## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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### H E L IX 

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### O F F S H O R E 

### I N T E R N A T IO N A L 

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v. 

### K E L V IN 

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F O U R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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Argued January 11, 2017

J U S T I C E D E V I N E delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which C H I E F J U S T I C E H E C H T , J U S T I C E W I L L E T T , J U S T I C E G U Z M A N , and J U S T I C E B R O W N joined.
J U S T I C E J O H N S O N filed a dissenting opinion, in which J U S T I C E G R E E N , J U S T I C E L E H R M A N N , and J U S T I C E B O Y D joined.

The J ones Act provides a compensa tion scheme desig ned to mitigate the unique perils fac ed by “sea men”—mar itime worke rs with a substantial connec tion to a “vesse l in navig ation.” Chandris

v. Latsi s , 515 U.S. 347, 357 (1995). But without straig htforwa rd statutory definitions, and with
courts l eft to wade into a historically murky body of admiralty law, an arr ay of vexing (and inevitable) questions pe rsists. What must a maritime worke r do to be ar an adequate connec tion to

a vessel? What is a vessel in the first place ? And how do we know whether a vessel rema ins innavig ation when it e x its the water for some time? Answer ing the se questions has proven to be , as

the Supreme Court ha s char itably descr ibed the ende avor, “ a diffic ult task.” Id. at 358. Despite rec ent clar ifications on the subject, questions rema in. Be that as it may , we are not without enoug h clar ity to g uide our resolution of t oday ’s case. That t ask requires us to deter mine whether a cer

tain ship—taken out of service , subjected to a 20-m o n th c o nversion proce ss, and unable
to eng ag e in transporta tion during the entirety of the claimant’s onboard employ ment—was “out of navig ation” and thus outside the J ones Act. We must deter mine also whether that question can be

answe red a s a matter of

law.
We answe r both questions in the aff irmative; the vessel was out of navig ation as a matter of law. We acc ording ly reve rse the court of appea ls, which found a fac t question, and we reinstate the trial court’ s summary

judgme nt in favor of

the ship’s owner

. I. Background
I n Aug ust 2012, Helix Energ y Soluti ons Group purcha sed the HEL I X 534 for $85,000,000. Prior to the purcha se, the 534 was laid up in a shipy ard. And upon purcha se, another vessel towed the 534 to the J urong Shipy ard in Sing apore . The 534 ser ved her previous owne r as a drill ship, a ship that drills wells. But Helix purcha sed the 534 with plans to conver t her into a well-interve ntion ship, a ship that service s pre- exis ting of fshore wells. Work beg an upon the 534’s arr ival in Singapor e. Due to the extent of the conver sion, Helix
tu rn ed t h e 5 3 4 over to the control of contra ctors at the shipy ard for completion of the bulk of the overha ul; though, Helix employ ees assisted with minor repa irs. The conversion i nvolved, among other things, removing obsolete equipment, config uring and installing well-interve ntion equipment,
2a

n d o verha uling the eng ines, thrusters, g ener ators, and in-line propulsion equipment. The work d o n e

on the propulsive components rende red the 534 unable to navig ate o n her own for a substantial portion of the conve rsion proce ss. Thoug h Helix in i t i ally expected the conver sion to take five or six months (ending in mid 2013), unanticipated work, labor issues, and trouble procur ing cer tain parts delay ed the conver sion.
I n September 201 3 , with work still to be done, Helix dry -towed the 534 from Singapor e to 1 Galveston, Texas. I n April 2014, 20 months afte r work beg an, the 534 enter ed well-interve ntion service for the first time under Helix’s control. I n total, the 20-month conver sion cost $115,000,000,
or roug hly

135% of the 534’ s purcha se price

. Today ’s dispute involves a pa rticular Helix employ ee, Kelvin Gold. I n November 2012, near the beg inning of the projec t, Helix hired Gold as an “able bodied seama n,” anticipating that he would

serve as an offshore worke r. Consequently , Gold’s responsibility was to familiarize himself with the cra ft and to assist with the overha ul (painting , clea

ning, taking inventory , etc.)

. Gold serve d two alterna ting 28-day hitches betwee n ear ly Dec ember 2012 and Marc h 2013, along with a partial hitch in l ate April 2013. During the entire time Gold worke d aboar d the 534 (almost five months), the ship lacked the ability

to navig ate on he r own due to the overha ul of her e ng ines. Gold repor

ted injuries suffe red aboar d the 534 in D ece mber 2012 and in A pril 2013. Gold then stopped work aboar d the 534 in April 2013, and his em ploy ment cea sed in November 2013.

D r y - t o w i n g i n v o l v e s p l a c i n g a s h i p a b o a r d a s e c o n d s h i p a n d p i g g y b a c k i n g t h e s h i p a c r o s s t h e w a t e r . 1 3Helix paid Gold “maintena nce and cure ” benef

its, benef its available to an injured J ones Act seama n. But He lix terminated the pay ments after

Gold alleg edly

failed to follow his doctor’ s order s. Gold then sued Helix and Helix’s aff iliated enti ties for additional maintenanc e-a nd-cur e benef its as well as actua l and punitive damag es. Gold claimed these reme dies under the J ones Act

as a “sea man” aboar d a “vesse l in navig ation.” Helix disag ree d that the J ones Act applied to Gold’s lawsuit and moved for summary judgme nt on the gro u n d t hat the 534, while underg oing a major overha ul, was not a ve ssel in navig ation. The trial c ourt ag ree d and g rante d Helix’s mot ion. Gold appea led, and the court of appea ls reve rsed. 482 S

. W

. 3 d 6 3 8, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2015). The court observe d that Helix failed to “conc lusively prove that the [534] was totally deac tivated or out of service for an extended peri o d o f t i m e befor e Gold’s injury .” Id. I n turn, the cour t held, “A r easona

ble fac t-finder could deter mine, based on the Helix
534’s phy sical char acte ristics and ac t i vities, that the ship was desig ned to a prac tical deg ree for

car ry ing people or things over water , and the Helix 534’s use as a means of transporta tion on water

was a prac tical possibilit y .” Id. We gr anted He lix ’s petition for re view.
II. Stand ard of Review
We revie w a trial court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt de novo. Provident L ife & Acc

. Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). To preva il on a t raditional motion for summary judgme nt, “a movant must show that no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct ex ists and that it is entitled
to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant , 73 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002)

4(citing T E X
. R. C I V
. P. 166a(c )). When a movant conclusively neg ates an ess en t i al element of a

cause of ac tion, the movant is entitl ed to summary judgme nt on that claim. Id.
Fur thermore , “we take as true all evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant, and we indulge ever y

rea sonable infere nce and reso l v e any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor .” Id. But we cannot disreg ard “conc lusive evidenc e”—tha t evidenc e upon which “re asonable people could not differ in their conclusions.” City of Keller v. W

ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). Ty pically , evidenc e is conclusive when “it conce rns phy sical fac ts tha t cannot be de nied” or “whe n a par

ty admits it i s true.” Id. at 815. Here, Helix bore the burden to conclusively neg ate the “sea man” element of Gold’s J ones Act cla im.
III. Th e Jones Ac t The Jones Act provides that,
A sea man injured in the c ourse of employ ment

