In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-2270 

ANGELA FLOWERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

KIA MOTORS FINANCE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 21-cv-411-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2024 — DECIDED JUNE 26, 2024 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Early one morning, Angela Flowers saw a truck parked across the street from her apartment 

building in Lodi, Wisconsin. She and her son got into her car, 

a Kia Forte, to drive to work. The truck parked behind them, 

preventing them from backing out of their parking space. So, 

they drove through their backyard, onto the street, and later 
2 No. 23-2270 

the highway, the truck following close behind. Eventually, 

they lost the truck. 

The next day Flowers contacted Kia Motors Finance 

(“Kia”), with whom she had a car loan. The company confirmed that she was behind on her payments and that her vehicle was subject to repossession. Kia had repossessed her car 

a year earlier, so Flowers suspected that the previous day’s 

events were another repossession attempt. 

Flowers sued Kia, alleging unlawful collection practices. 

But she unduly delayed her attempt to include the earlier repossession in her amended complaint. And she cannot point 

to any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 

Kia was involved in the events she describes. The district 

court granted Kia summary judgment, which we affirm. 

I. Background

A. Factual

Summary judgment was granted to Kia, so we construe all 

facts and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-movant, Flowers. Biggs v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 

82 F.4th 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2023). 

Flowers purchased a Kia Forte compact sedan in 2017. Kia 

financed a loan for her to buy the car. In 2019, Flowers fell 

behind on her loan payments. Kia gave her notice that she was 

in default and the Forte was repossessed in September 2019. 

Flowers paid the amounts she owed, and the next month regained possession of the car. 

In the summer of 2020, Flowers again failed to make the 

scheduled loan payments, and Kia gave her notice that she 

was in default and that the vehicle may be repossessed. 
No. 23-2270 3

Flowers spoke to a Kia representative and was told she would 

be sent some paperwork to try to resolve the default, but she 

alleged she never received it.

In November 2020, Flowers and her son would drive to 

work together early in the morning. One morning before 3:00 

a.m. she went outside and noticed a truck parked across from 

her apartment building. She did not hear its engine running, 

nor could she recognize the make or model of the truck. She 

could see that its driver was a man wearing a beanie, but his 

clothing did not display any identifying information. The 

only other cars she saw in the parking lot that morning were 

her mother’s and possibly a neighbor’s. Flowers knew her 

neighbor’s car had been paid off for some time. 

That same morning at 3:30 a.m. Flowers and her son left 

their apartment, walked across the parking lot toward Flowers’s vehicle, and saw the truck still parked across the street. 

As they walked toward the Forte, the truck drove backwards 

and stopped behind and perpendicular to Flowers’s car. She 

estimated a four-to-five-foot gap between the rear of her car 

and the truck. 

Before Flowers entered her car, she looked at the truck. 

She could not see any signs, numbering, lettering, or license 

plate. Neither she nor her son communicated with the driver, 

who remained in the truck. 

Flowers and her son then got into her car. They sat for 

about a minute with the truck parked behind the Forte. This 

prevented her son, who was driving, from backing out of the 

parking space. So, he drove the car across the grassy backyard 

of the apartment building, through a small driveway, and 

onto a city street and eventually the highway. The truck 
4 No. 23-2270 

followed them through town, “right on [her] bumper,” only a 

foot or 18 inches behind her car. Rather than Flowers directing 

her son to take them to work, she told him to “go, go, go.” 

The truck followed them onto the interstate. Instead of 

traveling their usual route south, Flowers’s son drove north. 

The truck pursued them, staying “a bumper distance away” 

from their car. Flowers’s son left the interstate, traveled 

through a truck stop parking lot, and then returned to the 

highway heading in the opposite direction. Only after traveling through the truck stop did Flowers and her son lose sight 

of the truck. 

The next day, Flowers called Kia to ask if her car was subject to repossession. The representative initially said it was 

not, but later admitted it was. While Flowers had her loan 

with Kia, the company used repossession companies in Wisconsin, including in the area where she lived. The Forte was 

not repossessed in 2020 or thereafter. 

B. Procedural

In June 2021, Flowers sued Kia alleging that blocking her 

car in and chasing her were an unlawful attempt to repossess 

the Forte. She claimed this violated the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wisconsin Statutes ch. 421 to ch. 427. 

The district court held a pretrial conference and issued a 

scheduling order. The deadline to amend pleadings was set 

for July 29, 2022, after which “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

15 applies, and the later a party seeks leave of the court to 

amend, the less likely it is that justice will require the amendment.” 
No. 23-2270 5

Four days before that deadline, the parties filed a stipulation about Flowers amending her complaint. The July 25, 2022 

stipulation read: “Plaintiff shall have leave to amend the 

Complaint by and through the date seven (7) days after Plaintiff deposes [Kia Motor Finance]’s 30(b)(6) corporate representative, which the parties expect to complete in August 

2022.” 

