THE FOUR-YEAR EFFORT

President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009

Contributions of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

to secure the world’s most vulnerable nuclear material 

by December 2013
Today I am announcing 

a new international effort 

to secure all vulnerable 

nuclear material around 

the world within four 

years. We will set new 

standards, expand our 

cooperation with Russia, 

pursue new partnerships 

to lock down these 

sensitive materials.”

Global Threat 

Reduction Initiative

Securing vulnerable nuclear and radiological material 

at civilian sites worldwide

President Barack Obama

Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009

“

T h e Fo ur - Y ear E ff o rt REDUCING NUCLEAR DANGERS 1
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President Obama’s nuclear security agenda, 

laid out in his historic speech in Prague on 

April 5, 2009, included a vision of a world free 

of nuclear weapons, ending the production of 

fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear 

weapons and ensuring that terrorists never 

acquire a nuclear weapon. In support of that last 

goal, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) led the 

United States’ effort to implement President 

Obama’s call to secure all vulnerable nuclear 

material around the world within four years, set 

new security standards, expand our partnership 

with Russia, and pursue new partnerships to lock 

down sensitive materials. 

This effort was supported by NNSA’s international 

partners who convened two Nuclear Security 

Summits, bringing countries together based 

on a shared recognition—at the highest levels 

of government—of the dangers of nuclear and 

radiological proliferation. The summits reinforced 

the importance of the global nuclear security 

architecture and emphasized the importance of 

securing and, when possible, eliminating nuclear 

and radiological materials. These unprecedented 

gatherings of world leaders recognized that 

nuclear and radiological terrorism continues 

to be a grave threat and that defeating this 

threat requires strong national measures and 

international cooperation.

NNSA Leads the Implementation 

of the Four-Year Effort

NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

(DNN) has, for more than a decade, significantly 

reduced the danger of nuclear terrorism. NNSA’s 

efforts have focused on preventing terrorists 

from acquiring the most dangerous of nuclear 

materials, namely highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

and plutonium. Even small amounts of these 

materials could be used to create a catastrophic 

nuclear weapon with the ability to kill hundreds 

of thousands of people. In support of President 

Obama’s Four-Year Effort to secure the world’s 

most vulnerable nuclear material, DNN completed 

security upgrades at 32 sites in Russia (for a total 

of 218 sites), removed more than 5,060 kilograms 

of nuclear material, removed all HEU from 

12 countries/locations, completed 24 bilateral 

physical protection assessments of foreign 

facilities holding U.S.–obligated nuclear material, 

and provided physical protection training to 

nearly 2,500 foreign officials either bilaterally 

with partnering countries or multilaterally with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Despite these successes, there also have been 

challenges, which is why we need to continue 

to bring both the scientific tools and political 

commitment to bear on addressing the 

nonproliferation issues that continue to face the 

global community. 

2 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 3
GTRI and the Four-Year Effort

Completion of this monumental effort required 

the hard work and dedication of hundreds of 

individuals from DOE, other U.S. government 

organizations (the White House; the departments 

of State, Defense, and Transportation; the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission; and multiple U.S. 

embassies abroad), the U.S. national laboratories 

(including Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho 

National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory, the Savannah River National 

Laboratory, the Savannah River Site, and the Y-12 

National Security Complex), law enforcement, the 

IAEA, and international partners in 27 countries.

The completion of a typical nuclear material 

removal or elimination project includes a variety 

of political, technical, and regulatory activities, 

including negotiating government-to-government 

agreements, converting reactors and isotopeproduction facilities from using HEU to LEU fuel/

targets, providing upgrades to reactor facilities 

and physical protection systems, stabilizing and 

processing material, packaging material, obtaining 

certifications and permits for packaging and 

transport, transporting the material to its final 

destination, and downblending HEU to LEU. 

Throughout this effort, GTRI and its partners 

overcame several significant technical obstacles.

The program’s noteworthy technical achievements 

included the first international transport of spent 

fuel by air, the first transport of both separated 

plutonium and non-U.S.–origin spent fuel to the 

United States, the first known reuse of previously 

irradiated research reactor fuel, the development 

of new processes and procedures to stabilize 

plutonium and convert uranium solutions to 

oxide, the first international validation of a U.S 

DOE–designed Type B nuclear materials package 

for plutonium, and the development of the first 

Type C cask to be used for the air transport of 

spent nuclear fuel. These achievements allowed 

GTRI to address additional forms of nuclear 

material and accelerate activities to remove 

material more quickly.

