Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1708-CR-1837 | June 28, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Philip R. Skodinski

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Quintein S. Walker,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 28, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1708-CR-1837

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable John M. 

Marnocha, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D02-1610-F1-18

May, Judge.
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[1] Quintein S. Walker appeals his conviction of Level 1 felony child molestation.1 

Walker argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him and the trial court 

abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to cross-examine a 

witness by not allowing testimony regarding his victim’s previous sexual 

encounters. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In October 2016, Walker was living with his girlfriend Chandra Jackson and 

her six children. On October 8, 2016, Jackson and Walker were watching 

movies in their bedroom. Two of Jackson’s children, N.J. and Z.J., were 

watching movies with them. Walker and Jackson had both mattresses in the 

room pushed together and were lying with the children. N.J., who was eight, 

was lying between Walker and Z.J. Jackson and Z.J. both fell asleep. While 

they were asleep, Walker pushed N.J. “towards his balls” and “made [her] suck 

them.” (Tr. Vol. II at 47-49.) Walker also touched N.J.’s butt and put his 

fingers in her vagina. Walker told N.J. he would hit her if she told anyone. 

[3] Jackson woke up when she felt Walker’s arm moving as if he were 

masturbating. Jackson said Walker was still watching the same movie that 

Jackson had fallen asleep to. When Jackson began to move, Walker moved 

closer to her and adjusted his pants. Jackson turned on the lights and told the 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (2015). 
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children to leave. Jackson noticed N.J. was still under the covers. When 

Jackson pulled back the covers, N.J. was “facing [Walker’s] private area.” (Tr. 

Vol. II at 25.) As N.J. left the room, Jackson saw her adjusting her underwear. 

After asking N.J. what happened, Jackson and N.J. confronted Walker, who

immediately got angry.

[4] Walker left the house, and Jackson took N.J. to the hospital. The doctor 

observed evidence of irritation on the inside of N.J.’s vagina. The doctor 

explained the irregularities were uncommon for someone N.J.’s age. The 

injuries were consistent with finger penetration. A DNA test of material found 

on N.J.’s underwear revealed male DNA, but there was not enough to 

determine whose it was. 

[5] At trial, Walker’s attorneys wanted to question N.J. about her sexual 

knowledge and about prior sexual encounters she had had with her cousins and 

brother. After a brief hearing away from the jury, the trial court decided to not 

allow questioning regarding those matters. Walker was convicted of one count 

of Level 1 felony child molesting and sentenced to thirty-years. 

Discussion and Decision
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Sufficient Evidence

[6] Walker argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.2 When 

considering the sufficiency of evidence, “a reviewing court does not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 

124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We must affirm “if the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of 

fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 126 

(internal citation omitted). 

[7] To prove Walker committed Level 1 felony child molesting, the State had to 

present sufficient evidence that (1) Walker, (2) who was over the age of twentyone, (3) with a child under fourteen years of age, (4) knowingly or intentionally 

performed “other sexual conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1). “Other sexual 

conduct” is defined as “an act involving a sex organ of one person and the 

mouth or anus of another person; or the penetration of the sex organ or anus of 

a person by an object.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5. 

[8] N.J. testified Walker put his finger in her vagina. Walker argues N.J.’s account 

is not believable because Jackson and Z.J. were both in the room. However, it

is not our duty to judge the credibility of a witness or reweigh the evidence. See 

McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126 (stating standard of review). N.J.’s testimony, 

 

2 The Appellant’s brief contained multiple spelling, grammar, and citation errors rendering it difficult to read 

and determine the arguments being made. 
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which is supported by part of Jackson’s testimony and by the doctor’s findings,

is sufficient to support Walker’s conviction. See, e.g., D’Paffo v. State, 749 

N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (minor victim’s testimony as to 

defendant sexually assaulting her with fingers was sufficient to support child 

molesting conviction), summarily aff’d in relevant part 778 N.E.2d 798, 803 n.2 

(Ind. 2002).

