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SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at 

(703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil

Summary of Report: SIGIR 09-027 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

This report discusses a $350 million MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) contract funded by the Iraq Security 

Forces Fund, to complete the Taji National 

Maintenance Depot (TNMD) in Iraq. 

Constructing the depot was a seven-phase 

project, and this contract supports the final four 

phases; procuring and installing equipment; 

training Iraqi soldiers and civilians in depot 

maintenance and operations; initiating 

operations; and transitioning the depot to Iraqi 

control. The contract was awarded by the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCCI/A) to AECOM Government Services. 

SIGIR’s objectives are to review the key 

requirements and provisions of the contract to 

determine cost, outcome; and management 

oversight with an emphasis on the controls to 

prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. 

What SIGIR Recommends 

SIGIR recommends that the Commanding 

General, MNSTC-I take the following actions: 

1. Due to the seriousness of the safety hazards 

and electrical problems uncovered within 

the depot facilities related to the Phase III 

construction, reevaluate the decision to not 

pursue action against the responsible 

contractors. 

2. Develop a comprehensive plan to guide the 

activities of the future U.S. organization 

that assumes responsibility for assisting the 

Iraqi Army to realize the goal of the 

TNMD. The plan should address lessons 

learned, revised or modified objectives, the 

way ahead, and how best to sustain the 

TNMD once the Depot Integrator contract 

expires. 

Management Comments 

MNSTC-I concurred that it should develop a 

plan for guiding the activities of a follow-on 

organization. MNSTC-I partially concurred that 

it should take action against the Phase III 

contractors stating that only the contracting 

office can hold the contractors accountable. 

GRD stated that it had not had an opportunity to 

review the documents provided to SIGIR, but 

was evaluating possible legal alternatives. It is 

also noted that SIGIR did not interview GRD 

officials regarding the Phase III issues. 

July 30, 2009 

DEVELOPING A DEPOT MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AT TAJI 

HAMPERED BY NUMEROUS PROBLEMS

What SIGIR Found 

Although the contract was valued at $350 million, MNSTC-I elected to 

cancel two option periods, and final costs for the contract will be about $220 

million. However, the possibility that the Iraqi Army will be capable of 

successfully operating the depot even at a low rate of production by 

December 31, 2009, seems unlikely.1

 Much of the equipment required under 

Phase IV of the contract still needs to be installed and commissioned.2

 The 

training required under Phase V of the contract has not produced sufficient 

numbers of journeyman-level mechanics, and the low rate production 

requirements under Phase VI of the contract have been minimally achieved 

for only a few types of equipment. Until these objectives are met, the Iraqi 

Army’s ability to independently conduct depot level maintenance will be 

limited. Nonetheless, MNSTC-I reports that it intends to transfer the facility 

on December 31, 2009, in an “as is” condition without regard to level of 

facility, equipment, or training development. 

Although the outcome of this contract is less than successful to date, 

SIGIR’s assessment of MNSTC-I’s management and oversight found that it 

was generally effective. The MNSTC-I team responsible for this contract 

has managed two complex issues: the quality of the renovation and 

construction work under the Phase III contract, and the failure of the Iraqi 

Army to commit soldiers for training. SIGIR’s analysis of project 

management generally shows that despite the schedule extension, MNSTC-I 

managed these issues well. Most specifically, MNSTC-I kept the overall 

contract costs to near the original estimate, and has decided to transfer the 

facility on December 31, 2009, in an “as is” condition without regard to 

level of facility, equipment, or training development. SIGIR has previously 

recommended that continued U.S. investment in developing the Iraqi 

Army’s maintenance capability be contingent on negotiating an agreement 

with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense for transitioning maintenance 

responsibility. SIGIR also previously identified a lesson learned that when 

agreements cannot be reached, assessing the risk of increased costs and the 

failure to achieve objectives should be an integral part of the management 

decision-making process. In this case, MNSTC-I has assessed that risk and 

made its decision. 

 

1

 A low rate production goal, as defined by MNSTC-I, refers to the number of times 

Iraqi personnel must independently demonstrate the capability to successfully 

complete certain maintenance actions. For example, a goal of 30 engines means that 

before transition the Iraqis should have successfully overhauled 30 engines. 2

 Commissioned means that a piece of equipment has been certified as production 

capable. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

July 30, 2009 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

U.S SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMANDIRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

SUBJECT: Developing a Depot Maintenance Capability at Taji Hampered by Numerous 

Problems (SIGIR 09-027) 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is providing this audit report for 

your information and use. We performed this audit in accordance with our statutory 

responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended. This law provides for 

independent and objective audits of policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness of programs and operations and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This 

audit was conducted as SIGIR project 9014. 

We considered comments from the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition 

Command–Iraq and the Commanding General, Gulf Regional Division when preparing this 

report. The comments are addressed in the report where applicable, and the letters are included 

in Appendix D of this report 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Joan Hlinka, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, 

DC), (703) 604-0945/ joan.hlinka@sigir.mil, or Nancee Needham, Deputy Assistant Inspector 

General for Audits (Baghdad), (240)-553-0581, ext. 3793/ nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Introduction 1

Background 1

Objectives 4

Cost Goals Are Being Met but Key Maintenance Capability Goals Are Not 5

The Contract is Currently Within Budget 5

Contract Objectives Are Behind Schedule 6

Contract Management and Oversight Has Been Generally Effective 15

Conclusion and Recommendations 17

Conclusion 17

Recommendations 17

Management Comments and Audit Response 18

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 19

Appendix B—Acronyms 21

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 22

Appendix D—Management Comments 23
1 

Developing a Depot Maintenance Capability at Taji 

Hampered by Numerous Problems 

SIGIR 09-027 July 30, 2009

Introduction 

Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) prepare a final forensic audit report on all amounts appropriated or 

otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq. To help meet this requirement, we are 

undertaking a series of audits of major Iraq reconstruction contracts. These audits include 

contract cost and outcome and the U.S. government’s program and contract management 

oversight, with emphasis on issues related to fraud, waste, and abuse. This report examines the 

Taji National Maintenance Depot–Master Integrator Contract, hereafter referred to as the Depot 

Integrator contract. 

