U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

81–726PDF 2013

THE NASA AUTHORIZATION 

ACT OF 2013 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 19, 2013 

Serial No. 113–37 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

MARK TAKANO, California 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Date of Hearing 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Steven M. Palazzo, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 95 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 96 

Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 98 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 99 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 101 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 102 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Steven W. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy, Cornell University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 103 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 106 

Mr. A. Thomas Young, Former Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin 

Corporation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 114 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 117 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 125

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Steven W. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy, Cornell University ................................................................................................................... 142 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Submitted statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 158 

Submitted letter by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 160 

Submitted letter by Representative Steve Stockman, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 161 

Submitted report, Investment in Space Technology is Critical for NASA and 

our Nation’s Future, by Robert D. Braun, David and Andrew Lewis Professor of Space Technology, Georgia Institute of Technology ........................... 162 

(1) 

THE NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven Palazzo 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 

LAMAR S. SMITH. Tc)(es 

CHAIRMAN 

Q:onyrcss of the canitell ;6nmz 

ii'iOUllC of 1RrpfcsmUltiDcs COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE; SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFfICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-£301 

(202) 225-6371 

wW\N,s.clen(1),hotls-e.gov 

Subcommittee on'Space 

"NASA Authorization Act of2013" 

Wednesday, June 19,2013 

10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. 

2318 Raybilrn House Office Building 

Dr. Steven W. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy, Cornell University 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Ts)(as 

RANKING MEM8ER 

Mr. A. Thomas Young, Former Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin Corporatibn 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

NASA Authorization Act of 2013 

Wednesday, June 19,2013 

10:00 am. -12:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

The purpose of the hearing is to review a discussion draft of the National Aeronautics. and Space 

Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of2013. 

• Dr. Steven M. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy, Cornell University 

• Mr. A. Thomas Young, Executive Vice President (retired), Lockheed Martin Corporation 

Background 

Congress has provided consistent guidance to the Administration through consecutive NASA 

Authorization Acts, most recently in 2010. That Act (p.L.111-267) authorized NASA for three 

years. As the expiration of that authorization nears, the Committee will consider the priorities, 

funding levels, and authorities granted to NASA contained in the draft legislation. 

Attachments 

• One Page Summary 

• Section by Section 

• DiscussionDraft 

1 
4 

Highlights of the NASA Authorization Act of2013 

This bill authorizes programs and projects at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

for two years. Proposed NASA funding is consistent with the Budget Control Act and FY2013 

appropriations--$16,865,200,OOO. If House-Senate agree to repeal and replace the BCA, then funding 

would be added to the International Space Station, Space Launch System, and Commercial Crew. NASA 

continues to be the world's premier space organization. This bill seeks to ensure sustainability of purpose 

and budget for high-priority programs. 

NASA's Mission Objectives 

Human Spaceflight: Building on the themes ofprcviolls authoriLations, this legislation reaffirms Congress's 

commitment to space exploration, both human and rohotic, using a "go-as-wc-can-afford-to-pay" strategy 

toward NASA's missions. This bill makes clear that missions to lunar orbit, the surface of the Moon, and Mars 

are the goals for NASA's human spaceflight program with quadrennial reports for what progress has been made 

toward those goals. 

In the near-term, the primary ohjectives for NASA human spaceflight include: 

>- Realizing the research potential or the International Space Station with an Oflice of Science & 

Technology Policy-led strategic plan for all science agencies to conduct research on the Station. NASA 

will study the feasibility of continuing its operational lifespan beyond 2020 . 

..,. Continued commitment to develop the Space Launch System and Orion Crew Vehicle to return to the 

Moon and beyond, but no funding for an asteroid rendezvous mission. Reiterates Congressional 

direction that Orion he a hack up system to support the Space Station if necessary . 

." Building Commercial Crew systems (with NASA funds) to launch American astronauts on American 

rockets from American soil as soon as possible, so we are no longer reliant on Russia. 

Science Programs: Relying on the guidance ofNCltional Academy of Sciences Decadal Surveys, this bill 

restores proper balance to NASA's science portfolio. NASA Earth Science is reduced to 2008 spending levels 

to provide better balance of funding for NASA's planetary science programs. Thirteen different federal 

agencies fund $2.5 billion annually in climate science research, but only NASA has space exploration as its 

primary mission. NASA is still involved in climate change research~spending S1.2 billion annually. NASA 

must remain focused on building weather satellites for NOAA to meet our nation's urgent weather-monitoring 

needs, as well as building LANDSAT satellites for the US Geological Survey. 

}o Maintains launch date of the James Webb Space Telescope hy 2018. 

? Funds survey for potentially-hazardous Earth-crossing asteroids . 

.,. Continues exciting search for planets around othcr stars and life on other worlds. 

Aeronautics: A robust aeronautics research program is important for the safe integration of unmanned Clerial 

systems into thc national airspace as well as NextGen technology for air traffic management. 

STEM Education: There's bipartisan agreement that the Administration's proposal to re-organize NASA's 

STEM education program is questionable. This bill maintains FY 2013 organization and funding level. 

NASA Leadership: Witnesses have raised concerns that NASA have been too politicized in recent years, 

adversely affecting the success of NASA's programs. This bill would make the following changes: Like the 

National Science Foundation, the NASA Administrator would be appointed to a 6-year term appointment. The 

NASA Advisory Council would be structured to provide more stakeholder input, with appointments by both the 

Congress and the President. 

Space Act Agreements: The bill provides greater public accountability and transparency on SAAs. 

Controlling Costs: Requires NASA to enforce more cost estimating discipline for its programs, whlle restoring 

funds set aside for contract termination liability toward development work on high-priority programs. 
5 

SECTION BY SECTION - NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013 

Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents 

This Act may be cited as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act 

of2013. 

Section 2. Definitions 

This section provides relevant definitions within the Act. 

TITLE I - AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS 

Sec. 101. Fiscal Year 2014. 

This section would authorize NASA at levels in line with the Budget Control Act of2011. 

Sec. 102. Fiscal Year 2015. 

This section would authorize NASA at levels in line with the Budget Control Act of2011. 

Section 103. Budget Control 

This section would state that the amounts authorized are consistent with the Budget Control Act 

of 20 II (PL 112-25). This section would state that if PL 112-25 is repealed or replaced with an 

Act that increases allocations, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums, in order of 

priority: 50% for the International Space Station (ISS); 25% for the Space Launch System (SLS); 

and 25% for Commercial Crew Development activities. 

TITLE II - HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT 

Subtitle A - Exploration 

Sec. 201 - Space Exploration Policy. 

This section would support expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit. This section 

would state that Congress remains committed to ensuring that authorized budgets for the human 

space flight program maintain NASA's safety standards and shall apply to programs in a cost 

etIective manner. This section would state that exploration deeper into the solar system should 

be the core mission of NASA. This section would state that Congress strongly supports the 

development of the SLS and Orion crew capsule (Orion) as enabling elements for human 

exploration, advanced scientific missions, and national security priorities beyond low-Earth 

orbit. This section would state that it is the policy of the United States that the development of 

capabilities and technologies necessary for a human mission to Mars and beyond is the top 

priority of NASA's human space flight and technology development programs. This section 

would require the Administrator to establish a program to develop a sustained human presence 

on the Moon and the surface of Mars. This section would create the milestone oflaunching the 

first crewed mission of Orion fully integrated with SLS as close to 2020 as possible. This 

section would add language to the law creating the milestone of enabling human to land on the 

Moon. This section would add language to title 51 regarding the acceleration of development of 

capabilities to enable a human exploration mission to the surface of Mars and beyond through 
6 

the prioritization of those technologies and capabilities best suited for such a mission in 

accordance with the Mars Human Exploration Roadmap. This section would state that nonUnited States human space tlight capabilities only be used as a contingency when no domestic 

commercial provider is available. 

Sec. 202 - Stepping Stone Approach to Exploration. 

This section would require the development of a Mars Human Exploration Roadmap defining the 

capabilities and technologies necessary to extend human presence to the surface of Mars, 

providing a process for the evolution of the capabilities ofthe fully integrated Orion with SLS. 

and describing the capabilities and technologies that could be demonstrated or research data that 

could be gained through the utilization of the ISS. The roadmap would describe a framework for 

international cooperation and a process for utilizing private companies. The roadmap must be 

transmitted the Congress, updated at least every four years, and include an addendum from the 

NASA Advisory Council with a statement of review. 

Sec. 203 - Space Launch System. 

This section would require the Administrator to report on the effort and budget required to 

enable and utilize a cargo variant ofthe 130 ton SLS contiguration. 

Sec. 204 - Orion Crew Capsule. 

This section would state that the Orion must meet the practical needs and the minimum 

capability requirements described in law. This section would require a report to Congress 

detailing those components and systems or Orion which ensure it is in compliance with the law, 

the expected date that Orion will be available to transport crew and cargo to the ISS, and 

certifying that the requirements of the law will be met in time for the tirst crewed test tlight in 

the year 2021. 

Subtitle B - Space Operations 

Sec. 211 - Findings. 

This section would contain findings regarding the importance of ISS and the need to acquire an 

operational domestic commercial crew transportation service by the year 2017. 

Sec. 212 - International Space Station (ISS). 

This section would state that it is the policy of the United States that the ISS be utilized to the 

maximum extent practicable for the development of capabilities and technologies needed for the 

future of human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. This section would require the 

Administrator to take all necessary steps to support the operation and full utilization of the ISS 

and seek to minimize the operating costs of the ISS. This section would state that reliance on 

foreign carriers for crew and cargo is unacceptable and the Nation's human space tlight program 

must acquire the capability to launch American astronauts on American rockets trom American 

soil as soon as possible. This section would reaffirm Congress' commitment to development of a 

commercially developed launch and delivery system to the ISS for crew missions. This section 

would reaffirm that NASA shall make use of the United States' commercially provided ISS crew 

transfer and crew rescue services to the maximum extent practicable. This section would 

2 
7 

reaffirm that NASA shall pursue means to maximize ISS logistics capabilities, reduce risks to 

ISS systems sustainability, and minimize United States operations costs relating to the ISS. This 

section would amend the law to state that it is the policy of the United States to maintain an 

uninterrupted capability for human space flight and operations in low-Earth orbit and beyond as 

an essential instrument of national security and the capability to ensure continued United States 

participation and leadership in the exploration and utilization of space. This section would 

require the Administrator to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of extending the 

operation of the ISS. This section would require the Director ofOSTP to develop and transmit to 

Congress a strategic plan for conducting research in the physical and life sciences and related 

technologies on the ISS through at least 2020. This section would require the Comptroller 

General to submit a report to Congress on the progress of the chosen not-lor profit entity for 

management of the National Laboratory. 

Sec. 213 - Commercial Crew Report. 

This section would require the Administrator to create contingencies in the event that 

sequestration continues to reduce NASA's budget. This section would require the Administrator 

to transmit a report with five distinct options lor the final stage of the Commercial Crew 

program: a strategy which assumes an appropriation of $500 million over three years; a strategy 

which assumes an appropriation of $600 million over three years; a strategy which assumes an 

appropriation of$700 million over three years; a strategy which assumes an appropriation of 

$800 million over three years; and a strategy that has yet to be considered previously but that 

NASA believes could ensure the flight readiness date of 20 17 for at least one provider or 

decrease the program cost. Each strategy shall include the contracting instruments NASA will 

employ to acquire the services in each phase of development or acquisition, the number of 

commercial providers NASA will include in the program, and the estimated flight readiness date 

in each scenario. 

Sec. 214 - Flight Readiness Demonstration Deadline. 

This section would require NASA to meet a flight readiness demonstration deadline of 

December 31, 2017. This section would require a quarterly report to Congress providing the 

status of the Commercial Crew development program and a Statement of Flight Readiness. 

NASA must notify Congress if a partner misses a milestone. This section would require the 

Administrator to provide and begin implementation of a new acquisition strategy with the goal of 

ensuring that one company will be prepared to provide crew transport services by the flight 

readiness demonstration deadline. 

TITLE III - SCIENCE 

Suhtit[e A - Genera[ 

Sec. 301 - Science Portfolio. 

This section would amend the law to state that a balanced and adequately funded set of activities 

contributes to a robust and productive science program tbat serves as a catalyst for innovation 

and discovery (language previously did not contain "discovery"). This section would state that 

unless otherwise directed by Congress, NASA shall take into account the current decadal surveys 

from the National Academies when submitting tbe President's budget request to Congress. 
8 

Sec. 302 - Assessment of Science Mission Extensions. 

This section would amend the law to require biennial reviews within each of the Science 

divisions to assess the benefits of extending the date of termination of data collection for 

missions that exceed their planned mission lifetime. This section would require consultation by 

relevant agencies for missions with an operational component. This section would state that if a 

mission is extended by a consultation, the full costs of the extension shall be paid for by the 

operational agency. This section would require a report to Congress detailing the assessment 

required. 

Sec. 303 - Space Communications. 

This section would direct the Administrator to develop a plan for updating NASA's space 

communications architecture for both low-Earth orbit operations and deep space exploration so 

that it is capable of meeting NASA's needs over the next twenty years. The plan shall include 

life-cycle cost estimates, milestones, estimated performance capabilities, and tive year funding 

profits. The plan should include (but is not limited to) a description of: projected Deep Space 

Network requirements for the next twenty years; upgrades needed to support Deep Space 

Network requirements; cost estimates for the maintenance of existing Deep Space Network 

capabilities; projected Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System requirements for the next 

twenty years; and cost and schedule estimates to maintain and upgrade the Tracking and Data 

Relay Satellite System to meet projected requirements. 

Sec. 305 - Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators. 

This section would require the Administrator conduct and transmit to Congress an analysis of 

NASA requirements for radioisotope power system material needed to carry out high priority 

robotic missions in the solar system and other surface exploration activities beyond low-Earth 

orbit, as well as the risks to NASA missions in meeting those requirements due to a lack of 

adequate domestic production of radioisotope power system material. 

Subtitle B - Astrophysics 

Sec. 311 - Decadal Cadence. 

This section would state that the Administrator shall ensure a steady cadence oflarge, medium, 

and small missions when following the guidance provided by the decadal surveys. 

Sec. 312 - Extrasolar Planet Exploration Strategy. 

This section would require the Administrator to contract with the National Academies to develop 

a strategy for the study and exploration of extrasolar planets that would provide a foundation tor 

NASA roadmaps, strategic plans, and activities related to exoplanet research and exploration. 

Sec. 313 - James Webb Space Telescope. 

This section would state that it is the sense of Congress that the James Webb Space Telescope 

program is significant to our understanding ofthe history of the universe and should continue to 

receive priority of funding in accordance with the recommendations of the most recent decadal 

survey. 

4 
9 

Sec. 314 - Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope. 

This section would require the Administrator to ensure that the development of the Wide-Field 

Infrared Survey Telescope continue while the James Webb Space Telescope is completed. 

Sec. 315 - National Reconnaissance Office Telescope Donation 

This section would require the Administrator to report to Congress on NASA's plan for 

developing the Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope including a plan for the Wide-Field 

Infrared Survey Telescope 2A, which includes the donated 2A-meter aperture National 

Reconnaissance Office telescope. 

Sec. 316 - Public-Private Partnerships 

This section would require a report to Congress describing how NASA can use the lessons 

learned from partnerships with private sector organizations to expand collaborative publicprivate partnerships to study life's origin, evolution, distribution, and future in the Universe. 

Subtitle C -Planetary Science 

Sec. 321 - Decadal Cadence. 

This section would state that when following the guidance provided by the decadal surveys, the 

Administrator shall ensure that NASA carries out a balanced set of programs in accordance with 

the priorities established in the most recent decadal survey, including: a Discovery-class mission 

every 24 months; a New Frontiers-class mission every 60 months; and a Flagship-class mission 

at least once every decade thereafter, including a Multiple-Flyby Europa mission. 

Sec. 322 - Near Earth Objects. 

This section would require the Administrator to continue to discover, track, catalogue, and 

characterize the physical characteristic of near-Earth objects equal to or greater than 140 meters 

in diameter in order to assess the threat of such near-Earth objects to Earth. It shall be the goal of 

the survey to achieve 90 percent completion of its near-earth object catalogue by 2020. This 

section would rcaftinn the policy in title 51 relating to detecting, tracking, cataloguing, and 

characterizing asteroids and comets. This section would require the Administrator to transmit to 

Congress an initial report that provides a recommended option and proposed budget to carry out 

the Survey program; and analysis of possible options NASA could employ to divert an object on 

a likely collision course with Earth; and a description of the status of efforts to coordinate and 

cooperate with other countries to discover hazardous asteroids and comets, plan a mitigation 

strategy, and implement that strategy. This section would require the Administrator to transmit 

an annual report that provides a summary of all activities and expenditures taken with regards to 

the Survey since the enactment of this act. 

Sec. 323 - Astrobiology Strategy. 

This section would require the Administrator to contract with the National Academies to develop 

a science strategy for astrobiology to guide NASA roadmaps, strategic plans and other activities. 

Subtitle D -Heliophysics 
10 

Sec. 331 - Decadal Cadence. 

This section would state that the Administrator shall ensure a steady cadence of large, medium, 

and small heliophysics missions when following the guidance provided by the decadal surveys. 

Sec. 332 - Review of Space Weather. 

This section would require the Director ofOSTP to contract with the National Academies to 

provide a comprehensive study that reviews planned space weather monitoring requirements and 

capabilities to infonn future space weather monitoring. 

Sec. 333 - Deep Space Climate Observatory 

This section would prohibit the Administrator from integrating or funding the development of 

any sensor on the Deep Space Climate Observatory not aligned with the spacecraft's original 

space weather mission requirements. This section would prohibit NASA from developing or 

implementing algorithms or any other application or product that are not aligned with the Deep 

Space Climate Observatory mission's intended space weather requirements, or to enable the 

"Earth at noon" images from the spacecraft. 

Subtitle E - Earth Science 

Sec. 341 - Goal 

This section would state that the Administrator shall continue to develop first of a kind 

instruments that can be transitioned to other agencies for operations. This section would require 

the Administrator to conduct research and development on new sensors and instruments that will 

mitigate the risks associated with the development of operational systems and long term data 

continuity requirements by other agencies. This section would also add language stating that 

NASA is not responsible for long term data continuity or the development of operational 

systems, including satellite, sensor, or instrument development, acquisition, and operations, as 

well as product development and data analysis, unless such work is conducted on a reimbursable 

basis that accounts for the full cost of the work and that NASA shall use the existing Joint 

Agency Satellite Division structure to manage this process on a fully reimbursable basis. 

Sec. 342- Decadal Cadence. 

This section would state that the Administrator shall ensure a steady cadence of large, medium, 

and small Earth Science missions when following the guidance provided by the decadal surveys. 

Sec. 343 - Research to Operations. 

This section would prevent the transfer of operational responsibility of science and space 

weather mission or sensors to NASA without authorization by Congress. 

Sec. 344 - Interagency Coordination. 

This section would amend the law to require coordination with the US Geological Survey in 

addition to NOAA. 

Sec. 345 - Joint Polar Satellite System Climate Sensors. 

This section would state that NASA shall not be responsible for the development of Joint Polar 

Satellite System climate sensors, and that any effort by NASA related to this work will be 

6 
11 

conducted on a fully-reimbursable basis, and executed by NASA's Joint Agency Satellite 

Division. 

Sec. 346 - Land Imaging. 

This section would require the Director of OSTP to take steps to ensure the continuous collection 

of space-based medium-resolution observations of the Earth's land cover with the data made 

available so as to facilitate the widest possible usc. This section would prevent the Administrator 

from initiating the definition ofland imaging capabilities unless this work is conducted on a 

fully-reimbursable basis, and executed by NASA's Joint Agency Satellite Division. 

Sec. 347 - Sources of Earth Science Data. 

This section would direct the Administrator to acquire space-based and airborne Earth remote 

sensing data, services, distribution, and applications from a commercial provider. This section 

would require that acquisition be carried out in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. 

This section would require a report to Congress on NASA's efforts to utilize this authority. 

TITLE IV- AERONAUTICS 

Sec. 401 - Sense of Congress. 

This section would state that it is the sense of Congress that a robust aeronautics research 

portfolio will help maintain the United States' status as a leader in aviation. This section would 

state that aeronautics research is essential to NASA's mission and that the Administrator should 

coordinate with other stakeholders to minimize duplication and leverage resources. 

Sec. 402 - Unmanned Aerial Systems Research and Development. 

This section would require the Administrator to direct research and technological development to 

facilitate the safe integration of unmanned aerial systems into the National Airspace System. 

This section would require the Administrator to update and transmit to Congress a roadmap for 

unmanned aerial systems research and development. This section would require that operational 

flight data from specified cooperative agreements be made available to NASA and the FAA for 

the development of regulatory standards. 

Sec. 403 - Research Program On Composite Materials Used In Aeronautics. 

This section would state that the Administrator, in overseeing NASA's Integrated Systems 

Research Program's work on composite materials, shall consult with the FAA Administrator and 

partners in industry to accelerate safe development and certification processes for new composite 

materials and design methods while maintaining rigorous inspection of new composite materials. 

This section would require the Administrator to transmit to Congress a report detailing NASA 

and FAA's work on new composite materials and the coordination efforts between agencies. 

Sec. 404 - Hypersonic Research. 

This section would require the Administrator to develop and transmit to Congress a road map for 

hypersonic aircrati research. 

Sec. 405 - Supersonic Research. 
12 

This section would require the Administrator to develop and transmit to Congress a road map for 

supersonic transport research and development with the goal of developing and demonstrating, in 

a relevant environment, airframe and propulsion technologies to minimize the environmental 

impact of overland flight of supersonic civil transport aircraft in an efficient and economical 

manner. 

Sec. 406 - Research On NextGen Airspace Management Concepts And Tools. 

This section would require the Administrator, in consultation with the Director of FAA's Joint 

Planning and Development Office, to review NASA's research and development activities in 

support ofNextGen and make any necessary adjustments to NASA's research and development 

activities in support of Next Gen. This section would require the Administrator to report to 

Congress regarding the progress of NASA's research and development activities in support of 

the NextGen airspace management modernization initiative, including details of coordination 

with the FAA and any adjustments made to research activities. 

Sec. 407 - Rotorcraft Research. 

This section would require the Administrator to prepare and transmit to Congress a plan for 

research relating to rotorcraft and other runway-independent air vehicles. The plan must include 

specific goals for the research, a timeline for implementation, metrics for success, and guidelines 

for collaboration and coordination with industry and other Federal agencies. 

TITLE V - SPACE TECHNOLOGY 

Sec. 501 - Space Technology Program. 

This section would create a Space Technology Program within the office of the Administrator to 

pursue the development of technologies that enable exploration that supports human missions to 

the surface of the Moon, the surface of Mars, and beyond. This section would state that the Space 

Technology program may manage cross-cutting development projects within the various 

elements of NASA that have specific applications to such purpose. This section would state that 

the Administrator shall organize and manage NASA's Small Business Innovation Research 

program and Small Business Technology Transfer program within the space technology 

program. This section would require the Administrator to certify that no project within the Space 

Technology program is also under development in any established mission directorate. 

TITLE VI - EDUCATION AND OUTREACH 

Sec. 601- Education. 

This section would state that NASA must continue its education and outreach efforts to: increase 

student interest and participation in STEM education; improve public literacy in STEM; employ 

proven strategies for improving student learning and teaching; provide curriculum support 

materials; and create and support opportunities for professional development for STEM teachers. 

This section would require NASA to continue its STEM education and outreach activities within 

the Missions Directorates. This section would require that funds for education and public 

outreach be maintained in the Directorates, and prohibit their consolidations into the Education 

Directorate. This section would prohibit NASA from implementing any proposed STEM 

education and outreach related changes proposed in the budget for FY 2014. 
13 

TITLE Vll- Other Provisions 

Sec. 701 - Asteroid Retrieval Mission. 

This section would prohibit the Administrator from funding the development of any asteroid 

retrieval mission to send a robotic spacecraft to a near-Earth asteroid for rendezvous, retrieval, 

and redirection of that asteroid to lunar orbit for exploration by astronauts. This section would 

prohibit the Administrator from pursuing a program to search for asteroids of 20 meters or less in 

diameter until the survey program described in section 322 is at least 90 percent complete. This 

section would require the Administrator to report to Congress on the proposed Asteroid Retrieval 

Mission including a detailed budget profile, a detailed technical plan, a description of the 

technologies and capabilities anticipated to be gained that will enable future missions to Mars 

which could not be gained by lunar missions, and a review by the Small Bodies Assessment 

Group and the NASA Advisory Council. 

Sec. 702 - Termination Liability 

This section would direct funds set aside for contract termination liability toward development 

work. 

Sec. 703 - Indemnification Extension. 

This section would extend indcmnitication for the space launches until December 31, 2018. 

Sec. 704 - Baseline and Cost Controls. 

This section would amend requirements associated with Baseline and Cost Controls to make the 

reporting more timely. 

Sec. 705 - Project and Program Reserves. 

This section would require the Administrator to report to Congress on NASA's criteria for 

establishing the amount of reserves at the project and program levels and how such criteria 

complement NASA's policy of budgeting at a 70 percent confidence level. 

Sec. 706 - Independent Reviews. 

This section would require the Administrator to report to Congress on NASA's procedure for 

independent reviews of projects and programs at lifecycle milestones and how NASA ensures 

the independence of the individuals conducting those reviews. 

Sec. 707 - Space Act Agreements. 

This section would set the following conditions for Space Act Agreements: 

Funds provided by the government under a Space Act Agreement should not exceed the 

total amount provided by other parties to the agreement or other transaction; 

A Space Act Agreement may be used for a research project only when the use of a 

standard contract, grant, or cooperative agreement for such a project is not feasible or 

appropriate; 

The Administrator shall publically disclose on NASA's website and make available in a 

searchable format all Space Act Agreements with appropriate redactions for proprietary 

infonnation in a timely manner; 

9 
14 

Space Act Agreements must be available for public notice and comment prior to 

agreement; 

The Administrator shall not enter into any funded Space Act Agreements in excess of $50 

million unless such an agreement has been specifically authorized by law; 

The Administrator must submit to Congress an annual report on the use of Space Act 

Agreement authority by NASA during the previous fiscal year. The report must also 

include a list of anticipated agreements for the upcoming tiscal year. 

Sec. 708 - Human Spaceflight Accident Investigations. 

This section would add vehicles being used by the Federal Government pursuant to a contract or 

Space Act Agreement to the list of vehicles covered by the investigative provision. 

Sec. 709 - Commercial Technology Transfer program. 

This section would add "protecting national security" to the considerations used in evaluating 

technology transfer. 

Sec. 710 - Orbital Debris 

This section would require the Administrator to report to Congress on etforts to coordinate with 

countries within the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee to mitigate the etfects 

of orbital debris as required by law. This section would require the Director ofOSTP to report to 

Congress on the status of the orbital debris mitigation strategy required by law. 

Sec. 711 - NASA Leadership 

This section would state that the Administrator shall serve a six year term and may be 

reappointed. and that in the Administrator's absence, the Deputy Administrator shall not act as 

Administrator for a period of more than 45 days. After 45 days, the Associate Administrator 

shall exercise the powers of Administrator until a new Administrator is confirmed. 

Sec. 712 - NASA Advisory Council 

This section would establish the NASA Advisory Council and set guidelines for appointing its 

members. This section would establish criteria for membership on the Council, set the terms of 

membership, set requirements for meetings of the Council, and describe its internal leadership. 

This section would require the Administrator to provide the Council with staff This section 

would state that the functions ofthe Council are: to review the Administration's budget proposal 

and provide advice to the President, to advise the Congress on the budget, and to report their 

findings, advice, and recommendations to thc President and Congress on matters ofpolicy 

interested on space exploration and aeronautics. 

Sec. 713 - Cost Estimation 

This section would require a report to Congress on the implementation of more effective cost 

estimation practices. 

10 
15 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467 XML 

[DISCUSSION DRAFT] 

,JUNE 12, 2013 

113TH CONGRESS 

Is'r SESSION H.R. 

To authorize the programs of the National Aeronautics Hnd Spac'e 

Administration, all(l for other pllrp()Si~s. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

)'[_. _ introduced the following bill; whidl was referred to the 

Committee on 

A BILL 

To authorize the programs of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Cong1'ess assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.-This Act lllay be cited as the 

5 "National Aeronautics and Space Administration Author6 ization Act of 2013". 

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.-rrhe table of contents for 

8 this Act is as follows: 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
16 

F:IEIS\EJS_ 467.xML 

2 

See. 1. 8110rt title; table of conll'nls. 

Set', 2. Defillition~. 

TITLE I-AUTIIORIZATION (W AI'PIWPHUTIONS 

Sec. 10l. B'iscal ~'ear 2014. 

Se(', 102. F'iseal year 2015. 

Sec. lOa. Bmll(et cOlllrol. 

TITLE II-IImIAN SPACE FUGH'!' 

Subtitle A-Iexploratioll 

Sec. 201. Space exploration policy. 

Sec. 202. Steppinl( stOlle approac'll to exploration. 

See. 20:3. Space Lanneh System. 

Sec. 204. Orion crew c·apslIle. 

Subtitle B-Spaec Operations 

See. 211. F'indin{.,:rs. 

See. 212. Illtel'national Spaec Station. 

Sec. 213. Commercial ('re\\' report. 

Sec. 214. Flight readiness d('11l01lstratioll deadline. 

'['ITLE Ill-SCIENCE 

Subtitle A-lieneral 

Sec. 301. Science portfolio. 

See. ;102. Assessment of science mission extensiOlm. 

See, ~~O;J. Space communicatIons. 

See. :304. Radioisotope thermoelectric gl"llemtors. 

Subtitle B-Astrophysies 

Sec. :111. Deeadal eadence. 

See. :312. Extrasolar planet exploration stra!e!!..". 

Sec. :11:J. James Webb Spacc Telescope. 

Sec. 3U. Wirlc-F'iclcl Infrm·etl Surw,v Telescope. 

See. :315. National HI?('OHIlHisSHll('C Offiee teleseope donation. 

Sec. 316. Public-pl'iYaic partnerships. 

Subtitle C-Planetary Sci<:'lleC 

Sec'. 321. Deead"1 caclenee. 

See. 322. "car-Earth ol1jeets. 

See. 32:1. Astrobiology strategy. 

Subtitle D-Ileliophysics 

Sec. :331. Deeadal eadence. 

See. :332. Reyiew of space weather. 

Sec. ;13:1. Deep Space Climate Ohsel"\-ator),. 

Subtitle E-gal'th Seienee 

S"C. 341. Goal. 

Sc'c. :3-12. Dreadal eadellee. 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
17 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

3 

See, :34:), ReR('arl'h to opel'>ltions, 

Set', :~4"". hltel'ag-Clley eOOf'dinatioll. 

Sec, :145, ,Toint Polar Satellite System climate sensors, 

See, :3--1-6. Land imag-illg. 

SeC'. :347. SOlll'CPS of garth SCICllCC <lnta. 

S(1(', 401. 

See. -Hl2, 

See, ,lOa, 

Sec, 404, 

See, 405. 

See, 406. 

S('l'. 407, 

TITLE IY-AERONAUTICS 

Sell~e of Congress. 

UnnUHlll(ld aerial systems rcsearch and development. 

Researeh program 011 eompositc materials used ill aCl'OlH-lutiefl. 

HYPcl'sonic ['('search. 

SUllefSOllie rescan'h. 

RCSCHl'eh on NextOen airspace management eonCl'pts and tools. 

Rotorcraft research, 

TITJ,I~ V-SPACJ<J 'l'ECHXOLOGY 

SN:. GOl. Space ter·hnology. 

TITLE VI-J<JDUCATIOX 

Sec, 601. Education, 

'l'ITLJ<J "\1I-POLICY PROVISIONS 

Sec. 701. "~stew)itl RetrieYHI )lissioll. 

Be(~. 702. Termination liability. 

Sec. 703, Indemnificatioll ('xt('nr-;ioll. 

Sec. 704. Baseline and eost controls. 

Sec. 705, Projeet and pl'O~;l'a m t·e~et'Yes. 

See. 706, Independent rcyiews. 

See. 707. Spaee Aet AgreemelltR. 

See. 708, Human Hpaed1ight accident iIlYestigations. 

Sec. 709, Commcreial tt~dlllology 1Tansfer })I"ognun. 

Sre. 710, Orbital debl'is. 

Set', 711. ~ASA kwlel'ship, 

See, 712, ~ASA A(l\'isol'Y Couneil. 

