alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
www.gpo.gov

### §973. Distribution of assets

#### (a) Tribal assets; time limitation

All property of the United States used for the benefit of the Ponca Tribe of Native Americans of Nebraska is declared to be a part of the assets of the tribe, and all of the tribe's assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of this section. The distribution shall be completed within three years from September 5, 1962, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

#### (b) Designation of property for church, park, playground, or cemetery

The tribe shall designate any part of the tribe's property that is to be set aside for church, park, playground, or cemetery purposes, and the Secretary is authorized to convey such property to trustees or agencies designated by the tribe for that purpose and approved by the Secretary.

#### (c) Homesites; market value; improvements

Each member may select for homesite purposes and receive title to not to exceed five acres of tribal land that is being used for homesite purposes by such member. The member shall pay the current market value of the homesite selection excluding any improvements or repairs constructed by such member, his wife, children, or ancestor, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior.

#### (d) Sale of assets not selected; bidding

All assets of the tribe that are not selected and conveyed to members shall be sold by competitive bid at not less than the current market value, and any member shall have the right to purchase property offered for sale for a price not less than the highest acceptable bid therefor. If more than one member exercises such right, the property shall be sold to the member exercising the right who offers the highest price.

#### (e) Proceeds and tribal funds for payment of tribal debts; distributive share; set off; member purchases of tribal property

The net proceeds of all sales of tribal property, and all other tribal funds, shall be used to pay, as authorized by the Secretary, any debts of the tribe. The remainder of such proceeds and funds shall be divided equally among the members whose names are on the final roll, or their heirs or legatees. Any debt owed by a member, heir, or legatee to the tribe or to the United States may be set off as authorized by the Secretary against the distributive share of such person. Any member of the tribe who purchases tribal property in accordance with this section may apply on the purchase price his share of the proceeds of all sales of tribal property, and the Secretary of the Interior shall adopt sales procedures that permit such action.

(Pub. L. 87–629, §3, Sept. 5, 1962, 76 Stat. 429.)

#### Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in section 971 of this title.
###### Editorial Note on Part 301

#### Editorial Note:

In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations.

References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

#### § 301.6872-1 Suspension of running of period of limitations on assessment.

If any fiduciary in any proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. chapters 1-14), including a trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession, or a receiver in any other court proceeding is required, pursuant to section 6036, to give notice in writing to the district director of his qualification as such, then the running of the period of limitations on assessment shall be suspended from the date the proceeding is instituted to the date such notice is received by the district director, and for an additional 30 days thereafter. However, the suspension under this section of the running of the period of limitation on assessment shall in no case exceed 2 years.
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Re:          Annual Statement of Compliance for JPMDB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust2016-C4 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C4

 

 

Per the Pooling and ServicingAgreement dated as of November 1, 2016 (the "Agreement"), theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asCertificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies asfollows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "ReportingPeriod"):

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo'sactivities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under theAgreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of suchofficer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

February 27, 2017

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll go far |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

#### § 250.2 Forms.

The forms referred to in §§ 250.3 and 250.4 shall be used in connection with the payment of awards hereunder. Voucher applications for all payments will be mailed to awardees by the Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Treasury Department, Hyattsville, MD 20782, without request therefor by awardees.

[31 FR 9418, July 9, 1966, as amended at 49 FR 47001, Nov. 30, 1984; 58 FR 4578, Jan. 15, 1993]
Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

§ 212.8 Other rights and authorities. ( a ) *Exempt status.* Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit an individual's right under Federal law to assert against a creditor a further exemption from garnishment for funds in excess of the protected amount, or to alter the exempt status of funds that may be protected from garnishment under Federal law.
( b ) *Account agreements.* Nothing in this part shall be construed to invalidate any term or condition of an account agreement between a financial institution and an account holder that is not inconsistent with this part.
#### Michael Rienzi, Appellant, v Nina Rienzi, Respondent.

