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87–353 PDF 2014

TSA OVERSIGHT: EXAMINING THE SCREENING 

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 14, 2014 

Serial No. 113–95 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

Vacancy 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia Ranking 

Minority Member 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MARK POCAN, Wisconsin 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on January 14, 2014 ......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Kelly C. Hoggan, Assistant Administrator for Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Mr. Mark Bell, Acting Deputy Inspector General for Audits, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Ms. Jennifer Grover, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 26 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 28 

APPENDIX 

The Hon. John Mica, a Member of Congress from the State of Florida, 

Opening Statement .............................................................................................. 58 

Questions for Mr. Bell submitted by Rep. Connolly ............................................. 60 

(1) 

TSA OVERSIGHT: EXAMINING THE 

SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 

Tuesday, January 14, 2014, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John L. Mica 

[chairman of the subcommittee], presiding. 

Present: Representatives Mica, Turner, Amash, Meadows and 

Connolly. 

Staff Present: Will L. Boyington, Majority Press Assistant; Daniel Bucheli, Majority Assistant Clerk; John Cuaderes, Majority 

Deputy Staff Director; Linda Good, Majority Chief Clerk; Mitchell 

S. Kominsky, Majority Counsel; Eric Cho, Majority Detailee; Jaron 

Bourke, Minority Director of Administration; Devon Hill, Minority 

Research Assistant; and Julia Krieger, Minority New Media Press 

Secretary. 

Mr. MICA. Good morning, everyone. 

Welcome to the Subcommittee on Government Operations’ hearing this morning. The title of today’s hearing is ‘‘TSA Oversight: 

Examining the Screening Partnership Program.’’ 

We are pleased to have several members join us today. 

The order of business will be, first of all, we will have opening 

statements from any of the members attending. I will recognize Mr. 

Connolly in just a few minutes. Then we will turn to our panel of 

witnesses. We will hear from them and then go through a series 

of questions to the panel and witnesses who are participating 

today. 

Mr. Issa always starts off with a colloquy that states how important our responsibility is which is to conduct oversight. We are the 

stewards of taxpayer dollars. We created these programs through 

legislation like TSA and from time to time, we have a responsibility 

to conduct oversight to make certain they are run as efficiently, 

economically and effectively as possible. That is the purpose of our 

being here today. 

I have an opening statement the staff wrote and will insert that 

as part of the record. 

Mr. MICA. I wrote my own at 3:00 a.m. this morning. It is a bit 

different but I had some time to think about it and I thought I 

would give my commentary. 

First, I would say to Mr. Connolly, Mr. Meadows and the staff, 

in the last few weeks TSA has been fairly cooperative and provided 

2 

us with more information than we received in the past, and I appreciate the working relationship. 

Other than that, the reason we are here is, as I mentioned to Mr. 

Meadows and Mr. Connolly, I was one of the people who helped 

create TSA. I actually picked the name myself and with other 

members of Congress, we enacted the legislation pretty rapidly 

after the events of 9/11. President Bush wanted the legislation on 

his desk by Thanksgiving and we did deliver it. 

The country had been hit by the most significant terrorist attack 

since probably World War II when they struck us at Pearl Harbor. 

We needed to act, we needed an effective transportation security 

operation, and we tried to do that. 

We made some mistakes and have tried to correct them. We have 

worked with a number of administrators and some outstanding 

people. I remember Michael Jackson, for example. We also lost jurisdiction for sometime. We started in Transportation and shifted 

the TSA over to Homeland Security. I think part of the problem is 

that it is an agency with 200,000 and some personnel. Combining 

22 agencies and make it work does not always work well. 

That being said, when we started to change the way we screen 

passengers, we never intended TSA to operate aviation passenger 

screening forever. As a compromise, we set up five initial airports 

with private screening under federal supervision. 

Let me say at this conjuncture, I have never advocated going 

back to having the airlines do that or take away the government’s 

responsibility. I think it is important that we maintain that. If you 

analyze the events of 2001 and the terrorist attack, it was the government that failed, not the private screening. 

The government failed for several years to put in place standards 

for screening. The government failed for several years to put in 

rules governing what could be taken on a plane. For example, box 

cutters were not prohibited at that time, all of which led to the 

events of September 11. 

When we set up the screening program, we had all federal 

screening for most of the airports. For the first two years, we initially created five airports, one in each size category, with private 

screening under federal supervision. We tested the performance of 

the two models after some two years and the GAO, which independently looked at them, came up with a report. The report said 

that private screening under federal supervision performed statistically significantly better—not my words, their words. 

After that, as TSA saw applications for privatization, they began 

a campaign to make certain that airports did not opt out. They had 

a very hostile attitude toward taking that option which intimidated 

some of the airports right up to several years ago when one of my 

airports, the Sanford Airport, said they had enough of the way TSA 

was operating and wanted to opt out. 

I got a call from the airport director who said he was never so 

disgusted. They tried to intimidate him, they were rude, offensive 

and threatening which prompted me to get re-engaged. Here we 

are today as a result of TSA’s action, not mine. 

I worked with other members when we passed the FAA reauthorization bill. President Obama signed it into law February two years 

ago next month. In that bill we went from the language in the 

3 

original law that said an airport can submit an application to opt 

out and TSA may accept it to language which said ‘‘TSA shall accept the application to opt out.’’ Members of Congress, like myself 

and others, were frustrated with what was going on. 

That was two years ago. Here we are at this oversight hearing 

this morning. Basically what happened in those two years is TSA 

has performed a clever, slow roll out of implementation of the provisions we requested. In fact, the January 2013 TSA report, 

‘‘Screening Partnership Annual Report,’’ says none of the three 

major goals towards implementing private screening were completed. That is their report, all top priorities and none of them were 

met. 

As a result of this hearing, my airport which has been waiting 

now some two years finally got notification on Friday or some time 

soon that they are moving forward with an RFP which is almost 

two years later. That is not what we intended and that is not why 

we are here. 

I might also say for the record that the United States is now one 

of the very few western countries with an all Federal passenger 

screening system. Bulgaria, Romania and Poland are a few of the 

western states that keep an all government force in place. Almost 

every other nation, including those hit hard by terrorist threats— 

Israel and the U.K.—use private screening under federal supervision which is the model we anticipated would be in place by now. 

Unfortunately, TSA is both regulator, administrator, operator, 

auditor and contractor. That creates a conflict and there have been 

recent articles saying that model needs to be changed. I believe 

that TSA should set the rules, conduct the audits and get out of 

the personnel business. 

The agency has grown from 16,500 screeners after 9/11 to 66,000 

employees, 51,000 screeners and 15,000 administrative personnel. 

The personnel work hard and there are some very dedicated 

screeners and employees. They make, on average, $38,000 apiece. 

We spend $1.1 billion on 15,000 administrators and spend $1.9 billion on the rest of the 51,000 personnel. Something is wrong in 

those numbers. 

We only have about 457 airports. If you have 15,000 administrators—do the math—that means you have 30 administrators for 

every airport in the country. Thirty-five airports handle 75 percent 

of the passengers. There obviously is something wrong in our distribution of administration funding. 

Also, most of the reports—I have just a few of them here—also 

prompted us to put into law the requirement they shall accept the 

application. In the past, when we had TSA perform a review of the 

cost of screening, private screening versus all federal screening, 

they cooked the books and did not include elements of costs that 

should be applied and tried to tell folks they cost more than the 

all federal program which defies logic. GAO came back and said 

they did cook the books. 

One of the considerations we did put in the law was we should 

look at cost. They used that provision to slow roll and are not being 

transparent. Again, that is regrettable. 

In most areas dealing with private screening partnership, they 

have unfortunately acted arbitrarily. The acquisition and contract 

4 

process has been a disaster. We have ended up in court and some 

of the awards have been delayed. 

I was talking with Mr. Moran on the way over here and he 

talked about the delays at Dulles and some of the other airports 

and how they were having trouble recruiting people. You may know 

the history of recruitment in the Washington area by advertising 

for personnel on the top of pizza boxes or advertisements above discount gas pumps. 

The retention, particularly in the metropolitan area, continues to 

be a problem. The solution for dealing with having people on the 

job, the national screening force and other costs incurred, as studies have all shown, continues to be a huge problem. 

I will not get into all of the reports that have criticized TSA but 

as we know we have had horrible experience with acquisition of 

personnel, retention and training but also have had fiascos with 

purchase of the puffers for hundreds of millions of dollars and 

ended up destroying them and most recently taking out half a billion dollars’ worth of backscatter equipment from the airport. Staff 

should track and see where those have gone. 

These are not my reports. We have had reports on the Behavior 

Detection Program which recommends stopping that program because it is ineffective. 

Today’s focus is primarily on the Screening Partnership Program 

and trying to make that work. I will be introducing legislation 

sometime in the next month which will require all TSA to opt out 

all airports within 24 months of the President signing the bill and 

all airports have the model we intended—to get TSA out of the personnel and human resources business and into the security and intelligence business. 

Even though we passed the law and said you must accept these 

applications, almost none have actually moved forward. Again, that 

is a slow roll purposely to ignore the intent of Congress. 

I am also concerned that I have reports that the Screening Partnership Office in TSA is in disarray, that the major knowledgeable 

people have left and I think we may want to look at moving the 

contracting from TSA for the screening services to an agency like 

GSA which routinely does this. 

We have private screening under federal supervision for our nuclear facilities, for our defense facilities and for a host of very sensitive operating positions. Yet, we have a disaster in a program intended to be crafted quite differently. 

Those are some of my long opening comments. I have a bit more 

history than some of the other members but I wanted to share with 

you how we got to this stage and this oversight. 

I have also asked staff from the Appropriations Committee to attend this hearing and staff from the authorizing committee because 

we can conduct oversight but they control the money and the policy. I am expecting them to also act so that we get to where Congress intended us to be on this issue. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much, Chairman Mica. Thank you 

for holding today’s oversight hearing on the Transportation Security Administration’s Screening Partnership Program. 

5 

Following September 11, Congress established TSA to safeguard 

our Nation’s commercial aviation transportation system. Today, 

TSA is responsible for screening airline passengers and baggage at 

more than 450 airports throughout the United States. 

In 2004, TSA created the SPP to enable commercial airport operators to apply to forego federal screeners in favor of qualified private sector screening contractors that meet federal standards and 

who operate under federal oversight. 

There are currently 14 airports where passenger screening is 

performed by private contractors and 6 additional airports awaiting 

contract awards, which I understand will be announced later this 

year. Of these 20 airports, nearly half are small airports located in 

the State of Montana. 

In 2012, the Government Accountability Office performed and assessment of the performance of SPP airports. While the details of 

that analysis remain classified, GAO did find that some SPP airports perform slightly above the national average on some measures, while others perform slightly below. 

GAO also recommended in this report that TSA develop a mechanism to monitor performance of private screeners versus federal 

screeners. TSA concurred with the recommendation and has begun 

the long overdue process of evaluating private sector screening performance to ensure air travel remains secure. 

Although the detailed results of these assessments are sensitive 

or classified, I nonetheless look forward to hearing what is being 

done to correct sub par performance where identified. 

Proponents of the expanding the SPP program assert that private screeners improve efficiency and reduce costs compared to federal screeners. However, TSA’s cost estimates have found the opposite concluding that private screening costs are generally between 

three to nine percent higher than federal screening. 

In light of that discrepancy between cost saving claims and certainly the Chairman’s legitimate concerns over the validity of the 

cost estimate methodology, I am interested in examining the matter closely to ensure that Congress and TSA utilize the most accurate performance and cost data available so that we can be properly informed about oversight, operations and the possibility of future legislation. 

It is no secret that debates over TSA often elicit strong reactions 

from members and the public alike, often stemming from anecdotal 

yet very real instances of inconvenience and perceived poor customer service. Mr. Hoggan, I shared with you my own unhappy anecdotal experience most recently. 

Security is our main focus but it cannot be our only focus. Given 

the fact we are interacting with the public to the tune of millions 

and millions and millions of passengers, it seems to me that some 

emphasis on training of proper customer interaction is very important. It is important how we treat the American citizen and it is 

important how we treat our foreign guests. Both deserve dignity at 

an airport. 

It is a stressful enough situation for the passenger. It is also 

stressful for the TSA because they have an awesome responsibility. 

We do sympathize with that and we respect it but we also need to 

respect the passengers we are asking to cooperate. When we misVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:56 Apr 09, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\87353.TXT APRIL
6 

treat them by barking orders at them as if they are cattle, not people, we actually diminish the spirit of cooperation and do not enhance it. 

As I indicated to you privately before this hearing, Mr. Hoggan, 

I do not understand why that cannot be a simple matter of training. I do not understand how hard it is to teach people to make 

sure you use the words ‘‘please’’ and ‘‘thank you’’ when interacting 

with our public and show that basic respect. 

In my experience this last weekend—going out and I took the 

redeye back—I encountered 20 barked orders but never once the 

world ‘‘please’’ with any of the TSA people I encountered—take 

that off, move over there, back up, put your hands up, take your 

shoes off. Not once was the word ‘‘please’’ used. 

That lack of courtesy shows a lack of respect for the public with 

whom you are dealing, a public that is unbelievably tolerant of how 

it is being treated. Maybe that has something to do with the culture of airports these days where many American airlines seem actually to resent having customers and that lack of respect has become part of the culture of air travel. 

When we represent the Federal Government or are overseeing 

private sector entities taking over some of these responsibilities, we 

have to show a respect for the public understanding their cooperation is essential to our mission. I do not think it is a trivial issue. 

I do not think it is a nice thing to do if we have time. I think it 

is integral to the mission of security. 

If I cannot get assurances that we are going to take that seriously and redouble our efforts to make sure TSA agents or the private sector analogs are properly trained in how to deal in customer 

service and show respect for the public we are serving, then we will 

have to do something legislatively about it. I am going to insist and 

I know I will not have any resistance on the other side of the aisle 

on that. 

I am going to use this hearing today, Mr. Hoggan, to get some 

assurance from you because I have had it. I think a lot of the public has had it. There is no excuse for it. We have to take it seriously. 

I am doubly grateful for this hearing because this is one of my 

pet peeves. I have mentioned it many times over the five years 

have been on this job. I see no improvement at all in my own experience in the airports. 

If necessary, one thing we might do since my colleagues, unlike 

me—I live here, I do not have to travel as Mr. Bell knows—but my 

colleagues are on a plane at least twice a week going home and 

coming back. If we do not get some satisfaction, I am going to use 

my colleagues as a filter. Tell us about your experience and by the 

way, let us encourage the public to tell a member of Congress. We 

will feed it all to you, Mr. Hoggan, so then you will have to deal 

with it because we will make a big issue of it. 

Either we deal with this and respect the public we are serving, 

understanding we have a stressful mission—by the way, enormous 

respect goes to TSA, to you, Mr. Hoggan, and your colleagues, for 

the fact that thank God, we have not had a recurrence of 9/11. 

Cumbersome though it is, uncomfortable, stressful, we have been 

focused properly on the mission and so far, thank God, it has 

7 

worked. That does not mean we cannot make the process better 

and as I said, create a framework that fosters more cooperation, 

willingness and understanding from the public, not less. 

Forgive the lecture but you can see I have enormous frustration 

with the experience I see the public experiencing. We have to do 

something about it. I hope we can do it collaboratively, I hope we 

do not have to do it legislatively. It is not really a complicated 

issue, but I can tell you what I witness the public going through 

is unacceptable behavior by federal civil servants. 

I am one too and I do not like seeing my government represented 

that way with so many millions of the public who interact with 

these systems as they go to travel. 

That is my plea and also it is going to be my insistence. 

Thank you all for being here and I look forward to hearing your 

testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Now to our Vice Chairman, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and thanks to each of you for coming. I will be very, very brief. 

Mr. Connolly has said it well. I guess part of the frustration you 

are hearing is that there is no federal agency that really is representative of the Federal Government to the vast majority of people where they actually come in contact with a federal employee 

other than TSA. You really are the face of the Federal Government. 

Your efficiencies or inefficiencies, your manners or lack thereof is 

a broad brush approach. 

