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I Comunicações

Comissão

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Taxas de câmbio do euro (1)

20 de Dezembro de 2006

(2006/C 314/01)

1 euro= 

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(1)

Fonte: Taxas de câmbio de referência publicadas pelo Banco Central Europeu.

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Aviso de início de um processo anti-dumping relativo às importações de determinados compressores originários da República Popular da China

(2006/C 314/02)

A Comissão recebeu uma denúncia, apresentada ao abrigo do disposto no artigo 5.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 384/96 do Conselho relativo à defesa contra as importações objecto de dumping de países não membros da Comunidade Europeia («regulamento de base») (1), alegando que as importações de certos compressores originários da República Popular da China («país em causa») são objecto de dumping, causando por esse motivo um prejuízo importante à indústria comunitária.

1.   Denúncia

A denúncia foi apresentada em 20 de Novembro de 2006 pela Federazione ANIMA/COMPO («autor da denúncia»), em nome de produtores que representam uma parte importante, neste caso mais de 50 %, da produção comunitária total de determinados compressores.

2.   Produto

Os compressores alternativos, incluindo bombas para compressores alternativos, de débito não superior a 2 metros cúbicos (m3) por minuto, originários da República Popular da China, constituem o produto alegadamente objecto de dumping («produto em causa»), normalmente declarados no código NC ex 8414 40 10, 8414 80 22, ex 8414 80 28 e ex 8414 80 51. Estes códigos NC são indicados a título meramente informativo.

3.   Alegação de dumping

Em conformidade com o n.o 7 do artigo 2.o do regulamento de base, o autor da denúncia determinou o valor normal para a República Popular da China com base no preço num país de economia de mercado que é referido no ponto 5.1, alínea d), do presente aviso. A alegação de dumping baseia-se numa comparação entre o valor normal assim determinado e os preços de exportação do produto em causa para a Comunidade.

Nesta base, a margem de dumping calculada é significativa.

4.   Alegação de prejuízo

O autor da denúncia apresentou elementos de prova de que, em geral, as importações do produto em causa originárias da República Popular da China aumentaram em termos absolutos e em termos de parte de mercado.

É alegado que os volumes e os preços do produto em causa importado tiveram, entre outras consequências, um impacto negativo sobre a parte de mercado, as quantidades vendidas e o nível dos preços praticados pela indústria comunitária, que tiveram graves repercussões nos resultados globais e na situação financeira dessa indústria.

5.   Procedimento

Tendo decidido, após consulta do Comité Consultivo, que a denúncia foi apresentada pela indústria comunitária ou em seu nome e que existem elementos de prova suficientes para justificar o início de um processo, a Comissão dá início a um inquérito, em conformidade com o artigo 5.o do regulamento de base.

5.1.   Procedimento para a determinação do dumping e do prejuízo

O inquérito determinará se o produto em causa originário da República Popular da China é objecto de dumping e se esse dumping causou prejuízo.

a)   Amostragem

Tendo em conta o número aparentemente elevado de partes envolvidas neste processo, a Comissão pode decidir aplicar o método de amostragem, em conformidade com o artigo 17.o do regulamento de base.

i)   Amostra de produtores-exportadores da República Popular da China

Para que a Comissão possa decidir se é necessário recorrer ao método de amostragem e, em caso afirmativo, seleccionar uma amostra, todos os produtores-exportadores, ou representantes que ajam em seu nome, devem dar-se a conhecer, contactando a Comissão e facultando as seguintes informações sobre a respectiva empresa ou empresas, no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea b), subalínea i), e da forma indicada no ponto 7:

A fim de obter as informações que considera necessárias para a selecção da amostra de produtores-exportadores, a Comissão contactará igualmente as autoridades da República Popular da China e todas as associações de produtores-exportadores conhecidas.

ii)   Amostra de importadores

Para que a Comissão possa decidir se é necessário recorrer ao método de amostragem e, em caso afirmativo, seleccionar uma amostra, todos os importadores, ou representantes que ajam em seu nome, devem dar-se a conhecer, contactando a Comissão e facultando as seguintes informações sobre a respectiva empresa ou empresas, no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea b), subalínea i), e da forma indicada no ponto 7:

A fim de obter as informações que considera necessárias para a selecção da amostra dos importadores, a Comissão contactará igualmente as associações de importadores conhecidas.

iii)   Amostra de produtores comunitários

Atendendo ao elevado número de produtores comunitários que apoiam a denúncia, a Comissão tenciona examinar o prejuízo para a indústria comunitária recorrendo ao método de amostragem.

Para que a Comissão possa seleccionar uma amostra, todos os produtores comunitários devem dar-se a conhecer, fornecendo as seguintes informações sobre a sua empresa ou empresas, no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea b), subalínea i), e da forma indicada no ponto 7:

iv)   Selecção definitiva das amostras

Todas as partes interessadas que desejem fornecer informações pertinentes sobre a selecção da amostra devem fazê-lo no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea b), subalínea ii), do presente aviso.

A Comissão tenciona proceder à selecção definitiva das amostras após consultar as partes interessadas que se tenham manifestado dispostas a ser incluídas na amostra.

As empresas incluídas nas amostras devem responder a um questionário, no prazo fixado ponto 6, alínea b), subalínea iii), e colaborar no inquérito.

Caso não haja colaboração suficiente, a Comissão pode basear as suas conclusões nos dados disponíveis, em conformidade com o n.o 4 do artigo 17.o e com o artigo 18.o do regulamento de base. As conclusões baseadas nos dados disponíveis podem ser menos vantajosas para a parte em causa, tal como explicado no ponto 8.

b)   Questionários

A fim de obter as informações que considera necessárias para o inquérito, a Comissão enviará questionários à indústria comunitária incluída na amostra e a todas as associações de produtores comunitários, aos produtores-exportadores da República Popular da China incluídos na amostra, a todas as associações de produtores-exportadores, aos importadores incluídos na amostra e a todas as associações de importadores referidas na denúncia, bem como às autoridades do país de exportação em causa.

Os produtores-exportadores da República Popular da China que apresentem um pedido de aplicação de uma margem de dumping individual, ao abrigo do n.o 3 do artigo 17.o e do n.o 6 do artigo 9.o do regulamento de base, devem enviar um questionário devidamente preenchido no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea a), subalínea ii), do presente aviso. Devem, por conseguinte, solicitar um questionário no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea a), subalínea i). No entanto, devem ter presente que, caso opte por recorrer ao método de amostragem no que respeita aos produtores-exportadores, a Comissão pode, mesmo assim, decidir não calcular uma margem individual se o número de produtores-exportadores for de tal forma elevado que uma análise individual complique indevidamente a sua tarefa, impedindo a conclusão do inquérito em tempo útil.

c)   Recolha de informações e realização de audições

Convidam-se todas as partes interessadas a apresentar as suas observações e a fornecer informações complementares para além das respostas ao questionário, bem como elementos de prova de apoio. Essas informações, bem como os elementos de prova de apoio devem ser recebidos pela Comissão dentro do prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea a), subalínea ii).

Além disso, a Comissão pode ouvir as partes interessadas, desde que estas apresentem um pedido demonstrando que existem razões especiais para serem ouvidas. O referido pedido deve ser apresentado no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea a), subalínea iii).

d)   Selecção do país com economia de mercado

Em conformidade com o n.o 7, alínea a), do artigo 2.o do regulamento de base, a Comissão tenciona escolher o Brasil como país com economia de mercado adequado para efeitos da determinação do valor normal em relação à República Popular da China. Convidam-se as partes interessadas a apresentar as suas observações quanto à adequação desta escolha no prazo específico fixado no ponto 6, alínea c).

e)   Estatuto de economia de mercado

Relativamente aos produtores-exportadores da República Popular da China que apresentem pedidos e forneçam elementos de prova suficientes de que operam em condições de economia de mercado, ou seja, que preenchem os critérios definidos no n.o 7, alínea c), do artigo 2.o do regulamento de base, o valor normal será determinado em conformidade com o n.o 7, alínea b), do artigo 2.o do regulamento de base. Os produtores-exportadores que tencionem apresentar pedidos devidamente fundamentados devem fazê-lo no prazo específico fixado no ponto 6, alínea d). A Comissão enviará os formulários dos pedidos a todos os produtores-exportadores da República Popular da China mencionados na denúncia, assim como a todas as associações de produtores-exportadores referidas na denúncia e às autoridades da República Popular da China.

5.2.   Procedimento para avaliação do interesse da Comunidade

Em conformidade com o artigo 21.o do regulamento de base, e na eventualidade de as alegações relativas ao dumping e ao prejuízo por ele causado serem fundamentadas, será necessário determinar se a adopção de medidas anti-dumping não é contrária ao interesse da Comunidade. Por esta razão, a indústria comunitária, os importadores, as suas associações representativas, os utilizadores representativos e as organizações de consumidores representativas, desde que demonstrem que existe uma relação objectiva entre a sua actividade e o produto em causa, podem dar-se a conhecer e fornecer informações à Comissão nos prazos gerais fixados no ponto 6, alínea a), subalínea ii). As partes que ajam em conformidade com o período anterior podem solicitar uma audição, indicando as razões específicas para serem ouvidas, no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea a), subalínea iii). É de assinalar que qualquer informação apresentada em conformidade com o artigo 21.o será tomada em consideração unicamente se for corroborada por elementos de prova concretos no momento da sua apresentação.

6.   Prazos

a)   Prazos gerais

i)   Para as partes solicitarem um questionário ou outros formulários

Todas as partes interessadas devem solicitar um questionário ou outros formulários o mais rapidamente possível, o mais tardar 10 dias a contar da publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

ii)   Para as partes se darem a conhecer, responderem ao questionário e fornecerem quaisquer outras informações

Salvo especificação em contrário, para que as suas observações possam ser tidas em conta durante o inquérito, todas as partes interessadas devem dar-se a conhecer contactando a Comissão, apresentar as suas observações, responder ao questionário e fornecer outras informações no prazo de 40 dias a contar da data de publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia. Chama-se a atenção para o facto de o exercício da maioria dos direitos processuais previstos no regulamento de base depender de as partes se darem a conhecer no prazo acima mencionado.

As empresas seleccionadas para integrar uma amostra devem responder ao questionário no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea b), subalínea iii).

iii)   Audições

Todas as partes interessadas podem igualmente solicitar uma audição à Comissão no mesmo prazo de 40 dias.

b)   Prazo específico para a constituição da amostra

c)   Prazo específico para a selecção do país com economia de mercado

As partes no inquérito podem desejar apresentar as suas observações quanto à adequação da escolha do Brasil que, tal como referido no ponto 5.1, alínea d), a Comissão tenciona utilizar como país com economia de mercado para efeitos da determinação do valor normal no que diz respeito à República Popular da China. A Comissão deverá receber essas observações no prazo de 10 dias a contar da data de publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

d)   Prazo específico para a apresentação de pedidos de estatuto de economia de mercado e/ou de tratamento individual

Os pedidos de aplicação do estatuto de economia de mercado devidamente fundamentados [tal como referido no ponto 5.1, alínea e)] e/ou de tratamento individual ao abrigo do n.o 5 do artigo 9.o do regulamento de base, deverão ser recebidos pela Comissão no prazo de 15 dias a contar da data da publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

7.   Observações por escrito, respostas ao questionário e correspondência

Todas as observações e pedidos das partes interessadas devem ser efectuados por escrito (não em formato electrónico, salvo especificação em contrário) e conter o nome, endereço, correio electrónico e números de telefone e fax da parte interessada. Todas as observações por escrito, nomeadamente as informações solicitadas no presente aviso, as respostas aos questionários e demais correspondência, enviadas pelas partes interessadas a título confidencial, devem conter a menção «Divulgação restrita» (4) e, em conformidade com o n.o 2 do artigo 19.o do regulamento de base, vir acompanhadas de uma versão não confidencial, que deverá conter a menção «Para consulta pelas partes interessadas».

Endereço da Comissão para o envio da correspondência:

8.   Não colaboração

Caso uma parte interessada recuse o acesso às informações necessárias, não as faculte no prazo estabelecido ou impeça de forma significativa a realização do inquérito, podem ser estabelecidas conclusões preliminares ou finais, positivas ou negativas, com base nos dados disponíveis, em conformidade com o artigo 18.o do regulamento de base.

Sempre que se verificar que uma parte interessada prestou informações falsas ou erróneas, tais informações não serão tidas em conta, podendo ser utilizados os dados disponíveis. Se uma parte interessada não colaborar ou colaborar apenas parcialmente e, por conseguinte, as conclusões se basearem nos dados disponíveis, em conformidade com o artigo 18.o do regulamento de base, o resultado poderá ser-lhe menos favorável do que se tivesse colaborado.

9.   Calendário do inquérito

Em conformidade com o n.o 9 do artigo 6.o do regulamento de base, o inquérito será concluído no prazo de 15 meses a contar da data de publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia. Em conformidade com o n.o 1 do artigo 7.o do regulamento de base, podem ser instituídas medidas provisórias, o mais tardar 9 meses a contar da publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

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(1)JO L 56 de 6.3.1996, p. 1. Regulamento com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) n.o 2117/2005 do Conselho (JO L 340 de 23.12.2005, p. 17).

(2)  Podem solicitar margens individuais, em conformidade com o n.o 3 do artigo 17.o do regulamento de base, as empresas não incluídas na amostra, em conformidade com o n.o 5 do artigo 9.o do regulamento de base, as empresas que possam beneficiar de tratamento individual nos casos de países sem economia de mercado/economias em transição e, em conformidade com o n.o 7, alínea b), do artigo 2.o do regulamento de base, as empresas que requeiram o estatuto de empresa que opera em condições de economia de mercado. É de notar que os pedidos de tratamento individual devem ser apresentados ao abrigo do n.o 5 do artigo 9.o do regulamento de base e que os pedidos de estatuto de empresas que operam em condições de economia de mercado devem ser apresentados ao abrigo do n.o 7, alínea b), do artigo 2.o do regulamento de base.

(3)  Para a definição de empresas coligadas, ver o artigo 143.o do Regulamento (CEE) n.o 2454/93 da Comissão, que fixa determinadas disposições de aplicação do Regulamento (CEE) n.o 2913/92 do Conselho, que estabelece o Código Aduaneiro Comunitário (JO L 253 de 11.10.1993, p. 1).

(4)  Esta menção significa que se trata de um documento interno, protegido ao abrigo do disposto no artigo 4.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1049/2001 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, relativo ao acesso do público aos documentos do Parlamento Europeu, do Conselho e da Comissão (JO L 145 de 31.5.2001, p. 43). Trata-se de um documento confidencial em conformidade com o artigo 19.o do regulamento de base e com o artigo 6.o do Acordo da OMC sobre a aplicação do artigo VI do GATT de 1994 (Acordo Anti-dumping).

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Autorização de auxílios concedidos pelos Estados no âmbito das disposições dos artigos 87.o e 88.o do Tratado CE

A respeito dos quais a Comissão não levanta objecções

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2006/C 314/03)

O texto da decisão na(s) língua(s) que faz(em) fé, expurgado(s) dos respectivos dados confidenciais, está disponível no site:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

O texto da decisão na(s) língua(s) que faz(em) fé, expurgado(s) dos respectivos dados confidenciais, está disponível no site:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

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Comunicação da Comissão no âmbito da execução da Directiva 1999/5/CE do Conselho

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

Publicação dos títulos e referências das normas harmonizadas ao abrigo da directiva

(2006/C 314/04)

Exemplo: Para a EN 60215:1989, aplica-se o seguinte:

NOTA:

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(1)

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Comunicação da Comissão no âmbito da execução da Directiva 89/336/CEE do Conselho de 3 de Maio de 1989 relativa àaproximação das legislações dos Estados–Membros respeitantes à compatibilidade electromagnética

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(Publicação dos títulos e referências das normas harmonizadas ao abrigo da directiva)

(2006/C 314/05)

Nota geral: Para normas de produto (família) em que a palavra «INEXISTENTE» seja indicada na quarta coluna e caso a data de cessação de conformidade não tenha ainda expirado, as normas genéricas conferem igualmente a presunção de conformidade.

Exemplo: Para a EN 61037:1992, aplica-se o seguinte:

AVISO:

Esta lista substitui todas as listas anteriores publicadas no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

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(1)

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Comunicação da Comissão no âmbito da execução da Directiva 89/686/CEE do Conselho, de 21 de Dezembro de 1989, relativa à aproximação das legislações dos Estados-Membros respeitantes aos equipamentos de protecção individual

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(Publicação dos títulos e referências das normas harmonizadas ao abrigo da directiva)

(2006/C 314/06)

AVISO:

Mais informação está disponível em:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/standardization/harmstds.

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(1)  OEN: Organismo Europeu de Normalização:

(2)JO L 204 de 21.7.1998, p. 37.

(3)JO L 217 de 5.8.1998, p. 18.

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Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros relativas a auxílios estatais concedidos nos termos do Regulamento (CE) n.o 70/2001 da Comissão, de 12 de Janeiro de 2001, relativo à aplicação dos artigos 87.o e 88.o do Tratado CE aos auxílios estatais a favor das pequenas e médias empresas

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2006/C 314/07)

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(1)  O montante de auxílio concedido à empresa beneficiária é expresso em equivalente subvenção bruta.

(2)   Se necessário, a medida será adaptada em conformidade com as disposições relevantes, na sequência da revisão do Regulamento (CE) n,o 70/2001. Do facto será dado conhecimento à Comissão.

(3)  Se necessário, a medida será adaptada em conformidade com as disposições relevantes, na sequência da revisão do Regulamento (CE) n.o 70/2001. Do facto será dado conhecimento à Comissão.

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Aviso de início de um processo anti-dumping relativo a importações de determinados dióxidos de manganês originários da África do Sul

(2006/C 314/08)

A Comissão recebeu uma denúncia, apresentada ao abrigo do disposto no artigo 5.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 384/96 do Conselho, relativo à defesa contra as importações objecto de dumping de países não membros da Comunidade Europeia (1) («regulamento de base»), com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) n.o 2117/2005 (2), alegando que as importações de determinados dióxidos de manganês originários da África do Sul («país em causa»), estão a ser objecto de dumping, causando por esse motivo um prejuízo importante à indústria comunitária.

1.   Denúncia

A denúncia foi apresentada em 10 de Novembro de 2006 pela empresa Tosoh Hellas AIC («autor da denúncia»), que representa uma parte importante, neste caso mais de 25 %, da produção comunitária total de determinados dióxidos de manganês.

2.   Produto

Determinados dióxidos de manganês electrolíticos (dióxidos de elevado grau de pureza de manganês fabricados por processo electrolítico e que não foram sujeitos ao tratamento térmico que normalmente se destina a torná-los adequados para aplicação em baterias de lítio), originários da África do Sul, constituem o produto alegadamente objecto de dumping («produto em causa»), normalmente declarado no código NC ex 2820 10 00. Este código NC é indicado a título meramente informativo.

3.   Alegação de dumping

Uma vez que não se realizaram vendas suficientes no mercado interno da África do Sul, a alegação de dumping relativa a este país baseia-se numa comparação entre um valor normal construído e os preços de exportação do produto em causa para a Comunidade.

Com esta base, a margem de dumping calculada é significativa.

4.   Alegação de prejuízo

O autor da denúncia apresentou elementos de prova de que as importações do produto em causa originário da África do Sul registaram um aumento global em termos absolutos e em termos de parte de mercado.

É alegado que os volumes e os preços do produto importado em causa tiveram, entre outras consequências, um impacto negativo sobre o nível dos preços praticados pela indústria comunitária, o que teve efeitos adversos significativos na situação financeira e na situação do emprego desta indústria.

5.   Processo

Tendo decidido, após consulta do Comité Consultivo, que a denúncia foi apresentada pela indústria comunitária ou em seu nome e que existem elementos de prova suficientes para justificar o início de um processo, a Comissão dá início a um inquérito, em conformidade com o artigo 5.o do regulamento de base.

5.1.   Procedimento para a determinação do dumping e do prejuízo

O inquérito determinará se o produto em causa originário da África do Sul está a ser objecto de dumping e se este causou prejuízo.

a)   Questionários

A fim de obter as informações que considera necessárias para o inquérito, a Comissão enviará questionários à indústria comunitária e a todas as associações de produtores na Comunidade, aos produtores-exportadores da África do Sul, a todas as associações de produtores-exportadores, aos importadores, a todas as associações de importadores citadas na denúncia e às autoridades do país de exportação em causa.

Em qualquer caso, convidam-se todas as partes interessadas a contactar a Comissão o mais rapidamente possível por fax, o mais tardar no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea a), a fim de saberem se são citadas na denúncia e, se necessário, solicitarem um questionário, dado que o prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea b), lhes é aplicável.

b)   Recolha de informações e realização de audições

Convidam-se todas as partes interessadas a apresentar as suas observações e a fornecer informações complementares para além das respostas ao questionário, bem como elementos de prova de apoio. Essas informações e esses elementos de prova de apoio devem ser recebidos pela Comissão dentro do prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea b).

Além disso, a Comissão pode ouvir as partes interessadas, desde que estas apresentem um pedido demonstrando que existem razões especiais para serem ouvidas. Esse pedido deve ser apresentado dentro do prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea c).

5.2.   Procedimento para avaliação do interesse comunitário

Em conformidade com o artigo 21.o do regulamento de base, e na eventualidade de as alegações relativas ao dumping e ao prejuízo por ele causado serem fundamentadas, será necessário determinar se a adopção de medidas anti-dumping não é contrária ao interesse da Comunidade. Por esta razão, a indústria comunitária, os importadores, as suas associações representativas, os utilizadores representativos e as organizações de consumidores representativas, desde que demonstrem que existe uma relação objectiva entre a sua actividade e o produto em causa, podem dar-se a conhecer e fornecer informações à Comissão nos prazos fixados no ponto 6, alínea b). As partes que ajam em conformidade com o período anterior podem solicitar uma audição, indicando as razões específicas para serem ouvidas, no prazo fixado no ponto 6, alínea c). É de assinalar que qualquer informação apresentada em conformidade com o artigo 21o será tomada em consideração unicamente se for corroborada por elementos de prova concretos no momento da sua apresentação.

6.   Prazos

a)   Para as partes solicitarem um questionário

Todas as partes interessadas devem solicitar um questionário ou outros formulários o mais rapidamente possível, o mais tardar 15 dias a contar da data de publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

b)   Para as partes se darem a conhecer, responderem ao questionário e fornecerem outras informações. Salvo indicação em contrário, para que as suas observações possam ser tidas em conta durante o inquérito, todas as partes interessadas devem dar-se a conhecer contactando a Comissão, apresentar as suas observações, responder ao questionário e fornecer as demais informações no prazo de 40 dias a contar da data de publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

Chama-se a atenção para o facto de o exercício da maioria dos direitos processuais previstos no regulamento de base depender de as partes se darem a conhecer no prazo acima mencionado.

c)   Audições

Todas as partes interessadas podem igualmente solicitar uma audição à Comissão no mesmo prazo de 40 dias.

7.   Observações por escrito, respostas ao questionário e correspondência

Todos os pedidos e observações das partes interessadas devem ser apresentados por escrito (não em formato electrónico, salvo indicação em contrário) e incluir nome, endereço, correio electrónico e números de telefone e fax da parte interessada.

Endereço da Comissão para o envio da correspondência:

8.   Não colaboração

Caso uma parte interessada recuse o acesso às informações necessárias, não as faculte no prazo estabelecido ou impeça de forma significativa a realização do inquérito, podem ser estabelecidas conclusões provisórias ou finais, positivas ou negativas, com base nos dados disponíveis, em conformidade com o artigo 18.o do regulamento de base.

Sempre que se verificar que uma parte interessada prestou informações falsas ou erróneas, tais informações não serão tidas em conta, podendo ser utilizados os dados disponíveis. Se uma parte interessada não colaborar ou colaborar apenas parcialmente e, por conseguinte, as conclusões se basearem nos dados disponíveis, em conformidade com o artigo 18.o do regulamento de base, o resultado poderá ser-lhe menos favorável do que se tivesse colaborado.

9.   Calendário do inquérito

Em conformidade com o n.o 9 do artigo 6.o do regulamento de base, o inquérito será concluído no prazo de 15 meses a contar da data de publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia. Em conformidade com o n.o 1 do artigo 7.o do regulamento de base, podem ser instituídas medidas provisórias o mais tardar nove meses a contar da data de publicação do presente aviso no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

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(1)JO L 56 de 6.3.1996, p. 1, com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) n.o 2117/2005 do Conselho (JO L 340 de 23.12.2005, p. 17).

(2)JO L 340 de 23.12.2005, p. 17.

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Autorização de auxílios concedidos pelos Estados no âmbito das disposições dos artigos 87.o e 88.o do Tratado CE

A respeito dos quais a Comissão não levanta objecções

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2006/C 314/09)

O texto da decisão na(s) língua(s) que faz(em) fé, expurgado(s) dos respectivos dados confidenciais, está disponível no site:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

O texto da decisão na(s) língua(s) que faz(em) fé, expurgado(s) dos respectivos dados confidenciais, está disponível no site:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

O texto da decisão na(s) língua(s) que faz(em) fé, expurgado(s) dos respectivos dados confidenciais, está disponível no site:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

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Notificação nos termos do n.o 4 do artigo 95.o do Tratado CE

Retirada de um pedido para manter disposições nacionais em derrogação de uma medida comunitária de harmonização

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2006/C 314/10)

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(1)JO L 304 de 21.11.2003, p. 1.

(2)  Decreto n.o 474/2000, que fixa os requisitos em matéria de adubos.

(3)JO L 150 de 3.6.2006, p. 17.

(4)  http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scher/scher_opinions_en.htm.

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ESPAÇO ECONÓMICO EUROPEU

Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA

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Informações resumidas para publicação no JO

(2006/C 314/11)

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Orientações para o cálculo das coimas aplicadas por força do n.o 2, alínea a), do artigo 23.o do Capítulo II do Protocolo n.o 4 ao Acordo que cria um Órgão de Fiscalização e um Tribunal

(2006/C 314/12)

INTRODUÇÃO

MÉTODO PARA A FIXAÇÃO DAS COIMAS

1.   Montante de base da coima

A.   Determinação do valor das vendas

B.   Determinação do montante de base da coima

2.   Ajustamentos do montante de base

A.   Circunstância agravantes

B.   Circunstâncias atenuantes

C.   Aumento específico tendo em vista o carácter dissuasivo

D.   Limiar máximo legal

E.   Comunicação sobre a clemência

F.   Capacidade contributiva

CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

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(1)JO C 210 de 1.9.2006, p. 2.

(2)  A competência para tratar casos individuais abrangidos pelos artigos 53.o e 54.o do Acordo EEE encontra-se dividida entre o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA e a Comissão nos termos do disposto no artigo 56.o do Acordo EEE. Apenas um destes órgãos de fiscalização tem competência para tratar de um caso específico.

(3)  Na sequência do Acordo que altera o Protocolo n.o 4 ao Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, de 24 de Setembro de 2004, que entrou em vigor em 20 de Maio de 2005, o Capítulo II do referido protocolo reflecte em larga medida, no pilar EFTA, o disposto no Regulamento (CE) n.o 1 do Conselho, de 16 de Dezembro de 2002, relativo à execução das regras de concorrência estabelecidas nos artigos 81.o e 82.o do Tratado (JO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1) .

(4)  Ver relativamente a este aspecto, por exemplo, os processos C -189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P a C-208/02 e C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri A/S e outros / Comissão [2005], Col. I-5425, ponto 172.

(5)  Orientações do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA para o cálculo das coimas, JO C 10 de 16.1.2003, p. 16 e Suplemento EEE do JO n.o 3 de 16.1.2003, p. 6.

(6)  «Orientações para o cálculo das coimas aplicadas por força do n.o 2 do artigo 15.o do Regulamento n.o 17 e do n.o 5 do artigo 65.o do Tratado CECA» (JO C 9 de 14.1.1998, p. 3).

(7)  Esta missão é partilhada com a Comissão nos termos do disposto no artigo 55.o do Acordo EEE, bem como nos termos das regras em matéria de atribuição de competências previstas no artigo 56.o do Acordo EEE, ver nota 2.

(8)  Ver relativamente a este aspecto, por exemplo, Dansk Rørindustri A/S e outros / Comissão, acima referido, ponto 170.

(9)  Ver relativamente a este aspecto, os processos apensos 100/80 a 103/80, Musique Diffusion française e outros / Comissão,[1983] Col. p. 1825, ponto 106.

(10)  Tal será o caso, por exemplo, de acordos horizontais de fixação de preços relativamente a um dado produto, quando o preço desse produto determina por sua vez os preços de produtos de qualidade inferior ou superior.

(11)  Nestes incluem-se os acordos, práticas concertadas e decisões de associações de empresas na acepção do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

(12)  Isto sem prejuízo de qualquer tipo de acção que possa ser intentada contra o Estado da EFTA em questão.

(13)  O texto do Capítulo II do Protocolo n.o 4 do Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal (que corresponde ao Regulamento n.o 17 de 6 de Fevereiro de 1962: primeiro regulamento de execução dos artigos 85.o e 86.o [agora 81.o e 82.o] do Tratado (JO 13 de 21.2.1962, p. 204) foi substituído em 20 de Maio de 2005, ver nota 3.

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Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 ao Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal sobre o Fundo de Financiamento à Habitação (FFH) da Islândia.

(2006/C 314/13)

Por Decisão 185/06/COL, de 21 de Junho de 2006, publicada na língua que faz fé a seguir ao presente resumo, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA deu início a um procedimento nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 ao Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça (Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal). O Governo da Islândia foi informado através da transmissão de uma cópia da decisão.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA notifica por este meio os Estados da EFTA, os Estados-Membros da UE e as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações sobre a medida em causa no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação da presente comunicação, enviando-as para o seguinte endereço:

As observações serão comunicadas ao Governo da Islândia. Qualquer interessado que apresente observações pode solicitar por escrito o tratamento confidencial da sua identidade, devendo justificar o pedido.

RESUMO

CONTEXTO

Em 11 de Agosto de 2004, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA adoptou a Decisão n.o 213/04/COL (1). Nessa decisão, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, em conformidade com o n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE, considerou o Fundo de Financiamento à Habitação (FFH) da Islândia compatível com as regras em matéria de auxílios estatais.

O FFH, uma instituição da propriedade integral do Estado islandês, concede empréstimos hipotecários à habitação a residentes na Islândia. O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA considerou que o FFH beneficiava de auxílios estatais do Estado islandês nos termos do n.o 1 do artigo 61.o do Acordo EEE, no que se refere ao financiamento e execução do seu regime de empréstimos. Além disso, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA considerou que o regime FFH, criado em 1999, constituía um «novo auxílio», ilegal do ponto de vista processual, que devia ter sido notificado e aprovado pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA nos termos do n.o 3 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal, antes de ser posto em execução.

Não obstante, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concluiu que o serviço prestado pelo FFH podia ser qualificado como um «serviço de interesse económico geral», na acepção do n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE. A referida conclusão baseou-se na premissa de que o FFH foi obrigado a disponibilizar financiamento à habitação a juros acessíveis nas mesmas condições em todo o território da Islândia, independentemente da rendibilidade de cada operação. Na opinião do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, o FFH passou a oferecer um serviço que não estava disponível no mercado islandês. Consequentemente, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA decidiu aprovar o regime FFH, tendo procedido a uma análise preliminar, sem dar início a um procedimento de investigação formal nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal.

Tal decisão foi contestada pela associação islandesa de entidades bancárias e de sociedades financeiras de corretagem através de uma acção intentada no Tribunal da EFTA. A acção de anulação baseou-se, nomeadamente, no argumento de que o FFH não presta um serviço de interesse económico geral, na medida em que a banca privada oferece empréstimos à habitação em condições comparáveis. Consequentemente, o FFH não poderia beneficiar da derrogação prevista no n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE. Foi igualmente alegado que devido à existência de dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade do FFH com o n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA devia ter dado início a um procedimento formal de investigação.

O ACÓRDÃO DO TRIBUNAL DA EFTA DE 7 DE ABRIL DE 2006 PROFERIDO NO PROCESSO E-9/04

O Tribunal da EFTA deferiu o pedido (2). Segundo o Tribunal da EFTA, o regime de auxílios estatais em questão levantou dúvidas ... quanto à sua compatibilidade com o Acordo EEE, dúvidas essas que não foram esclarecidas no decurso da análise preliminar. Consequentemente, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA tinha obrigação de dar início a um procedimento de investigação formal nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal. Uma vez que tal procedimento não foi iniciado, o Tribunal da EFTA anulou a decisão do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA.

No que respeita à aplicação do n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE, o Tribunal da EFTA considerou que um serviço com os objectivos do regime de empréstimos do FFH pode ser qualificado como um serviço de interesse económico geral, justificando-se assim o auxílio estatal. Todavia, determinados aspectos do regime levantaram dúvidas quanto à sua compatibilidade com o Acordo EEE. O regime de empréstimos não previa apenas a concessão de empréstimos para a construção ou a aquisição de habitações que reúnam todos os critérios em termos de dimensão e de valor, nem se limitava a apoiar os beneficiários no financiamento das suas habitações. O Tribunal da EFTA considerou igualmente que subsistiam dúvidas a nível da identificação do mercado do produto relevante, a fim de apreciar se o regime de empréstimos era susceptível de afectar o desenvolvimento das trocas comerciais de maneira que contrarie os interesses das Partes Contratantes do Acordo EEE, nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE.

CONSEQUÊNCIAS DO ACÓRDÃO

O objectivo da presente decisão de início do processo consiste em dar seguimento ao acórdão do Tribunal da EFTA e convidar as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações, a fim de determinar se os serviços prestados pelo FFH respeitam as condições estabelecidas no n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE.

