FILED 

NOVEMBER 1, 2016 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to 

K.S.F.t 

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No. 33774-0-III 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.CJ. -Kevin F. appeals from the trial court's order 

terminating his parental rights to his son, K.S.F. He argues the trial court erred in finding 

that all necessary services had been offered or provided because the Department of Social 

and Health Services (DSHS) failed to provide bonding and attachment therapy. Mr. F. 

also argues that because DSHS did not offer proper services, the trial court prematurely 

found that he was unfit, that little likelihood existed that conditions would be remedied so 

K.S.F. could be returned to him in the near future, and that termination was in K.S.F.'s 

best interests. We affirm the termination order. 

t To protect the minor's identity, we use initials for the child's name, and an initial 

for the father's last name. 
No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

FACTS 

Mr. F. is the father of K. S.F ., who was born in August 2007. 1 Mr. F. has cerebral 

palsy. Throughout 2007 and 2008, DSHS received multiple referrals questioning Mr. 

F.'s ability to care for K.S.F. The referrals alleged Mr. F. had asked the referent to feed, 

bathe, and change K.S.F. In May 2008, DSHS received a referral alleging that K.S.F. 

was crawling around on the floor with dog and cat urine and also had not eaten in 24 

hours, except for some applesauce. 

In light of these referrals, DSHS provided family preservation services (FPS). The 

FPS provider determined Mr. F. and the mother were not capable of parenting and that 

K.S.F. was unsafe in the home. DSHS then filed a dependency petition and placed K.S.F. 

in foster care. 

Following a contested fact finding hearing, the trial court found K.S.F. dependent. 

DSHS recommended the following services for Mr. F.: parenting education, a nursing 

child assessment satellite training (NCAST) assessment, applying for therapy and 

assistance equipment with a disability aid agency, participating in an occupational 

physical capacity evaluation, meeting with Developmental Disabilities Administration 

caseworkers and complying with their recommendations, and participating in individual 

counseling with a parenting component. DSHS also requested a psychological 

1 K.S.F.'s mother is M.C. The trial court terminated M.C.'s parental rights before 

the trial in this case, and M.C. is not a party to this appeal. 

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Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

evaluation. DSHS determined these were the appropriate services to address Mr. F.'s 

identified parental deficiencies. The trial court ordered Mr. F. to complete these services. 

In October 2008, Dr. Roland Dougherty, a clinical psychologist, performed a 

psychological evaluation on Mr. F. DSHS also referred Mr. F. and K.S.F. for a bonding 

and attachment assessment with Jennifer Obeid-Campbell, a bonding and attachment 

therapist. DSHS also contacted Nancy Riggle, a parenting instructor, to review Mr. F.'s 

and K.S.F.'s files and recommend other supports and services. 

At subsequent review hearings, the trial court also ordered Mr. F. to: (1) comply 

with all bonding and attachment recommendations, (2) participate in parenting coaching 

with Michelle Leifheit, (3) meet with DSHS caseworkers and other care providers to 

discuss accommodations that would assist him in caring for K.S.F., (4) participate in 

videotaped intensive interactive parenting, and (5) complete an updated parenting 

education program addressing K.S.F.'s developmental needs. Mr. F. also participated in 

nine months of parenting instruction with Aracelia Sanchez. 

The dependency lasted six years. At review hearings, the trial court consistently 

found that Mr. F. was in partial compliance with the court's prior orders but had not made 

progress toward correcting the problems that necessitated K.S.F.'s placement in foster 

care. Mr. F. participated in services and occasionally made some progress, but was 

generally unsuccessful in improving his parental deficiencies. Although Mr. F. said he 

understood the service providers' instructions, he was unable to demonstrate those 

parenting skills or put what he had learned into practice. He did not complete his 

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Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

parenting education assignments consistently, did not utilize the recommended adaptive 

equipment, and failed to eliminate safety hazards in his apartment. He refused individual 

counseling throughout the dependency because he did not believe he needed it. For the 

last year of the dependency, Mr. F. stopped engaging in services altogether. 

DSHS filed the termination petition in December 2013. The termination trial 

began July 30, 2014. At trial, DSHS called the four social workers who had worked on 

the case-Cloreese Wilkinson-Rivera, Timothy Barbour, Brenna Blanscett, and Kathy 

Lund. DSHS also called Ms. Leifheit, Deborah Cox (a physical therapist), Rachel 

Ockleston-Catt (an occupational therapist), Dr. Dougherty, Ms. Obeid-Campbell, Ms. 