In addition, the program had to overcome 

numerous bureaucratic obstacles (often before or 

during a shipment), including having a shipment 

canceled by the foreign government after the 

spent fuel had been packaged and was ready 

for transport, having overflight permits canceled 

at the last minute, and having a transit permit 

canceled while a shipment was ongoing. In 

each case, GTRI and its partners were able to 

quickly implement contingency plans to ensure 

shipments were completed successfully.

Finally, GTRI and its partners overcame 

environmental impediments, such as an 

earthquake in Chile three days before a shipment, 

a blizzard in Russia that closed airports, and 

a typhoon that jeopardized a shipment from 

Vietnam. 

In all cases, to make the President’s words 

reality, the task required the technical expertise, 

creativity, flexibility, perseverance, teamwork, 

and dedication of the hundreds of people who 

worked across the globe on the Four-Year Effort. 

The world now is a safer place because of their 

contributions. An account of their remarkable 

efforts over the past four years follows, mission by 

DOE/NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative mission—Argentina through Vietnam. 

(GTRI) reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear 

and radiological materials—at civilian sites around 

the world—that could be used by terrorists to 

make an improvised nuclear device or radiological 

dispersal device. GTRI executes its mission 

by converting research reactors and isotopeproduction facilities from using HEU to using lowenriched uranium (LEU) fuel/targets, removing 

and/or dispositioning excess nuclear and 

radiological materials, and protecting nuclear and 

radiological materials from theft. As such, GTRI 

was at the forefront of implementing the FourYear Effort. Under the effort, GTRI accomplished 

the following major tasks:

• Removed and/or dispositioned nearly 

3,000 kilograms of HEU and plutonium, 

bringing the lifetime total to more than 

5,060 kilograms—enough material to produce 

more than 200 nuclear weapons.

• Secured more than 10 metric tons of HEU and 

3 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium 

from Kazakhstan’s BN-350 reactor and 

transferred the material to long-term storage. 

• Removed all HEU material from 11 countries 

plus Taiwan, bringing the lifetime total to 

27 locations: Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 

Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, 

Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Latvia, Libya, Mexico, 

Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 

Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, 

Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam. 

4 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 5
6 The Four-Year Eff o r t R educing nuclear dangers 7
Preparing HEU fuel rods for removal from the reactor before loading into 

shipping casks. 

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ARGENTINA A u s tria

A U S TRALIA b elaru s

In December 2012, GTRI and Austria worked 

together to return all remaining HEU reactor fuel 

from Austria to the United States. Austria was the 

ninth country to work with GTRI to remove all HEU 

as part of the Four-Year Effort and the 24th country overall.

The project was initiated in September 2011 when 

the United States and Austria signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to work together to 

supply LEU fuel to fully convert the TRIGA reactor at the Vienna University of Technology and to 

return the remaining 1.2 kilograms of HEU to the 

United States by the end of 2013. GTRI worked 

closely with the Vienna reactor staff and the government of Austria to implement the steps laid out 

in the MOU and completed the project one year 

ahead of schedule. Together, both sides ensured 

this project minimized any interruption to the use 

of the reactor for research and training. In addition to enabling important scientific research work, 

the Vienna reactor plays an essential role in supporting the critical mission of the IAEA, including 

instrument calibration, IAEA safeguards inspector training, and other IAEA–supported training. 

Previously, GTRI and Austria partnered to remove 

all HEU from the ASTRA and SAR-Graz research 

reactors.

In October and November 2010, GTRI worked 

with Belarus, Russia, and the IAEA to remove 

41 kilograms of HEU spent fuel and 47 kilograms 

of HEU fresh fuel from the Pamir Reactor at the 

Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research in 

Sosny. The material was sent to secure facilities in 

Russia for storage pending downblending to LEU. 

GTRI continues to work with Belarus to eliminate 

its remaining stocks of HEU.

Loading HEU into specially designed casks for return to Russia.

In April 2013, GTRI worked with Argentina’s 

National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) 

to downblend the remaining fresh HEU in 

Argentina (1.4 kilograms of fresh HEU located at 

the Atomic Center of Constituyentes). GTRI and 

its predecessor programs have been working with 

Argentina to eliminate its stocks of HEU since 

In August 2012, GTRI successfully removed 

2.3 kilograms of fresh HEU from the Australian 

Nuclear Science and Technology Organization 

site. Also as part of the Four-Year Effort, GTRI 

successfully repatriated 14.5 kilograms of U.S.–

origin HEU spent fuel from Australia in 2009. With 

these shipments, more than 100 kilograms of 

HEU have been removed from Australia—enough 

material to produce more than four nuclear 

weapons. 