. . . may

elec t to bring a

civil action at law, with the rig ht of trial by jury , ag ainst the employ er. L aws of the United States reg ulating rec overy

for pe rsonal injury

to, or dea th of, a railway employ ee apply to an ac tion under this section.
46 U.S.C. § 30104. The heig htened leg al protec tion under the J ones Act “g row[s] out of the status of the seama

n and his peculia r rela tionship to the vessel, and as a fea ture of the maritime law
compensa ting or offse tting the specia l hazards and disadvantag es to which they who g o down to sea in ships are subjec ted.” Chandris , 515 U.S. at 355 (interna l quotations and citations omitt ed).
So who qualifies as a seama n? The J ones Act does not define the term, which left courts to apply the “g ener al maritime law [t hat exis ted] at the time the J ones Act was enac ted.” Id. Alas, the

5traditional admiralty definition was unhelpful; a seama n was “a mariner of any deg ree , one who lives his lif e u p o n the sea.” W

arner v. Goltra , 293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934). For tunately , Congr ess g ave

some context to the term in 1927 when it enac ted the L ong shore and Har bor Workers’ Compensation
Act (L HWCA), which provides cover ag e to “land- based maritime worke rs but which also expli citly excludes from it s cover ag e ‘a master or member of a crew of any vessel.’” Chandris , 515 U.S. at
355 (quoting 44 Stat

. (p ar t 2 ) 1 4 24, as amende d, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)( G)). I n eff ect, Congr ess’s

cre ation of “mutually exclusive” compensa tion reg imes meant that th e L H WC A ’s exclusion actua lly helped to define the t erm “seaman” in the J ones Ac t—i.e., a Jones Act seama n must be a m ember of a cre w of a vessel. See McD ermott Int’l, Inc. v. W ilander , 498 U.S. 337, 347 (1991) (explaining the rela tionship betwee n the acts). But not just any vessel will do. The Supreme Court later clar ified that a J ones Act seama

n must bear a satisfac tory connec tion to a “vessel i n navig ation.” Roper v. United States , 368 U.S. 20, 22–23 (1961). After deca des of navig ating a laby rinth of definitions and admiralty buzz words, the Supreme
Court identified t wo basic components of J ones Act cover age : t h e m ariti me worker mus t (1) be a

cre w member who does the “ship’s work” and (2) have a substantial connec tion t o a v essel in navig ation. Chandris , 515 U.S. at 368. But, like most aspec ts of admiralty law, there is more to this standard tha

n meets the e y e. A. Cre w Mem ber Who Does the Ship’s Work The Supreme Court has clar ified that the worke r’s duties must “contr ibut[ e] to the function of a vessel or to the acc omplishm ent of its mission.” W ilander , 498 U.S. at 355. The require ment thus looks to t he natur e of the person—what does he or she do in relation to the wa terc raf t?

6Her e, Gold was employ ed in anticipation of being an offshore worke r, and his duties plainly

“contr ibute[d] to the function” of the 534. Chandris , 515 U.S. at 368. Helix does not contend that it is Gold’s job descr iption that rende rs him outside J ones Act cover ag e—He lix say s simply that the
534’s conver sion took her out of navig ation. The prese nt dispute there fore does not hinge on Gold’s particula r duties while aboa

rd the 534.
B. Sub stantial Conn ect ion w ith a Vessel In Navigation A J ones Act seama

n must bear a

requisite conne ction—one that is “substantial in terms of both its durat i o n an d i t s nature ”—to a vessel in navig ation. Id. Whether the 534 was a vessel in navig ation is impl icated dir ectly by Helix’s mot ion for summary judgme nt. What is a vessel in navig ation? Ag ain, Congr ess provided some helpful context for the phrase

. I n Section 3 of the Rules of Construction Act, Congr ess define d the word “vesse l” to mean “eve ry descr iption of water -cr aft or other artificia l contrivanc e used, or capa ble of being used, as a

means of transporta tion on water .” 1 U.S.C. § 3. Dra wing on that definition and deca des of case law, the Supreme Court e mphasized in Stewart v

. Dutra Construction Co. that the vessel-in-na vigation require ment asks “whe ther the water cra ft’s use as a means of transporta tion on water is a prac tical possibili ty or mere ly a theore tical one.” 543 U.S. 481, 496 (2005) (interna l quotations and citations omitted). And i n making that deter mination, the S u p re m e C o urt rec ently stressed the importance of considering objective evidenc e of th e s t atus and char acte ristics of the water cra ft in lieu of subjective e vidence of the owne r’s intent. Lozman v. City of Riviera , 568 U.S. 115, 145 (2008).

7Thoug h the v es s el -i n-navig ation issue is couche d as a singula r require ment, two distinct situations can arise. This distinction play s an important role in conce ptualizi ng the crux of today ’s dispute and in dec iding its ultimate outcome.
1. The Design of

the Struct ure The first potential question under the in-navig ati o n fra mework involves the ty pe of
structure —is it desig ned to function in the manner of a seaf aring “vesse l,” or does it mere ly happen
to float? A classic example of thi s d i l em m a i s Lozman , in which the Court analy zed whether a 60-foot by 12-foot floating home was a vessel. 568 U.S. at 118. The Court conclude d the home was
not a vessel, rea soning that “[t] he home has no other fea ture that might sug g est a desig n to transport

over water any

thing other than its own furnishing s and rela ted per sonal eff ects. I n a word, we can find no t h i n g ab out the home that could lead a rea sonable observe r to consider it desig ned to a
prac tical deg ree for ‘transpor tation on water .’” Id. at 122. Numerous case s involve simil ar desig nbased ques tions. See, e.g. , Martin v. Boyd Gaming Corp. , 374 F.3d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2004) (a moored floating casino serve d no transporta tion function and was not a vessel in navig ation); Billiot

v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. , Civ. A. No. 92-2813, 1993 WL 322906, at *3 (E.D. L a. J un. 29, 1993) (a barg e conf

igur ed solely

for use as a w ork platfor

m was not a ve ssel in navig ation). The conver sion of the 534 presen t s n o s u ch controve rsy . Prior to Helix’s purcha se of the 534, the cr aft func tioned as a se afa ring vessel. She transporte d maritime worke rs i n the course of her well-drilling role—pre cisely the ty pe of func t i on perf

ormed by a J ones Act vessel. And the
534’s conver sion, though it g ave her an added well-ser vicing capa city , did nothing to chang e her

