IN	THE	SUPREME	COURT	OF	APPEALS	OF	WEST	VIRGINIA January	2016	Term

____________________ NO.	16‐0226

____________________

WILLIAM	R.	WOOTON,	candidate	for	the Supreme	Court	of	Appeals	of	West	Virginia, Petitioner

v. ELIZABETH	D.	WALKER,	candidate	for	the Supreme	Court	of	Appeals	of	West	Virginia; West	Virginia	Secretary	of State	NATALIE	TENNANT; West	Virginia	State	Elec tion	Commission	members GARY	A.	COLLIAS	and	VINCENT	P.	CARDI; West	Virginia	State	Auditor	GLEN	B.	GAINER,	III; And	West	Virginia	State	Tr easurer	JOHN	D.	PERDUE, Respondent

_______________________________________________________________ __________________________ Certified	Question	from	the	Circuit	Court	of	Kanawha	County The	Honorable	Charles	E.	King,	Jr.,	Judge Civil	Action	No.	16‐AA‐13 CERTIFIED	QUESTION	ANSWERED

_______________________________________________________________ ________________________ Submitted:	March	23,	2016 Filed:		April	19,	2016 Robert	M.	Bastress,	Jr.	 	 	 	 	 K&L	GATES	LLP Post	Office	Box	1295 Thomas	C.	Ryan Morgantown,	WV	26507‐1295 210	Sixth	Avenue Pittsburgh,	PA	15222 Robert	V.	Berthold,	Jr.	 	 	 	 	 Attorney	for	Respondent BERTHOLD	LAW	FIRM	PLLC	 	 	 	 Walker Charleston,	WV	25335 

### FILED April 19, 2016 released at 3:00 p.m. RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIAThomas	Patrick	Maroney	 	 	 	 	 Richard	L.	Gottlieb 608	Virginia	Street,	East,	Floor	2 Webster	J.	Arceneaux, III Charleston,	WV	25301 Spencer	D.	Elliott Attorneys	for	Petitioner	Wooton	 	 	 	 LEWIS	GLASSER	CASEY	& ROLLINS,	PLLC 300	Summers	St.,	Suite	700 Charleston,	WV 25301 Attorneys	for	Respondents Tennant,	Collias	&	Cardi

ACTING	CHIEF	JUSTICE	THOMAS	H.	KEADLE delivered	the	Opinion	of	the	Court.

CHIEF	JUSTICE	MENIS	E.	KETCHUM, JUSTICE	ROBIN	JEAN	DAVIS, JUSTICE	BRENT	D.	BENJAMIN, JUSTICE	MARGARET	L.	WORKMAN,	and JUSTICE	ALLEN	H.	LOUGHRY	II,	deeming	themselves disqualified,	did	not	participate	in	the	decision	of this	case. SENIOR	STATUS	JUDGE	THOMAS	H.	KEADLE, as	Acting	Chief	Justice, SENIOR	STATUS	JUDGE	JAMES	O.	HOLLIDAY, JUDGE	JOHN	W.	HATCHER,	JR., JUDGE	JAMES	P.	MAZZONE,	and JUDGE	THOMAS	C.	EVANS,	III,	sitting	by temporary	assignment.i SYLLABUS	BY	THE	COURT

1.	 	 	 	 	 “The	 appellate	 standard	 of	 review	 of	 questions	 of	 law	 an swered	 and certified	 by	a	circuit	court	is de novo .”	 	Syl.	Pt.	1, Gallapoo v. Wal

‐ Mart Stores, Inc ., 197	W.	Va.	172,	475	S.E.2d	172	(1996).

2.	 	 	 	 	 “A	 regulation	 that	 is	 proposed	 by	 an	 agency	 and	 approved by	 the Legislature	is	a	‘legislative	rule’	as	defined	by	 the	State	Adm inistrative	Procedures Act, W. Va. Code ,	 29A‐1‐2(d)	 	 [1982],	and	 such	a	l egislative	 rule	 has	 the	 force and effect	of	law.”		Syl.	Pt.	5, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm’n ,	216	W.	Va.	2, 602	S.E.2d	445	(2004).

