[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12660

____________________

MICHAEL GULISANO, 

Interested Party-Appellant,

CATHY COHEN,

Plaintiff,

versus

BURLINGTON, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-81420-BB

____________________

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

When attorney Michael Gulisano represented a client in a 

negligence action in the Southern District of Florida, he obtained a 

default judgment against a non-existent entity, “Burlington, Inc.”

He added an unrelated entity, Burlington Coat Factory Direct Corporation, as a judgment debtor on the resulting writ of execution. 

He used the writ of execution to levy funds from another entity, 

Burlington Stores, Inc. After Burlington Stores, Inc. and Burlington 

Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation protested and sought to 

quash the writ, Gulisano asked the district court in the Southern 

District of Florida to amend its default judgment order and name 

Burlington Stores, Inc. and Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse 

Corporation as judgment debtors. The district court denied the 

motion and, finding it to be legally and factually frivolous, imposed 

sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. It also denied 

Gulisano’s motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order. After 

careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

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I. FACTS1 

While Cathy Cohen was shopping at a Burlington Coat Factory store in Royal Palm Beach, Florida, she looked at a set of tables 

on display. When Cohen attempted to inspect the tables, they fell 

on her knee. Cohen jumped back to avoid the falling tables, injuring her neck and back. 

Cohen hired Gulisano as her attorney. He filed a civil action 

on her behalf in federal court in the Southern District of Florida. 

The complaint Gulisano drafted alleged that defendant “Burlington, Inc.”2 had been negligent and was liable for damagesto Cohen.

Gulisano served a summons and a copy of the complaint on CT 

Corporation System, ostensibly the registered agent of “Burlington, Inc.” After “Burlington, Inc.” failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the lawsuit, the district court clerk entered a default. Following a hearing on damages, the district court entered a 

default judgment, awarding Cohen $677,774.75. The district 

court’s final judgment named “Burlington, Inc.” as the sole defendant.

To collect on the default judgment, Gulisano requested that 

the court issue a writ of execution naming “Burlington, Inc. a/k/a 

1 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the facts necessary to explain our decision. 

2 Gulisano referred to the defendant as both “Burlington Inc.” and “Burlington, Inc.” For the sake of consistency, this opinion will use “Burlington, Inc.”

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Burlington Coat Factory Direct Corporation” as the judgment 

debtor. The court issued the writ. 

Seeking to execute the writ, Gulisano used employer identification numbers (“EIN”)3 to perform an asset search to find bank 

accounts from which he could levy funds. But, instead of using the 

EIN number of the judgment debtor, “Burlington, Inc.”—which 

did not exist—he used the EIN numbers of two other entities: Burlington Stores, Inc. (“BSI”) and Burlington Coat Factory Direct 

Corporation (“BCFDC”). BSI is the parent company of the entities 

that operate Burlington Coat Factory stores, including BCFDC and

Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation (“BCFWC”), 

which operates the Florida stores. After locating bank accounts in 

New Jersey that belonged to BSI, Gulisano registered the judgment

in the District of New Jersey. The New Jersey district court then

issued a writ of execution against “Burlington, Inc.” The United 

States Marshals Service delivered the writ to BSI’s bank. The bank 

withdrew the amount of the judgment award, plus costs, from 

BSI’s account. 

Once they discovered the withdrawal, BSI and BCFWC filed 

a motion in the New Jersey district court to vacate the levy, quash 

the writ of execution, and vacate the default judgment. They

pointed out that the writ of execution was based on a default 

3 An EIN number is the nine-digit tracking number that the Internal Revenue 

Service assigns to the tax accounts of businesses.

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judgment entered against “Burlington, Inc.,” but the judgment was 

levied on BSI, an unrelated entity not named in the Florida action. 

Gulisano opposed the motion. He asserted that “Burlington, 

Inc.” was a registered fictitious name or a misnomer that was similar enough to the correct name that it gave BSI and BCFWC—

which he collectively referred to as “Burlington”—notice of the action. 