HEU ready for transport. Examining the HIFAR core before decommissioning and removal of all HEU.

2001, when we jointly removed 30 kilograms of HEU 

spent fuel from Argentina’s RA-3 reactor. Since the 

beginning of the removal programs, more than 40 kilograms of HEU have been eliminated from Argentina.

UF6 cylinder in a glovebox for HEU removal and downblending. 

Nondestructive assay measurement of a UF6

 cylinder. 

8 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 9
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c h ile

In October 2010, GTRI cooperated to remove 

12.7 kilograms of Belgian-owned excess fresh HEU 

from the CERCA facility in Romans, France. GTRI 

is working closely with Belgium to convert the 

BR-2 reactor. GTRI continues to work with Belgium 

to meet our joint commitments from the 2012 

Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, to 

eliminate excess HEU and plutonium from Belgium 

by the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The 

Hague, Netherlands.

Inside the BR-2 reactor, one of the most powerful 

research reactors in the world. 

Loaded shipping containers being 

transferred to the United States.

Inside the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor (left), an HEU slowpoke reactor core is transported 

for disposal (below).

Chilean Military Police stand guard in front of an HEU spent fuel 

transportation cask at the La Reina Nuclear Center. 

In April 2010, shortly before the first Nuclear 

Security Summit, which was held in Washington, 

D.C., GTRI completed the removal of the final 

18 kilograms of HEU from Chile. That marked 

the 20th country to remove all of its HEU. The 

operation in Chile was completed successfully, 

despite a massive earthquake on February 27 and 

numerous aftershocks during the operation. 

During shipment preparations, an 8.8-magnitude 

earthquake occurred off the Chilean coast, causing 

widespread damage to surrounding areas. The 

Chilean Commission of Nuclear Energy (CCHEN) 

and GTRI officials immediately began working 

on contingency plans to ensure the shipment 

would not be significantly delayed. Because of the 

flexibility and cooperative spirit of the joint U.S.–

b elgiu m c ana d a

c h ile c h ile

The United States has been cooperating with Canada to reduce its 

HEU inventories since 1996. During that time, 67 kilograms of HEU 

have been removed from Canada—7.5 kilograms since the President’s 

Prague speech. By early 2014, we expect that another 189 kilograms 

of fresh HEU will have been transferred to NNSA. GTRI continues to 

work with Canada on HEU reactor conversion efforts and disposition 

issues.

GTRI representatives inspect a transportation route following a massive 

8.8-magnitude earthquake.

Chile team, the shipment occurred with minimal 

delay, and the material is now securely stored at a 

facility in the United States.

Despite this unprecedented national emergency, 

GTRI and CCHEN removed the remaining 

kilograms of HEU from the La Reina Nuclear 

Center in downtown Santiago and from the Lo 

Aguirre Nuclear Center, located 40 kilometers 

west of Santiago, as well as more than 400 U.S.–

origin radiological sources.

GTRI and CCHEN have a long track record of 

working together on nuclear nonproliferation 

issues. This history includes the return of all U.S.–

origin HEU spent fuel to the United States in 2001, 

the conversion of the RECH-1 research reactor in 

Santiago from using HEU to LEU fuel in 2006, and 

the implementation of physical protection at both 

reactors in 2007.

10 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 11
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On the eve of the fourth anniversary of President 

Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, GTRI and the 

Czech Republic’s Nuclear Research Institute (NRI) 

completed the successful removal of the final 

68 kilograms of HEU from NRI in Rez. With this 

shipment, the Czech Republic became the 25th 

country to give up all of its HEU. 

The Czech Republic’s HEU was securely 

transported by truck, rail, and ship to Russia, 

where it will be downblended to LEU for use in 

power reactors. This complex operation was the 

culmination of a multi-year effort by GTRI, NRI, the 

Russian Federation, and the IAEA. 

GTRI shares a long history of cooperation with 

the Czech Republic on nuclear security issues. 

This was the sixth GTRI shipment from the 

Czech Republic since 2004 and marked the 

complete removal of a total of 180 kilograms of 

HEU from the country. A key step, in April 2011, 

that enabled the removal of the fuel was the 

Reloading an overpack container at a railway station.