I think you have many very dedicated, capable, fine public servants. I appreciate the fact that we have safety, but as Mr. Connolly 

so eloquently put it, what happens is I get more complaints about 

TSA’s efficiency but more importantly their rude behavior and how 

they treat passengers than almost anything else. 

I challenge you to look from a customer service perspective on 

how we can effectively change this because if not, there will be 

great bipartisan support to find a private sector. We are talking 

about that partnership today but there will be great bipartisan 

support to find a private sector, more customer friendly way of 

doing it. 

I do that in the spirit of saying the responsibility you have is 

great in terms of the viability long term of your particular agency. 

I want to apologize because I am going to have to step out and 

be back and forth. I have a Transportation and Infrastructure 

hearing this morning going on right now for the highway bill but 

I will be back and forth. 

Thank each of you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. 

Now we will turn to our panel of witnesses. Today we have three 

witnesses. We have Mr. Kelly Hoggan, Assistant Administrator for 

Security Operations, TSA; Mr. Mark Bell, Acting Deputy Inspector 

General for Audits, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office 

of the Inspector General; and Ms. Jennifer Grover, Acting Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office. 

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses. I am not sure if you 

have been before us before but if you have a lengthy statement or 

8 

some documentation you would like to be included in the record as 

part of the hearing, you can request that through the Chair or a 

member. 

This is also an investigative subcommittee of Congress and we do 

swear our witnesses. Please stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

As a matter of business, members may have seven days to submit opening statements for the record. 

Mr. Connolly, I would like to keep the record open for two weeks 

because I think we are going to have additional questions. Without 

objection, we will take members’ statements for seven days and 

keep the record open for addressing additional questions to our witnesses over the next several weeks. 

With that, we will recognize and welcome Kelly C. Hoggan, Assistant Administrator for Security Operations of TSA. Welcome and 

you are recognized. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF KELLY C. HOGGAN 

Mr. HOGGAN. Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Connolly and 

members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you 

today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Screening Partnership Program, SPP. 

I am the Assistant Administrator for Security Operations at GSA 

and have been in this position for eight months. I have served in 

a variety of leadership roles in TSA since 2004. 

Prior to joining TSA, I worked in the airline industry for 18 

years. My experience covers many areas at TSA and airline operations including staffing allocation, resource management, technology development and capabilities and international aviation. 

Congress, through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 

established TSA and required the establishment of pilot programs 

under which airports may apply to utilize private sector rather 

TSA employees to conduct front line screening. 

As directed by ATSA, TSA selected five airports to participate in 

the pilot program representing five risk categories. SPP grew out 

of this pilot program which ended in 2004. Today, out of approximately 450 commercial service airports, 14 have contractors performing screening, including the original five pilot airports. 

Of those 14 airports, 7 fall within the smallest classification 

meaning they emplane between 2,500 and 10,000 passengers a 

year. These 14 airports represent approximately four percent of the 

passenger screening positions across the system. 

Applications from six additional airports have been approved and 

are currently in the contract solicitation process. I would note that 

since passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 

all SPP applications received have been approved within the 120 

9 

day time limit. Once approved for admission to SPP, contract solicitation and selection are completed in accordance with federal acquisition regulations. 

Over the past eight months in my position as Assistant Administrator for Security Operations I have taken steps to further streamline application processing, improve the level of experience and expertise assigned to the SPP Office and in collaboration with my 

counterparts in the Office of Acquisitions to establish a 12-month 

timeline goal for application receipt and contract award. 

For airport operators interested in SPP, the TSA website includes the SPP application itself, an overview of the application 

process and contact information for appropriate TSA staff. TSA 

also utilizes the Federal Business Opportunities website to communicate with a wide range of vendors. 

For instance, TSA advertised and held an SPP industry day on 

January 10, 2014. This event provided an overview of the program, 

the acquisitions process and provided a forum for questions and answers to the industry. 

I believe the steps taken have strengthened the program and 

made the program and application process more transparent to interested parties. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I will be 

happy to answer any questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Hoggan follows:] 

10 


Insert offset folio 1 here 87353.001

Statement of 

Kelly Hoggan 

Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Operations 

Transportation Security Administration 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

before the 

United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Operations 

January 14, 2014 

Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Connolly and members of the Subcommittee, I am 

pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

Screening Partnership Program (SPP). TSA is a high-performing counterterrorism agency with a 

dedicated workforce executing our mission around the clock and across the globe, charged with 

facilitating and securing the travel of the nearly 1.8 million air passengers who fly each day. Our 

goal at all times is to maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats 

while protecting passengers' privacy and facilitating the secure and efficient flow of legitimate 

commerce. TSA' s current security measures consist of a multi-layered system of transportation 

security that identifies, manages and mitigates risk. No layer on its own solves all our 

challenges, but, in combination, they create a strong and formidable system. 

TSA has taken significant steps to focus its resources and improve the passenger 

experience at security checkpoints by applying intelligence-driven, risk-based screening 

procedures and enhancing its use of technology To that end, TSA has several Risk Based 

Security (RBS) initiatives including TSA Pre.fTM, Known Crew Member, Managed Inclusion, 

and modified screening procedures for passengers less than 12 years of age and over 75 years of 
11 


Insert offset folio 2 here 87353.002

age, members of the military, and some members of the intelligence community - all designed to 

offer the most effective security in the most efficient way. 

Last month, TSA announced the expansion of expedited screening benefits for all U.S. 

Armed Forces service members at more than 100 airports nationwide. TSA enjoys strong 

partnerships with industry stakeholders, which has enabled the successful implementation of a 

variety of new RBS procedures. On December 27,2013, a high-volume day during the holidays, 

TSA provided expedited screening for 36.6 percent of the nearly 2 million passengers, and 

98.9 percent of passengers waited less than 20 minutes to pass through security checkpoints. As 

TSA continues to integrate RBS into its approach to transportation security, we will work with 

current and new private sector screening partners to ensure that RBS is integrated effectively into 

spp airports and the SPP program continues to be implemented effectively. 

Screening Partnership Program History 

Congress, through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (AT SA) (P.L. 107-71), 

established TSA and determined that aviation security would be most effective by making 

passenger screening a predominantly Federal responsibility. A TSA also authorized a pilot 

program for privatized passenger screening (see 49 U.S.C. 44919). TSA selected five airports to 

participate in the pilot program, representing five airport security risk categories as defined by 

the TSA Administrator. Companies that met statutory qualifications were then selected to 

conduct screening services under contract with the Federal Government. These private sector 

employees were, and remain, subject to the qualification and compensation criteria of Federal 

Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). Tn addition, ATSA enabled the Administrator to 

continue private contract screening with qualified companies at other U.S. airports after 

completion of the pilot program (see 49 U.S.c. 44920). 

2 
12 


Insert offset folio 3 here 87353.003

T71e Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 

(P.L. 112-95) amended 49 U.S.c. § 44920 to provide standards for approval of an SPP 

application, a timeline for approving or denying applications, and specific actions to take in the 

event an application is denied. Acceptance into the SPP program also requires that the TSA 

Administrator "determine(s) that the approval would not compromise the security or 

detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or the effectiveness of the screening of passengers or 

property at the airport." 

For airport operators interested in the SPP, the TSA website includes the SPP application 

itself, an overview of the application process, and contact information for the appropriate TSA 

staff. Additionally, the site provides a listing and map of SPP airports, recent news regarding 

SPP (such as contract awards), links to Requests for Proposals (RFPs) postings, and employment 

opportunities at SPP service providers. TSA also utilizes the Federal Business Opportunities 

website to communicate with a wide range of vendors. For instance, TSA advertised and held a 

SPP specific Industry Day on January 10,2014. This meeting was attended by approximately 

100 vendors and it provided a general overview of the program's direction and goals, informed 

industry of the acquisition process, and also provided a forum for obtaining feedback and insight 

into industry's capabilities. 

Program Size and Scope 

The SPP is a voluntary program whereby airports may apply for SPP status and employ 

private security companies to conduct airport screening according to TSA standards. 

Participation depends on interest from airport operators. To date, that interest has been limited. 

Since the creation of the program in 2004, 30 airports have applied to the program (including the 

original 5 pilot airports) and 14 airports have private contract screeners in place. Of those 

3 
13 


Insert offset folio 4 here 87353.004

14 airports, seven fall within the smallest airport classification (Category IV - which means they 

emplane between 2,500 and 10,000 passengers a year). The 14 airports currently participating in 

SPP represent approximately 1,849 or 3.9% of the passenger screening positions across the 

country. 

Applications from six additional airports have been approved and determinations for 

entry are pending contract solicitation. These six airports represent approximately 276 TSO 

positions. The other 10 applications have been withdrawn, denied, or commercial air service 

was discontinued at that location. 

Regardless of whether an airport has private or federal employees conducting passenger 

screening operations, TSA maintains overall responsibility for security. To fulfill our 

responsibility in this mission, it is important to maintain our flexibility-as new and emerging 

threats are identified, we must be able to adapt and modify OUf procedures quickly to protect the 

traveling public and promote the flow oflegitimate commerce. Federal Security Directors 

oversee the contracted operations as well as the other airport security operations, such as air 

cargo and facility security compliance inspections, that continue to be conducted only by Federal 

employees in accordance with ATSA. 

Cost Efficiency 

To provide information to prospective bidders on SPP applications, TSA includes the 

federal cost estimate of the airport screening operations in the RFP. The estimates were refined 

to conform with changes to the law, as well as to incorporate all recommendations from audits 

conducted by the Govemment Accountability Office and the Department of Homeland Security 

Office of the Inspector General. 

4 
14 


Insert offset folio 5 here 87353.005

Conclusion 

The SPP program continues to be a voluntary program. TSA adheres to the statutory 

requirements for considering applications and accepting companies into the program. As noted 

at the outset, we strive to maximize security not only by keeping ahead of current threats 

identified by intelligence, but by maintaining security systems that focus our resources on areas 

where they will yield the optimal benefit. This is consistent with our risk-based approach to 

security and critical in times of budget austerity. The SPP, no less than any other security 

program, must be implemented in a manner determined by cost as well as demonstrable benefits. 

We continue to work with SPP contractors to make adjustments required in an extremely 

dynamic security environment. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I will be 

happy to answer your questions. 

5 
15 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will hold questions until we have 

heard from all witnesses. 

We will hear from Mr. Mark Bell next. He is the Acting Deputy 

Inspector General for Audits at the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of the Inspector General. Welcome and you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MARK BELL 

Mr. BELL. Good morning, Chairman Mica, Ranking Member 

Connolly and members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me here today to testify on TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, known as SPP. My testimony will focus 

on the results of our audit of this program which we published in 

June 2013. 

We performed this audit in response to a request from Senators 

Roy Blunt and Bob Corker who had concerns about TSA’s management of SPP and the procurement process at Kansas City International Airport. 

In this program, TSA first reviews an airport’s application to 

participate and then if approved, procures private screening services. At the time of our audit, 16 airports were in SPP. Since that 

time, two airports have opted out, which means 14 are now participating. TSA has accepted 6 more airports but has not yet awarded 

screening contracts. 

We determined that although TSA administered SPP according 

to federal law, it could improve its program administration. Specifically, TSA did not adequately document its evaluation of applications in its procurement decisions, did not always use accurate information to determine program eligibility and did not verify the 

accuracy of data used in its procurement decisions. 

As a result, TSA risked making incorrect decisions on SPP applications, not selecting the best contractor and may have missed opportunities to save money. 

Until Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 

2012, TSA had no criteria to use when considering applications to 

join the program. The 2012 Act including requirements for approving applications, a timeline for decisions and a requirement to report to applicants and Congress about rejected applications. 

TSA complied with the Act’s requirements in approving five applications submitted after its passage but some documents related 

to its decisions including incorrect cost estimates and other documents are not finalized. 

We also identified missing details and inaccuracies in documents 

supporting four of the five SPP procurement decisions made between January 2011 and August 2012. For example, four procurement files contained a similar short paragraph noting the Source 

Selection Authority’s decision and two of the eight cost estimates 

had slight a difference in labor hours and overtime rates. 

In September 2011, a federal court concluded that TSA did not 

document its independent analysis of an SPP contract for Kansas 

City International Airport. Following this, TSA took steps to ensure 

it fully documented its proposal analysis, its decision rationale and 

the Source Selection Authority’s independence. 

16 

It also began to require documented support for its final selection 

decisions. We reviewed the decision documentation for a subsequent contract and confirmed that it included the necessary details. 

Under the 2012 Act, TSA must also consider cost efficiency in deciding on an airport’s admission into the program, but TSA reported that none of the four applications approved since the Act’s 

passage had reached the cost evaluation phase, so we were unable 

to determine TSA’s compliance with this requirement. 

However, in January 2013, the TSA Administrator directed that 

cost efficiency be evaluated when deciding on continued participation. TSA was also working on a methodology to estimate the cost 

of converting SPP airports back to TSA employee screening, but it 

had not yet determined the cost for any airport currently in the 

program. 

In our audit, we also noted that TSA’s screening cost estimates 

differed so they did not provide a consistent basis for deciding program participation. 

As a result of our audit, we recommended that TSA fully document its decisions on program applications and procurements and 

that it use relevant and accurate information in determining eligibility in approving participation. TSA concurred with both recommendations. 

We closed the first recommendation because TSA had already 

begun issuing policies and reminders and started revising the application process. We considered our second recommendation to be 

resolved because TSA is working to improve application document 

review and cost estimates. The recommendation remains open 

pending documented support of these actions. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome 

any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may 

have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Bell follows:] 

17 


Insert offset folio 6 here 87353.006

STATEMENT OF MARK BELL 

ACTING ASSIST ANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT ~~D GOVERNMENT REFORM 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

CONCERNING 

THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S SCREENING 

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 

JANUARY 14, 2014 
18 


Insert offset folio 7 here 87353.007

Good morning Chainnan Mica, Ranking Member Connolly, and Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the Transportation Security Administration's 

(TSA) Screening Partnership Program (SPP). My testimony will focus on the results of our audit 

ofSPP, which were included in a report issued in June 2013. I will also briefly summarize the 

Govermnent Accountability Office (GAO) audit report on SPP, which was issued in December 

2012. 

We perfonned this audit in response to requests from Senator Roy Blunt (Missouri) and Senator 

Bob Corker (Tennessee). The Senators had concerns about TSA's management ofSPP, as well as 

the procurement process at Kansas City International Airport. 

As of January 2013,16 airports were participating in SPP, under which an airport operator may 

apply to use a private company to screen passengers and baggage rather than use Federal 

Govermnent screening personnel. TSA reviews and approves applications to participate, awards 

contracts to private screening companies, and oversees the private screening workforce. We 

perfonned this audit to detennine whether TSA administered SPP in accordance with Federal 

regulations. 

TSA administered the program in accordance with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 

2012, but could improve aspects of its administration. Specifically, TSA' s files for its five most 

recent decisions to approve airports' applications to participate included documents that had not 

been finalized, as well as documents with inaccurate infonnation. In addition, TSA did not 

document the rationale used to decide on four of the five contracts awarded during 2011 and 

2012. 

TSA had these issues because it did not develop and implement procedures to ensure that 

application evaluation and procurement decisions were adequately documented. The Component 

also did not have quality assurance procedures to ensure that the most relevant and accurate 

infonnation was used to detennine eligibility and approve participation in SPP. As a result, 

TSA risks making incorrect decisions on applications and procurements, and thus, may miss 

opportunities to save funds. 

Background 

SPP was established in 2001 under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (A TSA) (P.L. 

107-71). Under SPP, airports can apply to TSA to use personnel from private companies to 

screen passengers and baggage. In 2002, five airports began participating in a 2-year pilot 

program; they elected to transition into the pennanent program in 2004. In the same year, TSA 

began accepting applications from other airports. 