The Depot Integrator contract was originally a $350 million contract funded by the Iraq Security 

Forces Fund, which was subsequently reduced to about $220 million, and is one of the largest 

Iraq Security Forces Fund contracts to date. The contract was to procure and install maintenance 

equipment in the Taji National Maintenance Depot (TNMD), train Iraqi soldiers and civilians in 

depot maintenance and operations, initiate operations, and then transition the depot to Iraqi 

control. This contract and its associated requirements was to accomplish the final four phases of 

the Taji National Depot Maintenance Project. Taji is located in the northern outskirts of 

Baghdad. 

Background 

In October 2005, the Department of Defense submitted a report to the Congress that identified 

the importance of developing the Iraqi Army’s logistics capabilities and transitioning 

maintenance responsibility to Iraqi Army control so that it could operate on its own.3

 Since then, 

establishing maintenance and other logistics capabilities within the Iraqi Army has been a 

priority of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I), which organizes, 

trains, equips, and sustains Iraq’s security forces for Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I). 

In the Iraqi Army, there are four levels of maintenance. The first two levels of maintenance are 

integrated within an Iraqi Army Division and provide operator and preventive maintenance, and 

organizational maintenance. The third level of maintenance is provided by Iraqi Army Location 

Commands, which support one or two Iraqi Army divisions in a specific area. These commands 

provide intermediate and organizational maintenance; that is, they perform day-to-day and more 

 

3 Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, October 13, 2005. Submitted to the Congress pursuant to Public Law 

109-13, Section 1024. 
2 

complex repairs (short of complete overhauls) of vehicles, radios, and night vision devices. 

SIGIR previously issued a report pertaining to the third level of maintenance.4

 

This audit is of the fourth level of maintenance, depot level maintenance. Depot maintenance 

involves the major overhaul or complete rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and 

individual pieces of equipment. It can also include the manufacture of parts, modifications, 

testing, and reclamation as required–typically to restore the item to like new condition. 

Depot maintenance serves to support other military units by providing technical assistance and 

performing maintenance that is beyond the capabilities and responsibility of those units. Depot 

maintenance provides stocks of serviceable equipment by using more extensive facilities for 

repair than are available in other military units. The primary function of depot maintenance is to 

replenish stocks in the military supply system, in this case the Taji National Supply Depot. 

MNSTC-I’s plan to develop an Iraqi Army depot maintenance capability at Taji involves seven 

phases. These phases are shown in Figure 1. 

 

4

 Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome and Oversight Problems (SIGIR 09-014, 

April 26, 2009). 
3 

Figure 1–Phases of Taji National Maintenance Depot Project 

Phases I and II Phase III Phases IV–VII (Depot Integrator) 

Phase I

Technical

Assessment

Phase II   

Planning

Phase  III Refurbishment and Construction

Phase  IV ‐ Procurement and Installation

Phase V ‐ Manning and Training

Phase VI

Initiate

Operations

Phase VII  

Transition

31 DEC 2009

1 JAN 2008

JUL 2008

5 DEC 2006

MAR‐JUN 2009

Electrical

Assessment Task

Order 72

JUN 2009

Phases I and II Completed 5 December 2006 (AMC, MNSTC-I J4, MoD M4) 

Phase III Completed July 2008 (MNSTC-I, GRC, Contractors) 

Depot Integrator Contract January 1, 2008 – December 31, 2009; Electrical 

Assessment awarded March 9, 2009 – Task Order 72 (MNSTC-I, JCC-I/A, AMC, 

AECOM, DCMA) 

‐ Electrical Assessment - March – June 2009 

‐ Transition Activities begin June 2009 culminating with Full Transition 31 

December 2009 

Some Equipment not

scheduled for installation

until January 10, 2010

Taji National Maintenance Depot – Integrator Contract MAR 2008

Source: SIGIR Analysis of the Taji National Maintenance Depot Integrator Contract, and Statement of Work 

The Phase I assessment was conducted by a team of technical experts from the Army Materiel 

Command.5

 The Phase II planning was conducted by a team comprised of members from the 

Army Materiel Command, and logisticians from MNSTC-I and Iraq’s Ministry of Defense. The 

Phase III facility construction and renovation was accomplished using contractors. Contracts 

were awarded to four contractors, all managed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ 

(USACE) Gulf Region Division-Central District (GRC). Phases IV through VII were to be 

accomplished under the Depot Integrator contract awarded by the Joint Contracting Command – 

Iraq/ Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) to AECOM Government Services (AECOM) in December 2007, 

and managed by MNSTC-I. The contract is a fixed-price contract with a not to exceed cost of 

$350 million. The contract period of performance was 24 months with provisions for two sixmonth option periods that if exercised, would extend the contract until the end of 2010. Each 

option period was valued at $65 million. Table 1 shows the key dates and events for the 

contract. 