Riggle, Ms. Sanchez, and both guardian ad litems (GALs) who had w~rked on the caseTara Symons and John Fredrick. 

Ms. Sanchez testified that she saw some bonding between Mr. F. and K.S.F., but 

that their bond was just building. She testified this was one of the reasons she 

recommended increasing the length of visitations. She also testified that, to her 

knowledge, there were no other services Mr. F. needed that DSHS had not offered or 

provided. 

Ms. Leifheit testified that Mr. F. was not emotionally responsive to K.S.F ., and 

that the two lacked a connection. She stated Mr. F. had a flat affect with K.S.F., had 

difficulty communicating with him, and was awkward with him. She also testified DSHS 

"made reasonable efforts in their referrals and services that they provided to Mr. [F.]." 

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 123. 

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No. 33774-0-111 

Parental Rights to KS.F. 

Dr. Dougherty testified that he administered the Millon Clinical Multiaxial 

Inventory (MCMI-3), which is a standardized test designed to detect personality 

disorders. Dr. Dougherty testified Mr. F.'s scores on this test suggested the possible 

presence of a narcissistic personality disorder with negativistic, paranoid, and depressive 

features, which are difficult to treat. He testified he was reluctant to simply diagnose a 

personality disorder because Mr. F. has cerebral palsy, which entails various emotional, 

psychological, and social challenges. However, he believed these traits affected Mr. F.'s 

functioning and should be considered in treatment. 

Pertaining to treatment, Dr. Dougherty recommended that Mr. F. engage in 

psychotherapy/counseling. He noted that Mr. F. was raised in an orphanage and had 

early problems with bonding and attachment. Dr. Dougherty believed Mr. F. 's 

relationship problems with K.S.F.'s mother and Mr. F.'s attachment problems with 

K.S.F. were related to his own bonding and attachment problems, and that counseling 

could address these. Dr. Dougherty believed counseling could address Mr. F.'s negative 

personality characteristics and provide extra support in reuniting him with K.S.F. Dr. 

Dougherty also recommended continued parenting training for Mr. F. When asked if 

there were other services that could be offered to Mr. F., Dr. Dougherty testified that 

support groups may be helpful, although he questioned whether Mr. F. would use them 

effectively. 

Finally, DSHS asked Dr. Dougherty what effect it has on a child to be in longterm foster care without being physically and legally identified in a permanent home. Dr. 

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No. 33774-0-111 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

Dougherty responded that it is best for children to be in stable relationships with parents 

they feel bonded and attached to, and children are more likely to become securely bonded 

the sooner they have a permanent home. 

Ms. Obeid-Campbell described the results of the bonding and attachment 

assessment. Ms. Obeid-Campbell testified that K.S.F.'s attachment to Mr. F. was "nonindicative of a secure attachment." RP at 203. She testified that the parenting dynamic 

was very unstructured, but that this was more illustrative of Mr. F.' s deficits than K. S .F.' s 

attachment to Mr. F. Ms. Obeid-Campbell believed it would be very difficult for Mr. F. 

to foster K.S.F.'s secure attachment development, as he did not provide K.S.F. with the 

necessary consistency, structure, and follow-through. Ms. Obeid-Campbell also noted 

Mr. F. had good empathy and nurturing ability. 

Mr. Barbour testified that DSHS individualized this case and assessed Mr. F.'s 

specific needs. He testified he reviewed the reports and assessments from Mr. F. 's 

various providers and relied on this information in formulating his opinions and 

recommendations. Mr. Barbour reviewed Ms. Obeid-Campbell's bonding assessment 

and determined that Mr. F. had real strengths, such as his ability to empathize and 

nurture, but he also had limitations, which included providing structure, organizing, and 

preparing to carry out parenting tasks. Mr. Barbour's main impression from the bonding 

assessment was a concern about Mr. F. 's general lack of parenting skills. 

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No. 33774-0-111 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

Mr. Barbour described Mr. F. and K.S.F.'s relationship as generally positive, but 

indifferent. He did not believe there was a strong attachment between Mr. F. and K.S.F. 

and believed that K.S.F. needed this. 

Ms. Blanscett testified that she reviewed all of the assessments, reports, and 

evaluations from all the various providers and took these into account when making her 

recommendations. She stated the services DSHS offered would have assisted in 

correcting Mr. F. 's parental deficiencies if he would have participated or demonstrated 

progress. She further testified that there were no other services that would have helped 

during the period of time she had the case. 

