CRUISE VESSELS

Most Required 

Security and Safety 

Measures Have Been 

Implemented, but 

Concerns Remain 

About Crime 

Reporting

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2013

GAO-14-43

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-43, a report to 

congressional requesters

December 2013

CRUISE VESSELS

Most Required Security and Safety Measures Have 

Been Implemented, but Concerns Remain About 

Crime Reporting

Why GAO Did This Study

In 2011, almost 11 million passengers 

took a cruise from a U.S. port. Media 

reports about passenger personal 

safety while aboard cruise vessels—

including those related to the January 

2012 grounding of the cruise vessel 

Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy, 

which resulted in 32 deaths—

combined with the increasing number 

of passengers taking cruises has 

raised questions about passenger 

safety and security. With the 

enactment of the CVSSA in 2010, 

cruise vessels that visit U.S. ports were 

required to meet certain security and 

safety requirements, such as having 

rail heights of at least 42 inches and 

reporting allegations of certain crimes 

to the FBI. GAO was asked to review 

cruise vessel safety as well as security

issues—related to keeping passengers 

safe from crime.

GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which 

the cruise vessel industry and federal 

agencies have implemented the 

CVSSA, and (2) any actions taken 

following the Costa Concordia accident 

to enhance the safety of cruise vessels 

visiting U.S. ports. 

GAO reviewed the CVSSA and related 

agency and industry documents, and 

interviewed officials from the Coast 

Guard, FBI, CLIA, five cruise lines 

which accounted for over 80 percent of 

North American cruise vessel 

passengers in 2012, and two crime 

victim advocacy groups. The cruise 

lines were selected based on several 

factors including their volume of North 

American passengers. Crime victim 

advocacy groups were selected based 

on their knowledge about cruise ship 

crime issues. GAO is not making any 

recommendations in this report.

What GAO Found

The cruise industry and federal agencies have implemented 11 of 15 Cruise 

Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) provisions, but implementation of 4 

provisions requires the development of regulations and policy, and is underway.

Officials from all five cruise lines GAO met with said most required measures

were in place when the CVSSA was enacted. According to U.S. Coast Guard 

officials, a notice of proposed rulemaking is in development to address 3 of the 4 

remaining provisions. The 3 provisions relate to technologies to (1) detect a 

person going overboard, (2) maintain a video surveillance system to assist in 

documenting crimes on the vessel, and (3) transmit communications and 

warnings from the ship to anyone in surrounding waters. A policy linked to the 

fourth provision on the certification of trainers who provide the CVSSA course on 

crime scene preservation to cruise line personnel, is, as of December 2013, 

undergoing review at the Department of Transportation. With respect to CVSSA 

crime-reporting requirements, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 

Coast Guard have implemented these provisions as required. Accordingly, the

agencies publish on a website information on reported crimes that are no longer 

under investigation. However, GAO identified some limitations in the usefulness 

of the publicly reported data. Specifically, (1) allegations for which investigations 

are not opened are never published; (2) the data are not timely—due to the 

length of the criminal justice process—and thus, crime data may be posted 

months or years after the alleged crime occurred and (3) the data reported are 

not put into context, such as a city’s crime rate, to provide the public with the 

information needed to compare rates and make decisions. However, some cruise 

lines are making efforts to improve reported crime data. In August 2013, several 

cruise lines began voluntarily disclosing alleged crime data on their websites. 

Also, in July 2013, legislation was introduced to amend the CVSSA that would 

revise and expand crime-reporting requirements, among other items. As of 

November 2013, however, these actions were either new or pending. Thus, GAO 

could not assess whether, or to what extent, the voluntary reporting or potential 

legislation might provide more useful data than current requirements.

Following the Costa Concordia accident, the cruise industry, an international 

maritime organization, and the Coast Guard took actions to improve passenger 

safety. The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)—which represents over 

98 percent of cruise lines in the United States—identified 10 safety-related 

policies in 2012 that were adopted by all member cruise lines by July 2013. 

These policies include improvements to vessel passage planning and life jacket 

stowage, among other things. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)—a 

United Nations agency responsible for maritime matters—has also adopted a 

regulation, effective January 2015, requiring passengers to participate in a safety 

and evacuation exercise (muster drill) prior to or immediately upon departure—

rather than within 24 hours of departure. CLIA member cruise lines adopted a 

similar muster policy weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. The Coast 

Guard is monitoring IMO’s consideration of additional regulations. The agency 

has also started witnessing predeparture muster drills and has reported no major 

concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard has worked with the cruise industry for 

several years to plan and hold disaster exercises, including one in April 2013 to 

practice a mass rescue from a cruise vessel.

View GAO-14-43. For more information, 

contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 

or caldwells@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Letter 1

Background 6

Cruise Industry and Federal Agencies Have Implemented Most 

CVSSA Provisions, and Additional Crime-Reporting Efforts Are 

Under Way 12

The Cruise Industry Made Changes after the Costa Concordia 

Accident and Potential International Regulations Remain under 

Consideration 30

Agency Comments 40

Appendix I Key Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security Activities 42

Appendix II Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act 45

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48

Tables

Table 1: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and 

Safety Act’s (CVSSA) Man Overboard Technology 

Provision 15

Table 2: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and 

Safety Act’s (CVSSA) Video Recording Requirements 

Provision 16

Table 3: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and 

Safety Act (CVSSA) Training Certification Provision 19

Table 4: Alleged CVSSA Crimes Reported to the FBI by Cruise 

Lines from January 2010 through September 2013 25

Table 5: Alleged CVSSA Crimes No Longer under Investigation by 

the FBI (Published on Coast Guard Website) from 

January 2010 through September 2013 25

Table 6: Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security Activities 42

Table 7: Summary of Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and 

Safety Act (CVSSA) 45

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Figures

Figure 1: Regulatory Oversight Regime Affecting Cruise Vessels 7

Figure 2: Law Enforcement Process for Investigation of Cruise 

Crime within FBI’s Jurisdiction 21

Figure 3: Timeline of CLIA Actions Relative to the Costa 

Concordia Accident 31

Figure 4: Timeline of IMO MSC Actions following the Costa 

Concordia Accident 37
Page iii GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Abbreviations

AAJ American Association for Justice

BRM Bridge Resource Management 

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CCTV closed circuit television

CEO chief executive officer

CLIA Cruise Lines International Association

CVSSA Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

ICV International Cruise Victim’s Association

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISM Code International Safety Management Code

MARAD Maritime Administration

MSC Maritime Safety Committee

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

OMB Office of Management and Budget

RFI Request for Information

SMS safety management system

SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

STD sexually transmitted disease

UCR Uniform Crime Reports

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 20, 2013

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Chairman

The Honorable John Thune

Ranking Member

Committee on Science, Commerce and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Bennie Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Doris O. Matsui

House of Representatives

The popularity of cruise vessels as a vacation option continues to grow. 

Since 1980, the cruise industry has had an average annual passenger 

growth rate of 7.6 percent, and in 2011, over 16 million passengers 

traveled aboard cruise vessels worldwide.1 About 10.9 million of these 

passengers traveled from U.S. ports.2

 1

Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), 2011 CLIA Cruise Market Overview (Fort 

Lauderdale, Florida: 2011). Passenger numbers for various years can be found on CLIA’s 

website at 

Media reports about passenger 

personal safety while aboard cruise vessels, combined with the 

increasing number of cruise vessel passengers and the January 2012 

Costa Concordia cruise vessel grounding off the coast of Italy, which 

claimed 32 lives, raised questions about personal security and passenger 

safety when aboard cruise vessels. According to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), from 2005 through 2010, sexual assaults and physical 

assaults on cruise vessels were the leading cruise vessel crimes 

investigated and reported by the FBI. However, the public was often not 

aware of these crimes because the federal government did not require 

information about them to be published. Moreover, cruise vessels 

http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/industry-welcome.

2

U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, North American Cruise 

Statistical Snapshot, 2011(Washington, D.C: March 2012). Data on the number of cruise 

passengers for 2012 were not available because the Department of Transportation’s 

Maritime Administration no longer collects this information.
Page 2 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

carrying U.S. passengers often travel to foreign ports before returning to 

the United States, a fact that can introduce the possible involvement of 

law enforcement from a variety of foreign countries—in addition to the 

federal and local law enforcement agencies that may be involved if a 

crime occurs during a voyage. The involvement or potential involvement 

of foreign governments can add to the confusion of crime victims as they 

attempt to navigate various justice systems.

The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA), enacted in July 

2010, requires cruise lines operating ships that visit U.S. ports and the 

federal government to take certain actions related to these issues.3 For 

example, the CVSSA requires the cruise lines to report allegations of 

certain crimes to the FBI and the United States Coast Guard as well as to 

ensure that passengers have key information available to them—such as 

U.S. embassy contact information for all of the countries on the cruise 

vessel itinerary—and to implement specific personal security measures 

onboard such as ensuring that all stateroom doors have peepholes, 

among other things.4 The CVSSA also requires that the Coast Guard 

maintain a website that provides a numerical accounting of certain crimes 

that have been reported by cruise lines, but are no longer under FBI 

investigation.5

In addition to the issue of personal security of passengers, the January 

2012 grounding of the cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy 

The CVSSA places much of the responsibility for 

implementing the law with the Coast Guard and FBI. The Coast Guard is 

the federal agency responsible for a wide array of maritime safety and 

security activities, including those involving cruise vessels and their 

landside facilities, while the FBI is responsible for investigating certain 

cruise vessel crimes, among other responsibilities.

 3

Pub. L. No. 111-207, 124 Stat. 2243. The CVSSA applies to cruise vessels that are 

authorized to carry at least 250 passengers, have onboard sleeping facilities for each 

passenger, are on a voyage that embarks or disembarks passengers in the United States, 

and are not engaged on a coastwise voyage. 46 U.S.C. § 3507(k)(1). Security, as it 

relates to the CVSSA and this report, is concerned with personal security from crime 

rather than threats of terrorism. We have previously reported on the issue of cruise vessel 

security as it relates to threats of terrorism. See GAO, Maritime Security: Varied Actions 

Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain, GAO-10-400

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2010). 

4

46 U.S.C. §§ 3507(g)(3)(A), 3507(c)(2), 3507(a)(1)(B).

5

Id. at § 3507(g)(4).
Page 3 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

raised questions about vessel management and the procedures for 

safeguarding passengers in emergency situations. For example, although 

international maritime law requires all passengers to be evacuated within 

30 minutes of an order to abandon a vessel, the Italian government 

reported that the evacuation of the Costa Concordia took over 6 hours. 

The accident resulted in the death of 32 passengers. The Italian 

government investigated the accident and reported in May 2013 on 

numerous lapses in emergency procedures and management, including 

problems with vessel evacuation, voyage planning, and emergency 

communication.

You requested that we review the implementation of the CVSSA as well 

as any safety actions taken by federal government agencies and the 

cruise industry following the Costa Concordia accident. This report 

examines the following questions:

• To what extent have the cruise industry and federal agencies taken 

actions to implement the requirements of the CVSSA?

• What actions, if any, have federal agencies and the cruise industry 

taken to enhance the safety of cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports as a 

result of the Costa Concordia accident?

To address both objectives, we conducted visits to four cruise vessel 

ports, which we selected in large part because of their high cruise traffic 

and passenger embarkation volume, among other things—Los Angeles, 

California; Miami, Florida; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Seattle, 

Washington. To understand how the Coast Guard checks for CVSSA 

compliance and other safety issues on cruise vessels, we accompanied 

Coast Guard officials on cruise vessel exams in the Port of Los Angeles 

and Port Everglades, the port for Fort Lauderdale. During these visits, we 

interviewed security and safety officials from five cruise lines to 

understand how they implemented the provisions of the CVSSA and what 

safety changes they have implemented as a result of the Costa 

Concordia accident.6

 6

Throughout the report we refer to these companies as cruise lines. However, they include 

two cruise corporations that are parent companies to several cruise lines or brands. 