The day after he filed his response in the New Jersey district 

court, Gulisano filed in the Florida district court a “Motion to 

Amend Final Default Judgment to Remove Any Ambiguity of the 

Correct Defendant’s Identity.” In this motion, Gulisano asked the 

district court to amend the default judgment so that all references 

to the defendant “Burlington, Inc.” would become “Burlington, 

Inc. a/k/a Burlington Stores, Inc. a/k/a Burlington Coat Factory 

Warehouse Corporation.” Doc. 33 at 6 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).4 Gulisano requested this change in order to “remove any 

alleged ambiguity that ‘Burlington, Inc.’ is not the same entity as”

BSI and BCFWC. Id. (emphasis in original). He contended that 

“Burlington, Inc.” properly referred to BSI and BCFWC because 

the company went by multiple names, all of which included the 

word “Burlington.” He argued that BSI and BCFWC were the 

same entity, operating under the fictitious name “Burlington, Inc.”

He also argued that he had served “Burlington” via its registered 

4 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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agent, and that service on “Burlington, Inc.” was effective service 

on BSI. 

BSI and BCFWC opposed the motion to amend. They

acknowledged that there were multiple entities that together 

owned and operated the retail stores known as Burlington Coat 

Factory, but stated that “Burlington, Inc.” was not one of those entities. Nor was it a fictitious name for BSI or another Burlington 

Coat Factory entity. Therefore, they argued, the judgment against 

“Burlington, Inc.,” a completely unrelated entity, was improperly 

levied on BSI. Noting that the New Jersey district court had granted 

their motion to quash the writ of execution, BSI and BCFWC asked 

the Florida district court to deny the motion to amend the judgment. 

In the Florida district court, BSI and BCFWC also moved for 

sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, asserting that 

the motion to amend was frivolous because Gulisano could not 

have reasonably believed that BSI and BCFWC used the fictitious 

name “Burlington, Inc.” They also asserted that Gulisano had misrepresented to the court that effective service had been made on 

“Burlington, Inc.” 

The district court denied the motion to amend. It observed 

that, although Gulisano now argued that he had sued BSI and 

BCFWC under their purported fictitious name, the complaint had 

not alleged that the defendant used a fictitious name. And, despite 

many opportunities, Gulisano never sought to amend the complaint to add that allegation, nor did he attempt to voluntarily 

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dismiss the action without prejudice and initiate a new action 

against the intended entities. The district court found no support 

for his claims that “Burlington, Inc.” was the same entity as or the 

fictitious name of BSI or BCFWC: “Appallingly, the Court has not 

identified a single piece of evidence . . . that substantiates the use of 

‘Burlington, Inc.’ as the proper entity to be named in this action, 

either as a fictitious name or as a company authorized to conduct 

business in Florida.” Doc. 50 at 9. The court observed that Gulisano’s motion to amend failed to explain why the default judgment 

named “Burlington, Inc.” but the writ of execution named BCFDC. 

It concluded, “Like the motion for writ of execution, it is clear that 

the instant Motion to Amend Judgment is a back-door attempt to 

correct an improperly named party and recover a $677,774.75 default judgment plus costs from the intended, but unnamed, entities 

without having to litigate the matter any further.” Id. at 11. 

In the same order, the court granted the motion for sanctions. It found that Gulisano had “add[ed] an independent and distinct legal entity to a motion for writ of execution that was neither 

referenced at any point in the litigation nor explicitly listed in the 

Court’s Final Judgment” and had “attempt[ed] to conflate various 

distinct corporate entities in order to recover an award of damages 

obtained through a default judgment against a non-existent corporate entity.” Id. at 13–14. The court found this conduct to be “both 

frivolous and dishonest.” Id. at 13. It stated that a brief investigation 

would have revealed the proper entities to sue, but Gulisano’s presuit investigation was “woefully deficient,” and his post-judgment 

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investigation was done in bad faith. Id. at 14. Because of his “serious 

fraudulent conduct,” the court granted the motion for Rule 11 

sanctions against Gulisano. Id. at 18. It ordered him to pay attorney’s fees and costs and referred him to the Florida Bar for appropriate disciplinary action. 

Gulisano filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 a 

motion for reconsideration of the court’s order imposing sanctions. 

After a hearing, the court denied his motion, concluding that it

merely disagreed with the court’s reasoning and failed to establish

a clear error of law or manifest injustice. It ordered him to pay 

$19,549.12 in sanctions. 