Due to scheduling conflicts, the deposition did not occur. 

Instead, Flowers’s counsel suggested several potential dates, 

including August 30 and 31. Kia’s counsel responded on July 

28 that either date would work. Without filing an amended 

complaint, Flowers’s counsel did not follow up with Kia 

about potential deposition dates until August 29. Then, on 

September 9, Flowers’s counsel noticed the Kia corporate representative deposition for October 11. 

On September 28, 2022, before that deposition, Kia moved 

for judgment on the pleadings. After Kia filed this motion, the 

district court accepted the parties’ July 25, 2022 stipulation 

nunc pro tunc. Flowers then requested an extension of her 

deadline to respond to Kia’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. She also said she intended to request leave to file 

an amended complaint. 

The district court distributed a text only order to the parties on October 26, 2022, which read: 

Plaintiff’s stated intent to seek leave to file an 

amended complaint that adds two new parties 

is a non sequitur. In any event, the deadline to 

amend without leave of court passed three 

months ago, and the court cautioned the parties 

in May, 2022 that the later they sought leave to 
6 No. 23-2270 

amend, the less likely it was that justice would 

require the amendment. R. [23] at 2. (To the extent the parties have stipulated to a future 

amendment, see R. [39], the court remains the 

gatekeeper whether to allow an amended complaint at this juncture regardless of the parties' 

stipulation).

Flowers received her requested extension to respond to 

Kia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. In her response, 

filed November 2, 2022, Flowers abandoned three of the four 

claims in her original complaint. She did preserve her claim 

that by the November 2020 events, Kia violated WIS. STAT. 

§ 427.104, which governs unlawful debt collection practices. 

The same day, Flowers moved for leave to file an amended 

complaint. In that proposed pleading, she sought to add allegations about the 2019 repossession. Emails between the parties’ counsel later filed with the district court showed that by 

March 10, 2022, Flowers knew all the facts related to the 2019 

default and repossession, the 2020 default, and those underlying any potential claims. 

Kia opposed Flowers’s motion to amend the complaint. 

Discovery closed, and on the deadline for dispositive motions, Kia moved for summary judgment on Flowers’s remaining claim. 

On June 1, 2023, the district court ruled on the pending 

motions. Kia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was 

granted as to three of the four counts in Flowers’s original 

complaint. Her motion to amend her complaint was denied 

on grounds of undue delay and futility. The district court also 

granted Kia’s summary judgment motion on Flowers’s 
No. 23-2270 7

remaining claim of unlawful debt collection under WIS. STAT. 

§ 427.104, concluding that she had failed to present any evidence linking Kia to the unidentified truck and driver. The 

district court entered judgment in Kia’s favor, and Flowers 

appeals.1

II. Amendment of the Complaint

Flowers first contends that under the parties’ July 25, 2022 

stipulation, she did not need the district court’s approval to 

file an amended complaint. Kia consented in writing to the 

amendment, Flowers argues, so the district court could not 

deny her motion. We “generally review denial of leave to 

amend for abuse of discretion.” O'Boyle v. Real Time Resols., 

Inc., 910 F.3d 338, 347 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Undue delay was one ground on which the district court 

denied Flowers leave to file an amended complaint. She fails 

to address that ground on appeal, so she has waived any argument that the proposed amended complaint was filed without undue delay. Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, Illinois, 59 F.4th

887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023) (appellant may waive issue or argument by failing to raise it in the party's appeal).

Even if we examine the merits of this argument, the district court was within its discretion to deny amendment of 

Flowers’s original complaint. The parties’ July 25, 2022 stipulation, which the court approved, did not trump that court’s 

1 The district court had federal question subject matter jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplementary jurisdiction over the Wisconsin state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This appeal is taken from 

a final judgment of the district court, so this court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
8 No. 23-2270 

scheduling order. That stipulation memorializes the understanding that after the Kia corporate representative deposition occurred, Flowers may need to amend her complaint. 

That agreement was based on a contingent event that did not 

take place. Stipulation or not, the district court always retained its authority to control the litigation, including the 

pleadings, as it reminded the parties on October 26, 2022. 

Flowers’s motion was filed after the scheduling order 

deadline, so the district court could have applied the “good 

cause” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). 

See Allen v. Brown Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th 843, 852–53 (7th Cir. 

