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WHAT DOES A SECURE MARITIME BORDER LOOK 

LIKE? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER 

AND MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 19, 2013 

Serial No. 113–45 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

GREG HILL, Chief of Staff 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Chairwoman 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah, Vice Chair 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (Ex Officio) 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security ........................................................................................................ 1 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security ........................................................................................................ 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Rear Admiral William D. Lee, Deputy for Operations Policy and Capabilities, 

U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

General Randolph D. Alles, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Maritime and Security Coast Guard 

Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Captain Marcus Woodring, USCG (Ret.), Managing Director, Health, Safety, 

Security, and Environmental Branch, Port of Houston Authority: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 30 

(1) 

WHAT DOES A SECURE MARITIME BORDER 

LOOK LIKE? 

Tuesday, November 19, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Marino, Palazzo, Jackson Lee, O’Rourke, and Gabbard. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the characteristics of a secure maritime border. 

We are pleased, certainly, to be joined by a very distinguished 

panel, most of whom have been here before, some have been, at 

any rate, of witnesses today. We have Rear Admiral William 

‘‘Dean’’ Lee, who is the deputy commandant for Operations Policy 

and Capabilities for the U.S. Coast Guard. We have General Randolph D. Alles, who is the assistant commissioner for the Office of 

Air and Marine at the United States Customs and Border Protection. Mr. Steve Caldwell is the director of Maritime and Security 

Coast Guard Issues at the Government Accountability Office. Captain Marcus Woodring is the managing director for Security at the 

Port of Houston Authority. 

We welcome you all back. 

Mr. Woodring, we were just chatting that you had the Vice President yesterday at your port and then jumped the airplane. So we 

were very pleased that you were able to join us again today. 

Earlier this year, this subcommittee convened a hearing to ask, 

what does a secure border look like? During that hearing, we exclusive examined security along our Nation’s land borders. 

An often-neglected aspect of border security, what we do in the 

maritime environment is equally as important and as critical to our 

overall border security approach. To minimize its importance is certainly a mistake for our Nation. Any point of weakness in our border security defenses can and will be exploited. So it is incumbent 

on this committee to ensure that the Coast Guard and the CBP 

have a plan to secure the very vast maritime border. 

The framework of the subcommittee used earlier this year can be 

applied to the maritime environment: What does a secure maritime 
2 

border look like? How do we get there? How do we measure success? 

Millions of square miles of ocean make those questions dependent on achieving situational awareness, or, to use the Coast 

Guard’s term of art, maritime domain awareness. Intelligence-driven operations will have to become the cornerstone of maritime operations so that we focus our limited maritime resources in the 

most productive and efficient way. That is especially true in an era 

of smaller budgets. 

In many instances, due to the vastness of the maritime domain, 

intelligence may be available but we just do not have the assets or 

the personnel capable to respond in time. Beyond using intel to 

focus operations, the Department of Homeland Security components that are in the same geographical area must coordinate and 

work together to increase effectiveness and to make the best use 

of the resources Congress provides. 

Last Congress, at the urging of this subcommittee, the Department released the Maritime Operations Coordinating Plan, or the 

MOCP, that established regional coordinated mechanisms for the 

Department of Homeland Security agencies with a role in maritime 

security, including the Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE. We will be interested to hear from the witnesses today how that structure is 

working and if Congress can help provide more robust direction to 

keep moving toward consolidation operational planning and coordination. 

Threats to the border have evolved in the maritime environment. 

As progress is made along the land borders, illicit activity is driven 

off the coast. Drug cartels and others who seek to do us harm will 

seek out the point of least resistance. The recent surge of panga 

boats carrying drugs off the coast of California is a very clear example of this. On average, there is now a known panga event every 

4 days, and, of course, those are just the ones that we know about. 

Although we haven’t seen a resurgence of semi-submersibles, the 

threat that they are being used and we fail to detect them is a very 

real and present danger. 

Achieving situational awareness in the maritime environment requires persistent surveillance, which is why we were disappointed 

to learn that we have used the maritime version of the Predator 

B only a handful of times off the coast of California, when it seems 

that this would be a very important mission for a maritime-enabled 

UAV. 

Other technologies must also play a role, especially as panga 

boats move farther offshore and up the coast, trying to evade our 

cutters and shore-based intercepters. We are interested in hearing 

about other capabilities we are exploring to expand our situational 

awareness as sea. 

To that point, excess DOD surveillance equipment is headed for 

the Rio Grande Valley in Texas to help detect illicit activity in the 

busiest sector in the Nation. This might also serve well in the maritime domain if attached to the right set of sensors and radar. As 

we continue to retrograde advanced surveillance technology from 

theater, CBP and the Coast Guard should also consider testing 

such gear on the maritime borders of the country. 
3 

When it comes to drugs, the focus of effort, rightfully so, has 

been centered on source and transit zones in the Eastern Pacific 

and Caribbean. We must continue to concentrate our efforts where 

interdictions make the most impact. We will be interested to hear 

from the witnesses as to the frequency that we have intelligence 

on the movement of drug shipments without the assets positioned 

to interdict them. 

Pushing our borders out to secure the outer ring of border security makes sense in the maritime world. We have been and continue to be very strong supporters of leveraging our trusted allies’ 

work where appropriate so we don’t duplicate security efforts in inspecting maritime facilities overseas where necessary to minimize 

risk to our country. 

As is the case for our land borders, we have to determine in a 

verifiable way if we are making progress. The American people 

have a right to know if the money that we are spending is moving 

the needle toward greater maritime security. How much security 

we are getting for the patrol and flight hours is something that we 

need to develop. I am certainly fully cognizant of the metrics used 

for the land borders will not be the right way to measure security 

offshore, but that cannot mean that we do nothing or throw up our 

hands because it is difficult. 

So I want to challenge the Department to develop a series of 

metrics that will help inform how we spend limited dollars to buy 

new cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft and point the way to 

progress in maritime security and situational awareness. Especially in times of austere budgets, we have to be smart about how 

we spend our money and find every efficiency that we can. 

With that, I will yield to my Ranking Member, the gentlelady 

from Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so very much 

for your yielding. I believe that this is, together, a very important 

hearing. I thank you and am delighted to join you on this hearing. 

I want acknowledge the presence of my Members, Ms. Gabbard 

and Mr. O’Rourke, and acknowledge your Members, as well, and to 

welcome Admiral Lee and Commissioner Alles, along with Director 

Caldwell and Captain Woodring, who did make a quick leave of 

Houston, Texas. We were both able to be there yesterday, Madam 

Speaker, with the Vice President. So I couldn’t think of a better 

and more fitting next day for the captain. 

As I was driving in from Ellington Field, I could see the potency 

of your message, and one that I support, and that is the importance 

of maritime security, as I passed one of the major, No. 1 petrochemical corridors in the Nation and realized the connectedness to 

our port and the importance of security. 

I do want to, if I may have a moment, Madam Chairwoman, just 

to acknowledge Mr. Robert Harvey of our Greater Houston Partnership, who is willing to sit here and listen to this hearing, partly, 

along with Bob Borochoff. I can assure you that they are strong 

supporters of border security and maritime security, as they are of 

immigration reform. 

I partly represent the Port of Houston and am the former chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security. Now on 

this committee I have seen, collectively—because the port has both 
4 

rail, obviously, and water and, as I indicated, a long, long legacy 

with the petrochemical industry. I have long advocated for 

strengthening our maritime borders while facilitating legitimate 

maritime trade. 

I was pleased to have Vice President Biden and Secretary of 

Transportation Foxx visit the Port of Houston yesterday. Their 

visit provided an opportunity to discuss the opening of the Panama 

Canal and the value of job creation from our Nation’s ports and related industries. 

I join with the Chairwoman in her acknowledgment of a matrix 

that should be created. My first-hand assessment, traveling on a 

speedboat out on the outer sides of the Panama Canal and listening to Coast Guard representatives talk about the dangers that are 

posed by waters that are not supervised and their impact on ports 

that necessarily need that security. 

The Vice President’s visit provided an opportunity to discuss, as 

I indicated, jobs. Maritime trade is the heart of the economy in 

many communities across this country, including Houston. 

A few facts and figures about the Port of Houston: Its 52-mile 

channel opened in 1914. It is home to 150 public and private companies. Handles nearly 230 million tons of cargo annually, making 

it the No. 1 U.S. port in foreign waterborne tonnage; Mexico’s top 

import and export trading partner. Therefore, it is busy, and the 

security is crucial. The Port of Houston had over $200 million in operating revenues 

last year, handling 42 tons of cargo, nearly 70 percent of the container cargo in the U.S. gulf annually. As a result, the port generates over 650,000 jobs at its terminals. 

A terrorist or an unfortunate incident could be catastrophic, not 

only for the Port of Houston but for the United States of America. 

This is an important topic, on how do we develop the next steps 

for maritime security. With the Nation’s largest petrochemical complex, supplying over 40 percent of the Nation’s base petrochemical 

manufacturing capacity, what happens at the Port of Houston affects the entire Nation. The Port Commission’s and Port 

Authority’s staff are keenly aware of their role in ensuring that the 

port is secured appropriately. 

A few months ago, we joined full committee Chairman McCaul 

at the port. I am very pleased to say they were the recipients, 

along with others, of UASI grants dealing with increased security 

and increased equipment. We are fortunate to have the best emergency response assets and personnel available to Houston to protect this National asset. The Federal Government’s use of these 

moneys in a responsible manner by distributing to ports like Houston have been enormously effective. 

We also recognize that we must continue to identify effective and 

efficient security solutions for our ports and for securing maritime 

borders. While much of the border security discussion in Congress 

today is focused on securing our land borders, securing our maritime borders is essential to any conversations focused on comprehensive border security. Although the Mumbai incident was not 

a port per se, having visited Mumbai and the site of the terrorist 

incident that occurred, I can assure that you it was similar. The 

water area penetrated onto the land. 
5 

When we discuss border security, whether we are talking about 

narcotics, undocumented aliens, or those who might wish to do us 

harm, we know that people will take the route they perceive to 

offer the best opportunity to enter the country. If we only secure 

our land borders, bad actors will exploit America’s maritime borders and vice versa. We are only as strong as our weakest link, 

which is why it is imperative that we support the work of the 

Coast Guard, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine, and State and local 

law enforcement agencies. 

I would say that one of the necessities, Madam Chairwoman, is 

an understanding of the matrix that can be created by the Coast 

Guard and funding of those extra assets and also their plan. I 

would like to see a plan from the Department, but I think the 

Coast Guard is going to be the most effective. 

Supporting these entities includes ensuring that they have the 

funds necessary to carry out their core functions. Given limited 

Federal resources, agencies across the Government should do everything possible to share information technology as appropriate, 

avoid duplication of efforts in order to secure our borders as effectively and efficiently as possible. 

Today I hope to hear how Coast Guard is collaborating with Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Air and Marine to leverage 

personnel assets and information to enhance the maritime security. 

Among other things, I hope to hear from Admiral Lee and Assistant Commissioner Alles about their joint efforts to operate the 

Guardian Maritime Unmanned Aerial System to increase awareness in the maritime domain, as well as Coast Guard’s on-going 

collaboration with the U.S. Navy to operate smaller U.S.S.’s aboard 

its National security cutter fleet. 

I would like to hear from Mr. Caldwell about how we define and 

evaluate investments to secure our borders through personnel, 

technology, and resources so that we can ensure that our efforts 

are focused and streamlined toward a better-managed maritime 

border. I would like to also hear how you are working with those 

smaller technology companies and whether or not they can be effective in helping us. 

I look forward to the testimony of Captain Woodring, who currently serves as the managing director for health, safety, and security. We have known each other for a long period of time. An outstanding representative of the U.S. Coast Guard for 27 years; and 

now committed to working with the Port of Houston on one of the 

largest ports, and, of course, has served us well in that position. 

The size of the Port of Houston, having 52 miles of chemical and 

petroleum facilities, bordering 21 communities, represents a unique 

challenge. You can be assured they are certainly in the eye of those 

who would want to do this Nation harm. For these reasons and 

more, the Port of Houston is an excellent example of the need for 

best practices and the use of best practices and for this hearing, 

Madam Chairwoman. Delighted to join you in it, because I think 

this is the right step to be taking, is to ask real, hard questions 

on maritime security. 

With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentlelady for her comments. 
6 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements might be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

NOVEMBER 19, 2013 

I know the subcommittee has focused largely on our land borders in its oversight 

hearings of late. While that is a critically important issue, I am pleased to see the 

subcommittee examining the security of our maritime borders as well. As challenging as managing our land borders with Canada and Mexico may be, in many 

ways the maritime domain poses an even greater challenge. 

The variety of threats we face, the vast areas involved, and our relatively limited 

resources make securing our maritime borders no easy task. That task gets more 

difficult every day with sequester on top of other recent budget cuts to the Coast 

Guard and Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine. 

I hope we can have a frank discussion about these cuts and what they mean operationally for the Coast Guard and CBP and their ability to secure our maritime borders. I look forward to a discussion about our current maritime border security priorities and what more needs to be done to address those priorities. 

Today, the Government Accountability Office is releasing a report I requested on 

one threat to maritime security—small vessels. As we have seen in incidents such 

as the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, small vessels can pose a serious threat to U.S. 

interests both at home and abroad. I look forward to hearing from our GAO witness, 

Mr. Caldwell, about this report as well as what more remains to be done to address 

this threat. 

I am concerned by GAO’s findings in another of its recent reports—this one regarding DHS’s efforts to secure maritime cargo. It is my understanding that GAO 

found CBP has not done an assessment of risks at foreign ports related to its Container Security Initiative (CSI) program since 2005. 

GAO did its own calculations and determined that less than half of the CSI locations are at high-risk foreign ports. If DHS has failed to assess the security of foreign ports in the last 8 years, and if its CSI is deployed mostly at medium-and-lowrisk ports, can the program be achieving its intended purpose? 

These troubling findings certainly undermine DHS’s contention that it has a robust and dynamic risk-based container security regime in place, despite its continued refusal to even attempt to implement the 100% cargo security scanning mandate. 

Just as our land borders won’t be secure until we know what is coming through 

our ports of entry, our maritime borders won’t be secure until we have greater certainty about the cargo arriving at our shores. 

Mrs. MILLER. Again, we are pleased to have four very distinguished witnesses with us today. I will give a little bit more formal 

introduction before we ask them for their testimony. 

First, Rear Admiral William ‘‘Dean’’ Lee is the deputy commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities at the United 

States Coast Guard. In this role, Rear Admiral Lee oversees integration of all operations capabilities, strategy, and resource policy. 

He spent 13 years in six different command assignments and spent 

a career specializing in boat operations and search and rescue. 

We welcome to you to the committee. 

General Randolph D. ‘‘Tex’’ Alles is the assistant commissioner 

for the Office of Air and Marine at United States Customs and Border Protection. Air and Marine is the world’s largest aviation and 

maritime law enforcement organization, and its mission is the use 

of Air and Marine assets to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of 

terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and 

other contraband across the border. 

Mr. Stephen Caldwell is GAO’s director of Maritime Security 

Issues. He has testified at more than 30 Congressional hearings 

and led the research and publication of more than 150 GAO re-
7 

ports. His recent GAO reports evaluated threats to and programs 

to protect our maritime transportation system and its supporting 

infrastructure, both far overseas and in our domestic ports at well. 

Again, Mr. Marcus Woodring retired from the U.S. Coast Guard 

as captain of the Port of Houston, Galveston, in 2011 and assumed 

his current position with the Port of Houston Authority in July of 

that year. He is responsible for safety, security, environmental 

stewardship, and emergency response at the eight terminals along 

the Houston Ship Channel. 

The full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Admiral Lee for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEE, DEPUTY FOR 

OPERATIONS POLICY AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST 

GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral LEE. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member 

Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I 

am honored to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s role in 

border security, and maritime border security in particular. 

Indeed, border security is a significant priority for our Nation, requiring comprehensive efforts across many departments and agencies, including, of course, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. DHS secures the Nation’s air, land, and sea borders to prevent 

illegal activity while facilitating lawful travel and trade. 

As a Department, we have three objectives with border security 

and management: No. 1, effectively securing the U.S. air, land, and 

sea points of entry; No. 2, safeguarding and streamlining lawful 

trade and travel; and, last, disrupting and dismantling 

transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. 

United States Coast Guard helps in this endeavor. We are responsible for maritime safety, security, and stewardship in U.S. 

waters on the high seas and in other waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Coast Guard plays a critical role in addressing threats 

to our Nation’s borders while facilitating the safe and efficient flow 

of maritime commerce. 