Unti12011, TSA had no criteria when considering whether to approve airports' applications to 

participate in SPP. In 2012, under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of2012 (P.L. 112-95), 

TSA was required to--

1 
19 


Insert offset folio 8 here 87353.008

• Approve an application when determining that doing so would not compromise security 

or detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or effectiveness of passenger and baggage 

screening at the airport; 

• Decide on an application within 120 days of receipt; and 

• Provide a written report to the applicant and Congress when rejecting an application, 

identifying why the application was rejected and recommending how to improve the 

application for future approval. 

Once an application is approved, TSA contracts with a qualified company to provide screening at 

the airport. According to A TSA, to enter into a contract, TSA must conclude and certifY to 

Congress that the level of screening services and protection will be equal to or greater than the 

level that Federal screeners provide. TSA considers a private screening company qualified if the 

company's screening personnel meet all ATSA requirements for Federal screening personnel. 

The company must provide at least the same level of compensation and benefits to its employees 

that Federal employees receive. 

TSA Federal Security Directors are responsible for overall airport security, provide oversight of 

screening operations, and ensure effective and efficient security operations. As of January 2013, 

TSA provided oversight for screening operations at 450 airports, including 16 airports 

participating in SPP. 

TSA developed a process to evaluate airports' SPP applications and award contracts, which TSA 

senior management approved after we concluded our audit work. According to TSA Office of 

Security Operations personnel, the application process begins when the Program Management 

Office (PMO) receives the airport application. The TSA Integrated Project Team analyzes the 

application and advises the Office of Security Operations Assistant Administrator on the effect 

of its acceptance on TSA' s Federal screening. 

The PMO's estimate of the cost of using private screeners at the airport and an Office of Security 

Operations estimate for using Federal screeners are given to the Integrated Project Team to 

review. TSA management personnel receive and review both estimates before they are presented 

to the TSA Administrator, who uses them to decide whether to approve or reject applications. 

Once approved, the TSA Office of Acquisition begins the procurement process. \\'hen an 

application is rejected, the PMO informs the applicant and Congress about the reasons for 

rejection and how the applicant might improve the application. 

The procurement process includes solicitation, evaluation, selection, and contract award. During 

solicitation, TSA selects evaluation factors, develops a source selection plan, establishes 

evaluation standards, holds a pre-proposal conference, and visits and surveys sites. In evaluating 

proposals, evaluation teams independently review proposals and submit evaluation reports. 

Following evaluation, the TSA Source Selection Authority selects a screening company and 

provides a written selection decision to the contracting officer. Contract award documentation is 

then finalized and approved. 

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20 


Insert offset folio 9 here 87353.009

SPP Application Process 

Prior to passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of2012 (2012 Act), ATSA was in 

effect, and it did not include criteria for TSA in approving SPP applications; TSA could approve 

any SPP application submitted. Also prior to the 2012 Act, there were no criteria beyond 

defining a qualified private screening company and how private screeners would be 

compensated. TSA complied with the requirements of the 2012 Act in approving the five SPP 

applications submitted after its passage. However, TSA did not ensure that documents related to 

decisions on these five applications were finalized and accurate. Because decisionmakers rely on 

the information in this documentation, it should be as accurate and complete as possible. 

From 2004 through 2008, TSA approved 19 SPP applications. During 2009 and 2010, five SPP 

applications were received, but none were approved. In 2011, the TSA Administrator decided 

that the Component would no longer approve SPP applications unless airports demonstrated "a 

clear and substantial benefit" to the Federal Government. 

Since the 2012 Act was passed, TSA approved five applications, two of which were submitted 

during 2009 and 2010. Although it approved these five applications, TSA indicated that actual 

program participation was conditional on private screening providers meeting the Act's 

requirements of effective and cost-efficient screening. As of January 2013, 16 airports were 

participating in SPP, but TSA indicated that it had not yet awarded contracts for these 5 airports. 

During our audit, we reviewed applications from the following five airports, whlch TSA 

approved since the passage of the 2012 Act: 

• Orlando Sanford International Airport (Florida) 

• Sacramento International Airport (California)l 

• Glacier Park International Airport (Montana) 

• Bert Mooney Airport (Montana) 

• Bozeman Yellowstone International Airport (Montana) 

TSA made decisions on these applications within 120 days of receiving them, but TSA's files 

included inaccurate documents. 2 For example, 14 of25 (56 percent) of the documents that TSA 

used to evaluate these five applications were not finalized. We also identified errors in the 

documents. For example, we noted the following errors in two separate documents: 

• A document included an incorrect figure, which resulted in a $162,057 overstatement of 

the cost to use private screeners. 

• A document used to compare the estimated cost of private screening to the estimated cost 

of Federal screening showed TSA understated an estimate of the cost savings of private 

screening by $423,572. If the estimate had been correctly stated, the report would have 

shown a 7 percent increase in maximum potential cost savings from using private 

screening compared to Federal screening. 

I After our audit work was completed, Sacramento International Airport withdrew its SPP application. 

'Documentation reviewed included cost estimate briefings, integrated project team briefings, SPP application chair 

briefings. application determination briefings, and decision memorandums. 

3 
21 


Insert offset folio 10 here 87353.010

According to TSA, the errors may have been a result of using information from an earlier 

application file and not changing all of the required figures to reflect analysis of the new 

applications. TSA did not have quality control procedures that required a second review of the 

data in application files to ensure that all required documentation was finalized and accurate. 

Although in these two cases TSA correctly approved the applications, there is still a risk that 

inaccurate estimates could lead to incorrect decisions. 

In a recent update provided by TSA, there are now 14 airports participating in SPP. Subsequent to 

the release of our audit report, Lewistown Municipal and Frank Wiley Field Airports opted out 

of the program. According to TSA, the following 6 airports have been accepted into the program, 

but TSA has not yet awarded contracts for these airports. 

• Orlando Sanford International Airport (Florida) 

• Glacier Park International Airport (Montana) 

• Bert Mooney Airport (Montana) 

• Bozeman Yellowstone International Airport (Montana) 

• West Yellowstone (Montana) 

• Sarasota Bradenton (Florida) 

SPP Procurement Process 

From January 2011 to August 2012, when documenting its award decisions on four SPP 

contracts, TSA did not comply fully with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 15.308. 

Specifically. in this time period, TSA' s documentation on proposal evaluations and decisions 

related to these contract awards was missing details and included inaccuracies. TSA did not 

formalize and implement procedures to ensure that SPP procurements were fully documented, 

and it did not have quality control procedures to verify the accuracy of data used for contract 

decisions. As a result, TSA risks not selecting the best contractor offer and not ensuring that it 

provides the best screening services. 

In four of the five procurement files for contracts awarded between January 2011 and August 

2012, the rationale for TSA's final decisions on contractor selection was not fully described in 

supporting documentation. The DHS source selection guide requires the Source Selection 

Authority (SAA) to document its rationale separately. The guide further specifies that files 

should include a decision statement, a brief description of the product or service being procured, 

a brief description of the basis for the award, a list of competitive offerors, the rationale for 

business judgments and tradeoffs, and the reason that the selected offeror's proposal is the best 

overall value to the Federal Government3 

Rather than including all of this information, all four files contained a similar short paragraph 

noting the SSA's decision. For example, in the file for the contract awarded to the Kansas City 

International Airport, the final decision noted that the SSA had completed an independent review 

and assessment of the technical and price reports, but did not include other details on the 

rationale for its decision. According to TSA, the files were missing documentation on the 

J A Practical Guide to Source Selection, Version 1.1, September 2008. 

4 
22 


Insert offset folio 11 here 87353.011

rationale because staff members believed the final decision documentation met FAR 

requirements. 

In September 2011, a Federal court ruled that TSA could not award a private screening contract 

to the contractor originally selected for the Kansas City International Airport, and it directed the 

Component to cancel or amend the solicitation. The Federal court concluded that the TSA SSA's 

decision did not include documentation on its independent analysis. According to FAR Section 

15.308, the SSA may use reports and analyses prepared by others, but its decision shall represent 

its independent judgment. 

Following the 2011 ruling, TSA developed lessons learned to ensure full documentation of its 

proposal analysis and the rationale for its decisions, as well as the SSA's independence. 

Although at the time of our audit the lessons learned had not been formalized as policy, TSA 

began requiring additional documentation to support final source selection decisions. We 

reviewed documentation for a decision on a contract to provide screening for three airports and 

confirmed that it included details on the rationale for procurement decisions and on independent 

analysis. 

In reviewing the five contracts awarded between January 2011 and August 2012 for eight 

airports, we noted data discrepancies in TSA's proposal evaluation documentation.4 In addition, 

we reviewed two of eight cost estimates that TSA prepared for the five procurements and 

identified discrepancies in both cost estimates. Specifically, there were differences in labor hours 

and overtime rates. Inaccurate cost estimates could affect TSA's evaluation of offerors. 

Cost Considerations 

Under the 2012 Act. TSA is required to consider cost efficiency in deciding on airports' 

admission into SPP. However, we were unable to conclude whether TSA was properly 

considering cost because TSA reported that none of the four SPP applications approved and in 

progress since the Act's passage had progressed to the contract evaluation phase in which cost 

would be evaluated. 

A January 13, 2013, memorandum approved by the TSA Administrator directed that cost 

efficiency be evaluated when deciding on an airport's continued participation in SPP. TSA 

developed and continued to refine a methodology for estimating the cost of converting SPP 

airports back to screening by TSA personnel, but at that time it had not yet performed the cost 

determination for any airport in SPP. 

The cost estimates consider factors such as labor costs, attrition, real estate costs, and overhead, 

which are partially based on the costs of using Federal personnel at two comparable airports. As 

TSA refines the cost estimates, the Component continues to adjust factors that result in several 

different cost estimates, some of which indicate TSA employee screening would cost more and 

others in which the contracted screening would cost more. Because different factors may be 

added and removed from the cost estimates, they do not provide a consistent basis for making 

decisions on SPP participation. 

4 One contract covered three airports; another contract covered two airports. 

5 
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Insert offset folio 12 here 87353.012

OIG Recommendations and TSA Response 

We recommended that TSA expedite developing and implementing procedures to ensure that 

decisions on SPP applications and procurements were fully documented according to applicable 

Department and Federal guidance. We also recommended that TSA establish and implement 

quality assurance procedures to ensure that the most relevant and accurate information is used 

when determining eligibility and approving airports' participation in SPP. 

TSA concurred with both of our recommendations. In its response, TSA noted that our 

recommendations reflected program enhancements since passage of the 2012 Act, and that it had 

already made significant progress toward implementing our recommendations. 

In December 2012, the TSA Office of Acquisition issued a policy letter, effective January 1, 

2013, on SSA appointment and business processes, including a requirement for an independent 

SSA tradeoff analysis decision. In January 2013, TSA issued a policy reminder on source 

selection procedures, reiterating that the SSA must independently document its decision. 

According to the policy reminder, the Contracting Officer also needs to review in detail all 

source selection documents. On March 4, 2013, TSA revised and approved its SPP application 

process. Because of these actions, we considered this recommendation resolved and closed. 

Early in fiscal year 2013, TSA began to improve quality assurance in application documents and 

completed part of the work in March 2013, when it finalized the revised application process. In 

the fall of2012, the Component had begun including dates on Govermnent cost estimates to 

track changes more accurately; it expected to finalize a cost estimating process in 2013. The SPP 

Program Management Office was finalizing a review process, which it planned to complete in 

2013, to ensure that all application documents are final and accurate before being used to reach a 

final determination. For all future procurements, the office would formally confirm or revise the 

TSA "cost efficiency number" 1 week prior to releasing the Request for Proposals. TSA 

expected to document and fmalize this standard in 2013. We considered TSA's planned 

corrective actions responsive to the recommendation, which would remain open and resolved 

until we received documented support that these processes and the standard were finalized. As of 

January 2014, this recommendation remains open. 

We also included responses to the Senators' specific questions in an appendix to this report. 

Specifically, the Senators asked whether, in administering SPP, TSA acted outside its own 

regulations and procedures; taken any actions that exceeded its statutory authority; or otherwise 

acted improperly, unethically, or unlawfully. In reviewing SPP application and procurement 

documents and processes and interviewing appropriate personnel, we found no evidence that 

TSA acted outside its regulations and procedures; exceeded its statutory authority; or acted 

improperly, unethically, or unlawfully. 

The Senators asked whether TSA was not embracing SPP by pressuring airport officials not to 

participate. We responded that TSA had met the intent of ATSA. The Component implemented 

SPP and made it available to interested airports, and it had not pressured airport officials to not 

participate. We conducted telephone interviews with officials from 24 non-SPP airports, none of 

whom said they were pressured by TSA about the program. Specifically, officials at 20 airports 

said that they were satisfied with TSA screening at their airports, two had no comment or were 

6 
24 


Insert offset folio 13 here 87353.013

undecided, one airport was not interested in the SPP, and one airport planned to apply to the 

program. We reviewed documentation for the six airports whose applications to participate in 

SPP were rejected, including the four that subsequently resubmitted applications. The four 

airports that reapplied were subsequently accepted. Officials from the two airports that did not 

reapply said that TSA had not placed undue pressure on them about this decision. 

The Senators asked whether TSA had taken full advantage of SPP to advance innovations and 

best practices in security and management, as well as cultivate positive relationships between 

screeners and passengers at airports. We replied that TSA had provided information on its webbased tool called the IdeaFactory, which collects information and suggestions from the 

workforce. SPP contractors can submit suggestions at the TSA website, but the website's terms 

leave it relatively unclear whether contractors' suggestions made through the website are 

desired. To develop a more detailed understanding of the process would have required lengthy 

discussions with SPP participant airports and TSA officials; and to draw a more complete 

conclusion would have required a review of innovations previously submitted and rejected. Time 

constraints did not allow the audit team to hold such discussions or review previously submitted 

innovations. 

The Senators asked us to determine whether TSA resisted implementing GAO recommendations 

to accurately assess the costs of screening at SPP and non-SPP airports. We reviewed TSA's 

preliminary work and plans for doing so, but could not answer this question until TSA finalized 

the process. At the time of our audit, the Component was still updating its SPP cost estimate used 

to compare actual costs for SPP contracts with the costs of federalized screening. 

The Senators asked us to determine TSA' s rationale for starting the Kansas City International 

Airport procurement process over. We determined that TSA decided to re-procure the 

solicitation due to 1) errors in the original Request for Proposals (solicitation), which led to a 

Federal court ruling and 2) the length of time since TSA had issued the original solicitation. 

According to the ruling, TSA could either amend the solicitation to correct the price evaluation 

scheme, notify the sole offerors about the amendment to the solicitation, and engage them in 

discussions; or re-procure the solicitation. 

The Senators inquired about any conflict of interest at Kansas City International Airport with a 

former TSA employee. TSA procurement files in the Office of Acqtrisitions at TSA 

Headquarters did not provide any evidence that the former TSA employee had any influence 

over the procurement. 

GAO Report on SPP 

In its December 2012 report, Screening Partnership Program: TSA Should Issue More Guidance 

to Airports and Monitor Private versus Federal Screener Pelformance, GAO noted that TSA 

had developed some resources to assist SPP applicants; however, it had not provided guidance to 

assist airports applying to the program. Consistent with the 2012 Act, TSA's revised SPP 

application requested that applicants provide information to assist it in determining if their 

participation in SPP would compromise security or detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or 

screening effectiveness of passengers and property at their airport. TSA also developed 

responses to frequently asked questions and expressed a willingness to help airports needing 

assistance. However, TSA had not issued guidance for airports on completing applications and 

7 
25 


Insert offset folio 14 here 87353.014

information on how the Component would assess them. Three of five airport operators who 

applied using the application current at that time said they needed additional guidance to better 

understand how to respond to the new application questions. With improved guidance, airports 

could evaluate their candidacy for SPP better. 

At the time of the GAO audit, TSA had improved its screener performance measures, but GAO 

concluded that it could benefit from monitoring private versus Federal screener performance. In 

April 2012, TSA added measures to better address the strategic goals and mission of screening in 

its assessments of screener performance at private and Federal airports. However, TSA did not 

separately monitor private screener and Federal screener performance. It made efforts to monitor 

screener performance at individual SPP airports, but these efforts did not provide information on 

SPP performance as a whole or across years, which made it difficult to identifY program trends. 

