§ 6321 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE Page 1280

permanent residence to the United States;

or

(B) a corporation, partnership, or other

nongovernment entity which is created or

organized under the laws of a foreign country or which has its principal place of business outside the United States;

(2) the term ‘‘goods or technology’’ means—

(A) nuclear materials and equipment and

sensitive nuclear technology (as such terms

are defined in section 3203 of this title), all

export items designated by the President

pursuant to section 2139a(c) of title 42, and

all technical assistance requiring authorization under section 2077(b) of title 42, and

(B) in the case of exports from a country

other than the United States, any goods or

technology that, if exported from the United

States, would be goods or technology described in subparagraph (A);

(3) the term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ means the

safeguards set forth in an agreement between

a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as authorized by Article III(A)(5)

of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(4) the term ‘‘nuclear explosive device’’

means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear

energy from special nuclear material that is

greater than the amount of energy that would

be released from the detonation of one pound

of trinitrotoluene (TNT);

(5) the term ‘‘non-nuclear-weapon state’’

means any country which is not a nuclearweapon state, as defined by Article IX (3) of

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London,

and Moscow on July 1, 1968;

(6) the term ‘‘special nuclear material’’ has

the meaning given that term in section

2014(aa) of title 42;

(7) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means—

(A) an individual who is a citizen of the

United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) a corporation, partnership, or other

nongovernment entity which is not a foreign

person; and

(8) the term ‘‘unsafeguarded special nuclear

material’’ means special nuclear material

which is held in violation of IAEA safeguards

or not subject to IAEA safeguards (excluding

any quantity of material that could, if it were

exported from the United States, be exported

under a general license issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission).

(Pub. L. 103–236, title VIII, §830, Apr. 30, 1994, 108

Stat. 521.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This subchapter, referred to in text, was in the original a reference to this part, meaning part B of title

VIII of Pub. L. 103–236, which is classified principally to

this subchapter. For complete classification of part B

to the Code, see Effective Date note set out under section 6301 of this title and Tables.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 262d, 2593a, 2708,

2753, 2780, 2799aa–2, 6301, 6324 of this title; title 12 section 635.

SUBCHAPTER II—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

ENERGY AGENCY

§ 6321. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to

maintain and enhance international confidence

in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in

other multilateral undertakings to halt the

global proliferation of nuclear weapons, the

United States should seek to negotiate with

other nations and groups of nations, including

the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear

Suppliers Group, to—

(1) build international support for the principle that nuclear supply relationships must

require purchasing nations to agree to fullscope international safeguards;

(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state

within the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures for declassifying information relating to

the design or production of nuclear explosive

devices and to investigate any measures that

would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation;

(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to

produce weapons-grade nuclear material for

large-scale commercial uses until such time as

safeguards are developed that can detect, on a

timely and reliable basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for nuclear explosive purposes;

(4) pursue greater financial support for the

implementation and improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with

significant nuclear programs, particularly

from those nations that are currently using or

planning to use weapons-grade nuclear material for commercial purposes;

(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual

financial contributions by all members of the

IAEA, including the United States;

(6) pursue the elimination of international

commerce in highly enriched uranium for use

in research reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation to develop and to use lowenriched alternative nuclear fuels;

(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon

states to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear

fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;

(8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would authorize the IAEA to

operate surveillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for

safeguards verification purposes;

(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA

member nations to share intelligence material

with the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without compromising national security

or intelligence sources or methods;

(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology

to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the

IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards

over that facility or technology, regardless of

its destination; and
Page 1281 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 6324

1So in original. Probably should be ‘‘section;’’.

1So in original. Probably should be ‘‘subsection (a) of this section’’.

(11) seek agreement among the parties to the

Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity

and to establish new limits on the right to

withdraw from the Treaty.

(Pub. L. 103–236, title VIII, §841, Apr. 30, 1994, 108

Stat. 522.)

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 6323 of this title.

§ 6322. IAEA internal reforms

In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementation of the safeguards

responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges

the President to negotiate with other nations

and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board

of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,

to—

(1) improve the access of the IAEA within

nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear

material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;

(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA’s efforts to meet

and to maintain its own goals for detecting

the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities

in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and

(B) if it is not technically feasible for the

IAEA to meet those detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare

publicly that it is unable to do so;

(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards

for information on possible safeguards violations, and to establish a ‘‘hot line’’ for the reporting of such violations and other illicit

uses of weapons-grade nuclear material;

(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged

in the manufacture of equipment or material

that is especially designated or prepared for

the processing, use, or production of special

fissionable material or, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive

device;

(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research and development activities and facilities;

(6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, as provided for

under existing safeguards procedures, and seek

authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge

inspections on demand at suspected nuclear

sites;

(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include

tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear

waste containing special fissionable material,

and increase the scope of such safeguards on

heavy water;

(8) revise downward the IAEA’s official minimum amounts of nuclear material (‘‘significant quantity’’) needed to make a nuclear explosive device and establish these amounts as

national rather than facility standards;

(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA

inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities;

(10) promote the use of near real time material accountancy in the conduct of safeguards

at facilities that use, produce, or store significant quantities of special fissionable material;

(11) develop with other IAEA member nations an agreement on procedures to expedite

approvals of visa applications by IAEA inspectors;

(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds,

technical assistance, and political support

necessary to carry out the goals set forth in

this subsection; 1 and

(13) make public the annual safeguards implementation report of the IAEA, establishing

a public registry of commodities in international nuclear commerce, including dualuse goods, and creating a public repository of

current nuclear trade control laws, agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judicial actions by IAEA member nations.

(Pub. L. 103–236, title VIII, §842, Apr. 30, 1994, 108

Stat. 523.)

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 6323 of this title.

§ 6323. Reporting requirement

(a) Report required

The President shall, in the report required by

section 3281(a) of this title, describe—

(1) the steps he has taken to implement sections 6321 and 6322 of this title, and

(2) the progress that has been made and the

obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to meet the objectives set forth in sections

6321 and 6322 of this title.

(b) Contents of report

Each report under paragraph (1) 1 shall describe—

(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives

that the President has taken during the period

since April 30, 1994, in pursuit of each of the

objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of

this title;

(2) any obstacles that have been encountered

in the pursuit of those initiatives;

(3) any additional initiatives that have been

proposed by other countries or international

organizations to strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards;

(4) all activities of the Federal Government

in support of the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title;

(5) any recommendations of the President on

additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards; and

(6) any initiatives that the President plans

to take in support of each of the objectives set

forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title.

(Pub. L. 103–236, title VIII, §843, Apr. 30, 1994, 108

Stat. 524.)

§ 6324. Definitions

As used in this subchapter—

(1) the term ‘‘highly enriched uranium’’

means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more

in the isotope U–235;

(2) the term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the International Atomic Energy Agency;