alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 53.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return or claim for refund to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record. ( a ) *In general.* A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in § 1.6107-1 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78457, Dec. 22, 2008]
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

July 27, 2015

N o. 04

- 14

- 00796

- CV

LOCKHILL VENTURES, LLC

,

Appellant

v.

ARD MOR, INC. , Texas Ardmor Properties, LP, and Texas Ardmore Management, LLC, Appellee s

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014

- CI

- 10796 Honorable Richard Price, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

On July 8, 2015

, this court issued its opinion and judgment

. On July 22 , 2015, Appell ees filed a n unopposed first motion for extension of time to file a motion for rehearing until August
7 , 2015

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 49.1, 49.8.
Appell ees ’ motion for extens ion of time is GRANTED. Appell ees ’ motion for rehearing
is due to be filed with this court by August 7 , 2015.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 27th day of July, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
#### §§ 1030.600-1030.670 [Reserved]
Statement Pursuant to Section
906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned, Richard Rubin, CEO, CFO and
Chairman of American Biogenetic Sciences, Inc, a Delaware corporation, hereby makes the
following certification as required by Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
with respect to the following of this report filed pursuant to Section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March
31, 2009.

The undersigned certifies that the above
quarterly report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and information contained in the above report fairly presents, in
all respects, the financial condition of American Biogenetic Sciences, Inc. and results of
its operations.

Date: May 20, 2009/s/ Richard RubinCEO, CFO and Chairman
#### Peter M. Olympia, Jr., et al., Appellants, v Town of Poughkeepsie, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[805 NYS2d 575]

In an action to recover for damage to property, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Brands, J.), dated November 8, 2004, which granted the motion of the defendant Town of Poughkeepsie for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

*446The Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendant Town of Poughkeepsie for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The Town established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as to the negligence cause of action by demonstrating that it inspected the plaintiffs’ flooded property on several occasions, using two separate tests to search for a municipal water leak, and found none *(see Biancaniello v Town of Colonie,*261 App Div 161 [1941]). The plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action, to recover damages for trespass and nuisance, likewise fail *(accord Kaplan v Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook,*12 AD3d 410, 411-412 [2004]). .

In view of the foregoing, we do not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. H. Miller, J.P., Cozier, Ritter and Dillon, JJ., concur.
Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

§ 215.3 Procedures for entering into a Withholding Agreement. ( a ) Subpart C of this part is the Withholding Agreement which the Secretary will enter into with a State, city or county. A State, city or county which does not have an existing withholding agreement with the Secretary and wishes to enter into such an agreement shall indicate in a letter its consent to be bound by the provisions of subpart C. The letter shall be sent to the Secretary by addressing the request to: Assistant Commissioner, Payment Management, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Department of the Treasury, 401 14th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20227. The letter shall be signed by an officer authorized to bind contractually the State, city or county. Copies of all applicable State laws, city or county ordinances and implementing regulations, instructions, and forms shall be enclosed. The letter shall also indicate the title and address of the official whom Federal agencies may contact to obtain forms and other information necessary to implement withholding.
( b ) Within 120 days of the receipt of the letter from the State, city or county official, the Secretary will, by letter, notify the State, city or county: ( 1 ) That a Withholding Agreement has been entered into as of the date of the Secretary's letter, or
( 2 ) That a Withholding Agreement cannot be entered into with the State, city or county and the reason for that determination.
( c ) The withholding of the State, city or county income or employment tax shall commence within 90 days after the effective date of the agreement.
[71 FR 2150, Jan. 13, 2006, as amended at 75 FR 51374, Aug. 20, 2010]
#### Wombacker v. Grindel et ux.

*208Before Hoban, P. J., Eagen and Robinson, JJ.

*James J. Powell, Jr.,*for plaintiff.

*Robert T. Gownley,*for defendants.

January 14, 1952.

Hoban, P. J.,

Claimant filed a lien for work done on one side of a double house of the familiar local type with a single dwelling on each side separated by a common structural partition. The house was described by the designated street number for one side, and the land was described with the technical description contained in the deed to the owners, which described the premises upon which the complete double house is situated.

The owners seem to think the foregoing effort to impose a lien on the property violates section 12 of the Mechanics’ Lien Law of June 4, 1901, P. L. 431, 49 PS §§54-55, as an attempt to fasten a lien on two different properties for a claim appropriate to one.

We cannot so read either the claim or the law. The claim presents a correct identification of the building in question with a correct description of the land as available to claimant from the records.

To get any other description of the land claimant would have to interpolate boundaries either by his own survey or his own guesswork, all at the risk of error, a risk which the law does not require him to assume.

Defendants are not harmed, for if execution is attempted the land may be divided so as to restrict a judicial sale to the portion determined to be appurtenant only to the dwelling concerned, under the procedure provided by section 14 of the Mechanics’ Lien Law.

