In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 18‐2525

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MICHA EATMAN,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 17 CR 00119 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2019

Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. After a heated argument with his

girlfriend, Micha Eatman found himself pounding on her

apartment door and yelling to be let inside. Chicago police

officers arrived in response to a 911 call and, within moments,

they friskedEatman, seizeda loadedhandgun, and placedhim

in handcuffs. Officers then asked Eatman to produce the gun’s
2 No. 18‐2525

registration. The officers also spoke to his girlfriend, who

refused to sign a police complaint. They then took Eatman to

the police station, where a background check revealed two

prior felony convictions. Eatman was turned over to federal

authorities and indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Eatman moved to suppress

the gun, arguing that he was searched without reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity and arrested without probable

cause since, at the time he was handcuffed, the officers did not

know that he possessed the gun unlawfully. The district court

denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable

suspicion when they found Eatman attempting to gain access

to the apartment and that the officers arrested Eatman only

afterinquiring whether he hadregistrationforthe gun.Eatman

entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal

the denial of his motion to suppress.

On appeal, Eatman concedes the police officers had

reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk but argues he was

arrested without probable cause when he was handcuffed and

thus his felon status shouldbe suppressed.Because we findthe

use of handcuffs on Eatman to be reasonable, we affirm.

I.  BACKGROUND

On August 19, 2016, at 5:09 a.m., the Chicago Police

Department received a call from a security guard reporting a

domestic disturbance at an apartment building located at

6425 South Lowe Avenue in the Englewood neighborhood of

Chicago. Just moments before, a tenant of the building called

security to report that her boyfriend had hit her and was trying
No. 18‐2525 3

to gain access to her apartment. The 911 call led to the dispatch

of two Chicago Police units, each receiving this message:

“security officer brooks states m/b mikah beat‐

ing f/b trinidad 2 children in the apartment no

drinking/no drugs cs possibly may have gun cs

she is req. more than 1 unit. cs he may try to

leave building,. nfi”

The 911 call reported more specific information, for

instance that there was likely a gun involved but a question as

to whether Eatman or his girlfriend had the gun. The security

guard did not say Eatman beat his girlfriend, but responded

“yes” when the dispatcher asked if Eatman “touched” her.

Both units received the message in their patrol cars’ computer

system in the minutes prior to arrival.

Four police officers entered the building and briefly spoke

with security guards before being escorted to the 19th floor.

According to the two officers who testified at the suppression

hearing, the guard escorting them upstairs reiterated that

Eatman may have a gun. As they exited the elevator, the

security guard directed the officers towards the apartment; the

four officers observed Eatman pounding on the door and

yelling to be let inside.

Once the officers approachedEatman,they toldhim to back

away from the door and put his hands on the wall. Officer

Alvarez frisked Eatman and found a loaded handgun tucked

into his waistband. Alvarez placed the gun into his pocket and

handcuffed Eatman with Officer Rangel’s assistance.
4 No. 18‐2525

The exact timing of what transpired after Eatman’s hand‐

cuffing is unclear, but otherwise the factual record is undis‐

puted. Eatman’s girlfriend emerged from the apartment and

spoke with the officers. According to the officers, she was more

concerned about $300 that she wanted from Eatman; she

ultimately refused to sign a criminal complaint against

Eatman. The officers asked Eatman if he had a Firearm Owners

Identification card or a conceal‐and‐carry license. Although

neither Rangel nor Alvarez testified as to how Eatman re‐

sponded, their interviews with the United States Attorneyʹs

Office and the district court record show that Eatman claimed

the gun was his girlfriendʹs and that he took it to keep the gun

away from the children.

The officers then transported Eatman to the police station,

where a background check revealed his prior felony convic‐

tions. Eatman was read his Miranda rights at 8:17 a.m. and then

admitted to having knowingly possessed the gun. Eatman was

turned over to federal authorities and charged with one count

for possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1).

Eatman filed a motion to suppress the gun, arguing that the

officers lackedreasonable suspicion toperform a frisk andthey

had arrested Eatman without probable cause when they

handcuffed him without knowing whether he could lawfully

possess the gun. At the suppression hearing, Officers Rangel

and Alvarez both testified that they had experience with

domestic disturbances and considered the apartment building

to be located in a high‐crime area.
No. 18‐2525 5

The district court denied the motion to suppress and wrote

an order the next day. Having found the officers’ testimony

to be credible, the court held that the officers had reasonable

suspicion to frisk Eatman and handcuff him for security

reasons andthat, after asking Eatman forregistration,they had

probable cause to arrest him for possessing a firearm in

violation of Illinois law. The district court added that the

officers arguably hadprobable cause to arrestEatman for other

crimes as well, including disturbing the peace, the alleged

domestic incident, and the alleged theft. Accordingly,the court

denied the motion.

II.  DISCUSSION

On appeal, Eatman does not dispute the district court’s

determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion to

conduct a frisk, but renews the argument that he was arrested

upon being handcuffed and, at that moment, the officers

lacked probable cause. Eatman argues that since his prior

convictions were only discovered as a result of this illegal

arrest, his felon status should be suppressed. In reviewing the

district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review

factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.