Sre, 718, Cost estimat iOIl. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) Amn),rlsTRATTO;\1.-'rhe term "Administra4 tiOll" means the National Aeronautics and Space 

5 Administration. 

6 (2) AmII;\1ISTRATOR.-'l'he term "Admillis7 trator" means the Administrator of the Administra8 tion. 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213,243,xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p,m,) 

(551274116) 
18 

F:IEIS\EJS_ 467.XML 

4 

1 (3) ORlO); CREW CAPSVLE.-The term "Orion 

2 crew capsule" refers to the multi-purpose crcw vehi3 de dcscribed in section 303 of the National Acro4 llautics amI Space Administration Authorization Act 

5 of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18323). 

6 (4) SPACE ACT AGREEl\IENT.-The term "Space 

7 Act Agreement" means an agreement created undcr 

8 the authority to enter into "other transactions" 

9 under section 20113(e) of title 51, United States 

10 Code. 

11 (5) SPACE LAliNCII SYSTEl\!.-The term "Space 

12 I..mul1ch System" refers to the follOW-OIl Govel'llment13 owned civil launch system developed, managed, and 

14 operated by the Administration to serve as a key 

15 component to eXl)aml human presence beyond low16 ].";arth orbit, as described in section 302 of the Na17 tional Aeronautics and Space Administration An18 thorization Act of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18322). 

19 TITLE I-AUTHORIZATION OF 

20 APPROPRIATIONS 

21 SEC. 101. FISCAL YEAR 2014. 

22 There are authorized to be appropriated to the Ad23 ministration for fiscal year 2014, $16,865,200,0()() as fol24 lows: 

f:\VHLCIOS12131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
19 

F:\EJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

(1) 1<'01' Space Exploration $4,007,400,000, of 

2 which3 (A) $1,454,200,000 shall be for the Space 

4' IJaunch System; 

5 (B) $318,000,000 shall be for E)q)loration 

6 Ground Systems; 

7 (C) $1,200,000,000 shall be for the Orion 

8 Crew Capsule; 

9 (D) $305,000,000 shall be for Exploration 

10 Hcsearch and Dcvelopment; and 

11 (E) $700,000,000 shall he for Commercial 

12 Crew Development activities. 

13 (2) For Space Operations $3,817,900,000, of 

14 which15 (1\) $2,984,100,000 shall be for the Inter16 national Space Station (ISS) ProgTam; and 

17 (B) $833,800,000 shall be for Space amI 

18 Flight Support. 

19 (8) For Science $4,626,900,000, of which20 (A) $1,200,000,000 shall be for Earth 

21 Science; 

22 (B) $1,500,000,000 shall be for Planetary 

23 Science; 

24 (C) $642,300,000 shall be for Astro25 physics; 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12. 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
20 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

6 

1 

2 

3 

(D) $G58,200,000 shall bc for thc ,James 

\V cbb Space Teleseoj)e; anel 

(E) $626,400,000 shall be for 

4 IIcliophysics. 

5 (4) For .i\.erollauties $565,700,000. 

6 (5) For Spaee Technology $500,000,000. 

7 (6) For Education $125,000,000. 

8 (7) For Cross-Agency Support $2,600,000,000, 

9 ofwhiehlO (A) $2,000,000,000 shall be for Ccnter 

11 Managemcnt and Operations; and 

12 (B) $600,000,000 shall be for Ageney 

13 1Uanag'cment and Operations. 

14 (8) 1"01' Construetioll anel Environmental COl1l15 pliance and Restoration $587,000,000, of whieh16 (1\) $542,000,000 shall be for Construction 

17 and Facilities; and 

18 (B) $45,000,000 shall be for Environ19 mental Compliance anellkstoratioll. 

20 (9) v-'or Inspector General $35,300,000. 

21 SEC. 102. FISCAL YEAR 2015. 

22 There are authorized to be appropriated to the Ad23 ministratioll for fiscal year 2015, $16,865,200,000 as fol24 lows: 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12. 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
21 

7 

(1) For Space Exploration $4,007,400,000, of 

2 which3 (1\.) $1,454,200,000 shall be for the Space 

4 I,aunch System; 

5 (B) $318,000,000 shall be for Exploration 

6 Ground Systems; 

7 (C) $1,200,000,000 shall be for the Orion 

8 Crew Capsule; 

9 (D) $305,000,000 shall be for Exploration 

10 Research and Development; amI 

11 (liJ) $700,000,000 shall be for Commercial 

12 Crew Development activities. 

13 (2) For Space Operations $3,817,900,000, of 

14 which15 (A) $2,984,100,000 shall be for the Inter16 national Space Station (ISS) ProgTful1; and 

17 (B) $833,800,000 shall be for Space and 

18 Flight Support. 

19 (3) For' Science $4,626,900,000, of which20 (A) $1,200,000,000 shall be for Earth 

21 Science; 

22 (B) $1,500,000,000 shall be for Planetary 

23 Science; 

24 (C) $642,300,000 shall be for Astro25 physics; 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
22 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

(D) $G58,200,000 shall be for the .James 

2 

3 

\Vebb Space 'l'elescope; and 

(E) $62G,400,000 

4 IIeliophysics. 

shall 

5 (4) }1-'or Aeronautics $5G5,700,000. 

be for 

6 (5) For Space 'l'eehnology $500,000,000. 

7 (6) FOl' Education $125,000,000. 

8 (7) For Cross-Agellcy Support $2,GOO,000,000, 

9 of which10 (A) $2,000,000,000 shall be for Center 

11 Managemcut and Operations; and 

12 (B) $600,000,000 shall be for Agency 

13 Management and Operations. 

14 (8) }1~or Construction and Environmental COI11-

15 pliance and Restoration $587,000,000, of which16 (A) $542,000,000 shall be for Construction 

17 and I;~acilities; and 

18 (B) $45,000,000 shall be for Env"iron19 mental Compliance and Restoration. 

20 (9) I;~or Inspector General $35,300,000. 

21 SEC. 103. BUDGET CONTROL. 

22 The amounts authorized to be appropriated to the 

23 Administration for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 arc con24 sistel1t with the Public Law 112-25, the Budget Control 

25 Act of 2011. If Public IJaw 112-25 is repealed or replaced 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
23 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

9 

1 ,vith an Act that increases allocations, there are author2 ized to be appropriated to the Administration such sums 

3 as that increase allows, with increases for the follm\ing 

4 programs in order of priority5 (1) 50 percent of snch increase for the 1nter6 national Space Station Program. 

7 (2) 25 percent of such increase for the Space 

8 Imuneh System. 

9 (3) 25 percent of such increase for Commercial 

10 Crew Development activities. 

11 TITLE II-HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT 

12 Subtitle A-Exploration 

13 SEC. 201. SPACE EXPLORATION POLICY. 

14 (a) }1'INDINGs.-The finds the following: 

15 (1) Congress supports a human exploration pro16 gram that is not critically dependent on the achieve17 ment of milestones by fixed dates and an exploration 

18 technology development program to enable lunar 

19 human and robotic operations, as descl'ibed in para20 graphs (1) and (2) of section 70502 of title 5], 

21 United States Code. 

22 (2) Congress supports the expansion of penna23 nent human presence beyond low-Earth orbit, in a 

24 manner involving international partners where prac25 ti.cal. 

f:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12. 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
24 

10 

(3) CongTess remams committed to ensuring 

2 that authorized budgets for the human space flight 

3 progTam shall maintain the Administration's high 

4 safety standards and shall apply to programs in a 

5 cost effeetive manner. 

6 (4) Exploration deeper into the solar system 

7 should be the core mission of the Administration. 

8 (5) Congress strongly supports the development 

9 of the Space Launch System and the Orion crew 

10 capsule as the enabling elements for human explo11 ration, advanccd scientific missions, and national se12 curity priorities beyond low-Earth orbit. 

13 (b) POLICy.-!t is the policy of the United States 

14 that the development of capabilities and technologies nec15 essary for human missions to Innar orbit, the surface of 

16 the lUoon, the surface of Mars, and beyond shall be the 

17 g'oals of the Administration's human space flight program. 

18 (e) VISION FOH SPACE gXPI,oRATION.-Seetion 

19 20302 of title 51, United States Code, is C1mended20 (1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the 

21 fonO\~ing: 

22 "(a) IN GENERAL.-The Administrator shall estab23 lish a program to develop a sustaincd human prcsence on 

24 the Moon and the surfacc of lUars, including a robust pre25 cursor program that follows the stepping stone plan I'Cf:\vHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
25 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

11 

1 quired in sectioll 70504 to promote exploration, SClencc, 

2 commerce, and United States preeminencc in space. The 

3 Administrator is f11rther authorized to develop and COIl4 duct appropriate international collaborations in pursuit of 

5 such progTam, but the absence of an international partner 

6 may not be justification for failure to pursue snch pro7 gram in a timely manner."; 

8 (2) in subsection (b)-

9 (1\..) by striking- paragraph (1) and insert10 ing thc following: 

11 "(1) Rcturning Americans to the Moon."; 

12 (B) by striking paragTaph (2) and insert13 ing the following: 

14 "(2) Launching the first erewed mission of the 

15 fully integrated Orion crew capsnle "ith the Space 

16 IJaunch System as close to 2020 as possible."; and 

17 (C) in paragraph (4), by striking "from 

18 :Mars and" and inserting "from the ]\Ioon, 

19 Mars, and"; and 

20 (3) by adding at the end the follmving: 

21 "(c) DEFINITIONS.-In this section: 

22 "(1) ORION eRE,\, CAPSULK-The term 'Orion 

23 crew capsule' refers to the mUlti-purpose crew vehi24 cle described in section 303 of the National Aerof:\vHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
26 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

12 

nautics and Space Administration L,"uthorization Act 

2 of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18323). 

3 "(2) SPACE LAU;\,CII SYSTEl\I.-Thc term 

4 'Space Il<umeh System' refers to thc follow-on Gov5 ernment-owned civil launch system developed, man6 aged, and operated by the Administration to serve as 

7 a key component to expand human presence beyond 

8 low-Earth orbit, as describcd in section 302 of the 

9 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Au10 thorization Act of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18322).". 

11 (d) KEY OB,JECTlvES.-Section 202(b) of the Na12 tional Aeronautics and Space Administration Authoriza13 tion Ad of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18312(b)) is amellded14 (1) in paragraph (3), by striking "and" after 

15 the semicolon; 

16 (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at 

17 the end and inserting "; and"; and 

18 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

19 "(5) to accelerate the development of capabili20 ties to enable a human exploration missioll to the 

21 surface of Mars and beyond through the 

22 prioritization of those technologies and capabilities 

23 best suited for such a mission in accordance with the 

24 Mars Human Exploration Hoadmap under section 

25 70504 of title 51, United States Code.". 

f:\vHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
27 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

13 

1 (e) USE OF NO;'\1"-UNITED STATES HlJ:lIAN SPACE 

TRA;'\1"SPORTATION CAPABIIJITIES.-Sectioll 

3 201 (a) of the National Aeronautics and Spaee Administra4 tion ~Authorization Aet of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18311(a)) IS 

5 amended to read as follows: 

6 "(a) USE OF' NON-UNITED STATES HmL\S SPACE 

7 FLIGHT TRA;'\1"SPORTATION CAPABILITIES.-

8 "(1) 1;'\1" GENI<;RAh-NASA may not obtain non9 United States human space flight eapabilities unless 

10 no domestie eommercial provider is available to pro11 vide such eapabilities. 

12 "(2) DEFI;'\1"ITIO;'\1".-For purposes of this sub13 section, the term 'domestic COlllmercial provider' 

14 means a person providing space transportation seI'V15 ices or other space-related activities, the majority 

16 control of which is held by persons other than a 

17 Federal, State, local, or foreign government, foreig'll 

18 company, 01' fOl'cig'u national.". 

19 (f) REPEAL OF SPACE SHUTTLE CAPABILITY ASSUR20 ANCE.-Section 203 of the National Aeronautics and 

21 Space Administration Authorization Aet of 2010 (42 

22 U.S.C. 18313) is amended23 (1) by striking subsection (b); 

24 (2) in subsection (el), by striking "subseetion 

25 (e)" and inserting "suhseetion (b)"; and 

f:IVHLCI061213\061213.243.xml (551274116) 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 
28 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

(3) by l'ede.sig1mting sub.sections (c) and (el) as 

2 subsections (b) and (c), respectively. 

3 SEC. 202. STEPPING STONE APPROACH TO EXPLORATION. 

4 (a) 1)1 GE)JERAL.-Section 70504 of title 51, United 

5 States Code, is amended to read as follows: 

6 "§ 70504. Stepping stone approach to exploration 

7 "(a) I)J GENEHAL.-1n order to maximize the costS effectiveness of the long-term space exploration and utili9 zation activities of the United States, the Administrator 

10 shall direct the Human EJq)loration and Operations l\Iis11 sion Directorate to develop a Mars Human Exploration 

12 Roadmap to define the specific capabilities and tech13 nologi.es necessary to extend human presence to the sur14 face of Mars and the missioIl sets required to demonstmte 

15 these capabilities and technologi.es. 

16 "(b) ROAD;\[AP REQUIREi\IENTS.-In developing the 

17 Mars Human E2q)loration Roadmap, the Administrator 

18 shall19 "(1) include the specific set of capabilities and 

20 teclmolog'ies required to extend human presence to 

21 the surface of Mars and the mission sets necessary 

22 to demonstrate the proficiency of these capabilities 

23 and technologies with an emphasis on using the 

24 International Space Station, hmar lanelings, CIS25 IUlIar space, trans-lunar space, Lagrangian points, 

f:WH LC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
29 

F:IEJS\EJS_ 467 .xML 

15 

and the natural satellites of Mars, Phobos and 

2 Deimos, as testbeds, as neC'essary, and shall iuC'lmle 

3 the most appropriate process for developing snch ca4 pabilities and technologies; 

5 "(2) provide a specific process for the eyolution 

6 of the capabilities of the fully integrated Orion crew 

7 capsule with the Space Ijalluch System and how 

8 these systems demonstrate the capabilities and tech9 nologies described in paragraph (1); 

10 "(8) provide a description of the capabilities 

11 and technologies that could be demonstrated or re12 search data that could be gained through the utiliz;a13 tion of the International Space Station, and the sta14 tus of the development of such capabilities and tech15 nologies; 

16 "( 4) describe a framework for international co17 operation in the development of all teehnologies and 

18 capabilities required in this section, as well as an as19 sessment of the risks posed by relying on inter20 national partners for capabilities and technologies on 

21 the eritical path of development; 

22 "(5) describe a process for utiliz;illg 110n-govern23 mental entities for future human exploration beyond 

24 trans-lunar space and specify what, if any, synergy 

25 eould he gained fromf:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
30 

F:\EJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

16 

"(A) pat·tnerships using Space l~et Agrcc2 mcnts (as defincd in scetion 2 of thc National 

3 "Acronauties and Spacc Administration Author4 ization Aet of 2013); or 

5 "(B) other acquisition instruments; 

6 "(G) update snch Roadmap at least cvery 4 

7 years and include it in the budg'ct for that fiscal 

8 year transmitted to eongTess undcr scetion 1105(a) 

9 of title 31, and descrihe10 "(A) thc achievcments and goals reaehed 

11 Il1 the process of dcveloping such eapabilities 

12 and teehnologies during the 4-year period prior 

13 to the submission of the Roadmap to eOngTCSS; 

14 and 

15 "(B) the e~1Jceted goals and aehicyelllents 

16 in the following 4-ycar pcriod; and 

17 "(7) illelnde in the Roadmap all addendum 

18 from the NASA Advisory Council with a statcmcnt 

19 of rcyiew of the Roadmap that shall include20 "(A) subjeets of agreement; 

21 "(B) areas of eonecrll; and 

22 "(e) recommcndations. 

23 "(c) DEFINITIONS.-The terms 'Orion erew capsule' 

24 and 'Spaec J~aunch System' have the mcaning's given sneh 

25 terms in section 20302.". 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213"243,xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p,m,) 

(551274116) 
31 

F:\EJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

17 

(b) l{EPOTtT.-

2 (1) Ix m~NERAL-)J"ot later than 1 year after 

3 the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator 

4 shall transmit a copy of the Mars Human Explo5 ration Roadmap eleveloped uneler section 70504 of 

6 title 51, Uniteel States Code, to the Committee on 

7 Science, Space, and Technology of the House of 

8 Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

9 Science, anel '1'ra llspol'tation of the Senate. 

10 (2) UPDATES.-rrhe Administrator shall trans11 mit a copy of each upelated Mars Human EX'Plo12 ration J~oadmap to the COll1mittee on Science, 

13 Space, and TechnololO' of the House of l{epresenta14 tivcs anel the Committee on Commerce, Sciellee, anel 

15 Transportation of the Senate not later than 7 days 

16 after such l{oadmap is updated uUller section 

17 70504(b)(6) of snch title. 

18 SEC. 203. SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM. 

19 (a) FTXDIXGS.-CongTess finds that the Space 

20 Launch System is the most practical approach to l'eaching 

21 the Moon, Mars, and beyond, and reaffirms the policy and 

22 ll11l11nlllln capability requirements contained in such sec23 tion. 

24 (b) REPORT.-Working ,,,ith the Secretary of Defense 

25 anel the Director of National Intelligence, the AdminisfWHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
32 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

18 

1 trator shall transmit a report to the Committee on 

2 Science, Space, and Teclmology of the House of Rep3 resentatiyes and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

4 and Transportation of the Senate not later than 180 days 

5 after the date of enactment of this Act that addresses the 

6 effort and budget required to enable and utilize a eargo 

7 variant of the 130 ton Space l,aunch Sy:-;telll configuratioll 

8 described in section :302( c) of the ~ational Aeronautics 

9 and Space Admini:-;tration Authorization Act of 2010 (42 

10 U.S.C. 18322(c)). 1'his report shall also include COIl sider11 atioll of the technical requirements of the scientific and 

12 national secnrity comlllunitie:-; related to such Space 

13 Lannch System and shall directly assess the utility and 

14 estimated cost savings obtained by using such Space 

15 IJaunch System for national security and space science 

16 mlSSlOllS. 

17 SEC. 204. ORION CREW CAPSULE. 

18 (a) I~ GE~EHAr,.-'l'he Orion erew eapsule shall meet 

19 the practical needs and the minimum capability require20 ments described in section 303 of the National Aero21 nllutics and Space Administration AnthOl'ization Act of 

22 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18323). 

23 (b) REPOHT.-Not later than 60 days after the date 

24 of enactment of this Aet, the Administrator shall transmit 

25 a report to the Committee on Science, Space, and rl'echf:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12. 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
33 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

If) 

1 llology of the House of l{epresentatives and the Committee 

2 on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Sell3 ate4 (1) detailing those components and systems of 

5 the Orion crew capsule that ensure it is in compli6 ance with section 303(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 

7 18323(b)); 

8 (2) dctailing the expectcd date that the Orion 

9 crew capsule will bc available to transport crew and 

10 cargo to the International Space Station; and 

11 (3) certif)ing that the requirements of section 

12 303(b)(3) of sl1ch l\.ct (42 U.S.C. 18323(b)(3)) will 

13 be met by the Administration in tillle for the first 

14 crewed test ±light in 2021. 

15 Subtitle B-Space Operations 

16 SEC. 211. FINDINGS. 

17 CongTess finds the follmving: 

18 (1) '1'he International Spaee Station is the ideal 

19 short-tenn testbed for fnture exploration systems de20 vclopment, including long-duration space travel. 

21 (2) '1'he use of the private market to provide 

22 cargo and crew transpOltation scrvices is currcntly 

23 the most expeditious process to restore domcstic ac24 cess to the International Space Station and low25 Earth orbit. 

f:IVHLCI061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
34 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

20 

(8) Government assured access to low-Earth 

2 orbit is paeamollnt to the continued surcess of the 

3 International Space Station and National Labora4 tory. 

5 (4) Acquiring and maintaining an operational 

6 domestic commercial crew transportation service by 

7 the year 2017 is of the utmost importance for the 

8 future viability of the International Space Station 

9 and National IJaboratory. 

10 SEC. 212. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.-The following' is the policy of the 

12 United States: 

13 (1) The International Space Station shall be 

14 utilized to the maximum extent practicable for the 

15 development of capabilities and technologies needed 

16 for the future of human exploration beyond low17 Earth orbit. 

18 (2) The Administrator shall, in consultation 

19 with the International Space Station partners20 (A) take all necessary measures to sllpport 

21 the operation and full utilizatiou of the Inter22 national Space Station; and 

23 (B) seek to minimize, to the extent prac24 ticable, the operating costs of' the International 

25 Space Station. 

f:\vHlC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
35 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

21 

un Reliance on foreig'n carriers for crew trans2 fer is nnacceptable, and the Nation's Illunan space 

3 f1ig'ht program mnst acquire the capability to launch 

4 United States astronauts on United States rockets 

5 from United States soil as soon as is safe and prac6 tieally possible whether on Government-owned and 

7 operated space transportation systems or privately 

8 owned systems that have been certified for flight by 

9 the appropriate Federal ageneies. 

10 (b) REAFFIR;\Li'l'ION OF POLICY.-Congress reaf11 firms12 (1) its eommitment to the development of a 

13 commercially developed launch awl delivery system 

14 to the International Space Station for crew missions 

15 as e:lq)ressed in the National Aeronauties and Spaee 

16 Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (Public 

17 IJHW 109-155), the National Aeronautics and Space 

18 Administration Authorizatioll l\.et of 2008 (Publie 

19 Law 110-422), and the National Aeronautics and 

20 Space Administration Authorization Aet of 2010 

21 (Public IJflw 111-267); 

22 (2) that the Administration shall make use of 

23 lJ nitecl States commercially provided International 

24 Space Station crew transfer and Cl'ew rescue services 

25 to the maximum extent practicable; and 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
36 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

22 

1 (3) the policy in section .'501(b) of the National 

2 Aeronautics and Space Administration Autborizatioll 

3 Act of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18351(b)) that the Adminis4 tration shall pursue illterllational, commercial, and 

5 intragovernmental means to maximize Illternational 

6 Space Station logistics supply, maintenance, and 

7 operational capabilities, reduce risks to International 

8 Space Station systems sllstainability, and offset and 

9 minimize United States operations costs relating' to 

10 the International Spaee Station. 

11 (c) ASSCRED ACCESS TO l,ow-EARTH ORBIT.-Sec12 tion 70501(a) of title 51, United States Code, is amended 

13 to read as follows: 

14 "(a) POLICY STATE:\[ENT.-It is the policy of the 

15 United States to maintain an uninterrupted capability for 

16 human space f1ight and operations in low-Earth orbit, and 

17 beyond, as an essential instrument of national security 

18 and the capability to ensure continued United States pa1'-

19 ticipation and leadership in the ecqJ\oration and utilization 

20 of space.". 

21 (d) REPEAI~S.-

22 (1) USE OF SPACE SHUTTLE OR AI~TER23 NATIVEs.-Chapter 701 of title 51, United States 

24 Code, and the item relating to such chapter in the 

25 table of chapters for such title, is repealed. 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
37 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

1 (2) SHU'l'TLE PRlCING POLICY FOR CmDIEIl2 CUI. AXD FOREIGN USERs.-Chapter 703 of title 

3 51, United States Code, and the item relating' to 

4 snch chapter iu the table of chapters for such title, 

5 is repealed. 

6 (3) SnuTTIJE PRIVATIZATION,-Seetion 50133 

7 of title 51, Uniteel States Code, and the item relat8 iug' to such section in the table of sections for chap9 tel' 501 of such title, is repealed. 

10 (e) EXTENSIOX CmTERIA REPORT.-Not later than 

11 1 year after the elate of enactment of this Act, the Admin12 istrator shall submit to the COlllmittee on Science, Space, 

13 and Technology of the Honse of Ilepresentatives and the 

14 Committee on Commerce, Scicnce, and 'rransportation of 

15 the Senate a report on the feasibility of extending the op16 eration of the International Space Station that includes17 (1) criteria foe defining the International Space 

18 Station as a research snccess; 

19 (2) cost estimates for operating the 1ntel'-

20 national Space Station to achieve the criteria in 

21 paragTaph (1); 

22 (3) cost estimates for e}.."iending operations to 

23 2020, 2025, and 2030; and 

24 (4) an assessment of how the defined criteria 

25 under paragraph (1) respond to the National Acadf:IVHLCI061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
38 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467XML 

24 

emil's Decaclal Sm'Yey on Biological and Physical 

2 Sciences in Spaee. 

3 (f) STRATEGIC PTu\X FOR IXTERXATIONAL SPACE 

4 STATION RESEARCII.-

5 (1) IN GEXERAL.-The Director of the Office of 

6 Seience and Teehnolog.y Policy, in consultation with 

7 the Administrator, academia, other Federal agencies, 

8 the International Space Station National Laboratory 

9 Advisory Committee, and other potential stake10 holders, shall develop and transmit to the Committee 

11 on Science, Spaee, and Technology of the House of 

12 Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

13 Science, and Transportation of the Senate a stra14 tegie plan for conducting competitive, peer-reviewed 

15 research in physical and life sciences and related 

16 technologies on the International Space Statioll 

17 through at least 2020. 

18 (2) Pr,AK REQGIREMEXTS.-The strategic plan 

19 shall20 (A) be eOllsistent with the priorities and 

21 recommendations established by the National 

22 Academies ill its Deeadal Survey on Biological 

23 and Physical Sciences in Space; 

24 (B) provide a research timeline and iden25 tify resource requirements for its implemelltaf:\vHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
39 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.XML 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

25 

tiOIl, including the facilities and instrmnentation necessary for the conduct of such research; 

and 

(C) idellti~y-

(i) criteria for the proposed research, 

including'-

(I) a justification for the research 

to be carried out in the space mierogravity environlllent; 

(1I) the use of model systems; 

(III) the testing of flight harclware to understand and ensure its 

functioning in the mierogravity envirOlllnent; 

(IV) the nse of eontrols to help 

distinguish among the direct and indiI'ect effects of microgTavity, among 

other effects of the flig'ht or space environmellt; 

(V) approaches for faeilitating 

data colleetioll, analysis, and illterpretation; 

(VI) procedures to ensure repetition of experiments, as needed; 

(551274116) 
40 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467,XML 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

26 

(VII) support for timely presentatioll of the peer-reviewed results of 

the researeh; and 

(VIII) defined metries for the 

sueeess of eaeh study; 

(ii) instrumentation required to support the measurements and analysis of the 

research to be carried out under the strntegie plan; 

(iii) the eapabilities needed to support 

direet, real-till1e communications between 

astronauts working on research experiments ontlOard the International Spaee 

Station and the principal investigator on 

the ground; 

(iv) a proeess for involving' the external user eommnnity in research planning, 

including planning for relevant flight hardware and instrumentation, and for utilization of the International Spaee Station, 

free flyers, or other research platforms; 

and 

(v) defined metries for sueeess for the 

research plan. 

(3) REPOHT.-

(551274116) 
41 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

27 

(A) IN GENERAL-~ot later than 180 

days after the date of enactment of this Act, 

the Comptroller General of the United States 

shall transmit to the Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and rl'ransportatioll of the Seuate a report on the progress of the organization chosen 

for the manag'ement of the International Space 

Station National IJaboratol'Y as directed in section 504 of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (42 

U.S.C. 18354). 

(B) SPECIFIC RE(WIHE:llENTS.-The report shall assess the management, organization, 

and performance of such organization and shall 

include a review of the status of each of the 7 

required activities listed in section 504(c) of 

such Act (42 U.S.C. 18354(c)). 

20 SEC. 213. COMMERCIAL CREW REPORT. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.-'l'he Administration shall consider 

22 the ramifications of and create contingencies as the se23 questration adopted in the Budget Control Act of 2011 

24 (Public Law 112-25) continues to reduce the Administra25 tion's overall budget. 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
42 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

28 

(b) HE PORT .-

(1) IN GENERAL.-::-.rot later than 60 days after 

the date of enactment of this ltet, the Administrator 

shall transmit to the Committee on Seienee, Spaee, 

and Teelmology of the House of RepresentatiYes and 

the Committee on COlllmeree, Seienee, and rl'ransportation of the Senate a report eontaining' 5 distinct options for the final stages of the eomillereial 

erew program, 

(2) REQUIRE:\IENTS,-These options shall melnde-

(A) a strategy that assumes an appropriation of $500,000,000 over the next 3 fiseal 

.. veal's' , 

(B) a strategy that assumes an appropriation of $600,000,000 over the nc)..i; 3 fiseal 

years 

(C) a strategy that assumes an appropriation of $700,000,000 over the next 3 fiseal 

years; 

(D) a strategy that assumes an appropriatiOll of $800,000,000 over the next 3 fiseal 

years; and 

(E) a strategy that has yet to be eonsidcreel previously in any budget submission but 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
43 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

29 

1 that the Administration believes could ensure 

2 the flight readiness date of 2017 for at least 

3 one provider or sig'uificantly decreases the over4 all program life cyele cost. 

5 (3) 1NCLUSIONS.-Each strategy shall inelude 

6 the contracting instruments the Administration w:ill 

7 employ to acquire the services in each phase of deS velopment 01' acquisition, the number of commercial 

9 providers the Administration will inelude in the pro10 gram, and the estimated flight readiness date in 

11 each scenario. 

12 SEC. 214. FLIGHT READINESS DEMONSTRATION DEADLINE. 

14 (1) DEADLI:\'E.-The Administration shall meet 

15 a flig'ht readiness de11l011stration deadline of Decem16 bel' 31, 2017. 

17 (2) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this sectioll, 

18 the term "flight readiness demonstration deadline" 

19 means the date by which one or more commercial 

20 crew partner companies shall have suecessfully 

21 transported .iunerican astronauts to the 1nter22 national Space Station. 

23 (b) REPORT.-Not later than 180 days after the date 

24 of enactment of this Act and every 90 days thereafter until 

25 the Administration meets the flight readiness demollstraf:WHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
44 

F:\EJS\EJS367.xML 

80 

1 tion deadline, thc Administrator shnll transmit to the 

2 Committee on Science, Spacc, and rreclmology of the 

3 Honse of Representatives and the Committee on Com4 meree, Sciencc, and Transportation of thc Scnate a re5 poIt6 (1) describing the current status of the Com7 mercial Crew progTam, including all funding paid to 

8 any partner company throughout the life of the pro9 gram detailed by specifie dollar amounts provided 

10 for each milestone completed for each partner COI11-

11 pally; 

12 (2) speeifying the accomplishmcnts and mile13 stoncs completed in the ~)O days prior to thc date of 

14 transmission of the report unclcr any phase of the 

15 program and all dollar amounts provided for (~aeh of 

16 those milestoncs; 

17 (3) identifying those aecomplishments and mile18 stoncs that wcre expected to be completed in the 90 

19 days prior to the datc of transmission of sneh report 

20 nnder any phase of the progTam but that were not 

21 eompleted in that timeframe; 

22 (4) setting forth the aecomplislllllents and mile23 stones that are expeetcd to be eompletecl in the 90-

24 day period following the transmission of such report 

25 under any phase of the program; and 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
45 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

:n 

1 (I)) containing a statement of flight readiness 

2 uncleI' subsection (c). 

3 (e) STA'rE~mNT OF FLIGHT READINESS.-The state4 ment of flight readiness required in subsection (b)(5) shall 

5 include either6 (1) a certification by the 41.dministrator that the 

7 Administration is 011 schedule to eomply with the 

8 flight readiness demonstration deadline; or 

9 (2) an explanation as to why the Administra10 tion is not on schedule to comply with the flight 

11 readiness demonstration deadline aud why the Acl12 miuistration did not develop an acquisition strategy 

13 based 011 existing' budget authority. 

14 (el) AUTHORIZATIOX OF }1'UNDS.-::-.Jot later than 60 

15 days after the issuance of the e::'1)lanation described in 

16 subsection (c)(2), the Administrator shall provide, and 

17 begin implementation of, a Bew acquisition strategy that 

18 ensures that at least 1 company will he prepared to pro19 vide crew transport services by the flight readiness dem20 ollstration deadline. 

21 

22 

TITLE III-SCIENCE 

Subtitle A-General 

23 SEC. 301. SCIENCE PORTFOLIO. 

24 (a) BAI,ANCED AND ADEQUATELY }1'UNDED ACT IVl25 TIES.-Section 803 of the National Aeronautics and Space 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
46 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

:32 

1 Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (124 Stat. 