Now, January 14, 1952, the rule entered on claimant to show cause why the mechanic’s lien and claim filed in the above entitled case should not be stricken off is discharged.
#### Alcide Salce et al., Respondents, v Jacques H. Check, Appellant.

[805 NYS2d 608]

*452In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (LaMarca, J.), dated December 1, 2004, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a jury verdict in his favor as against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 when he entered an intersection, attempted a left turn, and, upon seeing the headlight of the injured plaintiffs motorcycle, stopped in the intersection with his truck partially blocking the oncoming traffic lane. This violation constituted negligence as a matter of law and could not be disregarded by the jury *(see Klein v Byalik,*1 AD3d 399 [2003]; *Batal v Associated Univs.,*293 AD2d 558, 559 [2002]; *Botero v Erraez,*289 AD2d 274, 275 [2001]; *Dellavecchia v Zorros,*231 AD2d 549 [1996]). The injured plaintiff, as the driver with the right-of-way, was entitled to anticipate that the defendant would obey traffic laws which required him to yield *(see Klein v Byalik, supra*at 400; *Batal v Associated Univs., supra).*

On these facts, no fair interpretation of the evidence could have resulted in a verdict that the defendant was not negligent *(see Rossani v Rana,*8 AD3d 548, 549 [2004]; *Batal v Associated Univs., supra).*Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial *(see*CPLR 4404 [a]; *Batal v Associated Univs., supra).*

The remaining contentions of the parties need not be reached in light of our determination. Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Luciano and Lifson, JJ., concur.
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 21

- 00212

- CV

G LENDA B ROWN AND W ILLIAM

J ONES

, Appellants

V

.

R

UTH S ANDERS , Appellee §

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 431st District

Court

o f Denton County ( 17

- 3609

- 158 )

June 9, 2022

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the trial court ’ s jud gment

is affirmed.

It is further ordered that Appellants Glenda Brown and William Jones must pay

all costs of this appeal

.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ El izabeth Kerr

Justice Elizabe th Kerr
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>              9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                      15,348,249
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 62,405,670
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      19,360,024
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        19,178,750
<LOANS>                                    231,878,962
<ALLOWANCE>                                  4,009,575
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             348,073,564
<DEPOSITS>                                 304,153,815
<SHORT-TERM>                                 5,215,527
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          2,763,616
<LONG-TERM>                                  5,178,450
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        34,893
<OTHER-SE>                                  30,727,263
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             348,073,564
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             15,280,331
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            3,577,587
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               220,159
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            19,078,077
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           7,719,587
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           8,013,163
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                       11,064,914
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  450,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             626,760
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              7,719,985
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,460,572
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   4,460,572
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,907,139
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .84
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .84
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.60
<LOANS-NON>                                  2,322,200
<LOANS-PAST>                                   170,652
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             3,569,282
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   55,630
<RECOVERIES>                                    45,924
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            4,009,575
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         4,009,575
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.6679-1 Failure to file returns, etc. with respect to foreign corporations or foreign partnerships for taxable years beginning after September 3, 1982. ( a ) *Civil penalty* — ( 1 ) *In general.* In addition to any criminal penalty provided by law, each U.S. citizen, resident, or person filing a separate or joint information return or on whose behalf a return is filed, pursuant to sections 6035, 6046, or 6046A, and the regulations thereunder, who fails to file such a return within the time provided, or who files a return which does not show the required information, shall pay a penalty of $1,000, unless such failure is shown to be due to reasonable cause.
( 2 ) *Joint return.* The penalty imposed by section 6679 and this section shall apply to each U.S. citizen, resident, or person filing a joint return pursuant to the provisions of section 6035, 6046, or 6046A, which does not show the required information.
( 3 ) *Showing of reasonable cause.* The district director, the director of the Internal Revenue service center, and the director of International Operations are authorized to make the determination that such failure was due to a reasonable cause and that, accordingly, the penalty imposed by section 6679 shall not apply. An affirmative showing of reasonable cause must be made in the form of a written statement, containing a declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, setting forth all the facts alleged as a reasonable cause. If the taxpayer exercises ordinary business care and prudence and is nevertheless unable to furnish any item of information required under section 6035, 6046, or 6046A and the regulations thereunder, such failure shall be considered due to a reasonable cause. In determining the extent of a taxpayer's ability to obtain information, the percentage of stock owned by such taxpayer and the nature of the other interests in the foreign corporation will be considered.
( b ) *Deficiency procedures not to apply.* The penalty imposed by section 6679 may be assessed and collected without regard to the deficiency procedures provided by subchapter B of chapter 63 of the Code.
[32 FR 15421, Nov. 3, 1967, as amended by T.D. 7288, 38 FR 27215, Oct. 1, 1973; T.D. 7542, 43 FR 18552, May 1, 1978; T.D. 8028, 50 FR 23409, June 4, 1985]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alex Williams, Appellant.