United States v. Stewart, 902 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2018).

The instant case and our affirmation of the district court’s

ruling is best understood as part of the progeny of Glenna,

which holds that police officers may use reasonable means to

effectuate an investigatory stop, including but not limited to

the use of handcuffs. United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967 (7th

Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2011). After the
6 No. 18‐2525

Supreme Court’s ruling in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),

which recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth

Amendment seizures of persons must be based on probable

cause,the circuit courts have consistently authorized the use of

handcuffs so long as their use was a “reasonably graduated

response to the demands of the situation[.]” Glenna, 878 F.2d at

972;see United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786 (11th Cir. 1985);

United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983). Specifically,

“in evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop, we

examine first whether the officers’ action was justified at its

inception, and second, whether it was reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in

the first place.” Glenna, 878 F.2d at 971. To the extent that

Eatman argues that his handcuffing was necessarily an arrest,

his argument goes against established precedent. Rabin v.

Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 635 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that, “given the

safety risks at stake,it was reasonableunder clearly established

law for the officers to temporarily detain Rabin pending the

verification of his gun carry license”).

First, Eatman does not dispute the district court’s finding

that the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the

investigatory Terry stop. As the district court determined,

Eatman was found engaging in the exact conduct that the

complaint alleged: “[t]he security officers directed the police

officers to the location of the caller and when they arrived on

the scene outside the exact apartment, they observed the exact

behavior described to them and conveyed to them by both

the dispatcher and the security officers.” The police officers

received credible information that Eatman had just harmed his

girlfriend and may have a gun. The district court judge found
No. 18‐2525 7

“[the officers’]testimony was notimpeachedoncross examina‐

tion and was credible.”

Eatman’s argument relies on finding that his handcuffing

was an arrest or de facto arrest and without probable cause

since the officers only asked him about the Firearm Owner

Identification card and conceal‐and‐carry license after the

handcuffing. The parties and the district court agreed that

probable cause turned on a question that the officers asked

Eatman while he was undoubtedly in police custody. Smith, 3

F.3d at 1097–98 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655

(1984)). However, as in Glenna where police officers asked for

consent to search a car for registration papers, this question

alone is not a custodial interrogation since it is not designed to

norlikely to elicit testimonial evidence. Glenna, 878 F.2d at 972.

The district court specifically found that the officers

“searched and handcuffed [Eatman] based on the need to

secure the situation and forthe safety of all involved including

the responding officers.” Eatman does not argue that this

finding was clearly erroneous but instead asks this court to

find that the use of handcuffs was unreasonable because his

gun had already been seized, he had not acted violently

toward the police, and because the four officers outnumbered

him in the hallway while his girlfriend was locked inside the

apartment. This request asks this court to substitute our

judgment forthe police officers’ legitimate concerns, a request

we will not entertain.

Thedispatch to the police officers reportedthatEatman had

committed battery against his girlfriend, that he may have a

gun, and that he could try to escape. Moreover, this informa‐
8 No. 18‐2525

tion came from a security guard who explicitly requested two

units. When the officers frisked Eatman, they found a gun that

further corroborated the information they had received.

Whether or not the officers had probable cause to arrest him

for the battery or disturbing the peace, they had reason to

believe he may be combative or try to escape. The officers

decided the best way to control the volatile situation was to

handcuff Eatman and remove him from the door so they could

speak to the girlfriend. The officers’ experiences in conjunction

with the information presented to them made the use of

handcuffs reasonable in relation to the gravity of the situation.

Upon handcuffing Eatman, they spoke to both him and his

girlfriend in order to determine whether he committed any

crime. Although the record is unclear as to the exact time the

officers inquired about Eatman’s gun registration, the district

court determined this occurred shortly after he was

handcuffed.In this case,the district court properly determined

that the use of handcuffs was not an arrest butrather a method

tode‐escalate the situation andallow the officers to investigate.

Finally, we agree with the district court that the officers

likely had probable cause to arrest Eatman for either the

domestic battery or disturbing the peace. This court’s prece‐

dent suggests the officers had probable cause for the domestic

battery based on the information provided by the security

guards and the fact they found Eatman trying to enter the

apartment. Sheik‐Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240 (7th Cir. 1994)

(holding officers had probable cause to arrest for domestic

battery based on the report of a paramedic); United States v.

Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding officers had

probable cause when the suspect matched the description of
No. 18‐2525 9

the robber of a nearby bank). With regard to disturbing the

peace, Eatman was found yelling and pounding on his girl‐

friend’s apartment door in the early morning, which led his

girlfriend to contact the security guards; therefore, the officers

likely had probable cause to arrest him for that crime as well.

III.  CONCLUSION

We conclude that the district court did not err in its denial

of Eatman’s motion to suppress when it decided that the

officer’s decision to handcuff Eatman was a reasonable means

to effectuate the investigatory stop. The judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.