alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andre Fortner, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 470]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Penny M. Wolfgang, J.), rendered June 6, 2003. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously modified as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and on the law by vacating the sentence and as modified the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Erie County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.06 [5]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence without affording him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. The record establishes that defendant was not informed at the time of the plea that he must return for sentencing in order to avoid the imposition of an enhanced sentence. Contrary to the contention of the People, the waiver by defendant of the right to appeal does not encompass his challenge to the enhanced sentence “because there was no discussion of that issue at the time of the plea” *(People v Hendricks,*270 AD2d 944, 944-945 [2000]). Although the People are correct that defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review because he did not object to the enhanced sentence or move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment of conviction, we nevertheless exercise our power to review defendant’s contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see generally People v Cooke,*21 AD3d 1339 [2005]). We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the sentence, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court to impose the promised sentence or to afford defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea *(see id.; People v Spina,*186 AD2d 9 [1992]). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Kehoe, Martoche and Pine, JJ.
§ 19.1010 Suspending official. ( a ) *Suspending official* means an agency official who is authorized to impose suspension. The suspending official is either: ( 1 ) The agency head; or
( 2 ) An official designated by the agency head.
( b ) [Reserved]
Exhibit 32.1


                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Jacobs Financial Group, Inc.
(the  "Company")  on Form  10-QSB for the period  ended  November  30, 2005 (the
"Report") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission,  I, John M. Jacobs,
Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Company's  Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



         January 19, 2006                           /s/John M. Jacobs
                                                    --------------------------
                                                    John M. Jacobs
                                                    Chief Executive Officer
                                                    Principal Financial Officer
§ 1024.630 Prohibition on correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks; records concerning owners of foreign banks and agents for service of legal process. ( a ) Refer to § 1010.630 of this chapter.
( b ) [Reserved]
VALIDITY OF LONGVIEW HOSPITAL BOND ISSUE.

Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.

#### State of Ohio, on the Relation of John V. Campbell, Prosecuting Attorney, v. Fred E. Wesselmann et al.*

Decided, April 3, 1916.

*County Bonds*— Validity *of Issue of*— For *Enlargement of an Insane Asylum Where Issue Has Been Authorized by the Electorate*— ■ *How Proceeds May be Expended.*

Injunction does not lie against an issue of bonds, put forth by county commissioners for improvements in an insane asylum owned by the county, where the issue has been approved by the people and the proceeds are disbursed in accordance with the statutory provisions.

*576*Campbell, Hickenlooper, Hauck & Capelle,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Herman P. Goebel,*contra.

*

 Affirming, *State, ex rel Campbell,*v. *Wesselmann et al,*18 N.P.(N.S.), 564.

By the Court.

The commissioners of Hamilton county have the authority to provide for the issue of bonds for the construction, enlargement and repair of buildings for Longview Hospital under Section 2434, General Code, after first submitting the question of such issue to the voters of the county and receiving their approval in compliance with Section 5638, *et seq.,*General Code.

The proceedings for the issue of bonds in the sum of $300,000 for such purpose, which are attacked in this action, are regular and valid, and fully comply with all the requirements of the law.

So much of the proceeds of these bonds as are issued for the purpose of constructing new buildings can only be disbursed and expended by a building commission to be constituted and controlled under the provisions of Sections 2333 to 2342 inclusive, General Code; and the amount used for the repair of existing buildings must be disbursed and expended by the board of directors of Longview Hospital.

The judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1145 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1145

 To amend title 18, United States Code, with respect to jury tampering.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 7, 1995

   Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Conyers, Mr. 
  McCollum, and Mr. Schumer) introduced the following bill; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 18, United States Code, with respect to jury tampering.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 1503 of 
title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
following: ``If the offense under this section occurs in connection 
with a trial of a criminal case, the maximum term of imprisonment which 
may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise 
provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for 
any offense charged in such case.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Rey Martinez, Respondent, v Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority et al., Appellants.

[806 NYS2d 470]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Faul G. Feinman, J., and a jury), entered October 25, 2004, awarding plaintiff damages for past and future pain and suffering in the principal amounts of $150,000 and $750,000, respectively, unanimously modified, on the facts, to vacate the award of damages for future pain and suffering and direct a new trial thereon and otherwise affirmed, without costs, unless, within 30 days after service of a copy of this order with notice of entry, plaintiff stipulates to reduce the award for future pain and suffering to *303$450,000, and to entry of an amended judgment in accordance therewith.

Although plaintiff complains of lifestyle limitations as a result of a herniated disc at the L5-S1 level with nerve root impingement and resulting back pain, leg numbness and restriction in ranges of motion, he was never hospitalized and has not had and is not expected to have surgery, was able to return to his job as a cab driver and claims no lost earnings, and is able to manage his lower back and leg pain with over-the-counter Tylenol. In these circumstances, the $750,000 award for future pain and suffering over 39.9 years deviates materially from what is reasonable compensation to the extent indicated *(cf. Donlon v City of New York,*284 AD2d 13 [2001]; *Kane v Coundorous,*11 AD3d 304 [2004]). The $150,000 award for past pain and suffering over more than seven years does not deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation under the circumstances. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Marlow, Ellerin, Gonzalez and McGuire, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Richard Cusato et al., Appellants, v Glen at Great Kills Homeowners Association, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al. Respondent.

