alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
39830.

#### RICE v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ROADS & REVENUE OF PUTNAM COUNTY.

Decided January 8, 1963.

*208*Elliott ,& Davis, Joseph H. Davis,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. Clayton Hargrove, D. D. Veal,*contra.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

The primary question for determination here is whether the Tax Collector of Putnam County is entitled, under *Code Ann.*§ 92-6301, to commissions on funds paid by the United States of America to Putnam County, not as taxes, but in lieu of taxes. We think not. The term “net tax digest” referred to in *Code Ann.*§ 92-6301, contemplates and means the total amount of taxes due on all *taxable*property included therein. It is admitted here that the funds on which commissions were paid to the Tax Collector of Putnam County were not taxes, but were funds paid to Putnam County by the United States of America in lieu of taxes. Accordingly, such amounts were not and could not, as contended by defendant in fi. fa., be included as a part of the net tax digest. *Bruce v. County of Troup,*92 Ga. App. 786 (90 SE2d 60).

Defendant in fi. fa. contends in his affidavit of illegality that said commissions paid to him were legal, proper and ap*209proved by plaintiff in fi. fa. and their attorney and that they are now estopped to allege a default. “Where the compensation of a public official is fixed by the General Assembly such public official is without authority, by express agreement or otherwise, to fix a different compensation for such public office.” *Owens v. Floyd County,*96 Ga. App. 25 (99 SE2d 560). Accordingly, this contention of defendant in fi. fa. is without merit.

The plaintiff in fi. fa. seeks to recover interest at the rate of 20% per annum on the principal involved. However, *Code*§ 89-833 provides that only 7% is legally recoverable (which the plaintiff in fi. fa. now concedes in its brief), and the affidavit of illegality was not subject to the first ground of demurrer for such reason. Therefore the trial court erred in dismissing the affidavit of illegality for this reason. However, in the, event the execution is amended within 10 days from the receipt of the remittitur by the trial court to seek only the legal interest of 7% per annum the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, otherwise reversed.

*Judgment affirmed on condition.*

*Frankum and Jordan, JJ., concur.*
§ 15.737-11 Institution of proceeding. ( a ) Whenever the Director has reason to believe that any former officer or employee of the Department has violated 18 U.S.C. 207 (a), (b) or (c), he/she may reprimand such person or institute an administrative disciplinary proceeding for that person's suspension from practice before the Department or a separate statutory agency thereof. The proceeding shall be instituted by a complaint which names the respondent and is signed by the Director and filed in his/her office. Except in cases of willfulness, or where time, the nature of the proceeding, or the public interest does not permit, a proceeding will not be instituted under this section until facts or conduct which may warrant such action have been called to the attention of the proposed respondent in writing and he/she has been accorded the opportunity to provide his/her position on the matter.
( b ) The Director shall coordinate proceedings under this part with the Department of Justice in cases where it initiates criminal prosecution.
V

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1238

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise

trade for each of 3 barges.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 14, 1995

Mr. REED introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a

certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade for each

of 3 barges.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That notwithstanding section 27 of the Merchant Marine

4 Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883) and section 12106 of title

5 46, United States Code, the Secretary of Transportation

6 may issue a certificate of documentation with appropriate

7 endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade for

8 each of the following barges (owned by the Harbor Marine
2

•HR 1238 IH

1 Corporation of Rhode Island, incorporated under the laws

2 of the State of Rhode Island and located principally in

3 Warren, Rhode Island):

4 (1) HARBOR 223 (approximately 110 feet in

5 length).

6 (2) GENE ELIZABETH (approximately 200

7 feet in length).

8 (3) HARBOR 221 (approximately 90 feet in

9 length).

Æ
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20 - 003 3 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v. JUSTIN LEE LONGTINE ,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including June 1 5 , 2020, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 11 2020

05/11/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0033
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****Motor vehicle use map. SawtoothNational Forest, Idaho. Minidoka Ranger District**
 
2014:Front | Back
2015:Front | Back
2016:Front | Back
 
SuDoc Number:A 13.28:SA 9/20/
Item Number:0080-G (online)
CGP systemNumber:000926307
 
January 8, 2018
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph Eugene HAFF, Appellant.