8t ra n s p ortation-fa cilitating desig n. I n plain Eng lish, the 534 was, is, and (unless transfor med i n t o something like a

stationary

casino) w ill be a boat. He lix does not sug g est otherwise

. 2. Major Overhauls Diffe rent entirely , though also under the vessel-in-na vigation umbrella, is the principle that “major renova tions can take a ship out of navig ation, even though its use befor e and afte r the work will be the same.” Chandris , 515 U.S. at 374 (citing McKinley v. Al l Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. , 980 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1992)). That is, even when a structure is unquestionably desig ned to eng ag e in maritime transporta tion, an extended overha ul can remove th e structure from navig ation. McKinley , 980 F.2d at 570. This rule is deeply ingr ained in admiralty , dating back to W est v. United
States , in which the Supreme Court held as a matter of law that a vessel withdrawn from service and 2 underg oing a major overha ul was not in navig ation. See 361 U.S. 118, 121–22 (1959). L ower courts have likewise acknow ledg ed and applied the rule. See, e.g. , W ixom v. Boland Marine & Man. Co. , 614 F.2d 956, 957 (5th Cir. 1980) (a three y ear , $25,000,00 0 conversion that included major
structura l chang es such that the ship’s e ng ine and pr opellers we re inope rable for “ at l east some of the time” re ndere d the ship out of navig ation). Yet, at the same time, “a vessel does not cea se to be a vessel when she is not voy ag ing, but is at anchor , berthe d, or dockside,” even when she “is taken to a dry dock or shipy ard to un d ergo
repa irs in prepa

ration to making another trip.” Chandris , 515 U.S. at 373–74 (citations and internal

T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t d i d n o t m a k e e x p l i c i t i n W e s t t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n w a s a s a m a t t e r o f l a w . H o w e v e r , t r a c i n g 2 t h e p r o c e d u r a l h i s t o r y o f t h e c a s e r e v e a l s t h a t W e s t a f f i r m e d a d i s t r i c t c o u r t ’ s m a t t e r - o f

- l a w f i n d i n g . S e e W

e s t v
. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 1 4 3 F

. S u p p . 4 7 3 , 4 8 0 ( E

. D

. P a . 1 9 5 6 ) ( d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e s h i p w a s n o t a s e a w o r t h y v e s s e l ) ; s e e a l s o D a v i d W

. R o b e r t s o n , H o w t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ’ s N e w D e f i n i t i o n o f “ V e s s e l ” i s A

f f e c t i n g S e a m a n S t a t u s , A d m i r a l t y J u r i s d i c t i o n , a n d O t h e r A r e a s o

f M a r i t i m e L a w , 3 9 J

. M A R
. L

. & C O M
. 1 1 5 , 1 5 4 n . 1 8 2 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ( c h r o n i c l i n g W e s t ’ s p r o c e d u r a l m a z e )

.
9quotations omitted). L ower courts have echoe d this sentiment; temporar y and routine repa irs do not take otherwise sea

worthy vessels out of navig ation. See, e .g. , Romero v. Cajun Stabiliz ing Boats,
Inc. , 307 Fe d. App’x 849, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a vessel that was dry -docke d for sever al

wee ks for routine r epair s remaine d in navig ation as a ma tter of law )

. The dichotomy , phrase d in the Court’s lang uag e from W est , is betwee n ordinary , expected “ship’s work” and “complete overha ul[ s].” 361 U.S. at 122; see also Stewart , 5 4 3 U. S

. at 494 (explaining that a vessel does not move out of J ones Act cover ag e when “ber thed for minor repa irs”). Of course , that distinction is a matter of “deg ree ”— at some point “re pairs become sufficie ntly signific ant that the vessel can no longe r be considere d in na viga tion.” Chandris , 515 U.S. at 374. And i n evalua t i n g wh ere a shi p falls on the s pectr um, the S upreme Court enshrined a t ouchstone: “the focus should be upon the status of the ship, the pattern of the repa irs, and the extensive nature of the work contra cted to be done.” Id. (citing W est , 361 U.S. at 122). Over the y ear s, courts have utiliz ed various proxi es in evalua ting the extent of overha uls , b u t n o exhaustive list or uniform
approa ch has e merg ed.
I t bear s emphasis too that t h e d i s t inction betwee n routine, temporar y repa irs and major overha uls is not an arbitra

ry one. The d i s t i n ct i o n m akes g ood sense in the g rea ter context of the
J ones Act, which codified “a fea ture of maritime law compensa ting or offse tting the specia l hazards and disadva

ntag es to which they

who g o down to sea in ships are subjected.” Id. at 355 (c itations omitted). When a maritime worke r suffe rs an inj u ry d u ri ng a routine repa ir, we can confide ntly attribute the worke r’s injury to a risk associate d with “g o[i ng ] down to sea in ships.” Id. After all,

ever y seag oing ship (a

nd thus every

seama n) experienc es routine r epair s from t ime to time. But a

10maritime worke r whose only connec tion is to a ship underg oing a nonroutine, major overha ul incurs risks more akin to those fac ed by land-ba sed construction worke rs—a dang er better addre ssed by the
L on gs h o re and Har

bor Workers’ Compensation Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (cove ring those

non-sea men eng ag ed in maritime employ ment, such as longshor emen “and any harbor -worke r including a

ship repair

man, shipbuilder, and ship-br eake r”)

. Finally , we must addre s s the impact of Stewart , one of the Supreme Court’s most rec ent fora y s into in-navig ation territory

. Stewart dealt with both sides of the in-navig ation coin, answe ring first a desig n-bas ed q u es t i o n: whether a barg e was desig ned to a prac tical deg ree to fac ilitate maritime transporta tion. But Stewart dealt also with re p ai rs : whether a temporary repa ir took the barg e out of navig ation. Wit h respe ct to the repa ir question, Stewart did not eff ectua te a para digm shift from the conce pt that major overha uls take a s h i p o u t o f navig ation; in fac t, the Court

rea ffirme d W

est (the classic overha

ul case ) and the idea that “structur es may lose their char acte r as vessels if they have been withdrawn from the water for extended periods of time.” Stewart , 543 U.S. at 496 (c iting W

est , 361 U.S. at 118).
But Stewart did rec og nize that a major overha ul must car

ry with it a cer

tain eff ect to take a vessel out of navig ation. By broadly stating t h at the in-navig ation require ment “is rele vant to whether the craft is ‘used o r capable of being used’ for m aritime t ranspor tation,” and by stressing th at t h e v es s el in question was not rende red prac tically incapa ble of maritime transport by its temporar y repa ir, the Supreme Court appea rs to have clar ified that only overha uls that rende r ships
prac tically incapa

ble of transporta

tion will take those ships out of navig ation. Stewart , 543 U.S. at 496.

