alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# CI2020072EN.01000101.xml

| 5.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CI 72/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CI 72/1

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 27 February 2020

appointing a chairperson of a Board of Appeal and extending the term of office of a chairperson of a Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office

(2020/C 72 I/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (1), and in particular Article 166(1) and (3) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 22 November 2019, a list of candidates for the post of chairperson of a Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) was submitted to the Council by the Management Board of the EUIPO. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 22 November 2019, a list of candidates for the post of chairperson of a Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) was submitted to the Council by the Management Board of the EUIPO.

| (2) | On 19 November 2019, the Management Board of the EUIPO decided to propose to the Council the extension of the term of office of Mr Detlef SCHENNEN as chairperson of a Board of Appeal of the EUIPO for an additional period of five years, as from 1 November 2020, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 19 November 2019, the Management Board of the EUIPO decided to propose to the Council the extension of the term of office of Mr Detlef SCHENNEN as chairperson of a Board of Appeal of the EUIPO for an additional period of five years, as from 1 November 2020,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   Ms Virginia MELGAR, born in Minas (Uruguay) on 19 July 1959, is hereby appointed chairperson of a Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) for a term of five years.

2.   The date on which the five-year term referred to in paragraph 1 commences shall be determined by the Management Board of the EUIPO.

Article 2

The term of office of Mr Detlef SCHENNEN as chairperson of a Board of Appeal of the EUIPO is hereby extended from 1 November 2020 to 31 October 2025.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 27 February 2020.

For the Council

The President

D. HORVAT

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(1)  OJ L 154, 16.6.2017, p. 1.

1

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www.gpo.gov

### §500g. Distribution of reindeer, property, and profits to natives

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to distribute the reindeer and other property acquired by the United States under this subchapter among the Eskimos or other natives of Alaska, or to corporations, associations, or organizations of said natives, either in the form of gifts or under such conditions as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe, and to execute and deliver appropriate instruments of title, or to hold and use the same in trust for the use and benefit of said natives, with a view of effecting the widest possible distribution of such reindeer and other property among those natives of Alaska who are in need thereof and who can make proper use of the same: *Provided*, That during the period of the trust, income derived directly from the sale of reindeer and reindeer products as provided in this subchapter shall be exempt from Federal income taxation. The Secretary of the Interior may from time to time, in such manner as he determines to be proper for effectuating the purposes of this subchapter, distribute among those of said natives or corporations, associations, or other organizations of said natives, who are engaged in said industry or business or for whose subsistence reindeer are necessary, whatever profits may be earned by that part of the industry or business which is owned by the United States and which may, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior, be distributed in accordance with sound business practice.

(Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 897, §8, 50 Stat. 901; Pub. L. 99–514, title XVII, §1709(a), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2783.)

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 250g of Title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions.

#### Amendments

1986—Pub. L. 99–514 inserted proviso directing that during the period of the trust, income derived directly from the sale of reindeer and reindeer products as provided in this subchapter shall be exempt from Federal income taxation.

#### Effective Date of 1986 Amendment

Section 1709(b) of Pub. L. 99–514 provided that: “The amendment made by this section [amending this section] shall take effect as if originally included in the provision of the Act of September 1, 1937, to which such amendment relates.”
<PAGE>

                                                                 Exhibit 10.05

                                PROMISSORY NOTE

$859,516.18                                            EDEN PRAIRIE, MINNESOTA
                                                             NOVEMBER 29, 1995

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, LaserMaster Corporation, a Minnesota
corporation ("Maker"), hereby agrees and promises to pay to the order of
Marubeni International Electronics Corporation ("Holder"), at its address of 20
William Street, Wellesley, MA 02181 or at any other place designated by the
holder hereof, in lawful money of the United States, the principal sum of Eight
Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Dollars and Eighteen Cents
($859,516.18), together with interest on the principal amount at the lesser of
ten percent (10%) per annum, or the maximum allowed by the law.  The principal
amount and interest shall be due and payable as follows: Principal in the amount
of $429,758.09 shall be due and payable on March 29, 1996 with the final payment
of the remaining principal and interest due and payable on May 29, 1996.  This
note may be prepaid without penalty in whole at anytime, or in part from time to
time prior to the final payment.

This note is a Minnesota contract and Holder may seek to enforce it in any court
sitting in the State of Minnesota and Maker specifically consents to both the
subject matter and personal jurisdiction of such courts.  Service of process may
be made by registered or certified mail in addition to the methods allowed by
law.