 

5

 The Army Materiel Command provides technology, acquisition support, materiel development, logistics, and 

sustainment to the force. 
4 

Table 1—Key Dates and Events for Contract W91GY0-08-D-0001 

Date Key Events 

2005 

October Requirement for Logistics Capability Identified 

2006 

Jun–Dec Technical Assessment (Phase I)–Completed 5 December 06 

Nov–Dec Planning (Phase II) – Completed 5 December 06 

2007 

May–Jul 08 Refurbishment and Construction (Phase III)–Completed July 08 

December Depot Integrator Contract awarded to AECOM Government Services 

2008 

January 1 Taji National Maintenance Depot–Integrator Contract Begins 

January Phase IV–Procurement/Installation 

March Phase V–Manning/Training 

May Phase VI–Operation Initiated 

2009 

Mar–Jun Electrical Assessment 

Jun–Dec Phase VII–Transition Activities 

December 31 Transition Complete 

Source: SIGIR Analysis of MNSTC-I documents

Objectives 

SIGIR’s objectives for this audit of the Depot Integrator contract (Phases IV to VII) were to 

review cost, outcome; and management oversight issues with specific focus on the adequacy of 

controls to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. To accomplish these objectives we also 

needed to obtain information on activities that were conducted during Phases I to III and 

consider the impact that the results achieved in those phases had on accomplishing the phase 

objectives covered by the Depot Integrator contract. SIGIR is planning a review of the Phase III 

contract. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For a list of acronyms used, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, 

see Appendix C. For the management comment letters, see Appendix D. 
5 

Cost Goals Are Being Met but Key Maintenance 

Capability Goals Are Not 

Although the contract was valued at $350 million, MNSTC-I elected to cancel two option 

periods, and final costs for the contract will be about $220 million. However, the possibility that 

the Iraqi Army will be capable of successfully operating the depot even at a low rate of 

production by December 31, 2009, seems unlikely.6

 Much of the equipment required under 

Phase IV of the contract still needs to be installed and commissioned.7 The training required 

under Phase V of the contract has not produced sufficient numbers of journeyman-level 

mechanics, and the low rate production requirements under Phase VI of the contract have been 

minimally achieved for only a few types of equipment. Until these objectives are met, the Iraqi 

Army’s ability to conduct depot level maintenance will be limited. Nonetheless, MNSTC-I 

reports that it intends to transfer the facility on December 31, 2009, in an “as is” condition 

without regard to level of facility, equipment, or training development. 

Several key factors caused the contract’s goals not to be met. Most significant were construction 

quality problems (principally related to electrical installation) during Phase III. This situation 

has delayed equipment installation and, in turn, the means to train personnel. Further, it has 

created a dangerous working environment. MNSTC-I estimates that correcting these problems 

may cost about $2.86 million. Additionally, Iraqi military personnel have not attended training 

at the rates anticipated and often left training early. Various factors contributed to this situation 

including the contract’s overly optimistic training schedule, the Iraq military not providing 

trainees at the levels promised, and equipment shortages. 

The Contract is Currently Within Budget 

The original contract value was $350 million, but that included two option periods valued at $65 

million per period. However, according to MNSTC-I officials, they do not intend to exercise 

these option periods, which will reduce the overall contract value to about $220 million. As of 

April 30, 2009, MNSTC-I has issued 72 Task Orders to AECOM and $211.7 million had been 

obligated, of which $105.1 million had been disbursed. MNSTC-I estimates that it may need to 

spend approximately $2.86 million to remediate some construction problems. Thus, barring 

unforeseen problems, final costs on the contract should be in the range of $220 million. 

SIGIR identified four categories of contract costs. These include (1) shop facilities and 

equipment, (2) sustainment, (3) training, and (4) miscellaneous. Contract obligations and 

disbursements as of April 30, 2009, are shown in Table 2. 

 

6

 A low rate production goal, as defined by MNSTC-I, refers to the number of times Iraqi personnel must 

independently demonstrate the capability to successfully complete certain maintenance actions. For example, a goal 

of 30 engines means that before transition the Iraqis should have successfully overhauled 30 engines. 7

 Commissioned means that a piece of equipment has been certified as production capable. 
6 

Table 2—Funding Data by Cost Categories, as of April 30, 2009 (in dollars) 

Cost Category Obligations Disbursements Available %

Shop Facilities/Equipment 117,435,114.98 47,008,092.49 70,427,022.49 55

Sustainmenta 82,573,230.86 51,370,368.57 31,202,862.29 39

Training 10,112,150.83 6,258,637.55 3,853,513.28 5

Miscellaneous 1,554,324.88 481,563.52 1,072,761.36 1

Total $211,674,821.55 $105,118,662.13 $106,556,159.42 

Note: 

a Security costs represent $6,013,845.59 of the total for sustainment 

Source: SIGIR analysis of cost data provided by JCC-I/A 

One unknown factor affecting the final cost for this contract is the need to remediate some 

construction deficiencies from an earlier Phase III contract. These deficiencies are discussed in 

more detail later in this report. In March 2009, MNSTC-I issued AECOM a Task Order to 

assess the facilities to determine what is needed. In written comments on a draft of this report, 

MNSTC-I stated that it estimates that the cost will be about $2.86 million. However, SIGIR has 

not seen the report and does not know the extent of repairs covered by this estimate. 