3.					The	West	Virginia	State	Election	Commission	has	discreti on	to	certify	a participating	candidate	 for	public	 funding	under	the	“West	Virg inia	Supreme	Court of	 Appeals	 Public	 Campaign	 Financing	 Program,”	 W.	 Va.	 Code	 §	 3‐ 12‐1 et seq

. (2014),	notwithstanding	the	candid ate’s	failure	to	meet	the	tim e	deadlines	set	forth in	 W.	 Va.	 Code	 of	 State	 Rules	 §§	 146‐5‐6.1	 &	 6.2,	 where	 the	 can didate	 has substantially	complied	with	all	requirements	set	 forth	in	 the	A ct	and	 the	rules	and where	there	is	no	showing	of	prejudice.1 KEADLE,	Acting	Chief	Justice: Petitioner	 William	 R.	 Wooton	 is	 a	 candidate	 seeking	 election to	 the Supreme	Court	of	Appeals	of	West Virginia,	and	a	 “participating candidate”	as	 that term	 is	 defined	 in	 the	 “West	 Virginia	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Appeals Public	 Campaign Financing	 Program,”	W.	 Va.	 Code	 §	 3‐12‐3(11)	 (2014).	 	 On	 Februa ry	 5,	 2016,	 the West	 Virginia	 State	 Elections Commission	 (“the	 Commission”)	 cer tified	 Petitioner Wooton’s	campaign	for	public	funding	under	the	Act,	overruling a	challenge	filed	by Respondent	Elizabeth	D.	Walker,	a	non‐participating	candidate	a lso	seeking	election

to	the	Court.

Pursuant	 to	 the	West	Virginia	Administrative	Procedures	Act, W.	Va. Code	§	29A‐5‐1 et seq .,	Respondent	Walker	appealed	 the	Commission’s	decision	 to the	Circuit	Court	of	Kanawha	County,	which	certified	the	follow ing	question	to	this

Court: Whether	the	West	Virginia	State	Election	Commission’s	certifica tion of	Respondent	[now	Petitioner]	W ooton	for	public	financing	of	h is candidacy	for	the	West	Virginia Supreme	Court	under	West	Virgin ia Code	§	3‐12‐1,	et	seq.,	was	valid. The	court	answered	the	question	in	the	negative.

After	thorough	review	of	the	record	Appendix,	the	parties’	br iefs	and oral	 arguments,	 and	 the	 applicable	 law,	 we	 modify	 and	 answer	 th e	 certified question,	reverse	the	judgment	of	the	court	below,	and	reinstat e	the	decision	of	the Commission	certifying Petitioner	Wooton.2 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY West	 Virginia	 Code	 §	 3‐12‐1, et seq .	 (2014),	 known	 as	 the	 West Virginia	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 Public	 Campaign	 Financing	 Pro gram,	 was enacted	 by	 the	 West	 Virginia	 Legislature	 to	 “protect	 the	 Consti tutional	 rights	 of

voters	and	candidates	from	the	detrimental	effects	of	increasin gly	large	amounts	of money	 being	 raised	 and	 spent	 to	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 electi ons,	 protect	 the impartiality	and	integrity	 of	 the	judiciary,	and	 strengthen	 pub lic	 confidence	in	 the judiciary....”	W.	Va.	Code	§	3‐12‐1(10).

A	 candidate	 seeking	 public	 financing	 must	 file	 a	 Decl aration	 of	 Intent prior	to	the	end	of	the	qualifying	period,	W.	Va.	Code	§	3‐12‐7 ,	which	period	begins on	 September	 1	 of	 the	 year	 preceding	 the	 election	 year	 and	 ends on	 the	 last Saturday	in	January	of	the	election	year.		W.	Va.	Code	§	31‐12‐ 3(13).		After	filing	the Declaration	of	 Intent	but	before	certification	 for	public	 finan cing,	a	candidate	must gather	 at	 least	 500	 “qualifying	 contributions”	 from	 West	 Virgin ia	 voters.	 	 W.	 Va. Code	 §	 3‐12‐9(c).	 	 Each	 contribution	 can	 be	as	little	 as	 $1.00, but	 can	in	 no	 event exceed	 $100.00.	 	W.	 Va.	 Code	 §	 3‐12‐9(a).	 	 The	 total	 amount	 of the	 contributions must	be	no	less	than	$35,000.00	and	no	more	than	$50,000.00. Id

. 1

After	a	participating	candidate	has	collected	 the	 requisite	nu mber	of qualifying	contributions,	and	within	two	business	days	of	the	c lose	of	the	qualifying