Casks containing the final kilograms of HEU being loaded onto a truck at NRI 

in Rez, Czech Republic.

Overpack containers of HEU being loaded onto a ship in the Port of Gydnia, Poland, 

for transport to Russia for disposition.

C Z E CH REPU B L I C

FRAN C E

C Z E CH REPU B L I C

H UNGARY

In November 2013, GTRI and Hungary announced 

the completion of the final shipment of HEU from 

Hungary back to Russia, making Hungary the 

27th country to be cleaned out of all HEU. It was 

the 12th and final country cleaned out, as part of 

the Four-Year Effort, to secure the world’s most 

vulnerable material by December 2013. 

The removal of Hungary’s HEU caps a multiyear international effort among Hungary, the 

United States, the Russian Federation, and the 

IAEA to secure and remove this weapons-usable 

nuclear material. Previously, the four participants 

removed 190 kilograms of HEU from Hungary 

via three shipments—in 2008, 2009, and 2012. 

These operations were some of the more complex 

conducted by GTRI and involved transport by 

truck, rail, air, and ship as well as transit of three 

land borders before arriving in Russia. The final 

49.2 kilograms were removed over a series of 

three secure air shipments to Russia, where they 

successful conversion of the Czech Republic’s 

second research reactor from using HEU to LEU 

fuel. GTRI also worked with NRI to install physical 

protection upgrades.

will be downblended to LEU for use in nuclear 

power reactors. The September 2009 conversion 

of Hungary’s research reactor, from using HEU to 

LEU fuel, was a key step that enabled success with 

this country’s activities. 

Since the President’s April 2009 speech in 

Prague, GTRI has worked with France to identify 

excess HEU for transport to the United States 

for permanent disposition. To date, GTRI has 

completed two shipments of fresh HEU from 

France, totaling approximately 120 kilograms. 

In both cases, the material was packaged in 

secure transportation casks and transported by 

U.S. military aircraft to the United States. GTRI 

continues to work with France to identify excess 

HEU for disposition. 

Packaged U.S.–origin fresh HEU (left) being loaded onto a U.S. Air Force C-17 for 

transport to the United States (above).

Loading HEU into specially designed casks for return to Russia.

12 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 13
HEU, packaged into secure containers, being transferred to a shipping 

vessel for transport back to the United States.

Inside the Soreq nuclear reactor (photo credit: Yaakov Naumi/Flash90). The United States has been cooperating with 

Japan to eliminate its HEU spent fuel since 1998. 

GTRI has removed 696 kilograms of HEU from that 

country, with 5 kilograms being removed since 

the President’s 2009 Prague speech. Also since 

the President’s speech, GTRI worked closely with 

Japan to convert the Kyoto University Research 

Reactor from using HEU to LEU fuel, which was 

accomplished in March 2010. GTRI continues to 

work with Japan on HEU disposition issues and 

additional reactor conversions. 

GTRI completed two key HEU–elimination efforts 

with Kazakhstan since the Prague speech. In April 

2009, GTRI removed 73.7 kilograms of HEU spent 

fuel from the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP). 

This operation was conducted in close cooperation 

with the Russian Federation. In September 2011, 

GTRI and Kazakhstan cooperated to downblend 

the last remaining 33 kilograms of HEU fresh fuel 

HEU packaged into specially designed casks (left) for shipment by rail 

(below) to Russia, where the HEU will be downblended to LEU.

In January 2010, GTRI removed 12.4 kilograms of 

U.S.–origin HEU spent fuel from the Israel Research 

Reactor in Soreq. The material was packaged into 

secure transportation containers and transported 

by ship to the United States, along with the last 

remaining HEU from Turkey. 

In July 2013, GTRI cooperated with Italy to remove 

10.5 kilograms of excess fresh HEU from three 

sites—Saluggia, Casaccia, and Trisaia. Before this 

shipment, GTRI and its predecessor programs 

worked with Italy to remove almost 23 kilograms 

of U.S.–origin HEU spent fuel in five shipments, 

beginning in 1997. GTRI continues to work 

with Italy to meet our joint commitment from 

the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul to 

eliminate excess HEU and plutonium from Italy by 

the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, 

Netherlands.

Technicians prepare HEU oxide for packaging and shipment back to the 

United States (left). Casks, loaded with HEU, are transferred to a USAF C-17 for 

shipment back to the United States (above). 