GAO noted that consistent monitoring of SPP versus non-SPP performance would help ensure 

that the screening and protection at SPP airpOlts matched or exceeded that at non-SPP airports, 

and would ensure that SPP airports were operating as intended. 

GAO recommended TSA develop guidance for SPP applicants that included I) TSA's criteria 

and process for assessing whether SPP participation would compromise security or detrimentally 

affect screening cost-efficiency or effectiveness; 2) how TSA would obtain and analyze cost 

information on screening cost-efficiency and effectiveness and the implications of airports not 

responding to related application questions; and 3) specific examples of additional information 

airports should consider providing to help TSA assess their suitability for SPP. GAO also 

recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to regularly monitor private versus Federal 

screener performance. TSA concurred with both recommendations. 

Conclusion 

Through our audit, we determined that TSA needed to improve some aspects of its 

administration of SPP to help avoid the risk of not selecting the best contractor to provide 

screening services. Because administration includes in-depth examination of airport applications 

and private contractor offers, which requires detailed calculations and analysis, TSA should 

ensure that decisionmakers have accurate information. TSA has taken steps to fully document its 

decisions on SPP applications and procurements and to improve its quality assurance procedures, 

including cost estimating and application document reviews. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any questions you or other 

Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

8 
26 

Mr. MICA. Thank you again, Mr. Bell. We will defer questions. 

We will hear next from our final witness, Jennifer Grover, Acting 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO. Welcome and you 

are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER GROVER 

Ms. GROVER. Good morning, Chairman Mica, Ranking Member 

Connolly and other members and staff. 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss TSA’s implementation 

and oversight of the Screening Partnership Program. 

The Screening Partnership Program, SPP, provides airports a 

private alternative to federal screeners. As others have already 

noted, of the Nation’s 450 or so commercial airports, 14 participate 

in SPP and another 16 are waiting in the wings for TSA to complete the contractor procurement process. 

A year ago, GAO found weaknesses in TSA’s implementation and 

oversight of SPP. Regarding implementation, we found that TSA 

was not providing clear guidance to airports on how to apply to 

SPP. This is important to ensure that all airports have a full and 

fair opportunity to participate. 

Specifically, we found that TSA offered online FAQ’s but little 

else. Airports told us that they needed help with several issues 

such as understanding whether or not they were good candidates 

for the program, how to complete the applications and specific guidance about what cost information they were required to submit. 

Industry representatives echoed those concerns noting that airports were reluctant to invest in the application process when they 

were unsure about how they would be evaluated. 

Since then, consistent with our recommendations, TSA has posted additional guidance on its website including examples of helpful 

information that previous applicants provided, information about 

how applications would be assessed and clarification about the requirements for submitting cost information. 

Regarding oversight, we found that TSA did not evaluate the relative performance of federal and private screeners. This is important because private screeners must provide a level of service and 

protection that is equal to or greater than that provided by federal 

screeners. Therefore, we recommended that TSA regularly monitor 

SPP performance compared to the performance of federal screeners. 

Specifically, we found that TSA used a scorecard performance 

system to regularly assess screeners on numerous performance 

measures at every airport. The result is a point in time snapshot 

of performance at that airport relative to its goals and national 

averages but not a comparison to all of the airports in its category. 

To address the question of comparative performance, GAO reviewed several years of performance data for the then 16 SPP airports on foreign measures. We found that private screeners did 

slightly better than federal screeners on some measures and slightly worse on others. However, we could not attribute the differences 

in performance entirely to the use of private or federal screeners 

due to other factors that can affect performance. 

Since then, TSA issued its first SPP annual report which, consistent with our recommendations, includes comparative performance information for each SPP airport relative to other airports in 

27 

its category. TSA also began verifying annually that the level of 

screening services provided by private airports is equal to or greater than the level that would be provided by federal screeners. 

We are pleased that TSA’s changes address our recommendations 

on SPP. These changes also may help TSA in making future improvements to the program. For example, with greater clarity and 

transparency in the application process, additional airports may be 

encouraged to apply. 

Greater clarity and transparency may also help ensure that the 

application process is carried out in a uniform and consistent manner. 

With the new comparative performance information, TSA may be 

better equipped to identify best practices as well as to identify specific SPP airports that require additional attention to improved 

performance. 

Finally, a better understanding of how well SPP airports operate 

could inform future decision-making about the program. 

Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Connolly, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify this morning and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:] 

28 


Insert offset folio 15 here 87353.015

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Tuesday, January 14, 2014 

GAO-14-269T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on 

Government Operations, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

SCREENING 

PARTNERSHIP 

PROGRAM 

TSA Issued Application 

Guidance and Developed a 

Mechanism to Monitor 

Private versus Federal 

Screener Performance 

Statement of Jennifer Grover, Acting Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 
29 


Insert offset folio 16 here 87353.016

P€iUiWW·,.,t 

SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 

TSA Issued Application Guidance and Developed a 

Mechanism to Monitor Private versus Federal 

Screener Performance 

What GAO Found 

Since GAO reported on this issue in December 2012, the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) has developed application guidance for airport operators 

applying to the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). In December 2012, GAO 

reported that TSA had not provided guidance to airport operators on its 

application and approval process, which had been revised to reflect requirements 

in the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Refonm Act of 2012. 

Further, airport operators GAO interviewed at the time generally stated that they 

faced difficulties completing the revised application, such as how to obtain cost 

information. Therefore, GAO recommended that TSA develop application 

guidance, and TSA concurred. To address GAO's recommendation, TSA 

updated its SPP website in December 2012 by providing general application 

guidance and a description of the criteria and process the agency uses to assess 

airports' SPP applications. The guidance provides examples of information that 

airports could consider providing to TSA to help assess their suitability for the 

program and also outlines how the agency will analyze cost information. The new 

guidance addresses the intent of GAO's recommendation and should help 

improve transparency of the SPP application process as well as help airport 

operators determine whether their airports are good candidates for the SPP. 

TSA has also developed a mechanism to regularly monitor private versus federal 

screener performance. In December 2012, GAO found differences in 

performance between SPP and non-SPP airports based on its analysis of 

screener performance data. However, while TSA had conducted or 

commissioned prior reports comparing the performance of SPP and non-SPP 

airports. TSA officials stated at the time that they did not plan to conduct similar 

analyses in the future, and instead stated that they were using across-the-board 

mechanisms to assess screener performance across all commercial airports. In 

December 2012, GAO found that these across-the-board mechanisms did not 

summarize information for the SPP as a whole or across years, which made it 

difficult to identify changes in private screener periormance. GAO concluded that 

monitoring private screener performance in comparison with federal screener 

performance was consistent with the statutory provision authorizing TSA to enter 

into contracts with private screening companies and recommended that TSA 

develop a mechanism to regularly monitor private versus federal screener 

performance. TSA concurred with the recommendation. To address GAO's 

recommendation, in January 2013, TSA issued its first SPP Annual Report, 

which provides an analysis of private versus federa! screener performance. 

Further, in September 2013, a TSA Assistant Administrator signed an operations 

directive that provides internal guidance for preparing the SPP Annual Report, 

including the requirement that the report annually verify that the level of 

screening services and protection provided at SPP airports is equal to or greater 

than the level that would be provided by federal screeners. These actions 

address the intent of GAO's recommendation and could assist TSA in identifying 

performance changes that could lead to improvements in the program. 

_____________ United States Government Accountability Office 
30 


Insert offset folio 17 here 87353.017

Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Connolly, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work on the Transportation 

Security Administration's (TSA) Screening Partnership Program (SPP). 

TSA, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is 

responsible for ensuring the security of the traveling public through, 

among other things, screening passengers traveling by aircraft for 

explosives and other prohibited items. To fu~iII this responsibility, TSA 

maintains a federal workforce of screeners at a majority of the nation's 

commercial airports, but also oversees a smaller workforce of private 

screeners employed by companies under contract to TSA at airports that 

participate in TSA's SPP.' The SPP, established in 2004 in accordance 

with provisions of the Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA), allows 

commercial airports an opportunity to "opt out" of federal screening by 

applying to TSA to have private screeners perform the screening 

function.' At airports with private screeners, TSA continues to be 

responsible for overseeing airport screening operations and ensuring that 

the private contractors provide effective and efficient security operations 

in a manner consistent with law and other TSA requirements; however, 

the screening of passengers and baggage at these airports is performed 

by private screening contractors selected and approved by TSA.3 As of 

January 2014, there are 14 airports partiCipating in the SPP, as well as 6 

1For purposes of this report, a ~commercial airport" is any airport in the United States that 

operates pursuant to a TSAMapproved security program in accordance with 49 C.F.R pt. 

1542 and at which TSA performs or oversees the performance of screening services, of 

which there are approximately 450 as of November 2013. We refer to airports that are 

partiCipating in the SPP as SPP airports and the screeners in those airports as private 

screeners. We refer to airports not participating in the SPP as non-SPP airports and the 

screeners in those airports as federal screeners. 

'See PUb. L No. 107-71, § 108, 115 Stat. 597, 611-13 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 

U.S.C. §§ 44919-20). TSA established the SPP in 2004 a~er concluding a 2-year pilot 

program through which four private screening companies performed screening operations 

at 5 commercia! airports (one contractor served 2 airports). 

3The SPP contractor's responsibilities include recrUiting, assessing, and training screening 

personnel to provide security screening functions in accordance with TSA regulations, 

policies. and procedures. SPP contractors are also expected to take operational direction 

from TSA to help ensure they meet the tenns and conditions of the contract 

Page 1 
31 


Insert offset folio 18 here 87353.018

airports approved for participation and awaiting the selection of a 

screening contractor. 4 

The standard by which TSA evaluates airport applications for participation 

in the SPP has changed since the program's inception in 2004. First, in 

January 2011, the TSA Administrator announced his decision not to 

expand the SPP beyond the 16 airports that were partiCipating in the 

program at that time "unless a clear and substantial advantage to do so 

emerges in the future." In so doing, the Administrator cited his interest in 

helping the agency evolve into a "more agile, high-performing 

organization that can meet the security threats of today and the future" as 

the reason for his decision. Of the 6 airports that submitted applications 

from March 2009 through January 2012 and that were evaluated under 

the "clear and substantial advantage" standard, TSA approved the 

application of 1 airport and denied the applications of the other 5. Second, 

according to TSA officials, the Federal Aviation Administration 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Modernization Act), enacted 

in February 2012, prompted TSA to change the standard by which it 

evaluates SPP applications and requires, among other things, that the 

TSA Administrator approve an SPP application submitted by an airport 

operator if the Administrator determines that the approval would not 

compromise security or detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or the 

effectiveness of the screening of passengers or property at the airport. 5 

My testimony today addresses the extent to which TSA (1) has provided 

guidance to airport operators for the SPP application process and (2) 

assesses and monitors the performance of private and federal screeners. 

This statement is based on our December 2012 report and selected 

4According to TSA, in July 2013, the Department of Transportation ended the Essential Air 

Service subsidy to two of the SPP airports in eastern Montana. The los5 of the subsidy 

resulted in the discontinuation of air service to and from those airports that required the 

implementation of TSA~required screening measures. Therefore, the total number of 

airports in the SPP was reduced from 16 to 14. Between January and August 2012, TSA 

approved the applications of six airports. One of these airports, Sacramento Intemational 

Airport, CA, withdrew its application in January 2013. Sarasota~Bradenton International 

Airport FL submitted its application for participation to the SPP in February 2013 and was 

approved for participation in May 2013, bringing the total number of airports approved for 

partiCipation and awaiting selection of a screening contractor back to six. 

'See Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 830(a), 126 Stat 11. 135 (2012) (codified at 49 USC. § 

44920(b)). The term airport operator means a person that operates a "commercial airport: 

as that term is used in this report See also 49 C.F.R § 1540.5 (defining the term "airport 

operator"). 

Page 2 GAO·14-269T 
32 


Insert offset folio 19 here 87353.019

updates on the status of recommendations made in our December 2012 

report. 6 For our December 2012 report, we analyzed past and current 

SPP application forms and instructions and interviewed airport operators, 

screeners, SPP contractors, SPP applicants, TSA headquarters officials, 

and Federal Security Directors (FSD).7 We also compared TSA's process 

for reviewing applications and monitoring performance of private and 

federal screeners against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government to determine if any improvements were needed. 8 To 

determine how screener performance compares at SPP and non-SPP 

airports, we compared screener performance for the 16 SPP airports that 

were participating in the SPP at that time to the average performance of 

other airports in their category, as well as nationally, from fiscal year 2009 

through 2011.9 More detailed information on the scope and methodology 

appears in our December 2012 report. To update our work, we obtained 

related documentation, such as the SPP Annual Report issued in January 

2013, and interviewed agency officials in January 2014 on progress made 

to implement the recommendations from our December 2012 report 

related to application guidance and monitoring of private versus federal 

screener performance. We conducted the work on which this statement is 

based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

6GAO, Screening Partnership Program: TSA Should Issue More Guidance to Airports and 

Monitor Private versus Federal Screener Performance, GAO~13~20B (Washington, D.C, 

Dec. 6, 2012). 

7FSDs are TSA officials that provide day-te-day operational direction for security 

operations at the airports within their jurisdiction, including those participating in the SPP. 

8GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-OO-21.3 1 

(Washington, D.C .. Nov. 1999). 

9TSA classifies commercial airports in the United States into one of five security risk 

categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of 

takeoffs and landings annually, and other special security considerations. In general, 

category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category lV 

airports have the smallest 

Page 3 GAO-14-269T 
33 


Insert offset folio 20 here 87353.020

Background On November 19, 2002, pursuant to ATSA, TSA began a 2-year pilot 

program at 5 airports using private screening companies to screen 

passengers and checked baggage. 1O In 2004, at the completion of the 

pilot program, and in accordance with ATSA, TSA established the SPP, 

whereby any airport authority, whether involved in the pilot or not, could 

request a transition from federal screeners to private, contracted 

screeners. All of the 5 pilot airports that applied were approved to 

continue as part of the SPP, and since its establishment, 21 additional 

airport applications have been accepted by the SPP. 11 

In March 2012, TSA revised the SPP application to reflect requirements 

of the FAA Modernization Act, enacted in February 2012.'2 Among other 

provisions, the act provides that 

Not later than 120 days after the date of receipt of an SPP application 

submitted by an airport operator, the TSA Administrator must approve 

or deny the application. 

The TSA Administrator shall approve an application if approval would 

not (1) compromise security, (2) detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency 

of the screening of passengers or property at the airport, or (3) 

detrimentally affect the effectiveness of the screening of passengers 

or property at the airport. 

Within 60 days of a denial, TSA must provide the airport operator, as 

well as the Committee on Commerce, SCience, and Transportation of 

the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 

Representatives, a written report that sets forth the findings that 

u.s.c. § 44919. The pilot program was to assess the feasibility of having 

qualified private screening companies provide airport security screening services in lieu of 

federal screeners. The fcHewing airports from each security risk category were selected to 

participate: (1) San Francisco International Airport-category X, (2) Kansas City 

International Airport-category I, (3) Greater Rochester International Airport-category II 

(now a category! airport), (4) Jackson Hole Airport-category III, and (5) Tupelo Regional 

Airport-category IV 

11A total of 26 airports have been approved to the SPP since its inception in 2004, 

lncluding the 14 airports currently participating in the SPP and the 6 airports approved for 

participation and awaiting the selection of a screening contractor. Of the remaining 6 

approved airports, 4 airports had participated in the SPP but !eft the program after 

commercial air service was discontinued at the airport and 2 withdrew their applications 

after being approved. For more information on the history of application to the SPP, see 

GAO-13-2GB 

12See generally Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 803, 126 Stat at 135-36. 

Page 4 GAO·14--269T 
34 


Insert offset folio 21 here 87353.021

served as the basis of the denial, the results of any cost or security 

analysis conducted in considering the application, and 

recommendations on how the airport operator can address the 

reasons for denial. 

