alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Adrian Salas, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 776]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Wade, J.), rendered September 21, 1998, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree and attempted assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly precluded him from attempting to establish that the complaining witnesses were fabricating their testimony because of a pre-existing hostility towards him. The defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine those witnesses about certain matters tending to show bias or hostility. The Supreme Court properly limited the cross-examination and the introduction of extrinsic evidence pertaining to events and matters that were too remote and speculative to establish the witnesses’s hostility *(see People v Thomas,*46 NY2d 100 [1978]; *People v DaCosta,*201 AD2d 402 [1994]; *People v Ayers,*161 AD2d 770 [1990]).

During the trial, the defendant sought to have the People sanctioned for their failure to preserve certain photographs, which were discoverable *(see*CPL 240.20 [1] [d]). However, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court properly declined to impose a sanction *(see People v Kelly,*62 NY2d 516, 520 [1984]; *People v Hernandez,*207 AD2d 719 [1994]; *People v Haupt,*128 AD2d 172 [1987], *affd*71 NY2d 929 [1988]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for ap*415pellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]), or without merit. Goldstein, J.P., Skelos, Fisher and Lunn, JJ., concur.
IA

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 30

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States permitting

the President to grant a pardon to an individual only after such individual has been convicted.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. JACOBS introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to

the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States permitting the President to grant a pardon to

an individual only after such individual has been convicted.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
2

•HJ 30 IH

1 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several

2 States within seven years after the date of its submission

3 for ratification:

4 ‘‘ARTICLE—

5 ‘‘The President shall only have the power to grant

6 a reprieve or a pardon for an offense against the United

7 States to an individual who has been convicted of such

8 an offense.’’.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1173 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 1173

   To prohibit the expenditure of Federal funds for constructing or 
   modifying highway signs that are expressed only in metric system 
                             measurements.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 8, 1995

Mr. Stump (for himself, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Callahan, Mr. Bachus, and Mr. 
   Everett) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit the expenditure of Federal funds for constructing or 
   modifying highway signs that are expressed only in metric system 
                             measurements.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. METRIC SYSTEM SIGNING.

    (a) Limitation on Placement of New Signs.--No Federal funds may be 
expended to construct, erect, or otherwise place any sign relating to 
any speed limit, any distance, or any other measurement, on any highway 
if such sign establishes such speed limit, distance, or other 
measurement solely using the metric system.
    (b) Limitation on Modification of Existing Signs.--No Federal funds 
may be expended to modify any sign relating to any speed limit, any 
distance, or any other measurement on any highway for the conversion of 
such sign solely to the metric system.
    (c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section, the following 
definitions apply:
            (1) Highway.--The term ``highway'' means a highway as 
        defined in section 101(a) of title 23, United States Code.
            (2) Metric system.--The term ``metric system'' means the 
        metric system of measurement as defined in section 4 of the 
        Metric Conversion Act of 1975 (15 U.S.C. 205c).
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0341

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL RICHARD BONKO,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including June 4, 2021, within which to prepare, file, and 

serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 29 2021

04/29/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0341
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

The undersigned, as the Chief Financial Officer of HQ Sustainable Maritime Industries, Inc. (the Company), certifies that, to his knowledge on
the date of this certification:



|1. | This Quarterly Report on Form 10Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date
(the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The foregoing certifications are made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350) and shall
not be relied upon for any other purpose.

Dated: November 9, 2010



|                        
|------------------------
|/s/ Jean-Pierre Dallaire
|Jean-Pierre Dallaire    
|Chief Financial Officer
§ 1020.670 Summons or subpoena of foreign bank records; termination of correspondent relationship. ( a ) Refer to § 1010.670 of this chapter.
( b ) [Reserved]
Exhibit 10.5

 

AMENDMENT NUMBER ONE

TO

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

(Herbert M. Gardner)

 

On January 1, 2005, Supreme Industries, Inc., a Delaware corporation (hereafter called “Company”) entered into an Amended and Restated Employment Contract with Herbert M. Gardner (hereafter called “Executive”).

 

Paragraph 19 of such Amended and Restated Employment Contract provides that such Contract can be amended at any time by an instrument in writing setting forth the particulars of such amendment and duly executed by Company and Executive.

 

In accordance with such paragraph 19, Company and Executive hereby amend the Amended and Restated Employment Contract as follows:

 

1.             Amend paragraph 3. by deleting the phrase “and Chief Executive Officer” contained in the first and second lines of this paragraph.