2 2832) is amended to read as follows: 

3 "SEC. 803. OVERALL SCIENCE PORTFOLIO; SENSE OF THE 

4 CONGRESS. 

5 "Congl'(~ss reaffirms its sense, expresst~d in section 

6 80:3 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra7 tiou Authorization Act of 2010, that a balanced and ade8 quately funded set of activities, consisting of research and 

9 analysis grants programs, technology development, small, 

10 medium, and large space missions, awl suborbital research 

11 activities, contributes to a robust and procluctiye science 

12 program and serves as a catalyst for innovation and dis13 covery.". 

14 (b) DECADAL SUmTEys.-In proposing the funding' 

15 of programs and activities for the National Aeronautics 

16 and Space Administration for each fiscal year, the Admin17 istrator shall, to the greatest extent practicable, follow 

18 guic1allee provided in the eurreut deeadal surveys from the 

19 National Academics' Space Studies Board. 

20 SEC. 302. ASSESSMENT OF SCIENCE MISSION EXTENSIONS. 

21 Section 30504 of title 51, United States Code, is 

22 amended to read as follows: 

23 "§ 30504. Assessment of science mission extensions 

24 "(a) ASSEssjIE~T.-'l'hc Administrator shall carry 

25 out biennial reviews within each of the Science divisions 

f:\VHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
47 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

1 to assess the cost and benefits of extending' the date of 

2 the termination of data collection for those missions that 

3 exceed their planned mission lifetime. The assessment 

4 shall take into consideration the impact on delaying- the 

5 start of future missions in order to eA-tend existing mis6 SlOns. 

7 "(b) COXSUI,TATIOX AND CONSIDERATIOX OF PO8 TEXTIAT, BEXEFITS OF IXSTRUMENTS ON JUISSIOXS.-

9 \\lIen deciding whether to extend a mission that has an 

10 operational component, the Administrator shall consult 

11 with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra12 tion, the United States Geological Survey, or any other 

13 affected agency, and shall take into account the potential 

14 benefits of instruments on missions that are beyond their 

15 planned mission lifetime. 

16 "(c) CosTs.-If a mission is extended based Oll COll17 sultation required lUl(ler suhsectioll (h), the fnll costs of 

18 the eA-tensiou shall be paid for by the operational agency 

19 or agencies. 

20 "(d) REPOR'l'.-The Administrator shall transmit to 

21 the Committee Oil Science, Space, and Technology of the 

22 House of Representatives and the COlllmittee on COl1l23 merce, Science, amI Transportation of the Senate, at the 

24 same time as the submission to Congress of the Presi25 dent's annual budget reqnest, a report detailing- any asf:WHLC\0612131061213,243,xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p,m,) 

(551274116) 
48 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

34 

sessment required by subsection (a) that was carried out 

2 during the previous yeal'.". 

3 SEC. 303. SPACE COMMUNICATIONS. 

4 (a) PLAN.-The Administrator shall develop a plan, 

5 in consultation with relevant Federal agencies, for updat6 ing the Administration's space communications arehitec7 ture for both low-Earth orbital operations and deep space 

8 exploration so that it is capable of meeting the lciclminis9 tration's needs over the next 20 years. The plan shall in10 clude life-cycle cost estimates, milestones, estimated per11 formance capabilities, and 5-year funding' profiles. 1'he 

12 plan shall also include an estimate of the amounts of any 

13 reimbmsements the Administration is likely to receive 

14 from other Federal agencies during the expected life of 

15 the upgrades described in the plan. At a minimnm, the 

16 plan shall include a description ofthe following: 

17 (1) Projected Deep Space Network reqnire18 ments for the lle~'t 20 years, including' those in sup19 port of human space exploration missions. 

20 (2) Upgmdes needed to support Deep Space 

21 Network l'equirements, including cost estimates and 

22 schedules. 

23 (3) Cost estimates for the maintenance of exist24 ing' Deep Space Net,vork capabilities. 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xm1 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
49 

F:\EJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

35 

(4) Prqjectcd Tracking and Data Helay Sat2 ellite System requirements for the lle~i; 20 years, in3 eluding' those in support of other relevant Pederal 

4 agencies. 

5 (5) Cost and schedule estimates to maintain 

6 and upgrade the 'l'rackillg and Data Relay Satellite 

7 System to meet projected requirements. 

8 (b) SCIIEDULE.-The Administrator shall transmit 

9 the plan dc,'eloped under this section to the Committee 

10 on Science, Space, and 'l'cchnology of thc House of Rep11 resentativcs and the Committce on Commcrce, Science, 

12 and Transportation of thc Senatc not later than one year 

13 after the datc of enactment of this Act. 

14 SEC. 304. RADIOISOTOPE THERMOELECTRIC GENERATORS. 

15 (a) lL"'AT~YSIS (W RgQlTlRE~mXTS AND RISKS.-'l'he 

16 Administrator, in consultation with other Federal agen17 cies, shall conduct an analysis of18 (1) the requirements of the Administration for 

19 radioisotope power system material which is necded 

20 to carry out planncd, high priority robotic missions 

21 in the solar system and other surface exploration ac22 tivities beyond low-Earth orbit; and 

23 (2) the risks to missions of the Administration 

24 in mceting those rcquirements, or any additional )'cf:IVHLC\061213\OO1213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
50 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

36 

1 quircmcnts, due to a lack of adequate radioisotope 

2 power system material. 

3 (b) COXTENTS OF Lt\J'JALYSIS.-The analysis COl1-

4 ductecl under subsection (a) shall5 (1) detail the Administration's current pro6 jecte(l mission requirements and associated timc7 framcs for radioisotope power system material; 

8 (2) explain the assumptions used to determine 

9 the Administration's requirements for the material, 

10 including11 (A) thc planned use of Advanced Stirling 

12 Radioisotope Generator technology; 

13 (B) the status of and timeline for com14 plcting {lcvelopment and demonstration of the 

15 Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator tech16 nology, including the development of flight 

17 readiness requirements; and 

18 (C) the risks, implications, and contin19 gcncies for the Administration's mission plaus 

20 of any delays or unanticipated technical chal21 [enges related to the anticipated 11se of Ad22 vanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator tech23 nolo!,'Y; 

24 (3) assess the risk to the Administration's pro25 grams of allY potential delays in achieving' the schcclf:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
51 

F:IEJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

37 

1 ule and milestones for planned domestic production 

2 of radioisotope pmver system material; 

3 (4) outline a process for meeting any additional 

4 Administration requirements for the material; 

5 (5) estimate the incremental costs required to 

6 increase the amount of material produced each year, 

7 if such an increase is needed to support additional 

8 Administration requirements for the material; 

9 (6) detail how the Administration and the De10 partment of Energy will manage, operate, and fund 

11 production facilities and the design and development 

12 of all radioisotope power systems used by the Ad13 ministration and other g'overllment entities as 11ec14 essmy; 

15 (7) specify the steps the Administration will 

16 take, III consultation with the Department of Ell17 ergy, to preserve the infrastrncture and workforce 

18 necessary for pl'Oduetion of radioisotope power sys19 te111s; and 

20 (8) detail how the Administration has imple21 mented or rejected the recommendations fr0111 the 

22 National Research Council's 2009 rcport titled "Ra23 dioisotope Powcr Systems: Au Imperative for l\Iain24 taining U.S. Leadership in Space E>'l)loration". 

f:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
52 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

38 

1 (c) TRA::\S:\IITTAL.-~ot later tha1l 180 clays aftcr 

2 the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall 

3 transmit the results of the analysis to the Committee on 

4 Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Rep5 resentatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

6 and 'l'ransportation of the Senate. 

7 Subtitle B-Astrophysics 

8 SEC. 311. DECADAL CADENCE. 

9 In carrying out section 301(b), the 1:1dministrator 

10 shall ensure a steady cadence of large, medium, and small 

11 astrophysics missions. 

12 SEC. 312. EXTRASOLAR PLANET EXPLORATION STRATEGY. 

13 (a) STHATEGY.-The Administrator shall enter into 

14 an arrangement ''lith the ~ational Academies to develop 

15 a science strategy for the study and e:ll."j)loration of 

16 extrasolar planets that would17 (1) outline key scientific qnestions; 

18 (2) identify the most promising research in the 

19 field; 

20 (3) indicate the extent to which the mission pri21 orities in existing- decadal surveys address key 

22 extrasolnr planet research goals; and 

23 (4) make recommendations with respect to opti24 mal coordination with international partners. 

f:IVHLCI061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
53 

F:\EJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

39 

(b) USE 01<' STHATEUY.-The .Aclministrator shall usc 

2 the strategy to inform roadmaps, strategic plans, and 

3 other activities of the Administration as they relate to 

4 extrasolm' planet research and exploration, and to provide 

5 a foundation for future activities and initiatives. 

6 (c) REPORT TO Co)."cumss.-Not later than 2 years 

7 after the date of enactmcnt of this Act, the National Acad8 emies shall transmit a report to the Administrator, and 

9 to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of 

10 the House of Representatives and the Committee on COll1-

11 merce, Science, a11(l Transportation of the Senate, con12 taining the strategy developed under subsection (a). 

13 SEC. 313. JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE. 

14 It is the sense of Congress that the James Webb 

15 Space Telescope program is sig11ificant to our uncler16 standing of the history of the universe, including galaxics, 

17 stars, and planetary systems, and should continue to re18 ceive priori.ty of funding in accord with the reco1l1ll1enda19 tiolt of the National Acadcmies' Space Studies Board most 

20 recent decadal Slll'Vey for ~~t],ollomy and Astrophysics. 

21 SEC. 314. WIDE-FIELD INFRARED SURVEY TELESCOPE. 

22 The Administrator shall ensme that the development 

23 of the Wide-Field Infrared SUl'Vey Telescope continues 

24 whilc the James Webb Space Telescope is completed. 

f:WHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
54 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

40 

SEC. 315. NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE TELESCOPE 

2 DONATION. 

3 Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment 

4 of this Act, the Administrator shall transmit a report to 

5 the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the 

6 House of Representatives and the Committee on Com7 merce, Science, and Tl'ansportation of the Senate ont8 lining the cost of the Administration's potential plan for 

9 developing the Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope as 

10 deseribed in the most recent astronomy and astrophysics 

11 decadal survey, including' an altemative plan for the Wicle12 Field Infrared Survey Telescope 2.4, which includes the 

l3 donated 2.4-meter aperture National Reconnaissance Of14 fice telescope. Due to the budget constraints on the Ad15 ministration's science programs, this report shall in16 elude17 (1) an assessment of affordable approaches to 

18 develop the Wide-Pield Infrared Survey Telescope; 

19 (2) a comparison to the development of mission 

20 concepts that exelude the utilization of the donated 

21 asset; 

22 (3) an assessment of how the Administration's 

23 existing science missions will be affected by the utili24 zation of the donated asset described in this section; 

25 and 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
55 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

41 

1 (4) a description of the cost associated with 

2 storing and maintaining the donated asset. 

3 SEC. 316. PUBLIC·PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS. 

4 ).Jot later than 180 days after the date of enactment 

5 of the Act, the Administrator shall transmit to the Com6 mittee on Science, Space, and 'l'eelmology of the House 

7 of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

8 Science, and 'l'ransportation of the Senate a report de9 ser'ibing how the Administration can usc the lessons 

10 learned from partnerships with private sector organiza11 tions to e:~q)ancl collaborative public-private partnerships 

12 to the study life's origin, evolution, distribution, and fl!-

13 ture in the Universe. 

14 Subtitle C-Planetary Science 

15 SEC. 321. DECADAL CADENCE. 

16 In carrying out section 301(b), the j\dministrator 

17 shall ensure, to the gTeatest e}..'ient practicable, that the 

18 .Administration carries out a balanced set of planetary 

19 science programs in accordance with the priorities estab20 lished in the most recent decadal survey for planetary 

21 science. Snch progt'ams shall include, at a minimull1-

22 (1) a Discovery-class mission at least once every 

23 24 months; 

24 (2) a ).Jew Frontiers-elass mission at least once 

25 every 60 months; and 

f:\VHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
56 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

42 

1 (3) a :B'lag'ship-class mission at least once every 

2 decade thereafter, including the Multiple-Flyby En3 ropa mission, as recommcnded by the 2012 Europa 

4 Study and initiated throngh the Science Appropria5 tions Act, 2013 (127 Stat. 261). 

6 SEC. 322. NEAR·EARTH OBJECTS. 

7 (a) FINDINGs.-rrhe Cong-ress makes the follo"ing 

8 findings: 

9 (1) Near-Emih objects pose a scrious and cred10 ible threat to luunankill(l, as many scientists believe 

11 that a major asteroid or (~Olllet ""as responsible for 

12 the mass extinction of the majority of the Ealih's 

13 species, inclnding the dinosaurs, nearly 65,000,000 

14 years ago, 

15 (2) Similar objects have struck the Earth or 

16 passed through the Earth's atmosphere several times 

17 in the Earth's history and pose a similar threat in 

18 the future. 

19 (3) Several snch near-Earth objects have only 

20 been discovered ,,'ithin days of the objects' closest 

21 approach to Earth, and recent discoveries of snch 

22 large objects indicate that many large near-Earth 

23 objects remain to be cliscovered. 

24 (4) The efforts taken to date by the Adminis25 tration for detecting and characterizing the hazards 

f:IVHLCI061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
57 

F:\EJS\EJS367JeML 

43 

1 of near-Earth objeets must continue to fnlly deter2 mine the threat posed by such objects to cause wide3 spread destructioll and loss of life. 

4 (b) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this section the 

5 term "near-Earth object" means nn asteroid or comet with 

6 a perihelion distance of less than 1.3 Astronomical Units 

7 from the Sun. 

8 (c) )JEAR-EARTII OB.mcT SURvEY.-The Adminis9 trator shall continue to discover, track, catalogue, and 

10 characterize the physical characteristics of near-Earth ob11 jects equal to or greater than 140 meters in diameter in 

12 order to assess the threat of such near-Earth objects to 

13 the Earth, pursuant to the Georg'e E. Browll, ,Jr. )Jear14 Earth Object Survey Act (42 U.S.C. 16691). It shall be 

15 the goal of the Survey program to achieve 90 percent com16 pletion of its near-Earth object catalogue (based on statis17 tically predicted populations of near-Earth objects) by 

18 2020. 

19 (cl) WARNING At"D MITIGATION OF POTENTIAl, HAZ20 ARDS OF )JEAR-EARTII OB,TECTS.-Congress reaffirms the 

21 policy set forth in section 20102(g) of title 51, United 

22 States Code (relating to detecting', tracking, catalob'11ing, 

23 and characterizing asteroids and comets). 

24 (e) PROGRAlII REPORT.-The Administratol' shall 

25 transmit to the Committee on Science, Space, and Techf:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
58 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

44 

1 nology of the Honse of Hepresentatiws and the Committee 

2 on Commercc, Science, and 'rransportatioll of thc Sellate, 

3 not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this 

4 Act, an initial report that providcs5 (1) a recol11ll1ellded option and proposed buclg'et 

6 to carry out the Survey program pursuant to the 

7 recommended OptiOIl; 

8 (2) analysis of possible options that the Admin9 istratioD could employ to divert an object on a likely 

10 collision course with Earth; and 

11 (3) a description of the status of efforts to co12 ordinate and cooperate with other countries to clis13 cover hazardous asteroids and comets, plan a mitiga14 tion strategy, and implement that strategy in the 

15 event of the discovelY of an object on a likely colli16 sion course with Earth. 

17 (f) ANNUAL REPoRTs.-'rhe Administrator shall an18 Dually transmit to the Committee on Science, Space, and 

19 'rechnology of the Honse of Representatives and the Com20 mittel' on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 

21 Senate a report that providcs22 (1) a summary of all activities taken pursuant 

23 to subsection (c) sillce the date of enactment of this 

24 Act; and 

f:WH LC\061213\061213.243.xm1 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
59 

F:IEJSIEJS367.xML 

45 

(2) It summary of expenditures for all activities 

2 pursuant to subsection (C) since the date of enact3 ment of this Act. 

4 SEC. 323. ASTROBIOLOGY STRATEGY. 

5 (a) STRATEGY.-The Administrator shall enter into 

6 an arrangement with the N atioual Academics to develop 

7 a science strategy for astrobiology that would outline key 

8 scientific questions, identitY the mm;t promising research 

9 in the field, and indicate the extent to which the mission 

10 priorities in existing decadal surveys address the search 

11 for life's orig'in, evolution, distrihution, and future in the 

12 Universe. 

13 (b) USE OF STRATgGY.-The Administrator shallllse 

14 the strategy developed under subsection (a) in planning' 

15 and funding research and other activities and initiatives 

16 in the field of astrobiology. The strategy shall inclnde rec17 ommendations for coordination with international part18 ncrs. 

19 (c) RgpORT TO CONGHESS.-Not later than 2 years 

20 after the date of enactment of this Act, the N "tional Acad21 emies shall transmit a report to the Administrator, and 

22 to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of 

23 the House of Representatives and the Committee on Com24 merce, Science, and 'l'ransportation of the Senate, COll25 taining the strategy developed under subsection (a). 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
60 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

46 

Subtitle D-Heliophysics 

2 SEC. 331. DECADAL CADENCE. 

3 In carrying> out section 301(b), thc Administrator 

4 shall ensure a steady cadence of large, medium, and small 

5 hcliophysics missions. 

6 SEC. 332. REVIEW OF SPACE WEATHER. 

7 (a) REVIEw.-The Director of the Office of Science 

8 and Technology Policy, \'{ith cooperation from the Admin9 istrator, the Administrator of the National Oceanic anel 

10 Atmospheric Administration, the Director of the National 

11 Science Foundation, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec12 retary of Energy, and the Secretary of Homeland Secu13 rity, shall enter into an arrangement with the National 

14 Academics to provide a comprehensive study that reviews 

15 current and pi au ned space weather monitoring require16 ments and capabilities. 'rhe study shall inform the process 

17 of identitring national needs for future space weather 

18 monitoring amI mitigation. The National Academics shall 

19 give consideration to international and private sector ef20 forts and collaboration. The study shall also review the 

21 current state of research capabilities in observing, mod22 cling, and prediction and provide recommendations to en23 S111'e future advancement of predictive capability. 

24 (b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Not later than 1 year 

25 after the date of enactment of this Act, the National Acadf:\vH LC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
61 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

47 

emies shall transmit a report to the Administrator, and 

2 to the Committee on Science, Space, and 'l'echnology of 

3 the House of Representatives and the Committee on COIl1-

4 merce, Seience, and 'l'ranspol'tation of the Senate, eon5 taining the results of the study provided under subsection 

6 (a). 

7 SEC. 333. DEEP SPACE CLIMATE OBSERVATORY. 

8 (a) IXTEGRA'I'ING SENsoRS.-The Administrator 

9 shall not integTate or fund the development of any sensor 

10 on the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVI~) that 

11 is not aligned with the spacecraft's original space weather 

12 mission requirements. 

13 (b) ALGOnITmrs.-The Administration shall not de14 velop or implement algorithms, 01' any other application 

15 or produei, that arc not aligl1ed with thc Deep Space Cli16 mate Observatory mission's intended space \veather re17 quirements, or to enable "Earth at noon" images from 

18 the spacecraft. 

19 Subtitle E-Earth Science 

20 SEC. 341. GOAL. 

21 (a) IN GENERAJ,.-Recognizing the contributions 

22 that Earth science and remote sensing have made to soci23 ety over the last 50 years, the Administration shall con24 tinue to develop nrst-of-a-kind instruments that, once 

f:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
62 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

48 

proved, can be tr<1nsitionecl to other agencies for oper2 ations. 

3 (b) AJIEXmIExT.-Section G0501 of title 51, United 

4 States Code, is amended by inserting' "In order to aCCOIll5 plish this goal, the Administrator shall conduct research 

6 and development on new sensors and instruments that will 

7 mitigate the risks associated with the development of oper8 ational systems and long term data continuity require9 mellts by other ageneies. 'I'he Administration shall not be 

10 responsible for the development of operational Earth 

11 science systems, including satellite, sensor, or instrulllent 

12 development, acquisition, and operations, as well as prod13 nct development and data analysis, unless snch work is 

14 conducted on a reimbursable basis that accounts for the 

15 full cost of the work. The Administrator shall use the 

16 Joint .Agency Satellite Division structure, or a direct sue17 cessol' thereto, to manag'e this process on a fully l'eimbul's18 able basis." after "Earth observations-based research pro19 gram.". 

20 SEC. 342. DECADAL CADENCE. 

21 In carrying' out section 30 l(b), the Administrator 

22 slIall ensure a steady cadence of large, meclillll, and small 

23 Earth science missiolls. 

f:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
63 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

49 

1 SEC. 343. RESEARCH TO OPERATIONS. 

2 Section 60502(a) of title 51, United States Code, is 

3 amended by inserting "Operational responsibility for 

4 Earth science or space weather missions or sensors shall 

5 not be transferred from any other Federal agency to the 

6 Administration, except as specifically authorized by Imv." 

7 after "execute the transitions.". 

8 SEC. 344. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION. 

9 Section 60505 of titlc 51, United States Code, IS 

10 amendcd11 (1) III the section heading, by inserting' "and 

12 the United States Geological Survey" after 

13 "Atmospheric Administration"; 

14 (2) in subsection (a)-

15 (A) by striking "and the Administrator of 

16 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin17 istration" and inserting", the Administrator of 

18 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admll1-

19 istration, and the Director of the United States 

20 Geological Survey"; and 

21 (B) by striking "two agencies" and inscrt22 ing "3 agencies"; 

23 (3) in subsection (b)-

24 (A) by striking "and the Administrator of 

25 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin26 istration" both places it appears anel inserting 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml (551274116) 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 
64 

F;\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

50 

", the Administrator of the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, and the Director of the United States Geological Survey"; 

and 

(B) by striking "Committee on Science and 

Technology" and inserting "Committee on 

7 Science, Space, and Technology"; 

8 (4) in subsection (c), by inserting "and the Di9 rector of the United States Geological Survey," after 

10 "Atmospheric Administration"; and 

11 (5) in subsection (d), by striking' "Administra12 tion Earth science mission" and all that follows 

13 through the period and inserting "Earth SCICnce 

14 mission or Earth observing system to or from the 

15 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 

16 the United States Geological Survey, or the Admin17 istration, or to or from other stakeholders, until the 

18 plans required under subsection (c) have been ap19 proved by the Administrator, the Administrator of 

20 the National Oceanic and Atmm;pheric Administra21 tion, and the Director of the United States Geologi22 cal Survey, and until financial resourees have been 

23 identified to support the transition or transfer in the 

24 President's annual budget request for the National 

25 Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Adf:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
65 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467 XML 

51 

ministration, the United States Geological SUl'yey, or 

2 other relevant agencies. Operational responsibility 

3 for Earth science programs shall not be transferred 

4 from any other Federal agency to the Administra5 tion, except as specificaIly authorized by law.". 

6 SEC. 345. JOINT POLAR SATELLITE SYSTEM CLIMATE SEN7 SORS. 

8 The Administration shall not be responsible for the 

9 development of ,Joint Polar Satellite System climate sen10 SOl'S, including' the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (THIS11 2), the Ozone Mapping and ProfileI' Suite-Limb (Ol\IPS12 1,), or the Clouds and Earth Radiant Energy System 

13 (CERES-C) .. Any effort by the Administration related to 

14 this work shall be eondueted on a fully-reimbursable basis, 

15 and executed by the Administration's Joint Ageney Sat16 ellite Division or a direet Sllccessor thereto. 

17 SEC. 346. LAND IMAGING. 

18 (a) RRAFFIRsIATIO)< OF POLICY.-The Congress re19 affirms the finding in seetion 2 (1) of the I,and Remote 

20 Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (15 U.RC. 5601(1» which 

21 states that "The continuo1ls collection and utilization of 

22 land remote sensing data from space are of major benefit 

23 in stml,ring' and understanding human impacts Oil the 

24 g'lobal environment, in managing the Earth's natural re25 sources, in carrying out national security functions, and 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213,243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p,m.) 

(551274116) 
66 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

52 

III planning and conducting' lUany other activitiefl of sci2 cntific, economic, and social impol'iancc.". 

3 (b) COXTIXCOCS h\ND RE~IOTE SENSI:\G DATA 

4 COLLECTION.-The Dil'ector of Office of Science and 

5 Technology Policy shall take steps in consultation with 

6 other relevant Federal agencies to ensure, to the maximum 

7 extent practicable, the cOlltinllons collection of space-bascd 

8 medium-rcsolution observatiOIli'l of the Earth's land covel', 

9 and to ensure that thc data are made available in such 

10 ways as to facilitate the widest possible usc. 

11 (c) DEFINITION OF l,AXD hLAGING CAPABILITIES.-

12 The Administrator shall not initiate the definition of land 

13 imaging capabilities, ine\uding the system design, night 

14 flyfltem implementation, and launch of future mission, un15 ICfls this work is eOJl(luctccl on a fully-reimbursable basis, 

16 and executed by the Administrations's Joint Agcney Sat17 cllite Division or a direct successor thereto. 

18 SEC. 347. SOURCES OF EARTH SCIENCE DATA. 

19 (a) ACQUISITION.-The Administrator shall, to the 

20 extent possible and while satisfying the scientific Ot° eclu21 cational requirements of the Administration, and, whcrc 

22 appropriate, of other Federal agencies and scientific re23 searchers, acquire, where cost-cffcctive, space-based and 

24 airborne Earth remote sensing data, scrvices, distribution, 

25 and applications from a commercial provider. 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12.2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
67 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467XML 

53 

1 (b) TREAT~IE?\,T AS CmDIERCL\L 1TE:\I U?\,DER Ac2 (~UISITIOX LAws.-Acquisitions by the Administrator of 

3 the data, services, distribution, and applications referred 

4 to in subsection (a) shall be carried out in accordance with 

5 applicablc acquisition laws and regulations (inelucling' 

6 chapters 137 amI 140 of title 10, United States Code). 

7 1.'or purposes of snch law and reg111ations, such data, serv8 ices, distribution, and applications shall bc eonsidcred to 

9 be a commercial item. :Nothing in this subsection shall be 

10 construed to preclude the United States from acquiring', 

11 through contracts with commercial providers, sufficient 

12 rights in data to meet the needs of the scientific and edu13 cational community 01' the needs of other government ae14 tivities. 

15 (c) SAFETY STA?\'DARDS.-Nothing in this section 

16 shall be construed to prohibit the Pederal Government 

17 from requiring compliance with applicable safety stand18 ards. 

19 (d) 1~EPORT.-Not later than 180 clays after the date 

20 of enactment of the Act, the Administrator shall submit 

21 a report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Tech22 nology of the House of Representatives and the Committee 

23 on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate 

24 on the Administration's efforts to carry out this section. 

f:WHLCl061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
68 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467 XML 

54 

1 TITLE IV-AERONAUTICS 

2 SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

3 It is the sense of COllgre~~ that4 (1) a robust aeronautics research pOl'tfolio will 

5 help maintain the United States statns as a leader 

6 in aviation; 

7 (2) aeronautics re~earch is essential to the Ad8 ministration's mission; and 

9 (3) the Administrator should coordinate and 

10 consult with relevant Federal agencies and the pri11 vate sector to minimize duplication and leverage re12 sources. 

13 SEC. 402. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND DE14 VELOPMENT. 

15 (a) IN GENERAIJ.-The Administrator, 111 consult a16 tion with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad17 ministration and other Federal agencies, shall direct re18 search and technological development to facilitate the !'lafe 

19 integration of ullmanned aerial systems into the National 

20 Airspace System, including21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

f:WHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12.2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(1) positioning and navigation systems; 

(2) sense and avoid capabilities; 

(3) secure data and communication links; 

(4) flight reeovery systems; and 

(5) human systems integration. 

(551274116) 
69 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

55 

(b) HOAmIAP.-The .'\J1millistrator shall update a 

2 roaclmap for unmanned aerial systems research and devel3 opment and transmit this roadmap to the Committee on 

4 Scicnce, Space, and Technology of the House of Hep5 resentatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

6 and Transportation of thc Senate not latcr than 90 days 

7 aftcr the date of enactment of this Act. 

8 (c) COOPEHATIVB UNl\IANNED AERIAL VEHICLB Ac9 TIVITIES.-Scction 31504 of title 51, Unitcd States Codc, 

10 is amcnded by inserting "Operational flight data dcrived 

11 from thcse cooperativc agrecments shall be madc available, 

12 in appropriate and usable formats, to thc .Administration 

13 and the Fedcral Av;ation Administration for the develop14 ment of regulatory standards." aftcr "in remote arcas.". 

15 SEC. 403. RESEARCH PROGRAM ON COMPOSITE MATERIALS 

16 USED IN AERONAUTICS. 

17 (a) CONSl:r,TATION.-The Administrator, m ovcr18 secing thc Administration's Integrated Systems Research 

19 Program's work on compositc materials, shall consult v\;th 

20 thc Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 

21 and partners in industry to accelerate safe development 

22 and ccrtification processcs for new composite materials 

23 and dcsig'n methods whilc maintaining rigorous inspcction 

24 of new composite materials. 

f:\vHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
70 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

56 

(b) REpoRT.-?-Jot latcr than 1 ycar aftcr thc date 

2 of cnactment of this Act, the Administrator shall transmit 

3 a rcport to the Committee on Science, Spaee, and Tech4 nology of the House of Representatives and the Committee 

5 on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate 

6 detailing the Administration's and the Ij'ederal Aviation 

7 Administration's work on new composite materials and the 

8 coordination efforts between the agcncies. 

9 SEC. 404. HYPERSONIC RESEARCH. 

10 ?-Jot later than 1 year after the date of enactment 

11 of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation with other 

12 Federal ag'encies, shall develop and transmit to the ComB mittee on Science, Space, and Teelmology of the House 

14 of Representatiycs and the Committce on Commerce, 

15 Science, and Transportation of the Senate a rescarch and 

16 devclopment roadmap for hypcrsonic aircraft research 

17 with the objective of exploring the science and tcchnology 

18 of hypersonic flight using air-breathing propulsion eOIl19 cepts, through a mL,( of theoretical work, basic and applied 

20 research, and development of flight research demonstra21 tion vchiclcs. Thc roadmap shall IJt'escribe appropriatc 

22 ageney contributions, coordination efforts, and technology 

23 milestones. 

fWHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
71 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

57 

SEC. 405. SUPERSONIC RESEARCH. 

2 :;-Jot later than 1 year after the date of enactment 

3 of this Act, the Administrator shall develop and transmit 

4 to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of 

5 the House of Representatives and the Committee on Com6 merce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a road7 map, that allows for flexible fllnding profiles, for super8 sonic transport rcsearch and development with the objec9 tive of developing and demonstrating, in a relevant envi10 ronment, airframe and propulsion technologies to mini11 mize the environmental impact, including noise, of over12 land flight of supcrsonic civil transport aircraft in an effi13 ciellt and economical manner. The roadmap shall in14 clude15 (1) a status report on the Administration's ex16 isting research on supersonic f1ight; 

17 (2) a list of specific technolog'ical, environ18 mental, :H1.cl other challeng'es that must be overcome 

19 to minimize the environmcntal impact, including 

20 noise, of supersonic overland flight of civil transport; 

21 (~~) a research plan to address these challenges, 

22 as well as it project timeline for accomplishing rel23 evant research goals; and 

24 (4) a plan for coordination with stakeholders, 

25 including relevant government agencies and indus26 try. 

f:\vHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
72 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

58 

1 SEC. 406. RESEARCH ON NEXTGEN AIRSPACE MANAGE2 MENT CONCEPTS AND TOOLS. 

3 (a) IN GE"-TERAL.-The Administrator shall, m COIl4 sultation with the Director of the ,Joint Planning and De5 velopment Office of the Pederal Aviation Administration, 

6 review at least anIlually the alignment and timing of the 

7 Administration's research and development activities in 

8 support of the ~extGen airspace management ll10derniza9 tion initiative, and shall make any necessary acljnstments 

10 by reprioritizing or retargeting the Administration's re11 search and development activities in support of the 

12 NextGen initiative. 

13 (b) ANNUAL l~EPORTS.-'l'he Administrator shall re14 port to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

15 of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

16 COlIlmerce, Science, and 'l'ransportation of the Senate an17 nnally regarding the progress of the Administration's re18 search and development activities in support of the 

19 NextGen airspace management modernization initiative, 

20 inclnding details of coordination with the F'ederal Aviation 

21 Administration and any acljustments made to research ac22 tivities. 

23 SEC. 407. ROTORCRAFT RESEARCH. 

24 ~ot later than 1 year after the date of enactment 

25 of this Act, the Administrator, in coordination with other 

26 Federal agencies, shall prepare and transmit to the Comf:WHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
73 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

59 

1 mittee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House 

2 of Representatives and the Committcc on Commcrce, 

3 Seiencc, anel 'l'ransportation of the Senate a plan for I'C4 search relating to rotorcraft and other rnnway-illde5 pendent air vehiclcs, with the objective of developing and 

6 demonstrating improved safety, noise, and environmental 

7 impact in a relevant environment. 'rhe plan shall include 

8 specifie goals for the research, a timeline for implementa9 tion, metrics for success, and guidelines for collaboration 

10 and coordination with industry and other I~ederal agen11 ClCS. 