DSHS asked Ms. Riggle for her opinion on the services DSHS had offered or 

provided and whether she had any further recommendations. Ms. Riggle testified that 

"[t]he services that had been provided were excellent." RP at 289. She later added that 

Mr. F. could have benefitted from supported living services or a residential program, but 

aside from these, she did not believe DSHS could have offered or provided any other 

services that would have helped Mr. F. parent K.S.F. 

Ms. Symons, who was the assigned GAL from 2008 to 2014, testified that 

[ t ]here has certainly been attachment issues the entire time and that was 

very evident since [K.S.F.] was a toddler. He was very resistant to his dad. 

That bond and attachment was clearly not there . 

. . . The bond just wasn't really there and that was always a concern 

to me for [K.S.F.]. 

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No. 33774-0-III 

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RP at 309. Ms. Symons testified that a child with a secure attachment to a 

caregiver depends on that caregiver to meet his or her needs, and she never saw 

K.S.F. go to Mr. F. when he needed something. She testified that K.S.F. "was 

aggressive with his dad. He would run away. He would push him away. He 

wouldn't go to him for any kind of comfort." RP at 315. When asked if the 

services DSHS offered or provided were the appropriate services to address Mr. 

F.'s parental deficiencies, Ms. Symons agreed that they were. 

Mr. Fredrick, who was the assigned GAL from January 2014 until the termination 

trial, testified there was no parental bond between Mr. F. and K.S.F. He stated the two 

did not connect, talk to each other, or look at each other. Instead, K.S.F. would ignore 

Mr. F. He also testified, based on his review of all the records and the documents in the 

case, the services DSHS provided were the appropriate services to correct Mr. F.'s 

parental deficiencies. 

Ms. Lund, the last social worker on the case, also testified that the services the 

court ordered were those necessary to correct Mr. F.'s deficiencies. 

Following presentation of the evidence and closing arguments, the trial court 

granted DSHS's petition to terminate Mr. F.'s parental rights to K.S.F. In ordering 

termination, the trial court found DSHS had established each of the six elements 

contained in RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The trial 

court found that DSHS had offered or provided Mr. F. all necessary services, reasonably 

available, capable of correcting his parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future. 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

The trial court also found that there was little likelihood that conditions could be 

remedied so K.S.F. could be returned to Mr. F. in the near future. In making this finding, 

the trial court found that there was not a secure bond or attachment between Mr. F. and 

K.S.F., and that a secure bond would be very difficult for them to develop. The trial 

court also found that Mr. F. was unfit to parent, and that termination of Mr. F.'s parental 

rights was in K.S.F.'s best interests. 

Mr. F. appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

Parents have fundamental liberty and privacy interests in the care and custody of 

their children. In re Welfare of S.J, 162 Wn. App. 873, 880, 256 P.3d 470 (2011). Thus, 

a court may terminate parental rights "' only for the most powerful [ of] reasons.'" Id. 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Welfare of A.J.R., 

78 Wn. App. 222, 229, 896 P.2d 1298 (1995)). 

Washington courts use a two-step process when deciding whether to terminate 

parental rights. Id. First, DSHS must show that the statutory requirements in RCW 

13.34.180(1) are established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. S.J., 162 Wn. 

App. at 880. Second, DSHS must show.that termination is in the best interests of the 

child by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Only if the first step is satisfied may the 

court reach the second step. Id. 

Under the first element, the statutory requirements that DSHS must allege and 

prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence are outlined in RCW 13.34.180(1): 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

(a) That the child has been found to be a dependent child; 

(b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to 

RCW 13.34.130; 

( c) That the child has been removed ... from the custody of the 

parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of 

dependency; 

(d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been 

expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary 

services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental 

deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and 

understandably offered or provided; 

( e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so 

that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future .... 

(f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly 

diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and 

permanent home .... 

Mr. F. challenges the trial court's finding regarding subsection (d) and argues the 

trial court's finding regarding subsection (e) was premature. This court's review is 

limited to determining if substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact. 

S.J, 162 Wn. App.at 881. "Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to persuade a fairminded person of the truth of the declared premise." Id. Because the trial court has the 

opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the witnesses, its factual findings are 

entitled to great deference. Id. This court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh evidence on review. Id. 

A. NECESSARY SERVICES 

Mr. F. argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's finding 

that DSHS offered or provided all necessary services. Specifically, Mr. F. argues that 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

DSHS failed to offer bonding and attachment therapy. He argues that Dr. Dougherty 

recommended this service, and also cites testimony from the social workers, various 

providers, and GALs describing how he and K.S.F. lacked a secure attachment. 