1 If	 the	 aggregate	 amount	 of	 a	 candidate’s	 qualifying	 contributi ons	 exceeds $50,000.00,	the	excess	is	paid	over	into	the	Fund. Id

.3 period, 2 he	or	she	files	a	final	report	and	applies	to	the	Commission	t o	be	certified	to receive	 public	 financing.	 	W.	 Va.	 Code	 §	 3‐12‐10(a);	W.	 Va.	 Cod e	 of	State	 Rules	 §§ 146‐5‐6.1,	6.2.		The	candidate’s	application	must	include	a	swo rn	statement	that	he or	she	has	and	will	comply	with	all	requirements	of	the	program

. Id .		In	the	instant case,	 Petitioner	 Wooton	 filed	 his	 final	 report	 and	 all	 required substantive information	on	February	2,	2016,	but	did	not	file	his	sworn	sta tement	until	February 3,	 2016,	 one	 day	 late.	 	 This	 is	 the	 sole	 basis	 upon	 which	 Respo ndent	 Walker challenges	Wooton’s	certification	in	this		appeal. 3

The	 Commission	 overruled	 the	 challenge,	 finding	 that	 it	 had	 th e authority	 to	certify	 the	Wooton	campaign	 for	public	 financing	n otwithstanding	 the one‐day	 delay	in	 submission	 of	 th e	 sworn	 statement.	 	On	 appeal, the	 circuit	 court certified	 and	 answered	 the	 question	 set	 forth	 above,	 concluding ,	 by	 necessary implication, 4 that	the	Commission	did not have	such	authority.		Appeal	to	this	Court followed,	and	the	case	was	set	fo r	briefing	and	argument	on	an expedited	schedule.

2 The	qualifying	period	ends	on	J anuary	30,	which	in	2016	fell	o n	a	Saturday;	thus, February	2,	2016,	was	the	second	business	day. 3 Although	Respondent	Walker	file d	a	blanket	challenge	to	all	of Petitioner	Wooton’s contributions	 by	 letter	 of	 February	 2,	 2016,	 “reserv[ing]the	 ri ght	 to	 submit challenge	forms	as	soon	as	possibl e...,”	she	never	pursued	the	ma tter. 4 The	certified	question	and	answer	are	 framed	in	wholly	conclus ory	language	and give	no	hint	as	to	the	court’s ratio decidendi

.4 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW It	 is	 well	 established	 that	 “[t]he	 appellate	 standard	 of	 revie w	 of questions	 of	 law	 answered	 and	 certified	 by	 a	 circuit	 court	 is de novo .”	 	 Syl.	 Pt.	 1, Gallapoo v. Wal

‐ Mart Stores, Inc., 197	W.	Va.	172,	475	S.E.2d	172	(1996).

III. DISCUSSION Standing As	a	threshold	matter,	we	conclude	that	under	the	sp ecific	facts	of	this case,	 Respondent	 Walker	 has	 been “adversely	 affected”	 by	 the	 Co mmission’s decision,	a	prerequisite	for	standing	to	appeal	under	the	Admin istrative	Procedures Act,	 W.	 Va.	 Code	 §	 29A‐5‐	 4(a),	 and	 the	 West	 Virginia	 Supreme	 C ourt	 of	 Appeals Public	Financing	Program,	W. Va.	Code	§	3‐12‐10(i).

Respondent	 Walker	 frames	 the	 argument	 as	 one	 involvin g	 “the fundamental	 and	 sacred	 constitutional	 rights	 of	 free	 speech	 and substantive	 due process...,”	but	there	is	very	little	meat	on	these	constitutiona l	bones.		This	Court	has held	 that	 “speech	is	 chilled	 ‘when	an	 otherwise	willing	 speaker is	 prevented	 from speaking,	 or	 cajoled	into	 no	longer	 speaking,	 by	 government	 con duct[,]’” Men and

Women Against Discrimination v. The Family Services Protection Board ,	 229	W.	 Va. 55,	62,	725	S.E.2d	756,	763	(2011),	and	it	would	be	a	far	stret ch	to	conclude	that	the certification	 of	 Petitioner	Wooton	 for	 public	 funding	in	any	wa y	abridges	 or	 chills Respondent	 Walker’s	 free	 speech	 rights.	 	 She	 is	 as	 free	 now	 as she	 was	 prior	 to February	 5,	 2016,	 when	 the	 Commission	 certified	 Petitioner	 Woot on	 for	 public5 funding,	to	conduct	her	campaign	and	articulate	the	reasons	she believes	herself	to be	a	candidate	worthy	of	support	at	the	ballot	box.

In	 any	 event,	 “[i]nasmuch	 as	 this	 case	 may	 be	 decided on	 statutory grounds,	 this	Court	need	not	add ress	 the	constitutional	issue.” Hudson v. Bowling , 232	W.	Va.	282,	291	n.	13,	752	S.E.2d	313,	322	n.	13	(2013),	ci ting Lee Trace, LLC v. Rayne s,	 232	W.	 Va.	 183,	 191,	 751	 S.E.2d	 703,	 711	 (2013).	 Simply	 put, in	 this	 case Respondent	Walker	was	a	party	to	the	proceedings	held	before	th e	Commission,	and

the	 Commission’s	 decision	at	issue	in	 this	 case	was	made	as	a	 d irect	 result	 of	 her challenge	 to	 the	Wooton	 campaign’s	 certification.	 	 Under	 these circumstances,	 we can	perceive	of	no	basis	on	which	to	conclude	that	Respondent	W alker	has	no	first‐ party	standing	to	appeal	from the	denial	of	that	challenge.

Mandatory Disqualification/Substantial Compliance Although	 the	 question	 certified	 by	 the	 court	 below	 is very	 broad,	 the briefs	and	arguments	of	the	parties	make	it	clear	that	the	sole issue	for	decision	in this	 case	 is	 very	 narrow:	 whether	 Petitioner	 Wooton’s	 failure	 t o	 file	 his	 sworn statement	on	or	before	February	2,	2016,	the	second	business	da y	after	the	close	of the	 qualifying	 period,	 mandated his	 disqualification	 under	 the Act.	 	 Respondent Walker	 argues	 that	 “a	 deadline	 is	 a	 deadline,”	 and	 that	 under	 t he	 Act	 and	 the legislative	rules,	W.	Va.	Code	of	State	Rules	§	146‐5‐1 et seq .,	the	West	Virginia	State Election	 Commission	 has	 no	 discretion	 to	 excuse	 or	 extend	 any	 d eadline	 for	 any reason.		Further,	Respondent	Walker	makes	a	policy	argument	tha t	any	exercise	of6 discretion	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Commission	 will	 erode	 public	 conf idence	 in	 the integrity	of	the	public	financing	program. Cf. Brady v. Hechler ,	176	W.	Va.	570,	574, 346	S.E.2d	546,	550	(1986).

In	 contrast,	 Petitioner	Wooton	argues	 that	 the	legisl ative	 rules,	and	in particular	W.	Va.	Code	of	State	Rules	 §§	146‐5‐6.1	&	6.2,	are	m ere	 “administrative guide[s],”	and	that	nothing	in	the	Act	or	the	legislative	rules imposes	an	obligation on	the	Commission	to	disqualify	a ny	candidate	on	the	basis	of	a late	filing	of	his	or her	sworn	statement.		Petitioner	Wooton	also	makes	a	policy	arg ument	that	denying public	 funding	 to	a	participating	candidate	who	makes	any	proce dural	misstep,	no matter	how	inconsequential,	would	defeat	the	reform	goals	of	th e	Act.

We	 begin	 with	 the	 acknowledgment	 that	 “[a]	 regulation that	 is proposed	 by	 an	 agency	 and	 approved	 by	 the	 Legislature	 is	 a	 ‘leg islative	 rule’	 as defined	by	the	State	Administrative	Procedures	Act, W. Va. Code ,	29A‐1‐2(d)		[1982], and	such	a	legislative	rule	has	the	 force	and	effect	of	law.” Syl.	Pt.	5, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm’n ,	216	W.	Va.	2,	602	S.E.2d	445	(2004).		Accordingly, we	 reject	 any	 suggestion	 that	W.	 Va.	 Code	 of	 State	 Rules	 §§	 146 ‐5‐6.1	 &	 6.	 2	 are mere	“guides,”	a	term	with	no	le gal	significance,	or	are	otherw ise	of	no	consequence.