LASERMASTER CORPORATION


/s/ Melvin L. Masters, CEO
-------------------------------------------
Name and Title printed: Melvin L. Masters, Chief Executive Officer

Address:  7156 Shady Oak Road
          Eden Prairie, MN 55344

Subscribed and sworn to before me a Notary Public this 29th
day of November, 1995.


-------------------------------------------
Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

Seal
#### Raquel DEL CARMEN DEL CID, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT,* Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 00-70041.

INS No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 10, 2002 **.

Decided June 18, 2002.

Before O’SCANNLAIN, BERZON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

John Ashcroft is substituted for Janet Reno pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2).

**

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Raquel Del Carmen Del Cid, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal of the Immigration Judge’s order denying her application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), and denying her request for voluntary departure. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the denial of cancellation of removal where the BIA’s decision is based on a non-discretionary determination. *Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft,*277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition because Del Cid gave false testimony at her hearing and is therefore statutorily ineligible for relief. *See 8*U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6); *See id; Kalaw v. INS,*133 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that under the transitional rules, determination of per se ineligibility is not discretionary).

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of voluntary departure. *See 8*U.S.C. § 1229c(f); *Montero-Martinez,*277 F.3d at 1144.

We deny as moot petitioner’s motion for stay of removal pending decision of this Court.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
TECHNOLOG YEMPOWERIN G

th e LODGIN G INDUSTR Y 

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Richard D . Munson , CE

O Multi-Systems , Inc . RDM:kg Cc : Matthe wRemyns e Dickinso n Airpor t 

### 7600 North15t

hStreet Suite #25 0 • Phoenix , A Z8502 0 . (800 ) 331-789 0 . (602 ) 870-420 0 . fax : (602 ) 861-371 1 www.msisolutions.co m• c-mail : info@msisolutions.co m
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 10, 2021. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 10, 2021 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A22D0112. GEORGIA GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE COMMISSION v. NEW GEORGIA PROJECT ACTION FUND et al. .
Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 2019CV329485
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### F I L E D Octob er 18 , 20 10
Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm ined t hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 09-20371 Document: 00511265391 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/18/2010
§ 16.23 Subpoenas for attendance at hearing. ( a ) A party wishing to procure the appearance and testimony of any individual at the hearing may request that the ALJ issue a subpoena.
( b ) A subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony of an individual may also require the individual to produce documents at the hearing.
( c ) A party seeking a subpoena shall file a written request therefor not less than 15 days before the date fixed for the hearing unless otherwise allowed by the ALJ for good cause shown. Such request shall specify any documents to be produced and shall designate the witnesses and describe the address and location thereof with sufficient particularity to permit such witnesses to be found.
( d ) The subpoena shall specify the time and place at which the witness is to appear and any documents the witness is to bring with him or her.
( e ) The party seeking the subpoena shall serve it in the manner prescribed in § 16.8. A subpoena on a party or upon an individual under the control of a party may be served by first class mail.
( f ) A party or the individual to whom the subpoena is directed may file with the ALJ a motion to quash the subpoena within ten days after service or on or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance if it is less than ten days after service.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Angel Cruz, Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 763]

*1110Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Barry M. Donalty, J.), rendered October 24, 2002. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), defendant contends that County Court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach a prosecution witness with prior statements and the grand jury testimony of that witness. That contention is not preserved for our review *(see People v Marzug,*280 AD2d 974, 974-975 [2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 904 [2001]; *People v Secrest,*236 AD2d 839, 840 [1997], *lv denied*90 NY2d 863 [1997]) and, in any event, is lacking in merit. The court properly allowed the People to impeach their own witness because their case was affirmatively damaged by the in-court testimony of that witness that defendant was not the perpetrator of the crime *(see generally People v Saez,*69 NY2d 802, 804 [1987]; *People v Fitzpatrick,*40 NY2d 44, 51 [1976]; *People v Brazzeal,*172 AD2d 757, 759-760 [1991]). Similarly, defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in granting the prosecutor a brief recess in order to confer with a witness *(cf. People v Branch,*83 NY2d 663, 665-666 [1994]) and, in any event, that contention is without merit *(see generally id.*at 665; *People v Smith,*240 AD2d 949, 950 [1997]).

Defendant further contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence because the principal prosecution witness gave conflicting testimony regarding the crime. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the testimony of that prosecution witness was not incredible as a matter of law, and we see no basis to disturb the jury’s credibility determination with respect to that witness *(see generally People v Butler,*2 AD3d 1457 [2003], *lv denied*3 NY3d 637 [2004]; *People v Coleman, 278*AD2d 891 [2000], *lv denied*96 NY2d 798 [2001]). It cannot be said that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded, and we thus conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Hurlbutt, Gorski and Smith, JJ.
**Map Collections**

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[Rights and Reproductions]

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**Pakistan, administrative divisions.**

United States. Central Intelligence Agency.

