alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
www.gpo.gov

### §§531 to 535. Repealed. Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, §12, 68 Stat. 721

Sections 531 to 535, act Aug. 28, 1937, ch. 874, §§2–6, 50 Stat. 872, 873, related to revolving loan fund. See section 564 et seq. of this title.

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Section 12 of act Aug. 13, 1954, provided that the repeal is effective on the date of the transfer of title to tribal property to a trustee, corporation, or other legal entity pursuant to section 564e of this title.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Joseph R. Benfante, on Behalf of James Russell, Petitioner, v Warden of Rikers Island Detention Facility, Respondent.

[803 NYS2d 443]

Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application for bail reduction upon Richmond County indictment No. 163/05.

Adjudged that the writ is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

The determination of the Supreme Court, Kings County, was not an improvident exercise of discretion, and did not violate “constitutional or statutory standards” *(People ex rel. Klein v Krueger,*25 NY2d 497, 499 [1969]; *see People ex rel. Rosenthal v Wolfson,*48 NY2d 230 [1979]). Crane, J.P. Mastro, Rivera and Spolzino, JJ., concur.
Order: 2014-1-18

Served January 28, 2014

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Issued by the Department of Transportation

on the 28th day of January, 2014

Essential Air Service at

KINGMAN, ARIZONA

Under 49 U.S.C. 41731 et seq. 

DOCKET DOT-OST-1996-1899

 

ORDER APPROVING ALTERNATE SERVICE PATTERN

Summary

By this Order, the Department is approving the request of Great Lakes Aviation, Ltd. (Great 

Lakes) to change part of its service pattern at Kingman, Arizona, to include the option of onestop service to Denver International Airport (Denver) via Telluride, Colorado, effective 

January 31, 2014.

Background

By Order 2013-3-4, (June 3, 2013), the Department re-selected Great Lakes to provide 

subsidized Essential Air Service (EAS) at Kingman for the two-year period through

April 30, 2015. That Order established an annual subsidy rate of $1,635,180 for service 

consisting of 12 weekly nonstop round trips to either Los Angeles International Airport (Los 

Angeles) or Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (Phoenix).

Airline Proposal

As a result of the severe pilot shortage at Great Lakes, the airline has requested that the 

Department allow them the option to serve Kingman from its Denver hub, effective 

January 31, 2014.

Community Comments

David C. French, Executive Director of Kingman Airport Authority, submitted comments on 

January 21, 2014, stating that he concurred with Great Lakes’ request to include Denver as a 

hub from which to serve Kingman.
- 2 -

Decision

We will approve Great Lakes’ request, which meets the three conditions necessary for approval 

under authority assigned under 14 CFR Part 385.12(k)(3) of the Department’s Regulations: (1) 

the alternate service pattern is equal or greater than that determined to be essential; (2) the 

community does not object to the alternate service pattern; and (3) the alternate service pattern 

will not increase Great Lakes’ subsidy.

This Order is issued under authority delegated in 14 CFR Part 385.12k(3).

ACCORDINGLY,

1. We hereby approve the alternate service pattern requested by Great Lakes Aviation, Ltd., to 

serve Kingman, Arizona, from the hubs of Denver (via Telluride, Colorado), Los Angeles, and 

Phoenix effective January 31, 2014 through April 30, 2015;

2. This docket will remain open until further order of the Department; and

3. The Department will serve a copy of this Order on the Mayor and the Executive Director of 

Kingman Airport Authority, and Great Lakes Aviation, Ltd.

Persons entitled to petition the Department for review of this Order under the Department’s 

Regulations, 14 CFR Part 385.31(a), must file such petitions within seven (7) days after the 

date of service of this Order.

This Order will be effective immediately, and the filing of a petition for review shall not 

preclude its effectiveness.

By:

TODD M. HOMAN

Director

Office of Aviation Analysis

(SEAL)
Video: Multiflume runoff event August 1, 1990

This video is available at the following website: 

http://www.tucson.ars.ag.gov/unit/WGWebcam/WalnutGulchWebcam.htm. The direct link to 

the video is: http://www.tucson.ars.ag.gov/unit/Movies/Aug_1_1990_with_animation.wmv. This 

document can also be viewed at the USEPA Docket Center, Public Reading Room. Address: 

USEPA West, 1301 Constitution Ave. NW, Room 3334, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone: 

202-566-1744; Email: docket-customerservice@epa.gov.
N OTE : This o rder is non precedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ ALFRED CLEMMONS, Claimant

- Appellant

,

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERAN S AFFAIRS, Respondent

- Appellee

.