Gulisano filed this appeal of the order granting sanctions and 

the order denying reconsideration.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review a district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions 

for abuse of discretion. Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 

1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003). We must affirm unless we find that the 

court applied the wrong legal standard or based its ruling on a 

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Jones v. Int’l Riding 

Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 694 (11th Cir. 1995).

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of 

a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59. Am. Home Assurance 

Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1238–39 (11th 

Cir. 1985).

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III. ANALYSIS 

There are two issues before us on appeal: (1) whether the 

district court abused its discretion in granting BSI and BCFWC’s 

motion for sanctions, and (2) whether the district court abused its 

discretion when it denied Gulisano’s motion for reconsideration of 

the sanctions order. We see no abuse of discretion in the first issue 

and deem the second issue abandoned.

A. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Imposing 

Sanctions on Gulisano. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 authorizes a district court 

to impose sanctions against an attorney who files frivolous pleadings or motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), (c).5 Rule 11 sanctions are 

5 Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:

(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 

advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of 

the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 

law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 

further investigation or discovery; and 

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warranted when a party files a pleading or motion that “(1) has no 

reasonable factual basis; (2) is based on a legal theory that has no 

reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law; and (3) is filed in bad faith 

for an improper purpose.” Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 

1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Rule 11 imposes an affirmative duty on an attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into both the facts and the law before 

filing a pleading or motion. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 

Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991); Mike Ousley 

Prods., Inc. v. WJBF-TV, 952 F.2d 380, 382 (11th Cir. 1992). When 

deciding whether to impose sanctions under Rule 11, a district 

court must conduct a two-step inquiry, determining “(1) whether 

the party’s claims are objectively frivolous; and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been aware that they 

were frivolous.” Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 

1998). A factual claim is frivolous when it has no reasonable factual 

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

(c) Sanctions.

(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 

court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an 

appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule 

or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law 

firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, 

associate, or employee.

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basis. See id. A legal claim is frivolous when it has no reasonable 

chance of succeeding. See id. When the attorney’s evidence is 

“merely weak,” but supports a claim under existing law after a reasonable inquiry, sanctions are unwarranted. Id. Sanctions are warranted, however, when the attorney exhibits “a deliberate indifference to obvious facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

If the attorney failed to make a reasonable inquiry, then “the 

court must impose sanctions despite the attorney’s good faith belief that the claims were sound.” Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. 

McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996). The reasonableness 

of the inquiry depends on the circumstances of the case. See id.

In addition, an attorney’s obligations with respect to the 

contents of pleadings or motions are not measured solely as of the 

time when the pleading or motion is initially filed with the court, 

but also at the time when the attorney, having learned the claims 

lack merit, reaffirms them to the court. Turner v. Sungard Bus. 

Sys., Inc., 91 F.3d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(b) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment). “That the 

contentions contained in the complaint were not frivolous at the 

time it was filed does not prevent the district court from sanctioning [the attorney] for his continued advocacy of them after it should 

have been clear that those contentions were no longer tenable.” Id.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Gulisano’s claim that the default judgment against 

“Burlington, Inc.” allowed him to collect damages from BSI and

BCFWC was objectively frivolous. That claim was undergirded by 

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two arguments. First, Gulisano argued that “Burlington, Inc.” was 

the fictitious name of BSI and BCFWC. That argument was frivolous because there were no facts to support it. Second, he argued 

that a judgment entered against a corporation’s fictitious name 

could bind multiple distinct corporate entities. That argument was 

frivolous because it ignored basic principles of corporations law. 

First, there was no factual support for Gulisano’s claim that 

“Burlington, Inc.” was the fictitious name of BSI and BCFWC. It is 

true that Gulisano attached hundreds of pages to the motion to 

amend to illustrate that BSI used the name “Burlington,” including 

pictures from the website, pictures of the interiors of Burlington 

stores, the federal trademark registration of the Burlington logo, 

and BSI’s SEC 10-K Form. But he presented no evidence that BSI 

or any other Burlington entity used the name “Burlington, Inc.” 