JAPAN

KAZAK HS TAN

I S RAEL

ITALY

in that country. The material was downblended at 

the Ulba Metallurgical Facility in Ust-Kamenogorsk. 

GTRI also assisted Kazakhstan with the conversion 

of the INP critical assembly and continues to 

work with the country to convert the balance of 

its reactors and to eliminate all remaining HEU 

research reactor fuel. 

14 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 15
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Casks containing HEU being packaged at the Tajoura Research Center. Overpack container ready for transport.

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, the United 

States and Mexico announced the removal of the 

remaining 10 kilograms of HEU from Mexico’s 

National Institute for Nuclear Research (ININ). 

The removal followed the full conversion of the 

research reactor at ININ—from using HEU to LEU 

fuel—and was made possible by funding from the 

government of Canada. 

In December 2009, after converting the Tajoura 

reactor to use LEU fuel in 2006, the final 5 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU were removed from 

Libya with support from the IAEA and the Russian 

Federation. The HEU spent fuel was safely and 

securely returned to Russia from Libya’s Tajoura 

research reactor. In two previous shipments, GTRI 

removed nearly 20 kilograms of fresh HEU via 

multiple air shipments. With the December 2009 

In September 2012, the United States and Poland 

announced the removal of more than 88 kilograms 

of HEU from Poland’s Maria Research Reactor at 

the National Center for Nuclear Research. The 

removal, conducted in two shipments, was made 

possible following GTRI’s successful conversion of 

the Maria Research Reactor in Otwock—from using 

HEU to LEU fuel. GTRI worked in close partnership 

with National Center for Nuclear Research to 

convert the Maria reactor through the provision of 

technical, analytical, and licensing support.

Before this shipment, GTRI had successfully 

removed more than 500 kilograms of HEU in 

seven shipments from Poland, including the largest 

single shipment of HEU spent fuel (187 kilograms), 

which involved the entire fleet of 36 spent fuel 

casks GTRI uses for the transportation of Russianorigin HEU. During each of the nine shipments, 

the material was packaged into specially designed 

transportation casks, secured in shipping 

Technicians at the Maria Research Reactor prepare for the removal of HEU. containers, and transported in an armed convoy 

Polish military personnel stand guard as HEU is loaded for transport.

L I B Y A M EXI C O

POLAN D POLAN D

from the site to a nearby rail station. Then, the 

material was transported by rail to a Polish 

seaport, where it was loaded onto a vessel and 

transported to the Russian Federation.

HEU being loaded onto a USAF C-17 for return to the United States.

HEU packaged at ININ for shipment.

shipment, Libya became the 18th country to be 

cleaned out of all HEU and the third country 

cleaned out as part of the Four-Year Effort.

Since renouncing its nuclear weapons program in 

2003, Libya has cooperated with the United States 

on a wide range of nonproliferation activities. The 

latest shipment was part of a multi-step project to 

remove all Russian-origin HEU material from Libya.

To support this effort, GTRI supplied ININ with 

replacement LEU via an agreement through 

the IAEA. In early 2012, these exchanges were 

completed, and the final amounts of HEU 

were transported to the United States to be 

dispositioned. With these shipments, Mexico 

became the 22nd country to be free of all HEU, 

and the seventh country cleaned out as part of 

the Four-Year Effort. GTRI also worked with ININ 

to install physical protection upgrades at the 

reactor site.

16 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 17
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In June 2009, GTRI completed the final shipments 

of Russian-origin HEU from Romania. The material 

was removed and returned by air to Russia, where 

it will be downblended to LEU for use in power 

reactors. Romania was the first country to remove 

all HEU under the Four-Year Effort; it was the 16th 

overall. This also was the first time GTRI shipped 

HEU spent fuel by airplane, a development that 

greatly helped GTRI accelerate its efforts to meet 

the President’s objective.

In the first shipment of this final campaign, 

23.7 kilograms of HEU spent fuel stored at a 

research reactor in Magurele were packaged into 

Russian TUK-19 specialized transportation casks 

and secured in shipping containers. Then, the 

material was transported in an armed convoy 

from the reactor site to a nearby airport, loaded 

onto an An-124 cargo plane, and flown to a secure 

facility in Russia. The second shipment involved 

30 kilograms of fresh HEU from a reactor in 

Pitesti, 180 kilometers northwest of Bucharest. 

HEU, loaded into specially designed casks, fastened into overpack 

containers for transport to Russia.