This,	however,	is	hardly	the	end	of	the	inquiry.		It	is	well	s ettled	under this	 Court’s	 precedents	 that	 “not	 all	 technical	 procedural	 viol ations	 merit	 relief

where	there	is	substan tial	compliance	with substantive law.” West Virginia Alcohol7 Beverage Control Administration and Division of Personnel v. Scott ,	205	W.	Va.	398, 403,	 518	 S.E.2d	 639,	 644	 (1999)	 (Workman,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (emph asis	in	 original). E.g., State ex rel. Catron v. Raleigh County Bd. of Educ .,	201	W.	Va.	302, 496	S.E.2d	444 (1997)	(substantial	complian ce	in	filing	grievance); State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton , 196	 W.	 Va.	 208,	 470	 S.E.2d	 162	 (1996)	 (substantial	 compliance	 w ith	 publication requirements); Hare v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ .,	183	W.	Va.	436,	396	S.E.2d	203 (1990)	 (substantial	 compliance	 wit h	 evaluation	 procedures	 leadi ng	 up	 to termination	 from	employment); Vosberg v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of West Virginia ,	166 W.	 Va.	 488,	 275	 S.E.2d	 640	 (1981)	 (substantial	 compliance	 with grievance procedure).		This	Court	has	even	applied	the	principle	of	subst antial	compliance	in cases	involving	procedural	requi rements	set	forth	in	the	West	V irginia	Constitution. E.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Kelly ,	149	W.	Va.	381,	141	S.E.2d	142	(1965)	(substantial compliance	 with	 notice	 requirements	 prior	 to	 statewide	 vote	 on proposed constitutional	amendment); Morgan v. O’Brien ,	134	W.	Va.	1,	60	S.E.2d	722	 (1948) (to	same	effect).

In In re Burks ,	206	W.	Va.	429,	525	S.E.2d	310	(1999),	a	DUI	case,	the circuit	court	reversed	a	license	revocation	order	issued	by	the Commissioner	of	the Division	 of	 Motor	 Vehicles	 because	 the	 arresting	 officer	 had	 fa iled	 to	 mail	 his “Statement	of	Arresting	Officer” to	the	Commissioner	within	for ty‐eight	hours	of	the driver’s	 arrest,	 as	 required	 by	 statute.	 	 This	 Court	 reversed, holding	 that	 “[a]	 law enforcement	 officer’s	 failure	 to	 strictly	 comply	with	 the	DUI	 a rrest	 reporting	 time requirements	 of W. Va. Code ,	 17C‐5A‐1(b)[1994]	is	 not	 a	 bar	 or	impediment	 to	 ...8 administrative	action	based	on	the	arrest	report,	unless	there is	actual	prejudice	to

the	driver	as	a	result	of	such	failure.” Burks ,	Syl.	Pt.	1,	in	part,	206	W.	Va.	at	430,	525

S.E.2d	at	311.

Applying	 these	 principles	 to	 the	 instant	 case,	 we	 conclude	 tha t Petitioner	Wooton	substantially	complied	with	the	Act	and	the	r ules.		From	the	time he	 became	 a	 participating	 candidate,	 through	 and	 including	 Febr uary	 2,	 2016,	 he timely	filed	every	form,	every	disclosure,	and	every	piece	of	i nformation	required	– with	 the	exception	 of	 one	 piece	 of	 paper,	a pro forma sworn	 statement,	 	which	 he filed	one	day	late.		The	record	is	devoid	of	evidence	that	Peti tioner	Wooton’s	tardy

submission	of	the	statement	was of	any	consequence	to	anyone,	l et	alone	caused	any prejudice	or	harm	to	anyone.

Nothing	in	 the	history	or	language	of	 the	Act	suggests	 that	 the Commission intended	its	legislative	rules,	authorized	by	W.	Va.	Code	§	3‐1 2‐11(d),	to	constitute	a complicated	regulatory	trap	for	the	unwary.		Additionally,	noth ing	in	the	history	or language	 of	 the	 Act	 suggests	 that	 a	 violation	 of	 any	 rule,	 no	 m atter	 how inconsequential,	carries	a	mandatory	 “death	penalty”	 for	a	part icipating	candidate. See, e.g, State ex rel. Bumgardner v. Mills ,	132	W.	Va.	580,	53	S.E.2d	416	(1949); State