Nor did he show that “Burlington, Inc.” was a corporate entity in 

Florida or anywhere else. Eventually Gulisano admitted to the district court that “Burlington, Inc.” did not exist. 

Nor was “Burlington, Inc.” a fictitious name. In Florida, a 

corporation engaging in business under a fictitious name must first 

register the name with the State. Fla. Stat. § 865.09(3)(a). State records show that “Burlington, Inc.” was not a registered fictitious 

name. BSI stated that neither it nor any other Burlington entity 

used the name. Gulisano provided evidence that BCFWC applied 

for two fictitious names in Florida, “Burlington” and “Burlington 

Coat Factory.” But he produced no evidence revealing use or registration of the fictitious name “Burlington, Inc.” Without this 

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evidence, he failed to support the factual contention made in the 

motion to amend that he had sued BSI and BCFWC under their 

fictitious name. 

Second, there was no legal support for Gulisano’s argument 

that his judgment against “Burlington, Inc.” entitled him to collect 

monies from BSI or BCFWC. In Florida, a corporation must be

sued under its corporate name. RHPC, Inc. v. Gardner, 533 So. 2d 

312, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). A corporation operating under 

a fictitious name has no independent legal existence. Osmo Tec 

SACV Co. v. Crane Env’t, Inc., 884 So. 2d 324, 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 2004). “In pleadings, the corporate name must be strictly 

used.” RHPC, Inc., 533 So. 2d at 314. The district court explained 

that, when suing an entity under its fictitious name, the plaintiff 

should state the entity’s true name, the designation “d/b/a” or “doing business as,” and the fictitious name. Thus, even if “Burlington, 

Inc.” had been the registered fictitious name of BSI or BCFWC, 

Gulisano should have included those proper corporate names in 

the complaint. He failed to do so. Instead, he named only “Burlington, Inc.” without including a d/b/a designation. 

The district court denied the motion to amend and rejected 

Gulisano’s argument that “Burlington, Inc.” was a fictitious name. 

On appeal, Gulisano argues that “Burlington, Inc.” was a typographical error—he had accidentally omitted “Stores” from the 

party’s name on the complaint and repeated the error throughout 

the suit. It hardly matters whether Gulisano intentionally chose to 

use a fictitious name or inadvertently repeated a mistake. He tried

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to use a judgment against a non-existent party to collect from an 

unrelated non-party and persisted in his attempts well past the time 

when he learned of his error. We agree with the district court’s 

conclusion that “the factual and legal contentions asserted [in the 

motion were] objectively frivolous.” Doc 50. at 14.6

We turn now to the question whether Gulisano should have 

known that his arguments were legally and factually frivolous. Our 

answer is yes. Gulisano should have known that the motion to 

amend was frivolous because “even the most minimal investigation would have alerted” him that there was no such entity as “Burlington, Inc.” McGreal, 87 F.3d at 1255. The district court found 

that a search of registered corporations in Florida would have revealed proper Burlington Coat Factory entities that he could have 

sued. And we know that Gulisano could have performed such an 

investigation because, after obtaining the default judgment against 

“Burlington, Inc.,” he used the EIN numbers of BSI and BCFDC to 

locate their assets. He failed to mention whether he performed an 

asset search on “Burlington, Inc.” or what, if anything, he found. 

That he had to identify other entities from which to collect the 

6 Gulisano said that he effected service on BSI through its registered agent. 

The agent said that it sent Gulisano a letter rejecting service on “Burlington, 

Inc.” Gulisano said that he never saw the letter. BSI and BCFWC said that 

neither BSI, nor any related entity, ever received notice of the complaint. The 

district court explicitly declined to resolve or rely on the notice issue. Because

we, like the district court, need not resolve the issue to decide that sanctions 

were warranted, we do not address it further.

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judgment should have informed him that the named judgment 

debtor did not exist.

Even if Gulisano had failed to discover that “Burlington, 

Inc.” was non-existent and unrelated to the other Burlington entities, he learned these facts from BSI and BCFWC’s motion to quash 

the writ and opposition to the motion to amend. Though BSI and 

BCFWC had “alerted [him] to the potential impropriety of his collection efforts,” Gulisano persisted in claiming that he could collect 

the award from BSI, BCFWC, or BCFDC, despite failing to name

any of them as parties to the default judgment. Doc. 50 at 15. The 

district court properly concluded, “[I]t is abundantly clear that Mr. 