[808 NYS2d 116]

In an action to reform or rescind a stipulation of settlement, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lebowitz, J.), dated January 28, 2005, which, sua sponte, dismissed the action.

Ordered that the notice of appeal from the order dated January 28, 2005, is deemed an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted *(see*CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, and the complaint is reinstated.

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in, sua sponte, dismissing the plaintiffs action to reform or rescind the parties’ stipulation of settlement *(see Hoeffner v John F. Frank, Inc.,*302 AD2d 428 [2003]; *Loft Rest. Assoc. v McDonagh,*187 AD2d 643 [1992]; *Gibbs v Kinsey,*120 AD2d 701 [1986]). The power of the court to dismiss an action, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly *(see Myung Chun v North Am. Mtge. Co.,*285 AD2d 42 [2001]). The exercise of such power in this case was improper because no extraordinary circumstances were present to warrant dismissal *(id.).*

Moreover, we disagree with the Supreme Court’s implementation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel as the basis for its dismissal of the action, sua sponte, in view of the fact that it was not pleaded by the defendant as an affirmative defense *(see*CPLR 3018 [b]; 3211 [a] [5]), as was required *(see Pace v Perk,*81 AD2d 444 [1981]; *Surlak v Surlak,*95 AD2d 371 [1983]). In any event, there was no identicality of issues *(see generally Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co.,*93 NY2d 343 [1999]; *D’Arata v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*76 NY2d 659 [1990]) between this action and a post-judgment enforcement proceeding in the parties’ matrimonial action *(see Rienzi v Rienzi,*23 AD3d 447 [2005] [decided herewith]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Luciano and Lifson, JJ., concur.
16

Enclosure 9

 DURABILITY OPTION:

1. Valid until rescinded or modified.

2. All provisions of 40 CFR Part 86 apply unless specifically addressed in this abbreviated

protocol. 

2. The vehicle being converted must have been in the original certification configuration prior

to the conversion.

3. Bench testing of valves and switches must show useful-life capability. Equipment

manufacturers' data may be used in lieu of running data for each application.

4. The total sales for any manufacturer for ALL vehicles converted, without regard to the model

year, cannot exceed 10,000 units unless EPA grants an extension up to 30,000.

5. A temperature profile of the catalyst, as outlined in A/C 17F, must show that vehicle

operation on a gaseous fuel will not cause thermal degradation to the catalyst.

6. Accumulate 25,000 miles on the conversion system on a vehicle that has less than 75,000

miles.

7. An optional test at 0-conversion system miles is strongly encouraged to assure the installer

that the system has been installed properly. Testing must be performed at each 5K, 10K,

15K, 20K, and 25K miles(± 250 miles) using equipment described in 40 CFR Subpart B as

amended on September 21, 1994 (ref: 59 FR 48503).

8. The data generated at each test point will be treated as described in 40 CFR, Subpart A; e.g.,

line-crossing, multiple tests at a test point except where explicitly superseded by instructions

in this enclosure.

9. The CARB data outlier program can be used to eliminate one (1) data point only.

10. No unscheduled maintenance to ANY emission control system. (Scheduled oil changes,

filter changes, spark plug changes, CNG filters, etc., may be performed.)

11. If any unscheduled emission control system maintenance is performed, the vehicle would

have to restart at 0-system miles and EPA would have to be provided with an engineering

report as to why the need for the unscheduled maintenance and an engineering evaluation as

to why the modifications to the failed part would be unlikely to occur in the field. 
17

12. All of the DF values determined would have to be used to determine compliance with

emission standards. That is, all of the DF values must come from either the data generated

via this alternative procedure or from one of the eight enclosures.
39659.

#### CHANDLER v. CHANDLER.

Decided December 3, 1962

Rehearing denied December 17, 1962.

*126*Roberts & Thornton, Jack M. Thornton,*for plaintiff in error.

*Ray, Owens & Keil, J. Walter Owens, Joseph S. Ray, Kelly, Champion ■& Henson, Forrest L. Champion, Jr.,*contra.