Additionally, we conducted an interview with a subsidiary company of one corporation 

related to CVSSA implementation and security, but for purposes of this report, we have 

categorized this interview under the corporation. The five cruise lines we interviewed 

represent over 80 percent of North American cruise vessel passengers in 2012.

Additionally, we interviewed Coast Guard officials in 
Page 4 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

the field and in headquarters on their role in implementing the CVSSA, 

any challenges encountered during implementation, and any actions 

taken following the Costa Concordia accident. We also interviewed 

officials from the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)—which 

currently represents over 98 percent of the cruise industry operating in 

the United States—for their perspective on the impact of the CVSSA and 

to discuss the safety changes they have implemented among their 

members as a result of the Costa Concordia accident. Finally, during our 

visits to cruise vessel ports, we also interviewed FBI and local law 

enforcement agency officials to discuss their role in handling crime 

aboard cruise vessels. The information we obtained from personnel at the 

ports and the cruise lines cannot be generalized across all U.S. ports and 

the cruise industry—although CLIA does represent a substantial portion 

of the industry—but the information provided us with a perspective on the 

implementation of the CVSSA as well as any changes resulting from the 

Costa Concordia accident.

To address the first objective, we reviewed relevant documents, 

guidance, and policy from federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard’s 

policy letter on CVSSA implementation procedures. Additionally, we 

reviewed the provisions in the CVSSA and assessed the extent to which 

federal agencies and cruise lines were implementing those provisions. 

We also analyzed alleged and published cruise vessel crime data 

obtained from the FBI. Specifically, we analyzed all CVSSA crimes 

reported to the FBI from January 2008 through September 2013 (pre- and 

post-CVSSA implementation) as well as analyzed for the same time 

period the number of closed cases that appeared on the Coast Guard’s 

public website. To determine the reliability of these data, we interviewed 

FBI and cruise line officials familiar with the data regarding their 

procedures for obtaining, analyzing, and reporting cruise vessel crime 

data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes.7

 7

The data posted on the Coast Guard website were provided to the Coast Guard from the 

FBI and were a subset (“cases no longer under investigation”) of the information provided 

to us for analysis. The Coast Guard reported that it had no role in verifying the accuracy of 

the information. 

While the publication of the CVSSA crime data is consistent 

with the law, these data have some limitations. These limitations were 

identified through our independent analysis, as well as through comments 

from officials at the FBI, CLIA, the cruise lines we met with, and a crime 

victim advocacy groups. We discuss these limitations later in this report. 
Page 5 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

We interviewed Coast Guard officials as well as representatives of two 

victim advocacy groups and two academic researchers who have written 

extensively on cruise vessel crime for their perspectives on the 

implementation of the CVSSA. The interest groups and researchers were 

selected based on their knowledge about cruise vessel crime—either 

advocating for victims or researching cruise crime trends.8

To address the second objective, we reviewed relevant documents and 

policies from CLIA and the selected cruise lines, including the safety 

measures that CLIA introduced after the Costa Concordia accident. We 

also reviewed documents from the International Maritime Organization 

(IMO)—a United Nations agency that specializes in maritime issues—as 

well as the Costa Concordia marine casualty investigation report issued 

by the Italian government in 2013. We interviewed Department of State 

and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials to understand 

their agencies’ roles in relation to cruise vessel safety and the Costa 

Concordia accident. During our port visits, we also interviewed officials 

from two classification societies to better understand their roles in 

ensuring cruise vessel safety.

We also 

interviewed officials from the the Department of Transportation’s Maritime 

Administration (MARAD)—which works to improve and strengthen the

U.S. marine transportation system—to determine its role in implementing 

the CVSSA and discuss any challenges MARAD had encountered.

9

 8

While the information we obtained from these groups and individuals cannot be 

generalized across the entire cruise industry, it provided us with varying perspectives on 

issues associated with cruise vessel crime and CVSSA implementation.

We also witnessed a cruise vessel mass 

rescue exercise, conducted by the Coast Guard, which involved 

numerous cruise line personnel, federal agency personnel, and local 

authorities in the Bahamas. The exercise was part of a series of mass 

rescue operation–based exercises designed to educate and prepare 

9

A classification society verifies the structural strength and integrity of essential parts of a 

vessel’s hull and appendages, and the reliability and function of the propulsion and 

steering systems, power generation, and those other features and auxiliary systems that 

have been built into the vessel in order to maintain essential services onboard. 

Classification societies do this through the development and application of their own rules 

and by verifying compliance with international and national statutory regulations. We 

interviewed two classification societies that were headquartered in the Miami area—the 

location of one of our visits. While the information we obtained from the classification 

societies cannot be generalized across the entire cruise industry, it did provide us with a 

perspective on issues associated with cruise vessel safety.
Page 6 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

participants for a potential catastrophic event—similar to the Costa 

Concordia accident—involving a mass rescue operation at sea.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to December 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

International, national, state, and local requirements regulate maritime 

safety and security. At the international level, IMO is responsible for 

developing an international maritime regulatory framework. IMO member 

states (nations) have adopted the International Convention for the Safety 

of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which is designed to help ensure maritime 

security and safety worldwide. Among other things, SOLAS provides that 

companies and vessels should comply with the requirements of the 

International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), which was adopted 

by IMO in 1993. Federal laws, regulations, and guidance direct federal

agencies and vessel operators within U.S. ports and waters, and state 

and local requirements may also further direct activities of vessel 

operators within their jurisdictions.

The enforcement of safety and security requirements for all maritime 

vessels is governed by two different systems: flag state control and port 

state control. A flag state that signed on to the SOLAS Convention has 

responsibility for verifying that vessels flying its flag meet international 

safety and security standards and that the flag state’s standards are at 

least as stringent as those included in the convention’s ISM Code. A port 

state is the country where a port is located. Port state control is the 

process by which a nation exercises its authority over foreign-flagged 

vessels operating in waters subject to the port state’s jurisdiction. Port 

state control is generally intended to ensure that these visiting vessels 

comply with the various international and domestic requirements 

established to help ensure the safety of the visited port, its environment, 

and its personnel. Figure 1 shows the regulatory oversight regime 

affecting cruise vessels; however, there are many additional international 

and domestic stakeholders with roles contributing to the security and 

Background

Many Stakeholders 

Involved in Cruise Vessel 

Safety and Security 

Regulation
Page 7 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

safety of cruise vessels. For a list of key stakeholders and their activities, 

see appendix I.

Figure 1: Regulatory Oversight Regime Affecting Cruise Vessels
Page 8 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

The Coast Guard administers the U.S. port state control program for 

foreign-flagged cruise vessels that enter U.S. waters or a U.S. port, to 

enforce maritime safety and security in the United States.10

• Initial exams: Conducted on vessels with potential U.S. itineraries, 

these exams include concept reviews during the very earliest stages 

of design, preconstruction plan reviews by Coast Guard naval 

architects and fire protection engineers, and mid-construction 

inspections at the shipbuilder’s yard by Coast Guard marine 

inspectors.

The Coast 

Guard exercises this enforcement through port state control activities, 

which include initial, annual, and periodic examinations of foreign flag 

cruise vessels. These exams allow the Coast Guard to examine vessels 

at various times:

• Annual inspection: The Coast Guard inspects each cruise vessel 

visiting the United States at least twice a year. The first inspection, an 

annual inspection, focuses on the vessel’s fire protection, lifesaving, 

and emergency systems as well as any modifications to the vessel 

that would affect its structural fire protection and means of escape.

• Periodic inspection: The second Coast Guard inspection, a periodic 

inspection, focuses on the performance of the officers and crew, with 

specific attention paid to their training and knowledge of the vessel’s 

emergency procedures, fire fighting, lifesaving systems, and 

performance during drills.

From January 2008 through March 2013, the Coast Guard performed 

1,208 cruise vessel examinations (71 initial, 673 annual, and 464 

periodic) and identified 1,802 deficiencies. Nearly half of these 

deficiencies were related to fire-fighting systems. For example, according 

to the Coast Guard’s Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise, the most 

common deficiency identified in 2012 was the improper operation of fire 

screen doors. In 2011, the most commonly identified deficiency was the 

improper stowage of combustibles. According to Coast Guard officials, 

most deficiencies are corrected on the spot or within the time frames 

allowed by the Coast Guard. Moreover, officials reported that the Coast 

Guard rarely detains cruise vessels based on substandard compliance—

for example, from January 2008 through March 2013, they have detained 

 10Almost all cruise vessels operating in and out of U.S. ports are foreign flagged.
Page 9 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

seven cruise vessels as a result of their 1,208 cruise vessel 

examinations. Four of the seven cruise vessels made corrections and 

were released from detention the same day, while the others took 2, 3, 

and 8 days to make corrections.11

As part of its regulatory role, the Coast Guard also maintains data on 

marine casualties (accidents) that occur upon the navigable waters of the 

United States and its territories or possessions, or whenever an accident 

involves a U.S. vessel. Coast Guard regulations require that certain types 

of accidents be reported to the Coast Guard—including accidents that 

result in the loss of main propulsion or primary steering, or that materially 

and adversely affect the vessel’s seaworthiness, among other things.12

Our analysis of Coast Guard data shows that from January 2008 through 

March 2013, there were 256 marine casualties that involved cruise 

vessels: 128 of these were classified as failures of equipment or material; 

64 were classified as accidents that caused damage to the environment 

(mostly discharge of oil); and 64 were classified in a variety of other 

categories—such as fire, loss of electrical power, or collision.13

Enacted in July 2010, the CVSSA, as discussed above, required cruise 

lines and federal agencies to take certain actions designed to further 

bolster the security and safety of U.S. passengers aboard cruise vessels. 

The CVSSA applies to all passenger vessels that are authorized to carry 

at least 250 passengers, have onboard sleeping facilities for each 

 11According to Coast Guard officials, analysis shows that foreign cruise vessels have 

roughly 70 percent fewer deficiencies than other types of foreign-flagged vessels, and are 

less likely to be detained. Additionally, given the quick turnaround that can occur with 

cruise vessels at ports and the amount of time needed to conduct an inspection, Coast 

Guard inspections are scheduled in advance. 

12 46 C.F.R. pt. 4.

13This analysis excludes 786 marine casualties that were classified as “personnel 

casualties,” where one or more individuals were injured or died as the result of existing 

medical conditions or contact with the vessel as a result of a fall, among other things. 

Although in some instances personnel casualty data may be related to CVSSA crimes—

such as when injury or death is the result of a CVSSA crime—we did not include a 

comparison of marine casualty data to CVSSA crime data for two reasons. First, there is 

overlap but not a direct correlation between some of the data associated with personnel 

casualties and the required crime-reporting categories in the CVSSA. Second, there are 

differences in reporting requirements for marine casualties versus CVSSA crime, based 

on the ownership and registry of the vessel, the nationality of the person(s) involved, and 

the location of the vessel at the time of the incident. 