Gulisano should have known, and seemingly did know, that the 

claims he asserted during these proceedings were objectively and 

patently frivolous.” Id. at 15. Gulisano violated his duty of candor 

by “insisting upon a position after it [was] no longer tenable.” Peer 

v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). And, because “[a] finding of bad faith is warranted 

where . . . a frivolous argument is knowingly or recklessly raised,”

the district court correctly determined that Gulisano acted in bad 

faith. Johnson, 9 F.4th at 1314 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus conclude that the district court acted 

well within its discretion in imposing sanctions on Gulisano.

Gulisano’s arguments against the sanctions order are unpersuasive. He asserts that the court improperly punished his conduct 

throughout the litigation rather than looking solely at the challenged motion. But to determine whether the motion to amend 

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judgment warranted sanctions, the court had to examine whether 

Gulisano conducted a reasonable inquiry before filing the motion. 

It thus was required to look beyond the four corners of the motion 

to the attorney’s conduct. See McGreal, 87 F.3d at 1254–55 (affirming sanctions on an attorney who accepted his client’s assertions 

without questioning the client about damages, obtaining or examining any data, or contacting a third party who could shed light on

the claim’s validity). The district court properly considered Gulisano’s reasonable-inquiry conduct preceding the filing of the motion to amend judgment.

Gulisano also argues that the sanctions motion flouted Rule

11’s safe harbor provision. The safe harbor provision requires the 

moving party to serve the motion for sanctions on the nonmoving 

party and give it 21 days to withdraw the offending pleading before 

filing the motion with the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). 

Gulisano does not argue that BSI and BCFWC failed to do that.

Rather, he argues that the sanctions were aimed at conduct that

had already taken place and could not be withdrawn. Although the 

district court considered Gulisano’s prior conduct, it imposed sanctions based on the motion itself. The court stated, “[C]ontinuing to 

argue Plaintiff’s entitlement to collect the Final Judgment amount 

from corporate entities not named or involved in the instant action 

by filing and defending the instant Motion[], despite the utter lack 

of legal or factual support, is precisely the type of conduct subject 

to Rule 11’s duty of candor.” Doc. 50 at 16 (emphasis added). Gulisano admits that he could have withdrawn the motion. Thus, the 

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district court acted within its discretion when it imposed sanctions 

on a motion that could have been withdrawn under the safe harbor 

provision.7

B. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Denying 

Gulisano’s Motion for Reconsideration. 

Gulisano asked the court to reconsider its decision to impose 

sanctions. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district 

court denied his motion. Gulisano challenges the denial on appeal,

but he has abandoned this challenge. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). He failed to support the claim with arguments and citations to authority. See id. at 

681. Instead, he merely appended, repeatedly, the same sentence 

to the end of his arguments against sanctions: “In the alternative, 

the court abused its discretion by denying the Appellant’s Motion 

for Reconsideration, which raised this issue as grounds for doing 

so.” Appellant’s Brief at 39, 43, 47, 52, 54. These appended sentences are mere “passing references” that cannot raise an issue for 

appellate review. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. We consider the issue 

abandoned.

7 Gulisano contends that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded as sanctions 

was too high because BSI failed to mitigate its damages. This argument lacks 

merit. First, it is, at best for Gulisano, unclear whether any duty to mitigate 

damages was owed. Second, BSI asked Gulisano to withdraw the motion to 

amend judgment, and Gulisano refused, forcing BSI to incur attorney’s fees in 

defending against the motion. So, it seems to us that Gulisano himself prevented BSI from mitigating its damages.

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Were we to reach the merits, however, we would affirm the 

district court’s denial of the Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. 

The court found that the motion “amount[ed] to no more than disagreement with the Court’s reasoning and ultimate conclusions.” 

Doc. 70 at 10. It failed to establish a clear error of law or manifest 

injustice as required. Because the motion merely “relitigate[d] old 

matters,” the district court was within its discretion to deny it. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 

2005).

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order imposing sanctions and its denial of the motion for reconsideration.

AFFIRMED.

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