Bmll, Judge.

The amended petition shows on its face that the fraud alleged to have been committed by the defendant was intrinsic, not extrinsic or collateral, to the issue in the trial for alimony and child support and to the judgment rendered thereunder. The judgment rendered in favor of the defendant ordered the plaintiff to pay $25 per month to support the child *until she marries.*This constituted an adjudication that the child was not married on the day of the judgment. Admittedly, under the facts of the present petition, this judgment was obtained by fraud since the defendant knew that the child had been married

for more than 13 months prior to the time of the trial of the *127action for alimony and child support, but she falsely testified that the child was then unmarried.

“A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered, until such judgment shall be reversed or set aside.” *Code*§ 110-501. By a seemingly harsh, unreasonable and antiquated statute, it is the law in our State that where a judgment is obtained by perjury, it cannot be set aside unless the person charged with such perjury shall first have been tried and convicted of this crime. *Code*§ 110-706. See also *Stephens v. Pickering,*192 Ga. 199 (2) (15 SE2d 202); and *Munro v. Moody & Fry,*78 Ga. 127 (2) (2 SE 688). Because of this archaic statute, dating from 1833, and the decisions which it has compelled our courts to make, the plaintiff here cannot maintain his action for fraud unless the perjurer has been duly convicted of the crime, and the prior judgment set aside. Neither of these conditions precedent has occurred in this case.

Furthermore, a proceeding on a judgment procured by perjury cannot be arrested by an affidavit of illegality without proof of the conviction of the perjurer, and that the judgment could not have been obtained without his evidence. *Lewis v. Wall,*70 Ga. 646, 649. Cf. Restatement—Restitution, § 72, p. 293 and Illustration (1) to Comment c. (1937).

For the foregoing reasons, as both counts 1 and 2 of the petition seek to recover damages for the action of the defendant in defrauding the plaintiff without having first met the requirements of the above statute, the petition does not state a cause of action which the courts may consider. Accordingly the trial court properly sustained the general demurrer to the petition.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Hall, J., concur.*
40067.

#### RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. AYERS.

Per Curiam.

1. The motion to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that there is no final judgment is denied. The judgment of the trial court awarded attorney’s fees in a fixed sum based upon the pleadings and evidence. The provision in the order stating that . . if there is 'successful resistance to future litigation’ the matter should be left open for assessment of reasonable attorney’s fees for such services as may be required to be rendered hereafter” is clearly illegal and will be treated by this court as mere surplusage.

2. The petition seeking attorney’s fees because of alleged bad *661faith of the defendant insurance company does not show on its face that the fee claimed was excessive as a matter of law.

Decided April 9, 1963

Rehearing denied April 22, 1963.

*Eugene M. Kerr,*for plaintiff in error.

*Randall Evans, Jr.,*contra.

3. Where the plaintiff’s and defendant’s witnesses differed widely in their opinion as to the value of counsel services and the trial court awarded an attorney fee within the range of such conflicting testimony, this court is without authority to reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the motion for new trial on the ground that such fee was excessive. *Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Ayers,*217 Ga. 206 (121 SE2d 649).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Carlisle, P. J., Bell and Hall, JJ., concur.*
#### In the Matter of Leah G., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[805 NYS2d 405]

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Hunt, J.), dated September 8, 2004, which, upon a fact-finding determination of the same court dated June 4, 2004, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for a period of 18 months.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s application for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal *(see Matter of Rosario S.,*18 AD3d 563 [2005]; *Matter of Gerald W.,*12 AD3d 522 [2004]). Based upon the violent nature of the crime, the recommendation in the probation report, and the appellant’s disciplinary history in school including three suspensions, one of which was based upon the threat of violence against a teacher, the Family Court properly found that the “least restrictive [dispositional] alternative” was probation supervision for a period of 18 months *(see*Family Ct Act § 352.2 [2] [a]; *Matter of Naiquan T.,*265 AD2d 331 [1999]). The Family Court noted that the appellant’s conduct demonstrated “an increasing level of disrespect” and the appellant’s family circumstances rendered it inappropriate to impose a less restrictive disposition. The requirement that the Family Court impose the least restrictive alternative disposition does not require the court to actually try the lowest form of intervention and have it fail before trying a more restrictive form of intervention *(see Matter of Naiquan T., supra*at 332). Crane, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Lifson, JJ., concur.
(Franklin County Common Pleas,

1899.)