 

2.             Amend paragraph 5.d. by deleting it in its entirety and replacing it with the following:

 

“d.           Dental and Vision Benefits.  Company shall pay or reimburse Executive for all family dental expenses and all family vision (eye care) expenses up to a maximum of $5,000 per year.  However, in the event the full $5,000 is not used up in a given calendar year, the unused portion can be carried forward to a future calendar year (or years). Also, if the payment or reimbursement in one calendar year exceeds $5,000, the excess over $5,000 may be reimbursed from any unused amounts available in the succeeding calendar year (or years).”

 

In all other respects, Company and Executive hereby ratify and affirm all of the other provisions contained in the Amended and Restated Employment Contract.

 

This document may be signed in multiple counterparts, each of which for all purposes shall be deemed an original.

 

[Signature Page to Follow]

 











 

Dated to be effective June 29, 2012.

 

 

	
COMPANY:
    	
 
    	
EXECUTIVE:
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Supreme   Industries, Inc.
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
By:
    	
/s/   Matthew W. Long
    	
 
    	
/s/   Herbert M. Gardner
    
	
 
    	
Matthew   W. Long
    	
 
    	
Herbert   M. Gardner
    
	
 
    	
Interim   C.E.O and C.F.O.
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
P.   O. Box 237
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
2581   E. Kercher Road
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Goshen, IN   46527-0237
    	
 
    	
 
    


 

2
#### Peter Costalas, Appellant, v Vivia Amalfitano et al., Respondents.

[808 NYS2d 24]

*304Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III, J.), entered February 4, 2005, which denied plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (2) and (3) to vacate the judgment entered herein dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiffs new evidence showing an ex parte communication initiated by plaintiffs attorney with the trial court does not warrant vacatur of the judgment, since the communication, which was made after the trial court had issued its decision to dismiss the action at the close of plaintiffs evidence, did not concern “the merits of the cause” (Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-110 [b] [22 NYCRR 1200.41 (b)]), but rather the purely procedural matter of applying for an award of costs and attorneys’ fees *(see*Siegel, NY Prac § 428, at 695 [3d ed] [court must be convinced that new evidence would “probably” change the result]; § 429, at 696 [court must be convinced that misconduct complained of is something that could have affected the outcome]). Notably, moreover, defendant never did apply for an award of costs and attorneys’ fees. The motion court also properly declined to consider two other ex parte communications that plaintiff first raised only in his reply papers, and which, in any event, also appear to have concerned purely procedural matters that could not have had any effect on the outcome. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Marlow, Ellerin, Gonzalez and McGuire, JJ.
EXHIBIT 31.1





CERTIFICATION OF SENIOR OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE SERVICING FUNCTION OF THE SERVICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Kim Taylor, certify that:





1.   I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Huntington Auto Trust 2016-1 (the Exchange Act periodic reports);





2.   Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.   Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;





4.    I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and





5.    All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.





In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on the information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.








By:     /s/ Kim Taylor


Name:     Kim Taylor


Title:       Senior Vice President, The Huntington National Bank, as Servicer





Date: March 16, 2017
#### In the Matter of William P., a Child Alleged to be Permanently Neglected. Margaret P., Appellant; Forestdale, Inc., et al., Respondent.

[803 NYS2d 563]

*238Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Maureen McLeod, J.), entered on or about January 2, 2003, which, to the extent appealed from, upon a finding of permanent neglect, terminated respondent mother’s parental rights to the subject child and committed custody and guardianship of the child to the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York and petitioner agency for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s determination that respondent mother permanently neglected her child by failing to plan for his future *(see*Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [a]; *Matter of Sheila G.,*61 NY2d 368 [1984]; *and see Matter of Star Leslie*W., 63 NY2d 136 [1984]). Although the agency diligently endeavored to encourage a meaningful relationship between the mother and the child by, inter alia, arranging for visitation, referring the mother for services and providing her guidance in finding suitable housing, the mother visited with the child only sporadically, and on those occasions seemed disinterested or interacted poorly with him, failed to establish that she had completed the recommended courses of psychotherapy and domestic violence counseling, and, as of the date the petition was filed, had not obtained suitable housing.