Contract Objectives Are Behind Schedule 

The equipment installation, training, and low-rate production requirements of this contract were 

originally planned to be completed between November 2007 and January 2008. However, as 

shown in figure 2, the three requirements are currently one to two years behind schedule. Figure 

2 is a comparison of the originally estimated timeline for each phase of the Depot Integrator 

(Phases IV to VII) from November 2006, to the current estimate provided to SIGIR in June 2009. 
Figure 2

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8 

According to documents provided by MNSTC-I, however, much of this was not done. Some 

examples include: 

• Two transmission dynamometers, each with a power requirement of 180 amps, and a 

control panel with a power requirement of 30 amps were to be installed in a building. 

The only power supplied by the contractor was two 32 amp circuits. 

• A power washer with a power requirement of 225 amps was to be installed in a building. 

The contractor provided one 100 amp circuit. 

• The power requirement for equipment in another building is 1000 amps. The contractor 

installed a 500 amp service. 

• A hydraulic repair machine with a power requirement of 90 amps was to be installed in a 

building. The contractor provided one 63 amp circuit. 

Beyond insufficient power in the buildings, however, MNSTC-I identified serious electrical 

safety issues. In at least two instances water heaters in washroom facilities were incorrectly 

wired resulting in a potential electrocution hazard, and at least seven fires have been attributed to 

faulty wiring, according to AECOM officials. One of the most serious examples was an incident 

in which Iraqi students complained of “tingling” when using the washroom sinks. MNSTC-I 

officials conducted an inspection of the washroom facility, and using a voltmeter and a probe, 

discovered more than 220V of electricity in the water stream from the wash basin, as shown in 

figure 3 below. Subsequent inspections determined the water heater was incorrectly installed. 
9 

Figure 3—Photograph of voltmeter reading in water stream 

Source: MNSTC-I 

Although the facility renovation work conducted under Phase III was not a part of this review, 

MNSTC-I officials report that it has seriously impacted the accomplishment of tasks under this 

contract. SIGIR asked what action was taken during the reconstruction work to remedy the 

electrical problems. MNSTC-I explained that USACE’s Gulf Region Central District was 

responsible for contractor oversight and accepted the work and issued contract completion 

documents. Additionally, a MNSTC-I official said that the MNSTC-I project management office 

was not staffed with an electrical engineer or a master electrician during the renovation and final 

acceptance inspection of the facility. As a result, the problems were not discovered until 

installation of the new equipment started. According to a MNSTC-I e-mail, the MNSTC-I 

Project Manager decided not to take action against the contractors because GRC’s general 

counsel advised against litigating the case. To keep the contract on schedule the MNSTC-I 

Project Manager decided instead to accomplish the necessary repairs through the Depot 

Integrator contract. In commenting on a draft of this report, however, GRD said that it has no 

record of any involvement with this issue regarding possible action against the contractor. GRD 

further noted that it had not been provided the MNSTC-I documents for review and, therefore, 

could not comment. However, GRD also said that the GRC counsel is currently evaluating 

possible legal alternatives. 

In addition to the electrical problems, the equipment installation has also suffered from some 

other unforeseen issues. For example, rails are ordinarily built into a factory ceiling to support 

heavy-lift cranes needed to move equipment and vehicle parts. The rails in the Taji Depot 
10 

facilities were identified as having sufficient strength to support the cranes MNSTC-I planned to 

install. However, upon starting installation, the contractor found that the pre-existing rails were 

not strong enough to support the weight of the crane plus a load. To remedy this problem, 

MNSTC-I decided to use free standing cranes, but this solution requires reinforcing the floors to 

support the weight of the crane. Additional concrete foundation footers for support are being 

installed, but this is delaying installation. 

To better understand what is needed to address the electrical and construction problems, 

MNSTC-I issued a task order to AECOM in March 2009 to conduct an assessment of the 

facilities refurbished under Phase III with specific emphasis on the electrical wiring. This 

assessment was completed in late June 2009. SIGIR requested a copy of the assessment, but at 

the time of the draft report we had not received the assessment. MNSTC-I, in commenting on 

our draft report, stated that the current estimate is about $2.86 million. SIGIR has not received 

the assessment and is uncertain about the extent of repairs covered by this estimate. 

The net result of these problems is that, at present, some facilities cannot meet full operational 

requirements. According to the May 14, 2009, Maintenance Status Report, wheel depot facilities 

still in the construction phase includes the Engine Shop, Transmission Shop, Blast Booth, Paint 

Shop, and Reassembly Shop. In addition, facility deficiencies limited activity in the Main Wheel 

Shop, Automotive Shop/Upholstery, and the Ground Support Equipment/Material Handling 

Equipment/Forklift Shop. In its written comments MNSTC-I added that in the track depot, 

facilities that are incomplete include the Generator Shop, Small Arms Shop, Power Train Shop, 

Disassembly Shop, Radiator Shop, Component Cleaning Shop, and Paint Shop. 

Figure 4—Photograph of Pit for Line Bore Machine 

Source: SIGIR Photo 
11 

A senior MNSTC-I official said that the facility will be transitioned on December 31, 2009, even 

though some originally planned equipment may not be installed. For example, according to a 

MNSTC-I official, the line bore machine8

 may be canceled all together. As shown in figure 4 

above, the pit has been dug and prepared and MNSTC-I plans to wire it for the equipment, but 

the Iraqis may have to eventually purchase the equipment. MNSTC-I is also questioning other 

pieces of equipment such as a second electroplating machine. The MNSTC-I official 

emphasized that these measures are not being taken just to meet the December 31, 2009 

transition timeline; “it just makes good sense, and saves the American taxpayer money.” 