12 TITLE V-SPACE TECHNOLOGY 

13 SEC. 501. SPACE TECHNOLOGY. 

14 (a) FTNDINGS.-CongTess finds the following: 

15 (1) The Space Tcchnology Mission Direetorate 

16 created by the Administration is lacking an organic 

17 statntory authorization and in Hced of congressional 

18 direction. 

19 (2) In order to appropriately prioritize the Acl20 ministration's resources to accomplish its goals and 

21 purposes, the Space 'l'echnology Mission Directorate 

22 needs to be reorg'Hnized as provided in the amend23 mellts made by this section. 

24 (b) E>'TLORA'l'ION TECHNOWGY RESEARCH.-Sec25 tioll 70506 of title 51, United States Code, is amended 

f:IVHlCI0612131061213,243,xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p,m.) 

(551274116) 
74 

60 

1 by striking' "'fhe Administrator" ane! inserting "Within 

2 the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Din'e3 torate, the Administrator". 

4 (c) SPACE rrECIIXOLOGY PROGRA;\l.-

5 (1) Ai\fENDMENT.-Section 70507 of title 51, 

6 Ullited States Code, is amended to read as follows: 

7 "§ 70507. Space Technology Program authorized 

8 "(a) PnOGR.A)f .AJ;THORIZED.-'l'he Administrator 

9 shall establish, within the office of the Administrator, a 

10 Space Technology Program, to pursue the development of 

11 technologies that enable e:ll;ploration that supports human 

12 missions to the surface of the Moon, the surfaee of Mars, 

13 and beyond. 

14 "(b) CROSS-CU'l'TING DEVELOPi\fENT PROJECTS.-In 

15 carrying out its purpose uuder subseetioll (a), the Space 

16 Teehnology ProgTam may manage cross-cutting deyelop17 ment projeets within the various elements of the Aclminis18 tration that have specifie applications to sueh purpose. 

19 "(c) Si\IALL BUSINESS PROGRAMS.-rrhe Adminis20 trator shall organize and manage the Administration's 

21 Small Business Innovation Research progTam and Small 

22 Business Technology Transfer program within the Space 

23 Technology Program. 

24 "(d) Nm·..'DUPLICATIOX CERTIFICATIOx.-The Ad25 ministrator shall include in the budget for each fiscal year, 

f:IVH LC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
75 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

61 

1 as transmitted to CongTess under section 1105(a) of title 

2 31, a certification that no project, program, or mission 

3 uudertaken by the Space Technology Program is inde4 pendcntly undcr dcvelopment by any other office or clirec5 torate of thc Administration.". 

6 (2) rrABI,E OF SECTIONS X\IENDAIENT.-The 

7 item relating to section 70507 in the table of sec8 tiOIlS for chapter 705 of titlc 51, United Statcs 

9 Code, is amendcd to read as follows: 

"70507. Spaee Technology Program authorized.". 

10 TITLE VI-EDUCATION 

11 SEC. 601. EDUCATION. 

12 (a) IN GBNERAL.-The Administration shall contiuue 

13 its education and outreach efforts to14 (1) increase student interest and participation 

15 III Scicnce, Technology, Bngineering, and Mathe16 matics ("SrrElVI") education; 

17 (2) improve public literacy in STJ<Jl\I; 

18 (3) cmploy proven strategies for improving stu19 dent Icarning and teaching; 

20 (4) provide curriculum support materials; and 

21 (5) create and support opportunities for profes22 sional development for STEM teachers. 

23 (b) ORGAl'<IZATION.-In ol'dcr to ensure the inspira24 tion and engagement of children and the general public, 

25 the Administration shall continue its STBl\I education and 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
76 

F:IEJS\EJS_ 467,XML 

62 

outreach activities within the Science, Aeronautics Rc2 search, Space Operations, and Exploration lVIission Direc3 torates. Funds devoted to education and public outreach 

4 shall he maintained in the Directorates, and the consolida5 tion of thcse activitieR into the Education Directorate is 

6 prohibited. 

7 (c) PROHIBITION.-The Administration may not im8 plement any proposed STEM education and outreaeh-re9 lated chang'es proposed in the budget for fiscal year 2014 

10 transmitted to CongTCss under section 1105(a) of title 31, 

11 United States Code. 

12 TITLE VII-POLICY PROVISIONS 

13 SEC. 701. ASTEROID RETRIEVAL MISSION. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.-Consistent with the policy stated 

15 III section 201(b), the Administrator shall not fnnd the 

16 development of an asteroid retrieval mission to send a 

17 robotic Rpaeecraft to a near-Earth asteroid for rendezvous, 

18 retrieval, and redirection of that asteroid to lunar orbit 

19 for exploration by astronauts. 

20 (b) ASTEROID SURVEY.-The A(llllinistration Rhall 

21 not pursue a program to search for asteroids of 20 meters 

22 or less in diameter unless the survey progTalll described 

23 in section 322 (e) is at IeaRt 90 percent complete. 

24 (c) REPOI{T.-Not later than 180 days after the date 

25 of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall provide 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
77 

63 

to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of 

2 the H01lse of Represent.atives and the COlllmittee on Com3 merce, Science, and rl'ransportation of the Senate a report 

4 on the proposed Asteroid Retrieval Mission. Snch report 

5 shall include6 (1) a detailed budget profile, including' cost esti7 mates for the development of all necessary tech8 nologies and spacecraft required for the mission; 

9 (2) a detailed technical plan that includes mile10 stones and a specific schedule; 

11 (3) a description of the technologies and capa12 bilities anticipated to be gained from the proposed 

13 mission that 'will enable future human missions to 

14 Mars which could not be gained by lunar missions; 

15 and 

16 (4) a complete review by the Small Bodies 1\13-

17 sessment Group and the NASA Advisory Council 

18 that includes a recommendation to Congress on the 

19 feasibility of the mission as proposed by the Admin20 istration. 

21 SEC. 702. TERMINATION LIABILITY. 

22 (a) FINDINGS.-1'he Congress makes the following 

23 findings: 

24 (1) The International Space Station and the 

25 Space I,aunch System will enable the Nation to conf:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml (551274116) 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 
78 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

64 

tinue operations in low-Earth orbit and to send its 

2 astronauts to deep space. As a result of their unique 

3 capabilities and their critical contribution to the fu4 ture of space mqJloratioll, these systems have been 

5 desigllated by the CongTess and the National Aero6 nautics and Space Administration as priority invest7 ments. 

8 (2) \Vhile the Space IJ~lUnch System, currently 

9 under development, has made significant progress, it 

10 has not been funded at levels authorized, amI as a 

11 result congressionally-anthorized milestones will be 

12 delayed by several years. 

13 (3) In addition, contractors arc currently hold14 ing program funding" estimated to be in the hun15 dreds of millions of dollars, to cover the potential 

16 termination liability should the Government choose 

17 to terminate a progTam for convenience. As a result, 

18 hundreds of millions of ta.'Cpayer dollars arc unavail19 able for meaningful wOl'k on these programs. 

20 (4) According to the Government Accountability 

21 Office, the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis22 tration procures most of its goods and services 

23 through contracts, and it terminates very few of 

24 them. In fiscal year 2010, the agency terminated 28 

f:WHLC\061213\061213,243,xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p,m,) 

(551274116) 
79 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467XML 

65 

of Hi,a43 active contracts and orders-a termi2 nation rate of about 0.17 percent. 

3 (5) Providing' procpsses requiring Congnssional 

4 action 011 termination of tllPse bigh-priority pro5 grams and requiring' a supplemental appropriation 

6 for termination liability would enable contractors to 

7 apply the full appropriation of taxpayer dollars to 

8 making maximum progress in meeting the estab9 liRhed goals and milestones of thcsc progTHms. 

10 (b) NASA 'l'ElunxATTON LLUHLITY.-

11 (1) GENERAL Imu~.-'rcrmination liability 

12 CORts for a covcred progTam shall be provided only 

13 pursuant to this subsection. 

14 (2) PROJIIBITION ON RESERVING FUNDS.-'l'he 

15 Administrator shall not reserve funds from amounts 

16 a ppropriated for a covered program, and shall dircct 

17 prime contractors not to rcserve funds, for potential 

18 termination liability costs with respect to a covered 

19 prognUl1. 

20 (a) VOID CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS.-Any 

21 provision in a prime contract entered into before the 

22 datc of enactmcnt of' this Act that provides for the 

23 paymcnt of termination liability costs through any 

24 means other than as provided in this Rubsection IS 

25 hereby declared to be void and unenforceable. 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
80 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

66 

(4) CO:'\GRESSIONAL ACTION; NOTICE.-

(A) TEmIINATION FOR CCl:'iYENIEXCE.-

The Administrator shall not initiate termination 

for the cOllvenience of the Govel'llment of a 

prime contract on a covered program unless 

such program termination is authorized or reqnired by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act. 

(B) TERMINATION FOR CAl;SE.-'rhe Adminlstrator shall notify the Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on COlllmerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate before initiating termination for cause of a 

prime contract on a covered program. 

(5) SUPPLE:\IENTAIJ APPROPRIATION RE17 QUEST.-

18 (A) HEQUEST.-If the Administrator de19 cides to terminate a prime contract on a eov20 ered program and sufficient unobligated appro21 priations are not available to cover termination 

22 liability costs in the appropriations account that 

23 is funding the prime contract being terminated, 

24 the Administrator shall provide to Congress a 

25 supplemental appropriation request not later 

fWHLCI0612131061213.243.xml (551274116) 

June 12, 2013 (4;57 p.m.) 
81 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

67 

than 120 clays in advance of the contract tenni2 nation settlement for the covered program. 

3 (B) INTENT OF CONGRl~SS.-It is the m4 tent of Congress to provide such additional ap5 propriations as may be necessary to pay tel'l11i6 nation liability costs on prime contracts for cov7 creel progTams. 

8 (6) DEFINITIONS.-J<'or purposes of this sec9 tion: 

10 (A) COVERED PROGRA)L-The term "cov11 ered program" means the International Space 

12 Station and the Space Launch System. 

13 (B) PRDIE CONTRACTOR.-The term 

14 "prime contractor" means a person or entity 

15 contracting directly with the Federal Govern16 ment on a covered Pl'OgT<llll. 

17 (C) TERIIINATION LIABILITY cosTS.-The 

18 term "termination liability costs" means any 

19 eosts incurred by a prime contractor, or by any 

20 subcontractor of a prime contractor, for which 

21 the Federal Govel'llment is liable as a result of 

22 termination of a prime contract by the Adminis23 trator. 

24 (c) REPORTING.-Not later than 6 months after the 

25 date of enactment of this Act, and evelY 6 months theref:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
82 

F:\EIS\EIS_ 467.XML 

68 

after for the duration of the prime contracts on covered 

2 programs, the Administrator shall transmit to the COl11-

3 mittee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House 

4 of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

5 Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report that 

6 provides7 (1) the estimated termination liability costs for 

8 each of the prime contracts; anel 

9 (2) the basis for how the estimate was eleter10 mined. 

11 SEC. 703. INDEMNIFICATION EXTENSION. 

12 Section 50915(f) of title 51, United States Code, IS 

13 amended by striking "December 31, 2013" and inserting' 

14 "December 31, 2018". 

15 SEC. 704. BASELINE AND COST CONTROLS. 

16 Section 30104 of title 51, United States Code, IS 

17 amended18 (1) III subsection (a), by striking "Procedural 

19 Requirements 7120.5c, dated 1\larc11 22, 2005" and 

20 inserting "Procedural Requirements 7120.5E, elated 

21 August 14, 2012"; and 

22 (2) in subsection (f), by striking "heginning 18 

23 months after the date the Administrator transmits a 

24 report under subsection (e) (1 )(A)" and inserting 

f:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12,2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
83 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.XML 

69 

1 "beginning' 18 months after the Administrator 

2 makes such dctermination". 

3 SEC. 705. PROJECT AND PROGRAM RESERVES. 

4 To ensnre that the establishment, maintenance, and 

5 allotmcnt of project and progTam reserves contribnte to 

6 prudent managemcnt, not later than 180 days after the 

7 date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall 

8 transmit to the COlllmittee on Scicncc, Space, and Tech9 nology of the House of Representatives and the Committee 

10 on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate 

11 a report describing the Administration's critcria for estab12 lishing the amonnt of reserves at the project and program 

13 levels and how such criteria complement the Administra14 tion's policy of budgeting at a 70 percent confidence lcvcl. 

15 SEC. 706. INDEPENDENT REVIEWS. 

16 Not later than 270 days after the date of cnactment 

17 of this Act, the Administrator shall transmit to the Com18 mittee on Science, Space, and Technology of the HOllse 

19 of Representatives and the Committee on COllImerce, 

20 Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report de21 scribing the l\.dministration's procedures for conducting 

22 independent reviews of projects and pl'ognuns at lifecycle 

23 milestones and how the Administration ensnres the inde24 pendence of thc individuals who conduct those rcviews 

25 prior to their assig1lment. 

f:WHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12. 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
84 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

70 

SEC. 707. SPACE ACT AGREEMENTS. 

2 (a) COST-SIIARING.-rrO the extent that the Admillis3 trator determines practicable, the fnllds provided by the 

4 Government under a Space Act Agreement shall not ex5 ceed the total alllollnt provided by other parties to the 

6 Space Act Agreement. 

7 (b) NEED.-A Space Act AgTeement may be used for 

8 a research project only when the use of a standard con9 tract, grant, or cooperative agTeement for snch project is 

10 not feasible or appropriate. 

11 (c) TRANSPARENC'Y.-The Administrator shall pub12 lically disclose on the Administration's website and make 

13 available in a searchable format all Space Act AgTeements, 

14 with appropriate redactions for proprietary, sensitive, or 

15 classified information, in a timely manner. 

16 (el) PUBI,IC NOTICE AND Co:mIENT.-The Adminis17 trator shall make available for public notice and comment 

18 each proposed Space Act Agreement before entering' into 

19 such agreement. 

20 (e) AUTHORIZATION.-rrhc Administrator shall not 

21 enter into a funded Space Act Agreement for an amount 

22 in excess of $50,000,000 unless snch agreement has been 

23 specifically authorized by law. 

24 (f) A"JNUAI, REPORT.-

25 (1) REQUIRE:\lEN'r.-Not later than 90 days 

26 after thc end of each fiscal year, the Administrator 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
85 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467,XML 

71 

shall submit to the Committee on Science, Space, 

2 and Technology of the House of Hepresentatives and 

3 the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans4 portatioll of the Senate a report Oil the use of Space 

5 Act Agreement authority by the Administration dur6 ing the previous fiscal year. 

7 (2) CO':\TExTs.-The I'eport shall include for 

8 each Spaee Ad AgTeemellt in dfed at the time of 

9 the report10 (A) an indication of whether the agTeement 

11 IS a reimbursable, nonreimbursable, or funded 

12 Space Act AgTeementj 

13 (B) a cleseription of14 (i) the subjeet and terms; 

15 (ii) the parties; 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(iii) the responsible nllSSlOll din'ctorate, center, or headquarters clement; 

(iv) the value; 

(v) the eA-tent of the eost-sharing 

among I<'ederal Government and non-:B'ederal sourees; 

(vi) the time period or schedule; aud 

(vii) all milestonesj and 

(C) an indication of whether the agreement 

was renewed during the previous fiseal year. 

(551274116) 
86 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467 XML 

72 

(3) ANTICIPATED AGREElIIENTS.-rrhe report 

2 shall also include a list of all anticipated reimburs3 able, nonreimbursable, and funded Space Act Agree4 ments for the upcoming fiscal year. 

5 ( 4) CU:\IULA TIVE PROGRAJ.lI BENEFITS. -The 

6 report shall also include, with respect to the Spaee 

7 Act AgTeemeuts covered by the report, a summary 

8 of9 (A) the teclmology areas in which rescarch 

10 prqjeets were conducted under such agreements; 

11 (B) the e~-tent to which the use of the 

12 Space Act Agrecments13 (i) has contributed to a broadening of 

14 the technology and industrial base avail15 able for meeting Administration needs; and 

16 (ii) has fostered within the teehnology 

17 and industrial base new relationships amI 

18 practices that support the United States; 

19 and 

20 (C) the total amount of value received by 

21 the Fcderal Govcrnmcnt during the fiscal year 

22 pursuant to such Space Act Ag1'eements. 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
87 

F:IEJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

73 

1 SEC. 708. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT ACCIDENT INVESTIGA· 

2 TIONS. 

3 Section 70702 of title 51, United States Code, is 

4 amended by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the fol· 

5 lowing: 

6 "(3) any other space vehicle carrymg hnmans 

7 that is owned by the Federal Govel'llll1ent or that is 

8 being nsed pursuant to a contract or Space Act 

9 Agreement, as defined in section 2 of the :\f ationaI 

10 Aeronantics and Space Administration Authorization 

11 Act of 2013 with the Federal Government; or". 

12 SEC. 709. COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PRO. 

13 GRAM. 

14 Section 50116(a) of title 51, United States Code, IS 

15 amended by inserting ", while protecting llational secn· 

16 rity" after "research community". 

17 SEC. 710. ORBITAL DEBRIS. 

18 (a) PINDING.-Cong'ress finds that orbital debris 

19 poses serious risks to the operational space capabilities of 

20 the United States aIllI that an international consensus and 

21 strategic plan is needed to mitigate the gTowth of orbital 

22 debris wherever possible. 

23 (b) REPOIiTS.-

24 (1) COORDINATIOX.-:\fot later than 90 days 

25 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Adminis26 trator shall provide the Committee on Science, 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12. 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
88 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467XML 

74 

Space, and rrcclmology of the House of Representa2 tives and the Committee on COlllmerce, Science, and 

3 Transportation of the Senate with a report on the 

4 status of efforts to coordinate with countries within 

5 the IntCl'-Agellcy Space Debris Coordination Com6 mittee to mitigate the effects and !-"Towth of ()['bital 

7 debris nR required by section 1202(b)(1) of' the Na8 tional Aeronautics and Space Administration Au9 thorization Act of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18441(b)(1 )). 

10 (2) MITIGATION STRATEGY.-Not later than 90 

11 days afteJ' the date of enactment of this Act, the Di12 rector of the Office of' Science and Technology Policy 

13 shall provide the Committee on Science, Space, and 

14 Technology of the House of Representatives and the 

15 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor16 tation of the Senate with a report on the status of' 

17 the orbital debris mitig'ation strategy required under 

18 section 1202(b)(2) of the National Aeronautics and 

19 Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (42 

20 U.S.C. 18441(b)(2)). 

21 SEC. 711. NASA LEADERSHIP. 

22 Section 20111 of title 51, United States Code, IS 

23 amcnded24 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting "The Aclmin25 istl'ator shall serve for a term of G years, and may 

f:IVHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
89 

F:\EJSIEJS_ 467XML 

75 

1 be reappointed for additional terms." after "and ae2 tivities thereof."; awl 

3 (2) in subsection (b)-

4 (A) by inserting "The Deputy Adminis5 trator shall not aet for, and exereise the pmycrs 

6 of, the Administrator for a period in exeess of 

7 45 days. After 45 days, the .Associate Adminis8 trator shall exercise the powers of Adminis9 tratol' until a new Administrator is appointed 

10 and confirmed by the Senate." after "absenee 

11 or disability."; and 

12 (B) by striking "from civilian life". 

13 SEC. 712. NASA ADVISORY COUNCIL. 

14 (a) JjjSTABLISHlIIENT.-Subehapter II of chapter 201 

15 of title 51, United States Code, is amended by adding at 

16 the end the following new seetion: 

17 "§ 20118. NASA Advisory Council 

18 "(a) ESTAI3LISIDIENT.-There shall be established a 

19 NASA Advisory Council (in this section referred to as 'the 

20 Couneil') for the Administration in aeeordanee with this 

21 seetion, not later than 9 months after the clate of enact22 lllent of this seetion. 

23 "(b) MEMBERSIIIP AXD ApPOINT:lIENT.-The Coun24 cil shall eonsist of 11 members to be appointed as follows: 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
90 

76 

1 "( 1) 3 members shall be appointed by the 

2 President. 

3 "(2) 3 members shall be appointed by the presi4 dent pro tempore of the Senate. 

5 "(3) 1 member shall be appointed by the mino1'-

6 ity leader of the Senate. 

7 "( 4) 3 members shall be appointed by the 

8 Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

9 "(5) 1 member shall be appointed by the minor10 ity leader of the House of Representatives. 

11 In addition to the members appointed under paragraphs 

12 (1) through (5), the Administrator shall be an ex officio, 

13 nonvoting' member of thc Council. Members of the Council 

14 must comply with laws and regulations for I;'ederal advi15 sory committees and ethies in g·ovel"llment. 

16 "(c) (~l!ALlFICATIONs.-The persons appointed as 

17 members of the Council shall be18 "( 1) fonner astronauts or scientists or cllgi19 neers eminent in the fields of human spaceflight, 

20 planetary science, space science, Earth science, 01' 

21 aeronautics, or other scientific, engineering, busi22 ness, and disciplines related to spaee exploration and 

23 aeronautics; 

24 "(2) selected on the hasis of established reeords 

25 of distinguished service; and 

f:IVHLGI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
91 

F:\EJS\EJS_ 467.xML 

77 

"( 3) so selected as to providc representatioll of 

2 the views of engineering, science, and aerospace 

3 leaders in all areas of the N atioll. 

4 "(e) TEmrs.-The term of office of each member of 

5 the Council shall be 6 years. 

6 "(f) lVIEE'rrNOS.-The Council shall meet two times 

7 annually at minimum and at such other times as the 

8 Chairman lllay determine, but the Chairman shall also call 

9 a meeting whenever one-third of the members so request 

10 in ,vriting. The Council shall adopt procedures governing11 the conduct of its meetings, including delivery of notiee 

12 and a definition of a quorum, which in no case shall bc 

13 less than onc-half plus one of the mcmbers of the CounciL 

14 "(g) CfLURUAN AND VICE CIIAIRUAN.-The Chair15 man and Viee Chairman of the Council shall be elected 

16 by a majority vote of the Council for a two-year tenn. A 

17 YIembcr may serve as Chairman and Vice Chairman for 

18 up to three terms. The Viee Chairman shall perform the 

19 duties of the Chairman in his absence. In case a vacancy 

20 ocenI'S ill the ehairmanship or vice chairmanship, the 

21 Council shall elect a member to fill snch vacaney. 

22 "(h) S'rAFF.-The Administrator shall support the 

23 Council with professional staff to provide for the perform24 ance of sneh duties as may be preseribed by the Council. 

f:\vHLC\061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
92 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

78 

1 "(i) CmElrI'I'TEE8.-The Council is authorized to ap2 point from among its members sneh cOlllmittees as it 

3 deems necessary, and to assigl1 to committees so appointed 

4 such survey and advisory functions as the Council deems 

5 appropriate to assist it in exercising its powers and fimc6 tions. 

7 "(j) FUNCTIONS.-

8 "(1) BUDGET PROPOSAh9 "(A) REVIEW m' PROPOSr\J,.-~ot later 

10 than October 15 of each year, the COUJl(~il shall 

11 have reviewed the Administration's proposed 

12 budget for the next fiscal year and provicle to 

13 the President their advice based on the best 

14 professional judgment of a majority of mem15 bel'S. Portions of Council meetings in which the 

16 Couneil considers the budget proposal for the 

17 next fiscal year lllay be closed to the public 

18 until the Council submits the proposal to the 

19 President and the CongTess. 

20 "(B) ~AnvICE TO CO;-.rGRESSl:ONAI, cmmIT21 TEES.-~ot later than 14 days following the 

22 President's budget submittal to the Congress 

23 for the next fiscal year, the Council shall pro24 vide to the Committee on Science, Space, and 

25 Technology of the Honse of Representatives 

f:\VHLCI0612131061213.243.xml (551274116) 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 
93 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467XML 

79 

and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

2 Transportation of the Senate their advice based 

3 on the best professional judgment of a rnajority 

4 of members. 

5 "(2) ADVICE TO THE PHESIDENT AND CON6 GREss.-The Council shall report their findings, ad7 vice, and recommendations to the President and the 

8 CongTf~ss on matters of particular policy interest on 

9 space exploration and aeronautics based on the best 

10 professional jmlgment of a majority of members.". 

11 (b) TABLE OF SECTIONS.-'rhe table of sections for 

12 chapter 201 of title 51, United States Code, is amended 

13 by adding at the end of the items for subchapter II the 

14 following Ilew item: 

"2011S. NASA Ad,';sory COUI1(';1.". 

15 (c) CO);Sn,TATION AND ADVICE.-Section 20113(g) 

16 of title 51, United States Code, is amended by inserting 

17 "and CongT('SS" after "advice to the Administration". 

18 SEC. 713. COST ESTIMATION. 

19 (a) REPORT.-Not later than 90 days after the date 

20 of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall transmit 

21 to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of 

22 the House of Representatives and the Committee on COlll23 merce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report 

24 on current and continuing efforts to implement more effec25 tive cost estimation practices. 

f:IVHLCI0612131061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
94 

F:IEJSIEJS_ 467.xML 

80 

1 (b) ELEi\IENTS.-The report required under sub2 section (a) shall inclllde3 (1) a list of steps the Administration is llndcr4 taking to advance consistent implementation of thc 

5 joint cost and schedule levcl (JeL) process; and 

6 (2) a dcscription of mechanisms the Adminis7 tration is m;ing and \vill continue to use to ensure 

8 that adcquatc resources are dedicated to cost esti9 mation. 

fWHLCI061213\061213.243.xml 

June 12, 2013 (4:57 p.m.) 

(551274116) 
95 

Chairman PALAZZO. The Subcommittee on Space will come to 

order. 

Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing titled ‘‘The NASA Authorization Act of 2013.’’ In front of you are packets containing the 

written testimonies, biographies and required Truth in Testimony 

disclosures for today’s witnesses. I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

The discussion draft of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 2013 before us today is the result of input from 

a wide variety of interests throughout the science and space communities. The outreach efforts of this Committee have been unprecedented, and I am proud of the draft we have put together. My goal 

for this hearing is to ensure that all of our Members have an opportunity to ask questions, raise concerns and debate important 

topics. I expect the tenor of today’s hearing to be respectful. We are 

all here because we care about NASA and want it to succeed. 

The draft bill includes a top line budget of over $16.8 billion and 

authorizes the agency for two years. This budget is consistent with 

the requirements of the Budget Control Act. 

In regards to sequestration, I want to take a moment to point out 

that I and several of my colleagues sitting here in this room 

worked extremely hard to avoid getting to this point. We have offered solid solutions and replacements for these damaging cuts, 

and we stand ready to work with the Senate and the Administration to replace the sequester with responsible, strategic cuts. This 

authorization bill reflects a sincere effort to maximize return to the 

taxpayer while working to protect America’s role as the world leader in space exploration. 

It is realistic and reflective of the hard choices we must make as 

a Nation and provides support for agreed-upon priorities. The stark 

reality is that if we fail to reform mandatory spending, discretionary funding for space, science and research will continue to 

shrink. 

The Administration must focus on core programs such as the 

Space Launch System and Orion crew capsule, the International 

Space Station, the James Webb Space Telescope and the Commercial Crew program. The Space Launch System is authorized at over 

$1.7 billion and the Orion crew capsule at $1.2 billion. The SLS 

and Orion will take our astronauts deeper into space than ever before. I am committed to the success of these assets and ensuring 

their continued on-time development and appropriate prioritization 

moving forward. 

The Commercial Crew program is authorized at $700 million, but 

let me be clear: this is not a blank check for the Administration. 

The bill includes several accountability measures and a flight readiness deadline of December 31, 2017. This deadline is not negotiable. NASA must do whatever is necessary in its acquisition 

model to meet this deadline, even if that means radically altering 

their current plans. 

The International Space Station is authorized at over $2.9 billion, and the bill includes a framework for NASA to use for determining the future life of the Station. This Committee intends to ensure the ISS is utilized to the greatest extent possible and that 

every dollar is efficiently allocated with a priority placed on micro-
96 

gravity research. The $4.62 billion authorized for the Science Mission Directorate ensures critical programs will continue on schedule including the James Webb Space Telescope and Planetary 

Science missions. Over the last five years, the Earth Science program has grown by more than 40 percent at the expense of other 

critical missions within the Science Mission Directorate and elsewhere in NASA. 

There are 13 agencies throughout the Federal Government that currently fund over $2.5 billion in climate science research, but 

only one agency does space exploration and space science. This bill 

ensures a balanced portfolio of science mission programs by simply 

moderating the increases that Earth Science has received over the 

last five years. 

The Aeronautics Mission Directorate promotes technology sharing among government agencies and infuses critical research and 

data into the commercial market. It is authorized at $565 million 

with requirements for interagency roadmaps for various technology 

areas. 

This bill authorizes $500 million for the Space Technology program. This investment in game-changing technology development 

is crucial for future exploration mission, both robotic and human. 

We also recognize the role this program can play in finding innovative solutions to tough problems. 

The President’s budget request this year included a major structural change to STEM programs at NASA. The full Science Committee held a hearing that revealed significant bipartisan concerns 

about this plan. While the Committee generally supports consolidation of government programs to ensure efficiencies, this change was 

poorly conceived and is not ready for implementation. For this reason, the bill prohibits NASA from implementing those changes. 

Another request in the President’s budget was an Asteroid Retrieval Mission, or ARM. While the Committee supports the Administration’s efforts to study near-Earth objects, this proposal lacks in 

details, a justification or support from the NASA’s own advisory 

bodies. Because the mission appears to be a costly and complex distraction, this bill prohibits NASA from doing any work on the 

project, and we will work with appropriators to ensure the agency 

complies with this directive. 

In addition to authorizing funding and giving direction to the 

agency for critical missions, the Committee has included several 

measures to ensure good government practices and transparency 

within NASA including reform for the use of Space Act Agreements, changes to termination liability requirements and stricter 

cost growth controls. 

As people in our districts and across the Nation continue to 

struggle to find jobs and put food on the table, we must ensure that 

every single dollar appropriated to NASA is spent effectively and 

efficiently. This bill provides commonsense guidance and prioritizes 

those most critical NASA missions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE CHAIRMAN STEVEN PALAZZO

The discussion draft of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act 

of 2013 before us today is the result of input from a wide variety of interests 
97 

throughout the science and space communities. The outreach efforts of this Committee have been unprecedented and I am proud of the draft we have put together. 

My goal for this hearing is to ensure that all of our Members have an opportunity 

to ask questions, raise concerns and debate important topics. I expect the tenor of 

today’s hearing to be respectful. We are all here because we care about NASA and 

want it to succeed. 

The draft bill includes a topline budget of over $16.8 billion dollars and authorizes 

the agency for two years. This budget is consistent with the requirements of the 

Budget Control Act. 

I will take a moment to point out that I and several of my colleagues sitting here 

in this room worked extremely hard to avoid getting to this point. We’ve offered 

solid solutions and replacements for these damaging cuts, and we stand ready to 

work with the Senate and the Administration to replace the sequester with responsible, strategic cuts. This authorization bill reflects a sincere effort to maximize return to the taxpayer while working to protect America’s role as the world leader in 

space exploration. It is realistic and reflective of the hard choices we must make 

as a nation and provides support for agreed-upon priorities. The stark reality is that 

if we fail to reform mandatory spending, discretionary funding for space, science, 

and research will continue to shrink. 

The Administration must focus on core programs such as the Space Launch System and Orion crew capsule, the International Space Station, the James Webb 

Space Telescope and the Commercial Crew Program. The Space Launch System is 

authorized at over $1.77 billion and the Orion crew capsule at $1.2 billion. The SLS 

and Orion will take our astronauts deeper into space than ever before. I am committed to the success of these assets and ensuring their continued on-time development and appropriate prioritization moving forward. The Commercial Crew program 

is authorized at $700 million, but let me be clear; this is not a blank check for the 

Administration. The bill includes several accountability measures and a flight readiness deadline of December 31, 2017. This deadline is not negotiable. NASA must 

do whatever is necessary in its acquisition model to meet this deadline, even if that 

means radically altering their current plans. The International Space Station is authorized at over $2.9 billion and the bill includes a framework for NASA to use for determining the future life of the Station. 