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(1)  Aficha de informação da referida decisão foi publicada no JO C 112 de 12.5.2005, p. 8. Aficha indica o sítio Web do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA onde está disponível otexto integral da decisão, omitidos os dados confidenciais: www.eftasurv.int/fieldofwork/fieldstateaid/stateaidregistry/

(2)  Acórdão proferido em 7 de Abril de 2006 no processo E-9/04 Associação islandesa de entidades bancárias e de sociedades financeiras de corretagem/Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA [2006] Col. do Tribunal da EFTA (ainda não publicado). O acórdão está disponível no sítio Web do Tribunal da EFTA: www.eftacourt.lu

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EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 185/06/COL

of 21 June 2006

to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY,

HAVING REGARD TO the Agreement on the European Economic Area (1), in particular to Articles 59, 61 to 63 and Protocol 26 thereof,

HAVING REGARD TO the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (2), in particular to Article 24 and Protocol 3 thereof,

HAVING REGARD TO the EFTA Surveillance Authority's Decision No 213/04/COL of 11 August 2004 concerning the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund and an increase of lending by that fund up to 90 % of the purchase price of housing (3),

HAVING REGARD TO the judgment of the EFTA Court dated 7 April 2006 in Case E-9/04 concerning an application for annulment of Decision No 213/04/COL regarding the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund (4),

HAVING REGARD TO the Authority's Guidelines (5) on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, and in particular Chapter 18C on ‘State aid in the form of public service compensation’,

WHEREAS:

I.   FACTS

1.   Introduction

On 11 August 2004, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Authority’) adopted Decision No 213/04/COL. In this Decision the Authority declared, according to Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund (Íbúðalánasjóður) to be compatible with the State aid rules.

The Icelandic Housing Financing Fund (hereinafter referred to as ‘the HFF’ or ‘the HFF system’), an institution wholly owned by the Icelandic State, provides mortgage-secured housing loans to residents in Iceland. The Authority found that in funding and operating its loan system, the HFF received State aid from the Icelandic State within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority found that the HFF system, established in 1999, constituted ‘new aid’, unlawful on procedural grounds, which should have been notified to and approved by the Authority pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, prior to putting it into effect.

Nevertheless, the Authority concluded that the service provided for by the HFF could be qualified as a ‘service of general economic interest’, in the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement. This conclusion was based on the premise that the HFF was obliged to provide house financing at affordable rates and on equal conditions throughout the entire Icelandic territory, irrespective of the profitability of individual operations. In the Authority's view, the HFF offered a service which was not available on the private market in Iceland. Therefore, the Authority decided to approve the HFF system, by means of a preliminary examination, without opening the so-called formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

This Decision was challenged before the EFTA Court by an application of the Bankers' and Securities' Dealers Association of Iceland. The annulment action was, inter alia, based on the plea that the HFF did not provide a service of general economic interest, since the private banks offered house financing at comparable conditions. The HFF could therefore not profit from the derogation in Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement. It was further argued that because of the difficulty to declare the HFF compatible with Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, the Authority should have opened the formal investigation procedure.

The EFTA Court sustained the application. In the opinion of the EFTA Court, the State aid scheme in question had raised ‘doubts ... as to the compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement’, doubts which had not been overcome by means of the preliminary examination. Hence, the Authority was under an obligation to initiate a formal investigation procedure as provided for under Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, before making a decision. This was not done and, for that reason, the EFTA Court annulled the Authority's Decision.

With regard to the application of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, the Court found that a service with the objectives of the HFF's loan scheme may qualify as a service of general economic interest justifying State aid. However, certain specific features of the scheme gave rise to doubts as to the compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. The loan scheme was not limited to providing loans for the construction or purchase of dwellings that fulfilled any particular criteria as to size or value. Neither was the lending scheme limited to assisting the borrowers in financing their own dwellings. The EFTA Court also found that there were doubts as to the identification of the relevant product market for the assessment of whether the lending scheme would affect the development of trade contrary to the interest of the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement, in the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.

The purpose of this opening Decision is to follow the EFTA Court's judgment and to call upon the parties concerned to submit their comments, in order to clarify whether the services provided by the HFF comply with the conditions laid down in Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   The administrative procedure and developments leading up to the EFTA Court's judgment of 7 April 2006

By letter of 20 November 2003 from the Icelandic Mission to the EU, forwarding a letter from the Icelandic Ministry of Finance dated the same date, both received and registered by the Authority on 25 November 2003 (Doc No: 03-8227 A, now Event No: 255584), the Icelandic Government notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, an increase of lending by the HFF up to 90 % of the purchase price of housing.

According to Article 5(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Competition and State Aid Directorate sent a letter dated 23 January 2004 (Event No: 184357), requesting additional information from the Icelandic Government. By letter of 11 March 2004 from the Icelandic mission to the EU, forwarding a letter from the Icelandic Ministry of Finance dated the same date, both received and registered by the Authority on 12 March 2004 (Event No: 259197), the Ministry of Finance replied to the request for additional information. Attachments to the letter of 11 March 2004 were forwarded separately by the Icelandic Mission to the EU on 18 March 2004, received and registered by the Authority on the same day (Event No: 259976).

By letter dated 23 April 2004, received and registered by the Authority on 27 April 2004 (Event No: 279495), the Bankers' and Securities Dealers' Association of Iceland (hereinafter referred to as ‘SBV’) lodged a complaint with the Authority, alleging that the ‘... current legislation in Iceland on the operation of the State Housing Financing Fund is incompatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular the competition rules, the rules on State aid, free movement of services, capital and the freedom of establishment of the EEA Agreement’. As a consequence of this complaint, the Authority opened two additional cases, to the already existing State aid case, which dealt separately with the alleged infringements of the competition rules and the rules on the four freedoms.

Based on Article 5(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Competition and State Aid Directorate sent a letter dated 14 May 2004 (Event No: 280306) to the Icelandic Government requesting, for a second time, information and clarification, and forwarded by that letter with the consent of SBV, a copy of the complaint.

The notification was discussed between representatives of the Icelandic Ministries of Finance and Social Affairs, the HFF and the Authority during the State aid package meeting in Reykjavik on 26 May 2004. By letter of 10 June 2004 from the Icelandic Mission to the EU, forwarding a letter from the Icelandic Ministry of Finance dated the same date, both received and registered by the Authority on 11 June 2004 (Event No: 284350), the Ministry of Finance replied to the second request for information.

On the request of SBV, a meeting took place in Brussels on 14 June 2004 between representatives of SBV and the Authority, to discuss the complaint.

By letter of 23 June 2004 (Event No: 284459), the Authority informed SBV that it saw no reason to take further action on the complaint with regard to the alleged abuse of the dominant position of the HFF. Therefore, the Authority indicated that it was inclined to close the case, unless SBV would submit further information or arguments within two weeks from the receipt of the letter. SBV did not react to the letter.

On 1 July 2004, the Icelandic Mission to the EU forwarded a letter from the Icelandic Ministry of Finance dated 30 June 2004, received and registered by the Authority on 1 July 2004 (Event No: 286392), in which the Icelandic Government provided outstanding information in response to the Authority's second information request.

By letter of 1 July 2004 (Event No: 285198), the Authority informed SBV that it had not been able to detect any incompatibility of the HFF system with the four freedoms. SBV was informed that the case was proposed to be closed and was invited to submit its comments at the latest by 12 July 2004. SBV did not react to the letter.

The Authority received an email from the Department of Local Government in the Ministry of Social Affairs on 7 July 2004, registered by the Authority on 8 July 2004 (Event No: 287125), by which the Icelandic Government forwarded the following laws: Act No 57/2004, amending the Housing Act No 44/1998; Regulation No 544/2004 on ‘the Finances and Risk Management of the Housing Financing Fund’; Regulation No 522/2004 on ‘HFF Mortgages and HFF Bonds’; Regulation No 521/2004 on ‘Loan Proportions and Maximum Amounts of HFF Mortgages’ (6). By the same email the Icelandic Government also provided a document on the HFF's Funding and Risk Policy elaborated by a financial consultant.

Supplementary information and explanations concerning the above mentioned laws, the document on the HFF's Funding and Risk Policy, and certain other issues were sent by fax from the Icelandic Ministry of Social Affairs dated 8 July 2004, forwarded to the Authority by letter of 9 July 2004 from the Icelandic Mission to the EU, received and registered by the Authority on the same day (Event No: 287337).

In light of the Authority's assessment of the raised competition issues and SBV's inactivity, the Authority decided to close the case and informed SBV of this closure by letter of 27 July 2004 (Event No: 288068).

On 11 August 2004, the Authority adopted Decision No 213/04/COL approving the HFF system and declaring it compatible with Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement (7).

By letter dated 23 August 2004 (Event No: 289467), the Authority informed SBV that it had closed the case with regard to the alleged violation of the four freedoms.

By letter dated 15 September 2004 (Event No: 292140), the Authority informed SBV of Decision No 213/04/COL and attached, to this end, a copy of the decision.

By an application lodged at the Registry of the EFTA Court on 23 November 2004, SBV brought an action under Article 36 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement for annulment of the Authority's Decision No 213/04/COL.

On 7 April 2006, the EFTA Court rendered its judgment in the case and annulled the Authority's Decision No 213/04/COL (hereinafter referred to as the ‘annulled Decision’) (8).

3.   The HFF system

3.3.   Background

In 1955, a basis for State involvement, both as regards policy making in the field of housing affairs and the provision of loans for private housing, was laid. Later the State Housing Agency (Húsnæðisstofnun ríkisins) was established by Act No 51/1980 and provided, inter alia, loans on preferential terms to private home buyers.

In 1986 Icelandic Government assistance to private home-ownership was tied to access to pension funds, with the pension funds being required to provide partial funding for the system. The Icelandic banks generally did not provide funding for private housing. At this time, the State Housing Agency issued housing loans at affordable rates. This led to a substantial increase in demand, which in turn stretched the resources of the pension funds beyond their limits. To remedy the situation and in order to generate more financial resources to finance housing, a Housing Bond system was introduced in 1989. The Housing Bond system generated funding for the provision of housing loans. The issuing of Housing Bonds and the operation of the system were entrusted to the State Housing Agency.

The Housing Bond system was not a traditional mortgage loan system, but a bond swap system, meaning that homebuyers applied to the HFF to issue a mortgage bond, which was secured against the property to be bought. The State Housing Agency then bought this bond from the homebuyer and paid for it by issuing a Housing Bond to the seller. This Housing Bond could then be freely traded in the securities market. The seller could sell the Housing Bond on the securities market, use it as means of payment or keep it.

The Housing Bonds had maximum loan periods of 40 years but were subject to prepayment without penalty. They were linked to the consumer price index and carried a fixed real interest of 4,75 %. The Housing Bonds were secured by all the assets of the State Housing Agency, which consisted primarily of the collateral (mortgage-secured bonds) that the Agency held in property. In addition, the Housing Bonds carried an implicit State guarantee, due to the State ownership of the State Housing Agency.

The mortgage bonds had the same loan terms as the Housing Bonds, but with a fixed interest surcharge of 0,35 percentage points, to cover operational costs and expected losses on loans. This meant that the lending rate under the Housing Bond system was set at 5,10 % in real terms.

3.2.   The Act on Housing Affairs No 44/1998

On 1 January 1999, the Act on Housing Affairs No 44/1998 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Housing Act’) entered into force (9).

The Housing Act established and governed the HFF (10). The HFF was entrusted with the management and implementation of housing affairs under the Housing Act. The previous State Housing system was repealed (11) and the HFF took over all assets and obligations of the State Housing Agency (12), including the tasks of issuing Housing Bonds and providing housing loans through the bond-swap system. The HFF is a separate State-owned institution subject to special management. The State carries full liability for all obligations undertaken by the HFF. Organisationally, the HFF is accountable to the Minister of Social Affairs, who appoints its Board of Directors in accordance with Article 7 of the Housing Act.

According to Article 1 of the Housing Act, it is the purpose of this Act ‘... to promote, through the granting of loans and the organisation of housing affairs, the ability of Icelanders to live with security and equal rights in housing affairs along with the special allocation of funds to increase people's chances of acquiring or renting housing on manageable terms’.

The Housing Act was amended, inter alia, by Act No 57/2004, which entered into force on 1 July 2004. A number of changes were made to the housing loan system. These changes comprised, inter alia, the abolition of the system of swapping mortgage bonds for Housing Bonds. After 1 July 2004, loans have been paid out in cash to home buyers and secured by mortgages in the property under purchase.

At the time the Authority adopted the annulled Decision, the HFF provided the following three loan categories:

3.2.1.   General Loans

The conditions for general loans are established in Chapter VI of the Housing Act. The general loans are available on equal terms to all residents in Iceland, regardless of nationality, on the conditions laid down in and pursuant to the Housing Act. The loans are not limited to persons with income below a certain income bracket or with limited assets.

Before a general loan is paid out, the borrower must issue a borrower's mortgage instrument as a security as stated in Article 19(1) of the Housing Act. Article 19(2) of the Housing Act and Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation No 521/2004 on ‘Loan Proportions and Maximum Amounts of Borrowers' Mortgages’ set out maximum amounts for general loans in percentage of the value of the housing and in absolute figures.

According to Article 19(2) of the Housing Act, prior to 1 July 2004, a mortgage bond was exchanged for a Housing Bond for an amount up to 70 % of a dwelling's appraised value if the applicant was buying or building his first dwelling, but otherwise for up to 65 % of the dwelling's appraised market value (the ‘relative lending cap’). The loans were also limited in relation to the fire insurance value, which was often lower than the market value. The relative lending cap has later been raised to 90 % with Act No 120/2004, amending the Housing Act, which entered into force on 3 December 2004.

In addition to the relative lending cap, the Housing Act, both under the bond-swap system and after the amendments of 1 July 2004, states that a maximum lending cap is to be specified in regulations (the ‘absolute lending cap’). As specified in Regulation No 521/2004, which entered into force on 1 July 2004, the absolute lending cap was ISK 9,7 million for new housing and ISK 9,2 million for existing housing. Regulation No 959/2004 replaced Regulation No 521/2004 on 6 December 2004 and the absolute lending cap was raised to ISK 14,9 million (subsequently increased to ISK 15,9 million and later to ISK 18 million) for both new and existing housing.

With the entry into force of Regulation No 522/2004 on 1 July 2004, a limit was set of two dwellings for each borrower financed through HFF general loans. In exceptional circumstances, a loan for a third dwelling could be authorised, but it would be up to the Board of Directors to define the precise conditions for such an exception.

3.2.2.   Additional Loans and Loans for rental housing

Prior to the amendments of 1 July 2004, additional loans and loans for rental housing were not financed through Housing Bonds, but through a separate class of bonds issued by the HFF. As of 1 July 2004, the HFF stopped issuing both separate class of bonds and the Housing Bonds. The main means of funding the HFF became the HFF bonds. Unlike the Housing Bonds, which were subject to prepayment without penalty, the HFF bonds are non-callable. As for the loans from the HFF which are still subject to prepayment without penalty, the interest surcharge paid by borrowers was increased from 0,35 to 0,6 percentage points as of 1 July 2004, in order to take account of the new risk created by the mismatch in optionality between assets and liabilities. However, as the HFF bonds are issued in classes with varying interest rates depending on the market situation, the interest rates charged to HFF borrowers fluctuate.

3.3.   The financing mechanism

The HFF financed its tasks with the income from the fund's equity capital (i.e. the payments, interest and indexation of granted loans), by issuing Housing Bonds and by the sale of Housing Authority Bonds and the taking of loans (13).

The HFF's management of its assets and liabilities is described in Article 11 of the Housing Act. The HFF must always have adequate liquid funds to honour its obligations. Furthermore, it has to keep its revenues and expenses in balance and must establish a risk management system. Further requirements concerning risk management are set out in Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation No 544/2004 on ‘the Financing and Risk Management of the Housing Financing Fund’, according to which the HFF must, inter alia, keep its equity ratio over 5 % and provide quarterly reports on the progress of its risk management policy and key figures in operation to the Minister of Social Affairs and the Financial Supervisory Authority.

In case of unexpected difficulties such as illness, accident, loss of employment or comparable situations, the HFF may extend refinancing loans for up to 15 years in order to address temporary payment difficulties experienced by borrowers according to Article 48(1) of the Housing Act. The HFF is further authorised to freeze payments from borrowers for up to three years and add the payments due during that period to the debt proper, if this is considered likely to prevent payment difficulties as stated in Article 48(2) of the Housing Act.

According to Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation No 119/2003 on ‘Treatment of claims by the Housing Financing Fund that are without Collateral’, the HFF shall not make claims against borrowers individually if a house or apartment which stands as a security for a HFF loan is sold or auctioned as a part of collection proceedings and the price does not cover the claim of the HFF. The remaining debt does not accumulate interest and is not subject to index linkage. If the borrower wants to obtain a new loan from the HFF during a period of 5 years after the sale or the auction, he/she can pay up the remaining debt by paying half the nominal amount, upon which the HFF is authorised to write off the other half according to Article 5. As stated in Article 6, five years after an apartment or a house is sold or auctioned as a part of collection proceedings, the HFF can write off the remaining debt if the borrower shows himself/herself unable to pay.