We are closely integrated with our partners in DHS, as well as 

from the Departments of State and Justice, among others, to meet 

mission responsibilities. To succeed, we must continue to promote 

legitimate activity while carefully screening people, cargo, and conveyances that could do harm to our Nation. To be certain, the 

Coast Guard is part of a border security system in the United 

States. We are closely integrated with our partners in DHS, as well 

as from the Departments of State and Justice, among others, to 

meet mission responsibilities. 

The U.S. maritime border is vast and very challenging. The 

Coast Guard’s fleet patrols over 95,000 miles of coastline while exercising jurisdiction over 4.2 million square miles of ocean. In the 

Western Hemisphere, transnational organized crime networks are 

increasingly active. They traffic drugs, humans, and weapons and 

are increasingly involved with activity that accounts for recent 

spikes in regional violence. 

As you know, the Coast Guard’s resources are limited. Securing 

our maritime borders requires a strategic approach to maximize 

the impact of all of our efforts. Moreover, we must continue to work 
8 

closely with our partners to implement an adaptable layered security strategy to counter maritime border threats. Our risk-based 

approach relies upon effective awareness of threats, proper threat 

prioritization, efficacy of asset lay-down, and, as always, strong 

partnerships at many levels. 

The first layer of security starts overseas, where we assess foreign port security and antiterrorism measures through our International Port Security Program. These activities help to ensure the 

security of cargo that is shipped to the United States from our 

many international trading partners. 

Offshore, on the high seas and in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, we forward-deploy major cutters and law enforcement 

detachments to establish a presence and to respond to an array of 

maritime threats. Coast Guard patrol aircraft and cutter-deployed 

helicopters support this effort by providing long-range detection 

and response capabilities. 

Last year, our cutter and aircraft crews removed over 77 metric 

tons of cocaine and 35 tons of marijuana in the 6-million-squaremile Transit Zone. This is a decrease of approximately 30 metric 

tons from fiscal year 2012, which is attributed, in part, to the reduction in aircraft and cutter patrol hours under sequestration. 

Interdicting illicit narcotics in wholesale, bulk, and pure quantities continues to be the most effective approach to counter the 

flow and impact of narcotics to the United States and our Western 

Hemisphere neighbors. Perhaps equally as important, it denies 

transnational criminal organizations billions of dollars in profit and 

supports the international effort to dismantle these organizations. 

As an example, in late October, a maritime patrol aircraft detected a high-speed vessel suspected of drug trafficking in the central Caribbean, approximately 200 miles south of the Dominican 

Republic. A Netherlands Navy warship, operating under the tactical control of the Joint Interagency Task Force South, launched 

a helicopter that stopped the vessel. Simultaneously, a Coast 

Guard law enforcement detachment deployed from the Dutch ship 

to board the vessel. The boarding team seized 2,700 pounds of cocaine and apprehended 4 suspects, who were turned over to the Department of Justice for prosecution. 

Closer to home, we work with interagency, intergovernmental, 

and commercial entities to patrol maritime approaches, escort vessels, monitor critical infrastructure, and inspect port facilities. Last 

February, I testified before you on the role interagency and international partners play in protecting our maritime borders. These 

partnerships continue to enhance our capability and effectiveness 

along our coast and waterways. 

Close coordination of activities through the regional coordinating 

mechanism, or ReCoM, has been effective in capitalizing on multiagency DHS capabilities. Since October 2011, ReCoMs in California 

have been integral in the interdiction of more than 1,000 illegal migrants and nearly 211,000 pounds of illegal narcotics. 

To maximize the effectiveness of our efforts, we are a member of 

the National intelligence community. We screen ships, crews, and 

passengers bound for the United States by requiring vessels to submit an advance notice of arrival some 96 hours prior to entering 

any U.S. port. Using our maritime intelligence fusion centers and 
9 

Intelligence Coordination Center, we work hand-in-hand with CBP 

to analyze arriving vessels and highlight potential risks. Last year, 

we collectively screened more than 118,000 vessels and 29.5 million 

people and identified more than 237 individuals with terrorism or 

criminal associations. 

Beyond our domestic interagency partnerships, we have also developed strong partnerships with the governments of Canada and 

Mexico through several joint initiatives. Using joint standard operating procedures developed with Mexico, we successfully conducted 

30 joint interdictions and removed more than 97,000 pounds of illegal drugs since 2008. 

Through integrated cross-trained enforcement teams, commonly 

referred to a Shiprider, Coast Guard, and Royal Canadian Mounted 

Police Officers conduct joint interdictions operations in each other’s 

waters. Supported by jointly-developed intelligence, these teams leverage each other’s law enforcement authorities to prevent suspect 

vessels from escaping prosecution by fleeing into the other Nation’s 

territorial seas. 

As I have outlined in my testimony, our strategy to secure our 

borders relies on a layered defense that is supported by effective 

awareness and threat prioritization to ensure the most effective use 

of our limited resources. As always, we must also rely on building 

and maintaining partnerships with a variety of international, Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners to detect, deter, and interdict 

any threats well before they reach the waters of the United States. 

In conclusion, the United States Coast Guard is an important 

partner in securing the U.S. maritime border. We must constantly 

improve our ability to detect, monitor, and intercept in-bound vessels to our Nation from overseas, in the Transit Zone, and in our 

ports. In doing so, we must ensure we help to facilitate legitimate 

activity and support safe and efficient maritime commerce. 

Thank you for your opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Lee follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEE

NOVEMBER 19, 2013 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Madame Chair Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here today to discuss 

the Coast Guard’s role in maritime border security. 

The U.S. maritime border is vast and challenging in its scope and diversity. It 

encompasses the expanse of our ports and internal waters, our Territorial Seas, 

Contiguous Zone, and our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to 200 nautical miles 

from shore and beyond in some cases for Extended Continental Shelf Claims. 

Threats to our maritime border have the potential to adversely impact our National 

security and economic prosperity. These threats include illicit smuggling and trafficking activities conducted by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), undocumented migration, illegal exploitation of our natural resources, potential terrorist activities, and the disruption of maritime commerce. Securing our maritime 

borders requires a layered, multi-faceted approach of authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships. To accomplish its mission, the Coast Guard optimizes 

the use of operational resources, leverages intelligence and maritime domain awareness programs, and fosters domestic and international partnerships. These activities 

deter, and disrupt threats as far from the United States as possible. The Coast 

Guard is at the forefront of securing the broad and varied expanse of ocean that 
10 

makes up our maritime border while facilitating the smooth and efficient flow of legitimate maritime commerce and transportation. 

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

One of the most important aspects of the Coast Guard’s layered security approach 

is to understand the movement of vessels, people, and goods across our maritime 

borders. By combining security operations with effective governance such as vessel 

and cargo screening protocols, enforcing notice of arrival requirements and 

leveraging intelligence and information resources from across Government, the 

Coast Guard facilitates the secure and efficient flow of commerce through our Nation’s waterways. 

Vessel screening applies analytical criteria to inbound vessels to develop a manageable set of targets for a potential Coast Guard boarding and/or inspection. The 

Coast Guard screens ships, crews, and passengers for all vessels required to submit 

a 96-hour Advance Notice of Arrival (ANOA) prior to entering a U.S. port. Complementary screening efforts occur at the National and tactical levels. At the National level, the Intelligence Coordination Center’s Coastwatch Branch, which is colocated with CBP at the National Targeting Center, screens crew and passenger information. Through our partnership with CBP, we have expanded access to counterterrorism, law enforcement, and immigration databases and this integration has led 

to greater information sharing and more effective security operations. In 2012, 

Coastwatch screened approximately 118,000 ANOAs and 29.5 million crew/passenger records. 

At the tactical level, each of the Coast Guard’s Area Commanders receives support 

from a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC), which screens the commercial 

vessels operating within their areas of responsibility (over 350,000 in 2012) for 

unique indicators, as well as providing additional screening for vessels that submit 

an ANOA. The MIFCs focus on screening characteristics associated with the vessels 

itself, such as ownership, ownership associations, cargo, and previous activity. Coast 

Guard vessel screening results are disseminated to the appropriate DHS Maritime 

Interagency Operations Center, Sector Command Center, local intelligence staffs, 

and CBP and other interagency partners to evaluate and take action on any potential risks. 

The Coast Guard also supports the CBP Container Security Initiative, to ensure 

that all United States-bound maritime shipping containers posing a potential risk 

are identified and inspected prior to being placed on vessels. This initiative encourages interagency cooperation through collecting and sharing information and trade 

data gathered from ports, strengthening cooperation and facilitating risk-informed 

decision making. 

OPERATIONS TO COUNTER MARITIME RISK

Coast Guard cutters, maritime patrol aircraft, and Law Enforcement Detachments 

(LEDETs) embarked on U.S. Navy and Allied nation vessels are critical enforcement 

and deterrence assets in the offshore environment. They are capable of responding 

to threats far from our coasts and maintain a vigilant presence over U.S. interests 

on the High Seas and in our EEZ. Closer to home, Coast Guard helicopters, patrol 

boats, and boat stations monitor, track, and interdict vessels of interest. In our 

ports, the Coast Guard partners with Federal, State, local, Tribal, and industry 

stakeholders, to monitor critical infrastructure, conduct vessel escorts and patrols, 

and inspect vessels and facilities. The Coast Guard’s mix of multi-mission cutters, 

aircraft, boats, as well as deployable specialized forces, allows us to exercise layered 

and effective security throughout the maritime domain. 

To leverage existing programs, the Coast Guard established formal partnerships 

to collaborate with CBP on their maritime Predator Unmanned Aerial System 

(UAS) program (land-based), and with the Navy UAS programs. Incorporating the 

UAS capability with manned patrolling will improve detection and surveillance activities at a significantly reduced cost when compared to manned aviation. 

During a recent proof-of-concept deployment aboard USCGC BERTHOLF, the 

ScanEagle UAS proved to be a superb force multiplier in two separate law enforcement cases, resulting in the removal of 570 kilograms of cocaine and the detention 

of six suspected smugglers. 

When the Coast Guard is alerted to a specific maritime threat to the United 

States that requires a coordinated U.S. Government response, the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan is activated. The MOTR Plan uses established protocols and an integrated network of National-level maritime command and 

operations centers to facilitate real-time Federal interagency communication, coordi-
11 

nation, and decision making to ensure a timely, unified, and decisive response to 

maritime threats. 

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

To detect, deter, and counter threats as early as possible, the Coast Guard fosters 

strategic relationships with partner nations. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code provides an international regime to ensure ship and port 

facilities take appropriate preventative measures consistent with our domestic regime under the Maritime Transportation Security Act. Through the International 

Port Security Program, the Coast Guard conducts foreign port assessments to determine the port security effectiveness and antiterrorism measures of foreign trading 

partners. Since the inception of the International Port Security Program in 2004, 

Coast Guard personnel have visited more than 150 countries and approximately 

1,200 port facilities. These countries generally receive biennial assessments to verify 

compliance with the ISPS Code and U.S. maritime security regulations, as appropriate. Vessels arriving in non-ISPS Code-compliant countries are required to take 

additional security precautions while in those ports and may be boarded by the 

Coast Guard before being granted permission to enter U.S. ports. In specific cases, 

these vessels may be refused entry. 

To more effectively counter maritime threats in the offshore region and throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Coast Guard maintains more than 30 maritime 

bilateral law enforcement agreements with partner nations. These agreements facilitate coordination of operations and the forward deployment of boats, cutters, aircraft, and personnel to deter and counter threats as close to their origin as possible. 

To further address maritime threats and to improve security along with Southwest Border of the United States, the Coast Guard, U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM), the Mexican Navy (SEMAR), and the Mexican Secretariat for Communications and Transportation (SCT) have strengthened relations through the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). Through the SPP, SEMAR and SCT are 

increasing their engagement with the Coast Guard through training, exercises, coordinated operations, and intelligence and information sharing. Furthermore, the 

North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI) provides an operational relationship between SEMAR, NORTHCOM, Canadian Forces, and the Coast Guard 

built upon standard procedures for communications, training, and operations. Since 

the inception of NAMSI in December 2008, there have been 30 joint narcotics interdiction cases resulting in the seizure of 97,200 pounds of illegal narcotics. 

Cooperation and collaboration with Canada remains one of the Coast Guard’s 

most enduring and effective international partnerships. As outlined in the U.S.-Canada Beyond the Border declaration, border security includes the safety, security, and 

resiliency of our Nation; the protection of our environmental resources; and the facilitation of the safe and secure movement of commerce in the global supply chain. 

The Coast Guard is a key part of Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) activities, where U.S. and Canadian agencies share information and expertise to support interdiction operations along our common border. From this partnership, an 

operational relationship known as Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO), commonly referred to as Shiprider, has emerged. The 

ICMLEO arrangement spans the shared waterways of U.S./Canadian maritime border, and greatly facilitates cooperative, integrated maritime operations by providing 

U.S. and Canadian law enforcement officers the authority to conduct joint law enforcement operations on both sides of the border. 

DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS

The Coast Guard coordinates and conducts joint operations with other DHS components and interagency partners as part of a whole-of-Government response to 

maritime border threats. Along the Southwest Border, DHS partners continue to 

apply a broad-based approach to keep communities safe from threats of border-related violence and crime, and to weaken the TCOs that threaten the safety of communities throughout the Western Hemisphere. 

In our ports, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) is designated as the 

Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC). In this role, COTPs lead the Nation’s 43 Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) and oversee the development, 

regular review, and annual exercise of their respective Area Maritime Security 

Plans (AMSPs). AMSC’s assist and advise the FMSC in the development, review, 

and implementation of a coordination/communication framework to identify risks 

and vulnerabilities in and around ports. Additionally, AMSC’s coordinate resources 

to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from Transportation Security In-
12 

cidents (TSIs). AMSCs have developed strong working partnerships between all levels of Government and private industry stakeholders. 

On a National scale, the establishment of Interagency Operations Centers (IOCs) 

for port security is well underway. In ports such as Charleston, Puget Sound, San 

Diego, Boston, and Jacksonville, the Coast Guard, CBP, and other agencies are 

sharing workspace and coordinating operational efforts for improved efficiency and 

effectiveness of maritime security operations. 

The Regional Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM) is another example of the evolution of coordinated joint operations among interagency partners. Located at San 

Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, the ReCoMs are manned with Coast Guard, 

CBP, and State and local law enforcement agencies. The San Diego and Los Angeles/Long Beach ReCoMs coordinated operations contributing directly to the interdiction of 1,002 illegal migrants and 210,900 pounds of illegal drugs in fiscal year 2012 

and fiscal year 2013. 

To counter the drug and migrant smuggling threat in waters off Southern California, the Coast Guard, in partnership with other Federal, State, and local agencies 

increased our levels of effort for the standing Coast Guard Operation Baja 

Tempestad. 

This combined operation brings additional resources to the fight against TCOs, including flight deck-equipped cutters with airborne and surface use-of-force capability; increased Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection maritime patrol 

aircraft flights; additional non-compliant vessel use-of-force endgame capabilities 

from our shore-based boats; and enhanced intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. In fiscal year 2013, this interagency effort has led to the removal of 

more than 90,900 pounds of marijuana and the apprehension of 400 illegal migrants. 

On the high seas and throughout the 6 million-square-mile drug Transit Zone, 

joint interdiction operations with Federal partners are coordinated through Joint 

Interagency Task Force South (JIATF–S) and Joint Interagency Task Force West 

(JIATF–W). To support detection, monitoring, interdiction, and apprehension operations in the Transit Zone, the Coast Guard leverages maritime assets by forward 

deploying cutters, patrol aircraft, and Law Enforcement Detachments embarked on 

U.S. Navy and Allied (British, Dutch, and Canadian) assets. The Coast Guard also 

works closely with the State and Justice Departments to bring suspected illicit traffickers to the United States for prosecution. 

In Puerto Rico, the Coast Guard is part of a broad Federal effort to strengthen 

current joint operations. As the lead Federal maritime agency within DHS, the 

Coast Guard is conducting targeted surge operations in the maritime domain and 

is collaborating with international stakeholders to stem the flow of illicit drugs into 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As a result of these joint efforts, 7,165 kilograms of cocaine and 200 pounds of marijuana were removed in fiscal year 2012 and 

24,000 kilograms of cocaine and 9,500 pounds of marijuana were removed in fiscal 

year 2013. 

CONCLUSION

The Coast Guard’s layered maritime border security strategy addresses the broad 

range of offshore and coastal threats that have the potential to impact our National 

security and economic prosperity. From our efforts to expand maritime domain 

awareness to our international and domestic partnerships, and investments in cutter, boat, and aircraft recapitalization, the Coast Guard continues to improve maritime border security while facilitating the safe flow of legitimate commerce. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and thank you for your continued 

support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to answer your questions. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

As I recognize Commissioner Alles, let me just take a point of 

personal privilege, since you were talking about interagency partnerships between yourself and CBP. I see that every day in my 

own district at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, where we have 

Air Station Detroit. Colonel Ogden is your sector commander there. 