This Committee intends to ensure the ISS is utilized to the greatest extent possible 

and that every dollar is efficiently allocated with a priority placed on microgravity 

research. 

The $4.62 billion authorized for the Science Mission Directorate ensures critical 

programs will continue on schedule including the James Webb Space Telescope and 

Planetary Science missions. Over the last five years the Earth Science program has 

grown by more than 40% at the expense of other critical missions within the Science 

Mission Directorate and elsewhere in NASA. There are 13 agencies throughout the 

federal government that currently fund over $2.5 billion in climate science research, 

but only one agency does space exploration and space science. This bill ensures a 

balanced portfolio of science mission programs by simply moderating the increases 

that Earth Science has received over the last five years. 

The Aeronautics Mission Directorate promotes technology sharing among government agencies and infuses critical research and data into the commercial market. 

It is authorized at $565 million with requirements for interagency roadmaps for various technology areas. 

This bill authorizes $500 million for the Space Technology program. This investment in game-changing technology development is crucial for future exploration 

missions—both robotic and human. We also recognize the role this program can play 

in finding innovative solutions to tough problems. 

The President’s budget request this year included a major structural change to 

STEM programs at NASA. The Full Science Committee held a hearing that revealed 

significant bipartisan concerns about this plan. While the Committee generally supports consolidation of government programs to ensure efficiencies, this change was 

poorly conceived and is not ready for implementation. For this reason, the bill prohibits NASA from implementing those changes. 

Another request in the President’s budget was an Asteroid Retrieval Mission or 

ARM. While the Committee supports the Administration’s efforts to study Near 

Earth Objects, this proposal lacks in details, justification or support from NASA’s 

own advisory bodies. Because the mission appears to be a costly and complex distraction, this bill prohibits NASA from doing any work on the project and we will 

work with appropriators to ensure the agency complies with this directive. 

In addition to authorizing funding and giving direction to the Agency for critical 

missions, the Committee has included several measures to ensure good government 

practices and transparency within NASA including; reform for the use of Space Act 
98 

Agreements, changes to termination liability requirements and stricter cost growth 

controls. 

As people in our districts and across the nation continue to struggle to find jobs 

and put food on the table, we must ensure that every single dollar appropriated to 

NASA is spent effectively and efficiently. This bill provides common sense guidance 

and prioritizes those most critical NASA missions. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 

gentlelady from Maryland, Ms. Edwards, for an opening statement. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this hearing to discuss a draft of the proposed NASA authorization bill. 

NASA has been and should continue to be the Nation’s crown 

jewel for spurring innovation, highly skilled and good-paying jobs, 

and inspiring the next generation of scientists. It is vital that any 

new NASA Authorization match that same standard. 

I think we both agree that a strong NASA is critical to the Nation and that this authorization is vitally important, and it is an 

important opportunity to set the policy direction and authorized 

funding needed to ensure America’s global leadership in space. It 

is my hope that we can work together to ensure that NASA’s mission is clear, establish expectations that will inspire the public and 

the workforce, and then provide the level of resources needed to enable the agency to be successful. Doing otherwise would not only 

be a disservice to the men and women at NASA, its contractor 

workforce and the American people, but would effectively set the 

agency on a path to failure. I know that Members of this Committee want to see NASA thrive, and we must have an authorization bill that ensures that. 

Mr. Chairman, we are not, nor should we be, the scientists and 

engineers who devise the programs and projects to meet the highlevel goals set for the agency. That should be left to the capable 

experts at NASA. 

I was pleased to see that the draft bill contains a number of reporting requirements and other provisions taken from the 2010 

House version of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, since those 

were not included in the enacted law because Members only voted 

on the Senate bill in 2010. 

Developing a plan or a roadmap for human exploration to Mars 

and seeking criteria for evaluating the potential extension of ISS 

operations beyond 2020 are just a few of the key areas where I see 

the potential to build consensus. 

I am concerned however, with several aspects of this draft bill, 

and I question whether, in the end, this draft will serve to ensure 

our Nation’s hard-earned leadership in space and all the inspiration, discovery, international standing and economic benefits that 

such leadership brings. 

First, the draft bill would appear to shift the emphasis of NASA’s 

core mission to human exploration. This is counter to the policy of 

NASA’s organic Act, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 

1958, as well as to the policy statements of multiple NASA authorizations that have seen NASA as a multi-mission agency with significant activities in science, aeronautics and human spaceflight 

and exploration, and technology development 
99 

Another key concern is the level of funding that is authorized. 

The proposed bill would slash NASA’s budget by almost a billion 

dollars relative to both the President’s proposal for Fiscal Year 

2014 and the pre-sequester funding approved by Congress in Fiscal 

Year 2012, and it would maintain that cut over each of the years 

of the Majority’s authorization bill. 

The severe cuts to NASA’s top line are manifested throughout 

the draft bill. For example, Earth Science would be cut by almost 

$650 million relative to the Fiscal Year 2014 request, meaning the 

Earth Science account is cut by one-third. Cuts to Earth Science 

would not only result in gaps in the data needed to understand 

changes in our Earth system, it would also impact on the data 

needed for water monitoring, forest and timber productivity forecasting, improving gas and electric utilities load forecasting, and 

assessing the impact of sea-level rise in coastal communities. These 

uses and societal benefits are exactly what we hope for when we 

make Federal investments in research and technology. To stop 

them would be irresponsible. 

And the bill appears to shift all Space Technology activities to 

support only exploration-related technology development. More importantly, the proposed reduction in funding for Space Technology 

will not keep NASA on a path aligned with 21st century innovation 

and job creation. Plans to pursue new technologies such as in-space 

propulsion and cryogenic fuel storage may suffer. The impact of 

making these reductions was not discussed in preceding hearings, 

as they should have been. 

Compounding these things, the bill establishes aggressive milestones and activities that run contrary to proposed downsized levels without any real regard for safety and schedule. These are exactly the pressures of the lessons that we learned from both Challenger and Columbia, and we can’t afford to repeat those tragedies. 

We cannot expect NASA to develop a sustainable and inspiring 

space program under these circumstances, and Mr. Chairman, the 

Subcommittee has historically done best for NASA when we move 

legislation in a bipartisan manner. 

As a minimum, now that the draft bill is open for discussion and 

before we begin considering markup, we should first take the time 

to hold hearings with valued experts and stakeholders impacted by 

the bill’s provisions, especially in areas such as Earth Science, 

Space Technology, and Commercial Crew safety. 

As we will hear from one of the witnesses today, one way of 

counteracting the high cost of human space exploration may be in 

the form of expanded international partnerships. This is an idea 

that needs to be considered as the journey to Mars will be long, yet 

rewarding for the future of humankind. 

Thank you, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DONNA

EDWARDS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing to discuss a draft of the proposed NASA authorization bill. 
100 

NASA has been and should continue to be the Nation’s crown jewel for spurring 

innovation, highly-skilled and good paying jobs, and inspiring the next generation 

of scientists. It is vital that any new NASA Authorization match that standard. 

I think we both agree that a strong NASA is critical to the nation and that this 

Authorization is a vitally important opportunity to set the policy direction and authorize funding needed to ensure America’s global leadership in space. 

It is my hope that we can work together to ensure that NASA’s mission is clear, 

establish expectations that will inspire the public and workforce, and then provide 

the level of resources needed to enable the agency to be successful. 

Doing otherwise would not only be a disservice to the men and women at NASA, 

its contractor workforce, and the American people, but would effectively set the 

Agency on a path to failure. I know that Members of this Committee want to see 

NASA thrive; we must have an Authorization bill that ensures that. 

Mr. Chairman, we are not, nor should we be, the scientists and engineers who 

devise the programs and projects to meet the high-level goals of the Agency. That 

should be left to the capable experts at NASA. 

I was pleased to see that the draft bill contains a number of reporting requirements and other provisions taken from the 2010 House version of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, since those were not included in the enacted law because Members only voted on the Senate bill in 2010. 

Developing a plan or roadmap for human exploration to Mars and seeking criteria 

for evaluating the potential extension of ISS operations beyond 2020 are just a few 

of the key areas where I see the potential to build consensus. 

I am concerned however, with several aspects of this draft bill, and I question 

whether, in the end, this draft will serve to ensure our nation’s hard-earned leadership in space and all the inspiration, discovery, international standing, and economic benefits that such leadership brings. 

First, the draft bill would appear to shift the emphasis of NASA’s core mission 

to human exploration. This is counter to the policy of NASA’s organic Act, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as well as to the policy statements of multiple NASA Authorizations that have seen NASA as a multi-mission agency with 

significant activities in science, aeronautics, and human spaceflight and exploration, 

and technology development. 

Another key concern is the level of funding that is authorized. The proposed bill 

would slash NASA’s budget by almost a billion dollars relative to both the President’s proposal for FY 14 and the pre-sequester funding approved by Congress in 

FY 12, and it would maintain that cut over each of the years of the Majority’s Authorization bill. The severe cuts to NASA’s top line are manifested throughout the 

draft bill. 

For example, Earth Science would be cut by almost $650 million relative to the 

FY 14 request, meaning the Earth Science account is cut by 1/3. 

Cuts to Earth Science would not only result in gaps in the data needed to understand changes in our Earth system, it would also impact on the data needed for 

water monitoring, forest and timber productivity forecasting, improving gas and 

electric utilities load forecasting, and assessing the impact of sea level rise in coastal 

communities. 

These uses and societal benefits are exactly what we hope for when we make federal investments in research and technology. To stop them would not be responsible. 

And the bill appears to shift all Space Technology activities to support only exploration-related technology development. 

More importantly, the proposed reduction in funding for Space Technology will 

not keep NASA on a path aligned with 21st century innovation and job creation. 

Plans to pursue new technologies such as in-space propulsion and cryogenic fuel 

storage may suffer. 

The impact of making these reductions was not discussed in preceding hearings, 

as they should have been. Compounding things, the bill establishes aggressive milestones and activities that run contrary to proposed downsized levels. 

We cannot expect NASA to develop a sustainable and inspiring space program 

under these circumstances. Mr. Chairman, this Subcommittee has historically done 

best for NASA when we have moved legislation in a bipartisan manner. 

As a minimum, now that the draft bill is open for discussion and before we consider moving to markup, we should first take the time to hold other hearings with 

valued experts and stakeholders impacted by the draft bill’s provisions, especially 

in areas such as Earth science, space technology, and commercial crew safety. 

As we will hear from one of the witnesses today, one way of counteracting the 

high cost of human space exploration may be in the form of expanded international 

partnerships. This is an idea that needs to be considered as the journey to Mars 

will be long, yet rewarding for the future of humankind. 
101 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. Oh, I apologize, Ms. Johnson. Our Ranking Member is 

present. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee for her remarks. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning, and I would like to join you in welcoming our witnesses 

to this morning’s hearing. You both have offered valuable counsel 

to our Committee in the past, and I am certain that you will do 

that again today. 

As the Chairman has indicated, we are here today to begin our 

review of the Majority’s discussion draft of the NASA Authorization 

Act of 2013. Those who know me know that I consider NASA to be 

a critical part of the Nation’s innovation infrastructure, a driver of 

technological and scientific progress, a positive symbol of the 

United States throughout the world, and most importantly, a 

source of inspiration for successive generations of our young people. 

I strongly believe that any NASA authorization bill that comes out 

of this Committee should reflect these realities. 

Unfortunately, the draft bill that we are starting to examine 

today doesn’t do that. It doesn’t contain funding commensurate 

with the tasks NASA has been asked to undertake. In fact, it gives 

NASA additional unfunded mandates while maintaining deep sequestration cuts over the life of the bill. It contains policy direction 

that I fear will do long-term damage to the agency. And, I regret 

to say that if enacted, it would not help NASA meet the challenges 

facing the agency. In short, it is a missed opportunity to position 

NASA for excellence, and it is a bill that if enacted would lead to 

the erosion of the capabilities that have made NASA such a positive force for progress. 

Why do I say that? Well, I have already mentioned the deep and 

sustained cuts this bill makes to NASA’s overall budget at a time 

when we should be investing more in NASA, not putting it on a 

path to mediocrity. It also cuts NASA’s Earth Science budget by 

one-third, which I find very baffling. Certainly the Committee has 

held no hearings on NASA’s Earth Science program in this Congress nor the 112th Congress, so it is hard to see any justification 

for those cuts. It makes equally damaging cuts and changes to 

NASA’s Space Technology program, again without explanation. 

And despite on the one hand putting NASA’s budget on a path of 

declining purchasing power for the foreseeable future, it on the 

other hand directs NASA to establish major new programs, not just 

goals, for sustained human presence on both the Moon and Mars. 

Moreover, in addition to imposing other unfunded and underfunded mandates on numerous NASA programs, it also sets an arbitrary deadline by when NASA will have had to carry out a successful commercial crew flight to the International Space Station, 

a deadline that I fear will lead to the kind of schedule pressure the 

Columbia Accident Investigation Board warned against a decade 

ago after the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. 

Mr. Chairman, there are other areas of this draft legislation that 

I fundamentally disagree with, but I think you have a sense of my 

overall view. This is not a bill ready for markup. This is a flawed 
102 

draft, starting from its funding assumptions, and I cannot support 

it in the present form. I can also predict that if passed by our Committee, this bill would be DOA in the Senate, DOA meaning dead 

on arrival. 

Rather than moving directly to an unproductive markup, I hope 

that the Majority will take a step back and at a minimum hold additional legislative hearings so we can hear from the affected parties what the impacts of the proposed cuts and changes to Earth 

Science and Space Technology will be. We also need to hear from 

the congressionally established Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on 

its views of this legislation, because I know that no member of this 

Committee will want to do anything that would jeopardize safety. 

In closing, NASA is an investment in our future. The women and 

men who work at NASA are some of our best and brightest. We 

owe it to them and to our children and grandchildren to take the 

time to produce a NASA Authorization Act worthy of this Committee. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good morning. I’d like to join the Chairman in welcoming our witnesses to this 

morning’s hearing. You both have provided valuable counsel to our Committee in 

the past, and I am certain that you will do so again today. 

As the Chairman has indicated, we are here today to begin our review of the Majority’s Discussion Draft of the NASA Authorization Act of 2013. Those who know 

me know that I consider NASA to be a critical part of the nation’s innovation infrastructure, a driver of technological and scientific progress, a positive symbol of the 

United States throughout the world, and most importantly, a source of inspiration 

for successive generations of our young people. I strongly believe that any NASA 

Authorization bill that comes out of this Committee should reflect those realities. 

Unfortunately, the draft bill that we are starting to examine today doesn’t do 

that. It doesn’t contain funding commensurate with the tasks NASA has been asked 

to undertake—in fact, it gives NASA additional unfunded mandates while maintaining deep sequestration cuts over the life of the bill. It contains policy direction that 

I fear will do long term damage to the agency. And, I regret to say that if enacted, 

it would not help NASA meet the challenges facing the agency. In short, it is a 

missed opportunity to position NASA for excellence, and it’s a bill that if enacted 

would lead to the erosion of the capabilities that have made NASA such a positive 

force for progress. 

Why do I say that? Well, I have already mentioned the deep and sustained cuts 

this bill makes to NASA’s overall budget—at a time when we should be investing 

more in NASA, not putting it on a path to mediocrity. It also cuts NASA’s Earth 

Science budget by one-third, which I find baffling. Certainly the Committee has held 

no hearings on NASA’s Earth Science program in this or the 112th Congress, so it’s 

hard to see any justification for those cuts. It makes equally damaging cuts and 

changes to NASA’s Space Technology program—again without explanation. 

And despite on the one hand putting NASA’s budget on a path of declining purchasing power for the foreseeable future, it on the other hand directs NASA to establish major new programs—not just goals—for sustained human presences on 

both the Moon and Mars. 

Moreover, in addition to imposing other unfunded and underfunded mandates on 

numerous NASA programs, it also sets an arbitrary deadline by when NASA will 

have had to carry out a successful commercial crew flight to the International Space 

Station—a deadline that I fear will lead to the kind of schedule pressure the Columbia Accident Investigation Board warned against a decade ago after the tragic loss 

of the Space Shuttle Columbia. 

Mr. Chairman, there are other areas of the draft legislation that I fundamentally 

disagree with, but I think you have a sense of my overall view. This is not a bill 

ready for markup. This is a flawed draft, starting from its funding assumptions, and 
103 

I cannot support it in its present form. I can also predict that if passed by our Committee, this bill would be DOA in the Senate. 

Rather than moving directly to an unproductive markup, I hope that the Majority 

will take a step back and at a minimum hold additional legislative hearings so we 

can hear from the affected parties what the impacts of the proposed cuts and 

changes to Earth Science and Space Technology will be. We also need to hear from 

the congressionally established Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on its views of this 

legislation, because I know that no Member on this Committee will want to do anything that would jeopardize safety. 

In closing, NASA is an investment in our future. The women and men who work 

at NASA are some of our best and brightest. We owe it to them and to our children 

and grandchildren to take the time to produce a NASA Authorization Act worthy 

of this Committee. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. Again, the purpose 

of this Committee to hear our Members’ concerns, issues and questions and also have some debate on those issues. 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our panel of witnesses. Our 

first witness is Dr. Steven Squyres, the Goldwin Smith Professor 

of Astronomy at Cornell University, and Chair of the NASA Advisory Council. Our second witness is Mr. Thomas Young, former Executive Vice President of Lockheed Martin Corporation. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each, after which Members of the Committee have five 

minutes each to ask questions. Your written testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Squyres, for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF STEVEN SQUYRES 

GOLDWIN SMITH PROFESSOR OF ASTRONOMY, 

CORNELL UNIVERSITY 

Dr. SQUYRES. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear today. 

Three themes run through my testimony. First, NASA needs a 

clear and compelling long-term goal. In my opinion, that goal 

should be to send human explorers to Mars. Second, NASA is being 

asked to do too much with too little. Unless program content can 

be matched to budget, the result will be wasted effort and delay. 

Third, our Nation’s civil space program will be best served by having high-level policies set by the Administration and Congress, and 

implementation details recommended by NASA engineers, scientists and managers. 

I recently testified at a hearing before this Committee entitled 

‘‘Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond.’’ An underlying assumption of that hearing was that a crucial future goal 

for NASA should be to send human explorers to the surface of 

Mars. I argued then and I reiterate now that sending human explorers to Mars to learn whether or not life ever emerged there is 

a goal worthy of a great national space agency. It should be 

NASA’s number one long-range priority. 

To make progress towards the goal, the draft Authorization Act 

wisely calls for NASA to develop a Mars human exploration roadmap, but then, with little technical justification, the draft legislation also dictates what some of the key elements of that roadmap 
104 

should or should not be. Specifically, it directs NASA to establish 

a program to develop a sustained human presence on the moon and 

forbids NASA to fund the development of an Asteroid Retrieval 

Mission. I believe that it would be unwise for Congress to either 

prescribe or proscribe any key milestone in NASA’s Mars exploration roadmap at this time. Personally, I agree with the draft Authorization Act’s position on the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, and I 

disagree with its position on a sustained lunar presence, but my 

personal views are not the point. 

In the 1960s, the government set the high-level goal of sending 

humans to the Moon and then left it to the engineers and the scientists and managers of NASA to find the right program architecture to achieve this goal. I believe that a similar approach should 

be taken to achieving the goal of getting humans to Mars. I urge 

that milestones not be dictated either by the Administration or the 

Congress without allowing NASA to develop a technically sound 

roadmap first. The objective of this roadmap should be to achieve 

the goal of human exploration of Mars as quickly and efficiently as 

possible, and then once a viable roadmap has been generated, the 

additional technologies, vehicles and milestones that are needed to 

make it a reality will become clear. 

Moving on to Space Science, this program has been one of 

NASA’s major success stories for many years. Priorities across the 

full sweep of Space Science have been recommended by the National Research Council’s Decadal Surveys. I am pleased that the 

draft Authorization Act places particular emphasis on assuring 

that NASA’s Space Science program follows decadal priorities. 

Unfortunately, tight budgets and mission cost overruns have put 

NASA’s Space Science program under pressure. Recent Administration budget requests have funded most Space Science disciplines 

adequately but have included cuts to Planetary Exploration that 

were so deep as to appear punitive. The draft Authorization Act, 

in contrast, restores funding for Planetary Exploration but introduces alarmingly deep cuts to Earth Science. I feel it is important 

that cuts be driven by science priorities as outlined in the Decadal 

Surveys and that they be distributed sensibly across disciplines. So 

I urge this Committee to strive for balance in the Space Science 

portfolio rather than singling out Earth Science or any other discipline for disproportionate cuts. 

The draft Authorization Act would reorganize the Space Technology program by moving much of the responsibility for technology 

development to the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. Unfortunately, when budgets are tight, it is tempting for 

mission directorates to use technology funds to solve today’s problems rather than enabling tomorrow’s missions. So I favor a more 

distributed approach in which only technology funding for specific 

near- and medium-term needs of a mission directorate resides 

within that directorate. I feel that longer-term and more broadly 

applicable exploration technology funding is better maintained in a 

separate technology organization helping protect it from being used 

to solve immediate mission problems. 

Returning to my opening themes, I believe that the mismatch between the agency’s aspirations and its budget is the most serious 

problem facing NASA. Unless a solution is found, some very hard 
105 

choices may have to be made soon. Specifically, a choice is looming, 

I believe, regarding whether the focus of human spaceflight should 

be ISS utilization or moving beyond low-Earth orbit. At projected 

budget levels, I fear that NASA will not be able to do both of these 

safely and well. 

Part of the solution may be international partnerships. If no 

major funding increase for NASA is forthcoming, then I believe 

that the agency should aggressively seek out international partners 

for human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. If capable partners 

who are willing to shoulder a substantial fraction of the cost of 

deep space exploration can be found, then it may be possible for 

NASA to maintain something like its current portfolio of activities. 

Otherwise I fear that a painful reduction in program content may 

lie ahead. 

Despite the challenges that it faces, NASA is one of our Nation’s 

greatest assets and a source of pride for all Americans. An Authorization Act that enunciates a clear and compelling long-term goal 

for the agency, that matches program content to budget and that 

lets NASA formulate the implementation details of national civil 

space policy will allow it to remain so. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Squyres follows:] 
106 

Statement of Steven W. Squyres 

Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy 

Cornell University 

Before the Subcommittee on Space 

United States House of Representatives 

June 19,2013 

Mr. Chainnan and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today. My name is Steven W. Squyres, and my title is Goldwin Smith Professor of 

Astronomy at Cornell University. I have participated for the past thirty years in a number 

of NASA solar system exploration missions. Recently I chaired the planetary decadal 

survey for the National Research Council, and I am currently the Chainnan of the NASA 

Advisory Council. The views that I express today are my own, and do not represent the 

opinions of the National Research Council, the NASA Advisory Council, or any other 

organization. 

The subject oftoday's hearing is the NASA Authorization Act of2013. The draft 

legislation is long and detailed, and I will not attempt to address all of it in my testimony. 

I will focus instead on aspects that I find to be particularly worthy of comment. 

Three themes run through my testimony today: 

NASA needs a clear and compelling long-tenn goal. That goal should be to send 

human explorers to Mars. 

NASA is bcing asked to do too much with too little. Unless program content can 

be matched to budget, the result will be wasted effort and delay. 

Our nation's civil space program will be best served by having high-level policy 

set by the Administration and Congress, and implementation details 

recommended by NASA engineers, scientists, and managers. 

Human Space Flight 

I recently participated in a hearing before this committee entitled "Next Steps in Human 

Exploration to Mars and Beyond". An underlying assumption of that hearing was that a 

crucial future goal for NASA should be to send human explorers to the surface of Mars. 

In my testimony then I strongly supported that goal, and I reiterate that support today. 

Alone among the planets, Mars is enough like Earth that we can imagine life once taking 

hold there. A vast and growing body of scientific knowledgc shows that the martian 
107 

surface once possessed many of the essential ingredients required for life. If by exploring 

Mars we could show that life emerged there - and therefore that it emerged twice in just 

this one solar system it would take no great leap of faith, logic, or anything else to 

conclude that life may be commonplace throughout the cosmos. 

One could ask whether it is necessary to send humans to Mars to answer this question. 

Despite having devoted my career to exploring the solar system with robots, I am a strong 

advocate of human exploration, particularly at Mars. Humans have an extraordinary 

ability to function in complex environments, to improvise, and to respond quickly to new 

discoveries. Robots, in contrast, do best when the environment is simple and well 

understood, and when the scientific tasks are well defined in advanee. Because the 

capabilities of humans most surpass those of robots in complex environments, the 

exploration value that humans add is in proportion to the complexity of the environment 

to be explored. And there is no planetary environment where humans can operate in the 

foreseeable future that is more complex than the martian surface. 

We also must not underestimate the inspirational value of human explorers on Mars. I 

can tell you from personal experience that NASA's long-lived Spirit and Opportunity 

Mars rovers were designed and built by people like me who grew up watching the Apollo 

lunar landings on television, and dreaming of sending spaceships to Mars one day. 

Sending humans to Mars would surely provide an even more compelling inspirational 

spark for the next generation of scientists, engineers, and explorers. 

Scnding human explorers to Mars to learn whether life ever cmerged there is a goal 

worthy of a great national space agency. In my view, it is appropriate to make this goal 

NASA's top priority. 

To make progress toward this goal, the draft Authorization Act wisely calls for NASA to 

dcvelop "a Mars Human Exploration Roadmap defining the capabilities and technologies 

necessary to extend human presence to the surface of Mars". But then, with almost no 

technical justification, the draft legislation also dictates what some of the kcy elemcnts of 

that roadmap should or should not be. Specifically, it directs NASA to "establish a 

program to develop a sustained human presence on the Moon", and forbids NASA to 

"fund the development of an asteroid retrieval mission to send a robotic spacecraft to a 

near-Earth asteroid for rendezvous, retrieval, and redirection of that asteroid to lunar orbit 

for exploration by astronauts." 

I believe that it would be unwise for Congress either to prescribe or proscribe any key 

milestones in NASA's Mars exploration roadmap at this time. To do so would put the 

cart before the horse. Personally, I agree with the draft Authorization Act's position on 

the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, and I disagree with its position on a sustained lunar 

presence. But my personal views are not the point. In the 1960s, the government set the 

high-level goal of sending humans to the Moon, and then left it to the engineers, 

scientists, and managers of NASA to find the right program architecture to achieve this 

goal. I believe that a similar approach should be taken to the achieving the goal of getting 

humans to Mars. 
108 

The key early elements of the architecture that will be used to get to Mars have been 

agreed upon and are in development. The Space Launch System will provide an initial 

heavy lift capability, the Orion crew capsule will provide short-duration crew support, 

and the early flights will be to lunar orbit. Other pieces of the puzzle - new technologies 

and new vehicles - will be needed later. But these provide a start. 

Beyond lunar orbit, milestones that could be considered include an asteroid that has been 

redirected to lunar orbit, the lunar surface, a near-Earth asteroid, Mars orbit, and the 

moons of Mars. I urgc that milestones not be dictated, either by the Administration or the 

Congrcss, without allowing NASA to develop a technically sound Mars roadmap first. 

The objective of this roadmap should be to achieve the goal of human exploration of 

Mars as quickly and efficiently as possible. Once a viable roadmap has been generatcd, 

the additional tcchnologies, vehiclcs, and milestones that are needed to make it a reality 

will becomc clcar. 

Moving on to funding levels in the draft Authorization Act, I find cause for scrious 

concern regarding even thc most near-term elcments of NASA's human exploration 

program. Nowhere is the mismatch betwcen NASA's aspirations and its budget 

manifestcd more clearly. 

I have previously testified before this committee regarding the implications of NASA's 

budget for the flight rate of SLS and Orion. The currcnt cost-constrained dcvelopmcnt 

schedule for SLS and Orion calls for: 

In 2014, an orbital test flight of an Orion capsule with no crew, to bc launched on 

a Delta 4 Heavy. 

In 2017, a lunar flyby test flight of an Orion capsule with no crcw, to be launched 

on a 70-metric ton SLS. 

In 2021, cight years from now, the first flight of a crew in an Orion capsulc, again 

launched on a 70-metric ton SLS, on a mission to orbit the Moon. 

Subscqucnt missions would occur on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, with a launch roughly 

every two years. 

I believe that thc low flight rate projected for SLS and Orion is a serious problem. No 

human-rated launch system in NASA's history has flown so infrequently. With such a 

low launch rate it will not just be difficult to maintain program momentum; it will bc 

difficult to keep flight tcams sharp and mission-ready. 

So the problcm with dictating future milestones now is not just that it puts the cart before 

thc horse. In a situation where funding for even the nearest-term elements of human 

space cxploration is inadequatc, dictating a milestone like a sustained presence on the 

surface of the Moon would also amount to giving NASA an unfundcd mandate. 
109 

Unfunded mandates are the bane of any government agency. They can be particularly 

crippling for an agency like NASA that is tasked with attempting things that have never 

been done before, with the uncertainties regarding schedule and budget that invariably 

result. If NASA is directed to do something it is not funded to do, T predict that the result 

will be wasted effort and a delay in achieving the ultimatc goal of humans on Mars. 

Space Science 

Space Science has been one of NASA's major success stories for many years. From the 

Hubble Spacc Telescope to thc Kepler exoplanet discovery mission to the Mars rover 

Curiosity, Spaee Science missions are addressing some of the most significant scientific 

questions of our day, and are captivating the American public in the process. 

Priorities across the full sweep of Space Science have bcen recommended by the National 

Research Council's Decadal Surveys. These surveys are generated with broad input from 

the U.S. and intcrnational science communities, and reflect strong consensus views 

regarding science objectives and mission goals. T am pleased, therefore, that the draft 

Authorization Act places particular emphasis on assuring that NASA's Space Science 

program follows decadal priorities. 

Unfortunately, tight budgets and mission cost overruns have put NASA's Space Science 

program under pressure. The Administration and the Congress clearly have different 

priorities for Space Science, and those diffcrenccs are brought into sharp focus by this 

draft Authorization Act. 

Recent Administration budget requests have funded most Space Science disciplines 

adequately, but have included cuts to planetary exploration that were so decp as to seem 

punitive. The draft Authorization Act, in contrast, restores funding for planetary 

exploration but introduces alarmingly deep cuts to Earth science. 

In difficult budget times, some belt-tightening in Space Science is inevitable. But T feel it 

is important that cuts be driven by science priorities as outlined in the Decadal Surveys, 

and that they be distributed sensibly across disciplines. I urge this committee to strive for 

balance in the Space Scicnce portfolio, rather than singling out Earth science, or any 

other discipline, for disproportionate cuts. 

Aeronautics 

In previous Congressional testimony, I have said that NASA's aeronautics program is 

one of the Agency's shining jewels. I stand by that characterization. Tfyou ask what 

things NASA does that most directly benefit taxpayers in their daily lives, it's hard to 

find anything better than the aeronautics program. 
110 

I am pleased, therefore, that the draft Authorization Act continues funding for 

Aeronautics at approximately its current level. Most of the draft language calls for plans 

and reports to be provided Congress regarding Aeronautics activities; these will serve to 

keep the Congress well informed in these areas. I scc no significant problems regarding 

the Aeronautics sections of the draft Authorization Act. 

Space Technology 

Technology development enables NASA's future missions, and decades of experience 

have shown that adequate upfront investment in technology is a key part of controlling 

mission costs. Effective management of NASA's Space Technology program is therefore 

essential. 

The draft Authorization Act would reorganize the Space Technology program by moving 

mnch of the responsibility for exploration-related technology development to the Human 

Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. Some aspects of this proposed 

reorganization concern me. There is indeed value in having some funding for 

development of specific technologies reside within NASA's mission directorates, so that 

the development can be aligned with that directorate's mission goals. The problem is that 

when budgets are tight it is tempting for mission directorates to use technology funds to 

solve today's problems rather than enabling tomorrow's missions. So I tend to favor a 

more distributed approach in which only technology funding for specific near- and 

medium-term needs of a mission directorate reside within that directorate. I feel that 

longer-term and more broadly applicable exploration technology funding is better 

maintained in a separate technology organization, helping protect it from being used to 

solve immcdiate mission problems. 

I will also note that in order to find and fund the best ideas, it is important for a 

significant fraction of NASA's Space Technology program to be openly competed. 

Education and Outreach 

The President's FY 2014 budget request proposed a major restructuring of science, 

technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education and public outreach at a number of 

federal agencies. For NASA, this restructuring would eliminate most of the Agency's 

STEM education efforts, consolidating them under other government organizations that 

have little or no experience with space flight. 