**CREATED/PUBLISHED** [Washington : Central Intelligence Agency, 2010]

**NOTES**Includes location map. 

"803473AI (G02807) 12-10." 

 Scale 1:10,000,000 ; Lambert conformal conic proj., standard parallels 23�33' N/35�44' N.

**SUBJECTS**Pakistan--Administrative and political divisions--Maps.Maps.Pakistan.

**MEDIUM**1 map : col. ; 21 x 17 cm.

**CALL NUMBER**G7641.F7 2010 .U5

**REPOSITORY**Library of Congress Geography and Map Division Washington, D.C. 20540-4650 USA 

**DIGITAL ID****g7641f****ct003264** http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/**g7641f**.**ct003264**

**PREVIOUS****NEXT****NEW SEARCH**
§ 31.3406(b)(3)-3 Reportable payments by certain fishing boat operators. ( a ) *Payments subject to backup withholding.* A payment of a kind, and to a payee, that is required to be reported under section 6050A (relating to information reporting by certain fishing boat operators) is a reportable payment for purposes of section 3406. See § 31.6051-4 for the requirement to furnish a statement to the payee if tax is withheld under section 3406.
( b ) *Amount subject to backup withholding.* The amount described in paragraph (a) of this section subject to withholding under section 3406 is the amount subject to reporting under section 6050A, but only to the extent the amount is paid in money and represents a share of the proceeds of the catch.
[T.D. 8637, 60 FR 66119, Dec. 21, 1995]
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**Certification of Chief FinancialOfficerPursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Merit Medical Systems, Inc. (the “Company”)for the quarter ended September  30, 2009 (the “Report”), I, Kent W.Stanger, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

(1)   The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)   The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

 
| Date: November 5,  2009 | /s/ Kent W. Stanger                                    |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
|                         | Kent W. Stanger                                        |
|                         | Chief Financial Officer  (principal financial officer) |

 

This certificationaccompanies the foregoing Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not,except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemedfiled by the Registrant for purposes of Section 18 of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended.  A signed original of this certificationhas been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

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39936.

#### CAWTHON et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.

Frankum, Judge.

This case is a companion case to *Ford Motor Co. v. Williams,*108 Ga. App., the plaintiffs in error herein being the codefendants with Ford Motor Company in the trial court, and separate appeals having been prosecuted to this court. The plaintiffs in error herein filed joint general and special demurrers which were overruled, and that judgment is assigned as error here.

1. Insofar as the general demurrer of these defendants is concerned the ruling in the *Ford Motor Co.*case is an adjudication that the petition states a cause of action. In trespass cases all are principals *(McDougald v. Dougherty,*12 Ga. 613), and it was sufficient as against the general demurrers of these defendants for the plaintiff to allege merely that “said acts of the defendants were done illegally . . . and were done without authority.” *Ragland v. Simpson,*96 Ga. App. 405 (100 SE2d 135).

2. While the original petition alleged that the defendants were *887police officers, the recast petition does not so allege, and it is not therefore subject to the construction that the acts of the defendants here involved were presumptively lawfully done in their official capacity. The demurrers which raise this point are speaking demurrers and are therefore without merit. *Beckner v. Beckner,*104 Ga. 219, 222 (1) (30 SE 622).

Decided June 5, 1963.

*Benj. B. Blackburn, III, Randolph Karsh, Hansell, Post, Brandon & Dorsey, J. William Gibson,*contra.

*Phillips & Johnson, Ezra E. Phillips, James H. Archer, Jr.,*for plaintiffs in error.

3. None of the other grounds of special demurrer filed by these defendants are meritorious. Many of these grounds are incomplete in that they fail to point out wherein or how the petition is defective as contended. As such the grounds of demurrer are themselves incomplete. “ ‘A special demurrer which is itself vague, uncertain, and indefinite, and does not specifically point out wherein the petition is defective, will not be considered by the court.’ *Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Hill,*21 Ga. App. 231 (94 SE 50). It has been held many times that a demurrer, ‘being a critic, must itself be free from imperfection.’ This is particularly true of a special demurrer, which must point out clearly and specifically the alleged imperfection in the pleading attacked by it. It ‘must lay its finger, as it were, upon the very point.’ *Alford v. Davis,*21 Ga. App. 820 (4a) (95 SE 313).” *Martin v. Gurley,*74 Ga. App. 642, 643-4 (1) (40 SE2d 787). The court did not err in overruling the demurrers filed by the defendants Banks and Cawthon to the plaintiff’s petition.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*