All commercial airports are eligible to apply to the SPP, To apply, an 

airport operator must complete the SPP application and submit it to the 

SPP Program Management Office (PMO), as well as to the FSD for its 

airport, by mail, fax, or e-mail. Figure 1 illustrates the SPP application 

process, 

Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Screening Partnership Program (SPP) Application Process 

Note: The JPT is made up ofTSA staff from various offices across TSA including offices related to 

human capital, information technology. security capabWties, and acquisitions. 

Although TSA provides all airports with the opportunity to apply for 

participation in the SPP, authority to approve or deny the application 

resides in the discretion of the TSA Administrator. According to TSA 

officials, in addition to the cost-efficiency and effectiveness considerations 

mandated by FAA Modernization Act, there are many other factors that 

are weighed in considering an airport's application for SPP participation. 

For example, the potential impacts of any upcoming projects at the airport 

are considered. Once an airport is approved for SPP participation and a 

private screening contractor has been selected by TSA, the contract 

screening workforce assumes responsibility for screening passengers 

and their property and is required to adhere to the same security 

regulations, standard operating procedures, and other TSA security 

requirements followed by federal screeners at non-SPP airports. 

Page 5 GAO,I4-269T 
35 


Insert offset folio 22 here 87353.022

TSA Has Developed 

Program Application 

Guidance to Help 

Improve 

Transparency of Its 

Process and Assist 

Airports in 

Completing their 

Applications 

Since our December 2012 report, TSA has developed guidance to assist 

airport operators in completing their SPP applications, as we 

recommended. In December 2012, we reported that TSA had developed 

some resources to assist SPP applicants, but it had not provided 

guidance on its application and approval process to assist airports. As the 

application process was originally implemented in 2004, the SPP 

application process required only that an interested airport operator 

submit an application stating its intention to opt out of federal screening 

as well as its reasons for wanting to do so. In 2011, TSA revised its SPP 

application to reflect the "clear and substantial advantage" standard 

announced by the Administrator in January 2011. Specifically, TSA 

requested that the applicant explain how private screening at the airport 

would provide a clear and substantial advantage to TSA's security 

operations. 13 At that time, TSA did not provide written guidance to airports 

to assist them in understanding what would constitute a "clear and 

substantial advantage to TSA security operations" or TSA's basis for 

determining whether an airport had met that standard. 

As previously noted, in March 2012 TSA again revised the SPP 

application in accordance with provisions of the FAA Modernization Act, 

which became law in February 2012. Among other things, the revised 

application no longer included the "clear and substantial advantage" 

question, but instead included questions that requested applicants to 

discuss how participating in the SPP would not compromise security at 

the airport and to identify potential areas where cost savings or 

efficiencies may be realized. In December 2012, we reported that while 

TSA provided general instructions for filling out the SPP application as 

well as responses to frequently asked questions (FAQ), the agency had 

not issued guidance to assist airports with completing the revised 

application nor explained to airports how it would evaluate applications 

given the changes brought about by the FAA Modernization Act. For 

example, neither the application instructions or the FAQs addressed 

TSA's SPP application evaluation process or its basis for determining 

whether an airport's entry into the SPP would compromise security or 

affect cost-efficiency and effectiveness. 

13For more on the specific wording of this and other questions from the application, see GAO-13-208 

PageS GAO-14-269T 
36 


Insert offset folio 23 here 87353.023

Further, we found that airport operators who completed the applications 

generally stated that they faced difficulties in doing so and that additional 

guidance would have been helpful. 14 For example, one operator stated 

that he needed cost information to help demonstrate that his airport's 

participation in the SPP would not detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency 

of the screening of passengers or property at the airport and that he 

believed not presenting this information would be detrimental to his 

airport's application. However, TSA officials at the time said that airports 

do not need to provide this information to TSA because, as part of the 

application evaluation process, TSA conducts a detailed cost analysis 

using historical cost data from SPP and non-SPP airports. The absence 

of cost and other information in an individual airport's application, TSA 

officials noted, would not materially affect the TSA Administrator's 

decision on an SPP application. 

Therefore, we reported in December 2012 that while TSA had approved 

all applications submitted since enactment of the FAA Modernization Act, 

it was hard to determine how many more airports, if any, would have 

applied to the program had TSA provided application guidance and 

information to improve transparency of the SPP application process. 

Specifically, we reported that in the absence of such application guidance 

and information, it may be difficult for airport officials to evaluate whether 

their airports are good candidates for the SPP or determine what criteria 

TSA uses to accept and approve airports' SPP applications. Further, we 

concluded that clear guidance for applying to the SPP could improve the 

transparency of the application process and help ensure that the existing 

application process is implemented in a consistent and uniform manner. 

Thus, we recommended that TSA develop guidance that clearly (1) states 

the criteria and process that TSA is using to assess whether participation 

in the SPP would compromise security or detrimentally affect the costefficiency or the effectiveness of the screening of passengers or property 

at the airport, (2) states how TSA will obtain and analyze cost information 

14For our December 2012 report, we interviewed 4 of the 5 airport operators that applied 

to the SPP since TSA revised its application after enactment of the FAA Modernization 

Act All 5 of the applications were subsequently approved by TSA We reported that 3 of 

the 4 operators we interviewed struggled to answer the application questions related to 

the costMefficiency of converting to the SPP because they did not have data on federal 

screening costs, while the fourth airport operator did not need additional information or 

guidance to respond to the question. Further, 3 of the 4 airport operators we intelViewed 

said that additional guidance would have been helpful in completing the application and 

determining how TSA evaluates the applications, See GAO-13-208 for more information. 

Page 7 GAO-14-269T 
37 


Insert offset folio 24 here 87353.024

Performance between 

SPP and Non-SPP 

Airports Varied; TSA 

Recently Developed a 

Mechanism to 

Monitor Private 

versus Federal 

Screener 

Performance 

regarding screening cost-efficiency and effectiveness and the implications 

of not responding to the related application questions, and (3) provides 

specific examples of additional information airports should consider 

providing to TSA to help assess an airport's suitability for the SPP. 

TSA concurred with our recommendation and has taken actions to 

address it Specifically, TSA updated its SPP website in December 2012 

by providing (1) general guidance to assist airports with completing the 

SPP application and (2) a description of the criteria and process the 

agency will use to assess airports' applications to participate in the SPP. 

While the guidance states that TSA has no specific expectations of the 

information an airport could provide that may be pertinent to its 

application, it provides some examples of information TSA has found 

useful and that airports could consider providing to TSA to help assess 

their suitability for the program. Further, the guidance, in combination with 

the description of the SPP application evaluation process, outlines how 

TSA plans to analyze and use cost information regarding screening costefficiency and effectiveness. The guidance also states that providing cost 

information is optional and that not providing such information will not 

affect the application decision. We believe that these actions address the 

intent of our recommendation and should help improve transparency of 

the SPP application process as well as help airport officials determine 

whether their airports are good candidates for the SPP. 

PageS 
38 


Insert offset folio 25 here 87353.025

Performance Varied 

between SPP and NonSPP Airports for Some 

Measures, but Differences 

Cannot Be Entirely 

Attributed to the Use of 

Private or Federal 

Screeners 

In our December 2012 report, we analyzed screener performance data for 

four measures and found that there were differences in performance 

between SPP and non-SPP airports, and those differences could not be 

exclusively attributed to the use of either federal or private screeners. The 

four measures we selected to compare screener performance at SPP and 

non-SPP airports were Threat Image Projection (TIP) detection rates, 

recertification pass rates, Aviation Security Assessment Program (ASAP) 

test resufts, and Presence, Advisement, Communication, and Execution 

(PACE) evaluation results (see table 1). For each of these four measures, 

we compared the performance of each of the 16 airports then 

participating in the SPP with the average performance for each airport's 

category (X, I, II, III, or IV), as well as the national performance averages 

for all airports for fiscal years 2009 through 2011.'5 

Table 1: Perionnance Measures Used to Compare Screener Performance at Screening Partnership Program (SPP) and Non~ 

spp Airports, December 2012 

Perlonnance measure 

Threat Image Projection {TIP} 

detection rates 

Recertification pass rates 

Aviatlon Security Assessment 

Program (ASAP) tests results 

Presence. Advisement, 

Communications, and Execution 

(PACE) evaluations 

Description 

T!Ps are fictional threat images (guns, knives, improvised explosive devices, etc.) superimposed 

onto carry-on baggage as it passes through the X-ray machine. While screening carry-on baggage, 

screeners identify that a potential threat has been spotted by selecting a "threat" button. If the 

identified image is a TIP, the X~ray machine informs the screener that the threat was fictional. 

Otherwise, a screener will search the bag, as the threat object may be rea!. 

In order to maintain their certification to screen passengers and baggage, all screeners (at both SPP 

and non-SPP airports) must pass several recertification tests on an annual basis. These tests 

include assessments of threat detection skills on carry·on and checked baggage X-ray machines as 

wen as role-p!aying scenarios to assess other job functions, such as physical bag searches, patdowns, and screening passengers with disabilities. 

ASAP tests are covert performance assessments conducted at both screening checkpoints and 

checked baggage screening areas. Tests are implemented locally by unrecognizable role players 

who attempt to pass standard test items, such as knives, guns, or simulated improvised explosive 

devices, through the screening checkpoints or checked baggage screening areas 

PACE evaluations are used to assess screener performance on various elements that may affect 

security and a passenger's overall traveHng experience. PACE evaluators visit a checkpoint covertly 

and assess the screening personnel on a variety of elements, such as whether the officers provide 

comprehensive instruction and engage passengers in a calm and respectful manner when 

screening. Because PACE evaluations began as a baseline assessment program in fiscal year 2011 

and had only been implemented only at category X, I, and Il airports, our analysis for this measure 

was limited to the 6 SPP airports in those categories during fiscal year 2011.a 

Source GAO analySIS of TSA Informallon 

15 Additional information on these performance measures and how we selected them can 

be found in our December 2012 report. See GAO·13~208. 

Page 9 GAO·14·269T 
39 


Insert offset folio 26 here 87353.026

aThe six category X, I, and II SPP airports in fiscal year 2011 are San Francisco Intemational Airport 

(X), Kansas City International Airport (I), Greater Rochester International Airport (I), Key West International Airport (II), Joe Foss Field (II), and Jackson Hole Airport (II), 

As we reported in December 2012, on the basis of our analyses, we 

found that, generally, certain SPP airports performed slightly above the 

airport category and national averages for some measures, while others 

performed slightly below. For example, SPP airports performed above 

their respective airport category averages for recertification pass rates in 

the majority of instances, while the majority of SPP airports that took 

PACE evaluations in 2011 performed below their airport category 

averages." For TIP detection rates, SPP airports performed above their 

respective airport category averages in about half of the instances. 

However, we also reported in December 2012 that the differences we 

observed in private and federal screener performance cannot be entirely 

attributed to the type of screeners at an airport, because, according to 

TSA officials and other subject matter experts, many factors, some of 

which cannot be controlled for, affect screener performance. These 

factors include, but are not limited to, checkpoint layout, airline schedules, 

seasonal changes in travel volume, and type of traveler. 17 

We also reported in December 2012 that TSA collects data on several 

other performance measures but, for various reasons, the data cannot be 

used to compare private and federal screener performance for the 

purposes of our review. For example, passenger wait time data could not 

be used because we found that TSA's policy for collecting wait times 

changed during the time period of our analyses and that these data were 

not collected in a consistent manner across all airports. 18 We also 

recertification pass rates, the term "instance" means performance by an airport 

a particular year or fiscal year, while for TIP detection rates, the term means 

by an airport during a particular fiscal year for a specific type of screening 

17DHS deemed the details of our analyses of the four performance measures we used for 

companng SPP with non-SPP screener performance as classified or sensitive security 

information; thus, these details are not included in this testimony. 

18rSA's policy for measuring wait time changed in March 2010, Instead of collecting 

precise wait times every hour, TSA began only recording instances in which the wait time 

was more than 20 or 30 minutes. Further, through our site visits conducted for the 

December 2012 report, we learned that airports collect wait time data in different ways 

For example, some airports calculate the wait time from the end of the queue until the 

passenger reaches the travel document checker podium; other airports calculate the time 

from the end of the line until the passenger passes through the walkthrough metal 

detector after being screened or the advanced imaging technology. See GAO¥13~208. 

Page 10 GAO-14-2G9T 
40 


Insert offset folio 27 here 87353.027

TSA Has Developed a 

Mechanism to Monitor 

Private Screener 

Performance Separately 

from the Performance of 

Federal Screeners 

considered reviewing human capftal measures such as attrition, 

absenteeism, and injury rates, but did not analyze these data because 

TSA's Office of Human Capital does not collect these data for SPP 

airports. We reported that while the contractors collect and report this 

information to the SPP PMO, TSA does not validate the accuracy of the 

self-reported data nor does it require contractors to use the same human 

capital measures as TSA, and accordingly, differences may exist in how 

the metrics are defined and how the data are collected. Therefore, we 

found that TSA could not guarantee that a comparison of SPP and nonSPP airports on these human capital metrics would be an equal 

comparison. 

Since our December 2012 report, TSA has developed a mechanism to 

regularly monitor private versus federal screener performance, as we 

recommended. In December 2012, we reported that while TSA monitored 

screener performance at all airports, the agency did not monitor private 

screener performance separately from federal screener performance or 

conduct regular reviews comparing the performance of SPP and non-SPP 

airports. Beginning in April 2012, TSA introduced a new set of 

performance measures to assess screener performance at all airports 

(both SPP and non-SPP) in its Office of Security Operations Executive 

Scorecard (the Scorecard). Officials told us at the time of our December 

2012 review that they provided the Scorecard to FSDs every 2 weeks to 

assist the FSDs with tracking performance against stated goals and with 

determining how performance of the airports under their jurisdiction 

compared with national averages. 19 According to TSA, the 10 measures 

used in the Scorecard were selected based on input from FSDs and 

regional directors on the performance measures that most adequately 

reflected screener and airport performance. 20 Performance measures in 

19A1though FSDs provide day-to-day operational direction for security operations at the 

airports within their jurisdiction, including those participating in the SPP; FSDs have 

responsibility for overall security at SPP airports but do not have direct control over 

workforce management Rather, the SPP contractor is contractually obligated to 

effectively and efficiently manage its screening workforce 

2oPrior to the Scorecard, from 2006 through April 2012, FSDs used three performance 

measures in the Management Objective Report (MOR) to assess screener and airport 

performance. The MOR included three measures that assessed screener performance. 

including TIP detection rates. Advanced Imaging Technology checkpoint utilization, and 

layered security effectiveness. For more on these performance measures, see 

GAO-13-208 

Page 11 GAO-14-269T 
41 


Insert offset folio 28 here 87353.028

the Scorecard included the TIP detection rate, and the number of 

negative and positive customer contacts made to the TSA Contact Center 

through e-mails or phone calls per 100,000 passengers screened, among 

others,21 

We also reported in December 2012 that TSA had conducted or 

commissioned prior reports comparing the cost and performance of SPP 

and non-SPP airports. For example, in 2004 and 2007, TSA 

commissioned reports prepared by private consultants, while in 2008 the 

agency issued its own report comparing the performance of SPP and 

non-SPP airports,22 Generally, these reports found that SPP airports 

performed at a level equal to or better than non-SPP airports, However, 

TSA officials stated at the time that they did not plan to conduct similar 

analyses in the future, and instead, they were using across-the-board 

mechanisms of both private and federal screeners, such as the 

Scorecard, to assess screener performance across all commercial 

airports. 

In addition to using the Scorecard, we found that TSA conducted monthly 

contractor performance management reviews (PMR) at each SPP airport 

to assess the contractor's performance against the standards set in each 

SPP contract The PMRs included 10 performance measures, including 

some of the same measures included in the Scorecard, such as TIP 

detection rates and recertification pass rates, for which TSA establishes 

acceptable quality levels of performance, Failure to meet the acceptable 

quality levels of performance could result in corrective actions or 

termination of the contract 

However, as we reported in December 2012, the Scorecard and PMR did 

not provide a complete picture of screener performance at SPP airports 

because, while both mechanisms provided a snapshot of private screener 

21The TSA Contact Center handles these customer contacts for all of TSA, not only those 

related to passenger and baggage screening, For more on the Scorecard performance 

measures, see GAO-13-208< 

22Searing Point, Inc, Private Screening Operations Performance Evaluation Report (Apr. 