[806 NYS2d 610]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Blackburne, J.), rendered September 15, 2003, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the complainant did not sustain a “physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00 (9) was not raised with specificity at trial and, accordingly, is not preserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Bailey,*19 AD3d 431 [2005]; *People v Adams,*281 AD2d 486, 487 [2001]).

In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable *590to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant sustained a “physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00 (9) *(see Matter of Philip A.,*49 NY2d 198, 200 [1980]; *People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]). “Physical injury” means an impairment of physical condition or substantial pain *(see*Penal Law § 10.00 [9]). The testimony of the complainant established that the defendant grabbed her by the neck, knocked her down, and dragged her along the ground. As a result of her struggle with the defendant, her legs were cut and scraped, requiring treatment by paramedics following the incident. Moreover, she testified that she was in “a lot” of pain, which lasted for about two or three months, making it difficult to walk and bend down, and she showed the jury scars on both legs that were still present 18 months after the robbery. The scars alone are impairment sufficient to constitute physical injury, and the duration of the pain is evidence of its severity and provides a basis for the inference that the pain was substantial *(see People v Rivera,*183 AD2d 792, 793 [1992]; *People v Cartagena,*276 AD2d 636, 637 [2000]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Santucci, Goldstein and Dillon, JJ., concur.
March 23, 1998


 Mr. Christopher Canfield
 3200 Danville Blvd.
 Alamo, California

 Dear Mr. Canfield:

 In keeping with the terms of the asset purchase agreement between Worldport 
 Communications Inc. and Intercontinental Exchange Inc. we are pleased to 
 provide you the following offer of employment at WorldPort Communications, Inc:
 
 EFFECTIVE DATE:         Closing of the asset purchase agreement.

 TERM OF OFFER:          Two (2) years
 
 TITLE:                  Your exact title will be determined as we progress 
                         toward closing.

 REPORTING RELATIONSHIP: Initially you will report to the COO of Worldport.  
                         Subsequent to closing and final job determination 
                         you may report to another senior executive.

 COMPENSATION:           Base Salary:  $84,000 per year paid periodically 
                         according to WorldPort Communications payroll 
                         practices.

                         Performance Incentive:  The employee will receive 
                         stock purchase options as follows:

                         30,000 options vesting after one year of employment, 
                         with an exercise price of $7.00 per share;

                         30,000 options vesting after two years of employment, 
                         with an exercise price of $10.00 per share;

                         Benefits:  Standard Worldport Communications Benefits

                         Review:  Your compensation will be reviewed at the end
                         of the first six months following closing of the asset
                         purchase agreement.


 TERMINATION:            During the term of your employment as defined above you
                         will be terminated by the company only for cause, 
                         disability or death.

                         If you are terminated by the company for any reason 
                         other than those stated above you will be paid a 
                         severance equal to four (4) months base salary.

 NON-COMPETE/
 NON-SOLICITATION/
 CONFIDENTIALITY         As a condition of WorldPort entering into an employment
                         arrangement with you, and as a condition of continued 
                         employment with WorldPort, you agree to execute a 
                         separate agreement covering these aspects of your 
                         employment, and to abide by its terms and conditions.


 If these terms and conditions of employment are acceptable to you, please
 indicate your acceptance of this offer by signing below.

 I look forward to working with you.


 Sincerely,

 /s/ Phillip Magiera
 Mr. Phillip Magiera
 Its: Chief Financial Officer




 I hereby accept the above offer of employment and the associated terms:



 /s/ Christopher Canfield
 Christopher Canfield
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10681

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Fabian C. Fleifel, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:12-CR-318-3

Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Fabian C. Fleifel, federal prisoner # 57575-018, has appealed the 

district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argues that the district court should have 

reduced his sentence to time served in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 4, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-10681 Document: 00515887465 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/04/2021
No. 20-10681

2

and his health conditions. To the extent he has moved this court for 

compassionate release, the motion is DENIED because we cannot decide 

such a motion in the first instance as, in context, § 3582 directs the filing of 

such motions in the sentencing court. See § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also Dillon v. 

United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010). 

We pretermit the question whether the district court erred in 

determining that Fleifel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 

United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 

920 (2020). To the extent that Fleifel relies on documents or facts that were 

not before the district court, we will not consider them. See Theriot v. Parish 

of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999).

Fleifel has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in 

determining that he did not have an extraordinary and compelling reason for 

his immediate release. See United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 434-35 

(5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 2021 WL 2044647 (U.S. May 24, 2021) (No. 20-

7832). The district court’s order is AFFIRMED. 

Case: 20-10681 Document: 00515887465 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/04/2021