IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 233

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Michael Dean Hamilton, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20230052

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Cynthia M. Feland, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

Julie A. Lawyer, State’s Attorney, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.

William Woodworth, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

DECEMBER 15, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Hamilton

No. 20230052

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Michael Dean Hamilton appeals from a criminal judgment entered after 

he pled guilty to a charge of hindering law enforcement in violation of N.D.C.C. 

§ 12.1-08-03(1)(b). He argues the district court abused its discretion by 

rejecting his plea agreement and the court substantially relied on 

impermissible sentencing factors. We affirm the judgment.

I

[¶2] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by rejecting his 

plea agreement.

[¶3] The State charged Hamilton with hindering law enforcement in violation 

of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-03(1)(b), alleging he provided transportation and money 

to an individual he knew had engaged in the crime of abduction in Virginia.

[¶4] At a hearing two days before the scheduled trial, the parties presented 

the district court with a plea agreement. Hamilton pled guilty, and the court 

asked him to provide the factual basis. After hearing from Hamilton and the 

State, the court expressed concerns about the factual basis, explaining 

Hamilton’s “recitation of the facts basically tells [the court] [Hamilton] did 

absolutely nothing wrong.” The court found Hamilton’s guilty plea was not 

supported by a sufficient factual basis, explaining, “I’m not taking the guilty 

plea. We’re going to trial on Wednesday. There is not enough even remotely 

here based on [Hamilton’s] admissions for us—for me to take this.” The parties 

then filed a written plea agreement under Rule 43, N.D.R.Crim.P., which 

included a factual basis for the guilty plea. The district court also rejected this

written plea agreement.

[¶5] A change of plea hearing was held the next day. The district court 

explained, “Given the nature of the proceedings yesterday, the Court indicated 

it would not be taking a plea agreement in this case, and then any plea would 

need to be an open plea.” After the court reviewed Hamilton’s rights and 
2

explained the procedure for an open plea, he pled guilty to the charge of 

hindering law enforcement. Hamilton acknowledged a jury would be presented 

with sufficient evidence to find him guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable 

doubt, referencing the Alford plea procedure. The State provided a factual 

basis. The court found Hamilton’s plea to be knowing, intelligent, voluntary,

and supported by a sufficient factual basis.

[¶6] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by arbitrarily 

rejecting the plea agreement for lack of a sufficient factual basis but then 

accepting the open plea, because a factual basis is required for both. “Rule 11, 

N.D.R.Crim.P., governs pleas and provides the procedural framework for 

entering pleas. To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily. Generally, a defendant who voluntarily pleads 

guilty waives the right to challenge non-jurisdictional defects and may only 

attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea.” State v. Wallace, 

2018 ND 225, ¶ 6, 918 N.W.2d 64 (cleaned up).

[¶7] After making an unconditional, open plea, Hamilton may only attack the 

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea. See State v. Trevino, 2011 ND 

232, ¶ 6, 807 N.W.2d 211. Hamilton’s argument that the district court abused 

its discretion by rejecting the previously-presented plea agreement was waived 

when he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty. He can no longer 

challenge such non-jurisdictional defects. Id.

II

[¶8] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by substantially 

relying on impermissible factors. He argues the court impermissibly relied on 

facts outside the record, including: a Virginia court order finding the 

individuals he aided were “unsafe parents”; Hamilton’s actions aiding removal 

of the children from the custody of their aunt; and the procedure for issuing 

and general seriousness of Amber alerts. Hamilton argues he was sentenced in 

an illegal manner because the main factors the court relied on were based on 

information outside the record, or unreasonable inferences from information 

in the record.
3

[¶9] This Court reviews a district court’s sentencing decision under an abuse 

of discretion standard. See State v. Thomas, 2020 ND 30, ¶17, 938 N.W.2d 897. 

Our review is generally limited “to whether the court acted within the 

statutorily prescribed sentencing limits or substantially relied on an 

impermissible factor.” Id. (quoting State v. Clark, 2012 ND 135, ¶ 18, 818 

N.W.2d 739).

[¶10] Hamilton did not object to the district court’s discussion of or reliance on 

these factors during his sentencing hearing. When an issue has not been

properly preserved, we review only for obvious error. N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b); 

State v. Smith, 2023 ND 6, ¶ 5, 984 N.W.2d 367. “We exercise our power to 

consider obvious error cautiously and only in exceptional situations where the 

defendant has suffered serious injustice.” Id. (quoting State v. Landrus, 2022 

ND 107, ¶ 6, 974 N.W.2d 676). “To establish an obvious error, the defendant 

must show: (1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error affects the defendant’s 

substantial rights.” Smith, 2023 ND 6, ¶ 5. “There is no obvious error when an 

applicable rule of law is not clearly established.” State v. Gardner, 2023 ND 

116, ¶ 5, 992 N.W.2d 535 (quoting State v. Lott, 2019 ND 18, ¶ 8, 921 N.W.2d 

428. “[T]he determination whether to correct the error lies within the 

discretion of the appellate court, and the court should exercise that discretion 

only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” State v. Pemberton, 2019 ND 157, ¶ 9, 930 N.W.2d 125 

(quoting State v. Patterson, 2014 ND 193, ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d 113).

[¶11] During a sentencing hearing, a district court is not restrained by the 

rules of evidence except for the rules on privilege. N.D.R.Ev. 1101(d)(3)(D). 

Further, a district court may draw a reasonable inference from evidence 

presented. See State v. Hoverson, 2006 ND 49, ¶¶ 38-39, 710 N.W.2d 890

(rejecting argument that reliance on unproven conduct is an impermissible 

factor).

[¶12] We have held the district court relied on an impermissible factor when it 

misinterpreted a statutory definition of “dangerous weapon” to the detriment 

of the defendant. State v. Christensen, 2019 ND 11, ¶ 10, 921 N.W.2d 436. We 

have also held penalizing a defendant for exercising a constitutional right is 
4

an impermissible factor. State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 463-464 (N.D. 1978) 

(holding it is impermissible to penalize a defendant for standing trial or 

remaining silent); see also Hoverson, 2006 ND 49, ¶¶ 35-36 (concluding 

consideration of either uncounseled guilty pleas without waiver of counsel or 

pending criminal charges is impermissible).

[¶13] Hamilton cites no clearly established law prohibiting reliance on 

information from outside the record or a court’s use of its personal knowledge

regarding such things as Amber alerts. Hamilton has not demonstrated that 

the factors the court considered were a clear deviation from the applicable 

statutory provisions, case law, or rules of evidence. The sentencing factors are 

outlined in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04. “Although entitled to consideration, the 

sentencing factors in § 12.1-32-04 do not control the district court’s discretion 

and are not an exclusive list of all a district court may consider in fixing a 

criminal sentence.” State v. Lyon, 2020 ND 34, ¶ 7, 938 N.W.2d 908. A district 

court need not explicitly reference the factors listed in section 12.1-32-04. Id.

[¶14] We conclude the district court did not commit obvious error when it 

considered facts outside the record and relied on its personal knowledge 

regarding Amber alerts when deciding Hamilton’s sentence.

III

[¶15] The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

[¶16] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr