United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

No. 21-30446

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Robert Parker, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of Department of Public Safety and 

Corrections, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:18-CV-1030

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:

Robert Parker filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state 

court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Parker argues that LeBlanc

violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and 

thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release 

date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district 

court denied the motion. On this interlocutory appeal, we AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 17, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 21, 2016, Parker was arrested while on probation and 

placed in the Orleans Parish Prison. On March 27, 2017, a Louisiana state 

court sentenced Parker to two years of imprisonment for violating his 

probation but awarded him credit for the months he served in the parish 

prison. Three days later, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and 

Corrections (“DPSC”) assumed custody of Parker. 

On May 4, 2017, a DPSC employee identified as “L. Cato” 

determined that Parker had a “Must Serve” date of October 9, 2017. Parker 

alleges he should have been released on that date. Sometime in September 

2017, however, DPSC employee Brenda Acklin reviewed Parker’s file, 

crossed out the October 9, 2017, date, then wrote above it an acronym for 

“unapproved sex offender registry plan.” Under Louisiana law, the DPSC 

must verify the legality of sex offenders’ post-release residences before they 

can be released from prison. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:543.

During the course of his imprisonment at Richwood Correctional 

Center, Parker submitted several inmate request forms. In his first two 

requests, Parker asked to meet with Warden Ray Hanson about his release 

date. He filed two other forms in an attempt to provide the DPSC with 

addresses detailing where he could reside upon his release. Parker also 

consistently disputed that he was a sex offender.

On August 24, 2018, a public defender, Aaron Zagory, who had

previously represented Parker, emailed the reentry program manager for the 

DPSC probation and parole division. Zagory’s email stated that he did not 

“believe Mr. Parker has a conviction that requires him to register as a sex 

offender.” Zagory did note that Parker had been convicted in 1997 of 

indecent behavior with a juvenile and unauthorized entry into an inhabited 

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dwelling, but that Parker “was permitted to withdraw that plea and pleaded 

guilty to a single amended count of simple burglary.”

Rebecca Ikner, the reentry program director for the DPSC probation 

and parole division, responded that she was not involved in sex offender cases 

or time computation. Ikner copied her supervisor on the reply, who 

forwarded it to Charles Romero, the sex offender unit coordinator of the 

DPSC’s probation and parole office in New Orleans. Twelve days later, on 

September 5, 2018, Romero acknowledged the “honest mistake in the 

investigation” and explained that it had been corrected. Romero stated that 

“Mr. Parker can be released immediately (assuming there is nothing else 

holding him there)” and noted that Romero had informed the DPSC that 

Parker was not a sex offender. Parker was held an additional five days, until 

September 10, 2018, when he was finally released from prison.

Parker filed a civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against the 

DPSC, Secretary of the DPSC James LeBlanc, Ray Hanson, Brenda Acklin, 

“Does 1-10,” and ABC Insurance Companies. Parker alleged that the 

defendants violated his constitutional rights by detaining him past his release 

date. He also claimed that the defendants committed similar violations 

against other state inmates. LeBlanc and the other defendants removed the 

case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, specifically the 

claims Parker raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Parker filed a First Amended Complaint in April 2019. Hanson 

moved to dismiss the claims against him based upon misjoinder. The district 

court denied the motion but ordered Parker “to amend the operative 

complaint to add specificity and cure any deficiencies therein.” Parker then 

filed a Second Amended Complaint in November 2019.

LeBlanc, the DPSC, and Acklin filed a motion to dismiss Parker’s 

claims against them. LeBlanc and Acklin argued that Parker failed to state a 

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claim upon which relief could be granted because they were entitled to 

qualified immunity. The district court again granted Parker leave to amend 

his complaint after holding that Parker’s Second Amended Complaint lacked 

sufficient detail and that Parker had not adequately alleged deliberate 

indifference in “fail[ing] to allege, even on information and belief, that 

LeBlanc was aware” of the deficiencies in the prison systems.

Parker filed a Third Amended Complaint in August 2020. In his 

Third Amended Complaint, Parker cited three pieces of evidence to establish 

LeBlanc’s knowledge of deficiencies in the way the DPSC calculated and 

implemented release dates: (1) testimony by DPSC employees in unrelated 

cases regarding problems with the over-detention and release of inmates; (2) 

a 2018 newspaper opinion-editorial by Louisiana Attorney General Jeff 

Landry regarding the same issue; and (3) a legislative audit report. These had 

also been cited in his Second Amended Complaint. In his Third Amended 

Complaint, however, Parker alleged for the first time on information and 

belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the deficiencies in the system and 

the specific evidence cited in the complaint. LeBlanc again moved to dismiss 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to cure the 

main deficiency identified by the district court in its previous order —

namely, the lack of a pattern of similar constitutional violations.

The district court denied in part LeBlanc’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

because Parker had “adequately pled that there were sufficiently similar prior 

incidents in sufficient number and of which LeBlanc was aware to overcome 

qualified immunity at this stage.” The court found that LeBlanc could not 

“seriously dispute (1) that the prior incidents were sufficient in number and 

(2) that LeBlanc did not have actual knowledge of them, particularly 

considering the allegations on information and belief that he knew about the 

Legislative Auditor’s report, Attorney General op-ed, and state court 

testimony.” LeBlanc filed a timely notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION

We have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to 

review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified 

immunity when the resolution turns on an issue of law. See Orr v. Copeland, 

844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 

2008). 

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissals when a complaint fails “to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). This court 

reviews Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as 

true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” 

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “In an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified 

immunity, we have jurisdiction to consider only whether a certain course of 

conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable in light of 

clearly established law.” Brown, 519 F.3d at 236 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). A claim has facial plausibility “where a plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Morris, 739 F.3d at 745 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a 

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States 

and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law.” Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th 

Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 

“Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are 

timely released from prison.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 

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2011). Quite recently, and addressing the liability of this same defendant, we 

held that “it is without question that holding without legal notice a prisoner 

for a month beyond the expiration of his sentence constitutes a denial of due 

process.” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 188 (5th Cir. 2022).

This analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we examine whether Parker 

has sufficiently alleged supervisory liability against LeBlanc. Second, we 

determine whether LeBlanc’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established 

constitutional right.

I. Has Parker sufficiently alleged supervisory liability?

“Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior 

liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, 

“[s]upervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for their failure to adopt 

policies if that failure causally results in a constitutional injury.” Crittindon, 

37 F.4th at 186. “Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act, 

with ‘deliberate indifference,’ a ‘disregard [for] a known or obvious 

consequence of [their] action[s].’” Id. (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 446)

(alterations in original). “[A] plaintiff must show either the supervisor 

personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the 

constitutional violation.” Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics Trafficking 

Task Force, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

To show a causal connection between the wrongful conduct of a 

supervisor and a constitutional violation, the plaintiff “must introduce 

evidence that each Defendant had ‘actual or constructive notice’ that their 

failure to adopt policies would result in constitutional violations.” 

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 447). “A pattern of 

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily 

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necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 

U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Without notice 

that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers 

can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will 

cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id.

As noted, Parker’s Third Amended Complaint cited three pieces of 

evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc implemented deficient 

policies evinced by a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained 

employees. See id. They are: (1) an October 2017 legislative audit report on 

the Louisiana DPSC entitled “CFE Management of Offender Data: 

Processes for Ensuring Accuracy Department of Corrections”; (2) a 2018

editorial by Senator John Kennedy and Attorney General Landry entitled, 

“Criminal Justice Reform Actually Hurting Public Safety,” published in the 

newspaper “The Advocate”; and (3) testimony by DPSC employees 

admitting to rampant over-detention in a similar suit in Louisiana state court, 

Chowns v. LeBlanc, La. 37th JDC 26-932. Parker also alleges on information 

and belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the three items we just 

enumerated.

LeBlanc argues that this complaint did not adequately allege the 

requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees 

“ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for 

purposes of failure to train. See 563 U.S. at 62. He contends that Parker’s

allegations “identify issues of an entirely different kind than the one that 

allegedly caused Parker to spend too much time incarcerated.” Essentially, 

LeBlanc insists that there is a meaningful distinction between Parker’s overdetention due to his alleged misclassification as a sex offender, as opposed to 

over-detention due to miscalculations of his sentence or his status being 

generally lost in the system.

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The district court “decline[d] to draw the line as finely as LeBlanc 

advances and limit the types of problems involved solely to those instances 

where individuals have been misclassified as sexual offenders.” The court 

noted that the real problem alleged in the Legislative Audit report was the 

Department “not knowing when [inmates’] proper release date was” and 

that “inmate sentences have been ‘done wrong’” as stated in testimony from 

Chowns v. LeBlanc. We agree with the district court’s assessment. 

In a similar case about over-detention — against the same defendant 

— the plaintiff also relied on a study to show a pattern of constitutional 

violations and allege supervisory liability. See Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186–87. 

We held that “a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a 

‘pattern of similar constitutional violations,’ such that their inaction 

amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk.” Id. at 187. The court there 

noted that LeBlanc was “in a position to adopt policies that would address 

this delay” and that he could not “avoid the evidence that the study exposed 

unlawful detentions of prisoners.” Id. Much of the same is true here, though 

unlike in Crittindon, this case is merely at the 12(b)(6) stage, rather than a 

motion for summary judgment. See id. at 185. What LeBlanc may have done 

to comply with his supervisory obligations is not yet part of the record. 

Further, Parker has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery. His 

complaint alleges that 

despite his release date being properly calculated on the jail forms, he 

was not released for 337 days. For some unknown reason, when his 

properly calculated release date arrived, he was not released despite 

his numerous attempts to correct the issue. One possible reason for 

the over-detention is mistakenly classifying him as a sex offender and 

then failing to release him even after he provided the addresses 

requested.

The allegations in the complaint are that there is a “pattern of overdetention” that renders Parker’s own case “neither unique nor even 

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unusual.” The standard for deliberate indifference requires only a “pattern 

of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees,” rather than an 

exact duplication. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). Parker has 

alleged that he was detained for 337 days past his release date and has cited 

three pieces of evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc was aware of 

the deficiencies of implemented policies that routinely led to errors like the 

one that violated his constitutional rights. See id.

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept “all well-pleaded facts as true 

and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Morris, 

739 F.3d at 745 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim has facial 

plausibility when a plaintiff has pled “factual content” that allows us “to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with Parker 

that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of 

constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate 

indifference for purposes of failure to train. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. We

therefore hold that his complaint should proceed to the next stage of 

litigation, i.e., tailored discovery. See Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th 

Cir. 2022).

II. Did LeBlanc allegedly violate a right that was “clearly established” 

at the time of the alleged misconduct?

Qualified immunity involves answering two questions: (1) “whether 

the officer violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the ‘right at 

issue was “clearly established” at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.’” 1 

_____________________

1 There is variance in this circuit’s caselaw when articulating the second part of the 

analysis for qualified immunity. An objective-unreasonableness component, dating from 

some of our older caselaw, is sometimes applied to require a finding that “the defendant’s 

actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the 

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Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (alterations in original)). To determine 

whether a right is “clearly established,” we “first look[] to Supreme Court 

precedent and then to our own.” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “Ultimately, the touchstone is fair warning: The law 

can be clearly established despite notable factual distinctions between the 

precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior 

decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated 

constitutional rights.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Analyzing the first part of the test is not difficult here: the Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 

“Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in 

the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation 

of due process.” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). Parker 

was detained 337 days past his release date. His pleading also adequately 

alleged supervisory liability for LeBlanc. See infra.

The second part of the test is “whether the right at issue was clearly 

established at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874 

_____________________

violation.” See Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. That language is a vestige of older case law that 

predates the Supreme Court’s current test adopted in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), 

and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). See, e.g., Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 

F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990). Another circuit has similar language in some of its 

precedents but rejected it: “the test for qualified immunity has only two prongs — whether 

the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was clearly 

established; there is no separate ‘objective unreasonableness’ prong.” See Brown v. Lewis, 

779 F.3d 401, 417 (6th Cir. 2015). We cannot precedentially resolve conflicting caselaw

today, but we mention one of our recent decisions that also opined there is no “standalone 

‘objective reasonableness’ element to the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test for qualified 

immunity.” See Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 251 n.10 (5th Cir. 2023). 

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(quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). LeBlanc 

argues that the district court committed reversible error by not delineating 

between the two parts of the test for qualified immunity in its ruling or citing 

a case that would have put LeBlanc on notice that his conduct violated clearly 

established law. As support, he cites our decision in Joseph on behalf of Estate 

of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020). In that case, on a motion 

for summary judgment, the district court had denied qualified immunity to a 

group of police officers in a failure to intervene claim. Id. at 328. We 

reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to 

demonstrate that the law was clearly established because the plaintiffs had 

failed to “identify a single case to support the argument that any reasonable 

officer would have known to intervene under these circumstances.” Id. at 

345. We explained that “[w]ith no briefing and no district-court analysis to 

review, we cannot justify a denial of qualified immunity on the grounds that 

clearly established law shows that every officer acted unconstitutionally in 

this case.” Id. at 346. 

Parker counters that this case is distinguishable because, here, “[t]he 

law is clear that a jailer like LeBlanc has a duty to ensure inmates are timely 

released from prison,” citing Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We agree. Unlike the 

plaintiffsin Joseph, Parker identified cases in his district court briefing, as well 

as in his briefing to this court, that addressed the clearly-established-law 

prong of the qualified immunity analysis. In his complaint, Parker also stated 

that “[a]ccording to black-letter law, jailors may not imprison inmates longer 

than their sentences,” and that “[r]ecent Fifth Circuit precedent recognized 

that ‘There is a Clearly Established Right to Timely Release from Prison,’”

again citing Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We agree that there is sufficient clearly 

established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from 

prison and that Parker has sufficiently argued a violation of the right.

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Finally, as he does with the question of supervisory liability, LeBlanc 

contends that defining the clearly established right as “timely release from 

prison” is overbroad. We have already rejected that argument above in the 

supervisory liability context, and we do so here as well. In Crittindon, we held 

that the defendants had “‘fair warning’ that their failure to address this delay 

would deny prisoners like Plaintiffs their immediate or near-immediate 

release upon conviction” because the defendants knew of the delays in 

prisoners’ timely releases. 37 F.4th at 188. Parker’s Third Amended 

Complaint cured the deficiency of his Second Amended Complaint in that he 

alleged on information and belief that LeBlanc was aware of DPSC 

employees’ testimonies in Chowns v. LeBlanc regarding the regular pattern of 

over-detentions, and that LeBlanc was aware of Attorney General Jeff 

Landry’s op-ed and the Legislative Auditor report regarding the DPSC’s 

problem in not knowing inmates’ proper release date. Parker’s complaint

sufficiently alleges that LeBlanc violated a right that was clearly established. 

Construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Parker, we

agree they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had “‘fair 

warning’ that [his] failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like 

[Parker] their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction.” See 

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 188.

We close with a reminder. This appeal is from the denial of a motion 

to dismiss solely on the pleadings. LaBlanc’s defense is yet to be stated. It 

remains to be seen what an evidentiary record will show as to LeBlanc’s 

efforts to deal with the widespread problems in determining and enforcing 

release dates.

AFFIRMED.

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