With regard to the HFF's more detailed financial figures, the Authority's annulled Decision was based on the following information, which was submitted by the Icelandic Government in the initial notification:

4.   Icelandic market for house financing and possible trade effects

4.1.   Situation before August 2004

The Icelandic market for mortgage loans was largely divided between three main actors. These were the HFF (previously the State Housing Agency), the pension funds and other private credit institutions. Between 1997 and 2003, the State Housing system had a market share of about 77,5 % to 79 %. The rest was shared between the pension funds (approximately 13 % to 17 %) and the commercial banks and savings banks (approximately 4,5 % to 8 %). The banks did, however, provide certain services for the HFF, such as being the sole agents for evaluating borrowers for the HFF. Until a process of privatisation was completed in 2002 — 2003, most of the commercial banks were controlled by the State as majority shareholder.

The Icelandic Government stated that private banks almost exclusively restricted lending for housing purchases to property around the Reykjavik area. The Icelandic Government stressed that the HFF is the only lender which offered loans on equal terms which are universally accessible throughout the Icelandic territory. When lending is broken down by geographic areas the trend shows that the further one moves outside of Reykjavik the higher the proportion of the HFF lending gets.

SBV has submitted some documentation during the EFTA Court proceedings, which, in SBV's opinion, demonstrated that the commercial banks have granted affordable loans outside the Reykjavik area during the period between 1999 and August 2004.

As regards the financial institutions' interest rates charged on loans, the Icelandic Government provided in the initial notification lending rates of banks and pension funds for the years 1999 to 2003, which showed an average lending rate in real terms of approximately 7,4 %.

The Icelandic Government further presented, in the initial notification, average funding rates by financial institutions in the Icelandic housing finance market for the years 1999 to 2003. The information showed average funding rates for banks (real interest rates) of 6,43 %, for pension funds of 3,50 % and for the HFF of 4,75 %.

According to information submitted by SBV, all commercial banks in Iceland, savings banks, pension funds and some mortgage companies offered long-term housing loans to the public. According to SBV, these loans carried a real interest rate of between 5,9 % and 7,9 % depending on the security.

According to the Icelandic Government, the housing loan market for individuals is by its nature a local market and does ‘normally’ not involve any direct cross-border transactions. The Icelandic Government stressed that no foreign banks are granting mortgage loans in ISK to Icelandic households. Furthermore, it was stated, in the initial notification, that there were currently no foreign financial institutions or representative offices of foreign financial institutions in Iceland. It was moreover pointed out that the Icelandic economy was very limited in size. The limited number and small size of transactions in trade in the foreign exchange markets of the ISK did not warrant interest from foreign banks. The special geography and the scattered population outside Reykjavik further reduced the foreign interest for lending to the Icelandic housing market.

4.2.   Situation after August 2004

During the court proceedings, SBV argued that the market situation in Iceland changed in summer 2004. According to SBV, commercial banks have offered competitive rates compared to HFF rates and have gained market shares. SBV stated in its application to the EFTA Court that ‘[...] commercial banks in Iceland have demonstrated, through recent cuts in interest rates, that they would be both willing and able to provide general loans on similar terms (or even better) then HFF’. It was, for example, submitted that since summer 2004, the gap between commercial banks and the HFF has completely disappeared, as the banks have reduced their interest rates on long-term housing loans to 4,2 % due to their improved refinancing conditions.

According to a Icelandic news agency (16), the price of residential property in the Reykjavík area has risen by 67 % since August 2004, when the commercial banks entered the mortgage market.

5.   Alternatives to the HFF system

In the procedure leading up to the annulled Decision, the Icelandic Government discussed possible alternatives to the HFF system. The Icelandic Government stated, inter alia, that abandoning Government intervention in house financing would lead to considerable changes for lower and middle income families, increase division between the Reykjavik area and the rest of the country and dramatically reduce the number of families able to purchase housing on the market. Alternatively, entrusting banks to lend with the same favourable conditions would not be possible without massive direct State aid.

The Icelandic Government discussed, in the initial notification of 20 November 2003, the following alternative models:

II.   APPRECIATION

1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

This implies that for measures to be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, they must be granted by the State or through State resources, confer an advantage on the recipient, be liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties and distort competition.

Beforehand, it needs to be clarified whether the HFF is subject to the application of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, since it has been argued by the Icelandic Government, in the initial notification, that the HFF could not be qualified as an undertaking in the meaning of that Article.

Firstly, the HFF is a separate State-owned institution set up by law, having its own board of directors and annual accounts. Secondly and more importantly, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court of Justice’) has repeatedly defined the concept of an undertaking as any entity engaged in an economic activity, which is any activity which offers goods or services on a given market, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed (17). Although the Icelandic Government considers the HFF not to be a separate undertaking, as it operates only as a ‘branch of the State itself’, the Authority takes the view that the HFF is engaged in an economic activity. The economic activity consists of offering services on the market for housing mortgage loans, i.e. long-term house financing (for residential accommodation). Therefore, it is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the HFF has to be qualified as an undertaking in the sense of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.   Transfer of State resources and thereby favouring certain undertakings

In order to qualify as State aid, the HFF system must imply a transfer of State resources and thereby confer on the Housing Financing Fund an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

1.1.1.   The Altmark conditions

The Icelandic Government argued initially in its notification that the HFF system does not constitute State aid, because the system would, inter alia, not confer any advantage on the HFF. In this respect, the Icelandic Government referred to the Altmark ruling (18) of the Court of Justice and argued that the HFF system would comply with all of the four criteria that the Court of Justice established in that ruling.

It needs to be recalled that the Court of Justice has established the following conditions, which need to be fulfilled cumulatively, for a State measure to escape the classification of State aid. These conditions are:

It is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the HFF system neither complies with the second nor with the fourth condition (19). Concerning the second condition, the Icelandic authorities did not establish in advance, and in an objective and transparent manner, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation was to be calculated, in order to avoid conferring an economic advantage, which may favour the HFF over competing undertakings. The Icelandic Government has not demonstrated that such an ex ante assessment has taken place in an objective and transparent manner. To establish the parameters for the calculation of the compensation would have required quantifying the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligation in advance and comparing them with the possible benefits that the HFF enjoys. However, such quantification of costs has not taken place. Based on that shortcoming, it is not apparent from the outset what the level of compensation will amount to, since the isolated costs incurred in discharging the public service obligation have not been identified. Furthermore, with regard to the fourth condition, the HFF has neither been chosen by way of a public procurement procedure nor did the Icelandic authorities determine the level of compensation by way of a comparison between the HFF and a privately run ‘reference company’, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.

Since the HFF system seems not to comply with all of the above mentioned conditions, there is a presumption that the HFF system involves State aid, if the conditions of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met.

1.1.2.   Possible State aid elements

The HFF enjoys an implicit State guarantee for all of its securities. The State guarantee results in a more favourable credit rating for its bonds than bonds issued by private undertakings. This leads to cheaper funding costs for the HFF. Private credit institutions do not benefit from such a State guarantee. The State guarantee confers an advantage on the HFF compared to private credit institutions. The HFF is not subject to a State guarantee fee under Article 7 of Act No 121/1997 on State Guarantees. Hence, the Icelandic State is foregoing revenue it would normally collect. Since the HFF is not paying a premium for the State guarantee it enjoys, it is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the State guarantee, without any sort of premium to be paid, implies a transfer of State resources which favours the HFF.

The HFF received interest support from the State to cover obligations resulting from lending below market rates at 3,5 % and 4,5 % for rented housing for low income families. The support has varied through the years. It was ISK 9 million in 2001 and 71 million in 2002. This interest support is financed by State resources. It is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the interest support constitutes an aid element. The Authority is not in possession of any up-dated figures with regard to the interest support for the years 2003 to 2006. If interest support was granted in these years, the Authority would qualify such support, in light of the above assessment, as a transfer of State resources which favours the HFF.

The HFF is exempted from corporate tax and property tax. The HFF has not paid what would have amounted to ISK 335 million in corporate tax and 417 million ISK in property tax for the years 1999 to 2002. Thus, the Icelandic State has foregone income, which under normal circumstances would have been charged to the HFF's budget. It is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the exemptions from corporate and property tax constitute aid elements. The Authority is not in possession of any up-dated figures for the years 2003 to 2006. Any forgone tax for these years would qualify, in light of the above assessment, as a transfer of State resources which favours the HFF.

The HFF is charged with preserving and earning a return on the funds it supervises. The return is intended to sustain the operations of the HFF. The HFF is, however, not required to pay out any dividends to its owner.

A normal market investor requires a sufficient return on his capital. It is the Authority's preliminary view that the fact that the HFF is per se relieved from paying out any dividends to its owner might imply that it is generating not a sufficient return on capital a normal market investor would expect and that this might imply foregone revenues for the State and thereby a transfer of State resources which favours the HFF.

The Icelandic Government argued that the special status of the HFF implied that it was not subject to the same rules (20) as private credit institutions, as regards capital adequacy requirements and minimum solvency ratio rules.

However, if the HFF were covered by the same rules as private credit institutions, then an exemption from these rules could imply State aid.

Capital adequacy requirements and minimum solvency ratio rules for credit institutions are contained in the Act referred to in point 14 of Chapter II(i) of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Banking Directive’) (21). In this context, the Authority notes that the adaptation text (22) to Article 2(3) of the Banking Directive explicitly exempted from the scope of that Directive in Iceland the ‘Byggingarsjóðir ríkisins’ (literally translated ‘the State's Building Funds’ (23)). The Icelandic Government stated that this term was traditionally used for the funds operated by the predecessor of the HFF, namely the State Housing Board, which comprised the State Housing Fund and the Workers' Building Fund. The HFF was established by taking over all assets and obligations of the State Housing Board.

Furthermore, Article 1(1) of the Banking Directive defines a credit institution as ‘an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account [...]’. Given the way the HFF's financing mechanism operates, the Authority cannot see how the HFF could be classified as a credit institution in the meaning of the Banking Directive because the HFF is not receiving any deposits or other repayable funds from the public.

In light of the above and for the limited purpose of identifying possible State aid elements, it is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the HFF is not covered by the scope of the Banking Directive. The HFF is therefore not subject to the same rules as private credit institutions as regards capital adequacy requirements and minimum solvency ratio rules. Since the HFF is not subject to these rules, it is consequently not relieved of charges that it would normally bear from its own budget. Hence, excluding the HFF from these requirements seems not to entail an aid element.

In any event, even if the HFF should have been subject to these rules, an exemption from these rules seems not to imply that any State resources have been transferred to the HFF. A transfer of State resources is, however, a necessary condition, in order to qualify a measure as State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (24).

1.2.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

The granting of loans for financing purchases of residential accommodation is a financial service which, in the present market circumstances, is predominantly of a local character and normally does not involve any direct cross-border transactions. Distortion of competition arising from financial advantages accorded to the HFF operating such services seems therefore prima facie likely to have only limited direct trade effects. However, it cannot be excluded that the aid, which is involved in the HFF system, threatens to distort competition between banks in the European Economic Area, by making it more difficult for them to enter the Icelandic housing mortgage loan market. Such a potential effect on trade is sufficient for State aid to be caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.3.   Conclusion

In light of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the HFF system involves State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. To enable the Authority to calculate the amount of potential State aid involved, it is necessary, in the course of this formal investigation procedure, to obtain up-dated figures concerning the HFF's financing mechanisms.

2.   Notification requirement and Standstill obligation

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

The above notification requirement and standstill obligation concern ‘new aid’. On the other hand, ‘existing aid’ can be granted until the Authority finds the aid in question to be incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

The HFF system was not notified to the Authority. The HFF was established and entered into force on 1 January 1999, i.e. after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, taking over all assets and obligations of its predecessor, the State Housing Agency. In this context, the Icelandic Government argued that the HFF system had to be classified as existing aid.

The Authority does not share this point of view. In deciding whether or not an aid scheme is to be regarded as ‘new aid’ or ‘existing aid’, the Authority examines the relevant legal provisions providing for the aid in question and in particular the entry into force of these provisions.

In such cases the Authority is not obliged to carry out an economic analysis of the measure in question as compared to aid schemes which were in place prior to the introduction of the new legal provisions. This view is confirmed by the ruling of the Court of Justice in Namur-Les Assurances. In that ruling the Court held that ‘[...] the emergence of new aid or the alteration of existing aid cannot be assessed according to the scale of the aid or, in particular, its amount in financial terms at any moment in the life of the undertaking if the aid is provided under earlier statutory provisions which remain unaltered. Whether aid may be classified as new aid or as alteration of existing aid must be determined by reference to the provisions providing for it’ (25)(emphasis added).

The fact that the HFF system is the result of alterations to an old system, by merging different legal entities, and that a complete new law was adopted, which repealed the previous State Housing system, and which forms the legal basis of the HFF and the loan system, are sufficient grounds to classify the entire HFF system as ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(3) in Part I and Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (26).

Therefore, it is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the HFF system, established in 1999, constitutes ‘new aid’, which, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, should have been notified to the Authority in advance (27). Since the HFF system was not notified to the Authority, it is considered to constitute ‘aid unlawful on procedural grounds’, in accordance with Articles 1(f) and 10 et seq. in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (28). It should be recalled that any unlawful aid, which is finally not declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, is subject to recovery, in accordance with Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. This issue will be further addressed below in section II.4. of this Decision.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

The Authority cannot declare State aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, if that aid would infringe other provisions of the EEA Agreement. SBV submitted in its initial complaint that the ‘Housing Financing Fund is incompatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular the competition rules, the rules on State aid, free movement of services, capital and the freedom of establishment’.

In relation to the competition rules, the free movement of services, capital and the freedom of establishment, the Authority assessed these allegations and restated in its annulled Decision that they were unfounded.

With regard to the alleged infringement of some of ‘the four freedoms’, the Authority found that it was the State aid which created the possible hindrances to the free movement of services, capital and establishment. The effect of these possible hindrances was indissolubly linked to the objective of the State aid. Therefore, the Authority concluded that the case should be assessed under the lex specialis of the State aid rules and that the rules on the ‘four freedoms’ should not be applicable (29).

This view was confirmed by the EFTA Court in this judgment of 7 April 2006, when it held that:

‘With regard to the effects that the HFF general loans scheme may have on the free movement of services and capital and the right of establishment, the Court holds that any such effects would indeed seem inherent in the State-supportive elements of the HFF system and therefore are so indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evaluate them separately (see to this effect Case 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi SpA v Ditta Paolo Meroni [1977] ECR 557, at paragraph 14).’ (30)

With regard to the alleged infringement of the competition rules (the complainant alleged in particular an infringement of Articles 59(1) and 54 of the EEA Agreement), the Authority stated in the annulled Decision that SBV's complaint did not warrant the initiation of formal proceedings, since SBV did not substantiate that the HFF abused or will abuse its position as a consequence of the legislative framework by which it was governed.

In light of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary view that it sees no reasons why it should deviate from it original assessment on these points.

3.1.   Article 61 paragraphs (2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement

The Icelandic Government argued, in the initial notification, that the derogation under Article 61(2)(a) of the EEA Agreement applies to the case at hand. The intervention of the State in the housing market through the HFF is, according to the Icelandic Government, based on particular social objectives and is limited in scope. The Icelandic Government submitted that the privilege accorded to the HFF, through the implicit State guarantee on the Bonds, does not in any way benefit the HFF, but only the recipients of funding from the HFF.

Article 61(2)(a) of the EEA Agreement declares State aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, if the aid has a social character and is granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned.

In the Authority's preliminary view, this derogation is not applicable to the case at hand. The aid is granted to the HFF, which is considered to be an undertaking in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (see above in section II.1), and not directly to individual consumers. Furthermore, consumers are bound to finance their housing by the HFF, in order to enjoy favourable conditions. Consumers are not free to benefit from State aid by their own choice of financial institution. Hence, the State aid is not granted without discrimination related to the origin, in this case, of the service concerned. Therefore, the aid is not neutral with respect to the operators in the market for house financing (31).

With regard to the other derogations mentioned in Article 61, paragraphs (2) and (3), of the EEA Agreement, the Authority takes the preliminary view that none of them are relevant to the case at hand. For example, although it is one of the objectives of the HFF to ensure territorial cohesion, it is not its primary goal to serve as an instrument for regional development. The HFF system is based on the universality objective and grants housing finance under the same conditions throughout Iceland, regardless of the region.

3.2.   Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement

State aid may be declared compatible with the EEA Agreement under Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement (32) if it is necessary to the operation of the services of general economic interest and does not affect the development of trade to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties.

The following conditions must be satisfied in the present case, in order for Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement to apply:

In the context of assessing the HFF system under Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, the Authority will also apply Chapter 18C of the State Aid Guidelines. The purpose of Chapter 18C is to spell out the conditions under which State aid can be found compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.

As stated in point 24 of section 18C.5 of the State Aid Guidelines, Chapter 18C will apply as of the day of adoption by the Authority. The Authority adopted Chapter 18C on 20 December 2005. Furthermore, point 25 of section 18C.5 of the State Aid Guidelines states:

‘The Authority will apply the provisions of these guidelines to all aid projects notified to it and will take a decision on those projects after adoption of the guidelines, even if the projects were notified prior to adoption. In case of non-notified aid, the Authority will apply:

Thus, the Authority will take Chapter 18C of the State Aid Guidelines into account in its future assessment (33).

