NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 11-3949

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GEORGE DELGADO,

 Appellant

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-06-cr-00602-003)

District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 28, 2012

Before: SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,* District Judge.

(Filed: June 29, 2012)

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

George Delgado (“Delgado”) appeals from a judgment of sentence entered by the 

District Court. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.

 

*

The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, District Judge for the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2

I.

We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 

legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 

analysis.

Delgado entered a guilty plea on February 5, 2007, to six counts of mail fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and five counts of health care fraud, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1347. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, to be 

followed by three years of supervised release. Delgado completed the term of 

imprisonment on February 11, 2009. On May 27, 2011, he was arrested by Philadelphia 

police and charged in state court with conspiracy and possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver. On August 12, the Probation Office submitted a notice 

of violation of supervised release. The District Court held a violations hearing on 

October 21, and Delgado stipulated to the violations. By this time, he had been convicted 

and sentenced in state court to one to two years‟ imprisonment on the drug offense, and a 

consecutive sentence of one to four years for a state probation violation. The Guidelines 

range for the violation of federal supervised release was 30 to 37 months, but the 

statutory maximum sentence was 24 months. The Probation Office recommended a 

sentence of 12 months, to run consecutive to the state court sentences. The District Court 

imposed a sentence of 18 months‟ imprisonment, to run consecutive to the state 

sentences. Delgado filed a timely notice of appeal.
3

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e). 

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review 

the reasonableness of a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); 

United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007). Where, as here, a defendant 

challenges only the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, “we will affirm . . . unless 

no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 

defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. The 

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. Id. at 567.

III.

Delgado has failed to meet this burden. When imposing a sentence for a violation 

of the conditions of supervised release, a district court must consider the relevant 

§ 3553(a) factors, as well as the policy statements under Chapter 7 of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543-44. A revocation sentence is imposed “primarily to 

sanction the defendant‟s breach of trust, „while taking into account, to a limited degree, 

the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.‟” Id.

at 544 (quoting United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006)).

Here, Delgado‟s sentence on the mail fraud and health care fraud convictions was 

well below the Guidelines range. As the District Court noted, it had previously given 
4

Delgado a “break,” and Delgado, apparently undeterred from criminal behavior, 

rewarded the District Court‟s trust by selling drugs. Under such circumstances, the 

sentence imposed by the District Court was clearly reasonable, especially given that it fell 

within the applicable Guidelines range. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 

(2007) (explaining that within-Guidelines sentences may be afforded a “presumption of 

reasonableness”).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.