______________________

2014

- 7041

______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 08

- 3584, Judge William P. Greene, Jr.

______________________

ON MOTION

______________________

Before P ROST , O'M ALLEY , and T ARANTO , Circuit Judge s

.

P ER C URIAM

. O R D E R
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves to dismiss this appeal as untimely. The appellant has not respon ded. Case: 14-7041 Document: 4 Page: 1 Filed: 03/27/2014CLEMMONS v. SHINSEKI 2

On July 8, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ( “V eterans Court ” ) entered judgment in Alfred Clemmons’s case. The Veterans Court received Clemmons ’s notice of appeal on January 2, 2014

, more than 3 years after the date of judgment. To be timely, a notice of appeal must be received by the Veterans Court within 60 days of the entry of jud gment. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Like appeals from district courts, the statutorily prescribed time for filing ap peals from the Veterans Court to this court is mandatory and jurisdi ctional. See Wagner v. Shinseki , 733 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Henderson v. Shinseki , 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1204

- 05 (2011) (indicating jurisdictional restrictions on the time for taking an appeal under section 7292(a)). Accordingly, even in circumstances in which it would be equitable to do so, this court is without author ity to waive the deadline for filing an appeal to this court from the Veterans Court. See Bowles v. Russe ll , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

Because Clemmons ’s appeal was filed outside of the statutory deadline for taking an appeal to this court, we must dismiss the appeal

. Accordingly,

I T I S O RDERED T HAT : (1) The motion is granted

. The appeal is dismissed

. (2) Each side shall bear its own costs

.
F OR T HE C OURT /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole Daniel E. O’Toole Clerk

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: March 27, 2014

s25 Case: 14-7041 Document: 4 Page: 2 Filed: 03/27/2014
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1059

To require the Secretary of Agriculture to extend a nutrition assistance

program to American Samoa, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 27, 1995

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Agriculture

A BILL

To require the Secretary of Agriculture to extend a nutrition

assistance program to American Samoa, and for other

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PRO4 GRAM TO AMERICAN SAMOA.

5 The first sentence of section 601(c) of Public Law

6 96–597 (48 U.S.C. 1469d(c)) is amended by inserting be7 fore the period at the end the following: ‘‘, and the Sec8 retary of Agriculture shall extend a nutrition assistance
2

HR 1059 IH

1 program conducted under the Food Stamp Act of 1977

2 (7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) to American Samoa’’.

Æ
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-20395 

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BOBBY JOE BURTON, JR,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CR-36-3

- - - - - - - - - -

December 11, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Bobby Joe Burton, Jr., appeals his sentence on remand from a

jury trial and conviction for various drug trafficking offenses. 

Burton argues that (1) the indictment failed to allege a drug

quantity in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000); (2) 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) is unconstitutional; (3) the

sentence enhancement based on a prior felony drug conviction

violated Apprendi because the prior felony was not alleged in the

indictment; and (4) the sentence under the guidelines violated

Apprendi because the indictment did not allege a leadership role.
No. 01-20395

-2-

Although Burton’s indictment did not allege a drug quantity

or leadership role, he was not sentenced in excess of the 30-year 

statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Consequently,

there was no Apprendi violation. United States v. Doggett, 230

F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1152

(2001); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1163 (2001). Apprendi does not

invalidate a court’s factual findings for purposes of determining

the applicable Sentencing Guidelines. Id. Likewise, the

indictment need not allege a prior felony conviction under

Apprendi. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,

235 (1998); see also United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000)(noting that the Supreme Court in Apprendi

expressly declined to overrule Almendarez-Torres), cert. denied,

121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). The constitutionality of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b) has been upheld by this court. See United States v.

Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2015

(2001). Accordingly, Burton’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
#### § 521.106 Control of a domestic enterprise by a Danish enterprise.