3.2.1.   Definition of service of general economic interest and entrustment

The concept of service in the general economic interest means, among other things, that the State assigns ‘particular tasks’ to an undertaking (34). In order to qualify for classification as service of general economic interest, a service must have certain characteristics, the most important of which is that the service provided can not be provided in the same manner on the market and that the service should be clearly defined (35).

As an exception to the main rule in Article 59(1) of the EEA Agreement (36), the concept of ‘services of general economic interest’ must be interpreted restrictively (37) and applies only to activities of direct benefit to the public. Still, States remain free, in principle and where no common policy is established, to designate which services they consider to be of general economic interest and to organize these services as they see fit, subject to the rules of the EEA Agreement and the specific conditions laid down in Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement (38). States may take account of objectives pertaining to their national policy when defining the service of general economic interest which they entrust to certain undertakings (39). Thus, the competence to define such services lies with the States, subject to scrutiny by the Authority. This scrutiny must essentially be conducted on a case-by-case basis.

In this assessment, the nature of the undertaking entrusted with the service is not of decisive importance, nor whether the undertaking is entrusted with exclusive rights, but rather the essence of the service deemed to be of general economic interest and the special characteristics of this interest that distinguish it from the general economic interest of other economic activities (40). In conducting such analysis the Authority has to consider the nature of the service, as well as the extent to which the same service is provided by the market on the same conditions, and in the case of a universal service, particularly, the State's legitimate objective to ensure continuity of service on acceptable conditions throughout its territory (41).

As mentioned above (in section I.3.2), the HFF granted, at the time the annulled Decision was adopted, loans in the form of general loans, additional loans and loans for rental housing. The annulled Decision accepted all three lending activities as services of general economic interest.

The relevant part of the annulled Decision reads as follows:

‘In this respect, the so-called “Husbanken-case” is of importance, as it also concerned the relationship between Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and State aid to a public undertaking with a view to provide cheap housing loans [...]. In that case, the EFTA Court found that the services concerned were covered by Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, since the services concerned were specifically defined by Norway, limited to certain categories of houses and available to everyone on an equal basis. That the loans in the “Husbanken-case” were not restricted to people in weak financial situations could not, as had been argued by the applicant, lead to another result.

The Icelandic housing policy dates back more than 50 years and is based on the political goal to encourage private home ownership. To this end, public intervention in the Icelandic housing market has been aimed at making private housing affordable to a bigger proportion of the public. The HFF is the financing instrument whereby the Icelandic State pursues its public housing policy objectives. The Housing Act [...] entrusts the HFF with the management and implementation of the housing affairs and lays down in detail the tasks of the HFF, the objectives and the HFF's financing mechanisms. The Icelandic State uses the HFF to channel capital to the housing sector and to provide house financing on more advantageous terms than are available on the open Icelandic capital market. The HFF is obliged to provide house financing at affordable tariffs and on equal conditions, irrespective of the profitability of individual operations [...].

The loan system is available to everyone on equal terms and applies to the entire territory of Iceland, including sparsely populated areas, where asset evaluations differ compared to more densely populated areas. Thus, the HFF provides a universal service throughout Iceland on equal conditions. No private credit institution would be in the position to offer mortgage secured loans on equal conditions throughout the entire territory of Iceland. Asset evaluations differ between the Reykjavik area and sparsely populated areas. Prices and securities in real estate differ depending on where the dwelling is located in Iceland. In the Authority's opinion, this aim to correct regional imbalances must be considered as a task of general economic interest in the sense of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement both for the so-called additional loans and for the general loans.

The HFF's loan system contains also certain social dimensions. This is of course especially so for the additional loans. However, as the HFF loans will continue to be subject to a lending cap in the form of a maximum amount available, also the general loans entail a social element. These loans aim at financing housing that corresponds to the price of average apartments in Iceland. The HFF's loans alone will not be sufficient to finance high priced property. The relative advantage to house owners, due to the cheap loans that the HHF can offer, is accordingly inversely proportionate to the amounts they wish to loan and thereby, also to the price of the house. In this respect, the Authority has no reason to contest the notified increase in lending terms, since this increase is necessary to, inter alia, take account of inflation in housing prices in recent years.

Additionally, the Icelandic Government has introduced a new provision to the effect that HFF's loans will be limited to two dwellings for each applicant. In exceptional circumstances, a loan for a third dwelling could be authorised, but it would be up to the Board of Directors to define the precise rules for such an exception.

In light of the above, the Authority concludes that the HFF is entrusted with services of general economic interest, given their social and universal dimension, distinguishable from the economic interest of other economic activities, within the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.’

SBV's application to the EFTA Court, concerning doubts as to whether HFF loans could qualify as a service of general economic interest, was limited to the general loans scheme. The EFTA Court consequently limited its review on the general loans and did not address the other two loan schemes.

With regard to the question, whether the HFF general loans scheme could qualify as a service of general economic interest, the EFTA Court held:

‘The tasks of the HFF are defined in the Housing Act and further laid down by Regulations and ministerial decisions. The HFF general loans system is intended to promote security and equal rights as regards housing in Iceland by providing loans on manageable terms to the general public throughout the territory of Iceland and thereby foster private home ownership. This goes beyond the normal economic interest of operators in the financial sector. A service with this objective may qualify as a service of general economic interest justifying State aid, provided that the service fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 59(2) EEA. In that respect, the presumptions or conditions under which the HFF system operates (cf. Case E-4/97 Husbanken II, at paragraph 48) will be addressed below.’ (42)

When the EFTA Court later turned in its judgment to the presumptions or conditions under which the HFF system operates, it held:

‘[...] it is necessary to address the question of whether the conditions under which the loans were granted did not go beyond what was necessary for HFF to perform the tasks entrusted to it. The Court recalls that the ultimate aim of the State's intervention in lending services through the general loans scheme is to foster private home ownership in Iceland through lending on “manageable terms”. A service rendered with such an objective may, as has been stated above, be considered legitimate under Article 59(2) EEA. However, ESA has to make sure that public intervention does not, in reality, pursue other goals than those defined by Icelandic law or exceed what is necessary to achieve the defined goal.

In that regard, the Court notes that unlike the cost and size limitations practiced by the Norwegian Husbanken in Case E-4/97 Husbanken II, the HFF's relative and absolute lending caps do not limit the subsidised lending scheme to dwellings which fulfil certain criteria. They only limit the amount one may borrow from the HFF for any dwelling, regardless of the value or size of that dwelling. There is no limit as to how big or valuable a dwelling may be and still be eligible for a general loan under the HFF scheme; there are only limits to how much the HFF may grant as a general loan.

Moreover, the HFF general loans scheme is not limited to the financing of one unit of residential housing for each borrower. This means that in principle the system may provide financing for houses or apartments build or purchased for investment purposes. In 2004, a general limit of two units was introduced. As the Government of Iceland has pointed out, there may be social policy reasons why certain persons need to own more than one unit. The provision of more than one loan to the same person has not, however, been made dependent on that person fulfilling any criteria relating to such reasons.

These features mean that in principle the HFF general loans scheme provides subsidised financing, up to a certain limit, for any house or apartment regardless of size and value, and also for construction or purchase of residential units for investment purposes. The scheme is not formally limited to assisting the average citizen in financing his or her own dwelling. Even if it may be so that few people have in fact exploited these features of the system, they raise questions under Article 59(2) EEA. The Court recalls in this context that the HFF scheme is intended to promote security and equal rights as regards housing by providing loans on manageable terms. Whether the above-mentioned features of the aid system at stake go beyond this is not clear. That warrants an in-depth assessment, with the opportunity for interested parties to comment. [...]’ (43)

In its initial assessment, the Authority placed emphasis on three elements, in order to qualify HFF general loans as services of general economic interest:

With regard to the first element of affordable house financing, the Authority understands that the EFTA Court did not rule out per se that State intervention in lending services through general loans, which pursues the objective of fostering private home ownership through lending on ‘manageable terms’ may be considered legitimate under Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement. In this respect, it is also important to note that the EFTA Court clarified in its judgment that the Contracting Parties enjoy a margin of discretion in deciding what ‘manageable terms’ should mean in relation to a housing financing scheme which qualifies as a service of general economic interest (44). In this respect, it is the Authority's preliminary view that until August 2004 commercial banks in Iceland have not offered house financing on ‘manageable terms’. As confirmed in the judgment of 7 April 2006, SBV stated that its members were only from August 2004 onwards able to match the interest rate of HFF general loans (45). Concerning the element of affordable house financing, the Authority needs up-dated information on the development on the Icelandic mortgage market after the annulled Decision was taken, in order to assess to what extent commercial banks have offered mortgage secured loans on terms the Icelandic State would consider as manageable.

With regard to the second element of territorial cohesion, it is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that this element is an important factor to assess whether the HFF general loans system can qualify as a service of general economic interest. It is the Authority's opinion that SBV has not submitted any tangible evidence during the EFTA Court proceedings, which demonstrated that the commercial banks have offered and actually granted loans on ‘manageable terms’ outside the Reykjavik area during the period between 1999 and August 2004. Furthermore, in the Authority's view, SBV has submitted so far no evidence which showed that commercial banks have offered and granted loans on ‘manageable terms’ outside the Reykjavik area after August 2004.

Finally, with regard to the social element, the EFTA Court raised concerns whether the current conditions ensure that the general loans are formally limited to assisting the ‘average citizen in financing his or her own dwelling’. The EFTA Court criticized that the current features imply that in principle the HFF general loans scheme provides subsidised financing, up to a certain limit, for any house or apartment regardless of size and value, and also for construction or purchase of residential units for investment purposes. In light of the EFTA Court's conclusions on this point, doubts are raised whether the conditions for the lending services through general loans pursue a sufficiently restricted social objective.

With regard to additional loans, the Authority takes the preliminary view that these loans could be declared as services of general economic interests. Additional loans were granted to individuals with low income and limited assets for the construction or purchase of their own residential housing. Finally, concerning loans for rental housing to municipalities, associations and companies for the construction or purchase of residential housing to be rented out, the Authority takes the preliminary view that these loans might be qualified as services of general economic interests, if they pursue a sufficiently restricted social objective, in line with the concerns raised above, or if the private market is not providing for such kind of loans. To arrive at a final conclusion on these points the Authority would need up-dated information.

With regard to unlawfully granted State aid under the HFF system after the 20th of December 2005 (see above sections II.2 and II.3.2 of this Decision), it should be recalled that point 11 in section 18C.2.3 of the State Aid Guidelines requires that the responsibility for operation of the service of general economic interest must be entrusted to the undertaking concerned by way of one or more official acts, the form of which may be determined by each EFTA State. The act or acts must specify, in particular:

In the Authority's preliminary view, it is doubtful whether the HFF system complies with all of the above mentioned conditions, in particular with regard to the duration of the public service obligation and arrangements for avoiding and repaying any overcompensation.

3.2.2.   Obstruction of the performance of the particular tasks

Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement states that the rules of the EEA Agreement (here the State aid rules) apply as long as this does not obstruct, in law and fact, the fulfilment of the task of general economic interest entrusted to the given undertaking. In other words, the derogation contained in Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement is only applicable to the extent that it is necessary so that the undertaking in question can fulfil the task of general interest which has been conferred on it (46). This requirement of necessity is simply an expression of the principle of proportionality.

It is incumbent upon the State, which invokes Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, to demonstrate that this condition is met. Thus, the State must set out in detail the reasons for which, in the event of elimination of the measures, the performance of the tasks of general economic interest under economically acceptable conditions would, in its view, be jeopardized (47). However, that burden of proof cannot be so extensive as to require the EEA State to go even further and prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure could enable those tasks to be performed under the same conditions (48).

On these points, the annulled Decision stated:

‘In the Authority's view, the HFF would not be able to perform the same level of services of general economic interest, described above, without any State support. However, the above mentioned proportionality test also requires that the State support for the obligation to render a service of general economic interest must be based on the costs of such specific service. Therefore, in the following it will be assessed whether the HFF's costs to render the service of general economic interest are overcompensated and whether the State support is limited to what is necessary for the HFF to perform the specific service in question.

As stated above, the implicit State guarantee, the exemptions from taxes, the abstention from paying any dividends and the interest support imply that the HFF receives State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. On the other hand, the costs for the HFF can be said to be the interest support the final consumers get as a result of the HFF's lending activities. To the extent the HFF is able to be funded at lower costs than competing financial institutions, a benefit may be said to accrue to the HFF. Correspondingly, to the extent it is obliged to lend at lower rates than competing institutions, costs may be said to be incurred. In other words, as long as the HFF's is forced to lend at rates lower than market rates, it is forced to abstain from revenue.

While the HFF can raise money cheaply because of the State guarantee, it is not free to set interest rates to the public. Until the end of June 2004 it could only charge an interest rate on its loans that was 0,35 percentage points higher than its funding rate. As tables 2 and 3 above show, this margin was clearly lower than margins charged by other financial institutions. This means that low funding costs obtained by the HFF due to the State guarantee were transferred to the final consumers.

The charge of 0,35 percentage points was supposed to cover current operational costs of the HFF, provisions for losses on loans and to provide for a certain return on equity such that the HFF sustains its activity without drawing on direct State grants. Back in 1993 the margin was fixed at 0,25 percentage points. However, it turned out that this margin was a too small to cover losses on loans. Therefore, the margin was increased to 0,35 percentage points in 1994. A new review was undertaken in 1997. It was then concluded that the 0,35 % margin would be sufficient. Looking at developments for the years from 1999 to 2002, as shown in table 1 above, it also appears that this mark-up was appropriate to cover just operating expenditures, loss provisions and to yield a certain rather modest net profit, such that equity was kept rather stable in relation to total assets. Against this background the Authority concludes that the mark-up of 0,35 percentage points was and still is appropriate to just cover these different provisions.

The changes in the lending system as of 1 July 2004 have, introduced a new cost element that needs to be assessed. As of that date, the interest margin has been increased by 25 basis points. This increase stems from the fact that the previous bond swap system has been abolished and that direct cash lending has been introduced. As the Icelandic Government has pointed out, this implies that the HFF takes on new risks related to interest rate developments. Mortgage holders will, as before, have the possibility of prepayment of loans at par while the HFF cannot redeem its obligations in the same manner. Before 1 July 2004 HFF had the possibility to prepay its funding at par. The new situation creates new risks for HFF as developments in interest rates are uncertain. A fall in interest rates will normally increase prepayments while HFF does not have an identical means of adjusting its funding.

The value, or the cost, related to this new risk is naturally uncertain. The financial consultant estimated it to be in the range of 15 to 35 basis points. The Financial Supervisory Authority and the State Guarantee Fund have called for caution when fixing the additional mark-up to cover the risk. Under these circumstances, and also taking into account the new provisions on solvency ratio according to the Rules of the Financial Supervisory Authority, the Authority can accept that the increase in the interest rate margin for HFF with 0,25 percentage points is what is necessary to cover the costs of the new risks HFF is facing.

The Authority also takes note of the statement from the Icelandic Government that HFF's interest margin shall be reviewed regularly on the basis of HFF's performance and the risks it is facing at any given time. The Icelandic Government has also stated that building up funds inside HFF beyond what is required to maintain the solvency rate of 5 % is not the policy of the Government and would run counter to the expressed policy of enabling the borrowers to gain directly from the operation of the housing lending system.

According to the Icelandic Government, a common dividend requirement for Icelandic banks is some 15 % on equity. If the HFF were to be subject to a similar dividend policy and also subject to normal taxation, the interest mark-up would need to be increased correspondingly as the current margin would not provide for any means to cover such obligations. The Icelandic Government has estimated what the necessary interest mark-up would be in such a case, taking into account an 8 % capital adequacy ratio — instead of the current 5 % — and concluded that the mark-up would increase by 65 to 80 basis points above the current level. To the extent that the HFF were subject to the same taxation and dividend requirements as commercial banks, borrowing costs would increase for the ultimate borrowers, corresponding to what the State would charge in the form of taxes and dividends. When the Icelandic Government abstains from taxes and dividends in relation to the HFF, it is just to keep interest rates for house buyers low such that the Government is able to offer the service of general economic interest, namely to provide the Icelandic population with affordable housing.

As far as direct interest support is concerned, the HFF is obliged in certain conditions to grant interest support to low income families. To some extent such support has been granted by drawing on the Fund's own equity. In other instances the HFF has received direct contributions from the State. These contributions have been transferred directly to the beneficiaries and have not left the HFF with any extra financial means.

In light of the above and as demonstrated by the Icelandic Government, the mark-up of 0,35 percentage points applicable until 30 June 2004 and the mark-up of 0,60 percentage points thereafter can be justified as an appropriate margin to cover the expenses of running the HFF. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that the benefit of the HFF's low borrowing rate is fully transferred to the final consumers. The Authority has not detected any overcompensation to the HFF. The benefits it receives are passed on to the final consumers.

In conclusion, the Authority is of the view that the HFF's costs to render the service of general economic interest are not overcompensated and that the State support is limited to what is necessary for the HFF to perform the specific service in question’.

With regard to possible doubts as to the proportionality assessment of HFF's general loans, the EFTA Court held:

‘[...] This must include an assessment of whether the subsidised HFF general loans scheme is a suitable means of attaining its objective. There is no reason why a service which is not suitable to meet its aim should benefit from a derogation from the EEA rules. Furthermore, this also calls for an analysis of whether the HFF, or a different provider, could have provided loans at the same “manageable terms” as the HFF provided at the relevant time without, or with less State aid.

Firstly, with regard to suitability, the Applicant has claimed that the low interest rate on HFF general loans has led to a general increase in prices for houses and apartments which neutralises the effects of the low interest rates, since purchasers need to borrow more money in order to buy a certain house or apartment than they would have had to with lower prices.

The Court does not find it doubtful that the low interest rate on HFF general loans did not lead to price increases which completely neutralised the effect of the low interest rate. With respect to any lesser effect on housing prices, regard must be had to the margin of discretion which the Contracting Parties must enjoy in deciding what “manageable terms” should mean in relation to a housing financing scheme which qualifies as a service of general economic interest. As a consequence, the Contracting Parties must also enjoy a margin of discretion in deciding what constitutes a sufficient effect of the low interest rates on the real burden on borrowers' economy. In the end, it is this burden that borrowers have to be able to manage. For that reason, as long as it is not established that the effect of the low interest rate on HFF general loans is completely neutralised by an increase in housing prices, the HFF general loan scheme must be considered suitable to meet its aim.

Secondly, as to the question of whether there were doubts that neither the HFF, nor a different provider, could have provided loans at the same “manageable terms” at the relevant time without, or with less, State aid, the Court recalls that the interest rates charged by the HFF for its general loans are calculated on the basis of its funding costs, with an added margin set by the Minister of Social Affairs. This margin was set at 0,6 percentage points from 1 July 2004, up from 0,35 percentage points. The funding costs consist mainly in the interest paid on bonds issued by the HFF. In this context, the HFF benefits from the State guarantee which follows from the State's unlimited liability for the HFF's debts as its owner.

The Court does not find it doubtful that the State aid provided to the HFF system did not go beyond what was necessary in the case at hand to allow the HFF to cover expected losses and operate the general loans system under economically acceptable conditions (see, for comparison, Case C-157/94, Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, at paragraphs 52 and 53). This does not mean, however, that the general loans system as operated by the HFF is necessarily compatible with the EEA Agreement.

With regard to the ability of any other provider to supply the same service as the HFF, but without State support, the Court recalls that Contracting Parties must be allowed a margin of discretion with regard to what exactly should be considered affordable terms in relation to such schemes. In this regard, a Contracting Party cannot be bound to what other Contracting Parties, in leaving this kind of housing financing completely to the market, implicitly consider acceptable. The Court does not find that it has been demonstrated that doubts existed as to whether the regular banks did match the HFF interest rate level on comparable loans in any part of Iceland prior to the annulled Decision, or would have been able to do so without State support. Indeed, the Applicant has stated that it was only from August 2004 onwards that the banks were able to match the interest rate of HFF general loans.

Neither does the Court find that it has been demonstrated that doubts existed as to whether an alternative model for State-supported housing financing through the banks, the so-called “whole-sale alternative”, would enable the banks to provide the same loans as the HFF were providing at the relevant time without this support constituting State aid, or with less State aid and without the risk of cross-subsidisation.’ (49)

The Court endorsed the Authority's initial assessment that there were no doubts that the commercial banks did not match the HFF interest rate level on comparable loans in any part of Iceland prior to the annulled Decision, or would have been able to do so without State support. SBV itself stated that it was only from August 2004 onwards that commercial banks were able to match the interest rate of HFF general loans. With regard to the developments on the Icelandic mortgage market after the annulled Decision was taken, the Authority would require up-dated information, in order to assess to what extent commercial banks have offered loans on terms that the Icelandic State would consider ‘manageable’.

Should the Authority's assessment reveal that commercial banks have offered loans in the Reykjavik area since August 2004 on terms that the Icelandic State would consider ‘manageable’, concerns could be raised as to what extent the HFF needs to offer general loans within the Reykjavik area, in order to enable the HFF to grant general loans outside the Reykjavik area.

With regard to alternative models to the HFF system, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the presented models do not seem to be less distortive to competition.

With regard to unlawfully granted State aid under the HFF system after the 20th of December 2005 (see above sections II.2 and II.3.2 of this Decision), it should be recalled that point 18 in section 18C.2.4 of the State Aid Guidelines states that ‘[w]hen a company carries out activities falling both inside and outside the scope of the service of general economic interest, the internal accounts must show separately the costs and receipts associated with the service of general economic interest and those associated with other services, as well as the parameters for allocating costs and revenues’.

Furthermore, point 19 in section 18C.3 of the State Aid Guidelines states that ‘... EFTA States must check regularly, or arrange for checks to be made, to ensure that there has been no over-compensation’.

Without prejudice to the Authority's final Decision in the present case, for any HFF services which might fall outside the scope of services of general interest, the HFF would be required to comply with the above mentioned accounting requirements.

3.2.3.   Development of trade and the interest of the Contracting Parties

Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement further involves an assessment of whether the specific service in question affects the development of trade to an extent contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties (50). The Authority is charged with striking a balance between the right of Iceland to invoke the derogation and the interest of the Contracting Parties to avoid distortions of competition and restrictions to the ‘four freedoms’ (51).

This entails that it must be established that the performance of the service of general economic interest does not affect competition and unity of the market established by the EEA Agreement in a disproportionate manner. It is, however, not required that the measures adopted be the least restrictive possible (52). Rather, the test is of a negative nature: it examines whether the measure adopted is not disproportionate (53). This ‘negative test’ has once more been confirmed by the EFTA Court in its ruling of 7 April 2006 (54). A reasonable relationship between the aim and the means employed is satisfactory (53). Thus, the Authority does not have competence to strike down a measure that otherwise fulfils Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement simply because the measure might, in some minor aspects and details, go further than what is strictly necessary to fulfil the aims behind it. It is for the States to define their policies and organize general interest services, leaving the Authority no power to take a position on the organization and scale of the service or the expediency of the political choice made. Even if it were successfully shown that the scheme in question were not an optimally efficient one, this alone would not lead to the conclusion that the distortive effects are necessarily disproportionate to the goals assigned.

On this point, the Authority concluded in its annulled Decision:

‘The EEA Agreement establishes inter alia the general principles, both applicable to financial services, of the right of establishment for nationals of the EEA States and their freedom to provide services within the territory of the Contracting Parties. However, the secondary legislation which, under the EC Treaty and the EEA Agreement, has been adopted to make these basic provisions effective, does not extend to specialised housing finance institutions like the HFF( (55)). Consequently, such institutions are at present not able to benefit from the principles of mutual recognition and home country control contained in the banking legislation of the EEA Agreement. Therefore, due to different national credit rules and practices and the absence of effective harmonisation or mutual recognition at EEA level for such institutions, there continue to be considerable obstacles to effective cross-border operations in this area.

In most developed countries, including most parties to the EEA Agreement, Governments, both at central and local level, intervene in housing and housing finance markets. This intervention takes different forms from one State to another, depending, inter alia, on certain realities in the housing markets, in particular the pattern of housing tenure, and the objectives of the housing policy of the Governments concerned. There is, for instance, likely to be a relationship between the extent to which private individuals' home ownership is an objective of public housing policy and the scope of intervention by the Government concerned in housing finance; a Government that sees it as an important objective to its housing policy that as many households as possible own their own dwelling, like in Iceland, is likely to want to support the financing of such investments on a broad scale.

As already stated above, the Authority considers long-term house financing for residential accommodation to be the relevant market for the assessment in the present case.

As submitted by the Icelandic Government, the Icelandic market for mortgage loans is largely divided between three main actors. These are the HFF, the pension funds and other private credit institutions. The HFF had, in 2002, a market share of approximately 78 % of that market. The market share of pension funds was, in 2002, approximately 17 %. The remaining 5 % was taken by private credit institutions. The Icelandic Government submitted figures showing that the HFF had, in 2002, a total amount of ISK 382 billion in mortgage loans, compared to ISK 84 billion of the pension funds and ISK 27 billion of private banks (56).

The granting of loans for financing purchases of residential accommodation is a financial service which, in the present market conditions, is predominantly of a local character and normally does not involve any direct cross-border transactions. Distortion of competition arising from financial advantages accorded to the HFF operating such services are therefore prima facie likely to have only limited direct trade effects.

The HFF is not entitled to grant any loans for the financing of dwellings outside Iceland. The HFF's activities are, as laid down in the Housing Act, targeted exclusively towards promoting Icelandic housing policy.

Today no foreign banks are granting cross-border mortgage loans in ISK to Icelandic households. Furthermore, there are currently no foreign financial institutions or representative offices of foreign financial institutions in Iceland. The Icelandic economy is very limited in size. The limited number and small size of transactions in trade in the foreign exchange markets of the ISK warrants only limited interest from foreign banks. The special geography and the scattered population outside the Reykjavik area further reduces the foreign interest for lending to the Icelandic housing market. That foreign banks do not even operate representative offices in Iceland underpins the lack of interest in the Icelandic financial market. In the absence of any “flourishing” financial activities of foreign banks on the Icelandic market outside the particular market for long term housing loans, it can therefore hardly be argued that it is the State aid to the HFF which prevents foreign banks from entering the Icelandic financial market.

In the light of the above, given the limited size of the Icelandic housing market, with its special geographic and demographic features, the Authority is of the opinion that the HFF's financing mechanism does not affect the development of trade to an extent contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties.’

With regard to the assessment of whether HFF general loans did not affected the development of trade contrary to the interest of the Contracting Parties, the EFTA Court held:

‘As part of the assessment of whether the scheme did not affect the development of trade to such an extent as would be contrary to the interest of the Contracting Parties, the relevant market must be defined. ESA considered “long-term house financing for residential accommodation” to be the relevant product market (see section II point 3.2.3 of the annulled Decision). It is not obvious to the Court that the assessment should be limited in scope in this way, excluding the possible effects of the aid granted to the HFF on other parts of the EEA internal market, in particular the financial markets. For that reason, the definition of the relevant market in this particular case is also an issue which interested parties ought to be able to comment upon in a formal investigation procedure. The further assessment of the consequences of the HFF general loan system on the development of trade will depend to a considerable extent on the definition of the relevant market which the formal investigation procedure will lead to.’ (57)

In light of the EFTA Court's conclusions on this point, the Authority would require for its further assessment information as to what extent the aid granted to the HFF could affect other parts of the EEA internal market, in particular other financial markets, such as, for example, the private lending market.

3.3.   Conclusion

Doubts are raised, in light of the EFTA Court's ruling of 7 April 2006, whether the HFF system, partly or in its entirety, can be declared compatible with the State aid rules, according to Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Recovery

According to Article 14(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, ‘[w]here negative decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall decide that the EFTA State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary (hereinafter referred to as a “recovery decision”). The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law’.

In other words, any unlawful aid which cannot be declared compatible with the State aid rules will be subject to recovery. In case of recovery, it is the Authority's preliminary view that, in the case at hand, no legitimate expectations could be invoked, which would preclude the recovery.

According to settled case-law, ‘[...] undertakings to which an aid has been granted may not, in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful unless it has been granted in compliance with the procedure laid down in that article. A diligent businessman should normally be able to determine whether that procedure has been followed’ (58).

However, a recipient of illegally granted aid is not precluded from relying on exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful and thus declining to refund that aid (59). Because the aid at stake was not notified in advance, it is necessary to examine whether the Authority's favourable Decision No 213/04/COL, which approved the HFF system, is to be regarded as an ‘exceptional circumstance’ within the meaning of the case-law referred to. Such an assessment must be made in the light of the purpose of the protection of legitimate expectations.

In the Authority's view, the judicial review by the Community Courts or the EFTA Court of decisions concerning State aid cannot be regarded as an exceptional and unforeseeable event, forming as it does an integral and essential part of the system established by the EC Treaty and the corresponding provisions in the EEA Agreement and the Surveillance and Court Agreement for that purpose. A diligent businessman should be well aware of the fact that a decision, to the effect that a State measure is declared compatible, is, within the time-limit of two months referred to in Article 230 EC and Article 36 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, liable to be challenged before the Community Courts or the EFTA Court.

The Court of Justice itself has, moreover, and indeed recently, stated that ‘[...] in view of the mandatory nature of the supervision of State aid by the Commission under Article 88 EC, undertakings to which aid has been granted cannot, in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful unless it has been granted by the procedure laid down in that article [...] It follows that so long as the Commission has not taken a decision approving aid and so long as the period for bringing an action against such a decision has not expired, the recipient cannot be sure as to the lawfulness of the proposed aid which alone is capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on his part’ (60).

Subsequently, to the same effect, in Spain v Commission, the Court made it clear that ‘[t]he fact that the Commission initially decided not to raise any objections to the aid in issue cannot be regarded as capable of having caused the recipient undertaking to entertain any legitimate expectation since that decision was challenged in due time before the Court, which annulled it. However regrettable it may be, the Commission's error cannot erase the consequences of the unlawful conduct of the Kingdom of Spain’ (61).

Any argument to the contrary would render ineffective the review conducted by the Community judicature and the EFTA Court of the legality of a positive State aid decisions. If it were to be concluded that such a decision automatically gives rise to legitimate expectations on the part of the recipients, competitors of those recipients or other third parties harmed by the decision would have no interest in attacking the vitiated measure. That is because any annulment of a positive State aid decision would ultimately become a ‘pyrrhic victory’, since the negative effects of the decision could never be eliminated (62).

The Authority, therefore, preliminarily considers that the adoption of a favourable decision by the Authority regarding aid cannot in itself be regarded as an event which causes the recipient of that aid to entertain legitimate expectations as to its lawfulness.

5.   Conclusion

It is the Authority's preliminary conclusion that the HFF system constitutes unlawful aid on procedural grounds. Doubts are raised whether the HFF system, either partly or in its entirety, can be declared compatible with the State aid rules, according to Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement. Any unlawful aid which ultimately will be declared incompatible with the State aid rules will be subject to recovery.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Done at Brussels, 21 June 2006

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

B. T. GRYDELAND

President

K. JAEGER

College Member

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(1)  Hereinafter referred to as ‘the EEA Agreement’.

(2)  Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’.

(3)  The cartouche of this Decision is published in OJ 2005 C 112, page 8. The cartouche makes reference to the EFTA Surveillance Authority's website, where the non-confidential full text of the Decision is available: www.eftasurv.int/fieldof work/fieldstateaid/stateaidregistry/

(4)  Judgment of 7 April 2006, Case E-9/04 The Bankers' and Securities' Dealers Association of Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2006] EFTA Court Report (not yet reported). The judgment is available at the EFTA Court's website: www.eftacourt.lu

(5)  Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Aid Guidelines’), adopted and issued by the Authority on 19 January 1994, published in OJ 1994 L 231. The State Aid Guidelines are available on the Authority's website: www.eftasurv.int

(6)  The Icelandic Government provided English translations of these laws. Quotes from these laws in this decision are based on the translation provided by the Icelandic Government.

(7)  The cartouche of this Decision is published in OJ 2005 C 112, page 8. The cartouche makes reference to the EFTA Surveillance Authority's website, where the non-confidential full text of the Decision is available: www.eftasurv.int/fieldof work/fieldstateaid/stateaidregistry/.

(8)  Judgment of 7 April 2006, Case E-9/04, cited above.

(9)  The Housing Act was amended by Act No 57/2004. Act No 57/2004 entered into force on 1 July 2004, except for Temporary Provision I, which entered into effect immediately (see Article 22 of Act No 57/2004).

(10)  As amended, and various regulations, inter alia, Regulation No 544/2004 on ‘the Financing and Risk Management of the Housing Financing Fund’, Regulation No 522/2004 on ‘Borrowers' Mortgages and HFF Bonds’ and Regulation No 521/2004 on ‘Loan Proportions and Maximum Amounts of Borrowers' Mortgages’.

(11)  Section XII of the Housing Act. For example, according to Article 52 of the Housing Act, Act. No 97/1993 on the State Housing Board was repealed.

(12)  Article 53 of the Housing Act merged the State Housing Fund and the Workers' Building Fund and transferred the rights, assets, liabilities and obligations of these two funds to the HFF.

(13)  The above wording reflects the situation prior to 1 July 2004, i.e. prior to the entering into force of Act No 57/2004. Article 10 of the Housing Act was amended by Article 4 of Act No 57/2004. According to this amendment, the HFF finances its tasks with the income from the fund's equity capital (i.e. the payments, interest and indexation of granted loans), by issue and sale of HFF bonds and by borrowing as provided for in the Budget Act at any particular time and by service charges as provided for in Article 49.

(14)  This is the wording prior to 1 July 2004. After that date Article 5 of Act No 57/2004 amended Article 11 of the Housing Act and, inter alia, changed the title of that Article to: Management of Assets and Liabilities (this translation has been provided by the Icelandic Government).

