alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fw: Data Request

Michael Stewart to: Tricia Crabtree 03/04/2010 02:41 PM

please docket

Michael J. Stewart, Ph.D.

Environmental Protection Specialist

Health and Environmental Impacts Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

(919) 541-7524

stewart.michael@epa.gov

----- Forwarded by Michael Stewart/RTP/USEPA/US on 03/04/2010 02:41 PM -----

From: Michael Stewart/RTP/USEPA/US

To: Edmund <crouch@CambridgeEnvironmental.com>

Cc: graham.stephen@epa.gov, martin.karen@epa.gov

Date: 01/29/2010 04:26 PM

Subject: Data Request

Dr Crouch:

This is a follow-up to the email I sent this morning. We believe that we have 

compiled the data that you requested. If you can provide an FTP site, we can 

start uploading the data files this afternoon. Please let me know if this is 

convenient for you. 

Thanks,

Michael

Michael J. Stewart, Ph.D.

Environmental Protection Specialist

Health and Environmental Impacts Division

US. Environmental Protection Agency

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

(919) 541-7524

stewart.michael@epa.gov
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

EDWARD GOLPHIN,

Petitioner

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No. 203 EAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of September, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
#### Arnold A. Abramo, M.D., Respondent-Appellant, v HealthNow New York, Inc., Doing Business as Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Western New York, et al., Appellants-Respondents.

[803 NYS2d 842]

*987Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M. Siwek, J.), entered June 23, 2004. The order denied in part and granted in part defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously modified on the law by granting defendants’ cross motion in its entirety and dismissing the complaint and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying that part of defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the breach of contract causes of action. We therefore modify the order accordingly. It is well settled that the interpretation of the terms of an unambiguous written agreement is a function for the court *(see Chimart Assoc. v Paul,*66 NY2d 570, 572-573 [1986]; *Teitelbaum Holdings v Gold,*48 NY2d 51, 56 [1979]; *Matter of Cohen Swados Wright Hanifin Bradford & Brett v Frank R. Bayger, P.C.,*269 AD2d 739, 740-741 [2000]). In interpreting such an agreement, the court must examine the terms of the agreement as a whole in order to determine the intent of the parties *(see Benderson v Wiper Check,*266 AD2d 903, 904 [1999], *affd*96 NY2d 855 [2001]; *W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri,*77 NY2d 157, 162-163 [1990]), “giving a practical interpretation to the language employed so that the parties’ reasonable expectations are realized” *(Sunrise Mall Assoc. v Import Alley of Sunrise Mall,*211 AD2d 711, 711 [1995]).

We conclude that defendants established that their “construction of the agreement is the only construction which can fairly be placed thereon” *(Lipari v Maines Paper & Food Serv.,*245 AD2d 1085, 1085 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, defendants met their burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and we conclude that plaintiff failed to raise a material issue of fact in opposition thereto *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Defendants established that plaintiff was the subject of final disciplinary action by the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct resulting in a consent order that contained conditions impairing plaintiffs ability to practice medicine. Thus, the only “practical interpretation” of the terms of the agreement at issue is that defendants were justified in terminating plaintiff as a participating physician in their health *988maintenance organizations *(Sunrise Mall Assoc.,*211 AD2d at 711). Based on our determination herein, we do not address the issues raised by plaintiff on his cross appeal. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7430

ROD TURNER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus GENE JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (CA-04-19) Submitted: March 30, 2005 Decided: April 8, 2005 Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rod Turner, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Eldridge Jeffrey, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Rod Turner, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Turner has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny the motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
# Mexico City Policy and Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning 

# Memorandum for the Secretary of State [and] the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b(f)(1)), prohibits nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive Federal funds from using those funds “to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning, or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions.”  The August 1984 announcement by President Reagan of what has become known as the “Mexico City Policy” directed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to expand this limitation and withhold USAID funds from NGOs that use non-USAID funds to engage in a wide range of activities, including providing advice, counseling, or information regarding abortion, or lobbying a foreign government to legalize or make abortion available.  The Mexico City Policy was in effect from 1985 until 1993, when it was rescinded by President Clinton.  President George W. Bush reinstated the policy in 2001, implementing it through conditions in USAID grant awards, and subsequently extended the policy to “voluntary population planning” assistance provided by the Department of State.