Training Has Not Produced a Capable Workforce Due Primarily to Low Trainee Participation 

Rates and Equipment Shortages Under Phase V 

The lack of equipment has affected the training program forcing training to be cancelled or 

scaled back. However, a larger impediment has been a lack of Iraqi commitment to the training. 

About half of the assigned students are absent at any given time for a variety of reasons. As of 

May 31, 2009, only 74% of the required workforce has completed training and even the trained 

workers’ skill level is deemed “marginal.” 

Training is a key deliverable under the contract, and the statement of work identifies a “trained 

and capable workforce” as a requirement for transition. Students generally attend a military 

“Basic Training” program before being assigned to the depot. They then spend two weeks in the 

Taji Vocational Institute in a basic maintenance and safety course. After the two weeks, they 

take a week of leave, and then return to complete the remaining four weeks where they learn the 

basics of maintenance operations that prepares them for on the job training (OJT). After 

completion, they take another leave before beginning OJT. The OJT is a set period of time with 

a fixed start and end date. A typical OJT training period is approximately 180 consecutive days 

or 26 weeks. There are no additional breaks built into the program. 

As of May 21, 2009, the contractor reported having no certified depot level mechanics even 

though several OJT courses have been completed. In its written comments, MNSTC-I said that 

the policy accepted by the Iraqi Army was for the students to work 14 days on and take one week 

off. As it stands, the students usually work 5 days, take 2 days off, work 5 days, and then take 9 

days off. This “leave policy” occurs throughout every level of training to include the Taji 

Vocational Institute. The result of this practice is that out of a 26 week course of instruction, the 

students may only reach week 12 or 13 in the curriculum before the OJT period expires. 

According to the contractor this will not produce a journeyman-level mechanic. The final 

product will probably resemble a mechanic at the apprentice level. 

Further complicating the availability of soldiers to conduct training is the fact that the Ministry 

of Defense is temporarily removing some soldiers to attend basic training. MNSTC-I expected 

that students would have completed military basic training and some initial trade training with 

the Iraqi Joint Forces prior to entering training with the contractor. It was understood, however, 

 

8

 A line boring machine is used to bore precision holes in track vehicle hulls (that is tanks or armored personnel 

carriers) as part of the battle damage or normal wear and tear repair process. In this instance, the holes are bored to 

line up the drive sprockets with the transmission. The machine is approximately 28 feet long. The estimated cost of 

the machine is $2.7 million and takes 12 months to manufacture. 
12 

that this requirement may be waived for recruits with existing trade skills. According to the 

contractor, some students did not meet this requirement and the Ministry of Defense is now 

requiring that they attend basic training. In its written comments, MNSTC-I said that as of July 

9, 2009, the wheel depot has 413 students assigned of 448 required, with 100 of those at Basic 

Training. In the track depot, 179 students are assigned of the 556 required, with 45 in Basic 

Training. MNSTC-I also said that the problem is exacerbated by the fact that some “career 

fields” have too few people assigned while others have too many people assigned. 

Even when soldiers are physically at the facility, they are not always available for training. 

According to a senior Iraqi official, staffing shortages mean that some soldiers are pulled from 

training to perform other functions, such as security. The contractor expressed the need for 

leaders and supervisors as well as workers like parts keepers and material handlers, all of which 

are important to running a production facility. According to the contractor’s weekly Update 

Briefing to MNSTC-I dated June 12, 2009, a number of leadership and management positions 

have not been filled, and the contractor has identified manning to be at risk. 

Despite the challenges in having enough people attend for the required amount of time, the 

contractor has continued to conduct training. Additionally, the contractor has used 

“workarounds” to continue training when facilities are not available. When workarounds cannot 

be used, the students will not be trained at all on certain aspects of repairs, such as some machine 

work; milling, or resurfacing of cylinder heads, and grinding of crankshafts; standard operations 

for a depot facility. During our visit to the Track Depot at Taji, we observed one such 

workaround. Training in disassembly was taking place outside in the staging area under a large 

open bay garage with a roof for protection from the sun because the Disassembly Shop was still 

under construction, and there was insufficient electrical power to install the equipment. 

According to the current Modified Table of Organization and Equipment, the document that 

identifies the required and authorized strength of an organization, the Taji Depot requires 1,426 

personnel of which 1,037 are designated as skilled workers. MNSTC-I estimates that manning 

challenges left the depot with just 62% of its assigned soldiers and only 46% present for duty on 

average. The removal of some students for basic training further degrades the average number 

present for duty to approximately 33% of authorized strength. As of May 31, 2009, only 771 

students have graduated. Although a senior Iraqi military official has told MNSTC-I officials 

that he has 1,300 additional personnel to add to the number of those going through training, they 

had not arrived as of May 31, 2009. In order to have any additional soldiers fully trained to meet 

the December 31, 2009, transition date, they would have had to have begun training on or about 

May 21, 2009, and take no breaks from training to receive the full six weeks of training at the 

Taji Vocational Institute and the 26 weeks of OJT. The lack of operational equipment was cited 

by senior Iraqi military leaders as a reason why some students leave the program. 

Senior Iraqi officials told us they too recognize that there will be insufficient numbers of trained 

mechanics on December 31, 2009. One official said “we will face a lot of technician problems.” 