Colonel Rembold does such a great job with the Air and Marine 

Northern Border Wing there, as well. It really is a wonderful thing 

to see them all. 

So, with that, Commissioner Alles. 
13 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RANDOLPH D. ALLES, ASSISTANT 

COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE, U.S. CUSTOMS 

AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

General ALLES. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller and Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee and distinguished Members of the committee. 

It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the critical role 

of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in securing our Nation’s 

maritime borders. 

I appreciate the committee’s leadership and commitment to ensuring the security of the American people. I look forward to discussing Air and Marine contributions to CBP’s antiterrorism and 

border security mission at and beyond our borders in support of 

CBP’s layered approach to security efforts. 

So we are here to discuss what a secure maritime border looks 

like. A security maritime border necessitates significant domain 

awareness and involves partnerships, intelligence, and a coordinated approach to the use of detection resources for effective understanding of the threats associated with the maritime domain that 

could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the 

United States. 

Maritime security cannot be measured by a single metric; rather, 

a secure maritime border is one where ample opportunities and capabilities are present to mitigate threats and keep our communities 

safe. 

Over the past 11 years, CBP has dedicated historic levels of personnel and technology and resources in support of our maritime security efforts. The number of Air and Marine agents dedicated to 

supporting CBP’s mission currently stands at 1,728 enforcement 

and support personnel throughout the United States and its territories, which is about a three-fold increase since we were first created. 

In fiscal year 2013, Air and Marine interdicted over 820,000 

pounds of illicit drugs, with a street value of almost $12 billion; 

conducted 3,000 arrests; participated in the apprehension of 48,000 

illegal immigrants; seized $24 million in currency and 3,100 weapons. 

Our maritime border security mission is complex and challenging. The maritime domain, generally less restricted than the 

air and land domain, is an expansive pathway to the world without 

fences. The pathway connects to more than 95,000 miles of U.S. 

maritime border. 

Our aerial assets play a critical role in maritime security efforts. 

Air and Marine P–3s are high-endurance, all-weather aircraft used 

to intercept and track airborne smuggling threats. In partnership 

with the Coast Guard, Air and Marine developed a maritime variant of the Predator B called the Guardian. Air and Marine pilots, 

augmented by Coast Guard personnel, use the Guardian to conduct 

long-range surveillance in support of joint counter-narcotics operations in the southeast coastal, Gulf of Mexico, drug source, and 

transit zones. Working in conjunction with aviation assets, Air and 

Marine interceptor vessels operate in offshore coastal waters to 

combat smuggling and protect the U.S. maritime border from acts 

of terrorism. 
14 

To address the small-boat challenge and increase security and 

maritime domain awareness, CBP’s Office of Field Operations implemented the Small Vessel Reporting System. It is a voluntary online system for the reporting of foreign travel of small vessels’ operators and passengers. It segregates low-risk vessels and boater 

traffic and increases our ability to identify suspicious or unknown 

vessels approaching or traveling U.S. waterways. 

Additionally, a considerable threat along the maritime border involves the use of pangas, as mentioned by Admiral Lee. Smugglers 

use these wood or fiberglass homemade fishing vessels, with relatively high-speed capabilities, their small radar signature, and the 

cover of darkness, in an attempt to evade detection by service patrol vessels and patrol aircraft. They are used to quickly move contraband short distances. Larger and high-powered pangas, ranging 

in size up to 50 feet in length, are capable of carrying multi-ton 

loads of contraband great distance. Of the 123 maritime seizures 

to the San Diego region in fiscal year 2013, 81 were pangas, and 

they accounted for 93,000 pounds of marijuana. 

Air and Marine has been an integral part of successful interagency counter-narcotics missions. For example, operating in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force South, Air and 

Marine assets, including P–3 aircraft, patrol a 6-million-mile area 

of the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific known as the Transit Zone. We heavily cooperate with the Coast Guard in this region, 

I would say, on a daily basis. 

Air and Marine continues to engage with the Coast Guard and 

DOD to identify and deploy enabling technology to permit the expansion of overall maritime domain awareness and the integration 

of information and maritime sensor data throughout DOD and 

DHS. Currently, we are collaborating with DOD to obtain additional radar data from patrolling DOD air and service assets along 

the California coastline to increase our maritime domain awareness. 

Coordination and cooperation among all entities that have a 

stake in our mission have been and continue to be paramount to 

an effective maritime security strategy. Air and Marine continues 

to unify our enforcement efforts and expand collaboration with 

other agencies. 

Because of the continual support of Congress, Air and Marine 

has been a significant contributor to CBP’s progress in securing our 

Nation’s maritime borders. We will continue to transform our aviation and maritime fleet to enhance detection and interdiction capabilities and work with our international and Federal partners to 

combat the risks that exist today and be prepared for those of tomorrow. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity 

to discuss our role of Air and Marine and also Customs and Border 

Protection. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Alles follows:] 
15 

1 As of pay period 20, fiscal year 2013. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL RANDOLPH D. ALLES

NOVEMBER 19, 2013 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members 

of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) efforts to secure our Nation’s maritime borders. 

We are here today to discuss what a secure maritime border looks like. A secure 

maritime border necessitates significant domain awareness and involves partnerships, intelligence, and a coordinated approach to the use of detection resources for 

effective understanding of the threats associated with the maritime domain that 

could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. 

Maritime security cannot be measured by a single metric. Rather, a secure maritime 

border is one where ample opportunities and capabilities are present to mitigate 

threats and keep our communities safe. 

As America’s front-line border agency, CBP is responsible for securing America’s 

borders against threats while facilitating the lawful flow of people and goods entering the United States. To accomplish our mission, CBP has deployed a multi-layered, risk-based approach to enhance the security of our borders. This layered approach to security reduces our reliance on any single point or program that could 

be compromised. The ‘‘defense-in-depth’’ strategy extends our zone of security outward, ensuring that our physical border is not the first or last line of defense, but 

one of many. 

OVERVIEW OF CBP MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS

CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) is the world’s largest aviation and maritime law enforcement organization, and is a critical component of CBP’s layered enforcement strategy for border security. OAM protects the American people and the 

Nation’s critical infrastructure through the coordinated use of integrated air and 

marine assets to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful 

movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or across the borders of the United States. 

Over the past 11 years, CBP has dedicated historic levels of personnel, technology, 

and resources in support of our maritime security efforts. The number of OAM 

agents dedicated to performing CBP’s mission has grown from 943 in fiscal year 

2002 to a present force of 1,728 enforcement and support personnel throughout the 

United States and territories.1

OAM operations in the field are divided into three regions: The Southwest Border 

Region, the Northern Border Region, and the Southeast Border Region. Each region 

is split into Air and Marine Branches, and then further divided into Air and/or Marine Units. 

OAM also operates two unique operational entities: National Air Security Operations (NASO) and the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC). NASO, operating out of six centers Nation-wide, coordinates operational activities, long-range 

planning, and project oversight for the P–3 aircraft and unmanned aircraft system 

(UAS) programs. AMOC is a state-of-the-art law enforcement operations and domain 

awareness center that conducts air and marine surveillance operations. These air 

and marine surveillance operations provide direct coordination and support to OAM; 

CBP law enforcement agents performing interdiction missions; and other Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement agencies conducting criminal investigations. The 

AMOC is located in Riverside, California, with satellite operations centers in Puerto 

Rico and the National Capital Region. 

The OAM fleet consists of 289 coastal and riverine vessels and 242 aircraft including 105 fixed-wing, and 137 rotary-wing. These assets provide critical aerial and 

maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operational assistance to ground personnel 

to support CBP’s maritime security mission. CBP continues to modernize its fleet 

to enhance our operational performance in diverse marine environments and increase our ability to adapt to the challenges of securing the maritime approaches 

to the United States. 

Additionally, in support of OAM operations, CBP has assumed responsibility for 

the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) Program from the Department of Defense (DOD) in fiscal year 2014. TARS has assisted CBP and its legacy agencies 

with providing air domain awareness for more than 20 years—it is a multi-mission 

capability that supports CBP’s border security mission. 
16 

2DHS, Small Vessel Security Strategy, April 2008, page 4. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 

assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf. 3 ‘‘Small vessels’’ are characterized as any watercraft, regardless of method of propulsion, less 

than 300 gross tons. Small vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats 

and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. DHS, Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to 

the Public, January, 2001, page 1. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-uscg-small-vessel-security-strategy-report-to-public-012011.pdf. 4 USCG 2006 boater statistics compiled from State boater registration reports indicate there 

are 13 million registered boats in the United States. When combined with unregistered boats, 

the figure is estimated at 17 million total U.S. watercraft. DHS, Small Vessel Security Strategy, 

April 2008, footnote 2, page i. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf. 

OAM provides surveillance of known air, land, and maritime smuggling routes in 

an area that is twice the size of the United States. With our partners, OAM agents 

detect, monitor, and disrupt illicit activities before they reach the shore. 

MARITIME THREATS AND EFFORTS

CBP’s maritime border security mission is complex and challenging. The maritime 

domain, generally less restricted than the air and land domains, is an expansive 

pathway to the world without fences. That pathway connects to more than 95,000 

miles of U.S. shoreline.2

While the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) require many commercial, 

passenger, and fishing vessels to operate with an Automatic Identification System 

(AIS), a tracking system to, among other things, increase maritime awareness, the 

requirement does not cover many small vessels.3 The United States Coast Guard 

(USCG) estimates that, combined with unregistered watercraft, there are approximately 17 million small vessels 4 operating in U.S. waterways; a majority of these 

vessels are not required to utilize AIS. Therefore, detecting and assessing the risk 

of small vessels is particularly challenging. 

Additionally, the maritime environment contains both legitimate and illegitimate 

traffic sharing the same transit routes. Smugglers use a wide range of evolving 

methods, including the use of small vessels, to move contraband and people across 

our borders. OAM adapts its strategy and response to address emerging threats, tactics, and intelligence. 

As part of CBP’s comprehensive effort to improve the security of our Nation’s borders while enhancing legitimate travel specifically for small boaters, CBP’s Office 

of Field Operations (OFO) utilizes several alternate inspection programs such as the 

Canadian Border Boater permit (I–68), Nexus Marine program, and the Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS). SVRS, a voluntary, on-line program to report the foreign travel of small vessel operators and passengers, was developed to better track 

small vessels and make it easier to identify suspicious or unknown vessels. Enrollment in SVRS includes completing an on-line application, attending a face-to-face 

interview with a CBP officer, and, if needed, providing biometrics for verification. 

Once enrolled, participants are able to submit a ‘‘float plan’’ consisting of biographical information of all persons intending on traveling, vessel registration information, 

and itinerary information. By enrolling and submitting a float plan, participants 

may not have to appear in person for inspection by a CBP officer each time they 

enter the United States. Participants are still required to report via telephone their 

arrival in the United States. Initiatives such as SVRS provide CBP with advanced 

vessel information and increased awareness of small vessels approaching or traveling U.S. waterways. Segregating low-risk vessels facilitates legitimate recreational 

boater traffic and increases CBP’s ability to identify higher-risk vessels and dedicate 

resources to address illicit maritime activities. 

A considerable threat along our entire maritime border involves the use of 

‘‘pangas.’’ Smugglers use these wood or fiberglass homemade fishing vessels’ relatively high-speed capabilities, small radar signature, and the cover of darkness to 

attempt to evade detection by surface patrol vessels and patrol aircraft. Small panga 

vessels are used to quickly move contraband short distances; however, larger and 

higher-powered pangas can range in size up to 50 feet in length and are capable 

of carrying multi-ton loads of contraband greater distances. 

A recent trend identified off the California coast is a shift from using smaller 

panga vessels that make quick cross-border trips to beach areas near San Diego to 

using larger pangas. Larger pangas are typically used in the Western Caribbean 

transit zones from South America, but are now transiting from Mexico farther offshore and farther northward along the California coast. 
17 

In fiscal year 2013, the San Diego Maritime Domain along the California Coast, 

had 243 maritime smuggling events and 123 seizures, of which 81 were pangas, accounting for 93,240 pounds of marijuana. 

OAM is taking the Southern California panga threat seriously and is evaluating 

a number of options to aggressively address the significant increase in smuggling 

events and the trends moving these panga trips northward. Our response includes 

increasing the number of Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEAs) and maritime 

UAS patrols; the realignment of vessels and personnel in Southern California 

through surge operations; and the expansion of our partnerships. 

COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS

Through collaboration and coordination with our many partners, we have made 

great strides with regard to the integrity and security of our maritime borders. 

In 2011, the CBP Commissioner, USCG Commandant, and U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director signed the cross-component Maritime Operations Coordination (MOC) plan. The plan addresses the unique nature of the maritime environment and sets forth a layered, DHS-wide approach to homeland security issues within the maritime domain, ensuring integrated planning, information 

sharing, and increased response capability in each area of responsibility. 

OAM has been an integral part of successful interagency counter-narcotics missions. For example, operating in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task 

Force—South (JIATF–S), OAM assets, including P–3 aircraft, patrol a 6 millionsquare-mile area of the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, known as the transit zone, in search of drugs and illicit migrants that are in transit toward United 

States’ shores. OAM’s distinctive detection capabilities allow highly-trained crews to 

identify emerging threats well beyond the land borders of the United States. 

In partnership with USCG, OAM developed a maritime variant of its Predator B 

unmanned aircraft system (UAS), called the Guardian, to increase reconnaissance, 

surveillance, targeting, and acquisition capabilities in maritime operating environments. OAM pilots, augmented by USCG personnel, use the Guardian to conduct 

long-range surveillance in support of joint counter-narcotics operations in the southeast coastal and Gulf of Mexico border regions and drug source and transit zones, 

where maritime radar is necessary to detect a variety of threats. The Guardian is 

a strategic asset for homeland security operated at and beyond the Nation’s borders 

to overcome threats moving towards the United States. 

CBP, with assistance from several NASO Centers, USCG, DOD, along with State, 

local, and Tribal partners participate in Operation Blue Tempest. OAM supports 

this operation using P–3, DHC–8, MQ–9 (Guardian UAS) aircraft and marine interceptors. Operation Blue Tempest is intended to disrupt and seize drugs moving from 

the source zone through the transit zones on their way towards the United States. 

On-going missions provide aerial and maritime surveillance in transit/arrival zones 

allowing OAM to gather intelligence, develop a maritime database and exploit targets of opportunity that are conducting drug and alien smuggling in the California 

Coastal Region. The intelligence gained from these missions is shared among all 

operational participants. This intelligence may also be shared with the Government 

of Mexico (GoM) using vetted GoM Liaisons on staff at the AMOC. This sharing of 

information, which is done in coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as the single point of contact on behalf of the United States with regards 

to drug-related matters in the foreign environment, is critical in identifying potential departure locations to better posture limited GoM and U.S. resources in response. 

OAM continues to engage with the USCG and DOD to identify and deploy enabling technologies that permit the expansion of overall maritime domain awareness 

and the integration of information and maritime sensor data throughout DOD and 

DHS. Through this partnership, OAM is negotiating with DOD to receive radar data 

from patrolling DOD air and surface assets along the California Coastline. AMOC 

already receives feeds from airborne DOD aircraft and is looking to the Navy Southern California Offshore Range as an additional source for enhanced maritime domain awareness. With the support of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate 

and the USCG Research and Development Center, prototype technologies have been 

deployed to the AMOC and USCG Los Angeles/Long Beach Sector, and are currently 

under evaluation. The Coastal Surveillance System (CSS) pilot has already shown 

promise in its ability to manage and coherently integrate various maritime sensor 

systems into a single picture, which can be then shared between stakeholders. 

DHS and CBP have cooperated in various law enforcement and border security 

efforts including conducting joint air interdiction operations with Mexican forces to 

increase apprehensions of suspect air traffic. CBP continues to enhance our partner-
18 

ships with our international counterparts, as well as Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies and the public and private sectors to monitor, collect, 

analyze, and produce intelligence reporting on smuggling tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. Intelligence provides front-line personnel with a better understanding of 

the illicit transportation methods and concealment techniques they are likely to encounter. Coordination and cooperation among all entities that have a stake in our 

mission have been, and continue to be, paramount to an effective maritime security 

strategy. OAM continues to unify our enforcement efforts and expand collaboration 

with other agencies. 