Article IV of the convention provides, in effect, that if a Danish corporation by reason of its control of a domestic enterprise imposes on such later enterprise conditions different from those which would result from normal business relations between independent enterprises, the accounts between the enterprises may be adjusted so as to ascertain the true net income of each enterprise. The purpose is to place the controlled domestic enterprise on a tax parity with an uncontrolled domestic enterprise by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled enterprise, the true net income from the property and business of the controlled enterprise. The basic objective of the article is that if the accounting records do not truly reflect the net income from the property and business of such domestic enterprise the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may intervene and, by making such distributions, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem necessary of gross income or deductions of any item or element affecting net income as between such domestic enterprise and the Danish enterprise by which it is controlled or directed, determine the true net income of the domestic enterprise. The provisions of § 29.45-1 of Regulations 111 (26 CFR 1949 ed. Supps. 29.45-1) [and § 39.45-1 of Regulations 118 (26 CFR, Rev. 1953, Parts 1-79, and Supps.)] shall, insofar as applicable, be followed in the determination of the net income of the domestic business.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Donnell L. Pinkard, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 484]

Appeal from a *1116judgment of the Genesee County Court (Robert C. Noonan, J.), rendered August 16, 2001. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, attempted assault in the first degree and attempted aggravated assault on a police officer.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [1] [c]), grand larceny in the third degree (§ 155.35), attempted assault in the first degree (§§ 110.00, 120.10 [1]) and attempted aggravated assault on a police officer (§§ 110.00, 120.11). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention concerning the alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence with respect to the conviction of grand larceny *(see People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]), and we conclude with respect to the remaining counts that the conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence *(see generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Also contrary to defendant’s contentions, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally id.),*and the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contention and conclude that it is without merit. Present—Kehoe, J.P., Martoche, Pine, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
#### Barbara Wright, Respondent, v C.H. Martin of White Plains Road, Inc., et al., Defendants, Emil Mosbacher Real Estate, LLC, Appellant, and City of New York, Respondent.

[808 NYS2d 21]

*296Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling-Cohan, J.), entered December 7, 2004, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained in a trip and fall on the sidewalk in front of premises allegedly owned by defendant-appellant, denied appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, and order, same court and Justice, entered July 6, 2005, which, insofar as appealable, denied appellant’s motion to renew, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The only evidence appellant initially adduced to support its claim that it did not own the subject premises at the time of the accident is the deposition testimony of its officer that neither appellant nor any of its related companies has had anything to do with the premises since 1981, when it was sold by one such related company. Absent from the submission were copies of any deeds, including that from the related company conveying the premises in 1981, or even that showing the current title. Such lack of evidence normally adduced to prove title required denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Appellant’s motion to renew, consisting of deeds purporting to show the premises’ complete title history and an affidavit of its officer attributing certain inconsistencies in the deeds to scrivener errors, was properly denied for failure to show that the new evidence could not with due diligence have been presented on the original motion *(see Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y. v City of New York,*280 AD2d 374, 377 [2001]; *William P. Pahl Equip. Corp. v Kassis,*182 AD2d 22, 27 [1992], *lv dismissed in part and denied in part*80 NY2d 1005 [1992]). In any event, even considering the new evidence on the renewal motion, the deeds raise issues of fact as to appellant’s ownership at the time of the accident. We have considered appellant’s other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Marlow, Ellerin, Gonzalez and McGuire, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Gene Lopresti, Appellant, v Washington Mills et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[803 NYS2d 317]

Kane, J.

Appeal from an amended decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed April 26, 2004, which ruled that claimant violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a and was disqualified from receiving wage replacement benefits.

Claimant injured his knee during an altercation with a *726coworker which occurred at the conclusion of his shift on the employer’s premises. Claimant initially reported to his employer and two physicians that he sustained the injury when he slipped and fell on ice on the premises of the employer. However, claimant soon admitted that he had fabricated that explanation and provided an accurate explanation of how he had sustained the injury. After a hearing, a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge determined that claimant had sustained a compensable injury, had not violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a and was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Upon review, the Workers’ Compensation Board modified the decision, finding that claimant had violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a and was therefore disqualified from receiving wage replacement benefits. Claimant now appeals.

The Board’s determination as to whether a claimant has violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record *(see Matter of McCormack v Eastport Manor Constr.,*19 AD3d 826, 828 [2005]; *Matter of Amster v New York City Sheriffs Off.,*17 AD3d 789, 790 [2005]; *Matter of Michaels v Towne Ford,*9 AD3d 733, 734 [2004]). Additionally, a claimant’s false statement need not affect the compensability of the injury to be material and thus constitute a violation under Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a; rather, it need only be significant to the existence of his or her claim *(see Matter of Losurdo v Asbestos Free,*1 NY3d 258, 265 [2003]). It is undisputed that claimant knowingly made a false statement in connection with his claim and only admitted the truth upon his coworker’s refusal to participate in the deception. Claimant’s testimony that his motivation for lying was to protect his coworker from reprimand rather than to protect himself or ensure his receipt of workers’ compensation benefits presented a credibility issue which the Board was free to decide against him *(see Matter of Amster v New York City Sheriffs Off., supra*at 790; *Matter of Michaels v Towne Ford, supra*at 734). Inasmuch as the Board provided sufficient explanation for its decision to disqualify claimant from wage replacement benefits, we will not disturb its imposition of this discretionary penalty specifically authorized by the statute *(see Matter of Losurdo v Asbestos Free, supra*at 266-267; *Matter of Dieter v Trigen-Cinergy Solutions of Rochester,*14 AD3d 748, 749 [2005], *lv dismissed*4 NY3d 881 [2005]; *Matter of Phelps v Phelps,*277 AD2d 736, 739-740 [2000]).