To make his point, he added: “ask any soldier or officer to demonstrate how a piece of 

equipment works, and they will not be able to show you because they are not trained.” He 

blamed this on the fact that much of the equipment was not available during the training period. 

The contractor also explained that as more equipment becomes available, the attendance rate 

improves, albeit minimally. 
13 

Intended Maintenance Capability Goals Have Been Minimally Achieved Under Phase VI 

Although six months remain until MNSTC-I’s transition goal of December 31, 2009, only a few 

of the low rate production goals for the track depot and the wheel depot at Taji have been met. 

MNSTC-I defines its maintenance capability goal by using the term “low rate production.” Low 

rate production refers to the production run of a facility that is performed by the Iraqi Army to 

demonstrate a production capability. For example, a low rate production goal of 30 means that 

the Iraqi Army should have successfully performed a task 30 times. However, as shown in Table 

3, many shops have been unable to achieve their low rate production goals for a large number of 

equipment pieces. 

Table 3—Low rate production goals and accomplishments as of June 12, 2009 

Equipment 

Low Rate

Production Goal Accomplished 

M-1114 High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle 

30 1 

Forklift 10 0 

Wheeled Vehicle Engine 30 2 

Wheeled Vehicle Transmission 30 6 

Generator 100 8 

M-203 Rifle 500 0 

AK-47 Rifle 500 0 

T-72 Tank / BMP Personnel Carriera 2 0

Note: 

a SIGIR’s interpretation of the data is that the current low rate production goal for T-72s and BMP Personnel Carriers combined is two; either one 

of each, or two of one or the other. 

Source: MNSTC-I data 

In written comments on a draft of this report, MNSTC-I provided updated information as of July 

3, 2009, that shows that a number of shops are on target to meet their low rate production goals. 

For example, the transmission shop has met the low rate production goal of 30 transmissions and 

has started working on geared hubs, transfer cases, and differentials. Currently 7 of the 30 

transmissions have tested “good.” In the wheel depot, MNSTC-I reports that the engine, paint, 

wash rack, blast booth, main wheel are on track to meet their goals by September 2009. 

Achieving the low rate production requirements depends on the availability of repair parts, which 

continues to be an issue with some equipment items, specifically the 5 ton family of vehicles (M900 series) including the M-923, and some former Soviet style tracked vehicles such as the T-72 

Tank. The contractor is not responsible for obtaining repair parts and, to date, all repair parts 

have been provided by Coalition Forces. According to MNSTC-I, 37% of the total M114 lines 

and 89% of the total 5 ton lines required have been furnished by the U.S. government. Key 

remaining lines have been ordered by the U.S. government and are due in shortly. 

The absence of a technical library also adds to the difficulty of achieving the low rate production 

requirements. A key deliverable under the contract is the requirement to provide Depot 
14 

Maintenance Work Requirements for those vehicles and equipment identified for low rate 

production. Depot Maintenance Work Requirements provide the technical data and 

specifications necessary for depot level repair work and the overhauling of vehicles and 

equipment. A senior MNSTC-I official told us that while Depot Maintenance Work 

Requirements are critical for U.S. depots, they may not be as critical to the TNMD at its current 

stage of development. The JCC-I/A Office of Counsel is re-evaluating the requirement to 

determine whether it was an appropriate task under the statement of work. Depending on the 

result of their legal review, the requirement may be removed from the Statement of Work. 

There is also a requirement to have certain manuals translated into Arabic. Of the 115 

Operations and Maintenance manuals required to be translated, only 2 have actually been 

translated as of June 12, 2009. 
15 

Contract Management and Oversight Has Been 

Generally Effective

Although the outcome of this contract is less than successful to date, SIGIR’s assessment of 

MNSTC-I’s management and oversight found that it was generally effective. The MNSTC-I 

team responsible for this contract has managed two complex issues; the quality of the renovation 

and construction work done by the earlier Phase III contractors, and the failure of the Iraqi Army 

to commit soldiers for training, and has handled each of these issues effectively. 

As stated, this contract covers only Phases IV through VII of the TNMD project: the 

procurement and installation of equipment, training of Iraqi soldiers in depot maintenance and 

operation, developing a low-rate production capability, and transitioning the depot to Iraqi 

control. The success of the equipment installation was dependent on the preparation of the 

facilities under the Phase III contract. MNSTC-I, lacking construction expertise, turned this 

renovation and construction over to GRC, who awarded the work to four contractors. SIGIR did 

not review these contracts. However, documents provided by MNSTC-I raised issues about the 

quality of certain construction items. MNSTC-I said that these issues caused it to have to extend 

the completion date for the equipment installation by approximately two years. SIGIR notes that 

while GRD was administering the Phase III contracts, MNSTC-I was still the funding agency 

and had overall program management responsibility. 

SIGIR’s analysis of project management generally shows that despite the schedule extension, 

MNSTC-I has been managing these issues well during Phases IV through VII. Most specifically, 

MNSTC-I kept the overall contract costs to near the original estimate. Other positive signs of 

effective management include: 

• The Contracting Officer’s Representative and the Quality Assurance Representative 

conduct regular and independent inspections of the facilities using checklists based on the 

statement of work and developed specifically for each shop or facility. 

• The contractor provides Weekly Production Reports which are discussed in weekly 

meetings by MNSTC-I and Army Materiel Command personnel. 