#### ANGOVE v. STATE OF OHIO.

An ordinance requiring bill posters to takeout a license before posting bills or distributing advertising matter, is in conflict with the federal constitution providing that the rights of the citizens of one state shall not be abridged by the residents of another.

Biggger, J.

(memorandum of decision.)

The ordinance in question interferes with or abridges the rights of a manufacturer of another state and is, therefore, in conflict with the. national constitution which says that the rights of citizens of one state shall not be abridged by the residents of another.

Error to the police court of Columbus.

This case involved the ordinance passed by the city council of Columbus requiring bilí posters to take out a license before distributing or posting bills or printed matter. Angove was arrested for distributing bills advertising “Pheno Caffine” made in Massachusetts, without first taking out a license. •He was fined $50 and costs.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**Certification Pursuant to 18 USC 1350, As AdoptedPursuant toSection 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of ProCyte Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for thequarter ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof, I, Robert W. Benson, Chief Financial Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to18 USC Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

 

1.               theForm 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

 

2.               theinformation contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  August 13, 2003 | By     | /s/ Robert W. Benson                                             |
|-----------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                        |   | Robert W. Benson, Chief  Financial Officer,  ProCyte Corporation |

 

----
Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

§ 203.4 Financial institution eligibility for designation as a TT&L depositary. ( a ) To be designated as a TT&L depositary, a financial institution must be insured as a national banking association, state bank, savings bank, savings association, building and loan, homestead association, Federal home loan bank, credit union, trust company, or a U.S. branch of a foreign banking corporation, the establishment of which has been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency.
( b ) A financial institution must possess the authority to pledge collateral to secure TT&L account balances, a TIP main account balance, an SDI account balance, or a no account balance as applicable.
( c ) In order to be designated as a TT&L depositary for the purposes of processing Federal tax deposits through PATAX, a financial institution must possess under its charter either general or specific authority permitting the maintenance of the TT&L account, the balance of which is payable on demand without previous notice of intended withdrawal. In addition, investor depositaries and retainer depositaries must possess either general or specific authority permitting the maintenance of a TIP main account 27 balance or an SDI account balance. Investor, retainer, and collector depositaries that accept term investments must possess either general or specific authority permitting the maintenance of a TIO account balance. In the case of investor and retainer depositaries maintaining a TIP main account balance or an SDI account balance, the authority must perm it the maintenance of a TIP main account balance or an SDI account balance which is payable on demand without previous notice of intended withdrawal.
39941.

#### COMPTON v. WEEKES, Administrator.

Hall, Judge.

1. A suit against one described in the suit as “John Wesley Weekes, Administrator of the Estate of Robert F. Norton, Sr.,” is a suit against John Wesley Weekes individually. *Nolin v. Mooty,*29 Ga. App. 97 (1) (113 SE 814).

2. Assuming that the petition was amendable under *Code*§ 81-1308, the record does not show any offer by the plaintiff to amend the petition prior to the judgment of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the petition. In the absence of *284such showing, it cannot be said that the trial judge erred in failing to give the plaintiff the opportunity to amend before sustaining the demurrer. *Ripley v. Eady & Mayfield,*106 Ga. 422 (2) (32 SE 343).

Decided January 31, 1963.

*Linus L. Zukas,*for plaintiff in error’.

*Dennis, Bowden & Barton, Charles S. Barton, Weekes & Candler, John Wesley Weekes,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Carlisle, P. J., and Bell, J., concur.*
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