Indiana Evidence Rule 412

[1] Walker also argues the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Walker 

to cross-examine N.J. about her prior sexual experience and her sexual

knowledge. Trial courts have broad discretion to determine the admissibility of 

evidence at trial, Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017), and we review 

the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Marcum v. State, 772 N.E.2d 

998, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s 

decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 

875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). 

[2] Indiana Evidence Rule 412, the Rape Shield Rule, prevents the admission of 

evidence offered to prove a victim or witness engaged in sexual behavior on 

other occasions. There are three exceptions to the Rule: 

(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s sexual 

behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the 
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defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical 

evidence; 

(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s sexual 

behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual 

misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if 

offered by the prosecutor; and 

(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s 

constitutional rights.

Evid. Rule 412(b)(1). 

[3] Walker wanted to use Exception (A) to question N.J. regarding prior sexual 

contacts with her cousins and brother. The trial court held a hearing outside 

the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the testimony. Under

Exception (A), evidence of sexual behavior becomes admissible if it could prove 

“someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other 

physical evidence[.]” Id. However, Walker did not argue N.J.’s cousins or 

brother were the source of the irritation inside her vagina, and in regard to the 

experiences with her cousins and brother, N.J. testified she touched them, but 

they did not touch her. (See Tr. Vol. II at 105.) As a result, the evidence could 

not have demonstrated someone other than Walker was the source of the 

physical evidence, and the trial court correctly determined the information was 
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not admissible under Exception (A).

3

 See Parrish v. State, 515 N.E.2d 516, 519-

520 (Ind. 1987) (trial court properly denied the defendant’s request to question 

the child victim about prior sexual abuse because the Indiana Rape Shield 

statute prevents inquiry into past sexual conduct). 

[4] Additionally, under Exception (C), Walker argues his Sixth Amendment right 

to confront a witness was violated. At trial, Walker did not assert a 

constitutional argument. As a result, Walker waived this argument. See Small 

v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. 2000) (defendant failed to raise a 

Confrontation Clause objection at trial and, thereby, waived the argument on

appeal). 

[5] Waiver, notwithstanding Walker’s right to confront N.J., was not violated. The 

Supreme Court has held “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity

for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. 

Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis in original). “[T]rial judges retain 

wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose 

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among 

other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness safety, 

 

3 Nor could the evidence had been admissible under Exception (B) as an eight-year-old child cannot ever give 

consent. See Evid. Rule 412(b)(1)(B) (making other sexual encounters between victim and defendant 

admissible “if offered by the defendant to prove consent”). 
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or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 

[6] Walker wanted to question N.J. regarding her previous sexual encounter with 

her cousins because, Walker alleged, that was where she learned the term

“sucking balls.” (Tr. Vol. II at 94.) The trial court determined this information 

was not relevant and would not have been effective in disproving any facts of 

consequence in this case. (Id. at 113.) “Evidence is relevant when it has ‘any 

tendency’ to prove or disprove a consequential fact.” Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 177. 

We fail to see how testimony regarding where N.J. learned the term “sucking 

balls” could be relevant to whether inappropriate sexual contact occurred 

between Walker and N.J. on the night in question. At best, the evidence was

only marginally relevant. The trial court did not violate Walker’s constitutional 

right to cross-examine a witness by excluding the evidence. See West v. State, 

755 N.E.2d 173, 185 (Ind. 2001) (trial court properly denied the crossexamination of a witness where the testimony would have been irrelevant). 

Conclusion

[7] The evidence was sufficient to convict Walker of Level 1 felony child 

molestation. Additionally, because Walker did not meet any of the exceptions 

in Indiana Evidence Rule 412, the trial court properly refused to permit Walker 

to question N.J. about prior sexual behavior. Finally, the trial court’s denial of 

Walker’s request to question N.J. about prior sexual behavior did not violate 

Walker’s Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we affirm.
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[8] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.