JCC-I/A’s administration of the contract was also effective. JCC-I/A stationed the Contracting 

Officer in Iraq, facilitating site visits. This was a vast improvement over similar contracts 

managed from the U.S. For example, in a recent SIGIR audit of the Global Maintenance and 

Supply Services Contract, which was managed from Rock Island Illinois, SIGIR found that the 

absence of an in country Contracting Officer contributed to the contract oversight problems.9

 

Similarly, an Administrative Contracting Officer and a dedicated contracting officer’s 

representative on site has been beneficial in obtaining timely decisions on unforeseen problems 

such as the electrical safety issue. An on-site Program Management Office also helps with these 

issues. 

 

9 Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems (SIGIR 09-014, 

4/26/2009). 
16 

SIGIR also found that the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan is well defined, based on the 

Statement of Work, and is carried out by two independent government personnel, the 

Contracting Officer’s Representative from MNSTC-I and the Quality Assurance Representative 

from the Defense Contract Management Agency. The 16 person Army Materiel Command team 

dedicated to the TNMD project contained subject matter experts for most aspects of the program. 

Additionally, their presence in the depot shops facilitated continuous monitoring. Weekly 

meetings involving key personnel from JCC-I/A, MNSTC-I, MNF-I and the Iraqi military keep 

all parties apprised of issues relating to facilities, and training. 

Coordination with, and involvement of, the Iraqi military early on in the projects life was lacking 

according to two senior Iraqi military officials. SIGIR met with these officials in June 2009, and 

was told that Iraq had very little involvement with the planning of the Taji National Maintenance 

Depot. While they had some supervisory role in 2006, they had no involvement in project plans 

or drawings. The Iraqi officials stated that their involvement has improved somewhat since 

2008, and is getting better all the time. 

The training is similarly behind schedule, but SIGIR supports MNSTC-I’s decision to cancel the 

two contract option periods. In a previous SIGIR report addressing the low training participation 

rate of Iraqi soldiers, we said that in such situations, assessing the risk of failure should be a part 

of the program decision-making process.10 In that regard, as discussed earlier, it appears the 

contract training requirements were overly optimistic. MNSTC-I does not intend to exercise 

these two option periods, saving $130 million, and reports that it will end this contract on 

December 31, 2009, without regard to the level of facility, equipment, or training development. 

 

 

10 Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems, SIGIR 09-014, 

Apr. 9, 2009. 
17 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion 

MNSTC-I managers of the Depot Integrator contract (Phases IV through VII) inherited a project 

that reportedly has quality issues and was behind schedule. MNSTC-I’s ability to mitigate the 

impact of previous problems, and effectively manage the contract for the last four phases of the 

effort, was generally successful. However, MNSTC-I was unable to fully address the previous 

deficiencies, or overcome the lack of needed equipment for training, or Iraqi attendance at 

training. Nevertheless, MNSTC-I took measures to lessen the costs of a potentially marginally 

successful project by cancelling options to purchase additional services and equipment and to 

transfer the facility in an “as-is” condition rather than expend additional U.S. resources on a 

potentially marginally effective facility. SIGIR supports this decision. 

While the contract’s cost and performance were well managed, the objectives for achieving Iraqi 

military depot maintenance capability fell far short of the initial contract goals. A major cause of 

the contractor’s inability to meet program goals has been the construction quality issues 

experienced during Phase III. While MNSTC-I has taken some actions to correct the 

deficiencies, they have not attempted to recover damages related to construction quality issues 

relation to the workmanship performed under Phase III. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, MNSTC-I take the following actions: 

1. Due to the seriousness of the safety hazards and electrical problems uncovered within the 

depot facilities related to the Phase III construction, reevaluate the decision to not pursue 

action against the responsible contractors. 

2. Develop a comprehensive plan to guide the activities of the future U.S. organization that 

assumes responsibility for assisting the Iraqi Army to realize the goal of the TNMD. The 

plan should address lessons learned, revised or modified objectives, the way ahead, and how 

best to sustain the TNMD once the Depot Integrator contract expires. 

SIGIR also notes that it has previously recommended in April 2009 (SIGIR 09-014) that the 

Commanding General, MNSTC-I, negotiate an agreement with the Ministry of Defense for 

transitioning maintenance responsibilities to the Iraqi Army. This agreement should identify 

each party’s role and responsibilities, and identify a time line for achieving this goal. While 

MNSTC-I agreed with this recommendation, SIGIR has not yet been apprised of specific actions 

that have been taken. 
18 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

In preparing this report, SIGIR considered written comments from MNSTC-I and GRD. Their 

complete comments are included in Appendix D. 

MNSTC-I concurred with the recommendation that it develop a comprehensive plan to guide the 

activities of the future organization that assumes responsibility for assisting the Iraqi Security 

Forces to realize the goal of the TNMD. MNSTC-I further suggests that the comprehensive plan 

include processes and procedures for transferring the facilities first from the contractor to the 

U.S. government, and then from the U.S. government to the Iraqi Security Forces. Advisory 

coverage should continue during these transitions, and stay behind equipment should be used to 

seed the depot maturation process. SIGIR believes that these actions are consistent with the 

intent of our recommendation. 

MNSTC-I partially concurred with the recommendation that it reevaluate its decision not to 

pursue action against the responsible contractors. According to MNSTC-I, the construction 

project under Phase III was awarded by USACE’s Gulf Region Division, and as contracting 

agent, they are the sole entity that can hold the contractors accountable for their work. 

Nonetheless, MNSTC-I, as the program manager and funding agency, has the responsibility for 

taking the lead on addressing this issue. 