ex rel. Hall v. Gilmer County Court ,	87	W.	Va.	437,	105	S.E.	693,	694‐95	(1921); State

v. Bd. of Canvassers ,	 87	W.	 Va.	 472,	 105	 S.E.	 695	 (1921). As	 this	 Court	 stated	 in Bumgardner ,	132	W.	Va.	at	595,	53	S.E.2d	at	428: This	Court	has	held	that	prior	s tatutory	provisions	[governing verified	statements	of	financial transactions],	although	exacti ng9 promptness	in	the	preparation	an d	the	delivery	of	the	expense account	of	every	candidate	for	p ublic	office,	manifest	‘no	expr ess or	implied	determination	to	disq ualify	permanently	one	who	is tardy	in	that	respect	from	dis charging	the	functions	and receiving	the	emoluments	of	th e	office	to	which	he	has	been elected,	but	only	until	he	has	f iled	the	required	statements.’

The	case	of Brady v. Hechler ,	176	W.	Va.	570,	346	S.E.2d	546	(1986), relied	 upon	 by	 Respondent	 Walker,	 does	 not	 compel	 a	 different	 c onclusion.	 	 In Brady ,	 this	Court	issued	a	writ	of	mandamus	compelling	the	Secretary of	State	and

the	ballot	commissioners	of	 the	Ninth	Senatorial	District	of	We st	Virginia	 to	strike Tracy	W.	Hylton’s	name	 from	 the	May	13,	1986,	ballot,	 for	 failu re	to	 timely	 file	his certificate	of	candidacy	with	the	Secretary	of	State	as	require d	by	W.	Va.	Code	§	3‐5‐ 7	 (1985).	 	 A	 certificate	 of	 candid acy	 is	 a	 very	 different	 thing from	 the pro forma sworn	statement	at	issue	in	this	case;	submission	of	the	former sets	in	motion	all	of the	 machinery	 necessary	 to	 prepare	 the	 ballots,	 while	 submissio n	 of	 the	 latter	 is merely	 the	 final	 ministerial	 step	 allowing	 issuance	 of	 a	 check to	 a	 participating

candidate	 who	 has	 otherwise	 fulf illed	 every	 obligation	imposed by	law	 on	 him	 or her.		The	only	person	prejudiced	by	late	submission	of	 the	swor n	statement	is	 the candidate,	who	will	suffer	a	delay	in	receipt	of	 the	 funding	ne cessary	 to	run	his	or her	campaign.

Two	 further	considerations	guide	 this	Court’s	 resolution	of	 th e	issue presented	 in	 this	 case.	 	 First,	 although	 we	 do	 not	 find	 it	 nece ssary	 to	 determine whether	the	time	periods	contained	in	W.	Va.	Code	of	State	Rule s	§§	146‐5‐6.1	&	6.2 are	“arbitrary	or	capricious,” Grim v. Eastern Electric, LLC ,	234	W.	Va.	557,	565,	76710 S.E.2d	267,	275	(2014),	citing	Syl.	Pt.	2, W. Va. Health Care Cost Review Authority v.

Boone Memorial Hospital ,	 196	W.	 Va.	 326,	 472	 S.E.2d	 411	 (1996),	 or	 inconsistent with	“the	legislative	intent	expressed	in	the	controlling	or	su bstantive	statute	which the	rule	is	promulgated	 to	implement,” Harrison v. Commissioner, Division of Motor

Vehicles ,	 226	W.	 Va.	 23,	 31,	 697	S.E.2d	 59,	 67	 (2010),	we	 do	 find	 that they	are	 so abbreviated	 as	 to	invite	 exactly	 the	 type	 of	 problems	 that	 aros e	in	 this	 case.	 	 The documents	required	 to	be	 filed	within	 two	business	days	of	 Janu ary	30,	 the	end	of the	qualifying	period,	include, inter alia ,	a	full	accounting,	with	documentation,	of	all qualifying	contributions	received	by	the	candidate	during	the	m onth	of	January	–	in Petitioner	Wooton’s	 case,	 754	 contributions	 totaling	 $46,952.00