To satisfy its statutory b~rden under RCW 13 .34.180(1 )( d), DSHS is required to 

offer or provide "all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the 

parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future." When a condition prevents a parent 

and child from reunifying, DSHS must provide any necessary services to address that 

condition, regardless of whether it can be labeled a "parental deficiency." In re Parental 

Rights to K.MM, _ Wn.2d _, 379 P.3d 75, 83 (2016). Thus, a service is "necessary" 

within the meaning of the statute if it is needed to address a condition that precludes 

reunification of the parent and child. Id. DSHS must also tailor the services it offers to 

meet each individual parent's needs. S.J, 162 Wn. App. at 881. 

Mr. F. relies on S.J. In S.J, the mother rectified the unsanitary living conditions 

and substance abuse issues that led to the dependency, and she and the child then began 

participating in therapeutic visitation. Id. at 876-77. During visits, the child became 

increasingly resistant, controlling, and aggressive toward the mother. Id. at 877. The 

mother "faithfully kept the scheduled visitations and had applied parenting suggestions" 

but met increasing resistance from the child. Id. The mother suspected her child had 

detached from her, so she requested attachment therapy from her FPS therapist. Id. The 

social worker identified bonding and attachment as a major issue between the mother and 

child. Id. at 878. However, he did not refer them for bonding and attachment therapy 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.SF. 

because he incorrectly believed they were already getting similar services from the parent 

educator, the mother did not complain about those services, and he did not want to 

burden the mother with additional services. Id. The trial court terminated the mother's 

parental rights, finding that despite her engagement in services she nevertheless failed to 

repair her relationship with the child. Id. at 879. 

The SJ court reversed, holding that DSHS had not provided all necessary 

services. Id. at 884. The court reasoned that DSHS had identified attachment and 

bonding as a "major issue," but then failed to provide attachment and bonding services. 

Id. at 883. The SJ court further reasoned that the mother applied the suggested 

parenting skills and that it was DSHS's responsibility to try to reduce the child's 

controlling and aggressive behavior related to his detachment-not the mother's 

responsibility. Id. 

Another instructive case is In re Parental Rights to K.JB., 188 Wn. App. 263,354 

P.3d 879 (2015), review granted, 184 Wn.2d 1033, 366 P.3d 932 (2016). In that case, the 

trial court found the child dependent and then ordered the father to complete drug and 

alcohol evaluation and treatment, urinalysis testing, and parenting assessment and 

instruction. Id. at 267. The father never remedied his substance abuse issues, and the 

trial court terminated his parental rights. Id. at 267, 272. 

On appeal, the father, relying on S.J, argued that counseling and a mental health 

assessment were necessary services for correcting his identified parenting deficiency of 

substance abuse, and DSHS should have therefore offered them. Id. at 279. This court 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

distinguished S.J, reasoning that the trial court never ordered a mental health assessment 

or mental health counseling, and none of the social workers involved in the case testified 

that the father had a mental health issue that required evaluation or services. Id. at 280. 

In this case, the trial court found that Mr. F. and K.S.F. did not have a strong bond 

or attachment. The parties do not dispute this finding. Thus, in determining whether 

bonding and attachment therapy was a necessary service under RCW 13.34.180(l)(d), the 

central question is whether this lack of bonding and attachment prevented Mr. F. and 

K.S.F. from reunifying. If it did, it was a necessary service. 

There was no evidence at trial that bonding and attachment therapy was needed to 

address any condition that precluded Mr. F. and K.S.F. from reunifying. This case is 

therefore unlike S.J because in that case the mother had remedied her other parental 

deficiencies and the main condition preventing her and the child from reunifying was her 

inability to rectify her relationship with the child. S.J, 162 Wn. App. at 878. In contrast, 

the conditions here that precluded Mr. F. and K.S.F. from reunifying were Mr. F.'s 

"failure to participate in recommended services, failure to demonstrate progress in 

improving his parental deficiencies, and failure to make progress over the substantial 

period of time of the dependency." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 105. Mr. F.'s deficiencies 

included his "lack of parenting skills, mental health issues, and lack of motivation to 

change." CP at 108. The implication is that if these deficiencies were corrected, Mr. F. 

and K.S.F. would be able to bond and attach. 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F 

This case is more like K.JB., where the father argued on appeal that DSHS failed 

to provide counseling and a mental health assessment, but none of the social workers 

testified that the father actually needed those services. While it is true that Mr. F. and 

K.S.F. did not have a strong bond or attachment, the record does not support Mr. F.'s 

suggestion that this prevented the two from reunifying. 2 Accordingly, bonding and 

attachment therapy was not a necessary service. 