16,2004); Catapult Consultants, LlC, Private Screening Operations: BUSiness Case 

Analysis, Transportation Security Administration, Screening Partnership Program 

(Arlington: VA: Dec.14, 2007): and TSA, A Report on SPP Airport Cost and Performance 

Analysis and Comparison to Business Case Analysis Finding (Arlington, VA: Feb, 1, 

2008). 

Page 12 GAO·14·269T 
42 


Insert offset folio 29 here 87353.029

performance at each SPP airport, this information was not summarized 

for the SPP as a whole or across years, which made IT difficult to identify 

changes in performance. Further, neither the Scorecard nor the PMR 

provided information on performance in prior years or controlled for 

variables that TSA officials explained to us were important when 

comparing private and federal screener performance, such as the type of 

X-ray machine used for TIP detection rates. We concluded that 

monitoring private screener performance in comparison with federal 

screener performance was consistent with the statutory requirement that 

TSA enter into a contract with a private screening company only if the 

Administrator determines and certifies to Congress that the level of 

screening services and protection provided at an airport under a contract 

will be equal to or greater than the level that would be provided at the 

airport by federal government personnel. 23 Therefore, we recommended 

that TSA develop a mechanism to regularly monitor private versus federal 

screener performance, which would better position the agency to know 

whether the level of screening services and protection provided at SPP 

airports continues to be equal to or greater than the level provided at nonSPP airports. 

TSA concurred with our recommendation, and has taken actions to 

address it. Specifically, in January 2013, TSA issued its first SPP Annual 

Report. The report highlights the accomplishments of the SPP during 

fiscal year 2012 and provides an overview and discussion of private 

versus federal screener cost and performance. The report also describes 

the criteria TSA used to select certain performance measures and 

reasons why other measures were not selected for its comparison of 

private and federal screener performance. The report compares the 

performance of SPP airports with the average performance of airports in 

their respective category, as well as the average performance for all 

airports, for three performance measures: TIP detection rates, 

recertification pass rates, and PACE evaluation results. Further, in 

September 2013, the TSA Assistant Administrator for Security Operations 

signed an operations directive that provides internal guidance for 

preparing the SPP Annual Report, including the requirement that the SPP 

PMO must annually verify that the level of screening services and 

protection provided at SPP airports is equal to or greater than the level 

u.s.c. § 44920(d) (providing further that private screening companies must be 

owned and controlled by a Citizen of the United States, subject to a waiver of this 

requirement by the TSA Administrator in certain circumstances). 

Page 13 
43 


Insert offset folio 30 here 87353.030

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(441203) 

that would be provided by federal screeners. We believe that these 

actions address the intent of our recommendation and should better 

position TSA to determine whether the level of screening services and 

protection provided at SPP airports continues to be equal to or greater 

than the level provided at non-SPP airports. Further. these actions could 

also assist TSA in identifying performance changes that could lead to 

improvements in the program and inform decision making regarding 

potential expansion of the SPP. 

Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the 

subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you may have at this time. 

For questions about this statement, please contact Jennifer Grover at 

(202) 512-7141 or GroverJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

include Glenn Davis (Assistant Director), Stanley Kostyla, Brendan 

Kretzschmar, Thomas Lombardi, Erin O'Brien, and Jessica Orr. Key 

contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are 

listed in the product. 

Page 14 GAO-14-269T 
44 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will start with some questions. 

Mr. Hoggan, it is now two years in February since the President 

signed the bill that said TSA shall accept these applications. How 

many airports have you accepted applications for since then? 

Mr. HOGGAN. There were two, Sarasota-Bradenton and SanfordOrlando; four that were in Montana, Boozman. 

Mr. MICA. As I told the Ranking Member, the decision on Sanford was to put out an RFP last week. It has taken two years to 

put out an RFP? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. That is not acceptable. That is a slow roll, dragging 

your feet as I described in the beginning. Congress said you shall 

accept these. 

The other thing we have is the question of cost. Again I go back 

to some of the initial costs we looked at. Currently, you have 

51,000 screeners? 

Mr. HOGGAN. I have 48,000 screeners from a D-ban, part-time, 

TSO to an I-ban transportation security manager. 

Mr. MICA. But we have 66,000 employees. I don’t know if you 

have 20,000 administrators—that would floor me—but it is estimated you have about 15,000 administrative positions. 

Mr. HOGGAN. I don’t have 15,000. TSA, by my understanding and 

allocations, has under 10,000, closer to 9,000. 

Mr. MICA. We will go with your 9,000 figure. We have 450 airports divided by two. That is an average of 20 administrative positions for every airport in the country. Some of these airports have 

two and three flights a day and just a handful of passengers. 

Mr. HOGGAN. Out of the approximately 454 airports I have right 

now, I have little over 2,100 administrative staff at the airports. 

The rest in that allocation include the surface, cargo, aviation inspectors. 

Mr. MICA. I will give you an anecdotal experience at Orlando 

where we pay on average, across the board, $38,000 for screening 

personnel? 

Mr. HOGGAN. The exact average. 

Mr. MICA. That is the information we got from you all. 

I am leaving on one of the concourses and one of the employees 

takes me aside and says, see those four TSA employees, they are 

all making in the range of $100,000 sitting on their butts. That is 

not efficient operations. That is paying these people what amounts 

to almost minimum wage. We still have in the very large airports 

very significant turnover—not only in the large airports, you have 

some airports in the Midwest where you have a boom right now— 

the difficulty of finding personnel and you are sending in people. 

We have the cost of sending in people for the national screening 

force. They send them in, put them up in hotels, pay them per 

diem—the screeners they have to employ to fill those positions. The 

whole thing, if you add up the cost, there is absolutely no way it 

can be more cost effective to run the model you currently are operating. 

Can we put up one of the slides. We went to Quebec City. To be 

fair, we did emplanements. We got Rochester, one of the original 

SPP airports. You still have 16 personnel there making $80,000- 

$100,000 apiece. In Quebec City, they have one federal person, 

45 

probably UD2 if you use that to calculate. Again I see the same 

thing. 

At San Francisco, one of the original SPP airports, you have 84 

TSA personnel and you are spending $16 million, $190,000 on average for those personnel. Not all that cost, to be fair, is personnel 

cost in San Francisco, but it is very similar. I used San Francisco 

and Toronto because Toronto has huge international traffic in addition to San Francisco. Again, you have 84 personnel at that airport 

and huge personnel costs. 

I could go on through this. Your smaller airports, even Jackson 

Hole, which has been private, the airport does its screening, and 

you have six personnel. Some of those personnel may cover some 

other airports at a cost of $763,000. Are you counting this in your 

cost of the SPP operation? 

Mr. HOGGAN. For clarification, the numbers in San Francisco, I 

know that was 2010 and in 2013, it was 64. 

However, in the federal cost estimate we used, we take the fully 

loaded cost for the FSD and staff. There are certain positions which 

will stay in the federal government domain even in an SPP, as you 

well know, as relates to compliance inspectors and coronation centers and certain positions inside the FSD staff. 

When we look at an airport and look at their model between federal and private, the difference between the fully loaded that we 

calculate with federal and what we have with the private SPP, 

there is an incremental difference between the two. The difference 

is put into the federal cost estimate with the FTE allocations and 

the total cost to support the contract work at a manageable level. 

The net is exactly the same between the two, whether it is the 

federal or whether it is federal and the SPP contractor. 

Mr. MICA. Again, you calculate some of those costs. You could 

dismantle a great deal of your Washington personnel if you have 

the private sector. Most of our costs in some of these operations are 

personnel. 

Mr. HOGGAN. Absolutely correct. 

Mr. MICA. Again, there is no discounting for the number of personnel you do not need when you have a private operation. There 

are models all over. I used Canada. I would be glad to take you 

to the UK or Israel—again, highly impacted terrorist threat. Yet 

we go on with the most expensive model with people in some of 

these positions. 

The other thing is we may need to get you out of this whole contracting business. You are one of the few agencies that does contract for these services. We may look at moving that over to GSA 

and have them look at the contract. 

Again, you can conduct oversight and audit and set the rules and 

regulations. I have no problem with the Federal Government setting standards. That is what they failed to do on 9/11 and that is 

what they need to responsibly continue to do and audit the performance. 

If the private screening is not working as well in some instances, 

you get rid of them or it is corrected, but you cannot tell me for 

a minute that it costs less for the Federal Government to do this. 

46 

I was also telling Mr. Connolly one of the things private screening has done is actually pay the screeners more—you are aware of 

that—in some instances to retain them? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Perhaps they need to pay the commensurate 

amount. 

Mr. MICA. First, the conversion to private screening, now we still 

have 16 waiting. 

Mr. HOGGAN. Six, sir. 

Mr. MICA. She said 16. 

Mr. HOGGAN. I know she did. I would have to talk with her. I 

have six. 

Ms. GROVER. I apologize, six. 

Mr. MICA. If you have six waiting and have had several drop out, 

the intimidation program is very effective. Now I understand people who ask to opt out are also given old equipment and also harassed. 

Mr. HOGGAN. That is not true, sir. 

Mr. MICA. I know it is true. Do not tell me it is not true because 

I know it is true. I know also that they are the last for service of 

some of that equipment, for answers from TSA which never come. 

I met with all the screening companies and found out some of the 

things you do. 

Where airlines change and come into an airport, you do not allow 

a reasonable means of changing out the terms of the contract. You 

are one of the few to put some caps on the way you do and do not 

have a cooperative method of adjusting the contract for additional 

responsibilities that are incurred. 

Some airlines are new and some service airports but I am just 

telling you what we are learning about your operations. Again, we 

have several models you can look at. 

One of the questions I also have is we have asked on several occasions to disclose some of your operating costs. I was given information that is termed procurement sensitive? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Correct. 

Mr. MICA. I intend to release some of this information at some 

time to those who are going to compete. We are going to have to 

sit down and decide what is going to be disclosed so that those who 

are competing have a transparent and open process to know what 

your costs are and what they have to compete against. I am just 

giving you advance warning. 

Mr. HOGGAN. I would appreciate the opportunity to have that 

discussion with you about procurement sensitive information. I will 

have our legislative office work with you on that. 

Mr. MICA. Because I want them to be able to compete honestly 

but they cannot do that unless they get honest answers and the 

public should be able to see your exact costs. 

Mr. HOGGAN. I believe we have our exact costs. 

Mr. MICA. And what they are going to have to compete for now 

that you have set caps. 

We are looking again and I appreciate your cooperation. This is 

the first time we have gotten some of the information. We are trying to decipher what costs should be attributed to TSA as far as 

the federal screening and what costs should be attributed to priVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:56 Apr 09, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\87353.TXT APRIL
47 

vate screening under federal supervision so we get a very clear picture. 

The mandate by Congress was pretty clear. It should not take 

two years to get this moving, which it has done. 

I will come back. Let me go to Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all 

of our panelists for being here. 

Mr. Hoggan, in looking at the omnibus continuing resolution, 

which we anticipate we will be voting on tomorrow, it cuts $336 

million from DHS’ budget, mostly for TSA, and it caps the number 

of screeners at 46,000. If I heard you correctly, you said right now 

you have about 48,000? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Yes, sir, but that also includes transportation security managers and supervisors. They are in the same PPA count 

but they are not screening officers. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You could live with this cap? 

Mr. HOGGAN. I live with whatever my administrator submitted. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. How disruptive are these limits or cuts from your 

point of view in terms of your ability to fulfill your mission? 

Mr. HOGGAN. I will be able to fulfill my job at the level the Administrator supported. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You will? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Could you walk us through, I would like to better 

understand the process of hiring, career fulfillment and so forth. 

How do we recruit someone to be a TSA screener? 

Mr. HOGGAN. A multitude of ways. The primary way is posting 

on USA Jobs in the different locales where we have the vacancies. 

We end up having job fairs and opportunities at some locations 

where security directors come in, other locations it is staff and we 

give a pre-employment overview of what the job entails to ensure 

people understand it is a very difficult job. 

As you stated, we interact with 1.8 million passengers a day and 

screen 1.2 million bags a day. Over the course of a year that is a 

long period of time. It is a very, very demanding job. As I have said 

in town halls when I travel the Nation, it is the most difficult job 

in the Federal Government because they have to be on their game 

for everything they have to do in the security effectiveness environment all the time while at the same time providing the customer 

service and interaction with the American traveling public and our 

foreign guests, as you said. 

It is a difficult job. We do a lot of previews, we do some job fairs 

and we have information on USA Jobs and other means as well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You do background checks? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Once you have made a job offer to someone, what 

kind of training do they go through for the job? 

Mr. HOGGAN. You have initial OJT training, initial new hire 

training over 80 hours and then you have OJT or on the job training for an additional 40 hours. That is for a basic officer, entry 

level. There is additional training provided for unique types of 

equipment that you would use as well. That is incremental on top 

of that. 

48 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The basic orientation is a combination of 120 

hours? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is customer service part of that training? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Yes, sir, it is. Customer service is an initial part 

of the training. It is also in recurrent training. I will commit to you 

that I will do a review and double the efforts for that interaction. 

For the record, I also want to satisfy some of your questions. Recently, based on directions from our Deputy Administrator—I think 

it had to do with some questions Chairman Mica had and some 

others at the last hearing—we have instituted integrity training 

across the enterprise at TSA. There are situations and samples in 

there as relates to service training. 

We have also instituted leadership training for anyone who manages any employees inside of TSA. They are required to have specific leadership training. That service training was in there as well. 

I would also say for the record that currently today we are averaging about 35 percent of the traveling public on any given day, 

well over half a million individuals that come through our aviation 

system are going through TSA pre-check. As a matter of fact, the 

Administrator and the Secretary for Homeland Security are at Dulles right now talking about a TSA enrollment site. 

That changes the perspective of our passengers as well, as well 

as the interaction of the officers when you have a passenger go 

through pre-check as opposed to standard screening. We believe 

that will also change and have a dramatic effect on interaction 

with the traveling public. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Every member of Congress is in the customer 

service business. I have been in public life and elective life 19 

years. I always say all of my constituents are wonderful. Some are 

more wonderful than others. We experience what you experience. 

People are not all the same. Some people are very cooperative and 

some people can be less so. 

While you are trying to do your job to make sure everyone is secure in that airplane when they get on it and nothing gets through, 

you also have to deal with the vagaries of different personalities in 

very large numbers of people. It is a huge challenge. I am sure if 

I had the responsibility there would be a sense of great stress. 

I still think it is not an either/or proposition. I still think we can 

have high quality customer service and satisfaction with also top 

notch fulfillment of our mission. The two are not incompatible. In 

fact, they are compatible. 

As I indicated, I happen to believe that the less pleasant the experience because we do not get customer service right in our interactions with the public we serve, I actually think it contributes to 

less cooperation, resentment and a desire frankly not to cooperate. 

We do not want that. We want people understanding our mission. As I said, I have been amazed since 9/11 at the level of tolerance and acceptance by the public because they get the tradeoff, 

but I think we can improve on that tradeoff. I think we have to 

do that. 

There is no excuse for someone barking orders continuously at 

the public at any airport in America who is an employee of the 

Federal Government or a contractor for the Federal Government. 

49 

Mr. HOGGAN. I would agree. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would lose my job if I treated the public that 

way, and rightfully so. My staff would be fired if I found they treated my public that way. We need to hold ourselves to that standard. 

I fear it is beyond anecdotal. 

The Chairman has referenced turnover in TSA. Could you comment a bit about that? What is it and do you think that it is too 

high and there are things we could do to try to ameliorate that? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Too high is a unique definition. I know the attrition rate today as well as last year is lower than it was three, four, 

five or six years ago. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What is that attrition rate? 

Mr. HOGGAN. I think a lot of it has to do with the professionalism we are building. There are full time positions in the TSA. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What is your annual attrition rate? 