Overpack containers of HEU being transferred to an An-124 for transport to 

Russia for final disposition. This shipment marked the first time GTRI shipped 

HEU spent fuel by air, allowing GTRI to greatly accelerate the pace of removals.

Overpack containers of HEU inside the An-124.

A specially designed overpack container loaded with spent HEU arrives at the 

port for transport to Russia.

In December 2010, GTRI completed the final 

removal of HEU from Serbia—13 kilograms of 

Russian-origin HEU spent fuel from the Vinca 

Institute of Nuclear Sciences. The shipment was 

the culmination of an eight-year effort to remove 

all HEU from Serbia. It was the sixth country to 

eliminate all of its HEU as part of the Four-Year 

Effort and the 21st overall.

On this mission, GTRI worked in partnership under 

a cost-sharing arrangement with the Republic of 

Serbia, the IAEA, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the 

Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, and the 

European Union. In addition to the 13 kilograms 

of HEU spent fuel, the shipment also included 

approximately 2.5 metric tons of LEU spent fuel.

The material was packaged into specially designed 

transportation casks, secured in specialized 

R O M ANIA R O M ANIA

S E R B I A

Overpack containers, holding the last of Serbia’s HEU, are carefully loaded 

onto a specially designed shipping vessel at the port for transport to Russia.

shipping containers, and transported in an armed 

convoy from the site to a nearby rail station. 

The material then was transported by rail to a 

Slovenian seaport, where it was loaded onto a 

vessel and transported to the Russian Federation 

for secure storage and disposition. 

The United States and Serbia share a long history 

of cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation 

issues. Cooperation at the Vinca Institute 

began in August 2002, when the United States 

government, Russia, and the IAEA returned 48.4 

kilograms of HEU fresh fuel to Russia. GTRI also 

has worked with the Vinca Institute to install 

physical security enhancements at the spent fuel 

storage building and other buildings that use and 

store radiological sources.

The HEU was shipped by air to a separate secure 

Russian facility.

The shipments follow previous shipments by GTRI, 

including the 2008 removal of all U.S.–origin HEU 

from Romania. Altogether, GTRI, working closely 

with Romania, Russia, and the IAEA, removed 

more than 88 kilograms of HEU—enough to 

produce more than three nuclear weapons.

S E R B I A

18 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 19
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GTRI team inspecting the ZPRL reactor pool.

The ZPRL reactor loaded with HEU fuel elements.

In August 2011, GTRI removed all U.S.–origin 

HEU (5.8 kilograms) from South Africa. It 

was a complex operation that required close 

collaboration among GTRI, the government of 

South Africa, and the South African Nuclear 

Energy Corporation. The material was transported 

by ship to the United States in secure containers. 

GTRI continues to work with South Africa to 

eliminate excess HEU. 

In September 2009, GTRI removed 4.8 kilograms 

of HEU spent fuel from Taiwan. This marked the 

removal of all remaining HEU in Taiwan, making it 

the second country/location to give up all its HEU 

as part of the Four-Year Effort. The material was 

transported by ship to the United States for secure 

storage, pending disposition.

Technicians work to remove HEU fuel elements from the SAFARI-1 research 

reactor in Pelindaba, South Africa.

A cask containing HEU being 

transferred to a specially 

designed shipping container 

(far left). The shipping 

container is transferred to 

a shipping vessel (left) for 

shipment to the United States.

In March 2012, GTRI and Sweden completed 

the removal of all plutonium from Sweden. The 

announcement was made at the 2012 Nuclear 

Security Summit. It was GTRI’s first shipment of 

separated plutonium to the United States. More 

than 3 kilograms of plutonium were removed, 

including Swedish–, U.K.–, and U.S.–origin material, 

stemming from former research and development 

activities in that country. 

To complete this project, Sweden developed new 

facilities to stabilize and repackage the plutonium 

materials. The mission to remove plutonium from 

Sweden was initiated in 2009 and completed in 

2012. GTRI previously worked with Sweden to 

remove all HEU, completing that effort in 2002. 

In all, GTRI removed 55 kilograms of HEU and 

plutonium from Sweden. 

In January 2010, GTRI removed 5.3 kilograms of 

HEU spent fuel from Turkey. This work marked 

the removal of all remaining HEU from Turkey. It 

was the fourth country cleaned out as part of the 

Four-Year Effort and the 19th country cleaned out 

overall. The material was transported by ship to the 

United States, along with HEU from Israel, and is in 

storage pending permanent disposition.