2022). Instead, the court applied the more lenient standard of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2): “[t]he court should 

freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” As that 

rule states, amendment is generally favored. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Nevertheless, a district court may 

deny leave to amend when it has “good reason” for doing so, 

one example of which is undue delay. L. Offs. of David Freydin, 

P.C. v. Chamara, 24 F.4th 1122, 1133 (7th Cir. 2022); Liebhart v. 

SPX Corp., 917 F.3d 952, 964 (7th Cir. 2019). 

The district court properly found that Flowers “proposed 

an amendment seeking to add a new claim regarding an entirely different incident than was the focus of her original 

complaint.” She “suggest[ed] without explanation that she 

could not have pleaded the new claim until she had deposed 

Kia’s representative.” But Flowers “conced[ed] that she was 

already aware of the facts and legal basis for her new claim, 

and even had the evidence in her possession by at least March 

10, 2022.” She never explained why she proposed her 

amended complaint eight months after having all the necessary information about the 2019 repossession. Without a 
No. 23-2270 9

sound excuse for the undue delay, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion when it denied Flowers leave to amend 

her complaint. Given this evaluation, we need not address

whether Flowers’s motion to amend her complaint was futile.

III. Summary Judgment

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to Kia de novo. Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1043 (7th 

Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact” and the moving party “is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

In applying this standard, we read the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pierner-Lytge, 60 F.4th at 1043. 

Flowers alleges that Kia violated two provisions of WIS.

STAT. § 427.104. Subsection (1)(a) provides that a debt collector may not “[u]se or threaten force or violence to cause physical harm to the customer or the customer’s dependents or 

property.” And Subsection (1)(h) prohibits a debt collector 

from “[e]ngag[ing] in other conduct which can reasonably be 

expected to threaten or harass the customer or a person related to the customer.” 

Flowers contends that circumstantial evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find that Kia was legally responsible 

for the unidentified truck driver’s actions in November 2020. 

Viewing the facts in favor of Flowers, a truck blocked in her 

vehicle within the parking lot adjacent to her home, and the 

only other parked cars were not susceptible to repossession. 

The truck then chased the Forte sedan for miles, at highway 

speeds and close range. The next day, Flowers confirmed with 

Kia that her car was subject to repossession. Discovery 
10 No. 23-2270 

yielded that in November 2020 Kia worked with a repossession company in her area of Wisconsin. Moreover, Kia previously had her Forte repossessed in 2019 by a company Kia 

had hired.2 

There is no way, according to Flowers, that the events on 

November 2020 could be entirely coincidental. Any other explanation for the truck’s actions pales next to the conclusion 

that Kia tried to repossess her car. To Flowers, only a jury 

could resolve this question. 

Flowers incorrectly asserts that the type of evidence she 

points to—circumstantial—indicates whether a genuine issue 

of material facts exists on her claim. As this court has noted in 

its pattern civil jury instructions, “[t]he law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.” FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 1.12 (2017 rev.). Either type of evidence can 

prove a fact. See, e.g., United States v. Godinez, 7 F.4th 628, 639 

(7th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases providing that circumstantial 

evidence is not weaker than direct evidence). The type of evidence Flowers relies on to support her claim does not dictate 

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists requiring a jury 

trial.

This court has recognized “that circumstantial evidence 

may be enough to survive summary judgment if that evidence could allow a jury to draw a reasonable inference in 

support of the non-moving party.” Jones v. Van Lanen, 27 F.4th 

2 Flowers submitted this evidence about the 2019 repossession in her 

additional proposed findings of fact in March 2023, Dist. Ct. DE 63, nos. 

2–4, unrelated to her previous motion to amend her complaint to include 

the 2019 repossession. 
No. 23-2270 11

1280, 1286–87 (7th Cir. 2022). But an inference that “veers too 

far into speculation [fails] to survive summary judgment.” Id. 

at 1286. Flowers offers only speculation in support of her remaining claim. 

There is no dispute that Flowers cannot identify the truck 

involved in the events that early morning in November 2020, 

other than to say it was “dark blue or black.” She could not 

see any markings on the truck. And she “did not know why 

the unidentified truck was in the parking lot or what actually 

was going on.” 

Flowers could not describe the truck’s driver, other than 

to say he was a “male wearing a beanie.” She did not identify 

any markings on the driver’s clothing that might indicate who 

he was or for whom he may have been working. She had no 

contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with the 

truck driver. 

She has not advanced evidence about who owned the 

truck; who the driver worked for; whether the driver was acting under the instructions of any other individual or company; what those potential instructions may have been; why 

the truck was at Flowers’s apartment; why the driver followed Flowers and her son; and ultimately, if Kia or any company with which it contracted was involved in any of the 

events underlying her claim. 