Mr. HOGGAN. It is through calculation right now. I do not want 

to say the exact number because it is being worked but somewhere 

between the 12 and 13 range is my understanding how we finished 

fiscal year 2013, part-time rates higher than full-time rates. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Are there things you have learned from that to 

try to get that down, to try to improve on retention and higher job 

satisfaction? It is not an easy job. 

Mr. HOGGAN. No, it is not an easy job. As Chairman Mica said 

and talked about the average wage, whether in Orlando Airport or 

other locations, the transportation security officers are some of the 

lowest paid federal employees in the government. We need to work 

harder to see what we can do about salaries. 

I think a lot of it has to do with flexibility and scheduling and 

opportunities for career advancement, future development and 

growth, not only inside the TSA but also inside the Federal Government. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to impose on my 

time. 

Mr. MICA. Go right ahead. It is just the two of us right now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If it is all right with you, I will finish. 

Mr. MICA. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so, much. 

Ms. Grover, this may be a logical thing, but I would like to look 

at the turnover/retention issue. In terms of best practices, what do 

we know that we could do or should do, including here in Congress, 

to try to help Mr. Hoggan and his mission of higher retention and 

higher job satisfaction for people in very stressful jobs? Did you 

look at that all? 

I would like to see some comparison and I am sure the Chairman 

would also. How does it compare with other federal agencies? I 

would assume, given the nature of the stress of the job, you are actually going to have higher turnover in TSA than in some other 

parts of the federal enterprise. I think that is to be expected. 

Are things we could do to make it more satisfying to improve job 

satisfaction and lower some of that turnover and help Mr. Hoggan 

in terms of retention? Has GAO looked at that, especially in comparison with either other federal entities or the private sector? 

Ms. GROVER. In our work last year on SPP, we were interested 

in being able to compare workforce performance measures for the 

50 

SPP versus the non-SPP airports. That is things like attrition and 

injury rates and so on. 

What we found is that TSA has data they collect for all of the 

airports that use federal screeners but at the time we did our work, 

TSA did not give the contractors specific instructions about how to 

define, measure and collect the same data. 

The contractors were providing TSA with information about attrition but we found that TSA had no assurances that the data was 

comparable. We were not able to do a comparison of attrition at the 

SPP airports versus the non-SPP airports. One first step would be 

to make sure they had comparable attrition data across all of the 

airports. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, fair enough. I am also interested in the 

broader subject, not just comparing the SPP with non-SPP, but 

generally this whole area of screening with say a large corporate 

entity. If you are a large corporation with 20,000 employees, what 

is the expected turnover that you would absolutely expect, just normal turnover every year? 

Corporations do monitor that because that tells them something 

about what is going on in the work environment and what they 

need to do to retain. It cost a lot more money to recruit a new employee, train that employee—that is why I asked Mr. Hoggan about 

the process. To lose that employee costs you a lot of money. It is 

cheaper to retain that employee. 

What do we need to do to do that? How does it compare in a 

stressful job, not easy, constantly dealing with the public versus 

other lines of work—Mr. Hoggan, an acceptable turnover given the 

nature of the work, maybe 13 percent a year. 

If we find that it is 18 percent then we have a problem. We all 

would agree we have a problem because 13 is what we are expecting. If we are below 13, then we are doing something right. That 

tells us something too and we want to do more of that. 

I think we will need you to help us look at other benchmarks as 

a management tool so that we can monitor what is happening in 

TSA and the SPPs and so can Mr. Hoggan, as a useful management tool. I commend that to you. 

Mr. Bell, have you looked at that at all? 

Mr. BELL. That is not something we have looked at. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One of the things the Chairman brought up and 

I brought up in my opening statement was there seems to be some 

difference in terms of cost estimate methodology. If I understand 

TSA correctly, their finding is that SPPs tend to cost about three 

to nine percent more than TSA itself. 

There are others—I think the Chairman among them—who 

would argue that the SPPs actually save money and do not cost 

more. 

Could you comment on methodology and the discrepancy in cost 

estimates, Ms. Grover? I think GAO did look at that? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, we did. We looked at TSA’s cost estimating 

methodology back in 2009 and 2011. When we did our last report 

on this, TSA did indeed show a discrepancy of three percent between the cost of running SPP and non-SPP airports. 

However, at the time, we did not have confidence in the three 

percent figure because one of the issues that was still unresolved 

51 

at that time was the question of uncertainty in the underlying estimate and underlying assumptions going into the estimate. 

Whenever you build an estimated cost, you have to make a series 

of assumptions that underlie it. Ideally what you want is a range 

around your point estimate so that policymakers have a good understanding of the level of confidence in the point estimate, so the 

actual difference in cost could have been three percent but it could 

have been eight percent or it could have been negative two percent—in other words that it was actually less expensive to run airports with private screeners. 

Until TSA has a good understanding of the level of uncertainty 

feeding into their assumptions and how that plays out with the 

range around their point estimate, I think there is still some question about the relative cost. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. This, to me, is a very critical question that has 

to be resolved because we cannot deal with different assumptions 

about how to get at a cost estimate. We have to have a methodology we all buy into so that we can then have one set of numbers, 

not a competing set of numbers. 

Otherwise, how can Congress or the Administration make informed decisions about which is better in a given circumstance— 

going the SPP route or going the TSA route—if we cannot even 

agree that it saves or costs money? How can we pass another bill 

mandating further privatization on the risk that we may get it 

wrong, that the assumption we are making, that privatization is always good and always saves money, is wrong? 

I am a big believer that these decisions have to be made on a 

pragmatic basis, not a theological basis. Privatization is not intrinsically good or bad and neither is federal employment. It is a matter of what works. Part of what works is how much does it cost and 

what is the quality we are getting. 

It seems to me this is a very critical question. Again, GAO can 

be very helpful in helping us get to the bottom of a methodology 

we all buy into. 

Mr. Bell, did you want to comment on that? 

Mr. BELL. I agree with your comments. We did not go into testing the cost methodology, similar concerns that GAO had that we 

did not have faith in the underlying methodology and did not have 

enough information to audit to make a good conclusion. I know 

that is something I know TSA is working on. Our second recommendation is coming up with solid cost estimates. We are still 

waiting for that documentation to take look and see if they have 

actually done that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Hoggan, I assume you would agree with the 

principle that we need one methodology we all agree on so we can 

have one set of accurate cost estimates to make informed decisions? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Absolutely, we do. It is my understanding with our 

federal cost estimates, we have taken all the recommendations 

from both GAO and the IG and put them inside to come up with 

that. 

I know there is a large conversation or a difference of opinion as 

it relates to imputed cost as relates to additional employee benefits, 

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52 

ity insurance, but those are costs that TSA is not allocated for and 

are outside of our appropriations. 

I know the Chairman has expressed concern with that fundamental difference and I am sure that will come up again. Not being 

a finance manager, and with the folks from the Appropriations 

staff here, I can only spend money that has been appropriated to 

me. That would be outside my appropriations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I represent the third largest number of federal 

employees in the United States in my district and probably represent the largest number of federal contract employees in the 

United States. I deal with this issue all the time about in-sourcing 

or out-sourcing. I absolutely insist it not be done theologically. One 

is not better than the other. It is a matter of circumstance and 

what is the best outcome for the taxpayer. 

Often the private sector will complain that the Federal Government often does not—you used the term ‘‘fully loaded costs,’’ but 

sometimes the private sector feels that when the Federal Government gets in the business of comparing the private sector to the 

public sector, it does not hold itself to the same standard to which 

it holds the private sector—fully loaded costs. 

Trying to get our arms around this in an accurate way I think 

is essential if we are going to make informed decisions moving forward. 

I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman 

talked about maybe what we need to do in contracting for SPP is 

get TSA out of the contracting business and give it to GSA. Do you 

have any opinion about that, Ms. Grover, from GAO’s point of 

view? 

Ms. GROVER. GAO has not done any work specifically examining 

that issue, sir. We would be happy in the future to do a broad review of the current construct of the way that TSA operations are 

being run; examine the question of conflict of interest and whether 

it exists under the current arrangement; and what implications 

that might have for cost or efficiency. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You have looked at TSA’s performance as a contracting agency? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And? 

Ms. GROVER. They have a system set up where they meet monthly with each of their contractors and look at their performance 

based on a very broad series of measures. They have systems in 

place to follow up in any areas where they see concerns or discrepancies. 

One of the things we pointed out in the past is that at the time 

of our review, they were maintaining all of those monthly records 

on paper. We encouraged them to consider putting them into electronic format to allow better contractor oversight over time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Hoggan, my final question, to give you a 

chance to comment, is from your point of view, would TSA be alleviated of the burden if we were to transfer all contracting responsibility to GSA or would that just complicate your life? 

Mr. HOGGAN. I believe it would complicate my life. The acquisitions process we have in TSA, I think we will see going forward, 

satisfies the requirements of the SPP office. 

53 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you so much for your indulgence. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, too. We got these figures from TSA. They spent $1.1 billion on administrative staff 

and $1.9 billion on their screening staff. I do not know if that 

$46,000 or $51,000 is in their 66,000 total. 

Mr. Hoggan, how many administrative personnel do you have in 

TSA in Washington, D.C.? 

Mr. HOGGAN. My understanding is we have just under, headquarters staff and all, about 4,000; 2,500 in headquarters. 

Mr. MICA. Just under 4,000—3,986, making $103,000, nothing 

because I think people who live in the D.C. area need a good wage. 

Mr. HOGGAN. There are 2,500 employees at headquarters roughly. 

Mr. MICA. I helped envision TSA with other members of Congress. Not in our wildest imagination did we ever think you would 

get to 66,000. You are bigger than the United States Coast Guard 

and I think six departments of government. You are at $103,000. 

If we divided this by half, we get $51,000 to 8,000 screeners, you 

might get a bit better performance. 

They have 9,656 administrators in the field. They are making $80,000 on average. Again, I want people to have a living wage. 

This is not about wages. I think we should keep them high for retention purposes, whether they are private or federal. 

This is not about union membership and I told you that. San 

Francisco had unions, private screening under federal supervision, 

long before the all federal. It is not about getting cheap labor. It 

is actually paying people. We spent over $1 billion on training and 

more than half the people who were trained have left. 

We compared Los Angeles with San Francisco on the training costs which we got access to and it was $11,000 more per employee, 

that is what I was talking about, for federal screeners compared to 

the SPP screeners’ training. 

I am glad to hear you have the integrity training going on. That 

is only after meltdowns. I do not want to go through the sordid history of even my own airport, Orlando, where it was on national television, the folks ripping off passengers. I am glad to see you are 

taking steps on that. 

When Mr. Pistole came in I sat with him and he promised me 

a risk-based system. How many Americans have had records of 

being airline passengers have ever been involved in a terrorist act? 

Mr. HOGGAN. How many passengers? 

Mr. MICA. How many Americans that have been passengers with 

a flying record have ever been involved in a terrorist act? 

Mr. HOGGAN. I would have to pull the records. 

Mr. MICA. There are none. I can give you the list. 

Mr. HOGGAN. Are you asking U.S. or international? 

Mr. MICA. I can give you the people who have been involved in 

terrorist acts. Richard Reid is one of the few Anglo names. He was 

Jamaican and English. You have had the shoe bomber. We had the 

Kenyan. Most of the events start in another country. At one time 

we had—it was a classified number—just a handful of people, looking at people coming into the United States. However, 99.9 percent 

of Americans have never caused a problem. 

54 

Now we are getting to where you are telling the committee that 

we have pre-check for what percentage? 

Mr. HOGGAN. Approximately 35 percent. 

Mr. MICA. It should be 95 or 99 percent. When Mr. Mineta was 

Secretary, we set this up. We set up a system where it was 15 minutes from curb to the plane. At the time, the Administrator was 

Michael Jackson. I am telling you that is the way this should operate. 

If you come to Orlando or Sanford Airport, what is going on is 

almost criminal to American citizens with the way they are treated. You just heard from the Ranking Member. He does not fly as 

much. He just drives across the 14th Street Bridge, but I fly all the 

time. I see what we are doing to Americans who pose no risk. 

Now I see finally the mess we have created, the lanes, you have 

a clear lane, you have a pre-check lane. It used to be you go 

through quickly and now pre-check is almost worse than the other 

lanes. They have known crew member lanes. The poor bastard public is there with their kids. 

The other day I saw them patting down a gentleman and if he 

posed a risk, dear, God. This is the mess we have created along 

with the expensive uniforms, the badges and the intimidation. We 

tried to get this shifted to what we intended, private screening 

under federal supervision, with the Federal Government playing 

the appropriate role, conducting the intelligence, setting the security standards, changing things out. 

You could go down to Orlando and probably let 90 percent of the 

people go through if you had a risk-based system with no hassle 

and screen them. Mr. Pistole has failed to put in place a risk-based 

system. Now you are telling me you are going to have 35 percent 

in pre-check. I can tell you that you are not ready for it out there. 

The other thing I find out talking to the screening people is they 

have been the innovators. I know they are the innovators because 

I watched the transition. Probably some of the things I did to help 

TSA—almost all of the innovations I took from San Francisco and 

some of the other models from the private screeners—but they 

were allowed to innovate to actually process people efficiently and 

effectively. I saw the results. They performed statistically significantly better. 

I know what happens now—this new evaluation, the tip offs and 

all of that stuff to tilt the scales. I followed this from the very beginning but I am telling you that in fact this needs to be converted 

out to a risk-based system. 

The thing I passed three times in law and we put in the FAA 

bill, we tweaked it a little and now they are using it as an excuse 

to further delay, it is over ten years to have identification with a 

biometric measure, a hard copy and a pilot, for example. 

The TWIC card, they wrote us and said they cannot get a reader, 

so we spent $1 billion probably on TWIC cards that you have to 

use a driver’s license. I do not know where we end this. 

I will tell you what is coming. As you heard here today, the frustration is bipartisan. How many people do you have in your SPP 

office now? 

Mr. HOGGAN. I have 10 people right now. 

55 

Mr. MICA. You may need a whole lot more because I think I will 

get the support. I may not get it done this year but I will get it 

done within the next year. Mark my words. It took me a while to 

get the change in the language which you are now slow rolling, but 

I will get the language that within a certain amount of time, you 

get out of the screening business, you set the rules, conduct the audits and so forth. I will get the support to do it one way or the 

other. If you cannot handle it, we will put it in GSA and they will 

handle it as a contracting thing. 

We also need to get you out of the equipment business. You cannot maintain, you cannot acquire the acquisition when you buy the 

puffers and they have to be destroyed so spend a couple million dollars. The back scatter equipment staff, I want to do investigate 

where we are on that. We spent half a billion on that. They have 

been removed. 

You deployed the RF Wave, millimeter wave screening which 

was never supposed to be used as primary screening, never, never. 

You have people up there, little old ladies and people who pose no 

risk and you are using that equipment on them and then patting 

them down. Come on, guys. It is just unbelievable. That was another half a billion dollar acquisition—a quarter of a billion split 

between a couple. It cost half a billion to install because they can 

do it the most expensive way. 

I need to even get you out of that business, acquisition of equipment, acquisition of services because you cannot do it. It is nothing 

against you personally. You have been there eight months. 

Mr. HOGGAN. I have been in this position as Assistant Administrator for Security Operations for eight months. I have been at TSA 

since November 2004. 

Mr. MICA. I am told that the SPP Office is in disarray as far as 

its leadership. 

Mr. HOGGAN. I disagree. 

Mr. MICA. I am just told that people who deal with them cannot 

get an answer and also movement of personnel. 

We have a host of questions, some of them technical in nature. 

I want to know what you have done with these applications, some 

of them approved back in January 2012 for your six airports, two 

approved in June 2012, two in August 2012, one in May 2013 and 

we still do not have these done after we passed the law. 

The slow rolling is not going to work. I am probably going to let 

you stew in your juice a little bit longer but I can tell you that folks 

are getting fed up with the whole thing. There is support for a dramatic redo. 

If we could move people after 9/11 through in 15 minutes, having 

had that risk at that point, here we are 10 or 12 years later, and 

I now aviation is still a target, but we are holding millions of 

Americans hostage and they are not getting proper screening at the 

most efficient and effective cost. 