. 5 To	make	 things worse,	W.	Va.	Code	of	State	Rule s	§	146‐5‐7.3	requires	that	any challenges	to	these

contributions	must	 be	 “filed	 wit h,	 and	 received	 by,	 the	 Secreta ry	 [of	 State]	 within two	 business	 days	 after	 the	 close	 of	 the	 qualifying	 period	 of	 t he	 filing	 of	 a candidate’s	 Application	 for	 Cert ification,	 whichever	 is	 earlier .”	 	 This	 means,	 in practical	terms,	that	a	challenger	has	hours,	or	perhaps	even	m inutes,	to	file	timely challenges.		In	short,	the	restrictive	time	periods	set	forth	i n	the	relevant	regulations set	 the	stage	 for	exactly	what	happened	in	 this	case:		a	candid ate	 timely	 filed	a	29 page	 report,	which	included	information	and	 documentation	 of	 75 4	 contributions, but	 failed	 to	include	one	additional	piece	of	paper,	 the pro forma cover	letter;	and

5 We	reject	Respondent	Walker’s	argument	that	Petitioner	Wooton was	negligent	in “waiting	until	 the	last	minute”	 to	 file	his	paperwork,	as	under the	Act	he	could	not compile	 his	 final	 accounting	 unt il	 after	 the	last	 qualifying	 co ntribution	in	 January, 2016,	had	come	in.11 then	 the	objection	 that	 followed	was	untimely	because	 the	chall enger	didn’t	know

she had a	challenge	until	after	the	time	period	had	already	expired. 6

The	second	consideration	which	guides	our	resolution	of	 this case	is the	complete	lack	of	prejudice	to	Respondent	Walker,	or	anyone else,	resulting	from

Petitioner	Wooton’s	 submission	 of his	 sworn	 statement	 one	 day	 l ate.	 Nowhere	 in her	 brief	 or	 in	 oral	 argument	 wa s	 Respondent	 Walker	 able	 to	 art iculate	 any prejudice	 resulting	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 to	 certify	 P etitioner	 Wooton, other	 than	 the	 conclusory	 assertion	 that	 any	 exercise	 of	 discre tion	 by	 the Commission	in	enforcing	procedural	deadlines	will	cast	a	“shrou d	of	doubt”	over	the election.		We	disagree.		In	this	case,	as	noted	above,	the	only prejudice	was	suffered by	Petitioner	Wooton	himself,	as	his	late	filing	of	the	sworn	s tatement	resulted	in	a delay	in	his	receipt	of	the	funding	he	needs	to	run	his	campaig n.

In	 West	 Virginia	 Code	 §	 3‐12‐ 2(10),	 the	 Legislature	 articula ted	 the critical	objectives	of	the	Act: As	demonstrated	by	the	2012	West	Virginia	Supreme	Court	of	Appe als Public	Campaign	Financing	Pilot Program,	an	alternative	public campaign	financing	option	for	ca ndidates	running	for	a	seat	on the Supreme	Court	of	Appeals	will	ensu re	the	fairness	of	democratic elections in	this	state,	protect	the	Const itutional	rights	of	voters	and candidates from	the	detrimental	effects	of increasingly	large	amounts	of	m oney

6 It	is	 questionable	whether	Respondent	Walker	 had	 the	 right	 to challenge	in	 this case	at	all,	since	the	Act,	W.	Va.	Code	§	3‐12‐10(g),	and	the	r egulations,	W.	Va.	C.S.R. §	146‐5‐7.1,	provide	only	for	challenges	to	qualifying	contribu tions,	not	to	any	other act	or	omission	on	the	part	of	a	participating	candidate.		The Commission	found	that it	 should,	 in	 equity,	 consider	 the	 challenge,	 and	 Petitioner	 Wo oton	 mentions	 but does	 not	 contest	 the	 point.	 	 Accordingly,	 this	 Court	 has	 reache d	 the	 merits	 of	 the challenge.12 being	raised	and	spent	to	influence	the	outcome	of	elections,	p rotect the	impartiality	and	integrity	o f	the	judiciary,	and	strengthen public	confidence	in	the	judiciary....