There is no evidence that Kia intended to use or threaten, 

or in fact used or threatened, force or violence directed at her 

to cause physical harm to her or her property in violation of 

WIS. STAT. § 427.104(1)(a). Flowers has no evidence of physical 

damage to herself or her property, and she did not identify 

any experts who may opine on that topic. 
12 No. 23-2270 

Just so, Flowers cannot demonstrate that Kia engaged in 

any conduct which could be reasonably expected to threaten 

or harass a customer, or a person related to a customer, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 427.104(1)(h). There is no question that 

Flowers and her son were harassed that morning. But she has 

not shown that the unidentified truck and its driver who did 

the harassing was connected to Kia in any way. 

Simply put, there is no evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could find that Kia was involved in the November 2020 

events, let alone that Kia violated Flowers’s rights. As the district court correctly ruled, “speculation [] is insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”

Flowers’s theory of liability is that her car was susceptible 

to repossession, her Forte was previously repossessed by a 

company hired by Kia, so that company (or another Kia contracted with) must be connected to the events in November 

2020. But that theory is conjecture. Which company (if any) 

hired the truck and driver? At whose direction was the driver 

acting? And for what reason? Speculation cannot create a genuine issue of fact that defeats summary judgment. Circle City 

Broad. I, LLC v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 99 F.4th 378, 384 (7th Cir. 

2024) (citing White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 

2016)). And speculation is insufficient to defeat a summary 

judgment motion. See Herzog v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc., 

742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014) (nonmovant “is entitled ... to 

all reasonable inferences in her favor, ‘inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a 

summary judgment motion.’”) (citing Tubergen v. St. Vincent 

Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 517 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Put directly, there must be some evidence connecting Kia to 

the actions of the unidentified truck and driver. There is none. 
No. 23-2270 13

Flowers offers inferential leaps: Who else would it be? 

Why else would he be there? But courts deal in proof, and the 

leaps Flowers offers cannot be used to defeat summary judgment. Making all reasonable inferences for Flowers, no evidence connects a repossession company hired by Kia with the 

unidentified truck and driver. No evidence connects Kia to 

the November 2020 events—circumstantial or otherwise. 

To Flowers, Kia suggests that the only way she could 

prove her case is by direct admission—from Kia, or a repossession company with which Kia contracts—that they directed or authorized the truck driver to chase Flowers. But 

that is not correct. Evidence on any of the topics or questions 

identified above could create a genuine issue of material fact. 

But no such evidence has been produced. 

Flowers submits that Kia itself provided that evidence in 

its initial disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

26. She points to those disclosures as information linking Kia 

to the events about which she complains. Specifically, Kia disclosed that it “dealt with” a national repossession management company, Primeritus Financial Services, on the account 

for Flowers’s vehicle. Kia stated Primeritus subcontracted

with towing companies like Statewide Recovery Specialists, 

including for the incident “forming the basis of [Flowers’s] 

claims.” To Flowers, Kia’s identification of this discoverable 

information constituted a judicial admission to its involvement in the November 2020 incident, and that Kia’s disclosure 

that entities may have or should have certain information is 

evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 

But Rule 26 initial disclosures do not play the role that 

Flowers contends. Judicial admissions are “formal concessions in the pleadings, or stipulations by a party or its counsel, 
14 No. 23-2270 

that are binding upon the party making them.” Keller v. United 

States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th Cir.1995). And initial disclosures fail to meet any of those criteria. Flowers does not cite 

any statute, rule, or precedent that states otherwise. 

Initial disclosures are neither pleadings to the court nor 

sworn statements of parties. Rather, they provide information 

early in the proceedings to allow the parties to pursue discovery, collect evidence, and take necessary depositions. They relay the identity “of each individual likely to have discoverable 

information—along with the subjects of that information—

that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses ... .” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). As the district court 

correctly explained, “[t]he purpose of the disclosures is to allow the parties to begin collecting evidence and engaging in 

discovery; they do not excuse a party from confirming information in the disclosures or from translating the disclosures 

into admissible evidence.” 

Thus, although Kia’s disclosures contained information 

attempting to link Kia and the truck driver, Flowers did not 

develop that information into evidence a court could weigh at 

summary judgment. So, Kia’s initial disclosures do not defeat 

its motion for summary judgment on Flowers’s claims.

Flowers’s final argument is that the truck driver was acting as Kia’s agent when it harassed and scared her. But, again,

she has not developed evidence to suggest that a Kia agent, 

such as a repossession company with which Kia contracted, 

was involved in any way on the events in November 2020. At 

summary judgment there is no evidence that Kia gave approval or permission for, or had control over, any attempted 

repossession. Without evidence as to what company the truck 
No. 23-2270 15

driver may have worked for, there is no evidence that he was 

acting as an agent of Kia. So, this theory fails.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decisions.