I believe that the restructuring proposed by the Administration is deeply misguided. 

NASA's space missions arc unique within the federal government, both in their technical 

audacity and in their capacity to educate and inspire. The education and outreach 

components of NASA's missions have been enormously successful, in large part because 

they are managed and run by people who have a deep knowledge of the subject matter 

and a passion for sharing it. 
111 

I believe that dismantling NASA's education and outrcach efforts would deal a serious 

blow to our nation's scientific and technicallitcracy. So I am vcry plcased that the draft 

Authorization Act states that NASA "may not implement any proposed STEM education 

and outreach-related changes proposed in thc budget for fiscal year 2014". 

Agency Leadership and Management 

The draft Authorization Act includes provisions rcgarding leadership and oversight of 

NASA. Among these is languagc calling for establishment of a NASA Advisory Council. 

I note that both the membership and the responsibilities of this group would be 

dramatically different from thosc of the body that is now called the NASA Advisory 

Council, which I currcntly chair and which reports only to the NASA Administrator. 

I support the formation of a body that is jointly appointcd by the Administration and thc 

Congress, and that rcports to both regarding NASA. In the absence of such a body, there 

has bccn an unfortunate tendency for NASA's implementation of national space policy to 

ovcrsecn in what I view to be excessive detail, particularly by OMB. I have argucd above 

that the government should set high-level policy (likc the goal of sending humans to 

Mars), but that many of the implementation details are better dcvised and recommcnded 

by experienced NASA engineers, scicntists, and managers. A high-level advisory body 

with dcep technical and management experience could help provide the Administration 

and the Congress with assurances that the right recommendations arc being made by the 

Agcncy, and could suggest corrective actions when necessary. 

The devil will be in the dctails in the establishment of such a group. I note that the draft 

language calls for eight members to be appointed by Congress but only three by the 

Administration, an imbalance that could be problcmatic. I also note that careful 

coordination will be requircd to assure that the appropriate range of expertise is 

represented on the group. But I support the concept strongly. 

Overcommitment of NASA: A Possible Long-Range Solution 

I bclievc that the mismatch between NASA's aspirations and its budget is the most 

serious problem facing the Agency. Unless a solution is found, some very hard choices 

may have to be made soon. Specifically, a choice is looming regarding whether the focus 

of human space flight should be ISS utilization or moving beyond low Earth orbit. At 

projected budget levels, I fear that NASA will not be able to do both ofthese safely and 

well. 

As I noted the last time I appcared before this committee, part of the solution may be 

international partnerships. If no major funding increase for NASA is forthcoming, then I 

believe that the Agency should aggressively seek out international partners for human 

exploration beyond low Earth orbit. As one cxample, an international partner might 
112 

provide a habitation module that would allow long-duration missions into deep space. If 

capable partners who are willing to shoulder a substantial fraction of the cost of deep 

space exploration can be found, then it may be possible for NASA to maintain somcthing 

like its current portfolio of activities. Otherwisc, I fear that a painful reduction in program 

contcnt lies ahead. 

Despite the challenges that it faces, NASA is one of our nation's greatest assets, and is a 

source of pride for all Americans. An Authorization Act that enunciates a clcar and 

compelling long-term goal for the agency, that matches program content to budget, and 

that lets NASA formulatc the implemcntation details of national civil space policy will 

allow it to remain so. 
113 

Steven W. Squyres is Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy at Cornell Univcrsity, and 

is the Principal Investigator for the science payload on the Mars Exploration Rover 

Project. He reccived his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1981 and spent five years as a postdoctoral 

associate and research scientist at NASA's Ames Research Center before returning to 

Cornell as a faculty member. His main areas of scicntific interest have bcen Mars and the 

moons of the outer planets. Research for which he is best known includcs study of the 

history and distribution of water on Mars and of the possible existence and habitability of 

a liquid water ocean on Europa. 

Dr. Squyres has participated in many of NASA's planetary exploration missions, 

including the Voyager mission to Jupiter and Saturn, the Magellan mission to Venus, and 

the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous mission. Along with his current work on MER, he 

is also a co-invcstigator on the Mars Express, Mars Rcconnaissance Orbiter and Mars 

Scicnce Laboratory missions, a member of the Gamma-Ray Spectrometer Tcam for the 

Mars Odyssey mission, and a member of the imaging team for the Cassini mission to 

Saturn. 

Dr. Squyrcs chaired the most recent planetary decadal survey for the National Rescarch 

Council. He has also served as Chair of the NASA Space Science Advisory Committee, 

and is currently Chair of the NASA Advisory Council. His awards includc the American 

Astronomical Society's Harold C. Urey Prize, thc Space Scicnce Award of the Amcrican 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the American Astronautical Society's Carl 

Sagan Award, the National Space Society's Wernher von Braun Award, and the 

Benjamin Franklin Mcdal of the Franklin Institute. He is a fellow ofthe American 

Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
114 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Squyres. 

I now recognize our next witness, Mr. Young. 

TESTIMONY OF A. THOMAS YOUNG, 

FORMER EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION 

Mr. YOUNG. Chairman Palazzo, Ms. Edwards and Committee 

Members, I am pleased to have the opportunity to present my 

views on issues I believe to be important as you prepare the NASA 

Authorization Act of 2013. 

The United States civil space program has been the source of 

enormous pride, prestige, knowledge and awe-inspiring technology. 

This has been the product of the exceptional men and women in 

NASA, other government agencies, industry and the scientific community working with highly competent leadership. This integrated 

effort is the foundation of the U.S. civil space program. As we move 

forward there are storm clouds over this great human endeavor 

that require attention. 

Nothing is more important than maintaining NASA as the premier civil space organization including maintaining the special capabilities of other government agencies, industry and the scientific 

community. This can only be achieved by having challenging, inspiring and worthy things to do. Studies, technology pursuits and 

overseeing others are important but will not maintain the civil 

space program as world class. We must endeavor to populate the 

Authorization Act with worthwhile opportunities that maintain 

these critical capabilities. 

To maximize the return from the investment in the civil space 

program requires that program content be in balance with the 

budget. This is a much discussed but seldom achieved goal. We 

continually operate with a budget that is inadequate to implement 

the established program. Our inability to delete worthy but lowerpriority endeavors results in this imbalance. Too much program for 

the available budget results in inefficiencies, excessive risk and 

program cancellations. The result is that less is accomplished for 

more. Pay-as-you-go is a much-discussed concept that I believe has 

merit. Go-as-you-pay is a useful concept when deciding the point at 

which the budget will support starting a project. Go-as-you-pay is 

a most wasteful concept for the implementation of a project. 

The dominant strategic issue facing the civil space program 

today is human spaceflight. Today, there is a human spaceflight 

program but no credible human space exploration strategy. There 

is much discussion about going to the Moon, an asteroid, Phobos, 

Deimos and Mars, however, there is no credible plan or budget. 

There are human exploration elements such as SLS and Orion. 

The NASA budget contains about $8 billion for human 

spaceflight, not including infrastructure costs. This funds the International Space Station, SLS, Orion, some technology, Commercial 

Cargo and Commercial Crew. If the budget remains approximately 

the same, my judgment is that there are two basic choices: a space 

station-focused human spaceflight program or an exploration-focused program. I do not believe the budget is adequate to accomplish both, and a choice needs to be made to have a credible path 

forward. I believe as a part of making this choice, an independent 
115 

assessment of the value of the ISS return for the significant portion 

of the NASA budget that is dedicated to ISS is necessary. A senior 

review is a concept that is appropriate for conducting this assessment. If this human spaceflight strategy issue is not resolved, the 

graveyard of cancelled, abandoned and unachievable endeavors will 

continue to be populated. The responsibility for leading the resolution of this strategic issue should reside with NASA. 

Another strategic issue that is important resides in the science 

area of the NASA program. There are a small number of profound 

questions for which the United States is in a leadership position 

and is on the cusp of greatly increasing our knowledge. These include: Are we alone? What is dark energy and dark matter? What 

is the future of our climate? Is the United States going to be a leader in these profound areas or are we going to voluntarily move to 

the sidelines? Decadal Surveys have identified the top-priority programs in pursuing these special opportunities. Sample return from 

Mars, a wide-field IR telescope and missions identified in the Earth 

Science Decadal deserve priority consideration in the new Authorization Act. 

Technology is important ‘‘seed corn’’ for the civil space program. 

A debate in any organization involving high-technology pursuits is: 

Should the technology be managed in a mission organization to 

maximize the relevance of the technology, or should the technology 

be managed in an independent organization to maximize the probability that the technology program will be implemented? 

The risk of the former is that the demands of implementing challenging projects will consume all the resources, thus sacrificing 

technology endeavors. The risk of the independent organization is 

the technology will be less relevant to NASA’s missions and become 

an end in itself with scope beyond what is affordable. I believe the 

independent organization concept with a strong oversight process 

to assure maintaining relevance and responsibly containing scope 

of the endeavor is the best balance of merit and risk. 

The final topic I want to discuss in my prepared comments is 

leadership. I place my toe in these troubled waters with great reservation. However, I believe leadership of the civil space program 

is a topic that must be openly discussed. I strongly believe the leadership of the U.S. civil space program must be vested in NASA. 

This includes both formulation and implementation. Politics and 

ideology are a part of the fabric of a democracy, however, they 

should be relegated to lower-level issues in the civil space program. 

I recognize that there are times when national issues are important factors, as was the case for Apollo, however, NASA has been 

and will be sensitive to such issues. 

NASA is about engineering, science, exploration and discovery. 

NASA really is rocket science in its broadest definition. Leadership 

of the civil space program must have the capabilities and experience consistent with this demanding charter. Today, leadership of 

the civil space program is diffuse and authority is invested in organizations, while important, that do not have the expertise to be in 

a controlling role. This is a prescription for mediocrity whether it 

be an organization of great national importance, an industrial corporation or a local community organization. I have great worry 

about what I believe to be a declining trajectory for NASA and the 
116 

civil space program. I believe the most significant factor in this 

negative outlook is the adverse leadership concept I observe. 

As an example of what results from diffuse leadership with too 

much authority in the wrong places is the proposed Asteroid Retrieval Mission. This is a mission that is not worthy of a worldclass space program that is focused upon maximizing the return 

that can be realized from a constrained budget. NASA must be returned to the leadership role of the civil space program. If this occurs, many of the issues confronting the program will be very positively addressed. If not, the outlook is discouraging. 

The Authorization Act of 2013 will be important in achieving a 

positive trajectory correction for NASA and the civil space program. 

It is hard to overstate the need for a program that is focused upon 

the highest-priority opportunities, a program that is consistent 

with available funding, and a program with leadership vested in 

NASA. 

Great nations do great things. The United States is a great Nation, and I continue to believe the civil space program is a great 

thing. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:] 
117 

TESTIMONY 

TOTHE 

COMMITIEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

JUNE 19, 2013 

A. THOMAS YOUNG 
118 

Chairman Palazzo, Ms. Edwards and Committee members, I am 

pleased to have the opportunity to present my views on issues I 

believe to be important as you prepare the NASA Authorization 

Act of 2013. 

The United States civil space program has been the source of 

enormous pride, prestige, knowledge and awe inspiring 

technology. This has been the product of the exceptional men 

and women in NASA, other government agencies, industry and 

the scientific community working with highly competent 

leadership. This integrated effort is the foundation of the U. S. 

civil space program. As we move forward there are "storm 

clouds" over this great human endeavor that require attention. 

Nothing is more important than maintaining NASA as the 

premier civil space organization including maintaining the 

special capabilities of other government agencies, industry and 

the scientific community. This can only be achieved by having 

challenging, inspiring and worthy things to do. Studies, 

technology pursuits and overseeing others are important but 

will not maintain the civil space program as world class. We 
119 

must endeavor to populate the Authorization Act with 

worthwhile opportunities that maintain these critical 

capabilities. 

To maximize the return from the investment in the civil space 

program requires that program content be in balance with the 

budget. This is a much discussed but seldom achieved goal. 

We continually operate with a budget that is inadequate to 

implement the established program. Our inability to delete 

worthy but lower priority endeavors results in this imbalance. 

Too much program for the available budget results in 

inefficiencies, excessive risk and program cancellations. The 

result is that "less is accomplished for more." "Go as you pay" 

is a much discussed concept that I believe has merit. "Go as 

you pay" is a useful concept when deciding the point at which 

the budget will support starting a project. "Go as you pay" is a 

most wasteful concept for the implementation of a project. 

The dominant strategic issue facing the civil space program is 

human spaceflight. Today, there is a human spaceflight 

program but no credible human space exploration strategy. 

There is much discussion about going to the moon, an asteroid, 

Phobos, Deimos and Mars; however, there is no credible plan 

or budget. There are human exploration elements such as SLS 

and Orion. 
120 

The NASA budget contains about SB$ for human spaceflight, 

not including infrastructure costs. This funds the International 

Space Station (ISS), SLS, Orion, some technology, commercial 

cargo and commercial crew. If the budget remains 

approximately the same, my judgment is that there are two 

basic choices, a space station focused human spaceflight 

program or an exploration focused program. I do not believe 

the budget is adequate to accomplish both and a choice needs 

to be made to have a credible path forward. I believe as a part 

of making this choice, an independent assessment of the value 

of the ISS return for the significant portion of the NASA budget 

that is dedicated to ISS is necessary. A Senior Review is an 

appropriate mechanism for conducting this assessment. If this 

human spaceflight strategic issue is not resolved, the grave yard 

of cancelled, abandoned and unachievable endeavors will 

continue to be populated. The responsibility for leading the 

resolution of this strategic issue should reside with NASA. 

Another significant strategic issue resides in the science area of 

the NASA program. There are a small number of profound 

questions for which the U. S. is in a leadership position and is 

on the cusp of greatly increasing our knowledge. These 

include: 

Are we alone? 

What is dark energy and dark matter? 
121 

What is the future of our climate? 

Is the U. S. going to be a leader in these profound areas or are 

we going to voluntarily move to the sidelines? Decadal Surveys 

have identified the top priority programs in pursuing these 

special opportunities. Sample return from Mars, a wide-field IR 

telescope (WFIRST) and missions identified in the Earth Science 

Decadal deserve priority consideration in the new 

Authorization Act. 

Technology is important "seed corn" for the civil space 

program. A debate in any organization involving high 

technology pursuits is 

Should the technology be managed in a Mission organization 

to maximize the relevance of the technology? 

or 

Should the technology be managed in an independent 

organization to maximize the probability that the technology 

program will be implemented? 

The risk of the former is that the demands of implementing 

challenging projects will consume all the resources thus 

sacrificing technology endeavors. The risk of the independent 

organization is the technology will be less relevant to NASA's 

missions and become an end-in-itself with scope beyond what 

is affordable. I believe the independent organization concept 
122 

with a strong oversight process to assure maintaining relevance 

and responsibly containing scope of the endeavor is the best 

balance of merit and risk. 

The final topic I want to discuss in my prepared comments is 

leadership. I "place my toe" in these troubled waters with 

great reservation. However I believe leadership of the civil 

space program is a topic that must be openly discussed. I 

strongly believe the leadership of the U. S. civil space program 

must be vested in NASA. This includes both formulation and 

implementation. Politics and ideology are a part of the fabric of 

a democracy; however, they should be relegated to lower level 

issues in the civil space program. I recognize that there are 

times when national issues are important factors as was the 

case for Apollo; however, NASA has been and will be sensitive 

to such issues. 

NASA is about engineering, science, exploration and discovery. 

NASA really is about "rocket science" in its broadest definition. 

Leadership of the civil space program must have the capabilities 

and experience consistent with this demanding charter. Today, 

leadership of the civil space program is diffuse and authority is 

vested in organizations, while important, that do not have the 

expertise to be in a controlling role. This is a prescription for 

mediocrity whether it be an organization of great national 

importance, an industrial corporation or a local community 
123 

organization. I have great worry about what I believe to be a 

declining trajectory for NASA and the civil space program. I 

believe the most significant factor in this negative outlook is the 

adverse leadership concept I observe. 

An example of what results from diffuse leadership with too 

much authority in the wrong places is the proposed asteroid 

retrevial mission. This is a mission that is not worthy of a world 

class space program that is focused upon maximizing the return 

that can be realized from a constrained budget. NASA must be 

returned as the leader of the civil space program. If this 

correction occurs many of the issues confronting the program 

will be very positively addressed. If not, the outlook is 

discouraging. 

The Authorization Act of 2013 will be important in achieving a 

positive trajectory correction for NASA and the civil space 

program. It is hard to overstate the need for a program that is 

focused upon the highest priority opportunities, a program that 

is consistent with available funding and a program with 

leadership vested in NASA. 

Great nations do great things. The United States is a great 

nation and I continue to believe the civil space program is a 

great thing. 

Thank you. 
124 

A. Thomas Young 

A. Thomas Young joined NASA in 1961. He was Mission Director for the 

Viking Project, Director ofthe Planetary Program, Deputy Director of 

the Ames Research Center and Director of the Goddard Space Flight 

Center. 

Mr. Young joined the Martin Marietta Corporation in 1982. He is the 

former President and COO of Martin Marietta. He retired from 

Lockheed Martin in 1995. 

Following retirement, he has been on Corporate Boards and lead 

numerous Committees and Review Teams associated with national 

security and civil space. 

Mr. Young is the former Chairman of SAle. 

Mr. Young is a member ofthe National Academy of Engineering. 
125 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Young. I thank the witnesses for being available for questioning today, reminding members that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes. The 

Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

One of the first questions I asked Administrator Bolden at our 

NASA budget hearing earlier this spring was whether the President’s budget request would cause a slip in the schedule for the 

Space Launch System. Administrator Bolden replied that it would 

not. After looking at the budget request, however, it became apparent that if this was indeed true, the funding levels were barely 

enough. That is why the discussion draft before us calls for an increase of $70 million above the Administration’s request. 

Mr. Young, what funding levels are necessary to maintain the 

current SLS schedule? 

Mr. YOUNG. I really can’t answer that question, but I do have 

some comments on the question. One of the things that is in the 

authorization bill and I pointed out is that go-as-you-pay is a useful 

concept when you are deciding when to start a project, but when 

you are implementing a project, it is a most wasteful concept, and 

I think if SLS falls into the mode of a go-as-you-pay program, then 

it is going to be highly inefficiently implemented, and what really 

happens in a go-as-you-pay concept when you are implementing a 

program is, good people accomplish all the work in a given Fiscal 

Year that they can for the money that is available. What they can’t 

accomplish, they move to the right, and this accumulates into 

schedule delays but it is even more significant that you don’t accomplish the program in the most efficient manner and you probably end up with a lot of programs doing one program for the price 

of two. So I applaud your focus on this issue of assuring that the 

SLS funding is appropriate to implement a program in the most efficient manner. I am just not in a position to make judgment of exactly what those dollars are. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Dr. Squyres, do you have anything to add? 

Dr. SQUYRES. Yeah, I think the thing I would add to this, and 

I have mentioned this to this Committee in the past, is that the 

real issue to me is not when the first flight of SLS takes place, it 

is the flight rate thereafter. And if you look at the projected budget 

and what it implies in terms of the projected flight rate for SLS, 

you wind up with a flight rate that is almost an order of magnitude 

lower than what was done for, say, the Saturn V system back in 

the 1960s and early 1970s. We have no experience with a humanrated flight system that only flies every two or three or four years, 

and I believe that is cause for serious concern. It is not just simply 

a matter of maintaining program momentum. It is not even purely 

a matter of efficiency. It is also largely a matter of just keeping the 

flight team sharp and safe and mission-ready. So I am deeply concerned about the flight rate of that system. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Can NASA afford to develop the 130-metricton variant right now or will it have to focus on the 70-ton version? 

Does anybody want to—no comments on that? We will work that 

one out later. It keeps popping in my mind. Now, this is something 

I think you all can elaborate on. Now, the discussion draft includes 

the requirement that NASA build a Mars human exploration road-
126 

map. Are there any additional requirements for the roadmap that 

you think should be added? Dr. Squyres? 

Dr. SQUYRES. Actually, I think the roadmap requirements in the 

bill are overconstrained. What I mean by that, I think the idea of 

establishing a roadmap for human exploration to Mars is great. It 

is one of my favorite provisions in this bill. But I think it would 

be best to allow NASA to do that, to work out that roadmap and 

its technical details and find the best way to achieve that and then 

come back with a set of recommendations of what the intermediate 

milestones should be. As written, the bill prescribes certain milestones, for example, sustained presence on the surface of the Moon, 

which as the Ranking Minority Member of the full Committee 

noted is an unfunded mandate. It also says that we should not do 

certain things along the way. I think, and I agree with Tom on 

this, that allowing NASA to take the first steps towards establishing what the roadmap should be using the technical expertise 

that resides within the agency would be an appropriate way to go 

forward. 

Mr. YOUNG. I too applaud the roadmap. I mean, I think we are 

badly in need of a human exploration strategy. I think that the 

concept of doing the roadmap, NASA leading it, is good, giving 

NASA as much flexibility as can be and putting together is also 

good. You will always have an opportunity to critique the products 

as they come out. The only thing I would add to what Steve has 

said is that it is also got to be a roadmap that gives appropriate 

recognition to budget, and what is realistic and what is not realistic, and I don’t mean to overconstrain you by that because if I had 

the job, I would look at options and various levels to understand 

what we can do, you know, at various levels. But a strategy without the resources to execute the strategy or a roadmap without the 

resources to execute it is simply a hope as opposed to something 

that is realistic. So we have got to put it in the context of what 

is realistic to be implemented. But personally, it is the objective— 

I was sitting thinking as Steve was doing his testimony, I don’t 

know how long I have been associated with Mars but I almost have 

three children: Carter, Blair and Mars. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you for your comments. I now recognize Ms. Edwards for five minutes. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Dr. Squyres and Mr. Young. It is always good to have you here, and I just really appreciate the value 

that you provide for the Committee. As I read your testimony and 

listened to you today, what I heard is that I think we actually can 

agree on some of the broad concepts of the bill including identifying 

a roadmap to Mars as we just discussed, maintaining a balanced 

and steady agenda for NASA’s programs as a multi-mission agency, 

and taking a look at how we can assure the effectiveness of the 

agency’s leadership in maintaining a long-term vision. But there 

are some aspects of the draft bill that I think are really problematic, and I wonder if you could discuss with some level of detail— 

and Dr. Squyres, you did, but Mr. Young, I wonder if we could have 

a comment from you about this idea of a sustained presence on the 

Moon and Mars. Because there is where I do think that there is, 

you know, some significant division in the details, and I wonder if 

you might comment as well about some of the things that we could 
127 

ask for in a roadmap and a timetable that would allow us a Committee to look at what NASA is doing and ask those questions in 

detail without prescribing the scientific detail for the agency. 

Mr. YOUNG. The comment I would make on the Moon question 

that you have is the following. I do not believe that landing on the 

Moon or operations on the Moon is a prerequisite to going to Mars. 

So if Mars—you know, given Mars as the focus, then it is not necessary? And it is probably a significant resource consumer that will 

take away from the time and the effort to go to Mars. 

I also don’t want to imply that the Moon is a useless location, 

and so that is not, from my standpoint, meant to be implied at all. 

I mean, I think there is enormous, you know, research, understanding and benefit that can be derived from a mission to the 

lunar surface. I just think that if our focus is on Mars, it is not 

a necessary prerequisite and it is an enormous consumer of resources including time, and it really takes away from the basic 

thrust of a Mars roadmap. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Dr. Squyres? 

Dr. SQUYRES. Well, I certainly agree with Tom that the reason 

to go to the surface of the Moon is not to help us get to Mars; it 

is to go to the Moon. With respect to what you could ask for in a 

roadmap, certainly asking what are the appropriate technologies is 

the right thing to do, certainly asking what vehicles, what specific 

pieces of hardware are appropriate to get the job done, and then 

I think there are a range of different milestones that could be 

looked at. Clearly, lunar orbit is a sensible first milestone. Whether 

there is a rock there that has been directed from, you know, an asteroid that has been brought in or not, it is the right place to go. 

The other milestones you could look at include the lunar surface. 

They include a near-Earth object of significant size. They include 

the moons of Mars, Phobos and Deimos. They include operations in 

Mars orbit, which is clearly going to be necessary. 

So I think you could lay out the range of possible milestones and 

ask the agency, okay, with these possibilities, what are the right 

ones that will get us most efficiently to the long-term goal, and 

then what are the specific technologies, what are the specific pieces 

of hardware that are necessary, and one other thing that I would 

add is that I think it would be valuable to ask the agency and more 

broadly ask the question, once we have identified the vehicles, once 

we have identified the technologies, are there ones in there that 

could be sensibly provided by an international partner to help 

spread the costs. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, because I think that would 

help us actually develop an authorization that would be useful to 

the agency without us, as lawmakers without the requisite experience, pointing out the details of what it is that the agency should 

do. So I appreciate that. 

I want to ask you very quickly, both of you, the draft bill proposes to make drastic cuts in NASA’s Earth Science program at a 

time when natural disasters here at home in the United States and 

abroad are wreaking havoc on individuals, businesses, municipalities, the entire economic system, and so I wonder if you could share 

with me what you think the proposed cuts in the legislation mean 
128 

to our ability to understand, predict, monitor and respond to natural disasters and to climate change. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I am deeply concerned about the magnitude of the 

proposed cuts to Earth Science, just as I was deeply concerned 

about the magnitude of the proposed cuts to Planetary Science in 

the Administration budget. There needs to be a balance found. 

There needs to be a compromise found in which the cuts if they 

have to be directed to Space Science are spread more sensibly 

across the different disciplines. 

With respect to Earth Science, the National Research Council’s 

Decadal Survey for Earth Science has very nicely spelled out a sequence of missions, a series of activities that could be conducted by 

NASA studying the Earth from space and those have broad benefits both in the specific areas that benefit humans that you outlined but also just across the broad sweep of understanding the 

Earth as a complex system. The climate system, the geology of the 

Earth, the oceans, the sea ice, all of this are interconnected in a 

very complex way, and these missions are necessary to understand 

that system, and there are unexpected discoveries awaiting. There 

are unexpected consequences of flying these missions, and—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think I am actually out of time, so we will let somebody else continue. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I could go on on that one for a long time. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I know that you could. I apologize. I have to slip 

out for a bit but I will be back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. And we could listen for a long time. I would 

like to say this bill does not require NASA to establish a Moon base 

or lunar outpost. In fact, the 2005 and 2008 NASA Reauthorization 

Acts required NASA to establish a sustained human presence on 

the Moon and authorized NASA to establish a lunar base. This bill 

authorizes NASA to continue those pursuits already in existing law 

and to plan for eventual missions to Mars. So if there was any confusion, I want to clear that up. 

I now recognize Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

By way of background, I represent Alabama’s 5th congressional 

district, the home of the Marshall Space Flight Center, and quite 

frankly, the birthplace of America’s human spaceflight program. 

The Marshall Space Flight community plays a pivotal role in the 

development of America’s Space Launch System, the next-generation rocket system that empowers America to return to 

exceptionalism in space and stop the current rather humiliating 

situation wherein America is reduced to having our astronauts 

thumb rides with the Russians. 

The people in my district who either have a keen interest in SLS 

or who are responsible for building the next-generation SLS rocket 

system have had scant time to review the draft NASA Authorization Act of 2013. The early response, however, to these reviews 

have been, to put it mildly, most disconcerting, so disconcerting, in 

fact, that unless I receive differing expertise that satisfies me that 

our words and support of human spaceflight match our actions and 

deeds, I will have no choice but to vote against and otherwise oppose this Authorization Act. 
129 

In that vein, I seek today’s witnesses’ expertise and insight in 

hopes that it will help satisfy these concerns. Page 5 of the draft 

discussion bill states, ‘‘$1.454 billion shall be for the Space Launch 

System.’’ Have either of you had communications with any privatesector contractor who is responsible for building the next-generation SLS rocket to determine whether they can meet their 2017 

launch deadline if they are authorized only $1.4 billion in FY 2014? 

And if so, who have you spoken with, what have they said? Mr. 

Young, have you? 

Mr. YOUNG. I have not. 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Squyres, have you? 

Dr. SQUYRES. No, I have not. 

Mr. BROOKS. In that vein, let me share with you some of the concerns that I have had shared with me from folks in my district. The 

first one is a gentleman that I am sure you are very familiar with. 

I have a letter from former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin 

dated today, June 19, 2013, at 6:11 a.m. He is doing this while he 

is at the Paris air show in Europe. Dr. Griffin states in part, and 

I quote, ‘‘I wish to express my concern over the proposal to authorize 2014 funding for the Space Launch System at a level of $1.45 

billion. It is not adequate to develop the launch system that was 

approved by the Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. 

Development of the SLS that was mandated by the Congress requires a 2014 authorization and appropriation of $1.8 billion.’’ I repeat that: $1.8 billion. ‘‘Specific requirements which cannot be met 

at this level,’’ cannot be met at this level of $1.45 billion, ‘‘include, 

one, concurrent development of the upper stage required to meet 

the 130-metric-ton floor for human exploration capability that was 

mandated by the 2010 Authorization Act; two, schedule protection 

for completion of core vehicle development by 2017, again, a requirement of the 2010 Act; three, completion of the interim cryogenic propulsion stage by 2017 necessary to reach the initially 

planned SLS capability of 70-metric-tons; four, continuation of advanced booster development.’’ 

I also have a much more candid, and I have excised parts of it 

for family consumption, communication from a former well-respected NASA employee. This person states, ‘‘I have reviewed the 

draft authorization bill. I really seized up over the amount for SLS. 

It is too low. I have been talking for months now with the principals on the program on just this point, and the money they need 

to have a healthy program is $1.8 billion to the project manager 

for the rocket, not money to JSC, Johnson Space Center, for Orion, 

not money to Kennedy Space Center for ground facilities. These 

latter things are good to do, no question, but without the launch 

vehicle itself, they are irrelevant. As important as building the 

rocket is building the right rocket, the 130-metric-ton version, not 

the half-capable 70-metric-ton first step that Lori Garver and the 

Obamas want to settle for. That version is quintessential white elephant. It is twice as big as what you need to get to low orbit to 

service the International Space Station, and thus very inefficient 

for that application, and half what you need for human space exploration and thus inefficient for that application as well.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, I urge this Subcommittee conduct as many hearings as are necessary to determine whether $1.4 billion is adequate 
130 

to construct the Space Launch System rocket and restore America’s 

exploration in space as scheduled or is merely a painkiller given to 

a terminal patient to ease the cause of death. That having been 

said, with respect to these two communications, do you all have 

any reaction? 

Mr. YOUNG. I do. Mike Griffin, that was probably in his afternoon work even though you had it at 6 a.m. Yeah, my comment is 

the following. We actually know how to estimate the cost of these 

programs, not with great precision but within, you know, the realm 

of what is necessary for budgeting, and so this is really an example 

of some of the things I was talking about and have testified before 

previously. We have the ability based on experience to do a reasonably credible cost estimate for projects like SLS. We can do it in 

a statistical manner, and we know that for a standalone project, 

the most probable result is the 80/20 statistical number, a lot of 

history on that. I mean, I have looked at NRO data, I looked at 

NASA data, Air Force data, as others have, and that is the point 

at which you determine the most probable cost of a program. The 

next more important item is that the 80/20 not just be a total but 

it be 80/20 every year, because if I put all of my reserve and contingency into the program, I may feel good about the total but I have 

done nothing, which is probably what these letters are implying. 

So my recommendation or comment to you would be, get a credible organization who knows how to do independent cost estimating 

and get them to do an independent cost estimate for the SLS given 

the launch date that you want to specify and they can assess the 

realism of that and they do it at an 80/20 level and then you can 

really assess where the budget is relative to the reality as to what 

the program would cost. But I want to emphasize, we know how 

to do this. This is something that we really have developed a real 

capability for in the recent times. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Young. Dr. Squyres, out of 

consideration for the other members that are here, I would like to 

ask the members again to try to keep their questions and comments to five minutes. 

I now recognize Mr. Kennedy for five minutes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you once again 

to our witnesses for testifying yet again before the Committee. A 

couple of questions to broaden the base a little bit here. 

For both of you, just to start, you mentioned in the Administration’s—you each mentioned this, the Administration’s STEM education reorganization proposal as an issue moving forward. In my 

district back home in Massachusetts, we have a number of programs that have been highly successful in reaching students of all 

ages and getting them interested in STEM fields. I share some of 

your concerns about potentially reorganizing these programs and 

losing the expertise of issue area specialists. I visited at some vocational schools that have amazing partnerships with NASA in getting kids really excited about fields of engineering and exploration, 

and I think we can all agree that increasing the effectiveness and 

efficiency for Federal STEM efforts is something worth pursuing. 