These excessively broad conditions on grants and assistance awards are unwarranted.  Moreover, they have undermined efforts to promote safe and effective voluntary family planning programs in foreign nations.  Accordingly, I hereby revoke the Presidential memorandum of January 22, 2001, for the Administrator of USAID (Restoration of the Mexico City Policy), the Presidential memorandum of March 28, 2001, for the Administrator of USAID (Restoration of the Mexico City Policy), and the Presidential memorandum of August 29, 2003, for the Secretary of State (Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning).  In addition, I direct the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID to take the following actions with respect to conditions in voluntary population planning assistance and USAID grants that were imposed pursuant to either the 2001 or 2003 memoranda and that are not required by the Foreign Assistance Act or any other law:  (1) immediately waive such conditions in any current grants, and (2) notify current grantees, as soon as possible, that these conditions have been waived.  I further direct that the Department of State and USAID immediately cease imposing these conditions in any future grants.

This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                    The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the                     *Federal Register*.                

[FR Doc. E9-1923

Billing code 4710-10-P
IA

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 148

Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1996, and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 3, 1996

Mr. OBEY introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Appropriations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year

1996, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That section 106(c) of Public Law 104–56 is amended by

4 striking ‘‘December 15, 1995’’ and inserting ‘‘July 31,

5 1996’’.

Æ
# L_2019047EN.01003301.xml

| 19.2.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 47/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.2.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 47/33

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/281

of 12 February 2019

entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (‘The Vale of Clwyd Denbigh Plum’ (PDO))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the United Kingdom's application to register the name ‘The Vale of Clwyd Denbigh Plum’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the United Kingdom's application to register the name ‘The Vale of Clwyd Denbigh Plum’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘The Vale of Clwyd Denbigh Plum’ should therefore be entered in the register, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘The Vale of Clwyd Denbigh Plum’ should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name ‘The Vale of Clwyd Denbigh Plum’ (PDO) is hereby entered in the register.

The name specified in the first paragraph denotes a product in Class 1.6. Fruit, vegetables and cereals, fresh or processed, as listed in Annex XI to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 (3).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 February 2019.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Phil HOGAN

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 303, 29.8.2018, p. 12.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 179, 19.6.2014, p. 36).

3

---
§ 1.816-1 Life insurance reserves. ( a ) *Definition of life insurance reserves.* Except as provided in section 816(h), a reserve that meets the requirements of section 816(b)(1) and (2) will not be disqualified as a life insurance reserve solely because the method used to compute the reserve takes into account other factors, provided that the method used to compute the reserve is a tax reserve method as defined in section 807(d)(3) and that such reserve is not an asset adequacy reserve as described in § 1.807-1(b).
( b ) *Applicability date.* The section applies to taxable years beginning after *October 13, 2020.*
However, a taxpayer may choose to apply the rules of this section for a taxable year beginning after December 31, 2017, the effective date of the revision of section 807 by Public Law 115-97, and on or before *October 13, 2020,* provided the taxpayer consistently applies the rules of this section to that taxable year and all subsequent taxable years. See section 7805(b)(7). [T.D. 9911, 85 FR 64393, Oct. 13, 2020]
Served: December 23, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, DC

NOTICE

Japan Charter Authorizations

(January 1 – December 31, 2011)

Under the terms of the 2010 U.S.-Japan Memorandum of Understanding (2010 MOU), U.S. 

carriers may operate an unlimited number of one-way charter flights (hereinafter we refer to 

“one-way charters” simply as “charters”) between the United States and Japan during the 

2011 calendar year (January 1-December 31, 2011), subject to the limitation that no more 

than six hundred (600) charters may operate to or from Tokyo’s Haneda Airport. As a result 

of the 2010 MOU, U.S. carriers now only require a Notice of Consistency from the 

Department when operating charters between the United States and Haneda.

1

 

We have determined that the demand for U.S.-Haneda charters for the 2011 calendar year can 

continue to be met by using the U.S.-Tokyo charter allocation procedures that were 

implemented for the 2008 calendar year and have remained in place for subsequent calendar

years. Specifically, the 600 U.S.-Haneda charters will be available to U.S. carriers for 

distribution for the 2011 calendar year on a first-come, first-served basis subject to the 

following procedures and conditions:

1. Applications to operate U.S.-Haneda charters may be filed no earlier than 120 days in 

advance of the flight date.