Cruise Vessel Security 

and Safety Act Added to 

Regulatory Framework
Page 10 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

passenger, are on voyages that embark or disembark passengers from 

the United States, and are not engaged on coastwise voyages.14

• Rail heights

The 

CVSSA includes 15 provisions aimed at, among other things, increasing 

information available to passengers—such as requiring cruise lines to 

provide contact information in passenger staterooms for local embassies 

and providing crime victims with free and immediate access to sexual 

assault hotlines—as well as provisions requiring training to increase the 

capability of a cruise vessel’s crew to document crimes and preserve 

crime scenes. Many CVSSA requirements are aimed at the cruise lines 

and were effective with CVSSA enactment or by January 27, 2012—18 

months after CVSSA’s enactment. The topics addressed by these 15 

provisions are listed below (for a more detailed summary of these 

provisions please see app. II):

• Peepholes

• Security latches and time-sensitive keys

• Capture of images/detection of passengers who have fallen overboard

• Acoustical hailing and warning devices

• Video recording requirements

• Availability of passenger safety information

• Medical treatment for victims of sexual assault 

• Access to information and communications for victims of sexual 

 assault

• Confidentiality of sexual assault examination and support information

• Logbook details and requirement to report alleged crimes

• Crew access to passenger staterooms

• Crime data on Coast Guard website and link on cruise line websites

• MARAD certification of crew training on crime scene preservation

• Crew training on crime scene preservation

 1446 U.S.C. § 3507(k)(1). A coastwise voyage is defined as a voyage in which a vessel in 

the usual course of her employment proceeds from one port or place in the United States 

to another port or place in the United States or from a port or place in a possession to 

another port or place in the same possession, and passes outside the line dividing inland 

waters from the high seas (a voyage exclusively on the Great Lakes excepted), as well as 

a voyage in which a vessel proceeds from a port or place in the United States or its 

possessions and passes outside the line dividing inland waters from the high seas and 

navigates on the high seas, and then returns to the same port or place.
Page 11 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

On January 13, 2012, an Italian-flagged cruise vessel, the Costa 

Concordia, ran aground with over 4,000 passengers and crew onboard off 

the coast of Giglio Island, Italy. The vessel was so badly damaged that 

five contiguous watertight compartments—which housed machinery and 

equipment vital for the propulsion and steering of the vessel—rapidly 

flooded. The vessel then lost propulsion and suffered intermittent power 

outages, as the emergency backup systems could not handle an 

emergency on such a scale. The accident resulted in 32 deaths, including 

2 U.S. citizens.

The Costa Concordia accident triggered an investigation led by the Italian 

government to ascertain the reasons that the vessel went aground. In 

May 2013, the Italian government issued its findings and 

recommendations. The investigation found that the root cause of the 

accident rested with the vessel’s master for transiting too close to the 

coastline. According to the investigation, the accident was compounded 

because of poor emergency management by the master, some staff deck 

officers, and the vessel’s hotel director. However, the report also offered 

additional recommendations, including improvements in bridge resource 

management, emergency power generation, and search and rescue 

operations, among other things.15

 15A vessel’s bridge is the part of the vessel from which it is steered and navigated. Bridge 

Resource Management (BRM) is the effective management and utilization of all 

resources, human and technical, available to the bridge team (those employed on the 

bridge) to ensure the safe completion of the vessel’s voyage. BRM focuses on bridge 

officers’ skills such as teamwork, team building, communication, leadership, decision 

making, and resource management and incorporates these into the larger picture of 

organizational and regulatory management. 

Costa Concordia Accident 

Identified Numerous 

Potential Safety 

Shortcomings
Page 12 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

In 2011, the Coast Guard issued guidance on most of the provisions in 

the CVSSA, and the cruise lines had already implemented most of the 

safety measures required by the law. However, as of December 2013, the 

Coast Guard and MARAD were in the process of developing and 

publicizing new regulations before moving forward with the 

implementation of the remaining provisions related to items such as new 

technology and training certifications required or authorized by the 

CVSSA. Provisions regarding the publication of information on crimes on 

cruise vessels have been fully implemented by the FBI and Coast Guard 

in accordance with the law. Even so, efforts are under way that could 

address remaining concerns related to the thoroughness, timeliness, and 

context of reported crime data.

The Coast Guard issued guidance for 11 of the 15 CVSSA provisions in 

June 2011.16 The Coast Guard guidance was issued in the form of 

internal Coast Guard policy letters with the main purpose of providing 

instructions to Coast Guard port state control officers regarding CVSSA 

requirements.17

 16CVSSA required Coast Guard to issue guidelines, training curricula, and inspection and 

certification procedures necessary to carry out the requirements of the law. 46 U.S.C. § 

3507(i). Pursuant to the guidance, two of the provisions (rail heights and peepholes or 

other means of identification on stateroom doors) were not to be enforced by Coast Guard 

inspectors during their exams until January 2012; the remaining provisions were to be 

enforced from the date of enactment of the CVSSA, in July 2010 (although implementation 

guidelines from the Coast Guard did not come out until June 2011). The requirement for 

security latches/time-sensitive keys on stateroom doors applies only to those vessels 

where the keel was laid on or after July 27, 2010.

Guidance was provided in the following 11 areas: (1) rail 

heights; (2) peepholes in passenger stateroom doors, (3) security latches 

and time-sensitive keys for stateroom doors, (4) safety information 

provided to passengers, (5) medical licensing and proper equipment to 

perform sexual assault exams, (6) patient access to information and 

communications in the event of sexual assault, (7) confidentiality of 

sexual assault examination and support information, (8) crew access to 

passenger staterooms, (9) logbook and reporting requirements for 

CVSSA crimes, (10) availability of crime data on the Coast Guard’s 

website and the link on cruise lines’ webpages to the Coast Guard’s 

17The Coast Guard posted the policy guidance on its external website, so it was publicly 

available to cruise lines and others as well. 

Cruise Industry and 

Federal Agencies 

Have Implemented 

Most CVSSA 

Provisions, and 

Additional CrimeReporting Efforts Are 

Under Way

The Coast Guard Issued 

CVSSA Guidance, and 

Cruise Lines Have 

Implemented Most CVSSA 

Requirements
Page 13 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

website,18 and (11) training standards and curricula—which resulted in 

the development of the required course on crime scene preservation.19

Officials from all five of the cruise lines we spoke with, as well as CLIA, 

told us that there were minor issues with implementing these 11 CVSSA 

requirements and that most of the safety and security measures required 

by the law were already in place when the CVSSA was enacted, in July 

2010. For example, each of the cruise line officials we met with told us 

that their vessels already were in compliance with most CVSSA 

provisions including having peepholes in stateroom doors, using certified 

medical personnel for sexual assault exams, and carrying rape kits 

onboard. As a result, according to all of the cruise lines we spoke with, 

meeting the CVSSA deadline for most of the requirements was not 

difficult. In the case where a modification was needed to meet a CVSSA 

requirement, the cruise lines we spoke with described the modification as 

minor. For example, officials from CLIA stated that, for the most part, the 

rail heights on their members’ vessels already met the 42-inch height 

specified in the CVSSA. In one case, officials from a cruise line identified 

isolated locations where the rail height was below the requirement—such 

as around entrance gangways and by lifeboat stations—and thus they 

took steps to modify the railing height to meet the new standard. CLIA 

officials also reported that developing security information guides for 

passenger staterooms required a moderate amount of effort for the cruise 

lines because of the variations in their vessels’ itineraries, which required 

cruise lines to collect and update information for all of their vessels’ ports 

Coast Guard officials stated that the guidance was necessary to help 

clarify some aspects of the CVSSA, especially in those areas that are 

outside the Coast Guard’s normal area of expertise. For example, the 

guidance provides specific questions for inspectors to ask medical 

personnel to verify that adequate training, equipment, and medicine are in 

place in the event of a sexual assault.

 18Policy guidance was not issued in this area; however, Coast Guard officials told us they 

maintain a website with the FBI’s cruise vessel crime data and that they did an initial 

check of all cruise lines’ webpages to ensure they had a link to this Coast Guard crime 

data website.

19Three federal agencies were involved in creating the required course on crime scene 

preservation: the Coast Guard, the FBI, and MARAD. The Coast Guard coordinated the 

development of the course, the FBI provided much of the content for the course, and 

MARAD contributed its expertise in writing and structuring training courses, according to 

Coast Guard officials. 
Page 14 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

of call. Additionally, officials from one cruise line we spoke with discussed 

going beyond what the CVSSA requires. For example, this cruise line told 

us it was involved in discussions with officials from a victim advocacy 

group to evaluate and enhance the cruise line’s procedures for preventing

sexual assault and responding to sexual assault allegations. Additionally, 

this cruise line also told us it uses strict criteria to credential its 

professional staff to meet at least the minimum guidelines of the 

American College of Emergency Physicians and uses outside vendor 

software to help ensure credentials are kept up to date. Furthermore, 

these officials stated that an electronic medical record system is being 

introduced to improve the documentation and accessibility of health care 

information for guests and crew.

There are four CVSSA provisions that require the development of 

regulations and policy for enforcement, and these are in development by 

the Coast Guard and MARAD. These provisions are (1) man overboard 

technology, which detects and alerts the crew to a person falling 

overboard; (2) video recording requirements, which are to assist in 

documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the 

prosecution of such crimes; (3) acoustical hailing and warning devices, 

which provide communication capability around a vessel operating in 

high-risk waters; and (4) certification of training providers that teach the 

CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence 

preservation, and reporting.20

The Coast Guard issued a Request for Information (RFI) in May 2011 to 

obtain the public’s input on the CVSSA requirements on man overboard 

technology and video recording because they involved complex 

technology and the CVSSA language was not specific enough, according 

to Coast Guard officials, for them to use it to verify compliance on cruise 

vessels. In response to its RFI, the Coast Guard received comments from 

nine entities: CLIA, two cruise victim advocacy groups, five companies 

stating that they had effective technology in these areas, and one private 

citizen. In addition to the RFI responses, officials that we interviewed from 

The Coast Guard is responsible for 

developing regulations for the first three provisions, while MARAD is 

responsible for developing policy for the training certification provision.

 20High-risk waters are defined by the Coast Guard as waters with a high risk of terrorism, 

piracy, or armed robbery against vessels.

The Coast Guard and 

MARAD Are in the 

Process of Developing 

Regulations and Policy for 

Four CVSSA Provisions

Coast Guard CVSSA 

Provisions
Page 15 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

CLIA, cruise lines, and cruise victim advocacy groups also provided 

insights on some of the challenges associated with two of the technology 

provisions of the CVSSA. Comments from the RFI as well as additional 

information provided to us from interested stakeholders are discussed in 

tables 1 and 2:

Table 1: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act’s (CVSSA) Man Overboard Technology Provision

Man overboard technology

CVSSA language: The vessel shall integrate technology that can be used for capturing images of passengers or detecting passengers 

who have fallen overboard, to the extent that such technology is available.

Cruise Lines International 

Association’s (CLIA) request for 

information (RFI) comments

a

CLIA noted that there are two different parts to the man overboard technology: image capturing 

and detection. CLIA stated that the technology exists to reliably capture images of people falling 

overboard through closed circuit television (CCTV), thermal imaging, and so forth. However, the 

technology to reliably detect persons as they are in the process of going overboard does not 

presently exist. CLIA believes the technology is not yet reliable in a maritime environment 

because of the movement of a vessel, weather and sun glare, and lens encrustation caused by 

saltwater, among other things. 

Cruise victim advocacy group’s 

RFI comments

An official from the International Cruise Victim’s Association (ICV) stated that all CCTV systems 

of public areas should be monitored at all times and recorded by qualified shipboard security 

personnel in a dedicated watch center. Such a system would provide a safety blanket that 

envelops the vessel, making it impossible for someone to go overboard without being seen on a 

video camera. 

Five cruise lines interviewed 

comments

All five of the cruise lines we met with agreed with CLIA’s perspective that the technology to 

detect persons as they are in the process of going overboard is not yet reliable. However, 

officials from four of the five cruise lines we met with have or are currently testing different 

technologies onboard their cruise vessels. Officials from four of the five cruise lines also said one 

problem with the technology relates to the potential impact of false readings, both positive and 

negative. Specifically, one cruise line official commented that if cruise lines are going to be 

required to invest significant amounts of money in man overboard technology they want to be 

sure it does not produce inaccurate results that could result in increased operational costs such 

as conducting unnecessary searches or disrupting an itinerary, among other costs. Similarly, if 

the technology failed to detect a passenger who had gone overboard, and as a result the vessel 

failed to conduct a search for that person, this type of error could expose the cruise line to costly 

litigation.