(15)  This translation was provided by the Icelandic Government.

(16)  NFS, 10 May 2006.

www.visir.is/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060510/FRETTIR01/60510079/1091

(17)  Case C-118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599; Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979; Case C-69/91 Decoster [1993] ECR I-5335. See similar Case E-4/97 Norwegian Bankers' Association v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] Report of the EFTA Court, page 3, paragraph 30.

(18)  Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747.

(19)  With regard to the question whether the HFF is actually entrusted with public service obligations, see the discussion below in section II.3.2.1.

(20)  The Icelandic Government referred in this context to Directive 2000/12/EC on credit institutions.

(21)  Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1), as amended.

(22)  The adaptation text mentioned in point 14(a) of Chapter II(i) of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement.

(23)  This translation has been provided by the Icelandic Government.

(24)  Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag [2002] ECR I-2099.

(25)  Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA [1994] ECR I-3829, paragraph 28.

(26)  Furthermore, Article 4(1), first sentence, of the Authority's Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 states that ‘[f]or the purposes of Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, an alteration to existing aid is any change, other than modifications of a purely formal or administrative nature which cannot affect the evaluation of the compatibility of the aid measure with the common market’.

(27)  The European Commission Decision No 2005/842/EC of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) EC (which corresponds to Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement) to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (OJ L 312, 29.11.2005, page 67) lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation constitutes State aid compatible with Article 86(2) EC and exempts compensation satisfying those conditions from the prior notification requirement. The Decision has not yet been incorporated into the EEA Agreement. Public service compensation which constitutes State aid and does not fall within the scope of Decision No 2005/842/EC will still be subject to the prior notification requirement, also after that Decision has been incorporated into the EEA Agreement. In any event, it should be noted that, with regard to house financing, Article 2(1)(b) of Commission Decision No 2005/842/EC only exempts public service compensation granted to social housing undertakings. Recital 16 of Commission Decision No 2005/842/EC further specifies that social housing undertakings should be understood as meaning ‘... undertakings in charge of social housing providing housing for disadvantaged citizens or socially less advantaged groups, which due to solvability constraints are unable to obtain housing at market conditions...’.

(28)  Since the Authority's Decision No 213/04/COL was annulled by the EFTA Court's judgment of 7 April 2006 in Case E-9/04, the aid granted under the HFF system remains unlawful aid.

(29)  With regard to the relationship between the State aid rules and the provisions of the ‘four freedoms’, see for example Case 74/76 Ianelli & Volpi v Meroni [1977] ECR 557.

(30)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 82.

(31)  See similar Case E-4/97, cited above, paragraph 30.

(32)  Which corresponds to Article 86(2) EC.

(33)  Since the Authority's Decision No 213/04/COL was annulled by the EFTA Court's judgment of 7 April 2006 in Case E-9/04, the aid granted under the HFF system remains unlawful aid (see above section II.2).

(34)  See for example: Case 10/71 Muller [1971] ECR 723; Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 313; Case 7/82 GVL [1983] ECR 483; Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I-1520; Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries [1998] ECR I-3949.

(35)  Communication from the Commission — Services of General Interest in Europe (OJ C 17, 19.1.2001, p. 7), see paragraph 14 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Services of General Interest’).

(36)  The main rule in Article 59(1) of the EEA Agreement states that in the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which EC Member States or EFTA States grant special or exclusive rights, the Contracting Parties shall ensure that there is neither enacted nor maintained in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the EEA Agreement, in particular to those rules provided for in Articles 4 and 53 to 63.

(37)  See Case C-242/95 GT-Link A/S v De Danske Statsbaner [1997] ECR I-4449, paragraph 50; Case T-260/94 Air Inter [1997] ECR II-147, paragraph 135; Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5815, paragraph 53.

(38)  See in this context for example: Services of General Interest, cited above, paragraph 22; Case T-106/95 FFSA [1997] ECR II-229, paragraph 192. As stated by Advocate General Léger in his opinion in Case C-438/02 Åklagaren v Krister Hanner [2005] ECR I-4551, paragraph 139: ‘...it falls to the Member States to define the content of their services of general economic interest and, in so doing, they enjoy considerable leeway since the Court and the Commission will intervene only in order to penalise manifest errors of assessment’.

(39)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 67.

(40)  Case E-4/97, cited above, paragraph 47.

(41)  See in this context: Report of the European Commission to the Council of Ministers: Service of general economic interest in the banking sector (adopted by the Commission on 17.6.1998 and presented to the ECOFIN Council on 23.11.1998). Services of General Interest, cited above, paragraph 10.

(42)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 68.

(43)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraphs 76 to 79.

(44)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 71. See in this context also below section II.3.2.2 of this decision.

(45)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 74.

(46)  See Case C-41/90, cited above, paragraph 24; and Case C-242/95, cited above, paragraph 54.

(47)  It is not necessary that the survival of the undertaking itself be threatened. See Case C-157/94 Commission v The Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, paragraph 43.

(48)  See Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5815, paragraphs 94 to 107.

Case E-4/97, cited above, paragraph 62.

(49)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraphs 69 to 75.

(50)  In this context, it is interesting to note the opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-438/02, cited above, paragraph 143: ‘Finally, the last condition in Article 86(2) EC requires that “[t]he development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interest of the Community”. Even though the Court has not yet ruled on the meaning of that requirement, certain Advocates General have already adopted a position on the issue. In their view, effect on the development of intra-Community trade within the meaning of Article 86(2) EC, unlike the classic definition of the concept of “measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction”, calls for proof that the measure in issue has in fact had a substantial effect on intra-Community trade. That assessment does seem to me to be supported by the wording of Article 86(2) EC’.

(51)  See similar Case E-4/97, cited above, paragraph 70.

(52)  See for example: Case C-159/94, cited above; Case C-158/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-5789; Case C-157/94, cited above; Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 80.

(53)  Case E-4/97, cited above, paragraph 62.

(54)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 80.

(55)  See similar Case E-4/97, cited above, paragraph 63.

(56)  Sources: The Central Bank of Iceland and the HFF.

(57)  Case E-9/04, cited above, paragraph 81.

(58)  Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, paragraph 14; Case C-169/95 Spain v Commission [1997] ECR I-135, paragraph 51.

(59)  Case C-5/89, cited above, paragraph 16.

(60)  Case C-91/01 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-4355, paragraphs 65 and 66.

(61)  Case C-169/95 Spain v Commission [1997] ECR I-135, paragraph 53.

(62)  See in this context: Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano delivered on 9 February 2006 in Joined Cases C-442/03 P and C-471/03 P P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission (not yet reported), paragraphs 146 to 158.

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Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 ao Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal sobre a compensação pelo nível superior das contribuições para a segurança social concedida às «empresas Hurtigruten» (Processo n.o 56343)

(2006/C 314/14)

Por Decisão 215/06/COL, de 5 de Julho de 2006, publicada na língua que faz fé a seguir ao presente resumo, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA iniciou um procedimento nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 ao Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça (Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal). O Governo norueguês foi informado mediante o envio de cópia da decisão.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA notifica os Estados da EFTA, os Estados-Membros da UE e as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações sobre a medida em causa no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação da presente comunicação, enviando-as para o seguinte endereço:

Estas observações serão comunicadas ao Governo norueguês. Qualquer interessado que apresente observações pode solicitar por escrito o tratamento confidencial da sua identidade, devendo justificar o pedido.

RESUMO

Em 2 de Agosto de 2004, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA (em seguida denominado o «Órgão de Fiscalização») enviou um pedido de informações às autoridades norueguesas relativamente a uma previsão de pagamento às empresas Ofotens og Vesteraalens Dampskibsselskap ASA e Troms Fylkes Dampskibsselskap ASA (a seguir designadas «empresas Hurtigruten»).

Em 5 de Julho de 2006, após uma vasta troca de correspondência com as autoridades norueguesas, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA decidiu dar início ao procedimento formal de investigação em relação ao pagamento às empresas Hurtigruten.

As empresas Hurtigruten efectuam serviços de transporte marítimo que consistem no transporte combinado de pessoas e de mercadorias na linha costeira entre Bergen e Kirkenes. Entre 1 de Janeiro de 2002 e 31 de Dezembro de 2004, estes serviços estiveram abrangidos pelo acordo entre as autoridades norueguesas e as empresas Hurtigruten relativo ao funcionamento dos serviços marítimos ao longo da costa norueguesa. O «Acordo Hurtigruten» foi notificado pelas autoridades norueguesas ao Órgão de Fiscalização em Julho de 2000 e em seguida aprovado por este em 19 de Dezembro de 2001. O serviço Hurtigruten é em parte comercialmente viável, nomeadamente durante a temporada de Verão, não o sendo, em geral, durante o Inverno. Na sua Decisão de 2001, o Órgão de Fiscalização considerou que a compensação ao abrigo do Acordo Hurtigruten podia ser autorizada nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE dado que os serviços abrangidos por este são considerados serviços de interesse económico geral.

O artigo 10.o do Acordo Hurtigruten incluía uma cláusula segundo a qual ambas as partes poderiam solicitar um procedimento de renegociação caso se registassem alterações substanciais nas condições do Acordo. A vigência do Acordo Hurtigruten terminou, como previsto, em 31 de Dezembro de 2004 e, após a realização de um concurso em Junho de 2004, um novo acordo com as empresas entrou em vigor em 1 de Janeiro de 2005.

O presente caso diz respeito a um pagamento às empresas Hurtigruten referido na Posição 70, Capítulo 1330 (Særskilte transporttiltak) do Orçamento Geral do Estado norueguês de 2004, segundo o qual se pretendia conceder às empresas Hurtigruten um montante até 8,5 milhões de coroas norueguesas (cerca de 1,1 milhões de euros) como compensação pelas alterações no sistema norueguês de contribuições diferenciadas para a segurança social. A concessão dos auxílios não foi notificada ao Órgão de Fiscalização. O pagamento da compensação concedida às empresas Hurtigruten destinava-se a compensar plenamente o aumento dos custos da segurança social, não estabelecendo uma distinção entre a parte dos custos da segurança social correspondentes às actividades comerciais das empresas e os correspondentes às actividades que podem ser consideradas como serviço público na acepção do n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE.

Segundo a jurisprudência, devem ser preenchidos quatro critérios para que o n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE seja aplicável. Em primeiro lugar, deve existir um mandato pelo qual o Estado confere a uma empresa a responsabilidade pela execução de uma determinada tarefa. Em segundo lugar, o mandato deve referir-se a um serviço de interesse económico geral. Em terceiro lugar, a excepção tem de ser necessária para realizar as tarefas confiadas e proporcional a esse objectivo (o chamado «requisito da necessidade»). Finalmente, o desenvolvimento das trocas comerciais não deve ser afectado de maneira que contrarie os interesses das Partes Contratantes.

Com base nas informações disponíveis, o Órgão de Fiscalização tem dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade do auxílio concedido às empresas Hurtigruten com o disposto no n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE. Em especial, é questionável que o auxílio cumpra o requisito da necessidade previamente citado na medida em que o aumento concedido às empresas Hurtigruten em 2004 de destinou igualmente às actividades comerciais dessas empresas. A compensação não distinguia entre a parte dos custos da segurança social correspondente às actividades comerciais das empresas e a correspondente às actividades que podem ser consideradas serviço público na acepção do n.o 2 do artigo 59.o do Acordo EEE.

Por outro lado, o Órgão de Fiscalização duvida que o auxílio concedido às empresas Hurtigruten possa ser considerado como auxílio existente com base no artigo 10.o do Acordo Hurtigruten. O artigo 10.o do Acordo prevê apenas a possibilidade de modificar o contrato devido a alterações significativas e imprevisíveis das circunstâncias. Não impõe um aumento automático da compensação às empresas Hurtigruten em caso de aumento dos custos, prevendo simplesmente a possibilidade de ambas as partes solicitarem um procedimento de renegociação sem determinar o resultado da mesma. Desta forma, a posição preliminar do Órgão de fiscalização é que o auxílio concedido às empresas Hurtigruten não pode ser considerado um auxílio existente.

O Órgão de Fiscalização tem dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade do auxílio concedido às empresas Hurtigruten com as regras em matéria de auxílios estatais do Acordo EEE, em especial com o n.o 2 do artigo 59.o. Por conseguinte, o Órgão de Fiscalização deve dar início ao procedimento formal de investigação previsto no n.o 2 do artigo 1.o da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 ao Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal.

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EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 215/06/COL

of 5 July 2006

on compensation to the ‘Hurtigruten companies’ for increased social security contributions

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (1),

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (2), in particular to Articles 59 (2) and 61 to 63, and to Protocol 26 thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (3), in particular to Article 24 thereof and Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 thereof,

Having regard to the Authority's decision 417/01/COL of 19 December 2001 on compensation for maritime transport services under the ‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ (4),

Having regard to the Authority's decision 172/02/COL of 25 September 2002 to propose appropriate measures to Norway with regard to State aid in the form of regionally differentiated social security taxation,

Having regard to the Authority's decision 218/03/COL of 12 November 2003 on a three-year transition period in Zones 3 and 4 for the regionally differentiated social security contributions,

Having regard to the decision of the Standing Committee of the EFTA States No 2/2003/SC of 1 July 2003 whereby it was decided that the regionally differentiated social security contributions in Zone 5 was compatible with the EEA Agreement due to exceptional circumstances in this zone,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

On 2 August 2004, the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities regarding a prospective payment to Ofotens og Vesteraalens Dampskibsselskap ASA and Troms Fylkes Dampskibsselskap ASA (5) as a possible compensation due to the changes in the Norwegian differentiated social security system (Event No 289240).

The Norwegian authorities replied by letter from the Ministry of Trade and Industry dated 1 September 2004, forwarding a letter from the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the same date, received and registered by the Authority on 1 September 2004 (Event No 291435).

By letter dated 12 October 2004, the Authority asked for further information (Event No 294990). In this letter, the Authority's Competition and State Aid Directorate stated its view that as the payment was not notified to the Authority and was apparently already put into effect, it would have to be considered as unlawful aid in the meaning of Article 1 f) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

The Norwegian authorities replied by letter from the Norwegian Mission dated 18 November 2004, forwarding letters from the Ministry of Modernisation dated 17 November 2004 and the Ministry of Transport and Communications dated 16 November 2004. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 22 November 2004 (Event No 300326).

By letter dated 26 October 2005, the Authority's Competition and State Aid Directorate informed the Norwegian authorities that it had doubts concerning the compatibility of the payment to the Hurtigruten companies with the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Event No 329347).

The Norwegian authorities replied by letter from the Norwegian Mission dated 22 December 2005, forwarding letters from the Ministry of Modernisation dated 15 December 2005 and the Ministry of Transport and Communications dated 15 December 2005, received and registered by the Authority on 3 January 2006 (Event No 355950).

By letter dated 9 March 2006 the Authority commented on the Norwegian reply (Event No 364024). The Norwegian authorities responded by letter from the Norwegian Mission dated 29 March 2006, forwarding letters from the Ministry of Government Administration and Reform dated 27 March 2006 and the Ministry of Transport and Communications dated 24 March 2006. The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 30 March 2006 (Event No 368446).

2.   Background

The Hurtigruten companies operate maritime transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the coastal line from Bergen to Kirkenes. From 1 January 2002 until 31 December 2004, these services were covered by the agreement between the Norwegian authorities and the Hurtigruten companies concerning operation of maritime services along the Norwegian coast (6). The ‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ was notified by the Norwegian authorities to the Authority in July 2000 and subsequently approved by the Authority on 19 December 2001 (7). The Hurtigruten companies are also engaged in commercial business activities which are not part of the Hurtigruten service, such as operating high-speed ferries. The Hurtigruten service itself is partly commercially viable, notably during the summer season, whereas it is, in general, not commercially viable during the winter season. The Authority in its 2001 Decision considered that compensation under the Hurtigruten Agreement could be authorised under Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement as the services covered by it were considered to be services of general economic interest.

On 25 September 2002, the Authority decided to propose appropriate measures to Norway with regard to the Norwegian system concerning regionally differentiated social security contributions (8). In the appropriate measures the Authority proposed that Norway should take any legislative, administrative and other measures necessary to eliminate State aid resulting from the system of regionally differentiated social security contributions or render such aid compatible with the EEA Agreement with effect from 1 January 2004. However, the appropriate measures also stated that the Authority might agree to a later date should that be considered objectively necessary and justified by the Authority in order to allow an appropriate transition for the undertakings in question to the adjusted situation. The appropriate measures were accepted by Norway on 31 October 2002.

On 12 November 2003, the Authority accepted a three-year transitional period for the differentiated social security contributions in Zones 3 and 4 in order to achieve a smooth facing-out of the system (9).

On this basis, the Norwegian Parliament, during the autumn of 2003, adopted changes to the differentiated social security system, which entered into force on 1 January 2004. The changes led to higher social security costs for the Hurtigruten companies.