2 For the period January 1 through October 31, 2011, 

carriers may apply for up to 50 charters per month. After October 31, 2011, no 

restrictions apply on the number of charters that may be applied for each month;

2. Applications must identify the type of charter (passenger or cargo); the date of each 

one-way flight; the charterer(s); the city-pair markets involved by direction; the type 

of aircraft to be used; and (for cargo charters) the type of cargo transported. Carriers 

may be asked to provide copies of signed charter contracts; 

 1 This does not relieve U.S. carriers from the requirement to obtain proper authorization for all U.S.-Japan 

charters from the Japan Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT). 2 Applications should be sent by e-mail to robert.finamore@dot.gov, or by fax to 202-366-3694.
3. The Department will grant U.S.-Haneda charter pool allocations by providing a Notice 

of Consistency to applicant carriers;3

4. Carriers receiving a charter pool allocation shall, in writing, return any unused 

allocations to the U.S. Air Carrier Licensing Division.

4

By:

Paul L. Gretch, Director

Office of International Aviation

(SEAL)

Dated: December 23, 2010

An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide Web at:

http://www.regulations.gov

 3 The carrier must also obtain proper authorization for its U.S.-Haneda charters from the Japan MLIT. 4 This notification must be received within two business days of the carrier’s determination that an allocated 

flight or flights will not operate.
(Hamilton County Probate Court,.

1901.)

#### IN RE KUEHNKEN’S ESTATE.

A beneficiary in an estate has no power under the statute to receipt for her distributive share in advance of the distibution or of a finding of the amount coming to her, and a receipt so given by her remains subject to explanation, and an administrator has no power to negotiate for or accept such a receipt where the assets of the estate'have passed out of his hands and he is therefore unable to settle wiht the beneficiary.

Application for the reopening of the account of Plerman H. Kuehnken as administrator of the estate of his father, the late John H. Kuehnken.

The late John H. Kuehnken left an estate of $20,000 in government bonds and other securities in addition to real estate holdings. He left no debts. Some $8,000 of the bonds were used by the son as collateral for his personal debts, and subsequent to their hypothecation he obtained a receipt from his mother, the beneficiary, for these bonds, with the understanding that he was to pay her the interest on the bonds during her life, and at her death they were to become his own. His account was thereafter confirmed in the usual course of business, and one year and eight months subsequent to the confirmation the mother died. The present proceeding is to compel-an accounting to her estate for the bonds. It was contended on behalf of the administrator that the confirmation of the account worked a full discharge for himself and his sureties from all further liability.

Ferris, J.

The receipt which the administrator had taken from his mother, the beneficiary, was subject to explanation for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the funds in the hands of the administrator had been paid over or the assets of the estate distributed in kind, as provided by the statute as a prerequisite to such discharge from further liability; and the explanation of the receipt went to show that no distribution was made. As a matter of law, therefore, the beneficiary was without power to receipt for her distributive share in advance of the distribution, or of any finding as to the amount coming to her; and, further, the administrator was without power to negotiate for or accept the receipt, for the reason that he was not in a position to settle with the beneficiary, the assets of the estate having pass*658ed out of his hands. The amount thus found ! to be due from the administrator under the I account as recast will become the basis of an estate to be administered for the benefit of the heirs at law of the mother. ! |
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Omar Williams, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 266]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated March 8, 2004 *(People v Williams,*5 AD3d 514 [2004]), modifying a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered June 23, 2000.

*682Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). H. Miller, J.P., Crane, S. Miller and Rivera, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk October 1, 2009

jm 

# Order

October 1, 2009

139674 (55)

STEVEN BOYT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 139674
CoA: 282653 STEVEN DRAKOS,

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________ ________________

On order of the Court, the motion to waiv e fees is considered and it is DENIED
because MCL 600.2963 re quires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for an appeal to be filed, appellant must resubmit a copy of this order, and shall refile the copy of the pleadings which is being returned with this order within 21 days. By doing this, appellant becomes responsible for paying the $375.00 filing fee. Failu re to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely refiles the pleadings, m onthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in an amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant’s account until the payments equal the total amount of the filing fee stated above. That
amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) pl aintiff shall not file further appeals in this Court until the entry fee in this ca se is paid in full.
The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this orde r to appellant and return appellant’s pleadings with this order.
#### § 48.4161(b) [Reserved]