Do you have any recommendations or any suggestions on how 

NASA can improve its education and outreach priorities going forward? 
131 

Dr. SQUYRES. I believe that the Administration’s proposed reorganization of STEM education at NASA is deeply misguided. NASA 

is a unique organization within the government. It flies missions 

into space, and the technical audacity of those missions and their 

capability to inspire are virtually unmatched in terms of what this 

government does and its ability to get young people turned on by 

science, by technology. And to take that responsibility, the responsibility for sharing that capability with the public away from NASA 

and give it to, I don’t care, any organization that doesn’t do 

spaceflight I think is a bad idea. The thing that makes NASA’s 

education outreach programs as effective as they are is that they 

are conducted by people who have not only a deep knowledge about 

what they are doing but a passion for sharing it. And you listen 

to some of NASA’s scientists and engineers talk with young people 

about how excited they are about what we get to do for a living. 

You know, this is compelling stuff, and to take that away from the 

agency and hand it off to an organization that has no experience 

flying stuff in space I think is just a bad mistake. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Fair enough. Anything you want to add sir? No? 

Great. 

Then moving on, I would like to hear a little bit more about your 

thoughts on the Space Technology provisions of the bill. As I understand it, authorization levels included in the draft are obviously 

much lower, and the program would need to be adjusted to support 

exploration-related technology development by moving much of the 

funding to support the Human Exploration and Operations of Mission Directorate. How do you think this would impact the future 

development of space technology? 

Mr. YOUNG. The thing I commented on is not so much the level 

of the program, because that is important, but it is very difficult 

for someone in our position to have gone through all the activities. 

But having been involved both in NASA and in the private sector 

for a long time, both operational missions and technology, the thing 

that has always struck me is that there is a constant debate, and 

that is, there is a motivation to try to align the technology with the 

management of the missions or the projects because that really 

makes it most relevant. I mean, no question, they are the users. 

The problem is when the crunch comes, and it always comes, the 

resources that are there for the technology gets used to solve problems on the missions that you are trying to execute, and I don’t 

offer that as being wrong. I mean, that is the priorities that people 

have to take. 

The other side of it is, if you put technology in a technology organization, there are some dangers there too because then the technology kind of creeps away from being as relevant as you want it 

to be. It falls more in the paradigm of building the technology 

budget as opposed to the overall balance of the activities, and it 

can kind of become an end in itself, as I commented. 

So you have really got those two situations. There is not an optimum solution. Having watched it, lived it, seen the merits and the 

problems with it over time, I favor putting it in an independent organization, however, with a strong oversight capability—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, if I could—— 
132 

Mr. YOUNG. —to assure relevance and to assure that it doesn’t 

get out of control. The NRC or the Academies is a great oversight 

kind of an organization. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I have got three seconds, but briefly, you both 

commented on the Asteroid Retrieval Mission. I seem to sense 

some skepticism from both of you on that mission. Are there other 

technological advances, are there gains that can be made if our 

overall goal, NASA’s goal, is getting to Mars, that benefit from the 

Asteroid Retrieval Mission? And if you can, answer it in less than 

10 seconds. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I personally don’t see a strong connection between 

the proposed Asteroid Retrieval Mission and sending humans to 

Mars, but I believe NASA should at least be given the opportunity 

to try to make that case. I haven’t heard it yet. 

Mr. YOUNG. My belief is that any technology that comes out of 

it, there are better ways to do it, and I am passionate as you go 

forward with the Authorization Act to utilize whatever resources 

are available on the highest-priority endeavors, and my judgment 

is, this is not a highest-priority endeavor. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you both, and thank you, Mr. Chair, for 

the flexibility. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. I now recognize 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We 

just heard from my colleague from Alabama that the SLS project 

needs to be funded, and Mr. Young, the people he was quoting are 

the people who know how to do these numbers, Mr. Griffin and the 

rest of them. They build the rockets down in his district and they 

say for this project to be sustainable and to meet the deadlines that 

we are doing, and that costs a lot more in the long run, as you 

pointed out, that we are going to need to spend $1.8 billion rather 

than what is being authorized, which is 1.4. It seems to me that 

that should be a warning sign for all of us that this project is going 

to cost a lot more money and that money has got to come from 

somewhere. The tooth fairy isn’t going to leave it under our pillow, 

and all of this talk, we were talking about these other things that 

NASA does like whether it is inspire young people or whatever it 

is that NASA wants to do, that is going to suffer and it is going 

to go into this rocket, or the SLS Titanic, as I like to describe it, 

but this huge, massive rocket that our other witness, Mr. Young, 

has already stated he has studied and it has only got one or two 

uses that we are going to have out of that rocket. 

Doesn’t this mean that—frankly, I differ from my colleague from 

Alabama. I think all of this adds up to, we are on the wrong course 

and we should just get away, cancel this project. It is not sustainable and will drain money from every other thing that we want to 

do in space eventually, and worst of all, it may end up being canceled, as you pointed out so many times, Mr. Young. In the past, 

we have seen so many of these canceled after spending billions and 

billions of dollars right down the toilet. 

I would like to ask Mr. Squyres, you have stated and we all seem 

to assume that getting to Mars as soon as possible has got to be 

our ultimate goal. That just seems to me that everybody is accepting that. I don’t accept that. There are a lot of other things we need 
133 

to do in space before we need to get to Mars. But Mr. Squyres, do 

you believe that this massive rocket project that you seem to be 

skeptical about as well, is that a prerequisite to going to Mars? 

Dr. SQUYRES. Certainly, some kind of heavy lift capability is a 

prerequisite to get to Mars. Mars is far away. But SLS—I said in 

my opening statement that I believe that the biggest challenge, the 

biggest problem facing the agency is that NASA is being asked to 

do too much with too little, and this mismatch between the amount 

of money that is necessary to do SLS right and the amount of 

money that is actually available is symptomatic of that. Both Tom 

and I in our opening remarks pointed out that we see some tough 

choices looming in the area of human spaceflight. We can afford to 

utilize the Space Station, which we have invested so much in, for 

as long as its operational lifetime. We can afford to develop SLS 

and to do it on a safe and reasonable schedule, but I don’t see that 

we can do both, and so there may be some very tough challenges 

ahead for this agency and some choices to be made. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There are other alternatives that are out 

there, and we do have a proven rocket system right now. We have 

people who have done a good job at producing Deltas and Atlas 

rockets that are very effective and very safe, and perhaps those 

systems can be used perhaps combined with a refueling system of 

some kind rather than spending the tens of billions of dollars that 

we are going to spend to have this one large system that seems to 

have one purpose. 

Let me just note this. It was noted earlier how important human 

spaceflight is, and I agree that it is important that we do that, but 

NASA isn’t the only one in this ballgame. There are two other programs that I know that are aimed at putting people into space, and 

it is not costing us the big bucks from NASA to keep people in 

space. I mean, we have got Dennis Tito out there and I happen to 

think that his project will inspire a lot of people. When you are 

talking about inspiring humankind and especially young people, I 

think Dennis’ concept of sending a man and a woman around Mars, 

that is going to capture everybody’s imagination. Let us hope he is 

successful, however. 

And the other thing is SpaceX, of course, and others are putting 

money into developing a system much cheaper than what we are 

talking about here of putting people into space in turn for a number of purposes, one, to go to the Space Station, so we won’t have 

to hitch a ride with the Russians. So when we look at this budget, 

we are going to be looking at these budgets, Mr. Chairman, and 

you are going to be looking at this budget—I don’t know how much 

longer I am going to be around—but you are going to be around 

a long time and you are going to remember when we started this 

program and in the end, you are going to have to live through all 

of the cuts of everything else that we are going to have to cut to 

keep this giant rocket program going. There are other alternatives 

I think we should be looking at seriously. Thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I now recognize Ms. Wilson—or we will go to Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I wanted 

to ask Dr. Squyres and Mr. Young a specific question about the ISS 
134 

program. I know there has been a lot of comment on the intrinsic 

value and strength of the international partnership that the ISS 

program has engendered over the decades since the partnership 

was established, and what I wanted to know specifically from you 

is, how important is it to build on the ISS partnership in future 

human exploration endeavors? 

Dr. SQUYRES. I think it is tremendously important. ISS is a technological marvel but it is also a management marvel. To have had 

that many nations work together so effectively to build such a magnificent piece of hardware, it is unparalleled I think certainly in 

the history of space exploration. And the International Space Station truly is international to a deep, penetrating degree. The entire 

system is deeply international and that is manifested in a whole 

bunch of different ways. I believe very strongly that in order for 

NASA to find a way to deal with the level of over-commitment that 

is expected of the agency, for NASA to be able to do the things out 

in deep space that we would like to see happen with anything like 

the budgets that we are talking about here, there has to be a really 

substantial international component to that. And so I think building on the partnerships that have been really established so effectively in the management of the International Space Station, it has 

really been a triumph, and I think trying to take that capability 

and extend it beyond low-Earth orbit is probably going to be absolutely necessary. 

Mr. YOUNG. I really don’t have anything to add. I think that is 

exactly right. I mean, you know, the international relationship aspect of it, it is hard to imagine anything more successful than the 

Space Station has been in that regard, and building on that and 

doing whatever the next major thing we encounter or we undertake 

I think is extraordinarily important. 

Dr. SQUYRES. If I could just add one more thing to my remarks 

on that, and that is that if international partnerships are going to 

be a key element of our roadmap for exploration of deep space, it 

would make sense to involve our potential international partners 

in the development of that roadmap so that they have a sense of 

ownership of it. 

Mr. VEASEY. What would be the impact of disrupting the partnership without a follow-on program? 

Mr. YOUNG. It is a good question. It is kind of the nature of the 

business, I mean, you know, to have continuity is certainly a virtue 

but I would not make it a requirement. In other words, I think 

that, you know, we should collectively figure out the most important things to do and then how is the most effective way to execute 

them rather than say we have a workforce and we have an international partnership and now we have got to fill that international 

partnership. I don’t know if that is very helpful, but that would be 

my general reaction. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Veasey. I now recognize Mr. 

Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 

both the witnesses, and if I heard you correctly, both of you place 

a high priority on human space exploration as being the number 
135 

one thing that we should be doing. If we started today, how long 

do each of you estimate it would be before we could place a person 

on Mars? 

Dr. SQUYRES. With the current budget? 

Mr. POSEY. Yes. Well, we can do it for starters. Give me a date 

with the current budget and a date with the Apollo-era budget. 

Mr. YOUNG. With the current budget, bear with me, I would 

probably say never. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I agree. 

Mr. YOUNG. If you said, if we made this a national imperative, 

you know, to go do it, it took Apollo about eight years, if I recall 

correctly. I was around doing much of that activity, and, I mean, 

it was truly a national endeavor. Mars is harder. There are a lot 

of significant issues to resolve before going to Mars, but I think if 

we had the same national commitment to it, I would say 2025 we 

could land on Mars and return home safely to Earth. 

Mr. POSEY. During Apollo, you were around and I was around, 

and that was done in ten years. I am told they could not repeat 

that performance today. I don’t know whether it is true or not. And 

if you recall, that is when they carried around slide rules. The IBM 

mainframe was a quarter as big as this room and did about what 

you can get a little calculator to do for five bucks at Walmart 

today. It is amazing. It seems like we have regressed somewhat in 

some of our abilities. 

Mr. YOUNG. Can I comment on that? 

Mr. POSEY. Certainly. 

Mr. YOUNG. I know I am eating into your time. It really builds 

on some of what I think it is important in this Authorization Act. 

I actually think we could repeat that if we managed the enterprise today the way we managed it then, and I knew the leaders 

who were doing that, and we invested the authority and responsibility in the people executing the program the way we did it then. 

So I am not distressed so much that we don’t have the raw material capability; I am distressed that we have a management process, oversight process, et cetera that complicates the world. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. And we don’t seem to have—I mean, we 

have seen polling, and I keep copies of it, 76 percent of the people 

thought the Shuttle was a good program, to some people today, a 

more recent poll, they rate their dislike of space funding next only 

to welfare, and that is not a good position for us to be in. I mean, 

it would be great if we could have—what is it—the Rice University 

speech the President gave: why go to the Moon. You know, if more 

of us could hear that kind of thing in this day and time and inspire 

a little bit more. 

The President projects 2030, a quarter of a century from now, is 

when we could get to Mars, and the question is, do you think we 

could maintain the public’s interest, if we even have it now, to take 

a generation to complete a mission, do you think without shorter, 

more precise, more exciting stepping stones? 

Dr. SQUYRES. Well, I think that a necessary part, probably not 

sufficient, but a necessary part of maintaining public interest is in 

fact a focus on Mars. When the Curiosity rover landed on Mars recently, thousands of people showed up in the middle of the night 

in Times Square to watch it on television. People are actually cap-
136 

tivated by Mars exploration. So I believe the focus on Mars is necessary. I am not sure that it is sufficient, and so as you say, the 

time scales are substantial and so I think having some compelling 

milestones along the way is an important part of the program as 

well. 

I believe, and Tom and I, I think, are very of like mind on this, 

that it should be first and foremost left to engineers and scientists 

and managers at NASA to come up with the technically appropriate set of milestones, the ones that get us to the goal safely and 

efficiently, and then to have those reviewed carefully, both by organizations like the National Academy but also of course by the Congress and the Administration to make sure that they make sense 

in terms of maintaining the program. 

Mr. POSEY. And I concur. You know, you just—we say on the one 

hand we need to have priorities. Then people say well, you need 

to balance your spending, you need to balance your spending, and 

I am just afraid we are going to end up making NASA a jack-ofall-trades and a master of none, and you are shaking your heads 

‘‘yes.’’ You have the same fears. Thank you. 

Mr. YOUNG. Yeah, I am going to cheat, if I might. I think the 

other aspect of the milestones is, don’t forget about the robotic program and the excitement that will go along with return of samples 

from Mars robotically, which I think a necessary prerequisite for 

the human program, and the idea of having a rover going out and 

collecting that sample and storing it somewhere where a vehicle is 

going to come along a few years later and pick it up and return 

it, I think you can build a lot of excitement around it. 

And as long as I have cheated a little bit, you will remember 

Aaron Cohen, and Aaron told me one time—who was significant in 

the Apollo program. When we were talking about the Constellation 

program, he said we are about to find out how hard it really was 

to go to the Moon. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you very much. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Posey. I now recognize Ms. 

Bonamici. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

both for being here today and bringing your expertise. 

I just want to start by following up on Mr. Kennedy’s remarks 

about the importance of STEM education. I just came from the 

Education Committee, where we are marking up a bill, and a lot 

of discussion about STEM education, and I just share the concern 

of making sure that we are engaging the next generation. I do 

want to note that NASA recently selected its trainees to become astronauts, and half of them are women. I think that is the first time 

that that has happened. We want to make sure that we have the 

next generation of astronauts and scientists and people who are interested in these fields. So I am very concerned about whether we 

are going to be through restructuring affecting those existing partnerships between NASA and other education groups and entities. 

So I want to share that concern, and I know you have commented 

on it. 

I also want to bring up another thing. You know, many of us on 

the Committee do not have NASA facilities in our districts. We 
137 

might have involvement with programs like human spaceflight and 

missions to Mars just through subcontractors or others in the supply chain. But NASA has historically been a multi-mission agency 

with a balanced portfolio in human exploration, human spaceflight, 

science and aeronautics, and I know we are having conversations 

about whether those priorities should change, but because of that 

multi-mission history, I often discuss the importance of NASA’s 

other missions including the Earth Science mission, and I know 

Representative Edwards brought this up. I am the Ranking Member on the Environment Subcommittee. I know the chairman was 

here. And the Environment Subcommittee has jurisdiction over 

NASA Earth Science programs, so cuts to those programs cause me 

some serious concern. 

There is some significant national activity such as weather monitoring. Oregon State University, for example, receives funding 

through this program and the work that they do helps in that area. 

And according to the National Academies, NASA’s aging Earth Observation System threatens a disruption in information that can 

help detect long-term climate trends that contribute to severe 

weather patterns. That affects not only space exploration but a lot 

of other issues as well. 

So can you discuss the Authorization Act’s reduction in funding 

for the Earth Science programs, for NASA’s Earth Science programs? What impact might that have on long-term weather and climate forecasting, both within NASA and other agencies, and how 

important is that work to space exploration? 

Dr. SQUYRES. Well, as I remarked in my opening comments, I 

view with considerable concern the deep cuts to Earth Science that 

are contained in the proposed Authorization Act. It is clear that the 

Administration and the Congress have, at least as Congress’ views 

are expressed in this draft Act, very different views of how to allocate money within the Space Science enterprise at NASA. And on 

the Administration’s side, I have seen what I view to be alarmingly 

deep cuts in Planetary Exploration which has been, I think, one of 

NASA’s real shining successes in recent years. In this bill, the pendulum swings too far in the other direction, in my view, and has 

alarmingly deep cuts to Earth Science. If it is going to—if we are 

going to see a NASA budget, if we are going to see an authorization 

level that is consistent with sequestration sorts of budgets, clearly 

some tough choices have to be made. But rather than singling out 

any one scientific discipline for disproportionate cuts, which is 

what I am seeing on both sides right now, having those cuts sort 

of sensibly distributed across the Space Science enterprise I think 

makes more sense. It is going to fall on committees like this to 

come up with some compromises, and I urge you to try to do that. 

To get specifically to your question, if you look at the suite of 

missions that were recommended by the Earth Sciences Decadal 

Survey from the National Academies, they would focus on understanding the Earth as a system, not just focusing on trying to forecast tomorrow’s weather but trying to really understand the 

Earth’s climate system, the Earth geosciences, to really try to develop a systems approach to understanding the Earth. And that is 

inevitably going to pay off in providing decision makers who are 
138 

wrestling with things like climate change with the kinds of information that would be necessary to make smart decisions. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Mr. Young, you are nodding your head. 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much. I see my time is expired. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici. I now recognize 

Mr. Stockman. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. I have a quick statement to make about—I am 

feeling as NASA is more symbolism over substance, and we have 

gotten away from as you talked about in the 1960s where we actually did things. I think the reason the popularity has dropped is because a lot of people have no idea really what we are doing now, 

and it is kind of muddled, and we keep going off in these different 

directions, and I was wondering, what was the ratio of bureaucrats 

to engineers in the 1960s versus now? 

Mr. YOUNG. I obviously—— 

Mr. STOCKMAN. I could do Jay Leno, I guess. 

Mr. YOUNG. Yeah, I don’t have that number. It is a great question. I will tell you maybe a little bit relevant to that because I 

grew up in NASA, and even up through some, you know, modestly 

senior positions on Viking program where they landed a couple 

spacecraft on Mars and be a director of Goddard, and I finished 

that, I went off to my next life in, like, 1982 or 1983. The amount 

of time that I spent doing other than what I would call important 

NASA science and engineering discovery research would have been 

single digit. I mean, you know, it was just not a factor. Now, don’t 

get me wrong. I mean, OMB existed, you know, other organizations 

existed, but I—you know, my time and my dedication was 95-plus 

percent of doing science, engineering, research, discovery, whatever 

you want to call it. So I personally think that is a significant difference to what I observe today, and a source of enormous worry. 

Dr. SQUYRES. Well, I don’t have anything like Tom’s depth of experience but in the 30 or so years that I have been in this business, 

I cannot recall a time when I have seen organizations like OMB 

exercising the level of oversight of minute details of NASA’s program. I haven’t seen that to this extent in the years that I have 

been in this business. And I think one of the things that characterized the early days that we are talking about here, the 1960s, was 

that we had government organizations like OMB and like the Congress providing high-level priorities for the organization and then 

allowing people like Tom when he worked for NASA to figure out 

how to actually implement those policies and carry them out in detail. There was a level of oversight, you know, give and take back 

and forth that goes with that but I think that the level of detailed 

oversight that I am seeing at the agency these days is certainly unprecedented in my experience. And I think in some respects—and 

Tom touched on this in his opening statement—this has been detrimental to the agency doing its job as effectively as possible. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. I think it is kind of ironic hearing a government 

agency complain about government. I kind of like that idea. 

I am just amazed. I am a little bit familiar with that, and I am 

amazed at the side roads we take, and I think it adds 50 percent 

or more in the cost of a program, or more. I mean, it is bizarre 
139 

some of the things that NASA is requested to do and that the employees are requested to do, the diversion of time. It is just amazing to me that we don’t have the ability to trim that back, but if 

we could do it all across government, I think we would be much 

more efficient. 

Mr. YOUNG. I think you are right again. You are talking about, 

you know, going by—the first large space project I worked on was 

Lunar Orbiter, a robot which was fundamentally aimed towards 

picking landing sites for Apollo and Surveyor. We signed a contract 

for it, and 27 months after that we were in orbit above the Moon, 

and people were a little upset because it was supposed to have 

been 24 months. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Well, and the last thing I got is a more parochial 

question. They are moving the Arc Jet facility, and I was wondering how that is going to impact future development or authority 

of other projects. Oh, you are not familiar with it? Then I will submit the question and you can research it. 

I am extremely frustrated seeing firsthand the amount of tangential and what I call nonproductive compliance. It is over the top at 

NASA, and I just wish that somehow we could reduce that. Thank 

you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Stockman. 

You know, there has been a lot of talk about priorities and missions without the proper funding, and I would just like to—I think 

this garners consideration, that as mandatory spending continues 

to erode important discretionary investments like NASA, we are 

forced to make very difficult decisions. This is unfortunately the reality we must face until the Federal Government can get its finances in order. That is why this discussion draft complies with 

current law, the Budget Control Act, which passed the Senate, the 

House and was signed by the President, and I do hope that we can 

get mandatory spending under control soon so that we can continue 

funding essential and discretionary programs like NASA, like national defense, like homeland security, without having these debates over making sure that we fund our priorities appropriately. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony 

and the Members for their questions. The Members of the Committee may have additional questions for you, and we will ask you 

to respond to those in writing. The record will remain open for two 

weeks for additional comments and written questions from members. 

The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(141) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
142 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Squyres 
143 

observations). Only NASA funds the critically important space missions that 

explore more complex aspects of Earth System Science. 

3. The first test launch of the SLS is in 2017 and the first crewed launch is in 

2021. How could the draft bill be improved to ensure on-time development of the 

SLS system for these deadlines? 

The best way would be to increase the top-line budget authorized for NASA, so 

that more funding can be directed to the SLS and Orion developments. 

4. The current acquisition plan for the SLS calls for a flexible vehicle that starts 

with a 70 ton lift capability and evolves to a 130 ton lift capability. The final 

vehicle would require a new upper stage and advanced boosters to reach 

maximum lift capability. What further direction could Congress give NASA to 

ensure compliance with these requirements? 

I believe that Congress has already placed more than enough constraints on the 

SLS program, and that to provide additional direction to NASA would be unwise. 

5. You have noted your concern in the past that the launch rate for the SLS is 

very low. Is the risk associated with the low launch rate mitigated by building an 

anchor plan such as the Human Exploration Roadmap that gives specific 

planning guidance for future missions? 

Not significantly in my opinion. The low flight rate is driven by inadequate funding 

levels, and I believe that it poses a significant risk regardless of the specific 

missions that will be flown. 

6. The discussion draft includes a report for a study on the use of the SLS as a 

cargo vehicle for national security and science payloads. What other uses or 

customers for the SLS in the future should be included in this study? 

I believe that national security and space science are the most likely additional 

uses for SLS in addition to human spaceflight. 

7. NASA plans to do a test launch of the Orion in 2014 and then another in 2017 

with the SLS. Should NASA be required to have the Orion dock with the station in 

2017 to ensure appropriate pressure on the commercial crew providers to lower 

the prices? 

No. In my opinion the 2017 Orion mission should be focused on tasks that will 

most advance its future contributions to deep space exploration. 

Does the ability to launch Orion on an EELV put enough pressure on one 

commercial provider to possibly lower the cost of crew and cargo transfer 

services? 
144 

Transfer of crew and cargo to ISS is not the intended use of Orion. I believe that 

Orion development should focus on its intended goal of enabling deep space 

exploration. To also use Orion as a tool to further the aims of the commercial 

crew program would in my opinion place too many burdens on the Orion program. 

8. You have stated your concems about requiring NASA to do more than it has 

money to do. The stepping stone approach to exploration described in the bill is a 

framework for missions that could be funded individually and gradually. How can 

NASA use this roadmap as an anchor for proposing future missions and 

incremental steps to Mars? 

As I stressed in my written and oral testimony, the key is to produce a roadmap 

that gets humans to Mars in the quickest, safest, and most efficient manner 

possible. The Agency's (and the Nation's) resources will be used most effectively 

if the roadmap concentrates on getting humans to the ultimate goal of Mars 

without unnecessary and costly distractions along the way. I urge the committee 

not to prescribe or proscribe any stepping stones in the roadmap a priori. Instead, 

I feel that NASA should be directed to achieve the high-level goal of getting 

humans to Mars, and that the Agency itself should be left to propose the most 

efficient roadmap toward achieving that goal. 

If you were the administrator, who would you include in the team to design this 

roadmap? 

I would include capable engineers, scientists, and managers from within the 

Agency, perhaps augmented by a few retired senior NASA personnel who could 

bring in an experienced and independent perspective. 

Do you think NASA needs to be directed to include certain people or experts on 

the team? 

No. 

9. The discussion draft authorizes $700 million for the commercial crew program 

and requires quarterly reports to the committee from NASA on its progress as 

well as specific metrics for success. What additional information would you 

require from NASA in these reports, if anything? 

I believe that the report called for in the draft authorization bill is adequate and 

appropriate as described. 

10. The discussion draft does not include a requirement to down-select 

immediately but allows NASA to make the determination as to when and how to 

down-select for a provider. Does this flexibility create too much risk to the flight 

readiness deadline or should NASA be required to follow a specific down-select 
145 

schedule? 

I believe that it is best to allow NASA to determine the appropriate schedule for 

the down-select. While I would like to see the down-select happen as soon as 

possible, external imposition of a timeline, even though well intentioned, could 

have the undesirable consequence of creating schedule pressure that could 

adversely affect safety. 

11. There are currently no requirements in the discussion draft for NASA to 

evaluate the commercial providers in the final stages of selection under any 

specific criteria. Should Congress direct NASA to evaluate the systems available 

for contract based on a specific set of criteria? 

No. NASA has the necessary expertise in this area, and in my opinion they 

should be responsible for establishing the appropriate evaluation criteria. 

12. The draft bill directs NASA to "ensure that the development of the Wide-Field 

Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIRST) continues while the James Webb Space 

Telescope is completed." Is it appropriate for NASA to conduct preliminary preformulation review for WFIRST if doing so would not impact JWST, or be cost 

prohibitive? 

Yes, although I believe that the severe budget constraints that exist within the 

Science Mission Directorate will mean that a study of WFIRST that is not cost 

prohibitive will be very modest in scope. And note that I take "cost prohibitive" to 

mean having an unacceptably adverse affect on any science in the SMD portfolio, 

not just on astrophysics. 

Is it common for NASA to begin studying follow on missions while concurrently 

developing other systems? 

Yes. 

13. The International Space Station is a time-limited asset. Rather than providing 

a specific date for the end of station, the discussion draft directs NASA to 

develop a set of criteria on how to define it as a success. Are there any 

considerations unaddressed by the report required? 

I note that the requirements for the report make no mention of the contributions 

that international partners make to this highly international enterprise. I think it 

would be good for the report to explicitly address the roles that NASA anticipates 

international partners will play in both defining and achieving research success 

on ISS. 

14. There is currently no thorough plan for utilization of the International Space 

Station by all government agencies that could have an interest in doing so. What 
146 

would you add to the report required in the discussion draft for development of 

this plan? 

Nothing - I think it is adequate as currently conceived. I was particularly pleased 

to see the emphasis on consistency with the priorities identified in the decadal 

survey on Biological and Physical Sciences in Space. 

15. Part of the budget request this year includes an additional $20 million for the 

Near Earth Object Observations program. This money is supposed to be used for 

additional telescope time, for detection of candidate asteroids for a retrieval 

mission. The discussion draft permits NASA to continue its work to track and 

categorize those objects that are most hazardous. Are the restrictions in the draft 

bill enough to ensure NASA is focused on finding those objects which present the 

greatest threat or should there be additional direction? 

I do not feel that there should be additional direction. 

16. The Administration's budget request proposes transferring the Radioisotope 

Power System development infrastructure from the Department of Energy to 

NASA. A 2009 report from the National Academy of Science titled "Radioisotope 

Power Systems: An Imperative for Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Space 

Exploration" found that "roles and responsibilities as currently allocated between 

NASA and the Department of Energy are appropriate, and it is possible to 

address outstanding issues related to the short supply of Plutonium 238 and 

advanced flight-qualified RPS technology under existing organizational structures 

and allocation of roles and responsibilities." 

a. How is NASA qualified to manage, fund, and maintain the facilities and 

production of Plutonium 238? 

NASA's experience in this area is limited, and under the new arrangement I feel 

that lack of experience is a potential cause for concern. 

b. What are some of the possible repercussions from NASA taking over 

production responsibility of Plutonium 238 from DOE? 

That is difficult to predict. If things were to go poorly, a possible repercussion 

would be that the necessary 238pU would not be available on the required 

schedule. I do believe that the new arrangement is potentially workable, but it 

strikes me as non-optimal and warranting close attention. 

17. How important is it to follow the National Academies' decadal survey 

recommendations for a steady cadence of large, medium, and small astrophysics 

missions? 

The decadal survey recommendations represent the carefully considered 
147 

consensus views of the astronomy community. So I believe that fol/owing 

decadal recommendations is of critical importance to astrophysics, and indeed to 

all of space science. 

What are the potential consequences for disregarding their recommendations? 

Loss of important science. 

If budgets do not allow for the existing mission portfolio, what is more important 

to keep on track -large, medium or small class mission? 

All mission classes contribute, each in their own way. Small missions provide a 

steady flow of data, and allow rapid follow-up to recent discoveries. Larger 

missions can make particularly important discoveries that smaller missions 

cannot. So it would be a mistake in my opinion to target a specific class of 

missions for disproportionate cuts. Instead, it is important to maintain a balance 

across mission sizes. 

18. What is the single most important technological advancement that is needed 

to further exoplanet research? What advancement should be our highest priority? 

My personal choices would be advanced coronagraph technology for starlight 

suppression, and space-based interferometry technology, particularly in the midinfrared. However, a better way to get a good answer to this question would be to 

canvass the exoplanet science community, rather than asking a single space 

scientist. 

19. What role should NASA's suborbital and Explorer programs play in exoplanet 

exploration? 

One potential use for suborbital programs (sounding rockets and balloons) would 

be as low-cost testbeds for exoplanet instrumentation ultimately intended for orbit. 

There may be other innovative uses as well. And clearly important exoplanet 

research can be done by Explorer-class missions, as shown by the recent 

selection of the Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite for flight. 

Are there any NASA missions not currently used for exoplanet research that 

could have exoplanet applications? 

There are none that I am aware of. 

20. The Space Telescope Science Institute indicated that a telescope larger than 

the James Webb Space Telescope is needed to detect biosignatures from 

terrestrial-like exoplanets. They also indicated that a heavy launch vehicle such 

as the Space Launch System is needed to launch a spacecraft of this size. How 

does the development of the SLS enable future exoplanet discoveries? 
148 

A monolithic very large telescope could indeed be enabled by a heavy-lift 

capability of the sort offered by SLS. However, such a telescope is not the only 

potential approach to investigation of earth-like exoplanets. Other potential 

options that could make use of smaller launchers could involve a free-flying 

constellation of station-keeping spacecraft, or a fixed interferometer assembled 

on orbit. 

21. What it the most significant challenge facing completion of the James Webb 

Space Telescope by its launch date of 2018? 

The re-baselining of the JWST program has brought the development back on 

track. While it remains one of NASA's most challenging programs, at this point I 

see no one challenge that stands notably above all others. 

22. What is the significance of ensuring that early-stage development of the 

Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope is funded as the James Webb Space 

Telescope enters its operational phase? 

To do so would make progress toward implementing the highest priority large 

astrophysics mission identified in the most recent astronomy decadal survey. As I 

noted above, however, the costs of doing so will have to be balanced carefully 

against the rest of the NASA Space Science portfolio. 