S OUT H AFRI C A TAIW an

S W E D E N turkey

Swedish and GTRI experts prepare the plutonium for packaging and removal.

20 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 21
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The last remaining HEU in Ukraine being loaded for transport to Russia.

Technicians load fresh HEU into specially designed casks for transport 

to Russia.

Technicians prepare HEU for transport to Russia.

UKRAINE UKRAINE

UNITE D KING D O M U Z B EKI S TAN

GTRI has worked with Uzbekistan for nearly 

10 years to eliminate its HEU material. In October 

2012, GTRI completed the removal of the last 

remaining 36.4 kilograms of HEU from the 

Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) near Tashkent. 

This complex operation included seven separate 

shipments, totaling nearly 140 kilograms. All HEU 

was sent to Russia for permanent disposition. GTRI 

also assisted INP with the conversion of the INP 

reactor and continues to work with Uzbekistan 

to eliminate its last few kilograms of HEU in 

Uzbekistan.

Fresh HEU, packaged in secure casks, being loaded into specially designed 

rail cars for shipment back to Russia, where it will be downblended to LEU.

In March 2012, GTRI completed the removal of all 

HEU from Ukraine, making it the eighth country to 

be cleaned out of all HEU as part of the Four-Year 

Effort and the 23rd country overall. This shipment, containing 128 kilograms of HEU, fulfilled the 

commitments, made by presidents Obama and 

Yanukovych at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, 

to remove all of Ukraine’s HEU by the 2012 Nuclear 

Security Summit.

In August 2010, GTRI removed 3.7 kilograms of 

legacy HEU material from the U.K. The material 

was transported to the United States, by U.S. 

military aircraft, for eventual downblending to 

LEU. In addition, the U.K. confirmed, through the 

HEU Reconciliation effort, that it has downblended 

more than 1,240 kilograms of U.S.–origin HEU in 

the U.K.

Fresh HEU, packaged in secure casks, prepared for loading onto 

U.S. military transport (right) for return to the United States.

Implementation of the pledge made by presidents 

Obama and Yanukovych required six separate 

secure operations and unprecedented cooperation 

among the United States, Ukraine, Russia, and 

the IAEA to successfully remove a total of 

234 kilograms over a two-year period. The first 

shipment to remove 56 kilograms of HEU spent 

fuel from the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research 

(KINR) took place in May 2010. It was followed 

by three shipments—all in late December 2010—

to remove 16 kilograms of fresh HEU from the 

Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology 

(KIPT), 25 kilograms of fresh HEU from Sevastopol 

University, and 10 kilograms of fresh HEU from 

KINR. The HEU was returned to Russia, where it 

will be downblended to LEU.

In exchange, the United States agreed to provide 

Ukraine with replacement LEU fuel as well as a 

state-of-the-art neutron source facility (NSF) at 

KIPT. The NSF will be equipped with the most 

up-to-date technology to operate at the highest 

safety standards and will provide Ukraine with new 

research capabilities and the ability to produce 

more than 50 different industrial and medical isotopes to benefit the Ukrainian people.

Ukraine has a long, significant history of supporting nuclear nonproliferation. In the early 1990s, 

following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine 

voluntarily gave up the nuclear weapons left on its 

territory and joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty as a nonnuclear weapon state.

22 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 23
w

v ietna m

In July 2013, GTRI and Vietnam’s Ministry of 

Science and Technology, in a joint operation with 

the Russian Federation, successfully completed 

the removal of 11 kilograms of HEU from the Dalat 

Nuclear Research Institute (DNRI). With this shipment, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam became 

the 11th country from which all HEU was removed 

as part of the Four-Year Effort. Vietnam was the 

26th country overall to be cleaned out. 

The removal was executed in close coordination with the Russian Federation. The HEU from 

Vietnam was securely transported by truck from 

DNRI to a military airport outside Ho Chi Minh City 

and then was flown, by a Russian An-124 cargo 

plane, to Russia, where it will be downblended 

to LEU for use in power reactors. This complex 

operation was the culmination of a multi-year 

effort by NNSA; MOST, Vietnam’s Ministry of 

Science and Technology; Rosatom; and the IAEA. 

Financial support was provided by the Canadian 

government..