11P ra ct i ca l versus theore tical capa bility to transport over water is, to say the least, a rath er nebulous standard. How exactly such a standard should be applied t o a v ar iety of conce ivable circ umsta n ce s rema ins to be seen. Yet by rea ffirming W est , we can at least di scer n what satisfies
Stewart ’s standard in t h e co n text of a major overha ul. I n W est , the out-of-se rvice ship, while subjected to a substantial renova tion, was incapa

ble of transporta tion on its own and instead had to be towed to the shipy ard for construction work. 361 U.S. at 121–22. There fore , S tewart —at a minimum

— s an ctioned out-of-na viga tion trea tment for those major overha uls that rende r ships 3 incapa ble of self

-transpor tation.
C. The Pr opriety of Su m m ary Judgm ent Under the Jones A ct
Be fore diving into the court of appeals’ analy sis and the summary -j u d gment evidenc e, we
pause to consider the circ umstances in which judgme nt as a matter of law is appropr iate, if ever , on the threshold issue of seama n status. A plaintiff’s status as a seama n under the J ones Act is a mix ed question of law a

nd fac t. Chandris , 515 U.S. at 369. More spe cifica lly , “whe ther a vessel is or is not ‘in navig ation’ for

J ones Ac t purposes i s a fact-intensive question that is normally for the jur

y and not the court to decide .” Id. at 373. Gold stressed this admonition throug hout his briefing , and the court of appea ls did the same, citing the oft-re peate d phrase sever al times in its opinion. See 482

W e n e e d n o t h y p o t h e s i z e a b o u t w h e t h e r S t e w a r t m a k e s i t a n e c e s s a r y ( a s o p p o s e d t o m e r e l y a s u f f i c i e n t ) 3
c o n d i t i o n t o o u t

- o f

- n a v i g a t i o n s t a t u s t h a t a n o v e r h a u l r e n d e r a s h i p i n c a p a b l e o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o n h e r o w n . A s d i s c u s s e d m o r e f u l l y b e l o w , t h e 5 3 4 ’ s o v e r h a u l d i d , i n f a c t , r e n d e r h e r i n c a p a b l e o f s e l f

- t r a n s p o r t a t i o n d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e t y o f G o l d ’ s o n b o a r d e m p l o y m e n t

. 12S.W .3d at 642– 4 4 , 6 50. Yet, at the same time, the Supreme Court and lower courts routinely 4 5
decide the in-navig ation question in major-ove rhaul case s without resor ting to a jury

. How can these

case s be compatible with the Supreme Court’s cautionar y words? Th e an s we r: Despit e the admonishment, the Supreme Court (like this Court) adher es to the time-honored maxi m that we may

remove an issue from the jury ’s consideration “whe re the fac ts and the law will rea sonably support only one conclusion.” Chandris , 515 U.S. at 373 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986)) ; cf. City of Ke l l er , 168 S.W .3d at 814 (explaining that “[b] y definition, [conclusive] evidence can be viewed in only one light, and rea sonable jurors can rea ch only one conclusion fr om it”).
Stewart is particula

rly instructive. There the Supreme Court delivere d its usual caution that
t h e i n -n av i g ation question “may involve fac tual issues for the jury .” 543 U.S. at 496. But immediately there afte r, the Court conclude d, “[H]ere no rele vant fac ts wer e in dispute

. . . the [barg e] was only temporar ily stationary while Stewart and others wer e repa iring the scow; the [barg e] had
not been taken out of service , perma nently anchor ed, or otherwise rende red prac tically incapa ble of maritime transport.” Id. Put differ ently , the barg e in Stewart fell decide dly on the routine-r epair side

S e e , e
. g
. , S t e w a r t , 5 4 3 U

. S

. a t 4 9 6 ( f i n d i n g a b a r g e u n d e r g o i n g m i n o r r e p a i r s t o b e i n n a v i g a t i o n a s a m a t t e r 4
o f l a w ) ; W

e s t , 3 6 1 U

. S

. a t 1 2 2 ( f

i n d i n g a n o u t

- o f

- s e r v i c e s h i p s u b j e c t e d t o a m a j o r o v e r h a u l o u t o f n a v i g a t i o n a s a m a t t e r o f l a w )

. S e e , e . g . , M c K i n l e y , 9 8 0 F

. 2 d a t 5 7 2 ( h o l d i n g t h a t a v e s s e l u n d e r g o i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n v e r s i o n w a s n o t i n 5
n a v i g a t i o n a s a m a t t e r o f l a w ) ; R o m e r o , 3 0 7 F

. A p p ’ x a t 8 5 1 ( h o l d i n g t h a t a v e s s e l t h a t w a s d r y - d o c k e d f o r s e v e r a l w e e k s f o r r o u t i n e r e p a i r s r e m a i n e d i n n a v i g a t i o n a s a m a t t e r o f l a w ) ; W i x o m , 6 1 4 F

. 2 d a t 9 5 7 ( h o l d i n g t h a t a t h r e e - y e a r c o n v e r s i o n t h a t i n c l u d e d m a j o r s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s r e n d e r e d t h e s h i p o u t o f n a v i g a t i o n a s a m a t t e r o f l a w ) ; S a u n d e r s v
. G u l f C o a s t F a b r i c a t i o n , I

n c
. , N o . 1 : 0 2 C V 4 2 W J G

- J M R , 2 0 0 6 W L 1 7 6 6 7 2 2 , a t * 4 ( S

. D

. M i s s . J u n . 2 3 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( h o l d i n g a v e s s e l w a s n o t i n n a v i g a t i o n w h e n u n c o n t e s t e d a f f i d a v i t s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t w a s “ i n c o m p l e t e , u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d s i t t i n g a s h o r e s u p p o r t e d b y c o n c r e t e a n d w o o d s u p p o r t s ” )

. 13of the spectrum, and, with no fac tual disputes to send to the jury , the Court display ed no hesitation

in deciding the question as a matter of law. So long as (1) the rele vant fac ts are not in dispute in the
prese nt case and (2) the 534 falls decide dly on the major-ove rhaul side of the spectrum, neither should we. IV. Analysis Helix first takes issue with three aspec ts of the court of appea ls’ decision: (1 ) t h e court’s relianc e on cer

tain subjective evide n ce o f vessel status; (2) the court’s require ment that an out-of-na vigation ship be “‘pe rmane ntly out of the water ’ with only a ‘re mote possibili ty that [she]
may one day sail ag ain’” and (3) the court’s require ment that a ship be “totally deac tivated or out of service for an extended period of time” befor e the claimant’s injury

. 482 S.W .3d at 648, 650. And second, Helix arg ues that the undisputed evidenc e p ro ves conclusively that the 534 was out of navig ation for pur

poses of Gold’s e mploy

ment. We take the issues in turn.
A. Objective Ver sus S ubjective Evidence The court of appea ls stressed cer tain evidenc e in identify ing an issue wor t h y of jury deter mination, including that “‘e very body ’ ref err ed to the Helix 534 as a vessel.” Id. at 649. Ba sed

on this collective label, the court conclude d that a “re asonable observe r, looking particula rly to the phy sical char acte ristics of the Helix 534, could ‘consider it desig ned to a prac tical deg ree for

car ry ing people or things over water .’” Id. (citing Lozman , 568 U.S. at 121). Gold likewise points
to various communications betwee n Helix and Gold that ref er to Gold as an “able bodied seama n.” Gold arg ues these ref

ere nces prove t h at he was, in fac t, a seama n under the J ones Act. Helix
counter s that relianc e on these labels is improper.