As	this	Court	recently	noted	in	a	workers’	compensation	case, “[t]here

is	 no	 rational	 basis	 to discourage medically	 necessary	 treatment;	 this	 reasoning	is wholly	 incompatible	 with	 the	 Act’s	 benevolent	 objectives.” Moore v. K

‐ Mart Corporation ,	234	W.	Va.	658,	664,	769	S.E.2d	35,	41	(2015)	(emphasis	in	or iginal). Similarly,	 in	 the	 instant	 case,	 there	 is	 no	 rational	 basis	 to	 d eny	 funding	 to	 a participating	 candidate	 who	 has	 substantially	 complied	 with	 the whole	 welter	 of statutes	 and	 rules	 governing	 the	 “West	 Virginia	 Supreme	 Court	 o f	 Appeals	 Public Campaign	Financing	Program.”		T he	Act	specifically	seeks	to	enc ourage	participation in	 the	 program,	 not	 to	 erect	 trap	 doors	 through	 which	 participa ting	 candidates plunge	upon	the	slightest	misstep.

Mindful	 of	 the	 important	 objectives	 served	 by	 the	 Act,	 and	 in	 l ight	 of	 the foregoing	authorities,	we	conclude,	and	so	hold,	that	the	West Virginia	State	Election Commission	 has	 discretion	 to	 certify	 a	 participating	 candidate for	 public	 funding under	 the	 “West	 Virginia	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 Public	 Campai gn	 Financing Program,”	W.	 Va.	 Code	 §	 3‐12‐1 et seq .,	 notwithstanding	 the	 candidate’s	 failure	 to

meet	the	time	deadlines	set	 forth	in	W.	Va.	Code	of	State	Rules §§	146‐5‐6.1	&	6.2, where	 the	 candidate	 has	 substantially	 complied	with	 all	 require ments	 set	 forth	in

the	Act	and	the	rules	and	where there	is	no	showing	of	prejudic e.13 Although	 in	 this	 case	 the	 Commission	 made	 no	 specific	 findings of substantial	compliance	or	lack	o f	prejudice,	we	find	it	unneces sary	to	remand	for	the

Commission	 to	 consider	 these	 issues.	 	 The	 evidence	 in	 the	 volum inous	 record submitted	 by	 the	 parties	 is	 undisputed	 that	 Petitioner	 Wooton	 s ubstantially complied	 with	 the	 Act	 and	 the	 rules,	 and	 that	 Respondent	 Walker suffered	 no prejudice	 from	 the	 one	 day	 delay	 in	 submission	 of	 Wooton’s	 cove r	 letter.	 	 No contrary	inference	could	be	drawn,	and	 therefore	 this	case	may be	 finally	resolved in	this	appeal.

The Certified Question As	set	 forth	herein,	 the	questio n	answered	and	certified	by	 the court	below gives	 no	 hint	 as	 to	 the	 reasoning	 employed	 by	 the	 court,	 and	 th erefore	 serves	 no purpose	other	 than	 to	announce	winners	and	losers.		Because	 thi s	is	an	important case	involving	an	issue	likely	to	recur	in	proceedings	before	t he	West	Virginia	State Election	Commission,	this	Court	will	modify	the	certified	quest ion	in	order	to	make

clear	 the ratio decidendi of	 our	 decision,	 thereby	 providing	 guidance	 to	 the Commission	and	other	interested	parties: Whether	the	West	Virginia	State	Election	Commission	has	discret ion to	certify	a	participating	candi date	for	public	funding	under	t he “West	Virginia	Supreme	Court	o f	Appeals	Public	Campaign Financing	Program,”	W.	Va.	Code	§	3‐12‐1 et seq .,	notwithstanding the	candidate’s	failure	to	meet	the	time	deadlines	set	forth	in W.	Va. Code	of	State	Rules	§§	146‐5‐6.1, 6.2,	where	the	candidate	has substantially	complied	with	all	requirements	set	forth	in	the	A ct	and the	rules	and	where	there	is	no	showing	of	prejudice.14 We	answer	 this	question	in	 the	affirmative,	and	 find	 that	in	 t his	case the	Commission	acted	within	its	discretion	in	certifying	 the	ca mpaign	of	Petitioner Wooton	for	public	funding	under	the	Act.

IV. CONCLUSION For	the	foregoing	reasons,	we	m odify	the	certified	question	to apply	to the	 specific	 facts	 of	 this	 case, and	 answer	 the	 modified	 certif ied	 question	 in	 the

affirmative.	 	 The	 decision	 of	 the	 Circuit	 Court	 of	 Kanawha	 Coun ty	 is	 hereby REVERSED,	 and	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 West	 Virginia	 State	 Election Commission	 is hereby	reinstated	in	its	entirety.

Certified	Question	Answered.