Cardona, P.J., Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the amended decision is affirmed, without costs.
(November 29, 2005)

#### In the Matter of HSBC Bank USA, National Association, Respondent, v The National Equity Corp. et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent.

[804 NYS2d 311]

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Karla Moskowitz, J.), entered October 7, 2004, inter alia, confirming an arbitration award in favor of petitioner bank and against respondents-appellants borrowers and guarantors, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The arbitrators’ refusal to adjourn the hearing, which had already taken four years as a result of adjournments granted respondents to abide certain criminal prosecutions, did not foreclose the presentation of pertinent and material evidence and did not otherwise constitute misconduct within the meaning of CPLR 7511 (b) (1) (i) *(see Matter of Bevona [Superior Maintenance Co.],*204 AD2d 136, 139 [1994]). The only showing made by respondents, who factored loans to garment industry businesses with funds borrowed from petitioner, was that petitioner’s branch manager accepted bribes from respondents’ customers to wrongfully allow overdrafts. There was no proffer that the manager was complicit in the false invoicing by respondents or their customers that caused the loan defaults petitioner seeks to recover, or that petitioner was negligent in failing to supervise the extension of loans based on such invoicing. Thus, the foreclosed evidence could not have changed the result. As the application court correctly discerned from the language of the *306interim award, the arbitrators properly determined other issues without a hearing. We have considered respondents’ other contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Ellerin and McGuire, JJ.
§ 50.7 Returns. ( a ) *Form of return.* Every person liable for tax for any taxable year shall prepare for such year a return on Form 1 (California Debris) in accordance with the instructions thereon and in accordance with the regulations in this part.
( b ) *Content of return.* The return shall show: ( 1 ) The identity of the particular dam or other works restraining debris from the mine;
( 2 ) The name and location of the mine;
( 3 ) The name and address of the person to whom the California Debris Commission has issued a license to operate the mine;
( 4 ) The number and date of the license;
( 5 ) The name and address of the owner of the mine;
( 6 ) The dates on which hydraulic mining operations began and ended during the taxable year for which the return is made;
( 7 ) The number of cubic yards mined by the hydraulic process at the mine during the taxable year;
( 8 ) The rate of tax per cubic yard determined by the California Debris Commission applicable to the particular mine; and
( 9 ) The amount of tax due and payable (cubic yards mined multiplied by the rate of tax per cubic yard).
( c ) *Supporting statement.* With each return there must be submitted a supporting statement of the person who made the surveys at the mine for the mining season covered by the return (see § 50.6), stating that such surveys were made in accordance with requirements prescribed by the California Debris Commission.
( d ) *Verification of return and supporting statement.* The return and the supporting statement shall be verified by written declarations that they are made under the penalties of perjury.
#### Maria Valdez, Respondent, v Aramark Services, Inc., et al., Appellants.

[804 NYS2d 811]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated February 18, 2005, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it *(see Britto v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc.,*21 AD3d 436 [2005]; *Joachim v 1824 Church Ave., Inc.,*12 AD3d 409 [2004]). Only after the moving defendant has satisfied this threshold burden will the court examine the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851 [1985]; *Fox v Kamal Corp.,*271 AD2d 485 [2000]). This burden cannot be satisfied by merely pointing out gaps in the plaintiffs case *(see Nationwide Prop. Cas. v Nestor,*6 AD3d 409 [2004]; *Dalton v Educational Testing Serv.,*294 AD2d 462 [2002]).

Here, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The defendants failed to submit evidence sufficient to satisfy their initial burden, and a triable issue of fact exists as to whether they had constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition on the floor which caused the plaintiff to fall *(see Britto v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., supra; Joachim v 1824 Church Ave., Inc., supra).*Adams, J.P., S. Miller, Ritter and Lifson, JJ., concur.