14Reliance on these subjective labels prese nts two problems. First, as Helix sug g est s , t h e

subjective labels of “vesse l” and “able bodied seama n” are the ty

pe of evidenc e the Supreme Court
cast asid e in Lozman , favor ing “objec tive evidenc e” in lieu of “subjec tive elements, such as [t he]

owner ’s intent.” 568 U.S. at 127–28. A court must l ook to the “phy sical attributes” of a c raf t “as objective manifestations,” id. , and (with respe ct to an overha ul case like this one) “the status of the ship, the pattern of the repa irs, and the extensive nature of the work to be done.” Chandris , 515 U.S.
at 374. But there is a more fundame ntal problem with deny ing summar

y judgme nt based on these labels. Even if these labels wer e probative, they would be probative only of issues ancillar

y to the
true dispute in this case —the eff ect of the 534’s conv er sion. L et us assume that a collective ref ere nce to the 53 4 as a “v es s el ” did support the court of appea ls’ conclusion that the 534 was “desig ned to a prac tical deg ree to car ry ing people or things over water .” 482 S.W .3d at 649 (citation omitted). That conclusion is only a piece of the puzz le—a structure has to be desig ned as a seaf aring

cra ft to qualify for vessel status in the first instance

. S ee L o z ma n , 568 U.S. at 122. But the inesca pable conclusion that the 534 is a boat say s nothing about whether the 534 was out of navig ation during her overha ul. See McKinley , 980 F.2d at 570 (“I t is c lear that major renova tions

can take a ship out of navig ation, even though its use befor e and afte r the work will be the same.” ).
Nor are Helix’s ref

ere nces to Gold as an “able -bodied seama n” probative of the dispositi ve issue. No doubt, Gold was hired to do a seaman’s work. But in orde r to be a “sea man” unde r the
J ones Act, one must possess more than the rig ht job description; one must belong to a vessel, and that vessel must be in navig ation. Chandris , 515 U.S. at 368. I f, at the en d o f t h e d ay , He lix

15conclusively neg ated the “in-na vigation” piece of the equation, t h e o ther varia bles become immaterial.
B. P erm anency of the Sh ip’s Ti m e Out of Water
I n finding a lack of conclus i v e evidenc e, the court of appea ls cited Stewart and delineated what it thought to be the dichotomy betwee n minor repa irs and major ove rhauls:
On the one h an d , there is evidenc e that the Helix 534 was not mere ly at anchor , docked for loading or unloading , or berthe d fo r m i n or repa irs—when it would cer tainly rema in a vessel. On the other hand, there is evidenc e that the Helix 534 was not perma nently out of the water with only a remote possibili ty that [i t] may one day sail ag ain—when it would ce rtainly not be a ve ssel.
482 S

. W

. 3 d 6 4 7

– 4 8 (quotations and citations omitted). But Helix arg ues that the court misread
Stewart and in eff

ect tied in-navig ation status to whethe r a s h i p i s expected to sail ag ain. Helix

m ai n t ai n s that the court’s standard cannot comport with the well-e stablished rule that majo r overha uls take ships out of navig ation. After all, do not a vast majority of overha

uls occur f

or the
very purpose of

returning a ship to seawor thiness?
We ag ree with Helix that the court of appea ls misconstrued Stewart and there by skewe d the threshold for summary judgme nt. I n discussing the require ment that a ship be “used, or capa ble of being used” for maritime transporta tion in order to be in navig ation, the Stewart Court differ entiated betwee n the pra ctical a

nd the theore tical:
A ship and its cre w do not move in and out of J ones Act cover age d ep en d i ng on whether the ship is at anchor , docked for loading or unloading , or berthe d for minor repa irs, in the same way that ships taken perma nently out of the water as a prac tical matter do not rema in vessels mere ly beca use of the remote possibili ty that they may one day sail ag ain.

16543 U.S. at 494. The Stewart Court thus used the “ships taken perma nently out of water ” scena rio

as one of sever al hy

perbolic counter examples to those temporar ily berthe d vessels and to illust rate 6
that near ly

ever y water cra ft ca

n be theor etically

made r eady

to sail. See id. I nstead of r eading the
passag e in c ontext —as an exagg era tion to illust rate a conc eptual distinction—the court of appea ls
trea ted the passa g e as e nunciating the standar d for judg ment as a ma tter of law

. But, if mere expectation that a ship will return to sea was enoug h to cre ate a fac t question on in-navig ation status, the prec edential va lue of c ountless major-over haul ca ses would cr

umble. As Helix points out, major overha uls of ten occur with the prec ise g oal of returning a ship to sea. See,
e.g. , W est , 361 U.S. at 122 (a ship was out-of-na vigation as a matter of law despite being renova ted fo r t h e purpose of returning her to sea)

. The Stewart Court made absolutely no indication th at i t intended such a s we ep i n g limit ation of t he overhaul rule. I n fac t, Stewart did just the oppos ite; it

rea ffirme d W

est —the quintessential overha ul case . See 543 U.S. at 496 (citing W est , 361 U.S. at 21, 23).
C. Status of

the Wate rcr aft Pr ior to Injury The court of appeals correc tly outlined Helix’s burden of proof in this case: “H el ix had to establish conclusively that the Helix 534 was not a vessel i n n av i gat i o n at the time of Gold’s injuries.” 482 S.W .3d at 650. But the court then appende d a seconda ry b u rd en by concluding , “He lix did not conclusively prove that the [534] was totally deac tivated or ou t o f s er v i ce for an extended period of time befor e Gold’s injury .” Id. Helix arg u es t h at t his seconda

ry

F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e C o u r t n o t e d a l s o t h a t “ [ a ] s h i p l o n g l o d g e d i n d r y d o c k o r s h i p y a r d c a n a g a i n b e p u t t o s e a , 6
n o l e s s t h a n o n e p e r m a n e n t l y m o o r e d t o t h e s h o r e o r o c e a n f l o o r c a n b e c u t l o o s e a n d m a d e t o s a i l

. ” S t e w a r t , 5 4 3 U

. S

. a t 4 9 8

. 17require ment—that the ship be deac tivated for a signific ant time prior to injury —is improper beca

use it makes J o n es Ac t cover ag e depend on the timing of the plaintiff’s injury , a fac tor that has no bear ing on a

vessel’s in-na

vigation status.
He l i x is corr ect. Whether an overha ul takes a vessel out of navig ation is not d ec i d ed b y looking at the timing of the plaintiff’s injury

. The court of appea ls cited no authority for its temporal
p rer equisite, and, indeed, none exis ts. For g ood rea son: in an overha ul case , the in-n av i gat i o n inquiry depends on the status of the ship and the extensiveness of the overha ul. Chandris , 515 U.S.
at 374. I f the projec t is extensive e noug h to take a ve ssel out of navig ation, it matter s not w hether the claimant suff

ere d his or her injury

ear ly or late in the pr ocess. Additionally , the court of appea ls’ approa ch is in direc t conflict with Chandris

. There , Antonios L atsis, an eng ineer employ ed by Chandris, sailed aboar d one of its vessels and suffe red an
ey e injury