Source: RFI comments provided to Coast Guard and GAO interviews.

a

46 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)(D).
Page 16 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Table 2: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act’s (CVSSA) Video Recording Requirements 

Provision

Video recording requirements

CVSSA language: Requirement to maintain surveillance.—The owner of a vessel to which this section applies shall maintain a video 

surveillance system to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the prosecution of such crimes, as 

determined by the Secretary.

Cruise Lines International 

Association’s (CLIA) request for 

information (RFI) comments

a

CLIA said that two main factors must be considered in developing regulations for a video 

surveillance system: locations on the vessel that should be under video surveillance and the length 

of time that images should be retained. CLIA commented that each vessel is different in size, layout, 

and design as well as the number and demographics of its passengers, and the type and location of 

prior crime allegations. As a result, CLIA commented that there should be a risk-based approach, 

rather than arbitrary standards, that guide video recording requirements. CLIA also recommended a 

video retention period of 7 days, as the average cruise length of its member lines is 7.2 days.

Cruise victim advocacy groups’

RFI comments

Cruise victim advocacy groups state they would like to see more video cameras onboard, and the 

cameras monitored continuously. Two advocacy groups that provided RFI comments on the video 

recording requirements differed about how long video recordings should be kept. One group stated 

that the video recordings should be retained for 30 days; another stated the recordings should be 

retained for 90 days.

Five cruise lines interviewed 

comments

Officials from two cruise lines we spoke with said that most crimes are reported within 1 to 2 weeks 

after they occur, so video retention requirements longer than that would be unnecessary. 

Specifically, officials from one cruise line we spoke with commented that its current retention storage 

is 14 days, but if it was to double the retention period to 28 days, it would be at a one-time cost of 

$21.7 million. This cruise line also noted that it is standard practice to keep video footage indefinitely 

if it is tied to an ongoing investigation. This cruise line also reported that ensuring that video footage 

of a crime is maintained is generally not an issue, as 95 percent of crimes are reported to it within 24 

hours. Officials from two cruise lines also said that because of the large number of cameras onboard 

it is not feasible to have continuous monitoring. 

Source: RFI comments provided to Coast Guard and GAO interviews.

a

46 U.S.C. § 3507(b).

The Coast Guard’s RFI did not solicit feedback on the final provision, on 

acoustical hailing; however, Coast Guard officials told us that this 

provision would still be part of the final regulation as the technology 

already exists for acoustical hailing and warning devices. The term “highrisk waters” used in the provision was problematic to some cruise victim 

advocacy groups, according to Coast Guard officials, as they perceived 

the definition to be different from the Coast Guard’s definition. For 

example, Coast Guard officials said that some cruise victim advocacy 

groups believe that those places that may be high-risk terrorism targets 

near land should be considered high-risk waters (e.g., New York Harbor 

and waterways). However, Coast Guard officials told us they have a longstanding definition of high-risk waters, and that they are typically waters 

where terrorism, piracy, and armed robbery occur (i.e., the waters off the 

Horn of Africa, etc.). Therefore, Coast Guard officials said that they felt it 

was necessary to include this provision in the proposed rule to allow for 
Page 17 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

public comments because it was not clear from the law how the provision 

should be implemented.

In July 2013, Coast Guard officials told us that they had drafted a Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that will encompass these three 

provisions of the CVSSA. They added that the regulation will likely be 

performance based—focusing on what must be achieved—rather than 

prescriptive. Coast Guard officials noted that the NPRM is currently going 

through final agency review. According to the website of the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), which is the final reviewer in the 

rulemaking process, the NPRM will be issued in June 2014. There is no 

timetable for when the final regulation will be issued.

All cruise line officials we spoke with reported that one of their key 

frustrations with the implementation of the CVSSA was not having timely 

information related to these three technology areas of the CVSSA. They 

expressed concern with how long it has taken to develop the regulations 

as well as concern about the lack of interim communication from the 

Coast Guard on the status of the rulemaking process. Cruise line officials 

stated that this affects their business, and that they want to be in full 

compliance with the law. Coast Guard officials commented that the time 

they have taken to develop the proposed rule was to ensure that they 

were adequately addressing CVSSA requirements and incorporating all 

viewpoints, while MARAD officials said that the time they took was to 

determine the best approach for implementation. Furthermore, Coast 

Guard officials told us that once a rulemaking process is under way, 

federal agencies generally do not discuss it with outside parties to avoid 

concerns regarding ex parte communications. According to Coast Guard 

officials, engaging with outside parties to update them on the process, as 

cruise line officials wished had been done, could hinder transparency, 

unless the agency gave all parties and the public the same opportunity to 

comment and provide information.

While the Coast Guard is drafting its NPRM to address these three 

outstanding CVSSA provisions, in July 2013, legislation was introduced 

that would amend the video recording requirements of the CVSSA, 

among other items.21

 21S.1340, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2800, 113th Cong. (2013).

The proposed bills detail requirements for 

placement of video surveillance equipment on cruise vessels, access to 
Page 18 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

video records, and video retention standards, among other items. As of 

December 2013, the two bills have been referred to the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on 

Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively, and have not 

been voted on. It is unclear what effect these bills may have on the 

impending regulation from the Coast Guard if they become law.

For the fourth CVSSA provision, MARAD issued a notice of proposed 

new policy in the Federal Register in May 2013 for certifying providers of 

the CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence 

preservation, and reporting.22 While the CVSSA did not mandate that 

MARAD develop a training provider certification—the language of the 

CVSSA states that MARAD “may” develop a certification—MARAD 

officials stated that they were intent on pursuing certification because 

there were requests from both the Coast Guard and CLIA to provide 

clarity on the certification portion of the CVSSA. MARAD proposed a 

voluntary certification program for training providers to assure the general 

public that passenger cruise vessel security and safety personnel have 

received training that is in strict compliance with the CVSSA-mandated 

model training course. According to MARAD, certification would serve to 

assist the cruise industry in identifying and obtaining qualified training 

services. Training providers seeking to be certified by MARAD would be 

required to submit training plans and supporting information for review. If 

the training provider’s plans meet the CVSSA model course criteria, the 

agency would offer its certification subject to the training provider entering 

into an agreement that, in addition to other terms, would subject the 

organization to program audits. Four comments were received on the 

proposed policy from CLIA, ICV, the American Association for Justice, 

and a practicing maritime attorney. Their comments on the proposed 

policy are summarized in table 3. MARAD is reviewing the comments, 

and officials said that it will promulgate a final policy as soon as 

practicable.

 2278 Fed. Reg. 30,956 (May 23, 2013).

MARAD CVSSA Provision
Page 19 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Table 3: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) Training Certification Provision

Maritime Administration (MARAD) training certification

CVSSA language: The Administrator of the Maritime Administration may certify organizations in the United States and abroad that 

offer the curriculum for training and certification [for crime prevention, detection, evidence preservation and reporting].

Cruise Lines International 

Association (CLIA)

a

CLIA had both questions and suggested changes for MARAD to consider when developing its final 

policy. Specifically, CLIA addressed the process MARAD plans to use to certify training providers 

that may have already been independently certified, and requested that MARAD provide additional 

details on the qualifications it will be looking for in a training provider in order to obtain certification, 

among other items. CLIA also made numerous suggestions including a request for a quicker 

turnaround for certification approval and for MARAD not to publicize the course materials of certified 

training providers for proprietary reasons, among other items.

Cruise victim advocacy group’s 

perspective

International Cruise Victims’ (ICV) comments included a request to make the certification 

mandatory, as well as for MARAD to have responsibility for issuing uniform course completion 

certificates to training providers. ICV also asked about the criteria MARAD plans to use to evaluate 

training providers. Additionally, ICV sought more clarity from MARAD on the frequency of the 

compliance audits that MARAD plans to perform for training providers, among other items.

Other interested parties’

perspectives:

Two others commented on MARAD’s proposed policy. These included the American Association for 

Justice (AAJ) as well as a maritime attorney. First, AAJ commented that the certification program 

does not provide immunity to cruise lines for failure to preserve evidence; instead it is simply a 

certification of a training standard and nothing more. Second, AAJ urged caution in relying on the 

certification program to successfully and skillfully preserve evidence, as those that are certified 

remain cruise line personnel and are not agents of the government. The maritime lawyer had one 

main concern about the transparency of the training provider, and would like to see MARAD require 

cruise lines to post on their websites their training providers and the names of the crew who are 

certified.

Source: Notice of proposed new policy comments provided to MARAD.

a

46 U.S.C. § 3508(a).
Page 20 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

The FBI and the Coast Guard have fully implemented the CVSSA 

provisions regarding crime data reporting. Specifically, the FBI is 

responsible for implementing two main areas of the CVSSA: reviewing 

safety guides that the cruise lines prepare23 and reporting CVSSA crime 

data (regarding crimes that occur onboard cruise ships) to the Coast 

Guard which publishes it on a public website.24 FBI officials reported that 

they provide data for cases no longer under investigation, as stated in the 

CVSSA. The CVSSA identifies eight crimes that, if within the FBI’s 

jurisdiction, cruise lines must report to the FBI.25 These crimes are 

homicide, suspicious death, missing U.S. national, kidnapping, assault 

with serious bodily injury, firing or tampering with the vessel, theft of 

money or property in excess of $10,000, and certain sexual assault 

offenses.26 The CVSSA then requires the Coast Guard to publish on its 

website a statistical compilation of all allegations of CVSSA crimes 

reported to the FBI that are no longer under FBI investigation.27

 2346 U.S.C. § 3507(c)(1). FBI officials told us that after the CVSSA was enacted, the 

cruise lines sent them their safety guides for the FBI to review, and the FBI provided 

comments back to the cruise lines, as required. 

The data 

are to be updated at least quarterly, aggregated by cruise line, and each 

24 Id. at § 3507(g)(4). While both the Coast Guard and the FBI have implementation 

responsibilities for the crime-reporting requirements in the CVSSA, the vast majority of the 

work in implementing the crime reporting provision of the CVSSA falls to the FBI. The 

Coast Guard’s role is ensuring that the crime statistics that the FBI provides to it are 

posted on the Coast Guard’s website in a timely manner, and it has done so. The website 

where the crime statistics are posted is http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/CruiseLine.asp. 

2546 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(A). The FBI has jurisdiction to investigate an alleged crime if (1) 

the vessel, regardless of registry, is owned, in whole or in part, by a United States person, 

regardless of the nationality of the victim or perpetrator, and the incident occurs when the 

vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and outside the 

jurisdiction of any state; (2) the incident concerns an offense by or against a United States 

national committed outside the jurisdiction of any nation; (3) the incident occurs in the 

Territorial Sea of the United States, regardless of the nationality of the vessel, the victim, 

or the perpetrator; or (4) the incident concerns a victim or perpetrator who is a United 

States national on a vessel during a voyage that departed from or will arrive at a U.S. port. 

46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(B).

26The sexual assault offenses are aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, sexual abuse 

of a minor, and abusive sexual contact. Prior to the CVSSA, in March 2007, the FBI, the 

Coast Guard, and CLIA reached an agreement on voluntary, standardized protocols for 

CLIA member lines to report allegations of serious violations of U.S. law committed 

aboard cruise vessels. The agreement listed eight categories of incidents that are to be 

reported by CLIA members to the nearest FBI field office or legal attaché office. These 

incidents are identical to those listed in the CVSSA.

2746 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(4).

The FBI and the Coast 

Guard Have Fully 

Implemented CVSSA 

Crime Data Reporting 

Requirements
Page 21 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

type of crime is to be identified including whether it was committed by a 

passenger or a crew member. Figure 2 explains the FBI’s general 

process for receiving a CVSSA-related crime report and, if appropriate, 

opening and closing its investigation of a CVSSA-related crime.

Figure 2: Law Enforcement Process for Investigation of Cruise Crime within FBI’s Jurisdiction

Note: Figure 2 describes the general process law enforcement might use to investigate a cruise 

vessel crime. However, each case is different and the facts and circumstances will drive how the case 

is approached. Additionally, the FBI continues to gather information and evidence during the “active 
Page 22 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

investigation period.” However, we did not include specific methods the FBI uses because the 

purpose of this graphic is to show which alleged crimes are eventually reported publicly, and not to 

detail the FBI’s investigative methods.