No. 01-3557.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 11, 2002.

Filed June 20, 2002.

*849Before BOWMAN, FAGG, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Joseph Eugene Haff pleaded guilty to possession of more than 50 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Haff raises three issues in his appeal from the sentence imposed by the district court.*

First, Haff contends the sentencing scheme in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) is unconstitutional. We disagree. Haffs argument is foreclosed by our decision in *United States v. Woods,*270 F.3d 728, 729-30 (8th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*— U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 1342, 152 L.Ed.2d 246 (2002). Second, Haff claims the indictment was flawed because it did not plead the earlier felony convictions which the district court used to enhance Haffs sentence. Again, we disagree. We do not require that earlier felony convictions be pleaded and proved beyond a reasonable doubt for those convictions to be considered at sentencing. *United States v. Abernathy,*277 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir.2002), *petition for cert. filed,*(U.S. Apr. 19, 2002) (No. 01-9788). Finally, Haff contends the sentence violates *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because the indictment did not allege the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine, yet the district court considered these factors during sentencing. We find, however, that the indictment alleged Haff “possessed with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine” and Haff stipulated to this level of quantity and purity when he entered his guilty plea. Further, although Haffs earlier convictions increase the statutory maximum sentence, “the use of drug quantity at sentencing will not conflict with *Apprendi*so long as it results in a sentence within the § 841(b)(1)(C) maximum.” *United States v. Sheppard,*219 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir.2000). Haffs 156 month (13 year) sentence is well within the statutory 30 year maximum.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court.

*

 The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, Chief United States District Judge for the District of North Dakota.
§ 19.730 What information must I provide to the suspending official if I contest a suspension? ( a ) In addition to any information and argument in opposition, as a respondent your submission to the suspending official must identify— ( 1 ) Specific facts that contradict the statements contained in the Notice of Suspension. A general denial is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute over facts material to the suspension;
( 2 ) All existing, proposed, or prior exclusions under regulations implementing E.O. 12549 and all similar actions taken by Federal, state, or local agencies, including administrative agreements that affect only those agencies;
( 3 ) All criminal and civil proceedings not included in the Notice of Suspension that grew out of facts relevant to the cause(s) stated in the notice; and
( 4 ) All of your affiliates.
( b ) If you fail to disclose this information, or provide false information, the Department of the Treasury may seek further criminal, civil or administrative action against you, as appropriate.
40142.

#### GURIN v. BITUMINOUS CASUALTY COMPANY et al.

Decided May 23, 1963.

*E. B. Shaw,*for plaintiff in error.

*Wilson, Branch, Barwick & Vandiver, M. Cook Barwick, Thomas S. Bentley,*contra.

Jordan, Judge.

Nathan Herbert Gurin filed a claim before the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation against his former employer, Gate City Table Company, and a hearing to determine liability, disability, compensation and medical was conducted by a deputy director of the board who entered an award denying compensation. The full board on appeal adopted the findings of fact of the deputy director and likewise denied compensation. The Superior Court of Fulton County affirmed the award of the full board and the exception is to that judgment. *Held:*

The denial of compensation in this case was fully authorized by the evidence which disclosed that the claimant had arteriosclerotic heart disease which was neither produced nor aggravated by his employment. While the evidence further disclosed that the exertion required by the claimant’s job caused him pain, such fact would not authorize a finding of accidental injury; for, as was held in *Johnston v. Boston-Old Colony Ins. Co.,*106 Ga. App. 410 (126 SE2d 919), “The legal cause of the pain in such a case is the physical condition of the employee and not the exertion on the job. This case is not like the cases where exertion on the job causes heart damage which incapacitates the employee. Here there is no heart damage except from disease. Pain suffered by an employee because he engages in an occupation which he is physically unable to perform is not an accidental injury.”