In November 2010, GTRI completed a 10-year 

campaign to provide secure long-term storage 

for more than 10 metric tons of HEU and 3 metric 

tons of weapons-grade plutonium in Kazakhstan—

enough material to make 775 nuclear weapons. 

The final phase of the campaign involved 12 shipments from the BN-350 reactor in Aktau to a new 

secure storage facility in Eastern Kazakhstan—

traveling by train and road more than 3,000 kilometers (or 1,800 miles).

As part of its mission, GTRI’s Convert Program 

works globally to implement the U.S policy to 

minimize and eliminate the use of HEU in civilian 

applications by converting research and test reactors and isotope-production facilities to the use of 

LEU. Over the last four years, GTRI has converted 

or verified the shutdown of 25 research reactors 

and isotope-production facilities. Taken together 

with GTRI’s efforts to secure and remove nuclear 

material, the Convert Program made significant 

contributions in conjunction with the Four-Year 

Effort, eliminating the need for hundreds of kilograms of HEU. 

As part of its mission, GTRI’s Protect Program 

works globally at sites—such as hospitals, universities, and industry—to provide voluntary security 

enhancements to prevent terrorists from acquiring radiological materials. There are thousands of 

civilian sites around the world where radiological 

materials are used for legitimate and beneficial 

commercial, medical, and research purposes. 

While beneficial, these high-activity sources are 

attractive to terrorists or other adversaries for use 

in a radiological dispersal device or so-called dirty 

bomb. Taken together with the President’s commitment to secure high-priority nuclear material 

around the world, GTRI’s Protect Program has 

made significant contributions to global security 

in conjunction with the Four-Year Effort, securing 

hundreds of thousands of curies of radiological 

materials.

GTRI shares a long history of cooperation with 

Vietnam on nuclear and radiological security 

issues. This was the second GTRI shipment from 

Vietnam and marks the complete removal of all 

HEU from the country. GTRI also worked with the 

DNRI to convert its research reactor from using 

HEU fuel to LEU and to install physical protection 

upgrades at facilities storing or using both nuclear 

and radiological materials.  

Other GTRI Efforts Supporting 

Nuclear Security

The final HEU being transported from the Dalat Research Reactor to Ho Chi 

Minh City for transport to Russia.

Special casks, containing the last of Vietnam’s HEU, are loaded onto an 

An-124 for transport to Russia.

24 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 25
Global Threat Reduction Initiative Teams

Oak Ridge National laboratory

and Y-12 National Security complex

Idaho National

Laboratory

Savannah River National

Laboratory

Savannah River Site

Argonne National

Laboratory

DOE Headquarters

26 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 27
Beyond Prague

w

The Mikhail Dudin makes its way through the East Siberian 

Sea (following the Icebreaker Yamal) on its way to the Czech 

Republic, carrying spent-fuel loading equipment used to 

complete Vietnam’s removal efforts in 2013.

Argonne National Laboratory provided support 

for GTRI’s Russian-origin nuclear material removal 

efforts.

Idaho National Laboratory provided support for 

GTRI’s Russian-origin and U.S.-origin nuclear 

material removal efforts.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory provided support 

for GTRI’s Russian-origin nuclear material removal 

efforts.

Savannah River National Laboratory and Savannah 

River Site provided support for GTRI’s Russianorigin, U.S.-origin, and Gap nuclear material 

removal efforts.

Y-12 National Security Complex provided support 

for GTRI’s U.S.–origin and Gap nuclear material 

removal efforts.

Since 2009, NNSA and GTRI have led an accelerated international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear Contributing DOE/NNSA Laboratories

materials across the globe. As a result, the world today is unquestionably more secure from the threat 

of nuclear terrorism than it was four years ago. While it is important to highlight the substantial nuclear 

security achievements of the last several years, it is imperative to acknowledge that there is much work 

left to be done. HEU still exists in too many places, and global inventories of plutonium are steadily rising. 

Terrorists continue to seek the often-poorly-secured radioactive materials in medical, industrial, and 

research devices. While the technical and political challenges are substantial, they are not insurmountable. 

NNSA and GTRI will continue to eliminate and secure high-risk materials to ensure that terrorists can 

never acquire a nuclear weapon.

28 The Four-Year Eff o r t RE D U CING N U C L EAR D A N G ER S 29
Securing the world’s most vulnerable nuclear material 

within four years by setting new standards, expanding 

cooperation with Russia, and pursuing new partnerships 

to lock down sensitive materials

The Four-Year Effort

and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative