appoints the disbursing officer of that department “ *a special disbursing agent to disburse the appropriation for the construction ■ of additional buildings in the extension of the Government Hospital for the Insane,”*■and allows “ *the maximum compensation prescribed by the act March S, 1815, not exceeding three-eighths of one per cent."*The officer is required to give an additional distinct bond and is again required to increase his bond from $75,000 to $100,000. The appointment of a special agent to make these disbursements was, in the judgment of the Secretary of *504the Interior, a necessity. The Officer was treated by the accounting officers of the Treasury as a special disbursing agent, and his accounts were adjusted under his special bonds without reference to his bond given as the disbursing clerk of the department.

The court below decides:

I.The Revised Statutes, §§ 1763, 1764, 1765, relating to the additional compensation of public officers, have been repeatedly construed both by this and the Supreme Court. The cases reviewed.

II.The duties of the superintendent of the Government Hospital for the Insane are prescribed by the Revised Statutes, § 4839), and by them it is provided that “ *he shall he the responsible disbursing agent of the institution;”*but those sections refer only to disbursements for the support of administrative expenses of the hospital and not to disbursements for new buildings.

III.Where the disbursing officer of the Interior Department was required of the Secretary to act as “ *special Msbursing agent to disburse appropriations for the construction of buildings in the extension of the Government Hospital for the Insane,”*and to give bonds as such special disbursing agent, he is not, under the decision of the Supreme Court in *Woodioell’s Gase*(214 IT. S. R., 82), entitled to recover the compensation fixed by the Secretary at the time of his appointment.

The decision of the court below is affirmed on the same grounds.

January 6, 1913.

Mr. Justice Pitney

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court

Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Hughes dissented.
§ 19.645 Do other Federal agencies know if the Department of the Treasury agrees to a voluntary exclusion? ( a ) Yes, we enter information regarding a voluntary exclusion into the *EPLS.*
( b ) Also, any agency or person may contact us to find out the details of a voluntary exclusion.
#### § 20.2056(b)-9 Denial of double deduction.

The value of an interest in property may not be deducted for Federal estate tax purposes more than once with respect to the same decedent. For example, where a decedent transfers a life estate in a farm to the spouse with a remainder to charity, the entire property is, pursuant to the executor's election under section 2056(b)(7), treated as passing to the spouse. The entire value of the property qualifies for the marital deduction. No part of the value of the property qualifies for a charitable deduction under section 2055 in the decedent's estate.

[T.D. 8522, 59 FR 9654, Mar. 1, 1994]
#### Robert J. Binette, Appellant, v Cheryl L. Binette-Acker, Respondent.

[806 NYS2d 73]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated April 29, 1997, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Fagones, J.), dated November 18, 2004, which, after a hearing, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to enforce a provision of the parties’ stipulation of settlement, which was incorporated but not merged into their divorce judgment, increasing his child support obligation.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the hearing court properly computed his child support obligation based on the terms of the parties’ stipulation, the evidence adduced at the hearing, and the lack of any proof that the stipulation was unfair when executed or that its terms should not be applied because of an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances *(see generally Matter of Davis v Davis,*13 AD3d 623 [2004]; *Colyer v Colyer,*309 AD2d 9, 14 [2003]; *Jaeger v Jaeger,*260 AD2d 351 [1999]; *Cohen v Cohen,*249 AD2d 499, 500 [1998]). Moreover, the court adequately set forth the basis for its determination so as to facilitate the exercise of intelligent judicial review *(see Matter of Cassano v Cassano,*85 NY2d 649, 655 [1995]).

The plaintiffs remaining contention is without merit. Florio, J.P., Crane, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.
www.gpo.gov

### §4713. Latin American exchanges

Of any funds authorized to be appropriated for activities authorized by this chapter, not less than 25 percent shall be allocated to fund grants and exchanges to Latin America and the Caribbean.

(Pub. L. 99–93, title VI, §613, Aug. 16, 1985, 99 Stat. 444.)
#### U.S. UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 203-211 WEST 145TH STREET REALTY CORP. and 203 West 145th Street Associates, L.P., Defendants-Appellants, Richard Brown, Abram Gin, Stephen P. Grathwohl, Alex Zaika, Todd Lefkowitz and Donna Lefkowitz, Defendants.

Docket No. 01-9293.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 18, 2002.

Milton Thurm, Thurm & Heller, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.

S. Zalman Schochet, Bienenfeld *&*Wertman, P.C., New York, NY, for Appellants.

Present MINER, CABRANES and POOLER, Circuit Judges.

*576SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and hereby is VACATED AND REMANDED.

The defendants-appellants timely appeal from a judgment entered on October 17, 2001, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

The District Court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment because it concluded that under New York law “an insurer need not demonstrate prejudice before it may disclaim coverage based on an insured’s failure to comply with notice of suit requirements set forth in an insurance policy, even where an insured previously provided timely notice of claim.” *U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 203-211 West 145th Street Realty Corp.,*No. 99 Civ 8880 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2001).

In a recent New York Court of Appeals decision, *In re Brandon,*769 N.E.2d 810, 743 N.Y.S.2d 53, 97 N.Y.2d 491 (2002), the New York Court addressed whether an insurance company may be permitted to disclaim coverage of a policy holder. The Court held that, where a timely notice of claim has been provided, insurers relying on late notice of legal action should be required to demonstrate prejudice. *Id.*Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the cause to the District Court for further consideration in light of *In re Brandon.*

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court is hereby VACATED and REMANDED.