. Id. at 350. L atsis r emained onboard while the vessel underw ent a six -month overha ul. Id. at 351. And L atsis remaine d onboard the now-sea worthy vessel after the projec t’s completion. Id. at 350–51. The primary issue in the case was whether L atsis bore the rig ht ty pe of c onnection to the vessel to qualify

as a se aman. Id. at 349–50.
But Chandris dealt also with an issue more rele vant to the prese nt case —whether the vessel was out of navigation during the overha ul. Id. at 372–73. The Court explained the import of that in-navig ation deter

mination on the g ener al applicability of the J ones Act: “Of course , any time L atsis
sp en t with the [ ship] while t he shi p was out of naviga tion could not count as time spent at s ea for
purposes of that inquiry .” Id. at 373. The Court rema nded for further development of the rec ord but maintained that, upon a c onclusive re cord, “ it is poss ible that Chandris could be e ntitled to partial

18summary judgme nt or a direc ted v er d i ct co ncer ning whether the [shi p] rema ined in navig ation” during the re novation. Id. at 375. The Court’s in-navig ation discussion is telling; the analy sis had nothing to do with the timing of L atsis’ injury

. Nor did the Chandris renova tion beg in an “extended period of time befor e [L atsis’] injury ,” as the court of appeals’ analy sis seems to require. See 482 S.W .3d at 650. Rather, L atsis worke d aboar d the vessel long befor e the conver si o n beg an, y et the Supreme Court left open the possibili ty

for summary judgme nt all the same. Chandris , 515 U.S. at 375. The c ourt of appe als’ timing-of- the-injury prer equisite is thus incong ruous with Chandris

. We instea d f o ll o w th e Su

p r eme Court ’s ad v i ce to examine the status of the ship and extent of the modification in deter mining whether the 534 exited naviga

tion. See id. at 374.
D. Helix’s Entitlem ent to Sum m ary Judgm ent Finally , we r eac h the dispositive question: was the 534 a “vessel i n navig ation” during the

course of its conver sion? We hold as a matter of law that she w as not. 1. The Su m m ary-Judgm ent Evidence First, as we must ask in any summary -judg ment case , are there any rele vant fac tual disputes? 7
The answe r here is no. Helix submitt ed an af fi d av i t from a corpor ate repr esenta tive, J ason Shropshire, that outlines the phy sical char acte ristics of the 534, the extent and cost of the repa irs, and the 534’s ability (or lack there of) to navig ate during the course of Gold’s time onboard. The 534 was laid up at t he ti me of its purcha se. Helix purcha sed t he 534 fo r $ 8 5 , 0 00,000 and orchestra ted t he

G o l d ’ s e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e s u b j e c t i v e l a b e l s o f “ v e s s e l ” a n d “ a b l e b o d i e d s e a m a n , ” d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y , 7
s u p r a S e c t i o n I I I

. A , i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e u l t i m a t e i s s u e : w h e t h e r t h e 5 3 4 ’ s o v e r h a u l t o o k h e r o u t o f n a v i g a t i o n . 19water cra ft’s conver sion from a drill-ship to a well-interve ntion ship. That task was so extensive that

it required the 534 be turne d over to contractor s (thoug h Helix assis ted in the more minor r epair s) at the Jurong shipy ard. The conver sion la sted 20 months a nd cost $115,000,000. And finally , the

conver sion rende red the 534 unable to navig ate o n her own—she needed the assistance of t ug s or tows to move on the wate r—during the entire ty of Gold’s time onboar d. The deposition testim o ny of Gold does not call into question any of the objective char acte ristics of the 534 established above. I n fac t, Gold’s testimony rea ffirms that the 534’s
eng ines wer e inopera

ble and that the ship lacke d the ability to self-pr opel during his time onboard.
As a result, Helix’s evidenc e perta ining to “the status of the ship, the pattern of the repa irs, and the extensive nature of

the work c ontrac ted to be done” went unre butted. W est , 361 U.S. at 122.
For compar ative purposes, this case is unlike Chandris post-rema nd. After the Supreme
Court rema

nded for the district court to consider a mor e d ev el o p ed rec ord, the parties offe red diverg ent ev i d en ce co n cer ning the status of the vessel. See Latsi s v. Chandris , No. 91 Civ. 6900(L AP), 1998 WL 458095, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug

. 4, 1998). The owner testified that the eng ines

wer e inopera

ble during the entire conver sion. Id. But the claimant testified that the repa irs
proce eded on e ach e ng ine sepa rate ly such that the ship maintained its propulsive capa biliti es. Id. The conflicting testimony on a materia l issue thus cre ated a quintessential jury question. The rec ord befor e us today is instead like the one in Stewart , in which the Court observe d that “her e no rele vant fac ts wer e in dispute” befor e ruling on the vessel-in-na vigation question as a matter of law. 543 U.S.
at 496.

20Consequently , we hold that Helix conclusively established the above matters conce rning the

534 and the extent of her conver sion, leaving this Court—as a decide r of questions of law—to apply the rele vant admiralty fra mework and deter

mine whether the 534’s co n v er s i o n took her out of navig ation.
2. Was the 534 a “Vesse l In Navigation ”
Our rea ding of the overha ul jurisprudenc e indicates t hat the 534’s conver sion place s her decide dly in the cate g ory of ships rende red out of navig ation. Ag ain, the y ardstick for our analy sis is “status of the s hip, the pattern of t he repairs, and the ex tensive nature of the work contra cted to be done.” W

est , 361 U.S. at 122. The distinction lies betwee n routine, transitory repa irs incurre d in the ordinary course of a seag oing vessel and overha uls more proper ly char acte rized as land-ba sed endea vors. T h e S upreme Court and others have utiliz ed various considera tions for evalua tin g t h e extensiveness o f an y co n version: (a) the signific ance of the work perf ormed; (b) the cost of

conver sion rela tive to the value of the ship; (c) whether contra ctors exercised control over the work; (d) the duration of the repa irs; and (e) whether the repa irs took the ship out of service

. See, e.g. , id. ; Stewart , 543 U.S. at 496; Newsom v. Jantran, Inc. , NO: 2: 12-CV-150-M- V, 2013 WL 12178166,
at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec

. 9, 2013). And, of course , Stewart tells us that the overha ul must be one that rende rs the ship prac tically incapa ble of tra nsportation. See 543 U.S. at 496. The S upreme Court has not elabor ated on how precisely these c og s fit toge ther. Nor need

we for the purposes of this case ; all of the rele vant considerations indicate that t h e 5 3 4 was not a vessel in navig ation during Gold’s employ ment.