The evidence demonstrated that termination of respondent’s parental rights so as to facilitate adoption was in the child’s best interests *(see Matter of Star Leslie W.,*63 NY2d at 147-149; *Matter of Shareal Stacey S.,*17 AD3d 251 [2005]). The now nine-year-old child has been living with his foster family since he was a week old and respondent made no showing that she had taken the steps necessary to provide the child with a stable and nurturing home. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Marlow, Nardelli, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.
#### Sharon A. Brown, Respondent, v Tairi Hacking Corp. et al., Appellants. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[804 NYS2d 756]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated July 14, 2005, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The defendants submitted the affirmed medical reports of a neurologist and orthopedist who examined the plaintiff and determined that he did not suffer from any disabilities, impairments, or limitations in functioning, as well as the affirmed medical report of a radiologist who indicated that the plaintiff s magnetic resonance imaging reports of the cervical spine revealed only degenerative changes unrelated to the accident. *326This evidence sufficed to establish a prima facie case that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955 [1992]; *Luckey v Bauch,*17 AD3d 411 [2005]; *Sims v Megaris,*15 AD3d 468 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 703 [2005]; *Check v Gacevk,*14 AD3d 586 [2005]; *Paul v Trerotola,*11 AD3d 441 [2004]; *Mastaccioula v Sciarra,*11 AD3d 434 [2004]).

The affirmations of the plaintiffs doctors failed to raise a triable issue of fact. One physician based his affirmation upon examinations two years prior to the motion *(see Kauderer v Penta,*261 AD2d 365 [1999]; *see also Batista v Olivo,*17 AD3d 494 [2005]; *Constantinou v Surinder,*8 AD3d 323 [2004]; *Mohamed v Dhanasar,*273 AD2d 451 [2000]), while the other physician, who examined the plaintiff more recently, failed to account for the notations in the plaintiffs medical records indicating that the plaintiff had recovered from his injuries within a few months of the accident *(see Doran v Sequino,*17 AD3d 626 [2005]; *Cantanzano v Mei,*11 AD3d 500 [2004]; *Powell v Hurdle,*214 AD2d 720 [1995]).

Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Adams, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein, Skelos and Dillon, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ex parte Joseph Gomez

Appellate case number: 01-20-00004-CR & 01-20-00005-CR

Trial court case number: 1657519 & 1657521

Trial court: 338th District Court of Harris County

Appellant Joseph Gomez filed a motion asking this Court to designate the opinion in this 

case for publication.

Rule 19.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure permits an appellate court whose 

plenary power has expired to order its opinion published in accordance with Rule 47. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 19.3, 47. Rule 47.2(b) requires that a majority of the panel designate the opinion as 

“publish” or “do not publish” before it is handed down. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). It further 

provides: “Any party may move the appellate court to change the notation, but the court of 

appeals must not change the notation after the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted on any 

party’s petition for discretionary review or other request for relief.” Id. In addition, the “Court of 

Criminal Appeals may, at any time, order that a ‘do not publish’ notation be changed to 

‘publish.’” Id.

This Court’s plenary power expired when the State filed a petition for discretionary 

review. See Vidales v. State, 471 S.W.3d 457, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (holding that court of 

appeals does not retain plenary jurisdiction after a petition for review is filed in the Court of 

Criminal Appeals); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 19.2 (providing that plenary power of court of 

appeals continues after the filing of a petition for review in the Supreme Court but not extending 

the rule to the Court of Criminal Appeals). In addition, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an 

order granting the State’s motion to recall the mandates in these cases. 
Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted on a party’s request for relief, Rule 47 

does not authorize this Court to designate the opinion in this case for publication. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 47.2(b). Because we otherwise lack plenary power, we dismiss this motion. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ____/s/ Peter Kelly__________

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Kelly, and Landau.

Date: September 10, 2020
#### In the Matter of Kurt Westenberger, Appellant, v Rosalie Westenberger, Respondent. (Proceeding Nos. 1 and 2.) In the Matter of Rosalie Westenberger, Respondent, v Kurt Westenberger, Appellant. (Proceeding Nos. 3 and 4.)

[806 NYS2d 665]

In related child support proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Marks, J.), dated April 14, 2004, which denied his objections to an order of the same court (Dwyer, H.E.) dated March 25, 2003, which, after a hearing, inter alia, directed him to pay child support in the sum of $141 per week for two of the parties’ children and arrears in the sum of $8,565.25.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant’s contention that the hearing examiner erroneously imputed income to him for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation is without merit. In determining a party’s child support obligation, “a court need not rely upon the party’s own account of his or her finances, but may impute income based upon the party’s past income or demonstrated earning potential” *(Rocanello v Rocanello,*254 AD2d 269 [1998]; *see Curran v Curran,*2 AD3d 391 [2003])- This is particularly true when, as here, the record supports a finding that the appellant’s reported income on his tax return is suspect *(see Ivani*
      *572
      *v Ivani,*303 AD2d 639 [2003]; *Matter of Graves v Smith,*284 AD2d 332, 333 [2001]; *see also Matter of Hurd v Hurd,*303 AD2d 928 [2003]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Luciano, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.