When an alleged crime occurs aboard a cruise vessel, according to cruise 

line officials, the security officer onboard the vessel typically receives 

notification of the alleged crime. If the alleged crime is believed to be a 

CVSSA-related crime, the security officer is usually required to notify the 

vessel owner, since under the CVSSA it is the owner’s responsibility to 

report any CVSSA crime to the FBI and the Coast Guard as soon as 

possible.28 FBI officials stated that initial reports of crimes can come in 

varying forms, but generally for CVSSA crimes, they are notified within 24 

hours by telephone. FBI officials also stated that, in most instances, they 

are relying on cruise vessel personnel to preserve the crime scene 

aboard the vessel since the FBI cannot typically get to a cruise vessel 

until it arrives in a United States port.29

According to a cruise victim advocate group’s official, this “pre-opening”

phase has been a stated source of concern for the group because of the 

following issues:

To help address these 

circumstances, the FBI has provided the cruise lines with a standard form 

for detailing initial information about the alleged crime that includes a 

description of the incident; the names of victims, witnesses, and suspects; 

any statements made by those involved; and any evidence preserved 

(rape kits, video recordings, photos, etc.). The cruise lines are to send 

this form to the FBI and Coast Guard as soon as possible after the crime 

is reported. The FBI considers the information as it determines what 

further actions need to be taken.

• Law enforcement response: At sea, unlike on land, generally, a 

crime victim cannot call 911 to reach an independent local law 

enforcement authority. Instead, it is the responsibility of the cruise 

line’s security personnel to respond. This can be disconcerting to the 

 2846 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(A). The CVSSA also gives the cruise lines discretion to report 

any serious incident that does not meet the reporting requirements of the law if they wish. 

Officials from one cruise line we spoke with said it generally reports all crimes that occur 

onboard, including minor offenses, to the FBI.

29If the next port is a U.S. port, the FBI is to meet the vessel upon arrival. If the next port is 

a foreign port, the FBI works with the local foreign authorities to decide who has 

jurisdiction over the case. If it is determined that a foreign country has jurisdiction, it would 

be less likely the FBI would also open its own investigation, according to the FBI.

FBI Involvement—”Preopening” Period
Page 23 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

victim of a crime, particularly if the alleged perpetrator is a cruise line 

employee. An ICV official stated that the group realizes that it is the 

cruise line’s responsibility to respond initially, but the ICV believes that 

victims should be given immediate access to a private phone and 

contact information to call the FBI directly, and other support 

organizations.30

• Jurisdiction: Cruise vessels generally sail through multiple local and 

foreign jurisdictions during a cruise. A cruise victim advocate group 

official stated that this can result in a victim feeling confused in dealing 

with the different legal systems.31 Depending on where the reported 

crime occurs, there can be several foreign ports that the cruise line 

may visit before arriving back in the United States. Each of these 

foreign jurisdictions may investigate the crime if it so chooses.

• Evidence integrity: Cruise vessel personnel preserve crime scene 

evidence until law enforcement personnel board the vessel to begin 

reviewing the allegations, generally upon the vessel arriving at a U.S. 

port. For cruise victim advocates, this raises questions about evidence

preservation, conflict of interest, the feasibility of conducting an 

investigation days after a crime may have occurred, and the potential 

contamination of a crime scene if other jurisdictions investigate prior 

to the vessel arriving back in the United States.

In response to these concerns, FBI officials stated that they believe it is 

important to have cruise line security officials begin some evidence 

preservation work. They added that this is important given that there is no 

law enforcement agency onboard and that the FBI interviews and 

evidence collection are generally conducted when the cruise vessel has 

arrived in a U.S. port. To help support this effort, the FBI has provided 

 30The CVSSA does require cruise lines to provide victims of alleged sexual assault with 

free and immediate access to contact information for law enforcement, hotline services, 

and others and a private telephone line and Internet connection by which the individual 

may confidentially access law enforcement, an attorney, and information and support 

services. 46 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(5).

31If a crime occurs outside the United States’ jurisdiction, State Department officials said 

that if they are notified of a cruise vessel crime involving a U.S. citizen, the local embassy 

or consulate will provide assistance to that U.S. citizen, if needed, and coordinate with the 

FBI.
Page 24 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

CLIA with information on how to preserve crime scenes.32

Upon boarding the vessel, the FBI can more readily gather evidence, 

interview witnesses, and survey the crime scene. If the alleged crime 

meets the standard for opening an investigation, the FBI will open an 

investigation and certain statistics about the case are to be published on 

the Coast Guard’s website when the case is closed. Whether the FBI 

opens an investigation depends on a number of factors related to the 

facts and circumstances of each case. However, for a crime allegation to 

eventually appear on the Coast Guard’s public website, under the law, an 

investigation would have to have been officially opened by the FBI.

FBI officials in 

all field offices we visited told us they have never been concerned about 

the information they received or the integrity of an investigation as a result 

of the security officer being a cruise line employee. Most cruise line 

officials mentioned that the circumstances of an international cruise—

where no independent law enforcement agency is available in 

international waters—may make it necessary for their security personnel 

to begin preserving evidence and collecting information while the vessel 

is still at sea to assist law enforcement personnel. FBI officials in one port 

city noted that they had seen an improvement in evidence preservation 

since the CVSSA came into law.

According to FBI officials, an open case may no longer be under 

investigation if (1) the case has reached a final disposition in court (e.g., a 

verdict was rendered and appeals have concluded); (2) the statute of 

limitations has run out; and (3) at some point following the opening of an 

official investigation, the U.S. Attorney declines prosecution. Once a case 

is closed, FBI provides statistics on these closed cases to the Coast 

Guard for posting on the website.

However, there is a difference between the number of reported cases and 

the number of closed cases. Table 4 identifies alleged CVSSA crimes 

reported to the FBI by year, and table 5 identifies closed CVSSA cases 

published on the Coast Guard’s public website by year. As tables 4 and 5 

demonstrate, there were 287 alleged CVSSA crimes reported to the FBI 

 32However, in the information provided to CLIA, the FBI cautions that cruise line personnel 

should not be “collecting evidence” nor does their effort to preserve a crime scene create 

an agency relationship such that cruise vessel or other maritime vessel personnel are 

deemed to be acting as agents of the government, or vice versa. 

FBI Investigation—Active 

Investigation Period

FBI Investigation—Cases No 

Longer under Investigation, or 

“Closed” Cases
Page 25 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

during this nearly 4-year time period and 81 CVSSA crimes that were 

published on the website as closed.

Table 4: Alleged CVSSA Crimes Reported to the FBI by Cruise Lines from January 2010 through September 2013

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

Note: According to FBI officials, the FBI receives reports of alleged serious violations of U.S. law 

directly from the cruise lines in accordance with the CVSSA. The FBI then assesses the reports and 

classifies the allegations into one of the eight serious violations outlined in the CVSSA.

Table 5: Alleged CVSSA Crimes No Longer under Investigation by the FBI (Published on Coast Guard Website) from January 

2010 through September 2013

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

Crime 2010 2011 2012

2013

(JanuarySeptember) Total

Homicide 0 0 0 0 0

Death-suspicious 1 3 0 2 6

Missing U.S. national 3 5 7 7 22

Kidnapping 0 0 0 0 0

Assault with serious bodily injury 12 3 10 12 37

Firing or tampering with vessel 1 0 1 1 3

Theft greater than $10,000 19 16 15 13 63

Sexual assault 50 43 30 33 156

Total allegations 86 70 63 68 287

Crime 2010 2011 2012

2013

(January-September) Total

Homicide 0 0 0 0 0

Death-suspicious 4 0 1 0 5

Missing U.S. national 0 0 0 1 1

Kidnapping 0 0 0 0 0

Assault with serious bodily injury 3 3 0 2 8

Firing or tampering with vessel 0 0 1 0 1

Theft greater than $10,000 0 0 2 0 2

Sexual assault 28 13 11 12 64

Total crimes no longer under investigation 35 16 15 15 81
Page 26 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

While the FBI reporting of CVSSA crime data is consistent with the law, 

these data have some limitations. For example, the crime data currently 

reported are limited in that (1) allegations for which investigations are not 

opened are not reported, (2) the data reported are not timely, and (3) the 

data reported are not put into context that would provide the public with 

the magnitude of crime on vessels, as discussed below.

• Allegations for which investigations are not opened are never 

published: As shown in tables 4 and 5, there are more than three 

times the number of alleged crimes reported to the FBI by the cruise 

lines than the CVSSA requires the FBI to post publicly. The data in 

table 4 on alleged crimes are not available publicly. According to a 

cruise victim advocate we interviewed, and to some members of 

Congress, there are questions about whether the public is adequately 

informed about the numbers of alleged CVSSA crimes on cruise lines. 

An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we interviewed stated 

that without complete data on the crimes that have occurred on cruise 

vessels, the public may not have the necessary information to make 

informed decisions about cruise travel. However, information on 

allegations of crime also may not accurately reflect crime on cruise 

vessels, as some allegations may be unfounded.

• Data reported are not timely: There can be a lag between the time 

an alleged crime is reported to the FBI and the time a case is closed. 

According to an FBI official, the crime data that are posted on Coast 

Guard’s website represent incidents that may have occurred months 

or years in the past. Depending on the progression of a case, this may 

be due to the length of the investigation, criminal trial, or any appeals. 

As a result, crimes published on the public website often do not align 

with the quarter, and sometimes the year, in which the crime 

occurred. An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we 

interviewed commented that the significant time lapse from when a 

crime allegedly occurs to when it is ultimately reported on the public 

website results in the public getting less valuable information about 

crimes that may have occurred onboard cruise vessels.

• Data reported without any context for comparison: According to a 

CLIA official, appropriate context is needed when presenting the 

CVSSA crime data figures so that the public can determine how 

cruise vessel crime rates compare with land-based crime rates. The 

FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) collects crime statistics from over 

Efforts Are Under Way to 

Provide Additional Data in 

Crime Reporting
Page 27 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

18,000 city, university and college, county, state and tribal, and 

federal law enforcement agencies.33 In an effort to provide more detail 

on the comparative prevalence of cruise crimes, one cruise line and 

CLIA have included data that compare cruise line crime rates for 

homicide, rape, and assault with serious bodily injury with similar landbased crime rate statistics from the UCR for homicide, forcible rape, 

and aggravated assault.34

In July 2013, CLIA officials stated that certain cruise lines would begin 

reporting additional crime data on their websites. According to CLIA, in 

August 2013, six cruise lines—which account for over 90 percent of the 

North American cruise passengers—began to voluntarily report on their 

respective websites the number of alleged CVSSA crimes that had been 

reported onboard their cruise vessels.

As we discuss below, while the UCR 

comparison has some limitations, CLIA officials commented that 

providing this comparison would provide potential cruise passengers 

with more transparent and comprehensive crime statistics. In addition 

to using rates to compare the prevalence of cruise vessel crime with 

the prevalence of land-based crime, presenting cruise crime data in a 

rate-based format may also be useful in comparing crime statistics 

among cruise lines.

35

 33The UCR was conceived in 1929 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police to 

meet the need for reliable uniform crime statistics for the nation. In 1930, the FBI was 

tasked with collecting, publishing, and archiving those statistics. The FBI produces three 

annual publications: 

Officials from one of these cruise 

lines stated that they were volunteering to report this information to be 

more transparent about alleged crimes reported on their vessels. The 

data presented on their respective websites provide more information 

than they are required to report to the FBI—as the cruise line website 

information includes all alleged CVSSA crimes that have been reported 

regardless of FBI jurisdiction, even if the allegation of a crime is later 

determined to be unfounded.