MNSTC-I also plans to keep SIGIR apprised on the status of the open recommendation 

contained in its previous report (SIGIR 09-014) for the Commanding General, MNSTC-I to 

negotiate an agreement with the Ministry of Defense for transitioning maintenance 

responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces. 

In its written comments, GRD said that it was unable to provide detailed comments because it 

was unable to view some of the documentation used by SIGIR regarding Phase III construction. 

It also noted that SIGIR did not interview GRD officials regarding the Phase III issues. 

However, it stated that the GRC counsel is currently evaluating possible legal alternatives. 

SIGIR also notes that it did discuss these audit findings with GRD at the conclusion of our 

fieldwork. Further, the construction quality issues were identified to us by MNSTC-I and our 

recommendation to address the issue is to MNSTC-I as the program manager. 

 
19 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

This review was conducted to meet the requirements of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

requires the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to prepare a final forensic 

audit report on amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of 

Iraq.11 The 2008 Defense Authorization Act extended this requirement to other funds, including 

the Iraq Security Forces Fund.12 To fulfill this requirement, SIGIR has undertaken a series of 

audits examining major Iraq reconstruction contracts to identify vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, 

and abuse. To fulfill this requirement, SIGIR initiated this project in March 2009 (Project 9014) 

to review the key requirements and provisions of the contract to determine cost, outcome; and 

management oversight with specific focus on the controls to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and 

abuse. 

SIGIR’s objectives for this audit of the Depot Integrator contract (Phases IV to VII) were to 

review cost, outcome; and management oversight issues with specific focus on the adequacy of 

controls to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. To accomplish these objectives we also 

needed to obtain information on activities that were conducted during Phases I to III and 

consider the impact that the results achieved in those phases had on accomplishing the phase 

objectives covered by the Depot Integrator contract. The information on the construction quality 

issues in the Phase III contracts was obtained from MNSTC-I, and we discussed the issues with 

MNSTC-I officials. We also observed the construction quality issues during a site visit to the 

TNMD. However, we did not review the Phase III contracts’ statements of work, or other 

contract documents that might explain why the construction quality issues occurred. SIGIR 

plans to conduct an audit of the Phase III contract in the near future. 

To accomplish our objectives, we visited or held discussions with officials, and reviewed 

documents and data from the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, Army Materiel 

Command, the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq, and the Iraqi Military. Officials at these organizations included contracting 

officers, senior military officials, program managers, contracting officer representatives, and 

other personnel involved in the management and oversight of these contracts. We visited the 

TNMD in November 2008 and again in May 2009. 

To determine costs we obtained and analyzed relevant contract, financial, and other information 

from these organizations. This information includes the basic contract, task orders, task order 

modifications, and invoices submitted by AECOM for work under the task orders. We reviewed 

and summarized contract obligations and expenditures data received from contracting officials 

and AECOM. We compared initial cost estimates and periods of performance with actual costs 

and status of performance. 

To determine outcomes of the contract, we obtained and analyzed relevant programmatic 

documents and other information on AECOM’s performance. These sources included MNSTC-I 

 

11 Public Law 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 

Afghanistan, 2004. 

12 Public Law 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, January 28, 2008, extended 

requirements in P.L. 108-106 to the Iraqi Security Forces Fund, which provides money for the generation, 

equipping, and training of the Iraqi Security Forces. 
20 

and AECOM weekly progress reports on the work performed and prior audit reports relevant to 

the work being performed. 

To determine the adequacy of contract management and oversight, we obtained and analyzed 

relevant contract documents and quality assurance reports from contracting officer 

representatives. Additionally, we reviewed relevant portions of the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation and government internal control standards applicable to the Depot Integrator contract. 

To understand MNSTC-I’s process for overseeing the Taji contract, we met with officials on site 

and toured the depot level maintenance facilities during our visit to Taji military base. We 

performed our work in Baghdad, Iraq. We performed the audit for this report under the authority 

of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of 

inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We conducted this 

performance audit from March 20, 2009, through July 2, 2009, in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. The standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our results based 

on our audit objectives. Based on those objectives, we believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our results. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We did not use data from computer-based systems to perform this audit. Instead, we used 

financial data provided by contracting personnel to achieve the audit’s objectives. To determine 

the reliability of the data provided, we cross-checked the data provided with other documents in 

the JCC-I/A contract files. SIGIR determined that this data was the best available for purposes 

of our review. 

Internal Controls 

In conducting the audit, we assessed certain internal controls pertinent to the audit objectives 

regarding the administration and oversight of AECOM’s contracts. Specifically, we identified 

and reviewed internal and management control procedures for contract oversight and for 

monitoring and evaluating AECOM activities in the field. To do this, we relied on available 

reports in the contract files and discussions with key oversight officials to understand either the 

JCC – I/A or MNSTC-I’s internal controls. We also did not examine AECOM’s internal 

management and financial control systems. 

Previous SIGIR Reports 

Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities (SIGIR 06-032, 

10/28/2006). 

Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems

(SIGIR 09-014, 4/26/2009) 

 
21 

Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Definition 

AECOM AECOM Government Services 

GRC U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division-Central District 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

OJT On the job training 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

TNMD Taji National Maintenance Depot 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 
22 

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Wilson D. Haigler 

Paul J. Kennedy 

Whitney H. Miller 

Nancee K. Needham 

Jack A. Van Meter 

 
23 

Appendix D—Management Comments 
24 
25 
26 
27 

 
28 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, 

the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Daniel Kopp 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil