alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas Harris, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 854]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Francis A. Affronti, J.), rendered October 31, 2002. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of grand larceny in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree (three counts) and scheme to defraud in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law and a new trial is granted.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of two counts of grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law § 155.40 [1]), three counts of grand larceny in the third degree (§ 155.35) and one count of scheme to defraud in the first degree (§ 190.65 [1]). The charges arose from defendant’s theft of money from two business entities and three individuals. We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in denying his challenge for cause to a prospective juror. That prospective juror indicated that her assessment of defendant’s guilt would be influenced by the number of complainants, thus raising an issue concerning her ability to be fair and impartial. It was therefore necessary to obtain her unequivocal assurance that her prior state of mind would not influence the verdict and that she would render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence *(see People v Johnson,*94 NY2d 600, 614 [2000]; *People v Blyden,*55 NY2d 73, 77-78 [1982]). No such assurance was obtained, however, and the denial of defendant’s challenge for cause thus constitutes reversible error inasmuch as defendant had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges before the completion of jury selection *(see People v Morton,*271 AD2d 702, 703 [2000]; *cf. People v Schojan,*272 AD2d 932, 933-934 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 871 [2000]). Reversal is also required based upon the court’s improper curtailment of defense counsel’s questioning of prospective jurors with respect to their ability to follow the court’s instructions on the limited use of *Molineux*evidence *(see generally People v Boulware,*29 NY2d 135, 142 [1971], *cert denied*405 US *1039995 [1972]). Although the court has broad discretion in controlling and restricting the scope of voir dire *(see id.*at 140), the questions posed by defense counsel are “precisely the type of question [s] that should be permitted as indicative of the [prospective] juror [s’] fairness” and willingness to follow the court’s instructions *(People v Porter,*226 AD2d 275, 276 [1996]; *see generally Boulware,*29 NY2d at 142). In light of our decision, we do not address defendant’s remaining contentions. Present— Green, J.P., Gorski, Smith, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
# L_2019163DE.01011301.xml

| 20.6.2019 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 163/113 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.6.2019

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 163/113

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EU) 2019/631 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 17. April 2019 zur Festsetzung von CO2-Emissionsnormen für neue Personenkraftwagen und für neue leichte Nutzfahrzeuge und zur Aufhebung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 443/2009 und (EU) Nr. 510/2011

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 111 vom 25. April 2019
  )

Seite 44, Anhang II, Teil B, Abschnitt 2, Buchstabe j, Spalte „Ausführliche Daten, je zugelassenes Fahrzeug“:

Anstatt:

„Hubraum (cm3)

Stromverbrauch (Wh/km)“

muss es heißen:

„Kraftstofftyp

Kraftstoffmodus“.

---
#### Michelle S. Fridley Cave, Appellant, v Town of Galen et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[804 NYS2d 219]

Appeal from an order (denominated order and judgment) of the Supreme Court, Wayne County (John B. Nesbitt, A.J.), entered October 20, 2004. The order granted the motion of defendants Town of Galen and Town of Galen Highway Department for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them in a personal injury action.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she lost control of her vehicle and struck a post set in concrete in the yard of a landowner adjacent to a highway in defendant Town of Galen (Town). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the Town and its highway department (Town defendants) were negligent in allowing the landowner to place the post in the Town’s right-of-way too close to the roadway, thereby creating a hazardous condition. Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the Town defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. As the court properly determined, the Town defendants owed plaintiff no duty with regard to “ ‘a fixed object placed within the public right-of-way but outside the travel portion of the highway’ ” *(Clark v City of Lockport,*280 AD2d 901, 902 [2001], *lv dismissed in part and denied in part*96 NY2d 932 [2001]; *see Tomassi v Town of Union,*46 NY2d 91, 97-98 [1978]). We further note that plaintiffs reliance on the New York State Department of Transportation Highway Design Manual is misplaced. There is no authority, statutory or otherwise, mandating that the Town defendants comply with that manual in the design of their highways. In any event, it is well settled *1109that compliance with design standards adopted after the construction of a highway is not required unless the municipality undertakes “significant repair or reconstruction” that would provide an opportunity for compliance with the new standards *(Preston v State of New York,*6 AD3d 835, 835-836 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 601 [2004]; *see Vizzini v State of New York,*278 AD2d 562, 563 [2000]). Here, there is no evidence in the record before us that there was such repair or reconstruction. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Hurlbutt, Gorski and Smith, JJ. *[See*4 Misc 3d 1026(A), 2004 NY Slip Op 51073(11) (2004).]
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM INTERNAL
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FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
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<RECEIVABLES>                               11,234,898
<ALLOWANCES>                                   769,000
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            33,211,565
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<OTHER-SE>                                  15,232,934
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<INCOME-TAX>                                   651,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (3,043,196)
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---------------------·--

(:Jip.g~cll ZG~S ;,p~ - 8 D !2: 2 I 

ALASKA CORPORATION 

March 13, 2015 

To whom it may concern; 

I am writing this letter of recommend for Alaska Air Tr:ansit (AAT), an exemplary commuter airline that 

provides outstanding safe service to remote areas of Alaska's rainy, windy coastal communities in the 

Prince William Sound. 

I have flown with this organization for over 15 years and since Dan and Josie took over ownership and 

. ·management the organization is top-quality and professionaL I fly witt; them personally as well as my 

family, board members and employees of Chugach Alaska Corporation. They are the preferred carrier 

for the region. 

The staff and management have gone above and beyond to provide the highest quality people, well 

maintained aircraft, onetime departures and arrivals. 

I trust this organization to provide air travel to me and Chugach·Aiaska Corporation now and in the 

future. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at 907-261-0310. 

Sincerely, 

Sheri 

~~ Buretta 

Chugach Alaska Corporation 

Chairman of the Board . 

Chugach Ala~ku Corporation · 3800 Centerpoin; O:i<e. Suite 700, Anchorage. M 99503 . T: 907.563.S866 · F: 907.5618-102
§ 49.4253-1 Exemption for certain coin-operated service. ( a ) *In general.* Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the tax imposed on amounts paid for general telephone service is not applicable to a single telephone conversation paid for by inserting coins in a public coin-operated telephone. The tax imposed on amounts paid for toll telephone service or telegraph service is not applicable to a single telephone conversation for which a tool charge is made (see paragraph (a) of § 49.4252-2), or to a telegraph message, if the charge for such toll telephone service (including any additional charge for overtime) or telegraph service is less than 25 cents and is paid for by inserting coins in a public coin-operated telephone.
( b ) *Exception where service furnished for a guaranteed amount.* Where a coin-operated telephone service is furnished for a guaranteed amount, the amount paid under such guarantee plus any fixed monthly or other periodic charge is subject to the tax imposed on amounts paid for general telephone service. The tax applies to the full amount of the guarantee whether such amount is paid out of receipts from the coin-box of the telephone or from funds of the subscriber.
§ 100.12 Exchange of fused or mixed coin. ( a ) *Definitions.* ( 1 ) Fused coins are U.S. coins which are melted to the extent that they are bonded together.
( 2 ) Mixed coins are U.S. coins of several alloy categories which are presented together, but are readily and clearly identifiable as U.S. coins.
( b ) *Fused and mixed coins.* The United States Mint will not accept fused coins for redemption. The United States Mint will not accept mixed coins for redemption, except as provided for in § 100.11(d)(2).
| (logo) WELLS

            FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**  D1050-084, 8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334

 

  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Poolingand Servicing Agreement dated as of November 1, 2016, by and among CCRECOMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, L.P., as Depositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONALASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, RIALTO CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC, as SpecialServicer, AEGON USA REALTY ADVISORS, LLC, as Potomac Mills Special Servicer,WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONALASSOCIATION, as Certificate Administrator, Paying Agent and Custodian, PARKBRIDGE LENDER SERVICES LLC, as Operating Advisor and Asset RepresentationsReviewer with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, CFCRE2016-C6 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein nototherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 10.11 of thisAgreement, I, Leslie Hayton, Managing Director of Commercial Mortgage Servicesdo hereby certify that:

 

1.       Areview of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January1, 2018 through December 31, 2018 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and

 

2.       To thebest of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilledall of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughoutthe Reporting Period.

 

 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28thday of February 2019.

 

 

/s/Leslie Hayton

LeslieHayton 

ManagingDirector 

WellsFargo Bank

 

 

| Wells  Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo)  Together we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
(Superior Court of Cincinnati.)

Special Term, 1900.

#### FRANCIS v. MvCABE et al.

Where a verbal contract *may*he performed within a year it is not within the statute of •frauds., ^

James J. Smiley for the motion.

L. H. Pummill contra.

On motion for a new trial-'

'Dempsey, J.

The only point on which this motion was reserved for consideration was the defendants’ contention that the contract was within the statute of frauds because not performable within a year. Reliance is had upon 41 O. S., 146, Jones v. Pouch; but that case as I read it is against the defendants herein. As I found the contract herein to be, there was no definite period fixed for its continuance. The plaintiff was to have a certain percentage of proceeds from contracts that he would procure. It was something in the nature of a service contract, or contract of hiring, where nothing is said as to the time. It was continuing in its'' nature, and services under it were likely to be rendered and finally completed, and the contract itself fully performed as between the parties within the year. Where the contract by its terms is *not*to be performed, fully completed; within the year, the statute applies; but where under the contract’s terms, it may be performed, is capable of being fully completed, within the year the statute does not apply (see Westrop v. Westrop, 13 C. C., 244, where the authorities in Ohio and elsewhere are reviewed). In my judgment the defendants’ point is not well taken, and the motion is denied.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-12-0000723

30-JUN-2015

08:38 AM
39952.

#### DEARING LEASING COMPANY v. HARMON, INC.

*683Decided April 10, 1963

Rehearing denied April 25, 1963.

*684*Bouhan, Lawrence, Williams, Levy ■& McAlpin, George W. Williams, Thomas J. Dillon, Walter C. Hartridge, III,*for plaintiff in error.

*Brannen, Clark & Hester, H. Sol Clark,*contra.

Frankum, Judge.

The allegations of the petition quoted in the foregoing statement of facts admit of no construction other than that the motor vehicle truck which was the subject matter of the lease contract was destroyed by fire without fault or neglect on the part of the defendant. Much, if not the entire, argument of counsel for the parties is devoted in their briefs in this case to a discussion of whether the contract sued on (admittedly a “bailment lease” as defined in *Great American Indem. Co. v. Ashbaugh,*96 Ga. App. 166, 99 SE2d 501) obligated the lessee as an insurer of the truck and absolutely required the lessee to return the truck to the lessor in as good condition as when received by it, natural wear and tear excepted, or to pay the lessor its value in the case of the destruction of the truck without fault on the part of the lessee. All of this argument is beside the point, however, and it is unnecessary to decide in this opinion whether the contract was sufficient to authorize the plaintiff to recover for the value of the leased property upon its destruction, because the suit in this ease is one expressly to recover the rental which would have accrued on the leased vehicle for the remainder of the term and nothing more.

*Code*§ 12-207 provides: “The loss or destruction of the thing hired, without fault on the part of the hirer, puts an end to the bailment, and the hirer should pay only for the time it was enjoyed.” No provision of the lease contract in this case expressly or by implication required the lessee to continue paying the rental on the motor truck after its loss or destruction, and in the absence of a clear expression of intention by the parties that some other rule would govern their rights in the matter, the provisions of the foregoing Code section must control. The *685petition contains no prayer for general or nominal damages but only for special damages in the amount of the balance of the rental which would have accrued plus the one dollar representing the option purchase price. Under the Code section quoted above the rental was not recoverable after the destruction of the truck, and since the petition fails to allege that the defendant had in any wise exercised its option to purchase the vehicle, no basis for the recovery of the option purchase price was shown. Since none of the damages sought were recoverable, the petition was subject to general demurrer and was properly dismissed. *Hadden v. Southern Messenger Service,*135 Ga. 372 (69 SE 480); *Truitt v. Rust & Shelburne Sales Co.,*25 Ga. App. 62 (2) (102 SE 645); *Barwick v. American Mfg. Co.,*30 Ga. App. 761 (2) (119 SE 218); *Stewart v. Western Union Tel. Co.,*83 Ga. App. 532 (3) (64 SE2d 327); *Strickland v. Flournoy,*95 Ga. App. 315 (2) (97 SE2d 638).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
§ 1021.630 Prohibition on correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks; records concerning owners of foreign banks and agents for service of legal process. ( a ) Refer to § 1010.630 of this chapter.
( b ) [Reserved]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7216

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus WESLEY HODGE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (CR-96-54-BO, CA-99-178-4-BO) Submitted: January 14, 2002 Decided: February 4, 2002 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Wesley Hodge, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* We note that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hodge’s motions to amend his § 2255 motion as such amendments would have been futile. See United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2000), and United States v. Sanders , 247 F.3d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 2001). 2 PER CURIAM:Wesley Hodge seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate ofappealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. * See United States v. Hodge , Nos. CR-96-54-BO, CA-99- 178-4-BO (E.D.N.C. June 14, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 110

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow employers a tax

credit for hiring displaced homemakers.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow

employers a tax credit for hiring displaced homemakers.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS ESTABLISHED AS A

4 TARGETED GROUP FOR PURPOSES OF COM5 PUTING THE CREDIT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF

6 CERTAIN NEW EMPLOYEES.

7 (a) GENERAL RULE.—Paragraph (1) of section 51(d)

8 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to mem9 bers of targeted groups) is amended by striking ‘‘or’’ at

10 the end of subparagraph (I), by striking the period at the
2

•HR 110 IH

1 end of subparagraph (J) and inserting ‘‘, or’’, and by add2 ing at the end the following new subparagraph:

3 ‘‘(K) a displaced homemaker.’’

4 (b) DISPLACED HOMEMAKER DEFINED.—Section

5 51(d) of such Code (relating to members of targeted

6 groups) is amended by redesignating paragraphs (13),

7 (14), (15), and (16) as paragraphs (14), (15), (16), and

8 (17), respectively, and by adding after paragraph (12) the

9 following new paragraph:

10 ‘‘(13) DISPLACED HOMEMAKER.—The term

11 ‘displaced homemaker’ means an individual who—

12 ‘‘(A) has not worked in the labor force for

13 at least 5 years but has, during those years,

14 worked in the home providing unpaid services

15 for family members, and

16 ‘‘(B)(i) has been dependent on public as17 sistance or on the income of another family

18 member but is no longer supported by that in19 come, or (ii) is receiving public assistance on

20 account of dependent children in the home.’’

21 (c) TERMINATION NOT TO APPLY.—Paragraph (4)

22 of section 51(c) of such Code (relating to termination) is

23 amended by adding at the end thereof the following new

24 sentence: ‘‘The preceding sentence shall not apply in the

25 case of any displaced homemaker.’’
3

•HR 110 IH

1 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

2 this section shall apply to amounts paid or incurred after

3 the date of enactment of this Act to individuals who begin

4 work for the employer after such date.

Æ