21The work perf ormed on the 534 was signific ant. Not only did the propulsive equipment and other components require repa ir or re place ment, but the ship was purc hased with the ex press goa l of conver sion. A chan ge i n t h e function of the ship—from a drill-ship to a well-interve ntion ship—require d the addition of new equipment and remova l of obsolete equipment. I n terms of W est ,

no one could seriously sug g est that the work perf ormed o n t h e 5 34 was mere ly routine “ship’s work.” 361 U.S. at 122; see also Stewart , 543 U.S. at 494 (cha rac terizing temporar

y , minor repa irs

as those that do not take a vessel out of navig ation). I ndeed, this was not the ty pe of work that Helix could complete on its own. A majority of the construction work took place at the hands of outside
contra ctors at the J urong Shipy ard. See W est , 361 U.S. at 122 (g aug ing the extent of repa irs by the

nece ssity to turn over a ship to the hands of contra ctors). The 20-month duration and $115,000,000 cost of the ove rhaul likewise de monstrate its ext ent. Moreove r, the 534 was out of service for the entire duration of the overha ul. I n fac t, the 534

was laid u p , t aken out of the water , at the time Helix purcha sed her. Helix immediately beg an

conver ting t h e cr af

t to a well-interve ntion ship, and the 534 did not enter service until afte r her transfor mation. The status of the 534 befor e and afte r the conver sion ill ustrates that He lix did not i n cu r t h i s construction projec t in the ordinary course of putting the 534 to a seag oing use. C f

. Romero , 307 F. App’x at 851 (finding a vessel briefly dry -docke d for routine repa irs to be in navig ation). These undisputed fac ts bear a close rese mblance to McKinley , a Ni nth Circuit case the Supreme Court cited with approva l. See Chandris , 515 U.S. at 374 (citing McKinley , 980 F.2d at 567). I n McKinley , All Alaskan conver ted an oil-drill ship into a seag oing fish-and- cra b-proc essing

22s h i p . 9 8 0 F.2d at 568. Simi lar to the work perf ormed on the 534, the McKinley conver sion wa s extensive, costly , perf

ormed mostly by contra ctors, and lasted 17 months. Id. at 568–69. The Ninth
C i rc u i t held as a matter of law that the conver ted ship was not in navig ation while underg oin g construction. Id. at 572. The court of appea ls, howeve r, distinguished t h e 534’s conver sion from McKinley in two
way s. First, the court observe d that the ratio betwee n conver sion cost and pu rchase price in
McKi n l ey (3 3 : 1) was signific antly more than that of the 534 (1.35:1). 482 S.W .3d at 649. And second, the court noted that in McKinley , the v es s el o wn er converted a drill ship into a seafoodproce ssing ship—an entirely differ ent function. Id. (citing McK i n l ey , 9 8 0 F.2d at 568). Her e, howeve r, the 534 would reta in “its drilling capa biliti es and would appea

r as it alway s had.” Id. The
534’s conver sion, the court then conclude d, “could be char acte rized more as an upg rade compar ed to the projec t in McKinley .” Id. Boiled down to its essenc e, the court observe d that the 534’s conver sion was less extensive than the one at issue in McKinley

. True enoug h. But trea ting ev er y as p ec t of McKinley as a
prer equisite to out-of-na

vigation status misunders t an d s the Supreme Court’s test. The differ ence betwee n routine repa irs and major overha uls that take vessels out of navig ation is inhere ntly one of “deg ree .” Chandris , 515 U. S

. at 3 7 4

. Natura lly then, t he out-of-navig ation case s that qualify for judgme nt as a matter of law will likewise vary in deg ree —no two overha uls will ever be identical.
One can alway s conce ive of a bigg er, more extensive conver sion than the one at hand, but that is no

rea son to withhold summary judgme nt in a case falling clea rly on the major-ove rhaul side of th e spectrum.

23And in any event, the Supreme Court has sanctioned summary judgme nt in a case with a less

extensive conver sion than the one we fac e tod ay . I n C handris , the Court explained that “it is possible” that a vessel owner could rec eive s u m m ar y judgme nt as to a six month overha ul upon conclusive proof of signific ant modifications. Id. Thus, the Supreme C o u rt d o es n o t trea t ever y fa ce t of McKinley (or any other case for that matter) as a prer equisite for summary judgme nt. Neither should we. What’s more is that Chandris belies t h e court of appea ls’ complete- conver sion-versusupg rade distinction. I n Chandris , the ship did not underg o a conver sion in functionality at all. See id. Consequently , the Chandris overha ul too could be considere d a mere “upg rade ,” y et the Supreme Court did not foreclose summary judgme nt. Finally , and perha

ps most importantly in light of Stewart , the 534’s conver sion rende red the ship prac tically incapa

ble of transporta tion for months

— t h roug hout the entirety of Gold’s time onboard. We cannot g ive a compre hensive definition for the Supreme Court’s “pra ctically incapa ble of transporta tion” standard. But, in light of Stewart ’s rea ffirma tion of W est, we at least can say with confide nce that a major overha ul that rende rs a ship unable to self-na vigate qualifies for out-of-na vigation status. J ust like the overha ul in W est , the renova tion of the 534 rende re d her unable to self- navig ate. See 361 U.S. at 122. On those fa cts, summary judgme nt may lie. See id. (holding the ship out of navig ation as a ma tter of law ).
I n summary , all of the Supreme Court’s indicators of the extensiveness of the overha ul reve al that the 534’s conver sion war rants out-of-na

viga tion tre atment as a matter of law. So too does the
534’s conver sion war

rant out-of-na

vigation trea

tment under Stewart ’s capa bility -of- transporta tion

24standard. All in all, beca use Gold must have had a substantial connec tion to a vessel in navig ation, and beca use he had no vessel in navig ation upon which to connec t, Gold is not a J ones Act seama n in this l awsuit.
3. Response to the Dissent The dissent conclude s: “[T] he summary judgme nt evidenc e establishes the 534 was not
prac tically capa

ble of eng ag ing in tr ansportation at least from the time G old be g an working on the shi p i n De ce m b er 2012 until the t ime he last worke d aboar d the s hip in April 2013”—a period of almost five months. Post at ___. That is prec isely how we vi ew t h e ev i dence : Helix proved conclusively that an overhaul rende red the 534 prac tically incapa ble of navig ation during Gold’s entire tim e onboard. We there fore d i s agre e not about whether certain evidence is conclusive, but about whethe r ce rtain conc lusive proof satisfies the threshold for summar y judgme nt. The dissent acknowledg es that the overa rching in-navig ation question hinge s on a ship’s
prac tical ability to eng ag e in maritime transporta tion. Post at ___. And the dissent rec og nizes that Helix pro v ed s u ch i nability during Gold’s t ime onboard the 534. Yet the dissent would withhold
summary judgme nt beca

use conclusive proof for t hi s l en gt h o f time is not proof for a sufficie ntly
“exte n d ed p er i o d [ ] of time” to remove a vessel from navig ation as a matter of law. Post at

___ (quoting Stewart , 543 U.S

. at 496) (interna l quotations omitted). I nstead, the dissent sug g ests we
must evalua te t he abilit y of t he 534 to self- navig ate f or some long er, y et undefined “re levant ti me period” extending befor e and afte r Gold’s time aboar d the ship. Post at ____. To do otherwise, the dissent say s, would constitute an improper “snapshot” analy sis. Post at ____. We disag ree on both
counts.