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
§ 31.6001-1 Records in general. ( a ) *Form of records.* The records required by the regulations in this part shall be kept accurately, but no particular form is required for keeping the records. Such forms and systems of accounting shall be used as will enable the district director to ascertain whether liability for tax is incurred and, if so, the amount thereof.
( b ) *Copies of returns, schedules, and statements.* Every person who is required, by the regulations in this part or by instructions applicable to any form prescribed thereunder, to keep any copy of any return, schedule, statement, or other document, shall keep such copy as a part of his records.
( c ) *Records of claimants.* Any person (including an employee) who, pursuant to the regulations in this part, claims a refund, credit or abatement, shall keep a complete and detailed record with respect to the tax, interest, addition to the tax, additional amount, or assessable penalty to which the claim relates. Such record shall include any records required of the claimant by paragraph (b) of this section and by §§ 31.6001-2 to 31.6001-5, inclusive, which relate to the claim.
( d ) *Records of employees.* While not mandatory (except in the case of claims), it is advisable for each employee to keep permanent, accurate records showing the name and address of each employer for whom he performs services as an employee, the dates of beginning and termination of such services, the information with respect to himself which is required by the regulations in this subpart to be kept by employers, and the statements furnished in accordance with the provisions of § 31.6051-1.
( e ) *Place and period for keeping records.* ( 1 ) All records required by the regulations in this part shall be kept, by the person required to keep them, at one or more convenient and safe locations accessible to internal revenue officers, and shall at all times be available for inspection by such officers.
( 2 ) Except as otherwise provided in the following sentence, every person required by the regulations in this part to keep records in respect of a tax (whether or not such person incurs liability for such tax) shall maintain such records for at least four years after the due date of such tax for the return period to which the records relate, or the date such tax is paid, whichever is the later. The records of claimants required by paragraph (c) of this section shall be maintained for a period of at least four years after the date the claim is filed.
( f ) *Cross reference.* See §§ 31.6001-2 to 31.6001-5, inclusive, for additional records required with respect to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, the Federal Unemployment Tax act, and the collection of income tax at source on wages, respectively.
#### § 1023.530 [Reserved]
EXHIBIT A

June 19, 2002

Mr. Dennis M. Conerton
1352 Middle Road
S. Beloit, IL 61080

Dear Dennis,

This letter will confirm our understandings with respect to your resignation
from employment of Blackhawk State Bank and Blackhawk Bancorp.  They are:
1. Your resignation was effective January 31, 2002;
2. You will remain on the payroll through July 31, 2002;
3. You will participate in the employee health insurance plan through July 31,
   2002.  Thereafter, you will be eligible for COBRA participation at your sole
   expense.
4. You may continue to use your company car through January 31, 2003 and the
   bank shall pay for insurance and regular maintenance until you return or
   purchase it, whichever comes first.  You will pay for gasoline and oil
   changes.  You may purchase the car any time prior to then at the car's
   current book value.
5. Any unexercised stock options held by you expired on April 30, 2002.
6. You will remain a director subject to the by-laws of the company and receive
   such compensation as may be in effect, from time to time, for outside
   directors;
7. This agreement between us remains confidential except when disclosed to our
   respective counsels, board members and any disclosures that are required by
   law or regulation.
We appreciate your patience and cooperation in the matter.  If this letter
accurately reflects our agreement, please sign and return a copy to my
attention.

                                        Agreed and Accepted:
Sincerely,                              This 29th day of June, 2002

/s/ R. R. Bastian
------------------------------------
R. R. Bastian for Merritt J. Mott
Board of Directors                      /s/ Dennis M. Conerton
Blackhawk State Bank                    ------------------------------
Blackhawk Bancorp                       Dennis M. Conerton
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 158 (Tuesday, August 18, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 41711]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-19779]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. FDA-2009-N-0336]


Animal Drug User Fee Rates and Payment Procedures for Fiscal Year 
2010; Correction

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration is correcting a notice 
entitled that appeared in the Federal Register of August 3, 2009 (74 FR 
38429). The document announced the Fiscal Year 2010 fee rates for the 
Animal Drug User Fee Act. The document was published with a 
typographical error. This document corrects that error.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Miller, Office of Financial 
Management (HFA-100), Food and Drug Administration, 5600 Fishers Lane, 
Rockville, MD 20857, 301-827-3917.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In FR Doc. E9-18459, appearing on page 38429 
in the Federal Register of Monday, August 3, 2009, the following 
correction is made:
    1. On page 38429, in the third column, in the first sentence of the 
last paragraph under Background, ``$209,400'' is corrected to read 
``$290,400''.

    Dated: August 12, 2009.
Jeffrey Shuren,
Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning.
[FR Doc. E9-19779 Filed 8-17-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4160-01-S
1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0268

MONTANA TROUT UNLIMITED, TROUT UNLIMITED, MONTANA

ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION CENTER, EARTHWORKS, and 

AMERICAN RIVERS,

Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

AND CONSERVATION and TINTINA MONTANA, INC.,

Respondents and Appellees.

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Association of Gallatin 

Agricultural Irrigators, Montana Chamber of Commerce, Montana Farm Bureau 

Federation, Montana League of Cities and Towns, Inc., Montana Stockgrowers 

Association, and Montana Water Resources Association, seeking leave to file an 

amicus curiae brief in the above-captioned matter is GRANTED. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said parties shall file their joint amicus 

brief on or before October 23, 2023.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 7 2023

09/07/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0268
PASSENGERS AND INTENDING PASSENGERS DISTINGUISHED.

Court of Appeals for Stark County.

#### Jane Sinnock, Administratrix, v. The Pennsylvania Company.

Decided, 1916.

*Charge of Court*— As *to the Degree of Care Due an Intending Passenger hy a Carrier.*

Whether an intending passenger, who is in and about the depot awaiting the arrival of the train he desires to take, is a passenger and therefore entitled to the highest degree of care, is a question which should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions; and to charge the jury that one injured under such circumstances was a passenger at the time of his injury constitutes prejudicial error.

fbrneding, J. (sitting in place of Shields, J.).

A careful examination of the errors complained of in this case leads to the conclusion that the trial court in its charge to the jury omitted to distinguish between the degree of care a railroad company owes to an intending passenger in and about its station awaiting the arrival of a train, and a passenger actually aboard one of the railroad company’s cars.

An intending passenger has to a greater or less extent control over his movements and can therefore exercise corresponding precautions to protect himself from danger. To this end, it becomes the duty of the common carrier to provide such station accommodations as are reasonably safe for persons exercising ordinary care.

When a passenger is actually aboard a train, he has substantially no control over his movements; he has, in effect, wholly surrendered himself to the care and .control of the carrier, and the carrier must therefore exercise the highest degree of care to protect him (21 C. C., 288). This court followed this rule in the former hearing of this case.

*480The trial court in the present hearing charged, the jury as follows:

> “If you should find from the evidence in this ease that John Sinnock went to the station that morning for the purpose of taking train 26 to Youngstown, and was upon the depot platform and went there for that purpose, *he was a passenger,*and if he was a passenger he was entitled to that degree of care which the law imposes upon a railway company which is the common carrier of passengers, and that degree of care, gentlemen, is the highest degree of care. ’ ’ * * ***

We are unable to escape the conclusion that such instruction was of such character as to prejudice the rights of the railroad company in imposing upon it a higher degree of care than was required.

As a matter of fact, the evidence tends to prove Sinnock was not a passenger upon any.train. It is admitted he intended to board a train as a passenger, but whether he was or was not a passenger, we think was a question to be submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The court in effect announced in his charge to the jury that he was a passenger, and therefore entitled to the highest degree of care, and this, we think, was error.

The judgment of the court of common pleas will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Powell, J., concurs'; Houck, J., dissents.