23. The recent Science Definition Team (SOT) for the Wide-Field Infrared Survey 

Telescope Project reported that "if used for a mission, the 2.4-meter telescope 

[donated by NRO] would be significantly more capable than the smaller versions 

of WFIRST studied in previous SOTs." In the June 10,2013, edition of Space 

News, Dr. John Grunsfeld, Associate Administrator for the Science Mission 

Directorate, said that WFIRST built with the 2.4-meter NRO telescope would cost 

"between $1.5 billion and $1.7 billion." Given cost estimate challenges with other 

large NASA projects, including the James Webb Space Telescope, how 

confident are you that this cost estimate is close to being accurate? 

I cannot answer this question, because I do not know what cost estimation 

methodology was used to arrive at the numbers quoted by Dr. Grunsfeld. 

24. How can NASA expand its collaborative public-private partnerships with 

private sector organizations in order to study life's origin, evolution, distribution, 

and future in the Universe? 

The best scientific work in this area is being done under fundamental research 

grants funded by NASA's Space Mission Directorate. These grant programs are 

heavily oversubscribed, with low proposal selection rates. If the goal is to further 

Astrobiology research, I believe that the best approach is to increase 

Astrobiology funding within SMD. 
149 

25. Over the past 50 years, robotic planetary missions have opened up the solar 

system. Few programs are as visible, inspirational, or sCientifically important as 

NASA's planetary program. Yet, the FY14 budget continues the disproportionate 

and deep cuts begun in FY12 and FY13. The FY13 request alone represented a 

20% cut ($300M) to the program, and FY14 fundamentally continues that path, 

despite Congress' current objection to this path in the FY13 Appropriations bill. 

NASA's behavior seems to indicate a "going out of business" philosophy with few 

new missions slated for full-scale development, and eventual withdrawal. 

a. Why has the planetary program been singled out for such significant budget 

cuts? 

I do not know. Given the highly successful nature of the planetary program, 

singling it out for deep cuts does not make sense to me. 

b. Do you believe that the U.S. should cede its leadership in solar system 

exploration? 

No. 

If not, what should be done to ensure that NASA implements a program 

consistent with the priorities in the decadal survey? 

Necessary funding cuts should be distributed sensibly across the Space Science 

program and the agency, and should not fall disproporlionally on any single 

Space Science discipline. 

c. How will the proposed cuts to Planetary Science impact specific missions? 

The answer to that question would depend very much on how the cuts were 

implemented. One obvious program-level impact is that the selection rate of 

future Discovery and New Frontiers missions would be dramatically reduced. 

d. How would restoration of funding levels impact Planetary Science specific 

missions? 

Again, the answer to that question depends on the implementation of the cuts. 

One imporlant outcome of such a restoration would be that Discovery and New 

Frontiers selection rates could be kept more nearly in line with decadal 

recommendations. 

26. Do we have the tools and technology necessary to detect all near-Earth 

objects that threaten the planet? 

We have the technology, but that technology has not yet been fully implemented 
150 

to create the necessary set of tools. 

27. Why is NASA choosing to move forward with an Asteroid Retrieval Mission -

a mission of debatable merit - at a cost several billion dollars, while longstanding 

priorities of undeniable scientific value and comparable cost, such as a robotic 

Mars Sample Return or a mission to Jupiter's moon Europa, are passed over? 

The Agency has made it clear - correctly so, in my opinion - that it does not 

regard ARM as a scientific mission. So I believe that the Agency is moving 

forward with ARM because of the contributions they feel it will make to advance 

human spaceflight, not science. 

28. Both Dr. Holdren and Administrator Bolden testified to our committee in 

March that we have a long way to go to accomplish the goals established by 

Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 of detecting 90 percent of the 

near-Earth objects with a diameter of 140 meters or greater by 2020. What are 

the most important steps that should be taken in the next five years to 

accomplish these goals? 

There should be increased emphasis on and funding for ongoing programs such 

as Pan-STARRS, LINEAR, LONEOS, NEAT, Space watch, the Catalina Sky 

Survey, etc. There should also be strong continued supporl for the ongoing 

development of the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST). 

What size object should we be monitoring and tracking? Is 140 meters still an 

appropriate minimum size, or 'should we lower that threshold? 

Clearly objects significantly smaller than 140 meters can have serious 

consequences, as was shown recently in Chelyabinsk. However, I feel the 

primary emphasis for now should be placed on more fully utilizing facilities now 

online, and effectively completing facilities now in development, rather than 

changing the threshold. 

What costs would be associated with lowering that threshold? 

This is difficult to guess, but again, I would not recommend changing the 

threshold. 

29. Once we identify an object, what are our means of tracking it? 

Objects can be tracked via periodic monitoring with optical telescopes, and 

(when close enough to Earlh) with radar. 

30. In keeping with the latest Planetary Science decadal survey, Congress 

provided direction in the FY13 Appropriations bill to begin work on a mission to 

Jupiter's moon Eu ropa one of the most interesting destinations in the solar 
151 

system with vast ice-covered oceans that could potentially support some forms of 

life. (Language from HR 933 is below.) The bill provided $75 million in FY13 for 

such a mission. 

What are NASA's plans to comply with this direction? 

A pre-project team has been formed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and is 

working to develop the Europa Clipper mission. 

When might a mission to Europa be accomplished? 

The earliest possible launch date is probably about 2022. 

31. How could advances in astrobiology be affected if decadal cadences for 

astrophysics and planetary science are not followed? 

They would inevitably be slowed. 

32. NOAA recently determined that certain sensors on the Joint Polar Satellite 

System were not as important to keep on the satellite given difficult budget times. 

The Administration then directed NASA to pay for their development. Why should 

NASA pay for instruments that an operational agency decided were not important 

enough to keep? 

A system like JPSS serves multiple uses. One is operational weather monitoring 

of the sort for which NOAA is largely responsible, and another is Earth System 

Science that is largely the purview of NASA. A sensor that does not serve 

important needs for one agency can serve important needs for the other - and all 

can serve important needs for the Nation. 

33. The most recent decadal survey for Earth Science stated "[h}istorically, new 

Earth remote sensing capabilities have been developed in a process in which 

NASA develops first-of-a-kind instruments that, once proved, are considered for 

continuation by NOAA." The same report goes on to state that "Historically, 

NASA has viewed extended-phase operations for Earth-science missions as 

"operational" and therefore the purview of NOAA." Given the current budget 

situation, should this process be continued? 

I would answer by quoting the same paragraph of the Earth Science decadal 

survey as quoted above: "[TJhe compelling need for measurements in support of 

human health and safety and for documenting, forecasting, and mitigating 

changes on Earth creates a continuum between science and applicationsillustrating again the need for multiple agencies to be intimately involved in the 

development of Earth science and applications from space." In other words, there 

are important roles for NASA to play in both sensor development and operations. 
152 

34. NASA has a long history of building Earth Science satellites such as 

LANDSAT and TIROS. Given the substantial increases in other agencies' 

budgets for earth science, what role should NASA play in developing these 

systems? 

Where it makes technical and programmatic sense to do so, NASA could 

continue to do such work, particularly on a reimbursable basis. 

35. Can NASA conduct a viable Aeronautics research program under the current 

funding levels? Will a program funded that the current level significantly 

contribute the U.S. aeronautics industrial base? 

An Aeronautics program funded at current levels can be viable and can make 

significant contributions to aeronautics in the United States. However, in order to 

do so, the program must be thoughtfully crafted to fill specific high priority niches 

that are not addressed adequately elsewhere. 

36. Are there any areas of Aeronautics research that NASA cannot afford, but 

would given more money? 

There certainly are areas that would benefit from increased investment. 

How would you prioritize those efforts, and what impact would they have on U.S. 

competitiveness in the aerospace field? 

I would place highest priority on expanding Aeronautics investments in areas that 

leverage particular NASA strengths, both currently and historically. Examples 

include aeronautics autonomy research, research on unmanned aircraft systems 

and their integration into the national airspace, "green aviation", rotorcraft 

research, and hypersonic research. As just one example why such items are 

important for U.S. competitiveness, the top two rotorcraft providers to the U.S. 

civil market are European companies; the highest-ranking U.S. company is third. 

37. How can NASA better coordinate with other government agencies regarding 

research areas that overlap such as rotorcraft, hypersonics, and supersonic 

research? 

My sense is that the coordination with other government agencies in these areas 

is already good. 

38. Despite receiving $1.1 billion over the last three years, the Space Technology 

program doesn't really have any success stories yet. The draft bill includes 

guidance on mission priorities for Space Technology. What else could the 

committee include to ensure the program is on track and producing results? 

Technology development by its nature involves very long lead times, and three 
153 

years is not enough time to judge the success of a technology program. I believe 

that the authorization bill could best promote technology development by 

permitting long-term and broadly applicable exploration technology funding to be 

maintained in a separate organization, rather than moving it to the Human 

Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. 

39. In our most recent hearing about the future of human space flight, you 

mentioned that the most critical technologies to develop for human exploration to 

Mars included better entry, decent, and landing capabilities as well as advanced 

life support system. How could the draft bill be improved to ensure these two 

categories are priorities for technology development? 

I do not believe that changes should be made to the bill to establish specific 

priorities for exploration technology development. Instead, I feel that these 

priorities should be set within the Agency, consistent with the content of the 

exploration roadmap called for in the bill. 

40. The Administration's proposal would consolidate, or effectively terminate, 

numerous small STEM education activities that are embedded in larger NASA 

research programs. Their funding would be redirected to other agencies to pay 

for a smaller number of larger STEM education activities that will likely not be 

embedded in research programs. What does the termination of these small 

STEM programs mean to the larger research programs, and the research 

communities that support them? 

The termination would have little detrimental effect on the research done by the 

large programs themselves, but in my opinion they would have an enormously 

detrimental effect on the efficacy of STEM education in the U.S. 

What are the advantages and disadvantages of embedding STEM education 

programs within research programs? 

The enormous advantage is that the education programs are run by people with 

deep knowledge about and passion for the subject matter. 

Do you agree with the proposed consolidation or termination of these STEM 

programs? 

No. 

41. In your opinion, what are the strongest STEM programs that NASA offers? 

The ones directly associated with and carried out by its active space flight 

projects. 

42. What has been the reaction to the Administration's proposed STEM 
154 

education reorganization plan within the scientific community? Have scientists 

expressed concern that the programs that inspired their commitment to science 

and exploration may be threatened? 

In conversations with my scientific colleagues, I have encountered widespread 

and deep concern that the proposed reorganization would adversely affect STEM 

education in this country. 

43. NASA programs account for nearly half of the programs whose funding would 

be "redirected" to other agencies under the Administration's proposed STEM 

reorganization. Why do you think such a large number of NASA STEM programs 

have been targeted for consolidation? . 

I suspect that the number is large simply because NASA has many such 

programs - more than most other affected agencies. 

44. Is a six year term appropriate for the NASA Administrator? Should it be 

longer or shorter? Is a term even necessary? 

While I think history shows that six years is a reasonable length of time for a 

NASA Administrator to serve, I do not feel that a fixed-length term for the 

Administrator is necessary. 

45. How would the requirement to report to both the President and the Congress 

impact the advice provided by the NASA Advisory Council? 

I think it would help force it to be balanced and actionable, since it would have to 

be responsive to the concerns of both branches of the government. (I note here, 

as I did in my written testimony, that the "NASA Advisory Council" called for in 

the draft authorization bill is distinct from the group of the same name that I 

currently chair.) 

46. How would termination liability relief impact current NASA programs? 

It could increase the amount of funding that could be applied to program 

development, although at some difficult-to-quantify risk of incurring termination 

costs that would require additional funds to be appropriated by Congress. 

47. Should Congress consider permanently extending indemnification? 

I assume that this question refers to commercial launch indemnification. Such 

indemnification has significant benefits, in that government risk sharing with 

commercial launch providers can help spur growth of the commercial launch 

industry. Given the rapid pace of change in this arena, however, I feel it is 

probably best for Congress to re-approve commercial launch indemnification on 

a periodic basis, rather than extending it permanently at this time. 
155 

48. What impact would placing a cap on NASA's use of funded Space Act 

Agreements have on the agency? What is an appropriate level for a cap? 

If such a cap were too low it could have a stifling effect on partnering 

arrangements. I have not gotten the sense that there is a need for such a cap, so 

I would not advocate setting one. 

49. Should NASA conduct large scale development programs using Space Act 

Agreements? 

In my opinion, very large scale development programs, like major new launch 

systems, are best implemented using more traditional contracting arrangements. 

50. Would it be burdensome for NASA to post Space Act Agreements online? 

Would it be burdensome for NASA to post Space Act Agreements for Public 

Notice and Comment? 

I do not know how much of a burden it would be to post such material. 

51. Your testimony indicates that in order for NASA to accomplish all of the 

missions on its plate, it should look to a greater degree to international 

cooperation - specifically in the field of human exploration. Do you believe there 

are similar opportunities in other fields, such as earth science? 

A growing number of nations have viable, exciting space programs. I believe 

there are opportunities for international cooperation in almost everything that 

NASA does, earth science included. 

Questions submitted by Ranking Member Edwards: 

• What are your views on the draft bill's proposed direction that NASA develop 

the WFIRST mission while continuing to carry out the James Webb Space 

Telescope mission for a 2018 launch date? Is WFIRST ready for development? 

Given the bill's proposed funding levels, can NASA make effective progress on 

two major missions? 

The devil is in the details. WFIRST was the highest priority large mission in the 

recent astronomy decadal survey, and it could be brought closer to readiness for 

development by investments made in parallel with JWST development. However, 

costs must be balanced appropriately across all Space Science disciplines, 

keeping in mind the recommendations of all of the decadal surveys. Considering 

the high cost of JWST and the need for balance, the amount of significant work 

that could be done on WFIRST in a balanced program may be small. 
156 

• While the draft bill would authorize increased funding levels for Planetary 

Science over the President's request in order to restore cuts made in FY2013, is 

the funding in this 2-year draft bill sufficient for NASA to meet the cadence 

directed in the bill for small, medium, and large flagship missions in Astrophysics, 

Heliophysics, Earth Science, and Planetary Science? 

I do not believe that it is . 

• In your opinion, is the successful completion of a Mars Sample Retum Mission 

necessary before sending humans to Mars? 

No. In my opinion Mars Sample Return has very high priority because of its 

scientific importance, but I do not see it as a necessary precursor to sending 

humans to Mars. 
(157) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
158 

SUBMITTED STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE DANA ROHRABACHER

Opening Remarks from Mr. Rohrabacher 

NASA Authorization legislative Hearing 

June 19, 2013 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

First, J would like to note that, while rebalancing our science portfolio is a good step, J believe it is time 

for us to have a serious discussion about whether or not Earth Science needs to be done by NASA at all, 

or ifthe other 12 federal agencies performing Earth Science can get the job done. I believe NASA should 

not be doing Earth Science, but should focus on its core and unique mission of exploring space. 

Second, I received a letter from Dr. Bobby Braun, NASA's former Chief Technologist, and Professor of 

Space Technology at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The entire letter is included below, but here is 

a short passageBecause the Space Technology account accommodates the SBIR/STTR progroms and 

approximately 1000 civil servants across the Agency, a significant reduction in this account can 

only came from one place ... the higher TRL demonstrotians ... eliminating the possibility for 

NASA to make criticol investments in the landing and surface technologies required for its future 

human exploration missions ... solar electric propulsion, cryogenic propellant storoge and 

tronsfer, optical communicotions, solar soils, deep space navigation, robotic refueling ... would 

all terminate prematurely. Such cuts will also sever the connections Space Technology has built 

over the lost few years with industry and academia. 

Which leads me to the chosen architecture to meet our Exploration goals -I would like to note, once 

again, that I believe the SLS heavy lift launch vehicle to be both unsustainable and unnecessary to 

human exploration ofthe solar system. This heavy lift path we are on is the same strategy and same 

plan that doomed the Constellation program, but with less coherence. We are foolish if we do not 

expect the same results that we saw with Constellation. 

The heavy lift strategy seeks to minimize the number of launches required for a given mission because 

of the assumption that rockets are likely to fail. That may have been true in the hottest days of the Cold 
159 

War, but NASA, DOD, and our commercial industry have worked diligently over these past decades to 

make certain that is no longer the case. Change may be difficult, but it is the strongest constant in the 

universe. 

Let me briefly mention the NASA employees and contractors - the brilliant, hard-working, and dedicated 

men and women all across America - the failure of Constellation was not their fault. And the coming 

failure of the Heavy Lift Architecture will not be their fault. It is our fault - here in Congress, and at the 

White House, and NASA Leadership, for giving them goals that cannot be met with the resources we 

make available. 

Orion can be launched on a Delta IV Heavy - we're scheduled to do it next year. That strategy, along 

with a little bit of new technology, can take us on a different path. We can build fuel depots in orbitgas stations for spaceflight - which can enable all of our missions in LEO, to the Moon, to Mars, and 

beyond. We can develop and demonstrate the necessary technologies for less than one year's funding 

of the SLS. 

Let's use our NASA teams across the nation to build and improve fuel depots, and to build the other 

components necessary for Exploration - deep space habitats, landers, propulsion systems. This 

approach will not only yield faster, less expensive human exploration of the Moon and Mars, but will 

enable a robust market for American launch vehicles -leading to safer, better, less expensive and more 

capable rockets. That is beneficial to our civilian space programs, and our military space programs. And 

it just might open up space to private individuals in ways never before available. 

The strengths of America -liberty, individual initiative, the free-market capitalist system - can 

permanently expand humanity into the solar system under the rule of law. Sustainable space 

settlement must be our long-term goal, and that must inform our decisions now. 

2 
160 

SUBMITTED LETTER BY REPRESENTATIVE DANA ROHRABACHER

June 19,2013 

i,~:ll O[JQ®'G:LIlJ;l11JD;@ 

h[JQ@O@@W 

Congressman Dana Rohrabacher 

2300 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Congressman, 

School of Aerospace Engineering 

All.tntd, C('11rgi.l :ltl1,.lHH50 U.s.A. 

PtlONIi 404·tN4·300U 

I'}\X -t04·R94·2760 

The attached narrative provides my view regarding the importance of Space Technology to our 

nation's future. 

Unfortunately, the draft House of Representatives Authorization bill for NASA cuts NASA's 

Space Technology Mission Directorate by $243 million vs. the President's FY14 request, or 

33%. This is also well below the FYl2 and FY13 appropriated levels ($575M and $640M, 

respectively). This reduction will not place NASA on a path aligned with 21st century innovation 

and job creation and will instead do real harm to NASA's future exploration and science 

missions. 

Since Space Technology houses the SBIRISTTR program and covers nearly 1000 civil servants, 

these cuts would have to come entirely from the Space Technology procurement budget, 

severing connections Space Technology has built over the last few years with industry and 

academia. In such a scenario, NASA's present work towards flight demonstration of solar 

eleetric propulsion, cryogenic propellant storage and transfer, optical communications, non-toxic 

propellants, solar sails, deep space navigation, robotic refueling, in-situ resource utilization, and 

supersonic aerodynamic decelerators would likely need to be terminated prematurely. 

In my view, NASA is at a crossroads. We can attempt to rebuild the costly infrastructure of a 

historic, yet bygone era, or invest in new technologies that promise the capability to efficiently 

reach new vistas and increase the societal benefits that result from full utilization of space. A 

NASA that is reaching for grand challenges and operating at the cutting-edge is critical not only 

for our country's future in space, but also for America's technological leadership position in the 

world, and a robustly funded Space Technology account, authorized above $750M in FYl4 and 

FY15, is central to that theme. 

Sincerely, 

~~ 

Dr. RobertD. Braun 

David and Andrew Lewis Professor of Space Technology 

Georgia Institute of Technology 

Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace Engineering 

Atlanta, GA 30332-0150 
161 

SUBMITTED LETTER BY REPRESENTATIVE STEVE STOCKMAN

Statement Steve Stockman 

Release of House NASA Authorization 

June 19,2013 

This NASA authorization is essential guidance for an agency in crisis. The perception is of a 

rudderless agency stumbling around for a purpose-yet refusing to consider the only possible 

roadmap with will result in a successful Mars mission: build a modest lunar base which will 

teach us how to live on another world. 

Without this authorization, a hlUUan landing on Mars will fail by not having fIrst learned to live 

on another world. 

Without this authorization, scarce resources and years of time will be spent on an asteroid 

mission which offers little of value in exploring deep space and living on the moon and Mars. 

Without this authorization, our moonlMars rocket; SLS and Orion, as well as our commercial 

launch services may be delayed or endangered. 

Without this authorization, the International Space Station may not get the timely extension 

review necessary to offer launch providers and science users the certainty they need that the 

station will be there throughout the next decade. 

Without this authorization, youth may continued to be uninspired to major in STEM for a career 

in the space pro gram. 

Most importantly, without this authorization, NASA and its employees may continue to twist in 

the wind without a clear vision and roadmap to the future. 

I encourage my colleagues in the House and Senate to support this authorization. 
162 

SUBMITTED REPORT BY ROBERT D. BRAUN

Investment in Space Technology is Critical for NASA and our Nation's Future 

Robert D. Braun 

David and Andrew Lewis Professor of Space Technology 

Georgia Institute of Technology 

June 19,2013 

American technological leadership is paramount today, vital to our national security, our 

economic prosperity and our global standing. With applications as diverse as weather prediction, 

navigation, communications, agriculture, military operations and disaster relief, our society's 

demands from its space assets continue to increase. Aerospace remains a strong component of 

our national fabric and is the largest positive contributor to our nation's trade balance. However, 

this technological leadership position is not a given. Recently, Congressman Lamar Smith, 

Chairman of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee, observed, "The future is 

bright for discovery, but failure to invest in innovation and space exploration could leave 

America in the dark." To remain the leader in space exploration, space science and space 

commerce, we must invest in new technologies and capabilities. Doing so, not only positions our 

nation for continued global leadership, but grows a critical component of our nation's economic 

competitiveness. NASA's Space Technology account was created precisely for this purpose. 

A~ recognized by Congress and outlined in the NASA Authorization Act of 20 I 0 and America 

COMPETES Act, our Nation's economic competitiveness and high standard of living are based 

on decades of investment in innovation. A focus on innovation and technology is required both 

to enable new approaches to NASA's current missions and allow the Agency to pursue entirely 

new missions in aeronautics, science and exploration. Consider the following five examples of 

NASA technology investment: 

Following decades of investment in solar cell technology by both government and 

industry, NASA conceived, designed and is operating a solar-powered robotic mission at 

Jupiter (Juno). This distant location from the Sun is a regime where only nuclear-powered 

missions were once possible. This breakthrough is enabling collection of planetary 

science through a New Frontiers mission at a cost not possible through alternative means. 

This same high-efficiency solar cell technology is now making its way into other space 

science and human exploration missions as well as the space infrastructure that supports 

our society here on Earth. 

Following a decade of investment in lightweight carbon ablators, NASA matured the 

high-performance thermal protection system PICA that has enabled analysis of dust 

samples obtained from a comet following safe completion of the highest speed Earth 

reentry of all time (Stardust). Demonstrating the broad applicability of this technology, 

PICA was utilized to enable entry of the Mars Science Laboratory after a potentially 

catastrophic problem was uncovered late in the development cycle of this mission. The 

SpaceX Dragon capsule is presently using a form of PICA and this same material has 

becn considered for usc by the Orion project. 
163 

In 1996, the NASA TransHab program began development of large-scale inflatable 

structures suitable for space habitation. This technology was later transferred to the 

commercial sector through patents and intergovernmental personnel acts, enabling 

companies that included Bigelow Aerospace to engage in space commerce. Investing its 

own resources, Bigelow Aerospace is now taking on the challenge of producing hurnanrated inflatable space modules sized to provide the habitation needs for a multi-person 

crew. Coming full circle and as a stepping-stone on that technology developmcnt path, 

NASA is now planning to attach a Bigelow Aerospace produced inflatable module to the 

International Space Station. In addition to its in-space uses, this technology could serve to 

provide a surface habitat to future human explorers on the Moon or Mars. 

In 2000, NASA and the University of Arizona developed the Mars Oxygen Generator, a 

two-pound experiment designed to generate oxygen for life support and fuel production 

on Mars. The device used solid oxide electrolysis cells to convert carbon dioxide and 

water into oxygen and fuel. When operated in reverse as a fucl cell, this device has been 

shown to produce clean, reliable electricity here on Earth. Development and 

commercialization of this technology as a NASA spin-off by Bloom Energy, which is 

now largely supported by the private sector, has moved beyond demonstration, with the 

goal of generating electricity at prices lower than traditional methods while producing 

half the amount of greenhouse gases. Today, Bloom Energy energy servers are in use by 

more by more than two dozen U.S. companies including Walmart, AT&T, Google, CoeaCola, FedEx, Staples and Bank of America. Clearly, NASA technology investments are 

of benefit to more than the Agency's missions and the aerospace industry. 

In the late 1960's before the detailed design concepts that were to become the Viking 

mission to Mars were even on the drawing board, this nation embarked on a wide-ranging 

technology development efforts that yielded aero shells, heatshield materials, supersonic 

parachutes, radar systems, landing engines and other technologies that were to make out 

first robotic planetary landing a success in 1976. These same building block technologies 

were then evolved twenty years later as part of the Mars Pathfinder mission and have 

formed the basis of every Mars mission since. Many of these systems have also found 

there way into uses at other planets or during Earth return. As exciting as the 2012 Mars 

Science Laboratory was, it would not have been possible without the broadly applicable 

technology development effort that preceded Viking. 

One characteristic is common across these examples (and there are many more). Each was 

matured from broadly applicable space technology roots, not mission-focused objectives. As 

such, when the time came for flight project development, Stardust, Dragon and Mars Science 

Lab did not need to be planned inclusive of the cost and risk associated with the maturation of 

PICA and Juno did not need to be planned inclusive of the cost and risk associated with the 

maturation of high-efficiency solar cells. Removing this technology development risk has been 

cited numerous times by the GAO as a means to better manage NASA's future spaceflight 

missions. This is the principle upon which NASA's Space Technology account was built. 

Looking at NASA's past and prescnt missions it is clear that past space technology investments 

led to success in design and flight of the Apollo missions, the Space Shuttle, the International 

Space Station, and a myriad of robotic explorers that allowed us to reach destinations across our 

solar system and peer across the universe. Where will we be without such investments to build 
164 

NASA's future space capabilities? Unfortunately, the pioneering spirit embodied by this storied 

agency is presently endangered as a result of chronic underinvestment in space technology. A 

number of recent external reviews have addressed the issues of innovation and technology 

development at NASA, with a strikingly common set of themes. In 2009, the "Report of the 

Review of u.s. Human Space Flight Plans Committee" (Augustine Committee) strongly 

endorsed an increased focus on innovative technologies and approaches to achieving broadly 

defined NASA and national goals. This recommendation is similar to one made earlier by the 

"President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy: A 

Journey to Inspire, Innovate and Discover" (Aldridge commission) in its 2004 report. Also in 

2009, the National Research Council (NRC) rcport, "America's Future in Space," specifically 

calls for NASA to create a capability to develop game-changing approaches to national 

challenges while the 2009 NRC report "Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA 

Institute for Advanced Concepts", recommended re-creating an early stage innovation cngine like 

the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC). Finally, in a 2012 report on this topic, 

"NASA Space Technology Roadmaps and Priorities: Restoring NASA's Technological Edge and 

Paving the Way for a New Era in Space," the NRC offered the following stark assessment: 

Success in executing future NASA space missions will depend on advanced technology 

developments that should already be underway. However. it has been years since NASA 

has had a vigorous, broad-based program in advanced space technology. NASA's 

technology base is largely depleted. Currently, available technology is insujficient to 

accomplish many intended space missions. Future u.s. leadership in space requires a 

foundation of sustained technology advances. 

Each ofthese NRC reports emphasized the need for a broadly applicable technology 

organization independent from the mission-focused parts of the Agency in order to provide 

stability to the technology investment portfolio and a more risk-tolerant environmcnt to foster 

innovation. These Committees recommend a broad reach, across disciplines and organizations, to 

ensure the best ideas are brought forth and supported. All of these reports suggest that failure to 

invest in technology and innovation puts the Agency's future viability at great risk. Fortunately, 

NASA has such an activity today. Space Technology is focused on invcsting in the capabilities 

required by the Agency's future human exploration and science missions while lowering the cost 

of other government agcncy and commercial space activities. 

America is setting out on an exciting new chapter in human space exploration. This chapter 

centcrs on full use of the International Space Station, maturation of multiple, American vehicles 

for delivering astronauts and cargo to low-Earth orbit, and development of a crew vehicle and an 

evolvable heavy-lift rocket (two critical building blocks for our nation's deep space exploration 

future). Equally important is advancement of a suite of cutting-cdge space technologies that will 

allow us to safely and cfficiently send explorers to new destinations for the first time. 

With a sizeable budget increase, NASA can certainly recreate the systems and repeat the 

accomplishments ofthe Apollo program. Howevcr, to efficiently explore the surface of the 

Moon, the moons of Mars and the Mars surface, investment is required in a host ofncw 

capabilities that include the in-space propulsion, robotics, radiation protection, in-situ resource 

utilization, and entry, descent and landing technologies, presently being advanced through 
165 

NASA's Space Technology account. Developing these technological solutions creates high-tcch 

jobs. Because high-tech companics account for 40 percent of America's increase in productivity 

and half of all U.S. exports, investing in new itmovations and technological advancements is a 

good strategy for our nation as well as our space program. In fact, there is no aspect of the 

NASA budget better suitcd to building the economy of the 21 st century than the Space 

Technology account. 

Modest, sustained federal investment in Space Technology, at a funding level of approximately 5 

percent of NASA's budget (well below the R&D budget of many corporations and well below 

the budgets of NASA's Human Exploration and Science enterprises), is the key ingredient to 

accomplishing NASA's future science and human exploration missions. Space Technology was 

funded at a levcl of $575M in FYl2 and $640M in FY13. With these funds, many 

accomplishments were achieved and numerous technologies are now in the pipeline. Among the 

Space Technology accomplishments to date arc flight testing of a new compactly-launched and 

lightweight acrodynamic decelerator with applications to the challenges of ISS downmass and 

Mars entry, testing of the largest out-of-autoclave composite cryotanks ever constructed, a key to 

low-cost propellant storage in-space or at a variety of surface destinations, a new low-cost 

thermal protection material that has application to Venus and Saturn cntries as well as a possible 

use whcn intcgrated with the Orion capsule. In addition, there are now approximately 200 

graduate students across our nation's universities who feel part of our nation's space program 

having aligned their research with NASA technology objectives. If authorized at a FYl4 and 

FY15 budget level above $7S0M, NASA's Space Technology account will be able to continue 

the steady progress it has achieved, maturing the technologies and delivering the capabilities 

needed for our nation to achievc a vibrant future in space. 

NASA and our nation face a very different future in space if the Space Technology account is 

significantly cut. Because the Space Technology account accommodates the SBlRlSTTR 

programs and approximately 1000 civil servants across the Agency, a significant reduction in 

this account can only come from one place: cuts to the procurement budget that allow for NASA 

technology partnerships with industry and academia. Such cuts will dramatically curtail existing 

Space Technology projects including all of the higher TRL demonstrations presently planned for 

FYl4 and FYIS while eliminating the possibility for NASA to make critical investments in the 

landing and surface technologies required for its future human exploration missions. In such a 

scenario, NASA's present work towards flight demonstration of solar electric propulsion, 

cryogcnic propellant storage and transfer, optical communications, non-toxic propellants, solar 

sails, deep space navigation, robotic refueling, in-situ resource utilization, and supersonic 

aerodynamic decelerators would all terminate prematurcly. Such cuts will also sever the 

connections Space Technology has built over the last few years with industry and academia. 

Fifty years ago, a young President gave NASA a grand challenge, one chosen not for its 

simplicity, but for its audacity. One chosen not for its ultimate goal or destination, but to 

"organize and measure the best of our energies and skills." We didn't go to the Moon because it 

was a destination within our reach, but instead to remind us of who we are and give notice to the 

world of what free men can do when they set their minds to a singular objective. In 

accomplishing that goal, NASA made a lasting imprint on the economic, national security and 

geopolitical landscape of the time. 
166 

Æ 

More important than destination, is how we choose to explore space today. We can do so by 

rebuilding the costly infrastructure of a historic, yet bygone era, or by investing in new 

technologies that promise the capability to efficiently reach new vistas and increase the societal 

benefits that result from full utilization of space. A NASA that is reaching for grand challenges 

and operating at the cutting-edge is critical not only for our country's future in space, but also for 

America's technological leadership position in the world. A robustly funded Space Technology 

account is central to that theme. 

Robert D. Braun is the David and Andrew Lewis Professor of Space Technology at the Georgia 

Institute of Technology and served as the NASA Chief Technologist in 2010 and 2011.