25First, by imply ing that near ly five months is not a sufficie ntly “extended period of time” the

dissent’s approa ch eff

ectively eleva tes the duration of the overha ul (and an inability to self-na vigate)
to the status of a prec ondition. Yet no such rule exis ts. The most the dissent can do is cite Chandris for the proposition that six months of repa ir work “see ms to be a rela tively short period of time for important repa irs on ocea

ng oing vessels.” 515 U.S. at 374. But the Chandris Court simult aneously left open the possibili ty of sum mary judgme nt for a six-month renovation upon a more develope d

rec ord. Id. at 375. Chandris thus prese nts no independe nt, time-based hurdle to summary judgme nt. Nor does Butler v. W

hiteman (anothe r case cited by the dissent) support a temporal threshold.
356 U.S. 271, 271 (1958) (per curia m). We know very littl e of the details surrounding the Supreme
Court’s 1958 per curia m opinion. Thoug h J ustice Har lan explained in dissent that the “tug had been withdrawn from navig ation beca use it wa s inopera

ble” for at least nine months, he g ave no further indication of the work perf ormed (if any

) on the water cra ft, or whether it had been withdrawn from navig ation for minor repa irs or for a more extensive conver sio n p roce ss. Id. at 272 (Ha rlan, J ., dissenting)

. Butler does not explain why the majority id en t i fi ed a j u ry question, and it does not contain any swee ping rule of law that fore closes summary judgme nt for conver sions lasting less than nine m onths. After all, if Butler cre ated a ni n e- m o n t h t h re s hold, why would the Chandris Court have le ft open the possibility of summary

judgme nt for a shor

ter, six-mont h repa ir?
To be sure, the duration of an overha ul (and a ship’s corr esponding inability to navig ate) is

a helpful proxy

—one of many considerations—for evalua ting the overha ul’s extent. See Newsom , 2013 WL 12178166, at *1 (listing the duration of repa irs as one o f s i x fa ctors). But when we are fac ed with conclusive proof of a nonr outine, major over haul, W est , 361 U.S. at 122, that rende rs a
26ship prac tically incapa ble o f t ra n s portation, Stewart , 543 U.S. at 496, it matters not whether the ship’s inability to na

viga te lasted five months, or six months, or a few y ear s. Not only do we have

no prec edential basis for say ing otherwise, any limit we might impose would be inhere ntly arbitra ry . Second, t he dissent sug g ests that our choice to focus on the period of Gold’s onboard employ ment is inappropria te under the Supreme Court’s re p u d i ation of a “snapshot” test. The dissent claims instead that we should evalua te some other, more expansive “re levant period” for the
534’s ca pacity for transportation. We would then find, the dissent say s, that Helix failed to prove that the ship lacke d propulsion during an extended p er i o d b ef ore and afte r Gold came onboard. Ultimately , the dissent’s appr oach misunder stands the “sna pshot” dilemma. Acknowle dg ed first in Chandris , the Supreme Court reje cted the validity of a “snapshot” test when evalua ting the ty

pe of “ac tivity in which a maritime worke r was eng ag ed while injured.” 515
U.S. at 362–63. But what is a snapshot? The Court cl arified that seama n status must not be evalua ted by “ins p ec t i n g o n l y the situation as it exis ts at the instant of injury ; a more enduring rela tionship is contemplated in the jurisprudenc e.” Id. (empha sis added and quotations and citations omitted). I f a c ourt wer e to take suc h a snapshot, it would allow “a worke r [to] oscillate bac k and forth betwee n J ones Act cover ag e an d o th e r r e medies depending on” the worke r’s particula r activity

. Id. The Court reje cted a snapshot an aly sis ag ain in Stewart —this time in the context of the in-navig ation inquiry

. 543 U.S. at 495–96. The Court e mphasized the principle that a “wa terc raf t need not be in motion to qualify as a vessel” and observe d, “a water cra ft [does not] pass in and out of J ones Act cover ag e depending on whether it was moving at the t i me o f t he accide nt .” Id. at 495–96 (empha sis added and quota tions and citations omitt ed).

27Our analy sis of Gold and the 534 prese nts no conce ivable snapshot dilemma. As a matter

of plain Eng lish, it is hard to imag ine how observing the 534’s status throug hout the en t i re t y of Gold’s purported J ones Act connec tion—almost 5 months—can fairly be considere d a “snapshot.” And fortunately , there is no need to ponder t he term’s meaning ; the S upreme Court made ex plicit that the ty pe of prohibited snapshot is one that focuse s on the “instant of injury ,” Chandris , 515 U.S.
at 363, or the “time of the acc ident,” Stewart , 543 U.S. 495–96. When courts look with tunnel vision to the day of the injury , they risk mischara cter izi ng the status of an otherwise seaw orthy ship. Our analy sis does no such thing; we evalua te the extensiveness of the renova tion as a wh o l e an d the 8
status of the 534 during Gold’s entire time onboard, not just on the day (or day s) of his injury

. We do not cher

ry -pick a point in ti me that does not ade quately char acte rize the true status of t he shi p; the 534 rema ined stag nant—incapa ble of self-tra

nsit—throughout the entire time Gold claims J ones Act cove rag e. Snapshots a side, no case supports the dissent’s contention that we must require conclusive proof of incapa city for transporta tion throug hout some rele vant time befor e and afte r the claimant’s

connec tion to the ship. I nstead, Chandris tells a differ ent story

. There the Court explained that the

connec tion betwee n a s ea m an an d t he vessel in navig ation must be “substantial in terms of its duration and its nature .” 515 U.S. at 368. The Court said also that “any time [ the claimant] spent with the [shi p] while the ship was out of navig ation could not count as time spent at sea for purposes

o f t hat inquiry .” Id. at 373. We conclude (and the dissent rec og nizes) simply that t h e 5 3 4 wa s

O f c o u r s e , t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e p r o j e c t i s m a t e r i a l t o o u r a n a l y s i s

— t h e 5 3 4 ’ s e n t i r e 2 0

- m o n t h o v e r h a u l 8 i n f o r m s o u r e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e c o n v e r s i o n ’ s e x t e n s i v e n e s s a n d s o l i d i f i e s t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e p r o j e c t i s a m o n g t h o s e

“ c o m p l e t e o v e r h a u l [ s ] ” w o r t h y o f o u t

- o f

- n a v i g a t i o n t r e a t m e n t

. S e e W e s t , 3 6 1 U

. S

. a t 1 2 2

. 28prac tically capa ble of maritime transporta tion for no time during which Gold could claim a J ones Act

connec tion to the ship. That proof meets the thre shold for summary judgme nt. V. Conclusion Admiralty law is not alway s a model of clar ity —the J ones Act is no exception. Yet we can

never theless discern one rule of law with confide nce: m aj o r overha uls that rende r water cra ft
prac tically incapa

ble of transporta tion are sufficie nt to remove those cra fts fr o m “vessel in navig ation” status. As the S upreme Court has said time and aga in, analy zing t hat i ssue wil l often involve fac t questions worthy of jury consideration

. But here , absent any such disputes about rele vant fac ts, and fac ed with conclusive proof above and bey on d the threshold for summary judgme nt, we hold as a matter of law that the 534 was not in navig ation and there fore that the J ones Act did not apply

during the cour se of Gold’ s employ ment. Be caus e t h e co u rt of appea ls held otherwise, we reve rse, and we reinstate the trial court’s
summary judgme nt in favor of

Helix.

___________________________

J ohn P. Devine J ustice
OP INION DELIVERED : J une 16, 2017

29