Contrary to Mr. F.'s argument, substantial evidence supports the trial court's 

finding that DSHS offered or provided all necessary services. Mr. Barbour and Ms. 

Blanscett both reviewed the assessments, reports, and evaluations from all the various 

providers and relied on this information in formulating their opinions and 

recommendations. Ms. Symons, Mr. Fredrick, and Ms. Lund all testified the services the 

court ordered and DSHS provided were the appropriate services to correct Mr. F. 's 

parental deficiencies. Ms. Sanchez, Ms. Blanscett, and Ms. Riggle all testified there were 

no other services Mr. F. needed that DSHS had not offered or provided. 3 

2 Our Supreme Court has recently issued decisions addressing the necessity of 

bonding and attachment services under RCW 13.34.180(l)(d). See, e.g., K.MM, 379 

P.3d at 85-86 (affirming the termination order because bonding and attachment services 

would have been futile); In re Parental Rights to B.P., 186 Wn.2d 292, 376 P.3d 350, 365 

(2016) (reversing the termination order because DSHS failed to offer or provide bonding 

or attachment services). These decisions are not applicable here, where there was no 

evidence that the lack of bonding and attachment was a condition preventing 

reunification. 

3 Mr. F. asserts that "Dr. Dougherty recommended services to address attachment 

issues" between Mr. F. and K.S.F. Br. of Appellant at 31. The service Dr. Dougherty 

recommended was psychotherapy/counseling. Dr. Dougherty believed Mr. F. had 

bonding and attachment issues stemming from his childhood and believed counseling 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that DSHS offered or 

provided all necessary, reasonably available services, and therefore proved 

RCW 13 .34.180(1 )( d) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 

B. UNFITNESS, LITTLE LIKELIHOOD FOR REMEDYING PARENTAL DEFICIENCIES 

IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND BEST INTERESTS 

Mr. F. finally argues that because DSHS did not offer or provide bonding and 

attachment therapy, the trial court prematurely found (1) he was unfit to parent, (2) there 

was little likelihood his parental deficiencies would be remedied so K.S.F. could be 

returned to him in the near future, and (3) termination was in K.S.F.'s best interests. 

However, because we conclude that DSHS did in fact offer or provide all 

necessary services, these three findings were not premature. Because Mr. F. does not 

argue that these findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, but rather hinges his 

argument on the assumption that he did not receive all necessary services, we need not 

analyze each finding individually. 

C. AXIS II "DIAGNOSIS" 

Mr. F. assigns error to the following finding of fact: 

could address these. Dr. Dougherty also recommended continued parenting training and 

suggested a support group, but never mentioned bonding and attachment therapy. 

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The father was diagnosed in a psychological evaluation with Axis II 

personality characteristics of narcissistic, negativistic, paranoid, and 

depressive traits, which were born out by the father's actions and behaviors 

throughout the dependency. These traits are difficult to treat and require 

the motivation to change, which the father failed to show. 

CP at 106 (Finding of Fact l.l 1(4)(q)). Mr. F. does not address this assignment of 

error in the substantive portion of his brief. An appellant ordinarily waives an 

assignment of error when he or she presents no argument in support of the 

assigned error. See In re Welfare of L.NB.-L., 157 Wn. App. 215, 243-44, 237 

PJd 944 (2010). But we exercise our discretion to address this finding so it does 

not have consequences beyond this appeal. 

Mr. F. is correct that substantial evidence does not support the finding that 

he was diagnosed with these personality traits. Rather, Dr. Dougherty stated that 

Mr. F.'s scores on the MCMI-3 "suggested the possible presence" of a personality 

disorder, but that he was "reluctant to simply diagnose a personality disorder" due 

to Mr. F.'s cerebral palsy. RP at 154, 159. 

But this factual finding is irrelevant for purposes of the termination order. 

The fact that Mr. F. was not diagnosed with these personality traits does not 

impact the trial court's ultimate finding that DSHS proved RCW 13.34.lSO(l)(d) 

by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 

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No. 33774-0-III 

Parental Rights to K.S.F. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

j 

~aW, ·~-

Siddoway, J. ~. 

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