Crime in the United States, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 

Assaulted, and Hate Crime Statistics. The crime data are submitted either through a state 

UCR program or directly to the FBI’s UCR Program.

34 Although the crime data on CLIA’s website are presented through the end of 2012, the 

UCR’s definition of forcible rape was updated in January 2013 to be more broad and 

include rape of a male or a female. CLIA indicated that it would require its members to 

update their definitions as the UCR definitions change.

35CLIA reports a subset of these data on its website as well. One of the six cruise lines is 

a corporation that reported the crime data in aggregate for its four North American–based 

cruise line subsidiaries.
Page 28 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

However, methodological factors may limit the usefulness of these data 

for consumers. For example, there are some limitations associated with 

the UCR data comparisons that one cruise line and CLIA are making, in 

that, only certain CVSSA crimes—violent crimes—can be reasonably 

compared with the UCR crimes because of definitional differences and 

the lack of comparison crimes identified in the UCR. In addition, some 

factors that explain the relatively low rate of alleged cruise vessel crimes 

compared with UCR land-based crime rates include the fact that 

passengers are in a confined cruise vessel environment where all 

persons and items brought onboard are screened, camera surveillance is 

ubiquitous, security personnel are present, and the demographic profile of 

the passengers on cruise vessels does not necessarily compare well with 

the profile of a major U.S. city (average income, for example). As a result, 

the differences presented by these two environments make the 

comparison between a cruise vessel environment and a land-based 

community challenging. A CLIA official commented that despite these 

limitations, the UCR is still viewed as the only national data set of 

reported crimes that can be used to make crime comparisons. According 

to a criminal justice researcher familiar with the cruise industry data, the 

UCR is being used as a comparison baseline in part because of the lack 

of an alternative baseline for comparing crime data, and while there may 

be some limitations, the comparative analysis is appropriate.36

In July 2013, legislation was introduced in the Senate and House that 

would amend the CVSSA, including the FBI’s crime-reporting 

requirements, among other provisions.

While the 

presentation of the data on the cruise lines’ and CLIA’s websites may 

have limitations, the methodology for comparison generally appears 

sound and this voluntary crime data reporting is more comprehensive 

than what CVSSA currently requires.

37

 36There is precedent for the collection of alleged crime information across institutions for 

comparison purposes. For example, the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security 

Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act requires colleges and universities participating in 

federal financial aid programs to maintain and disclose statistics on certain alleged crimes. 

20 U.S.C. § 1092(f). According to the Department of Education, the goal of this regulation 

is to provide students, and their families, as higher education consumers, with accurate, 

complete, and timely information about safety so they can make informed decisions.

These bills propose amending 

the CVSSA so that a statistical compilation of all alleged crimes, including 

non-CVSSA crimes, reported by cruise lines to the FBI, irrespective of 

37S.1340, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2800,113th Cong. (2013).
Page 29 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

their investigative status, would be publicly posted, quarterly, on a new 

website maintained by the Department of Transportation. Under the 

proposed legislation, the allegation data would identify whether each 

crime was committed (or allegedly committed) by a passenger or crew 

member and whether it was against a minor. The bills also propose that 

cruise lines report CVSSA-type crimes within the FBI’s jurisdiction to the 

FBI and the nearest U.S. consulate within 4 hours of the crime occurring, 

among other items.38

The efforts of both the cruise lines and Congress could improve the 

completeness, timeliness, and context for crime data on cruise vessels. 

However, as previously stated, the cruise lines are publishing their 

information voluntarily, and it is unknown if they will continue to do so. 

Also, there are some consistency issues in how the data are reported, 

with one cruise company reporting its data in aggregate—combining the 

crime data of all of its North American subsidiary cruise lines into a single 

data set for reporting—while other cruise companies report crime data by 

individual company or by subsidiary cruise line. In addition, the cruise 

lines currently do not report crime in a rate-based format, which would 

allow for easier comparison among cruise lines. If enacted into the law, 

the proposed amendments to the CVSSA, introduced in July 2013, could 

also improve the timeliness, relevance, and transparency of cruise vessel 

crime data available to the public. As of November 2013, however, the 

cruise lines’ voluntary reporting had just begun and the CVSSA bills 

remained in committee, and thus we cannot assess whether, or to what 

extent, these efforts may address the data limitations.

In July 2013, these bills were referred to the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on 

Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively.

 38Currently, CVSSA requires an alleged crime to be reported to the FBI “as soon as 

possible,” and it does not require the nearest U.S. consulate to be notified. 46 U.S.C. 

3507(g)(3)(A).
Page 30 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

The cruise industry responded to the Costa Concordia accident by 

reviewing safety practices and implementing changes across the industry 

and potential international regulatory actions are under consideration at 

the IMO. The Coast Guard began witnessing passenger musters in 

February 2012, soon after the Costa Concordia accident, and has 

participated in a mass rescue exercise involving a cruise vessel.39

In response to the Costa Concordia accident, CLIA initiated an 

operational safety review and member cruise lines adopted 10 safetyrelated policies.40 According to CLIA’s Operational Safety Review 

Executive Summary, the review was guided by cruise industry members 

with the advice and input of an independent panel of safety experts.41

 39Musters are mandatory exercises conducted on cruise vessels to ensure passengers 

are informed of safety protocols while onboard the vessel, including emergency 

evacuation procedures.

Suggested policies were discussed and developed within CLIA’s 

Operational Safety Review’s Task Force, made up of senior industry 

executives from CLIA’s member lines with responsibility for maritime 

safety, and approved by the chief executive officers (CEO) of member 

lines. The resulting 10 policies relate to various safety enhancements, 

such as improvements to passenger musters, vessel passage planning, 

and life jacket stowage. CLIA announced these policies throughout 2012, 

as shown in figure 3.

40CLIA announced its Operational Safety Review on January 27, 2012, about 2 weeks 

after the Costa Concordia accident. CLIA officials said they completed their review in 

December 2012. 

41CLIA, Operational Safety Review Executive Summary, accessed June 14, 2013, 

http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/cruise-industry-policies/cruise-industry-operationalsafety-review. The panel of experts included a former chairman of the U.S. NTSB; a 

former rear admiral in the Royal Navy and head of the United Kingdom’s Marine Accident 

Investigation Branch; a former director, Office of Marine Safety, U.S. NTSB; and a former 

head and executive director of the European Maritime Safety Agency. 

The Cruise Industry 

Made Changes after 

the Costa Concordia 

Accident and 

Potential International 

Regulations Remain 

under Consideration

The Cruise Industry 

Adopted Safety-Related 

Policies Identified 

following the Costa 

Concordia Accident
Page 31 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Figure 3: Timeline of CLIA Actions Relative to the Costa Concordia Accident
Page 32 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

As a condition of CLIA membership, CEOs of all member cruise lines had 

to attest in writing that their companies had adopted the 10 policies and 

had included them in their companies’ safety management systems 

(SMS), according to CLIA officials.42 These officials said they expected 

cruise lines to implement most of the policies upon the dates of their 

announcement.43 Officials noted that they received written attestations 

from member cruise line CEOs at different times following the 

announcements; however, all had provided them as of July 2013. As a 

matter of international regulation, once a policy has been included in a 

company’s SMS, the policy is subject to routine external audits. These 

audits are conducted by vessels’ flag states (or classification societies 

acting on their behalf), which are responsible for ensuring that a vessel’s 

SMS is in compliance with the ISM Code and that the company operates 

the vessel in accordance with the SMS, among other things.44 Almost all 

cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports are registered (flagged) in other 

countries, and are therefore subject to SMS compliance audits by their 

flag states. When foreign-flagged cruise vessels visit U.S. ports, their 

SMSs are also subject to verification by the Coast Guard in its role as a 

port state control authority.45

 42An SMS is a structured and documented system enabling company personnel to 

implement effectively the company safety and environmental protection policy.

Coast Guard officials said their port state 

control boarding officers review the validity of the certificates issued by a 

vessel’s flag state and also perform spot checks of a vessel’s compliance 

with its SMS, and noted that their review of a vessel’s SMS is less indepth than a flag state’s review. Officials also explained that the Coast 

Guard may check items in a vessel’s SMS that go beyond domestic or 

43One policy—the location of life jacket stowage policy—went into effect on July 1, 2013, 

for newly constructed cruise vessels. CLIA officials said that they did not expect cruise 

lines to implement the harmonization of bridge procedures policy and the securing heavy 

objects policy upon the dates of their announcement (November 15, 2012).

44As part of enforcing the ISM Code, flag states (or organizations recognized by the flag 

administrations, such as classification societies) audit company and vessel compliance 

with its SMS, and issue documents of compliance and safety management certificates that 

are valid for 5 years, subject to periodic verification. The ISM Code also requires that 

companies perform annual internal safety audits to ensure compliance with their SMSs.

45As previously discussed, through its Port State Control Program, the Coast Guard 

routinely boards foreign-flagged vessels operating in U.S. waters to verify that they are in 

compliance with applicable international conventions and U.S. laws and regulations. When 

the Coast Guard identifies vessels that are not in substantial compliance with applicable 

laws or regulations, it is responsible for imposing controls to ensure the vessels are 

brought into compliance.
Page 33 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

international regulations—such as the 10 CLIA policies shown in figure 

3—but said that any deficiencies found would merely be subject to 

correction rather than vessel detention because such items are self 

imposed rather than part of any regulation. However, Coast Guard 

officials noted that a series of such deficiencies might indicate a lack of 

implementation of the SMS which could result in more serious actions by 

Coast Guard. 

To facilitate CLIA’s operational safety review following the Costa 

Concordia accident, each member cruise line was to conduct a review of 

its own safety practices and procedures and collaborate to share best 

practices. The reviews conducted by the five cruise lines we interviewed 

varied in scope and outcomes. For example, according to a document 

provided by one company, it conducted a safety review that examined 

nine areas of its cruise operations—such as emergency management and 

damage control—and officials said this review resulted in over 500 

recommendations. Another cruise line provided documentation showing 

that its review, conducted by an outside entity, focused on six objectives 

that in many cases relate to the human aspect of safety and emergency 

response—such as leadership involvement, teamwork and training, and 

safety culture—and the review resulted in 26 observations for further 

consideration. Representatives of the five cruise lines we spoke with 

identified some examples of changes they have made, or are making, 

after reviewing their safety procedures following the Costa Concordia

accident. They include the following:

• One cruise line, as part of its quality assurance processes, reported 

that it has its most qualified captains visit vessels and observe staff to 

determine whether they are fostering an open atmosphere on the 

bridge. These captains are to ensure that senior bridge officers are 

making their thoughts and intentions known, and that junior bridge 

officers challenge senior officers if they are unclear about orders or 

have concerns. This emphasis on bridge team management aligns 

with the new CLIA “Passage Planning” policy where, among other 

things, bridge team members are encouraged to raise operational 

concerns without fear of retribution.

• Another cruise line reported that it changed the duty of managing the 

vessel mustering process from the captain of the vessel to the hotel 

director, to alleviate extra burden on the captain during an emergency. 

It also changed its mustering policy, so if a passenger refuses to 

muster prior to departure, then that passenger is not allowed to travel.
Page 34 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

• Another cruise line reported that it sent its officers to receive testing to 

assess how they will react during the stress of an emergency; the 

suitability of their leadership style; and human factors such as 

approachability, reliability, and acceptance of change. CLIA officials 

also said testing of crew to assess how they will react during the 

stress of an emergency was a topic of in-depth discussion during its 

operational safety review following the Costa Concordia accident.

Representatives from all five cruise lines we spoke with said they have 

included, or plan to include, the safety-related changes they have made 

as a result of their internal reviews into their SMSs.

IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)—a key IMO committee charged 

with addressing all matters related to the safety of shipping—has adopted 

one regulation, issued 18 interim safety recommendations, and is 

considering additional safety-related measures that it may take following 

the Costa Concordia accident. Specifically, MSC adopted a regulation in 

June 2013 to be effective on January 1, 2015, which requires that newly 

embarked passengers muster prior to or immediately upon departure, 

instead of within 24 hours, as stated in current regulations.46 According to 

a Coast Guard official, in the case of the Costa Concordia accident, the 

passengers that had embarked at the previous port had not yet 

participated in a muster drill before the accident occurred.47

 46In June 2013, the IMO Marine Safety Committee adopted amendments to the SOLAS 

convention, regulations III/19.2.2 and III/19.2.3.

47According to the Italian government report on the safety technical investigation for the 

Costa Concordia accident, 1,270 of the 3,206 passengers had participated in a muster 

drill, while the remaining passengers received safety instructions by video. 

International Safety 

Measures Are Under 

Consideration and the 

Coast Guard Has Taken 

Some Initial Actions

IMO Adopted Muster 

Regulation and Is Considering 

Other Potential Measures
Page 35 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

IMO’s MSC has also issued 18 interim safety recommendations for 

passenger vessel companies to implement on a voluntary basis.48 Many 

of these recommendations closely align with the 10 CLIA policies 

discussed above. For example, as with CLIA’s policy, IMO recommends 

that companies record the nationality of persons onboard for purposes of 

coordination during emergencies.49

Following the Costa Concordia accident, the MSC created a long-term 

action plan to facilitate the consideration of measures resulting from the 

accident. According to a MSC report, MSC uses the action plan to 

document proposals from IMO member governments and international 

organizations. The action plan is not publicly available; however, a Coast 

Guard official present at the June 2013 MSC meeting said the plan 

contains about 20 items and can be viewed as a list of issues—similar to 

the list of 18 interim safety recommendations—on which the MSC may 

However, in some cases the IMO 

recommendations offer additional guidance. For example, in addition to 

recommending that passenger vessels carry additional life jackets in 

public spaces (similar to CLIA’s policy), IMO recommends that companies 

consider providing life jackets that are similarly designed and can be 

donned in a similar manner to avoid confusion. Following the release of 

the Costa Concordia safety technical accident investigation report in May 

2013, the MSC working group responsible for developing these 18 interim 

recommendations expressed the view that, in the future, a decision will 

need to be made on their final status.

 48In June 2012, IMO’s MSC issued a circular with 5 interim recommendations, and has 

subsequently updated the circular twice, for a total of 18 interim recommendations. These 

18 recommendations address life jackets onboard passenger vessels, emergency 

instructions for passengers, common elements of musters and emergency instructions, 

passenger muster policy, access of personnel to the navigating bridge and avoiding 

distractions, harmonization of bridge navigational procedures, voyage planning, recording 

the nationality of persons on board, lifeboat loading for training purposes, securing heavy 

objects, and inclinometer (rolling motion) data for the voyage data recorder. More 

complete information can be accessed by creating a public account on 

http://webaccounts.imo.org, and searching for the circular that lists the 18 interim 

recommendations (MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.2).

49Department of State officials said they had a difficult time determining who the U.S. 

citizens were that were onboard the Costa Concordia at the time of the accident. Officials 

said the vessel’s manifest contained only last names and first initials of passengers and 

did not have citizenship information, making it difficult for them to determine who the U.S 

citizens were so they could render assistance. 
Page 36 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

take further action.50

 50This same Coast Guard official noted that the long-term action plan was not intended to 

include only issues that can be linked directly to the Costa Concordia accident. He said 

the plan also includes issues that were already under consideration by MSC when the 

accident occurred. At the most recent MSC meeting (June 2013), MSC instructed the IMO 

Secretariat to revise the long-term action plan with a view to clearly identify whether 

proposed actions are related to existing issues or are new issues arising from the loss of 

the Costa Concordia. The Coast Guard informed us that this revision has been completed, 

but noted that the action plan has not been finalized and therefore continues to not be 

publicly available. 

This action could include a variety of outcomes, 

including the development of international regulations. Figure 4 

summarizes the main actions of IMO following the Costa Concordia

accident.
Page 37 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Figure 4: Timeline of IMO MSC Actions following the Costa Concordia Accident

Although IMO is considering additional measures that may become 

regulations, it could be years before they take effect, and the Coast 

Guard can then enforce them through its port state control inspections.51

 51 The Coast Guard generally focuses its enforcement activities on U.S. and international 

regulations. However, as of September 2013, we identified one international regulation 

and no U.S. regulations that have been adopted as a result of the Costa Concordia

accident.

In the interim, the one new regulation, adopted in June 2013, requires 

newly embarked passengers to muster prior to or immediately upon 

departure.
Page 38 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Although the new muster requirement does not go into effect until 

January 2015, the Coast Guard initiated the practice of witnessing 

passenger musters as part of its mandatory vessel examination program 

in February 2012, just weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. Coast 

Guard officials acknowledged that they are, in effect, regulating by policy; 

however, they said the industry is supportive of this effort and has 

developed a similar policy to perform passenger musters prior to 

departure. Coast Guard officials said that when witnessing passenger 

musters, the Coast Guard actively ensures they contain the elements 

required by current regulation. For example, they check to ensure that 

crew members are appropriately directing passengers to their muster 

stations and that passengers are instructed in how to wear a life jacket, 

among other things. The Coast Guard reported it has witnessed about 

280 musters since its policy went into effect, and agency officials said 

they have not had any major concerns with the musters they have 

witnessed.52

The Coast Guard reported that it is also continuing to monitor 

developments resulting from the Costa Concordia accident and may 

make additional policy changes in the future. For example, the Coast 

Guard and the NTSB represented the United States as a “substantially 

interested state” in the Italian-led Costa Concordia accident investigation, 

consistent with international law.53

 52Coast Guard officials said they do not separately track the number of musters they have 

witnessed. However, the Coast Guard conducted 301 cruise vessel examinations from the 

beginning of the muster policy (February 2, 2012) through July 1, 2013. Officials estimated 

that they witnessed musters at about 280 of these examinations, and did not witness 

musters at the roughly 20 examinations where passengers had embarked on the vessel 

elsewhere. 

Coast Guard and NTSB officials said 

they contributed to the investigation by interviewing U.S. passengers and 

providing comments on a draft of the report. A senior Coast Guard official 

noted some of the general lessons that all parties with an interest in the 

investigation have learned. For example, the official said that muster drills 

should be held prior to departure, vessel route changes should not be 

made as unilateral decisions by the captain, better control of a vessel’s 

environment can help alleviate human error, proper training of crew to 

handle emergency situations is essential, and extra life jackets should be 

53See IMO Resolution MSC.255(84). The investigating state should allow substantially 

interested states to interview witnesses, view and examine evidence and make copies of 

documents, make submissions in respect of the evidence, comment on and have their 

views properly reflected in the final report, and be provided with the draft and final reports. 

Coast Guard Witnesses 

Passenger Musters and 

Coordinated Mass Rescue 

Exercise
Page 39 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

available at locations convenient to evacuating passengers. Coast Guard 

officials said they are also monitoring actions being taken by CLIA and 

IMO, and may make policy changes in the future as they continue to 

review the final Costa Concordia report and wait for the results of the 

vessel salvage.54

Additionally, the Coast Guard has also been active in exercising 

scenarios related to cruise vessel evacuation and rescue. In April 2013, 

the Coast Guard coordinated an offshore cruise vessel rescue exercise in 

an effort to prepare for large-scale disasters similar to the Costa 

Concordia accident.55 Although the Coast Guard has participated in mass 

rescue exercises involving cruise vessels before, the Coast Guard 

reported that this exercise was the largest in terms of scale and 

complexity in the history of the international maritime community and the 

Coast Guard.56

 54As a result of the accident, the Costa Concordia turned on its side and rested on the 

ocean floor, with a significant portion of the vessel still above water. Vessel salvage refers 

to the process of removing the vessel wreck. The owner of the vessel plans to have the 

vessel removed in one piece by refloating it and having it towed away from the coast of 

the Island of Giglio, Italy, where the accident occurred.

The exercise was conducted in Freeport, Bahamas, and 

included Coast Guard collaboration with CLIA, three cruise lines, and the 

National Emergency Management Agency of the Bahamas, among 

others. One cruise line provided a cruise vessel that was used for the 

abandon vessel portion of the exercise, where we observed individuals 

posing as passengers boarding lifeboats that were lowered to the water 

and driven to shore. The second cruise line led the landing site and 

transportation element of the exercise, and the third cruise line led the 

sheltering operations element of the exercise where we observed 

passenger services— such as providing access to embassy consular 

affairs services, counseling, and minor medical services— being 

exercised.

55This operation was the first in a 5-year mass rescue exercise series known as Black 

Swan. Future mass rescue operations are scheduled in Hawaii in 2015, and Norfolk, 

Virginia, in 2017.

56The Coast Guard noted that all offshore mass rescue events require significant search 

and rescue efforts including international communications; coordination of rescue 

resources; local emergency management stakeholders; international health care systems 

to support medical surge capacities to care for large numbers of injured personnel; 

coordinated landing site management; sustained care for the rescued with clothing, food, 

and counseling services; and transportation travel documentation and logistics planning to 

return the rescued to their homes.
Page 40 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

In addition to witnessing the above actions as part of the mass rescue 

exercise, we observed efforts by the Department of State and Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) as they exercised their respective 

responsibilities for managing passengers under the cruise vessel mass 

rescue scenario. For example, Department of State officials established a 

meeting room at the Freeport Airport, where they interacted with U.S. 

passenger evacuees to process their required passport documentation. 

Additionally, because Freeport is a CBP preclearance location—where 

departing U.S. passengers are processed through U.S. customs and 

immigration prior to departure to the United States—we witnessed CBP’s 

approach for processing the surge of evacuees at the airport.57 The Coast 

Guard characterized the 2013 exercise as a success, and noted that the 

exercise had effectively and interactively put into effect the full spectrum 

of vessel-to-shore mass rescue operations and identified strengths and 

weaknesses in existing procedures.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, 

the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Department of State for 

review and comment. The Department of Homeland Security, Department 

of Justice, and Department of State provided technical comments, which 

we incorporated as appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 

issue date. At that time we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of 

Transportation, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety 

Board, the Secretary of State, appropriate congressional committees, and 

other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

 57Preclearance operations are part of CBP’s Office of Field Operations, which has the 

responsibility of managing 329 ports of entry nationwide. These operations are 

established via a formal agreement between the United States and host country, which 

allows CBP to staff officers at host airports and facilitate the customs and immigration 

process for passengers prior to arrival in the United States. As of September 2013, 

preclearance is in effect in Aruba, Bermuda, Bahamas (two locations), Ireland (two 

locations) and Canada (nine locations). 

Agency Comments 
Page 41 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III.

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders with Maritime 

Safety and Security Activities

Page 42 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

This appendix provides information on the international and domestic 

organizations that play a role in the safety and security of cruise vessels. 

The non-U.S. stakeholders are diverse; have wide-ranging roles and 

responsibilities; and include international organizations, governments of 

nations where cruise vessels make stops or are registered, and private 

organizations that help ensure the safe operation of vessels. See table 6 

for a list of some of the relevant international and domestic stakeholders 

involved in implementation of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act 

of 2010 (CVSSA) and cruise vessel safety and security issues.

Table 6: Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security Activities

Organization or agency Maritime security or safety activities

International organizations

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with 170 

member states that is responsible for developing an 

international regulatory framework addressing, among other 

things, maritime safety and security.

• Responsible for developing and maintaining a comprehensive 

regulatory framework for cruise vessels.

• Responsible for developing international standards for vessel 

security and safety.

Flag state

The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered, 

and a flag state’s control or authority over a vessel flying its 

flag can generally extend anywhere in the world that the vessel 

operates.

• Responsible for ensuring that vessels flying its flag meet all 

international safety standards.

Port state

The port state is the country where the port is located. Port 

state control is the process by which a nation exercises its 

authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters 

subject to the port state’s jurisdiction.

• Inspects foreign vessels in national ports to verify that the 

condition of the vessel and its equipment complies with the 

requirements of international regulations and that the vessel is 

manned and operated in compliance with these rules.

Classification societies

Classification societies are independent organizations that 

verify the structural strength and integrity of essential parts of 

the vessel’s hull and its appendages, and the reliability and 

function of the propulsion and steering systems, power 

generation, and those other features and auxiliary systems 

that have been built into the vessel in order to maintain 

essential services onboard. Additionally, they verify the 

functionality of safety equipment and systems during 

inspections and verify operational procedures through audit 

programs.

• Develop and apply their own rules and verify compliance with 

international and national statutes on behalf of flag states.

• Perform periodic surveys, carried out onboard the vessel, to 

verify that the vessel continues to meet relevant requirements.

Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)

CLIA is a trade association composed of 26 major cruise lines 

and represents 98 percent of the cruise line businesses 

operating in the United States.

• Responsible for acting as the coordinating body and conduit of 

information for its members in meetings with U.S. agencies at 

the national level.

• Serves as a nongovernmental consultative organization to IMO.

Appendix I: Key Stakeholders with Maritime 

Safety and Security Activities
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders with Maritime 

Safety and Security Activities

Page 43 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Organization or agency Maritime security or safety activities

Federal agenciesa

U.S. Coast Guard • Ensures vessels in U.S. ports comply with domestic and 

international maritime security and safety standards.

• Conducts initial, annual, and periodic exams of foreign-flagged 

cruise vessels calling in U.S. ports. This regime allows the 

Coast Guard to determine that the vessel is in substantial 

compliance with all applicable international and domestic 

standards.

• Investigates marine casualties that occur on foreign cruise 

vessels in the navigable waters of the United States and its 

territories or possessions. The Coast Guard may also represent 

the United States as a “substantially interested state” in certain 

marine casualty investigations outside of U.S. jurisdiction. 

Furthermore, the Coast Guard and the National Transportation 

Safety Board have agreed to coordinate investigative responses 

for certain marine casualties.

• Primary U.S. representative to IMO for all maritime policy 

development.

Maritime Administration (MARAD) • MARAD is the agency within the U.S. Department of 

Transportation dealing with waterborne transportation. Among 

other things, it promotes the viability of U.S.-registered (flagged) 

vessels moving in domestic and international commerce. 

Almost all cruise vessels servicing the United States, however, 

are foreign flagged.

• Responsible for developing a training curriculum for mariner use 

of force against piracy, and may certify organizations that offer 

a curriculum for training in the prevention, detection, evidence 

preservation, and reporting of criminal activities in the 

international maritime environment.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) • Responsible for investigating alleged serious crimes listed in the 

CVSSA that occur aboard cruise vessels and meet the 

jurisdictional requirements of the CVSSA.

• Employs maritime liaison agents who are responsible for 

coordinating with other organizations that share responsibility 

for security at the nation’s ports, and facilitate the sharing of 

information on threats and security measures.

• Employs victim specialists who provide information and crisis 

intervention/emergency assistance to victims of violations that 

fall under FBI’s investigative authority, whether charges are filed 

or not, to include referrals to counseling and other services

available in the victim’s home community.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) • NTSB’s Office of Marine Safety investigates major marine 

accidents on or under the navigable waters, internal waters, or 

the territorial sea of the United States as well as accidents 

involving U.S.-flagged vessels worldwide to determine the 

probable cause and identify safety recommendations that will 

prevent similar events in the future.
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders with Maritime 

Safety and Security Activities

Page 44 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Organization or agency Maritime security or safety activities

Department of State • Administers the Consular Information Program to inform U.S. 

citizens about potential threats to their health or safety abroad.

• Provides assistance to U.S. citizens on cruise vacations in the 

event of a crime, medical issue, death, or loss of passport, 

among other things.

• Works with foreign embassies and cruise companies in the 

event of a disaster to ensure U.S. citizens are accounted for 

and provided assistance—such as accommodations, clothing, 

and transportation home. 

State and local governments

Law enforcement agencies • Conduct investigations into cruise vessel crime occurring within 

their maritime jurisdictions.

• Except in those instances where the FBI has lead jurisdiction, 

coordinate with the FBI regarding alleged crimes and 

investigations, as appropriate.

Source: GAO analysis of organization and agency documents.

a There are numerous federal agencies that play a role with respect to cruise safety and security, 

including: (1) Customs and Border Protection, which is responsible for screening vessels, 

passengers, and cargo as well as extraditing suspects to law enforcement officials and making 

admissibility decisions for non-U.S. citizens involved in crimes, among other things; (2) Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, which conducts the vessel sanitation program to assist the cruise 

vessel industry in preventing and controlling the introduction, transmission, and spread of 

gastrointestinal illnesses on cruise vessels; and (3) United States Department of Agricultural Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service, which regulates garbage arriving from outside the United 

States. However, for the purposes of this report, we focus on the agencies listed in table 4 because 

they have significant responsibilities for implementing the CVSSA, addressing crime, and ensuring 

the structural safety of cruise vessels.
Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel 

Security and Safety Act

Page 45 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

This appendix provides summary information on the provisions of the 

Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, including time frames for 

implementation.

Table 7: Summary of Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA)

Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel 

Security and Safety Act

Category Provision Implementation time frame

Rail heights The vessel shall be equipped with rails that are located not 

less than 42 inches above the cabin deck.

Eighteen months after enactment of 

the CVSSA.

Peepholes/other means of 

identification

Each passenger stateroom and crew cabin shall be 

equipped with entry doors that include peepholes or other 

means of visual identification.

Eighteen months after enactment of 

the CVSSA.

Security latches and timesensitive keysEach passenger stateroom and crew cabin shall be 

equipped with security latches and time-sensitive key 

technology.

Required for any vessel constructed 

after July 2010. 

Capturing images of 

passengers/detecting persons 

fallen overboard

The vessel shall integrate technology that can be used for 

capturing images of passengers or detecting passengers 

who have fallen overboard, to the extent that such 

technology is available.

Eighteen months after enactment of 

the CVSSA. Per Coast Guard Policy 

Letter 11-09, the Coast Guard is using 

a phased implementation plan to 

accommodate analysis and research 

and development. This provision is to 

be addressed by regulation or updated 

policy guidance.

Acoustical hailing and warning 

devices

a

Vessels shall be equipped with a sufficient number of 

operable acoustic hailing or other such warning devices to 

provide communication capability around the entire vessel 

when operating in high-risk waters.

Eighteen months after enactment of 

the CVSSA. Per Coast Guard Policy 

Letter 11-09, the Coast Guard is using 

a phased implementation plan to 

accommodate analysis and research 

and development. This provision is to 

be addressed by regulation or updated 

policy guidance. 

Video recording requirements (1) The owner of the vessel shall maintain a video 

surveillance system to assist in documenting crimes on the 

vessel and in providing evidence for the prosecution of such 

crimes, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security.

(2) The owner of the vessel shall provide to any law 

enforcement official performing official duties in the course 

and scope of an investigation, upon request, a copy of all 

records of video surveillance that the official believes may 

provide evidence of a crime reported to law enforcement 

officials.

Per Coast Guard Policy Letter 11-09, 

the Coast Guard is using a phased 

implementation plan to accommodate 

analysis, research, and development. 

This provision is to be addressed by 

regulation or updated policy guidance. 
Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel 

Security and Safety Act

Page 46 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Safety information The owner of the vessel shall have available for each 

passenger a guide that provides a description of medical 

and security personnel onboard with 24-hour contact 

instructions and describes the jurisdictional authority 

applicable to, and the law enforcement processes available 

for, CVSSA crimes that arise in the territorial waters of the 

United States, on the high seas, or in any country to be 

visited on the voyage. The owner of the vessel shall also 

provide passengers with U.S. embassy and consulate 

information for each country the vessel will visit during the 

course of the voyage.

Effective immediately upon enactment 

of the CVSSA.

Sexual assault The owner of the vessel shall

(1) maintain adequate antiretroviral medications to prevent 

sexually transmitted diseases (STD) after a sexual assault;

(2) maintain on-vessel equipment and materials to perform 

a sexual assault medical evaluation;

(3) make available at all times medical staff who have 

proper credentialing; and

(4) prepare, provide to the patient, and maintain 

documentation of the exam findings.

Effective immediately upon enactment 

of the CVSSA.

Sexual assault, patient access 

to information and 

communications

The owner of the vessel shall provide patients free access 

to contact information for local law enforcement, FBI, Coast 

Guard, nearest U.S. embassy/consulate, and sexual assault 

hotline, as well as private phone line and Internet.

Effective immediately upon enactment 

of the CVSSA.

Confidentiality of sexual assault 

examination and support 

information

The master or other individual in charge of a vessel shall 

treat all information concerning an exam and post-assault 

counseling confidential.

Effective immediately upon enactment 

of the CVSSA.

Crew access to passenger 

staterooms

The owner of the vessel shall establish and implement 

procedures and restrictions concerning which crew 

members have access to passenger staterooms and 

periods during which they have access.

Effective immediately upon enactment 

of the CVSSA.

Logbook and reporting 

requirements

The owner of the vessel shall record in a logbook all 

complaints of CVSSA crimes, all complaints of theft of 

property in excess of $1,000, and all complaints of other 

crimes committed on any voyage that embarks or 

disembarks passengers in the United States. The owner of 

the vessel shall make the logbook available upon request to 

the FBI, any members of the Coast Guard, and any law 

enforcement officer performing official duties in the course 

and scope of an investigation.

Logbook details shall include vessel operator, name of 

cruise line, flag state, age/gender of victim and assailant, 

description of alleged crime, vessel’s position, 

time/date/method of initial report and law enforcement 

authority to which it was made, time/date of incident, total 

number of passengers and crew members, and case 

number. 

Additionally, the owner of the vessel shall contact the FBI by 

phone to report alleged CVSSA crimes, and shall furnish a 

written report to the Coast Guard Internet portal.

Effective immediately upon enactment 

of the CVSSA.
Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel 

Security and Safety Act

Page 47 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Source: GAO summary of Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act.

a

Availability and access of 

incident data via Coast Guard 

website

The Coast Guard used Policy Letter 11-09 to set dates for compliance with CVSSA provisions in 

cases where the act did not provide specific time frames.

(1) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall maintain 

statistical compilation on the Internet of CVSSA crimes that 

are no longer under investigation by the FBI. Information 

shall be updated quarterly and aggregated by cruise line, 

and each crime shall be identified as to whether it was 

committed by a passenger or a crew member.

(2) Each cruise line taking or discharging passengers in the 

United States shall include a link on its website to the 

website maintained by the Coast Guard described above.

Effective immediately upon enactment 

of the CVSSA.

Maritime Administration 

(MARAD) certification of crew 

training on crime scene 

preservation

MARAD may certify organizations in the United States and 

abroad that offer a curriculum for training and certification.

No implementation requirement for 

MARAD. Final policy under 

development as of December 2013.

Crew training on crime scene 

preservation

The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 

the FBI and MARAD, shall develop minimum training 

standards and curricula to allow for the certification of 

passenger vessel security personnel, crew members, and 

law enforcement officials on the appropriate methods for 

prevention, detection, evidence preservation, and reporting 

of criminal activities in the international maritime 

environment. Beginning 2 years after standards are 

established, no vessel may enter a U.S. port unless there is 

at least one crew member onboard who is certified as 

having completed training.

Within 1 year of the enactment of the 

CVSSA.
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 48 GAO-14-43 Cruise Vessels

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; 

Jeff Jensen; Daniel Klabunde; and Michelle R. Su made significant 

contributions to this report. In addition, David Alexander, Michele Fejfar, 

and Stan Kostyla assisted with design and methodology; Tracey King 

provided legal support; Jessica Orr provided assistance in report 

preparation; and Eric Hauswirth developed the report’s graphics.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441127)
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