INDICATORS OF SUCCESS

OAM will continue to work with our partners to increase maritime domain awareness through shared intelligence, advancements in technology, and continued cooperative efforts in detection and interdiction. 

OAM efforts, in coordination with our partners, have resulted in the seizure of 

immense quantities of contraband, and disrupted considerable illicit activity before 

it reaches our shores. In fiscal year 2013, OAM conducted more than 73,500 flight 

hours and 44,500 underway hours, resulting in the arrest of 2,997 individuals, the 

apprehension of more than 48,000 illegal migrants, over 3,100 weapons, 

$24,696,873.00 in currency, and the seizure of more than 820,000 pounds of illegal 

drugs which includes cocaine seizures valued at nearly $10 billion and marijuana 

seizures valued at $1.8 billion. 

Over the last decade, OAM has evolved to counter the egregious threat of noncompliant vessels. OAM has developed capabilities to disable non-compliant vessels 

and prevent the more serious violators from reaching our communities. Since 2003, 

OAM has engaged in 108 incidents involving marine warning and/or disabling 

rounds, and one incident involving air-to-vessel warning and disabling rounds. In 

each case, the criminals were safely brought to justice without incident or injury. 

We acknowledge that there is still work to do. The path forward is to improve 

our maritime domain awareness by continually enhancing our detection capabilities, 

maximizing maritime intelligence integration, increasing our resources, enhancing 

and expanding our technologies, and strategically aligning our resources to allow 

flexibility in responding to potential threats. OAM will continue to use a risk-based 

approach to adapt and align our personnel and assets as needed to address emerging and dynamic threats and to keep our maritime borders secure. 

CONCLUSION

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify about the work of CBP and 

OAM. With your support, we will continue to refine and further enhance the effectiveness of our detection and interdiction capabilities. I look forward to answering 

any questions you may have at this time. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Commissioner Alles. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Caldwell for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, MARITIME AND SECURITY COAST GUARD ISSUES, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CALDWELL. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, 

and other Members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting GAO to be here today to discuss how we secure our maritime 

borders. 

Based on GAO’s prior work, there are several factors that are 

critical to securing those maritime borders. These are: Robust maritime domain awareness; assessment of risks from foreign ports; 

international partnerships; maritime surveillance, interdiction, and 

security operations; domestic partnerships along our coast and in 

our ports; and measuring maritime security. 

So Admiral Lee and General Alles have already discussed many 

of these same factors, so I think I will concentrate my comments 
19 

on the last factor, which is: How do we measure the security of our 

maritime borders? My comments are in the spirit of the bill you 

had in the last Congress, H.R. 1417, a bill with bipartisan support 

from Chairman McCaul, Chairman Miller, as well as Representatives Thompson and Jackson Lee. 

H.R. 1417 called for DHS to develop and implement metrics on 

the effectiveness of security in the maritime environment. Some of 

these potential metrics, for example, were undocumented migrant 

interdiction rates, illicit drug removal rates, cocaine removal rates 

in the Transit Zone, response rates for assets to arrive on scene. 

These metrics are definitely a good start. However, there are 

going to be many challenges coming up with additional meaningful 

metrics. As you know, some of the H.R. 1417 metrics depend on estimates of things that are pretty hard to estimate, such as the actual flow of illegal migrants and drugs. 

GAO’s prior work has shed some light on both some of the 

progress and the challenges that we have made as a Nation in 

terms of measuring the security of our maritime borders. Some of 

the problems I have noted in my written statement, including cases 

where there is a lack of reliable or accurate data. There is a case 

where we have data but it is not being used to manage our programs. In some cases, there is just a lack of outcome-based measures. 

In our November 2011 report, we took a detailed look at the 

Coast Guard’s attempts to measure risk reduction related to its 

maritime security mission. Coast Guard, to its credit, did try to develop a measure that identified the percentage of reduction in maritime security risks resulting from various Coast Guard activities. 

However, given the relative dearth of actual maritime attacks or 

incidents, the Coast Guard used subject-matter experts to estimate 

these risks as a proxy measure to try to get at how we may have 

prevented, say, the radical terrorist attack. 

This exercise demonstrated that estimating risk reduction itself 

is inherently uncertain, as this measure is based largely on subjective measures of Coast Guard—subjective judgments of Coast 

Guard personnel. Therefore, the risk-reduction results that were 

reported and have been reported for several years were not based 

on measurable or observable activities but on those judgments. 

Looking at the Coast Guard’s broader maritime mission set, 

things like search-and-rescue and vessel safety, that makes it even 

more difficult for Coast Guard to use such measurements of security measures to manage its resources. So one of the challenges is 

going to be, can you combine a variety of the missions combined 

by Coast Guard and CBP to look at some of these broad measurements of mission success as well as some of the more specific ones? 

In closing, GAO will continue to work with this committee and 

the Congress as a whole to help agencies develop and refine performance measures that can measure the security of our maritime 

borders. Such measures can help agencies better gauge their 

progress and better manage their workforce and their assets. 

Thank you very much. I will be happy to respond to questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Caldwell follows:] 
20 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL

NOVEMBER 19, 2013 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–14–196T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Maritime borders are gateways to our Nation’s maritime transportation system of 

ports, waterways, and vessels—which handle billions of dollars of cargo annually. 

An attack on this system could have dire consequences and affect the global economy. In addition, criminals could use small vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and 

other contraband across U.S. maritime borders. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for many homeland security efforts in the maritime domain, including conducting port facility and commercial vessel inspections and coordinating maritime 

information-sharing efforts, among other things. In addition, CBP is responsible for 

screening incoming vessels’ crews and cargo to facilitate the flow of legitimate trade 

and passengers. 

This testimony identifies key factors important to secure the maritime borders, 

and discusses progress and challenges in related DHS programs. This statement is 

based on products GAO issued from July 2003 through October 2013. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to strengthen its maritime security programs. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and 

has taken actions, or has actions under way, to address them. 

MARITIME SECURITY.—PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN KEY DHS PROGRAMS TO SECURE

THE MARITIME BORDERS

What GAO Found 

GAO’s prior work has identified several key factors important to secure the maritime borders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components 

have made progress (e.g., coordinating with partners), and in some cases also experienced challenges with their related maritime security programs. 

• Maintaining robust maritime domain awareness.—It is critical that Federal 

agencies maintain maritime domain awareness—the understanding of anything 

associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the 

security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. The U.S. Coast 

Guard has developed systems—including information-sharing and vessel-tracking systems—to enhance maritime domain awareness. GAO’s prior work has 

found that the Coast Guard has made progress in developing its systems, but 

that it also experienced some challenges. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a system intended 

to enable the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. GAO recommended that the agency take actions to address this challenge. 

DHS concurred and stated it planned to take actions. 

• Assessing risks coming from foreign ports.—The security of maritime borders 

also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargo bound for the United 

States originates. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Coast Guard 

have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports, foreign vessels entering U.S. ports, and the cargo carried by these vessels from these ports. In September 2013, GAO found that CBP has taken steps to enhance the security of 

U.S.-bound cargo, but CBP does not periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States. GAO recommended that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from 

these ports. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendation and reported that it 

planned to take actions to address it. 

• Conducting maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations.—Along 

the coasts and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operations are 

conducted to ensure the security of the maritime borders. For example, CBP’s 

Office of Air and Marine is to provide maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities. In March 2012, GAO found that the office did not meet its National 

performance goal and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as high-priority. GAO made recommendations to help ensure that the 

office’s assets and personnel are best positioned to effectively meet mission 

needs and address threats, among other things. DHS concurred and reported 
21 

1Maritime domain awareness is the understanding by stakeholders involved in maritime security of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the 

security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. 2The Transportation Security Administration has responsibility for managing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program, which is designed to control the access of maritime workers to regulated maritime facilities in the United States. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation detection 

equipment, including radiation portal monitors at domestic seaports to support the scanning of 

cargo containers before they enter U.S. commerce. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

is responsible for administering grants intended to improve the security of the Nation’s highestrisk port areas. 

that it planned to take action to address the recommendations by the end of 

March 2014. • Measuring performance.—In securing our maritime borders, DHS and its component agencies have faced challenges in developing meaningful performance 

measures. For example, GAO’s prior work found that they have experienced 

challenges collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data; among other things. 

In January 2011, GAO reported that both CBP and the Coast Guard tracked 

the frequency of illegal seafarer incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of 

these incidents varied considerably between the two component agencies and 

between the agencies ’ field and headquarters units. GAO made a recommendation to improve the accuracy of DHS data, and DHS concurred and has made 

progress in addressing the recommendation. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss key aspects of a secure maritime border. Maritime borders are gateways to our Nation’s maritime transportation 

system of ports, waterways, and vessels, which handle billions of dollars of cargo 

annually. Accordingly, maritime borders are critical to our National security. For instance, an attack on this system could have a widespread effect on global shipping, 

international trade, and the global economy, and an attack on a domestic port could 

have dire consequences because of the size of ports and their general proximity to 

metropolitan areas. Further, criminals could use small vessels to smuggle narcotics, 

aliens, and other contraband across U.S. maritime borders. Balancing maritime security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of people and commerce remains an on-going challenge for the public and private sectors alike. 

Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast Guard has 

much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. maritime interests and leading homeland security efforts in the maritime domain. In this capacity, the Coast Guard conducts port facility and commercial vessel inspections, coordinates maritime information-sharing efforts, and promotes maritime domain 

awareness, among other things.1 Also within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for screening incoming vessels’ crews and cargoes for the 

presence of contraband, such as weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, or explosives, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and passengers. Several other 

DHS components, such as the Transportation Security Administration, the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, also 

have roles in securing our maritime borders.2

My statement today identifies key factors that are important to secure the maritime borders and discusses progress and challenges in related DHS programs. Specifically, I will address the following factors: (1) Maritime domain awareness; (2) 

risks from foreign ports; (3) international partnerships in global supply chain security; (4) maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations; (5) partnerships and coordination along the coasts and in ports; and (6) measuring performance. My statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from July 2003 

through October 2013 related to maritime, port, vessel, and cargo security and other 

related aspects of maritime border security. To perform the work for our previous 

reports and testimonies, we visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency 

program documents, port security plans, and other documents; and interviewed officials from the Federal, State, local, private, and international sectors, among other 

things. The officials we met with represented a wide variety of stakeholders including the Coast Guard, CBP, port authorities, terminal operators, vessel operators, 

foreign governments, and international trade organizations. Further details on the 

scope and methodology for the previously-issued reports and testimonies are available within each of the published products. We conducted the work on which this 

statement is based in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
22 

3The Common Operational Picture is an interactive, map-based information system that can 

be shared among Coast Guard commands. 4GAO, Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains Unachievable, 

GAO–11–743 (Washington, DC: July 28, 2011). 5GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management of Interagency 

Operations Centers, GAO–12–202 (Washington, DC: Feb. 13, 2012). 6GAO, Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common Operational Picture 

Development Would Strengthen Program, GAO–13–321 (Washington, DC: Apr. 25, 2013). 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

SEVERAL FACTORS ARE IMPORTANT TO SECURE MARITIME BORDERS AND DHS HAS MADE

PROGRESS TO ADDRESS THEM, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN

Our prior work has identified several key factors important to securing the maritime borders, which include: (1) Maintaining robust maritime domain awareness, (2) 

assessing risks coming from foreign ports, (3) leveraging international partnerships, 

(4) conducting maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations, (5) coordinating with partners along the coast and in ports, and (6) measuring performance. Our prior work has also shown that DHS and its components have made 

progress, and in some cases experienced challenges, with their programs to address 

these factors. 

Maintaining Robust Maritime Domain Awareness 

To ensure the security of our maritime borders, it is critical that Federal agencies 

maintain robust maritime domain awareness. According to the National Plan to 

Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, the maritime domain provides an expansive 

pathway around the world that terrorist organizations could exploit for moving 

equipment and personnel, as well as a means for launching attacks. Timely awareness of the maritime domain and knowledge of threats helps the Coast Guard to 

detect, deter, interdict, and defeat adversaries. For example, according to the Coast 

Guard, maritime domain awareness played a key role in allowing it to interdict narcotics, intercept thousands of alien migrants, detain hundreds of suspected smugglers, board foreign vessels to suppress illegal fishing, and rescue thousands of people. 

To enhance maritime domain awareness, the Coast Guard works with its maritime partners to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of a wide array of information and intelligence to better secure the Nation’s maritime transportation system 

against potential threats. The Coast Guard has made progress in developing its 

maritime domain awareness systems—including its Common Operational Picture— 

by increasing user access and adding data sources.3 The Coast Guard also has related systems that can be used to provide enhanced maritime domain information 

to Coast Guard units and port partners. However, as we previously reported, the 

Coast Guard experienced challenges in developing and implementing these systems. 

For example, in July 2011, we reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal 

of building a single, fully interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program system intended to 

enable the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft.4 In 

addition, in February 2012, we reported that the intended information-sharing capabilities of the Coast Guard’s WatchKeeper software—which was designed to gather 

data to help port partner agencies collaborate in the conduct of operations and share 

information, among other things—met few port partner agency needs. This is, in 

part, because the Coast Guard did not determine these needs when developing the 

system.5 Further, in April 2013, we reported that, among other things, the Coast 

Guard had not followed its own information technology development guidance when 

developing one of its new maritime domain awareness systems, known as Coast 

Guard One View.6 We recommended, and the Coast Guard concurred, that it take 

actions to address these challenges. DHS stated that it planned to take actions to 

address these recommendations, such as developing necessary acquisition documentation. 

In addition to its own systems, the Coast Guard also relies on systems operated 

by other entities to help it track vessels and enhance maritime domain awareness. 

For example, to track vessels at sea, the Coast Guard uses a long-range identification and tracking system and an automatic identification system that broadcasts information on the vessels and their locations. To track vessels in U.S. coastal areas, 

inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a land-based automatic 

identification system and also obtains information from radar and cameras in some 

ports. In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of tracking small vessels using 
23 

7GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for 

Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO–09–337 (Washington, DC: Mar. 17, 2009). 8GAO, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO–12–1009T (Washington, DC: Sept. 11, 2012). 9 As of July 2013, there were 58 CSI ports in 32 countries that, collectively, accounted for over 

80 percent of the container shipments imported into the United States. 10We reported in September 2013 that CBP subsequently added 35 ports to the CSI program 

from 2003 through 2007 on the basis of additional criteria, such as strategic threat factors and 

diplomatic or political considerations. 11GAO, Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing 

Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO–13–764 (Washington, DC: Sept. 16, 2013). 12GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later, 

GAO–08–126T, (Washington, DC: Oct. 30, 2007). 13GAO–12–1009T. 

available technologies.7 For example, we reported that although the Coast Guard 

and other agencies may have technology systems that can track small vessels within 

some ports, these did not always work in bad weather or at night. In September 

2012, we reported that the expansion of vessel tracking technology to all small vessels may be of limited utility because of, among other things, the large number of 

small vessels, the difficulty in identifying threatening actions, and the challenges 

associated with getting resources on scene in time to prevent an attack once it has 

been identified.8 DHS and its components—such as the Coast Guard and CBP— 

have started or completed initiatives to improve maritime domain awareness in 

order to address small vessel security risks, including an initiative to help CBP better track small vessels arriving from foreign locations and another initiative to assist the Coast Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites. 

Assessing Risks Coming from Foreign Ports 

The security of maritime borders also depends, in part, upon security at foreign 

ports where cargo and vessels bound for the United States may originate. CBP and 

the Coast Guard have developed models to assess the risks of cargo carried by these 

vessels, foreign ports, and foreign vessels entering U.S. ports. In particular, CBP developed the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program that places officials at select foreign ports to use intelligence and risk assessment information to determine 

whether U.S.-bound cargo container shipments from those ports are at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist contraband.9 CBP’s selection 

of the initial 23 CSI ports in 2002 was primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound 

containers, but beginning in 2003, CBP considered more threat information when 

it expanded the number of CSI ports.10 In our September 2013 report, we reported 

that CBP had not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to the 

United States since 2005.11 In 2009, CBP developed a model that ranked 356 potential expansion ports for a related program on the basis of risk, but it was not implemented because of budget cuts. We found in September 2013 that by applying CBP’s 

risk model to fiscal year 2012 cargo shipment data, CSI did not have a presence 

at about half of the ports CBP considered high-risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower-risk locations. As a result, we recommended that CBP 

periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo 

to the United States and use the results to inform any future expansion of CSI and 

determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports. DHS concurred 

with our recommendation and reported that by December 2014 it plans to develop 

a process for conducting periodic assessments of the supply chain security risks from 

all ports that ship cargo to the United States and use information from the assessments to determine if future expansion or adjustments to CSI locations are appropriate. 