Section 10 of the Hurtigruten Agreement contained a clause whereby both parties to the Agreement could demand a re-negotiation procedure in the event of substantial changes in the prerequisites of the Hurtigruten Agreement. The Hurtigruten Agreement ended as foreseen on 31 December 2004, and a new agreement with the companies entered into force on 1 January 2005, following a tender in June 2004.

3.   Description of the measure

The current case concerns a payment to the Hurtigruten companies contained in Position 70, Chapter 1330 (Særskilte transporttiltak) of the Norwegian 2004 State budget, whereby the Hurtigruten companies would be granted up to NOK 8,5 million (approximately EUR 1,1 million) as compensation due to the changes in the differentiated social security system (10).

The compensation payment granted to the Hurtigruten companies was paid out to fully compensate the increased social security costs without making a distinction between the part of the social security costs pertaining to the commercial activities of the companies and those activities which might be considered public service within the meaning of Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement.

In addition to the compensation granted to the Hurtigruten companies, the companies also received aid as a consequence of the Authority's decision of 12 November 2003. However, the present case only concerns the aid granted as compensation for higher social security contributions. In this respect, an amount of NOK 7,352 million (approximately EUR 900 000) was paid out to the companies.

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

The Norwegian authorities are of the opinion that the compensation was within the limits of the compensation authorised by the Authority in its 2001 Decision, and should therefore be classified as ‘existing aid’ in line with the definition of Article 1 b (ii) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

The Norwegian authorities consider the payment to be covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement in force at the time when the payment was granted. They rely, in this respect, on Section 10 of the Hurtigruten Agreement, a clause whereby both parties to the Hurtigruten Agreement may demand a re-negotiation procedure in the event of substantial changes in the prerequisites of the Hurtigruten Agreement. The Norwegian authorities state that they regard the changes in the differentiated social security system to fulfil this criterion. They could not have been foreseen by the Hurtigruten companies. As a result of the negotiations with the companies, the compensation for these costs was set to NOK 7,352 million for 2004. The purpose of compensating for the amendments in the social security scheme was, according to the Norwegian authorities, to ensure status quo with regard to the agreed level of transport along the Norwegian coastline, by enabling the Hurtigruten companies to continue to carry out the public service obligation entrusted on them in the Agreement.

The Norwegian authorities take the position that Section 10 of the Hurtigruten Agreement constitutes a legal basis for the re-negotiation of the Agreement and that the clause was recognised by the Authority in its 2001 Decision. On this basis, the compensation for increased social security contributions would, according to the Norwegian authorities, not constitute new aid provided that the compensation was within the scope of the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

Concerning the compatibility of the aid, the Norwegian authorities claim that the compensation for the changes in the social security scheme was granted to the Hurtigruten companies, in order to maintain the transport standard fixed by the Norwegian Parliament. Without the compensation, the standard of the public service obligations entrusted to the companies would have declined; either by the application of higher fares or by reduced frequency of the services. On this background, the Norwegian authorities consider the compensation to be necessary.

The Norwegian authorities declare that, on the basis of § 1 of the Hurtigruten Agreement, the Hurtigruten companies had been compensated without making a distinction between the part of the social security costs pertaining to the commercial activities of the companies and those activities which might be considered public service within the meaning of Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement. This provision states that a substantial part of the profits generated by the Hurtigruten companies in the summer season should be used to finance the unprofitable activity in the winter season. The Norwegian authorities are of the opinion that the Authority, by accepting the principle laid down in this provision, has accepted that no clear separation of the commercial and non-commercial services of the Hurtigruten companies is made. On this basis, the Norwegian authorities argue that it is ‘difficult to separate the PSO activity from other commercial activities’ of the companies and thus to grant compensation only to the public service part of the activities. The Norwegian authorities furthermore take the view that the separation between commercial and non-commercial services is not decisive in this connection, and claim that the cross subsidy in this case is clearly in support of the non-commercial services. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities stress that the compensation granted for 2004 does not alter the fact that the commercial services covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement support the activities linked to the public service obligation of the Hurtigruten companies.

Finally, the Norwegian authorities point out that the financial performance of the Hurtigruten companies indicates lower profit than expected (11), and maintain that this shows that no over-compensation takes place.

II.   APPRECIATION

1.   The presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’.

According to the Authority's 2001 Decision, the compensation granted to the Hurtigruten companies under the Hurtigruten Agreement constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority's assessment of the grants to the Hurtigruten companies in the 2001 Decision is relevant when assessing the additional aid granted to the companies for the year 2004. The following assessment will therefore, to a large extent, be based on the appreciation made in the 2001 Decision.

The increased compensation to the Hurtigruten companies is financed directly through a budgetary allocation and is thus granted directly by the State. Furthermore, the compensation relieves the companies of social security charges which they normally would have to bear in the ordinary course of business, and thus strengthens the position of these undertakings compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade. Moreover, the Hurtigruten companies are active on the markets for passenger and cargo transport and on the tourism market, in particular by offering cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. The Hurtigruten service to a large extent attracts foreign tourists, and the Hurtigruten companies thus compete with other undertakings offering similar services in attracting these customers. The compensation granted to the Hurtigruten companies can therefore have an effect on the competition on these markets, and is liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. The Authority thus considers the payment to the Hurtigruten companies to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   New or existing aid

The Norwegian authorities argue that the compensation was in line with the Authority's 2001 Decision, since Section 10 of the Hurtigruten Agreement contained a clause whereby both parties to the Hurtigruten Agreement may demand a re-negotiation procedure in the event of substantial changes in the prerequisites of the Hurtigruten Agreement. According to the Norwegian authorities, the compensation should thus be regarded as existing aid. The Norwegian authorities have stated that they regard the changes in the differentiated social security system to constitute a substantial change, and thus consider the compensation to be reasonable.

The Authority would like to point out that annual compensation of NOK 170 million, expressed in 1999-prices, under the Hurtigruten Agreement had been approved by the Authority. In contrast, the Authority's decision did not deal with Section 10 of the Hurtigruten Agreement as such, and nothing in the Authority's decision suggested that any future amendments of the Hurtigruten Agreement based on this clause would automatically be considered to be in compliance with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

Section 10 of the Agreement merely allows for the possibility of amending the contract due to unforeseen substantial changes of circumstances. It does not prescribe an automatic increase in the compensation to the Hurtigruten companies in the event of raised costs, but merely opens up for the possibility for both parties to the Hurtigruten Agreement to request a re-negotiation procedure without prescribing the result of such re-negotiation. Furthermore, the provision does not explicitly mention augmentation of the costs as a result of a tax increase as a reason for renegotiation, let alone as a fact that would require an automatic adjustment of the agreement with the exact amount flowing from the tax increase. A change in the tax situation of one contracting party is normally not a factor that the other party is obliged to bear. Hence, even if the Hurtigruten Agreement in its entirety was sent to the Authority, the Authority could not reasonably have been expected to foresee all the possible effects of the provision, and the Authority's silence about the provision in its decision cannot be held to imply that all uses of the provision was hereinafter automatically acceptable from a State aid point of view.

It is the view of the Authority that the contractual provision needs to be distinguished from the separate question of whether the chosen re-adaptation complies with the EEA Agreement, and in particular with the State aid provisions. This question needs to be assessed on its own merits for each case of re-adaptation.

In this case, the Norwegian argumentation can only be considered valid, if at all, for the part of the Hurtigruten activities which are covered by public service obligations within the meaning of Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement, as it was the public service obligation compensation which the Authority authorised. Any compensation under Section 10 of the Hurtigruten Agreement cannot be deemed to be in compliance with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. In the case at hand, compensation was granted for the full increase in social security costs, also for those costs that were related to commercial activities not being services of general economic interest. As stated by the Norwegian authorities themselves, it cannot be excluded that the compensation also benefits the commercial parts of the Hurtigruten activities.

The Authority thus considers the aid to be new aid within the meaning of Article 1 c) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

Pursuant to Article 1 (3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

The Authority considers the aid to the Hurtigruten companies to be new aid within the meaning of Article 1 c) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. This implies that the compensation should have been notified to the Authority, according to Article 1 (3) in Part I and Article 2 in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, and should not have been put into effect until the Authority approved the compensation. The Norwegian authorities, however, decided to grant the compensation and not to notify it to the Authority. The compensation is therefore considered as ‘unlawful aid’ within the meaning of Article 1 f) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement and, thus, possibly subject to recovery.

4.   Compatibility of the State aid

Direct aid aimed at covering operating losses is, in general, not compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. Since the increased compensation granted to the Hurtigruten companies covers costs concerning the day-to-day operation of the Hurtigruten service, this payment is to be regarded as operating aid. Such operating aid may be approved, exceptionally, if the conditions set out in derogation provisions of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

As in the 2001 Decision, the Authority takes the view that the aid under examination does not qualify for an exemption from the general prohibition of State aid in Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement on the basis of Article 61 (2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement.

Aid granted to undertakings performing a service in the general economic interest may, however, be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, provided that the conditions laid down in Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement are respected.

Pursuant to Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement ‘undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest...shall be subject to the rules contained in this Agreement, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary of the interests of the Contracting Parties.’

According to case law, four criteria must be met in order for Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement to apply. Firstly, there must be an act of entrustment whereby the State confers responsibility for the execution of a certain task to an undertaking. Secondly, the entrustment must relate to a service of general economic interest. Thirdly, the measure has to be necessary for the performance of the tasks assigned and proportional to that end (hereinafter ‘the necessity requirement’). Finally, the development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties.

In its 2001 Decision, the Authority assessed the compatibility of the compensation to the Hurtigruten companies, as defined in the Hurtigruten Agreement, with Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement. When carrying out that assessment, the Authority took into account sector specific rules, as laid down in the Maritime Cabotage Regulation (12) and Chapter 24A of the Authority's State Aid Guidelines: Aid to maritime transport. The Authority will base its assessment of the increased compensation for 2004 on the appreciation of the Hurtigruten Agreement in the 2001 Decision.

In the 2001 Decision, the Authority regarded parts of the Hurtigruten service as covered by the concept of a service of general economic interest. It furthermore concluded that the Hurtigruten Agreement constituted a public act through which the Hurtigruten companies were entrusted with the operation of services in the general economic interest. Moreover, the agreed payment to Hurtigruten under the Hurtigruten Agreement was, in the Authority's opinion, necessary in order to compensate for the public service obligations imposed on the Hurtigruten companies. Finally, the Authority concluded that the Hurtigruten Agreement would not affect trade to an extent contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

As the Norwegian authorities have paid an increased compensation to the Hurtigruten companies for 2004, the question arises whether the compensation can still be considered to meet the criteria of Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement, and in particular whether the necessity requirement is still met.

The necessity requirement implies that the amount of compensation shall not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit on own capital necessary for discharging those obligations. This compensation must be used for the functioning of the service of general economic interest concerned. It furthermore follows that where the undertaking also carries out activities falling outside the scope of the service of general economic interest, only the costs associated with the service of general economic interest shall be taken into consideration.

However, the increased aid to the Hurtigruten companies in 2004, paid out in order to compensate them for changes in the differentiated social security scheme, has been granted — as stated by the Norwegian authorities — also in favour of commercial activities, as the compensation did not make a distinction between the part of the social security costs related to the commercial activities of the companies and those activities which might be considered public service within the meaning of Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement.

The Norwegian authorities have agued that it follows from the Hurtigruten Agreement that no clear separation of the commercial and non-commercial services of the Hurtigruten companies has to be made, as a substantial part of the profits generated by the Hurtigruten companies in the summer season should be used to finance the unprofitable activity in the winter season. However, the fact that Norwegian authorities have chosen this solution in order to minimize the need for public service compensation does not imply that an increased new aid partially in favour of commercial activity can be considered as necessary for the provision of the public service.

Furthermore, the Authority would like to point out that the 2001 Decision clearly stated that the compensation granted to the Hurtigruten companies may only cover activities in relation with the public service obligation of the companies. The Authority did not accept State aid for the commercially viable part of the service. Moreover, the 2001 Decision was based on a report prepared by Arthur Andersen which analysed the Hurtigruten activities and the need for public service compensation in order to uphold the level of the public service. The public service cost, and thus the allowed State aid set out in the 2001 Decision, was established based on this report.

In addition, the Authority underlines that in order to increase the level of State aid granted to the Hurtigruten companies in line with the 2001 Decision, the Norwegian authorities would have to document that the increased aid is granted only to the public service part of the activity. However, the Norwegian authorities have not denied that the increased State aid to the Hurtigruten companies does partially finance the commercial part of the activity. Neither have the Norwegian authorities made any attempt to calculate the split between the public service part and the commercial part of the Hurtigruten activity in order to grant compensation only to the public service related part of the activity.

Concerning the argument made by the Norwegian authorities that the compensation has been paid without distinction because it was difficult to separate the public service obligations from the commercial activities of the Hurtigruten companies, this is not sufficient to accept an aid which is not in line with the necessity requirement. The concept of public service compensation presupposes that a separation of the costs relating to the public service activities and costs relating to commercial activities has been performed.

Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities argue that even if the grant to the Hurtigruten companies has been increased, this does not involve overcompensation, as the financial performance of the Hurtigruten companies indicates lower profit than was expected when the amount of compensation for public services activities carried out by the companies was calculated. However, even if the companies' profits should indeed be lower than expected, this does not give the Norwegian authorities the right to give a higher compensation than that approved by the Authority in the 2001 Decision, unless it is established that this compensation is necessary to cover the public service costs. In any event, it cannot justify the granting of aid for commercial activities, which are not covered by the application of Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement.

In the view of the Authority, it follows from the above that the increased aid paid to the Hurtigruten companies seems to exceed the amount of compensation necessary in order for the companies to fulfil their public service obligations. Such over-compensation would not be compatible with Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement, and would thus constitute State aid which is incompatible with the EEA Agreement.

It follows from the above that, according to the preliminary appreciation of the Authority, the part of the compensation granted to the commercial activities of the Hurtigruten companies is to be regarded as State aid incompatible with the EEA Agreement and, thus, possibly subject to recovery. Only the part of compensation directly relating to the performance of the public service obligation would be compatible and, hence, not subject to recovery. Should it, as argued by the Norwegian authorities, prove impossible to make a separation between the increased costs incurred in relation with the public service activities and with the commercial activities of the Hurtigruten companies, the Authority might be forced to regard the compensation in its entirety as State aid incompatible with the EEA Agreement. The compensation would in this case also be subject to recovery in its entirety.

5.   Conclusion

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian Government, the Authority cannot exclude that the compensation to the Hurtigruten companies for increased social security contributions constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority cannot see that any exceptions under Article 61 (2) or (3) to the general prohibition of State aid under Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement applies to the aid. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts that the measure can be regarded as complying with Article 59 (2) of the EEA Agreement. Consequently, the Authority has doubts that the above measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

Furthermore, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the aid is to be considered as new aid within the meaning of Article 1 c) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. This implies that the compensation should have been notified to the Authority, according to Article 1 (3) in Part I and Article 2 in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. The compensation is therefore considered as ‘unlawful aid’ within the meaning of Article 1 f) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement and subject to possible recovery.

Consequently, and in accordance with Articles 13 (1) and 4 (4) in Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1 (2) in Part I of Protocol 3 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1 (2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, requests Norway to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the compensation to the Hurtigruten companies for increased social security contribution, within two months from receipt of this decision.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Done at Brussels, 5 July 2006

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Bjørn T. GRYDELAND

President

Kristján A. STEFÁNSSON

College Member

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(1)  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Authority’.

(2)  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘EEA Agreement’.

(3)  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Surveillance and Court Agreement’.

(4)  The Authority's decisions are available on http://www.eftasurv.int/.

(5)  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Hurtigruten companies’.

(6)  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Hurtigruten Agreement’.

(7)  Decision 417/01/COL, hereinafter referred to as the ‘2001 Decision’.

(8)  Decision 172/02/COL.

(9)  Decision 218/03/COL. The transitional period did not apply to Zone 5, as the EFTA States by decision No 2/2003/SC of 1 July 2003 decided that the regionally differentiated social security contributions in Zone 5 was compatible with the EEA Agreement due to exceptional circumstances in this zone.

(10)  The comments to Position 70 read as follows: Av budsjettforslaget på 200,8 mill. kr for 2004, er 192,3 mill. kr direkte relatert til den gjeldende avtalen med hurtigruterederiene. Restbeløpet på 8,5 mill. kr er knyttet til ev. kompensasjon som følge av endringer i ordningen med differensiert arbeidsgiveravgift. Endelig kompensasjonsbeløp vil bli bestemt når forhandlingene mellom hurtigruteselskapene og departementet er avsluttet. [Unofficial translation by the Authority: Of the budget proposal of NOK 200,8 million for 2004, NOK 192,3 million are directly related to the current agreement with the Hurtigruten companies. The remainder of NOK 8,5 million is related to possible compensation as a consequence of amendments to the system concerning differentiated social security contributions. The final compensation will be determined when the negotiations between the Hurtigruten companies and the Ministry are finished.]

(11)  In this regard, the Norwegian authorities refer to a report prepared by Arthur Andersen in 2000 called Behov for statlige tjenestekjøp etter 2001, which analysed the Hurtigruten activities.

(12)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage).

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