Take that message back to Mr. Pistole. I will give it to him personally. I do have more questions and we will submit them for the 

record. 

Mr. Connolly, is there anything else? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

56 

Mr. MICA. Do you notice a little frustration? I get frustrated 

sometimes. I think together we can make it work better. I am embarrassed that I created the thing and now it has gone awry at 

great expense and inconvenience. 

Security is incredibly important. We still are at risk and I believe 

they will use aviation again to come after us, but I do not think 

the current structure is geared to deal with that. Everything we 

have done is in reaction. Take off your shoes was the liquids. It is 

all reactive. Pretty soon we will be going through there naked and 

that has to be an ugly sight for some of us. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is when I stop flying, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. I thank Mr. Hoggan, Mr. Bell and Ms. Grover for your 

work and your cooperation. 

There being no further business before the subcommittee, this 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(57) 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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Insert offset folio 31 here 87353.031

Opening Statement of Chairman John Mica 

Subcommittee on Government Operations 

"TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program." 

• Good morning and welcome to today's hearing. I would like to welcome Ranking 

Member Connolly, Members of the Subcommittee, and members of the audience. 

• The Transportation Security Agency, created in 2001 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 

was intended to be a lean security agency with the flexibility to quickly respond and 

adapt to potential threats of terrorism. Instead, TSA has mushroomed into a massive, 

inflexible, backward-looking bureaucracy of more than 65,000. Over its first ten years of 

existence, the agency and its numerous failures have cost taxpayers $57 billion. 

• TSA is a bloated, top-heavy agency in need of reform. Its ranks include approximately 

3,986 headquarters staff in Washington, DC making $103,852 per year on average, and 

9,656 administrators in the field. 

• The agency's primary objectives should be setting security standards, overseeing 

security performance, and analyzing intelligence, but it has become too focused on 

maintaining and growing its own bureaucracy. This is an agency that needs to get out of 

the personnel management business and into the security business. 

• As Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, I conducted extensive 

oversight of TSA operations, including their SPP program. I've continued rigorous 

oversight, as the Chairman of this Subcommittee, with the hopes of increasing efficiency 

and returning TSA to their original mission. 

• In 2011, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee issued a staff report, "TSA 

Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening ModeL" We made a number of important 

findings such as: taxpayers would save $1 billion over five years if the Nation's top 35 

airports operated as efficiently as San Francisco International under the SPP model, 

attrition rates were 5.1% higher at LAX than at SFO, initial hiring and training costs were 

more than $11,000 per employee higher for federal screeners compared to SPP 

screeners and SPP screeners are 65 percent more efficient than federal counterparts. 

• Today, the purpose of the hearing is to continue examining the Screening Partnership 

Program. Prior to the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, TSA was able to 

reject applications from airport operators for the SPP program without even providing 
59 


Insert offset folio 32 here 87353.032

justification. The FAA Modernization Act, however, mandated that a private screening 

company must be considered if it can provide services that are "equal to or better than 

those provided by TSA." This is measured by costs and security. 

• I have some concerns about TSA's cost-efficiency model and how the agency is 

measuring costs to define the threshold private screening companies must meet to 

become accepted into the SPP initiative. 

• Based on the many questions surrounding the Screening Partnership Program, I 

requested documents numerous times in the past year to shed light on the number of 

TSA personnel needed at SPP operated airports and the Cost Efficiency Model used by 

TSA to approve or deny airports into the program. 

• Information and costs regarding the SPP initiative is important to airport operators to 

understand so they can make an informed and effective decision about whether to 

privatize screening at commercial airports. 

• I am troubled by the seemingly large number of TSA staff needed at SPP airports. Unlike 

the TSA, I received information from the Canadian Embassy regarding Canada's Airport 

Screening Privatizing and we found that Canada has generated a model of efficiency 

while maintaining a high level of security at airports in Canada. 

• Specifically, Quebec City Jean lesage International Airport handled approximately 1.2 

million air travelers in 2010, while its ratio of private contract screeners to federal 

administrative personnel was approximately lSO-to-l. By comparison, in the U.S. under 

the SPP, at Sioux Falls Regional Airport (FSD), which handled approximately 700,000 air 

travelers in 2010, the ratio of private contract screeners to federal administrative 

personnel was 3-to-1. 

• Because the SPP is an important program to save tax-payer money, I want to ensure 

that the application and contracting process is a smooth as possible. While some 

airports recently had to wait, in some cases, years to go through the process, it appears 

TSA has recently developed a quicker time frame for approving and issuing RFPs to 

airports that have been approved for the SPP. We will continue to oversee the 

application process. 

2 
60 


Insert offset folio 33 here 87353.033

Questions for Mr. Bell 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Office of the Inspector General 

Questions from Ranking Member Connolly 

Subcommittee on Government Operations 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Hearing on: 

"TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program" 

I. Last June, the Office of Inspector General investigated whether TSA puts undue pressure 

on airport officials to forgo participation in the SPP program. The audit found: 

TSA has not pressured airport officials to not participate in the SPP. [DHS OIG] 

conducted telephone interviews with officials from 24 non-SPP airports, nonc of whom 

said they were pressured by TSA regarding the program. 

Could you please elaborate on that finding? 

Based on our audit work, we concluded that TSA met the requirements for SPP as intended 

under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The Component implemented SPP and 

made the program available to interested airports. 

We randomly selected 24 non-SPP airports to contact, without TSA's involvement, to ensure that 

the Component did not influence our discussions. Through interviews with airport officials, as 

well as review ofSPP documentation, we did not identify anything that indicated TSA pressured 

airport officials about SPP participation. Specifically, we asked officials at the 24 non-SPP 

airports about their knowledge of the program and about their communication with TSA on SPP. 

Airport officials were aware of the program through the aviation industry, media, and TSA's 

website. Five of the 24 airports had communicated directly with TSA about SPP. The 

communication focused on SPP as an option for their location and on the application process. 

We asked the airport officials whether they ever applied for inclusion in SPP and if they had, 

what prevented them from participating in the program. None of the airports had applied. Of the 

24 airports we contacted, 20 reported they were satisfied with TSA screening at their airport, 2 

had no comment or were undecided, I was not interested in SPP, and I planned to apply to the 

program. We also asked the officials if they had suggestions for TSA to promote SPP better. 

Some suggested that TSA should partner with the Airports Council International- North 

America and the American Association of Airport Executives to promote the program. 

We also reviewed documentation from the six airports that applied to participate in SPP and 

were rejected. Four of the six rejected airports subsequently reapplied and were accepted. 

Officials from the two airports that did not reapply said that TSA had not placed undue pressure 

on them about their decision. 

1 
61 


Insert offset folio 34 here 87353.034

2. The report also recommended TSA develop quality assurance procedures to ensure the 

most relevant and accurate information is used when adjudicating SPP decisions. TSA 

concurred with the recommendation and planned a number of corrective actions. What 

plans has TSA made and what is their timeline for implementing those actions? 

TSA's SPP application process is currently under review and will be updated to include quality 

assurance procedures. TSA expects to finalize the updated Screening Partnership Program 

Application Process by June 27, 2014. DHS OIG will review the entire process before closing 

our recommendation. 

Although it is currently updating the process, TSA began working to improve quality assurance 

in application documents early in fiscal year 2013. In March 2013, TSA approved an addendum 

on quality assurance procedures to the Screening Partnership Program Application Process. In 

December 2013, TSA reported that changes in key SPP leadership positions had delayed and 

altered some planned actions. In reviewing the addendum, leadership determined that it was 

more beneficial to incorporate quality assurance procedures into the application process, rather 

than add them as a supplement. 

According to TSA, to improve quality assurance, it has begun printing dates on Independent 

Government Cost Estimates (lGCE) to track changes and versions better over time and to ensure 

the quality of IGCEs. The SPP Program Management Office (PMO) has completed the final 

version of the Federal cost estimating methodology, which will detail how IGCEs arc created 

and how they will be reviewed. The SPP PMO is also finalizing a review process for all 

application documents to ensure they are final and accurate before being used to reach a final 

determination. For all future procurements, 1 week before releasing a Request for Proposals, the 

SPP PMO will formally confirm or revise the TSA "cost efficiency" number. 

On January I, 2013, the TSA Office of Acquisition issued a policy letter on Source Selection 

Authority (SSA) appointment and business processes. The policy letter includes requirements for 

an independent SSA trade-off analysis decision, with a reference to the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Source Selection Guide. In January 2013, the TSA Office of 

Acquisition also issued a policy reminder on source selection procedures. This policy reminder 

reiterates Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements for the SSA to independently 

document its decision, as well as the need for Contracting Officers to review all source selection 

documents in detail. According to TSA, these implemented actions will ensure that SSA 

decisions comply with the FAR and supplemental guidance. 

On March 4, 2013, TSA approved a revised process for documenting SSA decisions on SPP 

participation. The revised process complies with FAR Subpart 15.308 Source selection decision. 

The U.s. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Source Selection Guide also provides 

guidance on specific information to be included in SSA decisions. 

2 
62 


Insert offset folio 35 here 87353.035

Question#: J 

Topic: written testimony 

Hearing: TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program 

Primary: The Honorable Gerry Connolly 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: In your written testimony, stated, "Participation depends on interest from 

airport operators. To date, that interest has been limited." Only 30 airports have applied 

to the program, including the 5 airports originally involved in the pilot program. To what 

do you attribute the lack of interest in the program? 

Response: Because participation in the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) is 

voluntary, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) remains neutral with respect 

to whether airport operators decide to submit an application. Program background details 

and airport application instructions are available on TSA's website; however, to retain a 

neutral posture, TSA has not solicited input from airport operators about why they mayor 

may not have interest in the program. In 2007, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) explored factors that contribute to an airport operator's decision about whether to 

participate in the SPP. The GAO published thcse findings in GAO-09-27R: Aviation 

Security: TSA 's Cost and Peiformance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening. 
63 


Insert offset folio 36 here 87353.036

Question#: 2 

Topic: SPP 

Hearing: TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program 

Primary: The Honorable Gerry Connolly 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: Almost half of the participating airports are small airports located in Montana. 

Why does it seem that Montana airport operators are more interested in SPP than airport 

operators in other states? 

Response: Because participation in the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) is 

voluntary, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) remains neutral with respect 

to whether airport operators decide to submit an application. To retain this neutral 

posture, TSA has not solicited input from airport operators about why they mayor may 

not have interest in the program. Therefore, TSA does not know if Montana airport 

operators are more interested in SPP than airport operators in other states. 
64 


Insert offset folio 37 here 87353.037

Question#: 3 

Topic: GAO I 

Hcaring: TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program 

Primary: The Honorable Gerry Connolly 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: GAO recommended that TSA improve its application process to assist airport 

operators in understanding how their applications will be evaluated. TSA concurred with 

the recommendation and GAO reported that positive changes have been made. What has 

TSA done to make the SPP application process more accessible and transparent to airport 

operators? 

Response: In 2013, in response to the GAO recommendations and the FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act provisions, the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) revised the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) application and updated the 

guidance provided on its website for airport operators interested in participating in the 

program. Specifically, TSA posted an application overview that describes the process, 

provides as many details as possible concerning the data that is used to approve or deny 

an application, and discusses TSA's cost-estimating methodology and TSA's definition 

of cost efficicncy. 
65 


Insert offset folio 38 here 87353.038

Question#: 4 

Topic: GAO 2 

Hearing: TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program 

Primary: The Honorable Gerry Connolly 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: In its 2012 report, GAO stated it was not able to analyze the wait times and 

human capital measures (including attrition, absenteeism, and injury rates) of private and 

federal screener perfonnance because TSA either had not collected data or had not 

collected it in a consistent manner across all airports. Do you agree with the conclusion 

that there is not sufficient data to allow a comparison between federal and private 

screening operations? Does TSA have any plans to collect this data in a consistent 

manner so that comparisons can be made between airports? 

Response: Cost and screening perfonnance are the two areas where the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) compares the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) 

airports and non-SPP airports. Metrics such as attrition, absenteeism, or injury rates are 

not included as gennane to the definitions of either cost or screening perfonnance and, 

thus, are not monitored on a consistent basis. Because SPP contracts are not considered 

personal services contracts, SPP contractors have flexibility about how they manage their 

workforce as long as they meet the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) for screening 

perfonnance outlined in their contract. Airports, including those in the SPP, are required 

to report wait time data that exceeds lO minutes. However, TSA is still working to 

ensure consistency in the collection of that data. Wait time reporting is required in the 

Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) for each SPP contract along with other 

measures of perfonnance such as Threat Image Projection (TIP) detection rate, first time 

certification pass rate, and missed selectee rate. TSA does not collect data that measures 

any element for which the contractors are not legally or contractually liable. TSA 

believes the data that is collected provides a sufficient basis for comparison and does not 

agree with the conclusion drawn in the GAO report that there is insufficient data for 

meaningful comparison. 
66 


Insert offset folio 39 here 87353.039

Question#: 5 

Topic: contracts 

Hearing: TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program 

Primary: The Honorable Gerry Connolly 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: Once a contract has been awarded, what measures does TSA utilize to ensure 

contractors meet federal standards, including those relating to hiring, training, and 

screening procedures? 

Response: The Screening Partnership Program (SPP) contractors must meet contract 

requirements regarding hiring (as related to security vetting), training, and screening 

procedures. Hiring requirements include full security vetting of all contract personnel by 

the Personnel Security Division of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

The same training materials and screening procedures that are provided to federal 

employees are also provided to the SPP contractor for implementation at the local level. 

The SPP also executes a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) for every contract 

that outlines the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) for each metric related to legal or 

contractual compliance. These metrics include training completion and SOP compliance 

and are monitored by TSA monthly to ensure contractors continually meet federal 

standards. 
67 


Insert offset folio 40 here 87353.040

Question#: 6 

Topic: TWIC 

Hearing: TSA Oversight: Examining the Screening Partnership Program 

Primary: The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: The Coast Guard Authorization Act of2012 required the TSA to implement a 

program within 270 days of enactment to enable individuals to obtain a TWIC card with 

only one visit to a TWIC enrollment center. 

I understand TSA has implemented a pilot OneVisit program in two states. How is the 

pilot progressing and what lessons have been learned from it? 

Response: In June 2013, TSA launched Phase I of the OneVisit pilot in all nine 

enrollment sites in Alaska. In December 2013, Phase II of One Visit was initiated in five 

enrollment sites in Michigan. As of mid-February 2014, there were a total of2,279 

Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC) program enrollments at those 

enrollment sites. Of that number, 1,517 workers requested that their credential be sent to 

a mailing address, resulting in approximately 66 percent of the total enrollments 

requesting the OneVisit option. The primary lessons learned are that verifying the 

address provided by the applicant as a valid postal address before mailing has resulted in 

very few cards or personal identification number (PIN) mailers being returned. The pilot 

also confirmed as a lesson learned that a manual solution was highly labor intensive and 

as currently planned, an automated solution must be used for the nationwide rollout. 

Question: What is the average length of time it takes an individual to receive a TWIC 

card after the person completes the enrollment process at an enrollmcnt center? 

Response: The average wait timc for a TWIC is 5 to 7 days if there is no potentially 

disqualifying information associated with the applicant. For OneVisit enrollment, cards 

are received at the requested mailing address within 5-10 days whieh ineludes a typical 2-

day mailing period. 

Question: How will the OneVisit program be expanded will it be introduced slowly in 

additional states or simply rolled-out nationwide? 

Response: The nation-wide OneVisit rollout will begin in mid-May 2014 and will be 

implemented on an incremental basis over a three month period. 

Question: When will expansions occur and by what date will the program be 

implemented in all states? 
68 

Æ 


Insert offset folio 41 here 87353.041

Question#: 6 

Topic: TWIC 

Hearing: TSA Owrsighl: Examining the Screening Partnership Program 

Primary: The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Response: The nation-wide rollout will begin in Mid-May 2014. It is anticipated that the 

national rollout for OneVisit will be fully implemented in July 2014.