While CBP is focused on the security of the cargo shipped to the United States 

from foreign ports, the Coast Guard is focused on the security of ports and the vessels arriving in the United States. Under the International Port Security program, 

Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to evaluate their antiterrorism security 

measures against established international standards. We reported in October 2007 

that the Coast Guard had found that most of the over 100 countries it visited had 

substantially implemented international standards.12 More recently, the Coast 

Guard reported in November 2013 that it had visited over 150 countries. In September 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard had made progress with implementing its International Port Security program despite a number of challenges.13

For example, we reported that the Coast Guard was able to alleviate sovereignty 

concerns of some countries by including a reciprocal visit feature in which the Coast 

Guard hosts foreign delegations to visit U.S. ports. Further, as we reported in September 2013, the Coast Guard developed a risk-informed model—that it updates an-
24 

14GAO–13–764. 15 U.S. Coast Guard, International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012 (Washington, 

DC: Mar. 31, 2012). 16The World Customs Organization is an intergovernmental organization representing the 

customs administrations of 173 countries that aims to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency 

of customs administrations. 17 In November 2001, CBP announced the C–TPAT program as part of its efforts toward facilitating the free flow of goods while ensuring that the containers do not pose a threat to homeland 

security. In October 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 established 

a statutory framework for the C–TPAT program, codified its existing membership processes, and 

added new components—such as time frames for certifying, validating, and revalidating members’ security practices. 6 U.S.C. §§ 961–973. 18 In return for their participation in the program, C–TPAT members are entitled a reduced 

likelihood of scrutiny of their cargo. CBP has awarded initial C–TPAT certification—or acceptance of the company’s agreement to voluntarily participate in the program—to over 10,000 companies, as of February 2012. 19GAO, Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices, GAO– 

08–240 (Washington, DC: Apr. 25, 2008). 

nually—as part of its International Port Security program to regularly assess the 

potential threat foreign ports pose to the maritime supply chain and make operational decisions.14 According to the Coast Guard International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012, the Coast Guard uses the model to make informed decisions on how to engage each country with the International Port Security program, 

including: (1) How often to visit ports, (2) how many staff to assign to a particular 

visit, and (3) whether the country requires assistance.15

In addition to assessing the security of foreign ports, the Coast Guard also uses 

the results of the International Port Security program to help determine which arriving foreign vessels to board and inspect through its Port State Control program. 

In particular, according to the Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program: 

Annual Report 2012, the Coast Guard is to use risk-based criteria to identify which 

foreign vessels entering U.S. ports and waterways it considers to be at risk of noncompliance with international or domestic regulations, and perform compliance examinations of these vessels. The risk-based criteria used to make these decisions include the vessel’s management, the flag state under which the vessel is registered, 

and the vessel’s security compliance history resulting from previous examinations. 

Leveraging International Partnerships in Global Supply Chain Security 

International partnerships based on international standards are another key aspect of secure maritime borders. For example, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was developed after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to establish measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities with 

a standardized and consistent security framework. The ISPS Code requires facilities 

to conduct an assessment to identify threats and vulnerabilities and then develop 

security plans based on the assessment. The requirements of this code are performance-based; therefore, compliance can be achieved through a variety of security 

measures. Additionally, in collaboration with 11 other members of the World Customs Organization, CBP developed the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework), which is based, in part, on the core concepts of CBP programs and provides standards for collaboration among customs administrations and entities participating in the supply chain.16 The SAFE Framework was adopted by the 173 World Customs Organization member customs administrations in June 2005; and as of our last report on this topic in July 2008, 154 

had signed letters of intent to implement the standards. 

CBP and the Coast Guard also leverage relationships with private-industry stakeholders and foreign partners to promote the security of maritime borders, given that 

protecting domestic ports begins outside the United States where inbound shipments enter the supply chain. For example, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism (C–TPAT) program is a voluntary program that enables CBP officials to 

work in partnership with private companies to review and approve the security of 

their international supply chains.17 Companies that join the C–TPAT program commit to improving the security of their supply chains and agree to provide CBP with 

information on their specific security measures. In addition, the companies agree to 

allow CBP to verify, among other things, that their security measures meet or exceed CBP’s minimum security requirements. This allows CBP to ensure that the security measures outlined in a member’s security profile are in place and effective.18

In April 2008, we reported that the C–TPAT program holds promise as part of 

CBP’s multifaceted maritime security strategy.19 We also reported that the program 

allows CBP to develop partnerships with the trade community, which is a challenge 
25 

20Mutual recognition arrangements can be entered into with other countries as well as other 

governing bodies, such as the European Union. For the purposes of this testimony, the countries 

and governing bodies that enter into mutual recognition arrangements with the United States 

are considered partners. 21GAO–13–764. 22 According to DHS officials, the European Union characterizes its port visits as ‘‘inspections.’’ 

Under the memorandum of understanding procedures, the Coast Guard recognizes a successful 

European Union inspection of its member states’ ports in the same manner as it would recognize 

a successful country visit by Coast Guard inspectors. Coast Guard officials stated that they have 

collaborated with their European counterparts to develop standard operating procedures for 

these port inspections. 23 CBP’s Office of Air and Marine resources are divided among 70 air and marine locations 

across three regions (southeast, southwest, and northern); the National Capital area; and National Air Security Operations Centers throughout the continental United States, Puerto Rico, 

and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In deciding how resources should be allocated, considerations include historical location, Congressional direction, and differences in geography and relative need 

for air and marine support to address threats. 24The Office of Air and Marine has 23 branches and 6 National Air Security Operations Centers across these regions, and within the branches, the office may have one or more air or marine units. See GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s 

Air and Marine Assets, GAO–12–518 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2012). 

given the international nature of the industry and resulting limits on CBP’s jurisdiction and activities, and provides CBP with a level of information sharing that would 

otherwise not be available. However, our reports raised concerns about the overall 

management of the program and challenges in verifying that C–TPAT members 

meet security criteria. We recommended that CBP strengthen program management 

by developing planning documents and performance measures, and by improving 

the process for validating security practices of C–TPAT members. CBP agreed with 

these recommendations and has addressed them. 

Additionally, through mutual recognition arrangements with foreign partners, the 

security-related practices and programs established by the customs or maritime security administration of one partner are recognized and accepted by the administration of another.20 Both CBP and the Coast Guard have entered into such arrangements. For example, CBP can expand the reach of its supply chain security programs (such as C–TPAT) through mutual recognition arrangements. According to 

the World Customs Organization, mutual recognition arrangements allow customs 

administrations to target high-risk shipments more effectively and expedite low-risk 

shipments by, for example, reducing redundant examinations. As we reported in 

September 2013, mutual recognition arrangements may allow the Coast Guard to 

allocate resources more efficiently and reduce risks.21 For example, we further reported that the Coast Guard signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union that establishes a process for mutually recognizing security inspections of each other’s ports.22 According to DHS documents and Coast Guard officials 

in Europe, by signing this memorandum of understanding, the Coast Guard plans 

to reassign some International Port Security officials from Europe to Africa, where 

certain countries are having more difficulties than others in implementing effective 

antiterrorism measures in their ports. Further, we reported that one trade-off of 

signing the memorandum of understanding is that Coast Guard’s International Port 

Security officials will not have the same opportunities to have face-to-face interactions and share port security information and practices directly with their European Union counterparts as in the past. Despite this trade-off, Coast Guard officials 

stated that entering into such arrangements increases efficiencies and noted that 

they intend to negotiate additional memorandums of understanding with other foreign governments that have strong port inspection programs. 

Conducting Maritime Surveillance, Interdiction, and Security Operations along the 

Coast and in Ports 

Along the coast and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations are conducted to ensure the security of maritime borders. For example, 

CBP’s Office of Air and Marine provides maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities. Its strategic assumptions include the ability to provide a 24-hour, 7-daya-week response to border penetrations anywhere along the U.S. border, with a 1- 

hour response time for areas designated as high-priority.23 We reported in March 

2012 that as of May 2011, the Office of Air and Marine had placed about half of 

its air assets on the Southwest Border region and the remainder in the northern 

and southeast regions, while marine resources were distributed fairly evenly across 

the northern, southwest, and southeast regions.24 Further, our analysis of the Office 

of Air and Marine’s fiscal year 2010 performance results indicate that they did not 

meet its National performance goal to fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Pa-
26 

25See 46 U.S.C. § 70106. 26The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan was signed by the Director of Homeland Security Investigations, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 27GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over Collaborative Field Mechanisms, GAO–13–734 (Washington, DC: Sept. 27, 2013). 28 33 C.F.R. §§ 103.300–.310. 

trol air support requests and did not provide higher rates of support in locations 

designated as high priority based on threats. We made recommendations to help ensure that the Office of Air and Marine’s assets and personnel are best-positioned 

to effectively meet mission needs and address threats, and to help DHS better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies. 

DHS concurred with these recommendations, and described actions it was taking, 

or planned to take to address them, including making strategic and technological 

changes in its assessment of the mix and placement of its resources by the end of 

March 2014. 

In addition to CBP’s Office of Air and Marine interdiction and response activities, 

the Coast Guard conducts a number of activities to deter potential threats to the 

United States’ maritime borders. For example, the Coast Guard escorts a certain 

percentage of high-capacity passenger vessels—cruise ships, ferries, and excursion 

vessels—and energy commodity tankers to protect against an external threat, such 

as a waterborne improvised explosive device. The Coast Guard also provides additional security response capabilities through its Maritime Safety and Security 

Teams and Maritime Security Response Teams. Created by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Maritime Safety and Security Teams constitute a 

maritime security antiterrorism force.25 The teams are managed as assets that may 

be deployed Nation-wide, and are responsible for safeguarding the public and protecting vessels, harbors, ports, facilities, and cargo in U.S. territorial waters. The 

teams are to maintain readiness to deploy to events such as terrorist threats or incidents and storm recovery operations, and routinely deploy to National special security events such as Super Bowls and presidential inaugurations. They are also to 

enforce security zones around high-interest vessels in transit and at other times 

when additional levels of security are needed within the Nation’s ports and waterways. The Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Response Team complements the Maritime Security and Safety Team, and is charged with maintaining a high readiness 

posture 365 days a year. The Maritime Security Response Team is the Coast 

Guard’s advanced interdiction force for counterterrorism and law enforcement operations of a high-risk nature. The team provides a variety of advanced capabilities 

or skills, including addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and 

vertically deploying from helicopters to engage potentially hostile personnel. 

Coordinating with Partners along the Coast and in Ports 

Along the coast and in ports, partnerships and coordination among various stakeholders contribute to the security of the maritime borders. To target the threat of 

transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal borders, the Maritime 

Operations Coordination Plan, established in 2011, directs CBP, the Coast Guard, 

and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations to utilize the fusion of their intelligence, planning, and operations capabilities 

through the formation of Regional Coordinating Mechanisms.26 The Coast Guard 

serves as the lead agency responsible for planning and coordinating among components. We reported in September 2013 that, according to the Coast Guard, there 

were 32 Regional Coordinating Mechanisms as of June 2013 that aligned with Coast 

Guard sectors’ geographic areas of responsibility.27 In addition to the lead agencies, 

other stakeholders include the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the U.S. Attorney’s Office; State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies; and foreign law enforcement agencies. 

In ports, Area Maritime Security Committees consist of key stakeholders who: (1) 

May be affected by security policies, and (2) share information and develop port security plans. These committees, which are required by Coast Guard regulations that 

implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, also identify critical 

port infrastructure and risks to the port, develop mitigation strategies for these 

risks, and communicate appropriate security information to port stakeholders.28

Recommended committee members include a diverse array of port stakeholders, including Federal, State, and local agencies, as well as private-sector entities such as 

terminal operators, yacht clubs, shipyards, marine exchanges, commercial fishermen, trucking and railroad companies, organized labor, and trade associations. Area 

Maritime Security Committees also are to serve as forums for developing Area Maritime Security Plans. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 required the 
27 

29 46 U.S.C. § 70103(b)(2)(G). In 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 

2006 (SAFE Port Act) added a requirement that AMSPs include recovery issues by identifying 

salvage equipment able to restore operational trade capacity. 46 U.S.C. § 70103(b)(2)(G). 30 46 U.S.C. § 70103(b). GAO, Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid 

Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO–07–412 (Washington, DC: Mar. 28, 2007). 31Fiscal year 2007 Port Security Grant Program supplemental program funding supports the 

development of a plan that emphasizes port-wide partnerships, regional management of risk, 

and business continuity/resumption of trade. The central plan focuses on security across the port 

area and articulates a strategy for ensuring business continuity and resumption of trade within 

the port in the event of an emergency. 32 Illegal seafarers include both absconders (seafarers CBP has ordered detained on-board a 

vessel in port, but who depart a vessel without permission) and deserters (seafarers CBP grants 

permission to leave a vessel, but who do not return when required). GAO, Maritime Security: 

Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be 

Strengthened, GAO–11–195 (Washington, DC: Jan. 14, 2011). 33GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, 

but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data, GAO–08–12 (Washington, 

DC: Feb. 14, 2008). 

Coast Guard to develop Area Maritime Security Plans—to be updated every 5 

years—for ports throughout the Nation.29 The Coast Guard develops these plans for 

each of the 43 geographically-defined port areas with input from applicable Governmental and private entities, and the plans are to serve as the primary means to 

identify and coordinate Coast Guard procedures related to prevention, protection, 

and security. In March 2007, we reported that there was a wide variance in ports’ 

natural disaster planning efforts and that Area Maritime Security Plans—limited 

to security incidents—could benefit from unified planning to include an all-hazards 

approach. We recommended that DHS encourage port stakeholders to use existing 

forums for discussing all-hazards planning.30 DHS concurred with our recommendation and implemented it through the fiscal year 2007 Port Security Grant Program 

supplemental program, which was designed, in part, to facilitate the development 

of a Port-Wide Risk Management/Mitigation and Business Continuity/Resumption of 

Trade Plan.31

Measuring Maritime Security 

Another important aspect of a secure border is measuring maritime security. In 

the DHS component agencies’ implementation of the various maritime security related programs I have described today, and as we have previously reported, one of 

the challenges that DHS and its component agencies have faced has been the lack 

of adequate performance measures. The following are some of the performance 

measurement challenges we have reported on: • Lack of reliable and accurate data.—DHS and its component agencies have experienced challenges collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data. For example, in January 2011, we reported that both CBP and the Coast Guard tracked 

the frequency of illegal seafarer incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of 

these incidents varied considerably between the two component agencies and 

between the agencies’ field and headquarters units.32 As a result, the data DHS 

used to inform its strategic and tactical plans were of undetermined reliability. 

We recommended that CBP and the Coast Guard determine why their data varied and jointly establish a process for sharing and reconciling records of illegal 

seafarer entries at U.S. seaports. DHS concurred and has made progress in addressing the recommendation. • Not using data to manage programs.—DHS and its component agencies have 

not always had or used performance information to manage their missions. For 

example, we reported in February 2008 that Coast Guard officials used their 

Maritime Information for Safety & Law Enforcement database—the Coast 

Guard’s primary data system for documenting facility inspections and other activities—to review the results of inspectors’ data entries for individual maritime 

facilities, but the officials did not use the data to evaluate the facility inspection 

program overall.33 We found that a more thorough evaluation of the facility 

compliance program could provide information on, for example, the variations 

we identified between Coast Guard units in oversight approaches, the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, and whether some approaches work 

better than others. We recommended that the Coast Guard assess its Maritime 

Information for Safety & Law Enforcement compliance data, including the completeness and consistency of the data and data field problems, and make any 

changes needed to more effectively utilize the data. The Coast Guard agreed 

and has reported taking actions to address the recommendation. These actions 

include hiring a full-time management and program analyst to consistently review the data for trends and gaps, and developing training resources, help 
28 

34See GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO–03–770 (Washington, DC: Jul. 25, 2003); Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, GAO–05–404 (Washington, DC: Mar. 11, 2005); and Supply Chain Security: 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, 

but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices, GAO–08–240 (Washington, DC: Apr. 25, 

2008). 35GAO, Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations, GAO–12–14 (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 

2011). 

desks, and conferences, among other things, to help field personnel track 

changes to Maritime Information for Safety & Law Enforcement and to improve 

data entry time and consistency. • Lack of outcome-based performance measures.—DHS and its component agencies have also experienced difficulties developing and using performance measures that focus on outcomes. Outcome-based performance measures describe the 

intended result of carrying out a program or activity. For example, although 

CBP had performance measures in place for its C–TPAT program, these measures focused on program participation and facilitating trade and travel and not 

on improving supply chain security, which is the program’s purpose. We made 

separate but related recommendations in July 2003, March 2005, and April 

2008 that CBP develop outcome-based performance measures for this program.34 CBP concurred, and, in response to our recommendations, identified 

measures to quantify actions required and to gauge C–TPAT’s impact on supply 

chain security. The Coast Guard has faced similar issues with developing and 

using outcome-based performance measures. For example, we reported in November 2011 that the Coast Guard developed a measure to report its performance in reducing maritime risk, but faced challenges using this measure to inform decisions.35 The Coast Guard reported it has improved the measure to 

make it more valid and reliable and stated it believes it is a useful proxy measure of performance, but notes that developing outcome-based performance measures is challenging because of limited historical data on maritime terrorist attacks. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to 

any questions you may have at this time. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Captain Woodring for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MARCUS WOODRING, USCG (RET.), 

MANAGING DIRECTOR, HEALTH, SAFETY, SECURITY, AND 

ENVIRONMENTAL BRANCH, PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY 

Captain WOODRING. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

Chairwoman Miller, thank you for holding this important hearing today. 

To Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you for again inviting 

the Port of Houston Authority as the industry witness. 

As you know, the Port of Houston is in the Ranking Member’s 

district, and we appreciate her supportive engagement. 

The Port of Houston is comprised of the Port Authority’s 8 terminals, along with more than 150 private terminals. For 17 consecutive years, the port has ranked first in the United States in foreign 

waterborne tonnage, trading with over 200 ports of call globally, 

making us a true maritime border. 

Results of a recent economic impact study show that ship-channel-related businesses at the Port of Houston are responsible for 

more than 2.1 million jobs, generate $499 billion in annual economic activity, and contribute over $52 billion in annual tax rev-
29 

enue nationally. Just yesterday, we had the Vice President of the 

United States stop to visit our Bayport Container Terminal, underscoring the importance of our Nation’s ports in economic growth, as 

he traveled to visit the expanding Panama Canal. 

We have heard about a layered approach to border security, 

starting with offshore interdiction, all the way to the sea buoy. My 

focus today will be on the industry efforts to secure the border 

within the port. Our efforts use both physical assets and professional partnerships. 

For physical assets, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border 

Protection, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, and the Houston Police Department all maintain patrol vessels. Surveillance flights 

are also conducted on a regular basis by these same agencies. 

Those are the Federal and local resources, but how does industry 

link in? The story of the Houston Ship Channel Security District, 

a unique public-private partnership, clearly shows the direct relationship between assets and partnerships. 

In the aftermath of 9/11, Government began putting more stringent controls in place in the maritime domain. The industrial facilities and companies of the Port of Houston came to the table and 

essentially said, we don’t have law enforcement authority or jurisdiction, but we want to help, as our businesses have the most to 

lose if things go wrong. 

In 2007, the Texas legislature, backed by industry, passed a bill 

creating the Houston Ship Channel Security District. Assessments 

are paid annually by the facilities within the boundaries of the district. The overarching purpose is to provide greater security by supporting initiatives to enhance capabilities and joint operational 

readiness, ultimately ensuring maritime commerce flows unabated, 

therefore drives our economy. 

Examples include: Providing matching funds for a port security 

grant to purchase a Harris County Sheriff’s Office patrol vessel; 

providing matching funds for Harris County to install over 100 

cameras at 33 sites to monitor the maritime domain; purchasing 

the fuel used by the Houston Police Department helicopter to patrol the ship channel; and funding a watch center to monitor the 

camera system. 

Besides funding projects, the district also enhances partnerships. 

The Houston Ship Channel Security District cameras are linked to 

the U.S. Coast Guard and the Port of Houston Authority, with the 

district receiving access to both our camera systems in return. The 

force-multiplying effect is tremendous. 

I will conclude my remarks by focusing on the collaborative nature of maritime security in the Port of Houston. 

We meet regularly as part of the Area Maritime Security Committee, the Central Texas Coastal Area Committee, and the Lone 

Star Harbor Safety Committee. Each of these committees provides 

a constant opportunity for industry to interact with key local, 

State, and Federal agency leaders. 

We recently held our annual security drill at the Barbours Cut 

Container Terminal. Over 170 participants from 50 different agencies, entities, or companies came together to address a dirty bomb 

scenario. 
30 

Within their budgetary constraints, both the U.S. Coast Guard 

and Customs and Border Protection provide outstanding service to 

the Port of Houston. They come to work daily with the mentality 

that they must keep commerce flowing for the National good while 

also enforcing the mandated regulatory requirements. At the local 

level, they are considered leaders, partners, and valued teammates. 

An excerpt from a U.S. Coast Guard study summarizes my last 

point: ‘‘Port partnerships are predictably strongest, most collegial, 

and most productive where major calamities have necessitated lifeor-death relationships of trust. This is most evident in the partner 

interviews in New York and Houston, where partners seek each 

other out for after-work social and morale activities in addition to 

a high degree of work-focused collaboration.’’ 

I submit to you today that technology and resources are critical 

to maintaining maritime security, but dedicated people and trusting partnerships are equally as important. The industries of the 

Port of Houston are proud to contribute to both. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Woodring follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MARCUS WOODRING

NOVEMBER 19, 2013 

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of 

the subcommittee, I am Marcus Woodring. I serve as the managing director for 

Health, Safety, Security, and Environmental (HSSE) at the Port of Houston Authority. 

We would like to thank Chairman Miller for holding this important hearing today. 

I must also recognize Ranking Member Jackson Lee for again inviting the Port of 

Houston Authority as an industry witness. As you know, the Port of Houston is in 

the Ranking Member’s district and we continue to benefit from her leadership and 

advocacy on behalf of the Port. 

The Port of Houston is comprised of the Port Authority’s eight public terminals 

along with more than 150 private terminals. The port is consistently ranked first 

in the United States in foreign water-borne tonnage, trading with over 200 ports 

of call globally, making us a true maritime border. 

Results of a recent economic impact study show that ship channel-related businesses at the Port of Houston are responsible for more than 2.1 million jobs, generate $499 billion in annual economic activity, and contribute over $52 billion in annual tax revenue Nationally. Just yesterday, we had the vice president of the 

United States stop to visit our Bayport Container Terminal, underscoring the importance of our Nation’s ports in economic growth, as he travelled to visit the expanding Panama Canal. 

At the most basic level, the Port of Houston would be unable to sustain its operations and economic significance in the global marketplace without border security. 

This ‘‘border security’’ encompasses many things, ranging from keeping unauthorized cargo and people from entering the United States, to protecting our environment from invasive species. 

We have heard about a ‘‘layered approach’’ to border security, starting with offshore interdiction all the way to the sea buoy. My focus today will be on the industry efforts to secure the border within the Port of Houston. Our efforts use both 

physical assets and professional partnerships. 

For physical assets, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, and 

the Houston Police Department all maintain patrol vessels for the Houston Ship 

Channel. The majority of the Houston Ship Channel has been designated a ‘‘security 

zone’’ since shortly after 9/11. Other major channels into our Bayport and Barbours 

Cut Container Terminals are also designated security zones, i.e. ‘‘off limits’’, to recreational boaters. With the density of industrial activity, and really no recreational 

reason to be there, the overall impact to the public is minimal—yet provides safety 

for boaters and security for our Nation’s largest petrochemical complex. Surveillance 

by helicopters is also conducted on a regular basis by these same agencies. 
31 

Those are the Federal and local resources, but how does industry link in? The 

story of the Houston Ship Channel Security District, a unique public/private partnership, gives us the answer and clearly shows the direct relationship between assets and partnerships. 

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Federal, State, and local governments began putting 

more stringent controls in place within the maritime domain of the Houston Ship 

Channel. The industrial facilities and companies of the Port of Houston came to the 

table and essentially said—we don’t have law enforcement authority or jurisdiction, 

but we want to help as our businesses have the most to lose if things go wrong. 

In 2007, the Texas Legislature passed a bill creating the Houston Ship Channel Security District. The legislation enabled the industry to tax itself and collect assessments paid annually by the facilities and companies within the boundaries of the 

District, with the goal of ensuring commerce continues to flow in an unimpeded 

fashion. 

The ultimate purpose of the Houston Ship Channel Security District is to provide 

a regional approach for providing greater degree of security and safety for facilities, 

employees, and communities surrounding the ship channel by supporting projects 

and initiatives to enhance the capabilities, communication, and joint operational 

readiness of existing law enforcement organizations. 

Examples include providing the matching funds for a Port Security Grant to purchase a Harris County Sheriff’s Office patrol vessel, providing matching funds for 

Harris County to install 33 cameras to monitor the maritime domain, purchasing 

the fuel used by the Houston Police Department helicopter to patrol the ship channel, and funding a watch center to monitor the camera system. 

Each of these projects directly benefits industry’s desire to secure the maritime 

border and keep commerce moving, reducing their liability for interruptions in the 

supply chain. None would have been possible without the mechanism called the 

Houston Ship Channel Security District. 

I’ll conclude my remarks by focusing on the collaborative nature of maritime security in the Port of Houston. We meet regularly as part of the Area Maritime Security Committee, the Central Texas Coastal Area Committee, and the Lone Star Harbor Safety Committee. Each of these committees provides a constant opportunity for 

maritime personnel to interact with key local, State, and Federal agency leaders. 

We recently held our annual security drill, SECUREX 2013, at the Barbours Cut 

Container Terminal. Over 170 participants from 50 different agencies/entities came 

together to address a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ scenario. While we pray that we never convene 

in a real-life scenario similar to this, we are well-prepared as a maritime community 

to respond. 

The partnerships extend well beyond these committees. The Houston Ship Channel Security District cameras I mentioned earlier are linked in to the U.S. Coast 

Guard and Port of Houston Authority, with the Ship Channel Security District receiving access to both our camera systems in return. The force-multiplying effect is 

tremendous. 

Within their budgetary constraints, both the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and 

Border Protection provide outstanding service at the Port of Houston. They both 

come to work daily with the mentality that they must keep commerce flowing for 

the National good, while also enforcing the mandated regulatory requirements. At 

the local level, they are considered leaders, partners, and valued teammates in the 

maritime community. 

In 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard conducted a series of interviews at various ports 

around the Nation and published the results in the ‘‘Port Interagency Information 

Sharing Study’’. Maritime professionals from all segments of industry and Government were interviewed. An excerpt from this study summarizes the extremely 

strong nature of maritime security in the Port of Houston: 

‘‘Port partnerships are predictably strongest, most collegial, and most productive 

where major calamities have necessitated life-or-death relationships of trust. This 

was most evident in the partner interviews in New York and Houston, where partners seek each other for after-work social and morale activities, in addition to a high 

degree of professional work-focused collaboration’’. 

I submit to you today that technology and resources are critical to maintaining 

maritime security, but dedicated people and trusting partnerships are equally important. The industries of the Port of Houston are proud to contribute to both. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 
32 

ATTACHMENT.—2013 HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL SECURITY DISTRICT FACTSHEET

THE HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL SECURITY DISTRICT

THE HARRIS COUNTY HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL SECURITY PROJECT

Surveillance System 

• 19 Landside Sites with Cameras/Sensors/Equipment 

• 14 Waterside Sites with Cameras/Sensors/Equipment 

• Command-and-Control System integrating Security Project, Harris County, and 

Sheriff’s Office assets 

• 24/7/365 monitoring by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office Security Monitoring 

and Analysis Center (SMAG) 

• Video Links to Regional Partners such as the United States Coast Guard and 

the Port of Houston Authority Police Department 

• Upcoming: Select video links to industry partners and District Members 

Landside Assets 

• 9 Harris County Sheriff’s Office Trucks 

• 3 Harris County Sheriff’s Office, Baytown Police Department, and Galena Park 

Police Department Sedans 

• 5 Port of Houston Authority Police Department Trucks 

• Radiological Detection Equipment 

Waterside Assets 

• Four HCSO Marine Patrol Boats 

• One HCSO 36′ SAFE Patrol Boat 

• Submersible Remotely Operated Vehicle 

Communications Infrastructure 

• The Ring of Steel: a fiber communications network connecting regional First Responders, Law Enforcement, Governmental Planners, and Infrastructure Support Teams 

• 14 Public Safety LTE E-Node-B Sites Completed—the first functional Public 

Safety LTE system in the Nation 

HSCSD LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT

HSCSD supports the Houston Police Department with funding for training and 

deployment of assets including: 

• MD500 Patrol Helicopter 

• Bell 412EP Twin Engine Tactical Support Helicopter 

• Three Rapid Response Trucks for the HPD Bomb Squad 

• Fast-Rope and Rappelling Equipment 

• Assault Armor Kits, Masks, and Radios 

• An Airborne Radiation Detector 

HSCSD supports the Harris County Sheriff’s Office with funding for training, deployment, and maintenance of HCSO assets including: 

• Marine Unit Boat Fuel and Maintenance 

• Marine Unit Vehicle & Trailer Fuel and Maintenance • Landside Infrastructure Patrol Vehicle Fuel and Maintenance 

• SMAG Third Shift Surveillance Personnel 

HSCSD supports the city of Baytown with equipment designed to facilitate the 

deployment of the city’s multi-mission Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

and Explosive Weapons equipped boat that provides Type I HazMat and Bomb 

Squad/Explosives Team support and Type II Regional Structure Collapse/Technical 

Rescue services. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Captain. We appreciate 

that. 

We appreciate the testimony of all the witnesses. 

You know, I can remember when I first came to Congress about 

a decade ago—hate to date myself here—but my first trip down to 

the border, looking at the vast expanses that we had on the land 

border and thinking that—at that time, we really weren’t even 

using UAVs to assist in border security, and, of course, that has 

changed. 
33 

I am just a huge proponent of UAVs. I think the application— 

I think they have been so incredibly in theater, and they have the 

application, certainly, of border security, whether that is in the 

land or the maritime environment. So I was listening to some of 

your testimony there and thinking about the Predators that you 

have. 

Also, just as you were talking about the panga boats that are 

continuing to move up the northern border of California there, 

more northerly than Los Angeles or San Diego, sort of, away from 

your cutters or your stations, et cetera, and the utilization of Predators—and we were looking at the amount of instances that you 

use the Predators, and apparently it has been a very limited 

amount in California. 

So I guess that is part of my question. How you are really utilizing the resources that you have in the maritime environment, 

not only along California, the California coast, but even along the— 

it is my understanding that the one that you have in Cape Canaveral is not functioning at this time and that there are three now 

in Corpus Christi. 

So they are all in Corpus Christi; is that so? If so, is that your 

plan going forward? Do you expect that you would keep them all 

there or move them around a bit? Or how is your vision of all of 

that? How short do you think you are on the amount of UAVs that 

you could really utilize optimally? 

That question for Commissioner Alles and perhaps Admiral Lee 

a bit, too. 

General ALLES. All right, thank you, ma’am. 

As you indicated, the Predators are now all based out of Corpus 

Christi. There are currently two there; one was damaged in a hard 

landing and is being repaired currently at General Atomics in California. 

As I look at the Predator—so, one of the questions you asked is 

really about California operations. We have an operation called 

Blue Tempest, that we have done some limited Guardian operations out there. Guardian is the maritime variant of it, which has 

the sea view radar on it. We have flown around 100 hours out on 

the California coast with that particular asset. 

We do have some limitations out there. There are a number of 

FAA restrictions to our California operations. So we have found the 

aircraft is working very effectively for us on the borders. It is working very effectively for us in the Transit Zone. It is currently in the 

Transit Zone with some Coast Guard personnel conducting a deployment there and is working well for us there. In the actual offshore U.S. environment, we are still working through a number of 

issues with the FAA to get the best employment out of the Predator. 

So partly why you don’t see as much use there is I have based 

other maritime patrol aircraft—we have P–3s in Jacksonville. I 

have the Dash 8s in Jacksonville and Puerto Rico and New Orleans. I have the new maritime enforcement aircraft that we are 

building in San Diego. Those don’t have those kinds of unmanned 

restrictions. So those have been the bulk of my maritime patrol capability out there, as opposed to the Guardian UAV. 
34 

I would like to use it more in the future. We still, you know, are 

working through with the FAA as a process. They have been very 

cooperative. But they have a safety issue to work with, so we have 

to work through—I am talking about air traffic control clearance. 

So we just have to work through those issues with the FAA to get 

better utilization of it off of our coasts. 

Then, as far as equipment is concerned, I think we have a satisfactory quantity of the aircraft. It is really the amount of flying 

hours that I can put on the airplane, and that is based on the 

amount of flying-hour money I get per year. So I currently fly 5,000 

to 6,000 hours a year for all the systems. I could go much higher 

than that, probably towards 9,000 or 10,000, given sufficient funding, ma’am. 

Mrs. MILLER. Appreciate that. 

Admiral. 

Admiral LEE. Yes, ma’am. My counterpart here in CBP is far 

more invested in the UAS program than we are. We are still in the 

test and evaluation phase. We have already tested the UAS 

ScanEagle on the Cutter Bertholf and the Stratton. We are going 

into Phase 2 of that test and evaluation right now. We see great 

potential for this in the realm of MDA. 

However, I must add this caveat: All the MDA in the world will 

be of little use unless we have an end-game in place. So we can 

detect and we can monitor, but if we don’t have the capability to 

intercept and stop those threats—in this case, pangas and other 

sorts of surface vessels running illegal migrants or narcotics—then 

we lose the game. So we have to have the end-game to couple with 

the advancements in UAS. 

Mrs. MILLER. Do you think the pangas are the greatest threat, 

really, to the maritime security of the coast? 

Admiral LEE. Well, I wouldn’t necessarily say that, but I would 

say they are a significant threat. They are a significant threat because they are running around us. 

My counterparts in CBP and Border Patrol have done a fantastic 

job of securing the land border in the Southwest, and so that has 

pushed them into the maritime. Their tactics have changed over 

the past few years, and now they are going further and further out 

and further and further north up the coast of California. We are 

seeing them land as far north as San Francisco now. Where it used 

to be a southern-California issue, now it is a whole-of-California 

issue. They have the logistics in place do it, and we don’t have 

enough patrol craft to be on top of them at this particular time. 

Mrs. MILLER. To both of you, one other question: Talking about 

types of resources that we have had, the taxpayers have already 

paid for, that we gotten a good bang for our buck in theater, that 

have been successful, like the UAVs, et cetera, how are you doing— 

continuing to do? 

I know you have both advantaged yourself a bit of some of the 

returning equipment from theater. Is there anything that we can 

do to help you, as you are looking to resources that might be available? I know you are starting to use some of the rheostats and 

some of the various things, et cetera. Any comment on that or any 

help that we can assist you with in that regard? 
35 

General ALLES. I think, honestly, ma’am, we are getting good 

help from the committee on that. Most of those assets are going on 

the land borders. They are not—as you know, Afghanistan, Iraq 

have primarily been land issues. So most of that equipment fits 

better in that environment. 

We are getting—CBP is getting from the Marine Corps some 

UH–1Ns, some Iroquois that are going out of service. They were 

used overseas. So those are advantageous for us and will help us 

out as we do some of our service-life extensions on our UH–60s. 

But I think overall have we gotten good cooperation on that and 

are starting to get good re-use out of some of the—particularly the 

aerostat balloons along the Southern Border. The RGV balloon, the 

Rio Grande Valley balloon, as I recall, is now up. 

Mrs. MILLER. The last thing before I recognize my Ranking Member, I hope you all look at this committee as a conduit to assist you 

with challenges that you run into, not just where you come and testify. You know, we are here to work together with you. 

As you are mentioning, Commissioner, about some of the challenges you are running into with the FAA, the FAA has their mission, right? But they have this airspace thing all over the country 

they will keep running into with various kinds of strategic deployments that we are trying to do for border security or homeland security, et cetera. 

So, believe me, I appreciate the job that the FAA does, but if 

there is anything that we can do, again, to be a conduit to assist 

you with that, please don’t hesitate to ask us about that, as well. 

With that, I would recognize our Ranking Member. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairwoman. 

Let me thank the witnesses for their testimony and their presence before this hearing. 

I want to start, Director Caldwell, with you, and hopefully we 

can weave through what I think are very important findings by the 

GAO. 

Just with an opening point of your report here that says why 

GAO did this study, just to frame it: ‘‘An attack on this system 

could have dire consequences, and criminals could use small vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other contraband.’’ Certainly, 

this is a system that handles billions of dollars of cargo, and so, 

in essence, this is a system that should not be ignored. 

I would like to take you through some of your suggestions, or recommendations, rather, and have you expand on them a little bit 

more. 

I believe that, with the potential opening of the Panama Canal, 

we could not have a larger question mark and need for an answer 

than the issue of maritime security. This is going to be a new frontier for our region. The magnitude of incoming ships will broaden, 

the competition will broaden, and, certainly, the potential for 

wreaking havoc will likewise be broadened. 

You indicated that you want a robust—or suggested a robust 

maritime domain awareness. Go into just—be pointed beyond your 

written testimony, please, regarding the United States as it relates 

to maritime security. What are those key words, ‘‘maritime domain 

awareness’’? Do we need to have collaborators on that? 
36 

Mr. CALDWELL. Well, ‘‘maritime domain awareness’’ is very 

broad, and it starts very far out. So it starts with, obviously, the 

foreign waters and foreign ports that actually ship the things to us. 

Panama Canal is a good example of that. It is quite far from our 

waters, but it is going to be a case where we may have much larger 

ships with much larger cargos, many more containers, coming 

through there. 

So the main requirement in terms of that maritime domain 

awareness starts out there; it comes all the way into our own ports 

so that we know what is going on. You can even expand it to economic and issues of natural disasters. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But how do you to that? Is that technology? 

Is that ships on water? Is that expanding Coast Guard? Obviously, 

there are waters within our boundaries and then beyond, open 

seas. What is your, just, pointed answer to that? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Well, I think further away, obviously, it depends 

very heavily on international partnerships with other countries. A 

good example of these have already been cited in the deep Caribbean, where we are working with the Dutch, the French, the British, and other countries in terms of gathering information, sharing 

information, so that we can work as partners to identify the threats 

as they come in. 

Then closer to our shores, it depends maybe more on technology 

and coordination among the forces that we have, whether that is 

CBP, Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and others. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me ask this other question. Your October 

2012 report on CBP’s model for assessing risks of inbound cargo 

containers—the Automated Targeting System model, also known as 

ATS—had some troubling conclusions about CBP’s failure to regularly assess the performance of the ATS methodology used to assess risk and the rate at which ATS was currently identifying highrisk containers. 

Can you elaborate on what you found? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. We found that the ATS system was critical 

for CBP in identifying high-risk containers. We found that CBP 

was not regularly assessing that system, nor, when it did an update, was it evaluating whether the new updates were better than 

the model weights that they were replacing. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Where are we now? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We made recommendations that they do regular 

assessments, and the Department has pledged to do so, both DHS 

and CBP. We will be doing our update on that soon to find out 

what the status of that recommendation is, to decide whether we 

can close that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. They have the tools and all to do the assessment, right? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. I think it is a question of focused attention, 

and, obviously, it requires people, as well, to provide that focus—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So that is something that we can help with, 

is the idea of human resources, to be able to do that assessment. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Sometimes I think it is just attention, you know, 

being paid at the top level of leadership, in terms of making sure 

that those regular assessments are done. 
37 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But this was 2012 when you did your report. 

So you are going back again in 2014. You don’t have an update, 

an interim—— 

Mr. CALDWELL. I can provide that for the record. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Pardon me? 

Mr. CALDWELL. I can provide that for the record—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you, please? 

Mr. CALDWELL [continuing]. To you, in terms of a detailed status. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Great. 

Let me go quickly to your point about conducting maritime surveillance. I know this seems to go along with the question that I 

previously asked, but I am concerned about having on the waters 

those who are assessing threats regularly and then designing a response to those threats. 

I am going to also ask our admiral to answer that, as well. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Let me just start. I think—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Mr. CALDWELL [continuing]. Admiral Lee has already talked 

about that you have to have a balance between what you can actually find through your surveillance resources and whether you actually have the resources to then persecute. You know, you know 

those threats are out there; do you actually have the boats to go 

out to get them at that distance, you know, armed as needed and 

meeting other requirements? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Admiral, I know that Mumbai was not an example of, I believe, anything on our coast, but maybe there are 

places that are exposed. That was an unsecured little wharf with 

individuals coming up on little boats in the dark of night. 

But how are you assessing threats and revising strategies on 

those threats? Do you feel comfortable that you are able to assess 

those threats regularly? 

Admiral LEE. Well, I am going to answer that question in two 

parts. 

First off, how do we assess them? We are putting most of our energy and efforts into those ports and waterways where the most 

traffic flows, those large ports like New York, New Orleans, Los 

Angeles, et cetera, et cetera, because that is where someone with 

ill intent can do the most damage to our maritime transportation 

system. 

What keeps me and my colleagues up awake at night is the vulnerability that we have along our entire 95,000-mile maritime border, where anybody can pretty much come and go as they need. It 

is almost free-range. If somebody wanted to get into some smaller 

port to deliver something, they are proving that almost daily with 

the—all you have to do is look at the panga threat to see how easy 

it is for somebody to deliver a commodity to our shores. In that 

case, the commodity is marijuana. That commodity could be anything else. We are vulnerable. We are very vulnerable. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. This last question, may I just get to Captain 

Woodring? 

As a port that will benefit from the opening of the Panama 

Canal, as a port that handles an enormous amount of cargo, do you 

have the tools to be prepared for any enhanced security questions 

with the opening of the Panama Canal? 
38 

Captain WOODRING. Yes, ma’am, we do. We have already worked 

with Customs and Border Protection. They understand the plans, 

they understand the Panama Canal is expanding and are looking 

forward to making their internal resource request to make sure 

that we have enough officers there to keep commerce flowing out 

our gates. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairwoman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here. As a State 

and Federal prosecutor, I have seen what your efforts have done, 

and I commend you on it. Thank you so very much. 

Let me start out with asking you, with the assets that are seized 

and the cash that is seized—Rear Admiral Lee, if you would start— 

what happens with those funds? I think I know what the answer 

is, but I want the American people to hear it. 

Admiral LEE. Well, the assets that are seized are turned over, 

and after litigation is completed, the funds go into the Treasury. 

They don’t come back to us. 

Mr. MARINO. All right. That is the point I wanted to get across. 

Does anyone else have a different answer or would like to follow 

up on that? 

General ALLES. Yeah, the only, kind-of, technical point on that 

is, as the admiral mentioned, they go into general fund. Any assets, 

like a conveyance, if it is seized and utilized by the Government, 

then, you know, that obviously becomes an asset of the Government. Otherwise, typically, for boats, since they tend to reappear 

over and over, we have them destroyed. 

Mr. MARINO. Yeah. So nothing really—I am sorry, do either of 

you gentlemen have any comments on that? 

So none of those assets are really handed over, which I think 

should be, directly to your agencies, to your efforts. Is that correct? 

General ALLES. If it is an asset we can utilize, yes, we can seize 

it and use it internally in the organization. We have in the past. 

Mr. MARINO. You mean, ‘‘an asset,’’ that could be a boat, that 

could be an airplane, that could be weapons. Is it ever cash? 

Admiral LEE. No. Cash is going to be turned in. 

Mr. MARINO. I see. 

So, given the fact that the biggest problem we have here in this 

country right now is revenue flow, particularly $17 trillion in debt, 

but I think it is critical that agencies such as yours should at least 

reap part of that benefit to hire more personnel, to purchase more 

equipment. 

So that segues into my next question: If you each had a choice 

of what piece of equipment you would like to have more of, could 

you please share that with us? 

Admiral, you can start, and then move down the line, please. 

Admiral LEE. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. 

We all have our wish list. Right now, our wish list is to recapitalize our deepwater fleet that is aging and going off-line with 

great speed. Without that deepwater fleet, we will not have the capability to push our borders downrange, in this case the Transit 
39 

Zone, and conduct maritime operations that really have an impact 

on our Nation’s security. 

We know through past practice that the most effective way to 

take narcotics off the streets of the United States is to intercept 

those narcotics out of its shipping point, at its sources, down in the 

Transit Zone. We get the cocaine and marijuana in its largest 

quantities, in its purest form. 

When we seize operators in the Transit Zone, the intel that we 

get from those operators to feed back into the intelligence community is the purest we can get. Those folks are only one or two layers 

down from the cartels themselves. Once those narcotics are delivered back landside and it is broken up into smaller packages and 

delivered across the border landside, those operators are so far removed, we get limited intel out of those. 

So the bottom-line answer to your question is we need the funds 

to recapitalize our deepwater fleet so we can continue to push our 

borders out where they need to be. 

Mr. MARINO. Sir, please. 

General ALLES. From my standpoint, sir, our current biggest 

need is recapitalizing our UH–60 fleet. Those are currently expiring from service. They are actually the oldest UH–60s in service in 

the United States. 

After that is our multi-role enforcement aircraft that we are currently procuring; our coastal interceptor vessels that we are due to 

procure next year. I would just mention the TARS radar system, 

Tethered Aerostat Radar System, is used along the Southern Border to interdict people that are attempting to cross the border illegally. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

Anyone else? Mr. Caldwell or Captain Woodring. 

I see I only have 30 seconds left. Have any of you seen any connection between the drug cartels, the trafficking of drugs, and/or 

terrorists or potential terrorism? Have you actually seen any of 

those cross paths? 

Admiral LEE. I do not have an anecdote from the Coast Guard 

point, sir. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. 

General ALLES. I think as we look at Mexican drug cartels, we 

are concerned. Particularly as we look at the Iranian influence into 

Mexico, it would be one of our concerns. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I will be there 

pitching for you every step of the way. 

I yield back. Thank you, Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman for his questions. 

I thank the admiral for mentioning again about recapitalizing 

your deepwater fleet. Again, in an effort for this committee to help 

you, we are going to be thinking what we can do as we get into 

the next appropriations season on that. Because we are reaching 

a critical juncture, as you are well aware, with the Coast Guard of 

not being able to meet their mission that we have tasked you with 

and loaded you up since 9/11 and yet are not really resourcing you 

as we need to. 

The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

O’Rourke. 
40 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I am hoping to get a concise answer to the question posed in the 

title of the hearing, in terms of what a secure maritime border 

looks like. 

This subcommittee and the full committee of which we are a part 

has decided, when it comes to land borders, as imperfect a measure 

as this is, we have decided on operational control and have decided 

that 90 percent operational control at our land borders is a sufficient level to protect the public safety and interest, and it prevents 

us from overspending and receiving diminishing returns as a result. 

Is there—and I will start with Mr. Caldwell—is there something 

like that for maritime security? 

In your answer to the Ranking Member’s question about maritime domain awareness, you included some criteria that seem out 

of our control. You know, we are somewhat dependent on international partners, issues that take place away from our ports. 

What is within our domain of influence and control that we can 

hold the admiral, the commissioner accountable for, that we can 

use to understand how wisely we are spending taxpayer dollars? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Thank you. 

In terms of the concept of operational control, I cannot say I have 

seen something like that for the maritime domain. Generally, what 

we are looking at is drug seizures, either in tonnage or as a rate 

of estimates of what the total flow is. 

In terms of the criteria, I think it is hard to give a really concise 

answer because you want the criteria to capture some of the other 

things we worry about in the maritime domain, not just terrorists, 

not just drugs, not just illegal migrants, but maybe some other 

things out there. 

As you know, Coast Guard has a broader mission, too, in terms 

of environmental safety. You don’t want oil spills. You don’t want— 

you know, recovery from disasters in ports, a lot of other things, 

as well. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. For the commissioner, you know, just anecdotally 

getting the information in terms of tonnage seized, hearing you describe what is involved in executing your mandate, it sounds like 

you are being very effective with your resources. 

What is a good way for this committee to know that for sure, to, 

again, ensure that we are holding you and the men and women 

who serve under you accountable and that we are getting true 

value for taxpayer dollars spent, and if there is a request for additional resources, we know how to gauge what those dollars will buy 

and understand what the return should be back from that investment? 

General ALLES. I think we can measure, you know, those—you 

mentioned a couple of specifics, sir. We can measure the performance of our fleet based on what it does. So, I mean, I can tell you, 

for instance, a P–3, for each hour it flies in the Tran Zone, it delivers about $1.2 million worth of cocaine—a pretty good metric for 

the platform. Similar for the UAVs working down in that Transit 

Zone. I can use those kind of metrics to assess performance when 

it comes to drug interdiction. I can look at it in terms of illegal immigration flows, as far as some accountability there. 
41 

I would offer, though, that the, really, MDA metric—or, not the 

MDA—the maritime security metric, really, I don’t find a single 

metric as being adequate there. It is really going to be a combination of things inside of a risk-based approach that talks about 

things like intelligence, the enforcement statistics you already mentioned, maritime events, technology integration, and then risk 

analysis. 

We look at—our organization internally measures each air 

branch yearly by what it performs, in terms of what it turns out 

in terms of vehicles, drugs, cash, illegal immigration flow, those 

kind of things, to decide where we are most effectively positioned. 

Based on that analysis, we will move personnel or move aircraft or 

vessels based on that performance. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I guess, for Admiral Lee to continue with this 

line of questioning, I believe either you or the commissioner mentioned that during—or, as a result of the sequester and fewer flight 

hours, fewer resources deployed, we saw less tonnage interdicted. 

From the commissioner’s answer just now to my question, it seems 

like if we spent more, we would interdict more, but that is certainly 

not limitless. 

So, again, where do we want to be? Because we could spend unlimited dollars and never get there unless we know what the goal 

is. 

Admiral LEE. Thank you for that question, sir. 

ONDCP’s goal in terms of tonnage removed is about 36 percent. 

Last year, we only removed 13.4 percent—the interagency. I am 

not talking just about the Coast Guard, but that is the interagency 

writ large. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. That is all illegal drugs? 

Admiral LEE. Illegal drugs. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. 

Admiral LEE. Here, let’s just talk cocaine for a second. Last 

year—and I am just giving you rough estimates. Last year, we estimate that the source countries, which are Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, produced and shipped about 600 metric tons of cocaine. We, 

the U.S. Coast Guard, seized about 78 metric tons, which was down 

significantly from the previous year. 

So we received 78 metric tons. Just by virtue of another bar to 

measure, back in 2008, which was a banner year for us, we seized 

166 metric tons. The interagency and our partner nations seized 

about an equal amount. Twenty metric tons of that was seized at 

the border. Where is the rest of it going? That is the real metric. 

They ship 600. We, collectively, stopped 124 metric tons. 

I would submit, sir, that the real metric that the United States 

needs to be measuring is not how much we are seizing, but what 

is the impact to organized crime of that that we do seize? How 

much money are we taking out of their pockets, and how is that 

affecting instability downrange in our nations south of us? 

We have to keep our eye on that because it is a National security 

concern. We don’t want any more nations down south of us to get 

to the point such that we have in Honduras right now, where they 

have the highest murder rate per capita of any country in the 

world. Right now, 91 persons per 100,000 are murdered year-to- 
42 

year. The United States right now, to give the other benchmark, 

is 4.7 per 100,000. 

It is vitally important that we keep the pressure on those 

transnational organized criminal networks, those cartels. If we 

back away from that mission, if we stop taking that dope off of the 

street by way of seizing it in large quantities in the Transit Zone, 

we will fail in our National strategy. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South 

Carolina, who is looking particularly dapper, all in an effort to 

raise awareness of men’s prostate cancer. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is exactly right. November is prostate and 

pancreatic cancer month, and I support this in memory of State 

Representative David Umphlett, a good friend of mine that died 

June 2011 of pancreatic cancer. So thanks for recognizing that. 

Sitting here thinking about the cooperation that we have had 

with the country of Colombia and the impact it has had on really 

knocking back the amount of cocaine produced and the activity of 

the cartel, and really just rhetorically thinking about how that 

could be applied to Nicaragua and Honduras and some of the other 

Latin American countries, as well, it is really not my line of questioning but it is something that I think we need to talk about. 

Admiral Lee, you raised that awareness with your comments just 

now. 

I want to shift to the UAVs that are being utilized by both the 

Coast Guard and the CBP, because it is interesting to folks back 

in my district how they are utilized. There is a lot of groovy technology out there. 

So, Admiral Lee, can you discuss how the UAVs are being used? 

I know a Predator B has just been tasked to California to help with 

the pangas, and, also, I understand some of the cutter technology 

for launching and recovering some of those aircraft possibly. 

So if you could touch base on what you are doing with UAVs, 

whether they are cost-effective, whether they are operational-effective. 

Admiral LEE. Yes, sir. 

I stated earlier we are still in the test and evaluation phase for 

operating our UASs off of our cutters. We are going into Phase 2 

of that test and evaluation next month off of the Cutter Stratton. 

The Predators are being used by my counterpart here, General 

Alles, so I defer to him for more specificity on that program. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this before we go to Commissioner 

Alles. How are they being flown? Are they being flown remotely out 

of—like, the CBP flies those UAVs out of South Dakota or somewhere. How is the Coast Guard flying those? Are you flying them 

from shipboard controls, or is that on land-based pilots? 

Admiral LEE. Yes, sir, so far, we are launching and retrieving 

from aboard ship. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. So you are recovering the aircraft on a cutter? 

Admiral LEE. Yes, sir. 
43 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. That is interesting. I would love to see that 

someday. 

Commissioner Alles, could you respond? 

General ALLES. Yes, sir. So, just for clarification, the Coast 

Guard participates with us in the Predator program as pilots in the 

program actually flying the aircraft and operating the aircraft. 

Then the actual shipborne devices he is talking about I think have 

been the ScanEagle. 

Correct? 

Admiral LEE. ScanEagle, yes. 

General ALLES. Yeah. So that is a different UAV than we are 

using. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. 

General ALLES. So, primarily, our UAVs are used along the borders. In fact, they are restricted by FAA certificates of authorization to the borders, within about 75 miles of the borders. 

Our primary efforts, our UAV bases are in Corpus Christi, Cape 

Canaveral, Sierra Vista, which is where Fort Huachuka is down in 

Arizona, and then also up in Grand Forks, North Dakota. So the 

bulk of our effort goes along the Southwest Border in the Rio 

Grande Valley, in the Arizona area, New Mexico, other parts of 

Texas, and then, after that, some limited patrols off the California 

coast. 

We are doing more Transit Zone operations with the UAVs, and 

then also along the Northern Border. We use those using a synthetic aperture radar to do what is called change detection, which 

can actually detect border intrusions in low-traffic zones. So we use 

that actual change detection radar in our UAVs along our low-traffic areas in Texas and New Mexico, Arizona, and also along the 

Northern Border to basically see if we are having any activity. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. I visited the program out in the Tucson 

sector and was highly impressed with what I was learning there. 

That was a Predator B, I believe. 

But I guess we are talking about maritime. So you are flying off 

the coast of California to help with the panga interdiction. Anywhere else with maritime? Out of Corpus Christi, I am assuming. 

General ALLES. So it is primarily—we do some operations out of 

Corpus Christi over the water. We are not seeing a lot of traffic 

there for interdiction. We have done operations off the Florida 

coast. Again, not seeing a lot of traffic for interdiction, plus having 

those maritime assets out there that can work more easily. 

So, again, along the coastal areas of the United States, I am still 

working with the FAA to get more unlimited use of the UAV in 

those areas. So we haven’t used them as much there as we have 

over land or in the Transit Zone. So we are still working those particular issues on the FAA side. We are making progress, good 

progress, with them too. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me pivot back to Admiral Lee. 

Are we seeing the use of UAVs out of some of our ports, say, in 

El Salvador, to replace any of the P–3 flights, manned flights? Are 

they more cost-effective and efficient, or are they similar cost? 

Admiral LEE. Well, the Coast Guard doesn’t fly P–3s. We fly C– 

130s. But the bottom line is, again, we are still in the test and 
44 

evaluation phase. We do offer personnel for the Predator program 

that General Alles is running. 

I would have to get back with you for questions for the record 

if you want more specificity on it than that. That is all I can offer 

to you, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Well, thank you for that. 

[The information follows:] 

The Coast Guard is not yet replacing manned aircraft operations with unmanned 

aircraft systems (UAS) because the Service is in pre-acquisition for a land-based 

UAS. Until the state of technology can accommodate all Coast Guard missions, the 

Service will continue to collaborate with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 

conduct maritime security missions as part of the joint UAS program. 

Notionally speaking, UAS can be a more cost-effective and efficient option than 

their manned counterparts, but this is highly dependent on the specific system and 

payloads that are ultimately procured, as well as the type of flight operations that 

are required. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Madam Chairwoman, I know that UAVs can fly a 

lot longer. They can stay on station 24 hours or longer, the new 

technology. It just seems like a great platform for drug interdiction 

because that is a 24/7 attempt to smuggle drugs in the country. 

So I thank the gentlemen for what they do, and I want to see 

use of more technology as we can put it in the field and apply it 

under the budget constraints that we have. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady 

from Hawaii. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Miller and 

Ranking Member Jackson Lee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these very important issues of maritime security. I would like 

to thank our guests for being here today and sharing their own expertise and insights on these issues. 

I would like to follow up a little bit on Mr. Duncan’s questions 

regarding the UAV and UAS systems. 

Admiral Lee, if you could speak in a little bit more detail about 

the test and eval process that the Coast Guard is undergoing with 

these systems now? You are saying you are about to move into 

Phase 2. If you could speak about these different phases. 

I am specifically interested if any of these tests are being conducted in District 14 currently. 

Admiral LEE. No, the tests right now are not being conducted off 

of District 14. The next test is going to be conducted off of Wallops 

Island off of the Coast Guard Cutter Stratton. 

I could read to you the paragraph that my staff prepared for me 

on this, if you would desire. I am sorry I can’t right off the cuff give 

you the specificity that you are looking for. But let me just read 

this to you. 

It says, ‘‘The Coast Guard completed UAS demonstrations aboard 

the Cutter Stratton in August of 2012’’—that was Phase 1—‘‘and 

Bertholf in May of 2013.’’ That was Phase 2 alpha. 

‘‘Phase 1 focused on the basic engineering, installation, certification, and operation of UAS. Phase 2 alpha applied lessons 

learned in an actual shipboard deployment, along with an embarked MH–65’’—that is one of our Dauphin helicopters—‘‘as envisioned in our CONOPS. The final demonstration, which will be 

Phase 2 bravo, will explore a variety of sensor payloads, continue 
45 

to validate CONOPS, and provide tangible data on how the UAS 

contributes to our National Security Cutters’ overall effectiveness.’’ 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

The Container Security Initiative really centered around U.S.- 

bound maritime containers that potentially pose a risk being identified and inspected—I think you and General Alles spoke about 

this earlier—as they are leaving international ports. 

What specifically is the Coast Guard’s role in that program? I 

was wondering if you can speak on the benefit of having Coast 

Guard personnel on the ground in foreign ports as opposed to being 

able to interact remotely from here. 

Admiral LEE. All right. I hope I understood your question. 

Going back to the layered approach that we use for trying to provide a maritime secure border, we start overseas in our foreign 

ports. We have an IPSP program, that is the International Port Security Program, whereby we send inspectors to—there are 157 

ports internationally that ship goods to the United States. We visit 

those ports routinely to ascertain what kind of security measures 

they have in place, and do they meet the requirements that satisfy 

our needs for receiving those shipments on those vessels entering 

through their ports and waterways? 

The next layer is that layer in between, which is the open sea. 

That is where we have patrol craft that, if we get intelligence that 

something is inbound that might be a threat to our National security, we can intercept, board, and deal with it. 

Then, of course, the last layer is here in our own ports, whereby 

Customs and the Coast Guard team up with the port directors to 

do this Port Security Program here. 

I defer to the general for—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Thanks. 

Before, General, you comment on that, I just had a quick question about CBP’s Office of Air/Marine not having any presence or 

operations in my home State of Hawaii. Considering, obviously, our 

geographic location and some of the challenges that we face with 

both air and marine security there, I am wondering about your 

lack of presence there. Is it a lack of threats or resources? Or if you 

could explain why you don’t have a presence there. 

General ALLES. Yes, ma’am. As we looked at the overall U.S. posture of air and marine assets and where we consider the most likely avenues of approach and highest-threat locations, Hawaii was 

not one that we considered a high-threat location. Of course, it is 

a fiscal question of how many offices we can actually stand up. I 

mean, that is the basic issue for Hawaii and why we have not been 

based there to that point. 

It is the same, similar situation as we have in Alaska. We have 

no presence up there. So, in this case, we are relying on the Coast 

Guard presence that is already established there. 

Ms. GABBARD. Do you have any unmanned aircraft systems deployed in the region, either in the Pacific and, really, looking out 

past the West Coast? 

General ALLES. No. No, ma’am. They are not deployed that far 

afield. 

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you. 
46 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

Before we conclude, the Ranking Member has a follow-up question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so very 

much. 

To follow up some of the comments made by colleagues, I have 

always opposed this sequester, as it impacts the assets that, General, both you have and, Admiral, both you have. As someone who 

is asking the Budget Committee, chaired by the Chairman of the 

Budget Committee, Mr. Ryan, to remove the sequester, let me ask 

you about these decreased assets. 

Admiral, quickly, you said it was that number from—it appears 

in my head, 36 to 13 percent. Impacts on the kinds of assets—not 

assets, but the kinds of ability to be able to get a certain amount 

of metric tons out of the cycle. 

General, I am asking you, as well, the impact that it has on the 

Air/Marine when you have cut the assets and also cut human resources. 

Finally, Captain Woodring, if you would speak to the impact and 

the value of Federal dollars, both in terms of security and otherwise, in ports as large as yours. 

Gentlemen, if you could, what is the sequester, what are the diminished resources doing to the basic mission for both of you and 

the assets? Responding to my colleague’s question of assets not 

being in many places where you might want them. 

Admiral Lee, if you would start first. 

Admiral LEE. Yes, ma’am. 

As a result of the sequester, we had to curtail operations 25 percent across the board for Coast Guard operations. Most of that 

came out of our Transit Zone operations because that is where 

most of the fuel money goes. That was a 32 percent reduction last 

year as a direct result of the sequester. That obviously had an impact on the tonnage that we were able to remove. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

General. 

General ALLES. On the CBP side, the primary impact was to our 

flying-hour program. It substantially reduced that probably—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am sorry, flying what? 

General ALLES. Flying-hour program, the amount of hours we fly 

our aircraft per year. I think we are at about a 10,000-hour impact 

as a result of the sequester. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Help us, because hours and flying—when you 

reduce 10,000 hours of flying, how does that diminish your service 

and diminish the security here in the United States? 

General ALLES. So, for instance, as a metric, any hour I lose in 

the Transit Zone is $1 million of cocaine that gets by us. So any 

P–3 hour I have to cut back on, which there were cutbacks as a 

result, there is going to be cocaine that passes through. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Any hour lost, you lose $1 million in collection 

of metric tonnage. Is that—— 

General ALLES. In the Transit Zone, yes, ma’am, that is correct. 

Now, that is just for the P–3s. You have to be careful. That is just 

for the P–3 aircraft. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The other aircraft you have been able to—— 
47 

General ALLES. Well, the other hour impacts, the other aircraft, 

they affect things like illegal immigration flow and those. Those I 

can’t give you numbers. I can take that for the record, if you would 

like me to, to get those numbers. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would appreciate that greatly, General. 

Thank you for your service. 

Admiral Lee, thank you. 

Captain Woodring, you were going to say how Federal funds impact your work. 

Captain WOODRING. Yes, ma’am. The Federal funding for the 

port is mostly through the Port Security Grant Program. We also 

received recently a TIGER grant to expand one of our docks. Again, 

industries interested in commerce, the economy, moving cargo, and 

making money. Obviously, security impacts that, or a lack of security could impact that. 

I can tell you, as the Port of Houston Authority, since the inception of the Port Security Grant Program, we have received over $60 

million in funding. It has bought things such as an expanded port 

coordination center for us, vehicles, our three new fireboats that 

just came on-line, a lot of fiber infrastructure, a lot of TWIC card 

readers and things of that nature. 

On the Port Security Grant Program, we would like to see the 

funding level not shrink any further. We would also like to see the 

program kept separate from being bundled together with other 

grant programs that we would then have to compete for. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So it has been vital to the existence and the 

workings and operations of the Port of Houston. 

Captain WOODRING. Yes, ma’am. Those other things that I mentioned earlier with the Houston Ship Channel Security District, 

they were providing matching funds for port security grants. So, 

again, that may not have come to the Port of Houston Authority 

specifically, but certainly benefited the greater Port of Houston. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chairwoman, thank you. 

Again, I want to thank everyone for their service, but particularly I want to acknowledge Admiral Lee and General Alles and 

Captain Woodring, and I certainly thank Director Caldwell. I thank 

the gentlemen for their service to this Nation. 

With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, all of you gentlemen, so 

very, very much. Again, we so appreciate your service to the Nation 

and, certainly, the men and women that serve under you 24/7 and 

what they do for homeland security and protecting our Nation and 

our country. We think about it all the time. 

I appreciate many of the questions and the answers today, particularly about resourcing and how important it is for us to be able 

to give the resources as we can within the confines of a restrictive 

budgetary environment for all of the various missions that we have 

tasked you all with. 

So we thank you for that. 

I will also note that, pursuant to committee rule, the hearing 

record will be held open for 10 days if there are any other Members 

of the committee that might have additional questions for the witnesses. 
48 

With that, again, we thank you all so very, very much for your 

time and for your service and for being here today. 

The committee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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