[808 NYS2d 99]

In a proceeding to dissolve a homeowner’s association pursuant to Not-for-Profit Corporation Law § 1102, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Solomon, J.), dated May 21, 2004, which denied the petition to dissolve the homeowner’s association and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioners did not demonstrate that competing factions of the homeowner’s association engaged in oppressive conduct towards them, or that there was internal dissension among the members of the homeowner’s association such that it would be in the best interest of the members for the homeowner’s association to be dissolved *(see*N-PCL 1102 [a] [2] [C], [D]; *Matter of Korotun v Laurel Place Homeowner’s Assn.,*6 AD3d 710 [2004]; *Matter of John Luther & Sons Co. v Geneva Bldrs. & Trade Assn.,*52 AD2d 737 [1976]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition for dissolution. Moreover, since the petitioners failed to establish that dissolution was in order, the Supreme Court was not required to provide the petitioners with alternative relief *(see Matter of Farega Realty Corp.,*132 AD2d 797, 799 [1987]; *cf. Matter of Kemp & Beatley [Gardstein],*64 NY2d 63, 73-74 [1984]). Adams, J.P., Crane, S. Miller and Mastro, JJ., concur.
#### LuJean Colon, Respondent, v New York City Housing Authority et al., Appellants.

[805 NYS2d 601]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), entered November 22, 2004, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The plaintiff slipped and fell on snow and ice accumulated on an outdoor stairway of premises owned by the defendant New York City Housing Authority and managed by the defendant Marion Scott Realty.

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating that there was ongoing precipitation at the time of the plaintiffs accident and that an adequate amount of time had not passed for them to remedy any hazardous condition resulting from the accumulation of snow and ice *(see Gor v High View Estates Owners Corp.,*17 AD3d 316, 317 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 709 [2005]; *Dowden v Long Is. R.R.,*305 AD2d 631 [2003]; *Whitt v St. John’s Episcopal Hosp.,*258 AD2d 648 [1999]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning the defendants’ negligence.

Further, the defendants correctly assert that the plaintiffs failure to set forth any allegations in his notice of claim concerning negligent training or supervision on their part, or improper construction and repair of the stairs, requires that these causes of action be dismissed pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (2) (see *Dixon v Village of Spring Val.,*6 AD3d 489, 490 [2004]; *Bryant v City of New York,*188 AD2d 445, 446 [1992]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Adams, J.P., Crane, S. Miller and Mastro, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Birch Branch, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert Lazzeri,
Chief Financial Officer and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge,:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d),as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Date:    February 9, 2009
                                           /s/ Robert Lazzeri
                                           ------------------
                                           Robert Lazzeri
                                           Chief Financial Officer and Director
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 126 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 126

To repeal the provision of law under which pay for Members of Congress 
                       is automatically adjusted

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

  Mr. Coble introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and in addition to the 
     Committee on House Oversight, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To repeal the provision of law under which pay for Members of Congress 
                       is automatically adjusted.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (2) of section 601(a) of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 31) is repealed.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 601(a)(1) of such Act is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``(a)(1)'' and inserting ``(a)'';
            (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as 
        paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
            (3) by striking ``, as adjusted by paragraph (2) of this 
        subsection''.
                                 <all>
```
§ 55.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return or claim for refund to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record. ( a ) *In general.* A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 44 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer, and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in § 1.6107-1 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78459, Dec. 22, 2008]
www.gpo.gov

### §564w–2. Federal acquisition of tribal land

#### (a) Condemnation authority

The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to acquire by condemnation all of the Klamath Indian forest lands which the trustee for the Klamath Indian Tribe is required to sell by the terms of its trust agreement, and the lands so acquired shall become a part of the Winema National Forest.

#### (b) Initiation of action; authorization of appropriations

The condemnation action may be initiated either before or after the lands are offered for sale by the trustee, and for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $70,000,000.

#### (c) Applicability of homesite provisions

The homesite provisions of section 564w–1(g) of this title shall apply to the lands acquired by the Secretary pursuant to this subchapter.

(Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, §29, as added Pub. L. 93–102, Aug. 16, 1973, 87 Stat. 349.)
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1506

CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WESTINGHOUSE SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Aiken. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (CA03-484-RBH)

Submitted: August 18, 2005 Decided: August 23, 2005

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher Lawrence, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Franklin Thompson,

Jr., MALONE, THOMPSON & SUMMERS, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Lawrence appeals a district court judgment

adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, granting

summary judgment to Westinghouse Savannah River Company LLC and

dismissing Lawrence’s complaint. We have reviewed the record and

the district court’s order and affirm for the reasons cited by the

district court. See Lawrence v. Westinghouse, No. CA-03-484-RBH

(D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2005). We deny Lawrence’s motion to strike the

Appellee’s informal brief. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
#### Sam ANTHONY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL; United States Postal Service, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-1382.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted June 13, 2002.

Decided June 18, 2002.

*646Sam Anthony, Appellant Pro Se. David J. Ball, Jr., Office of The United States Attorney, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Sam Anthony appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his civil action for failure to comply with the court’s order to particularize his complaint in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny Anthony’s motion for appointment of counsel and affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Anthony v. United States Attorney General,*No. CA-01-635-2 (E.D.Va. March 6, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 43 Introduced in House (IH)]

                                     

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 43

    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
    allowing the President to veto any item of appropriation or any 
    provision in any Act or joint resolution containing an item of 
                             appropriation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

Mr. Stump (for himself and Mr. Solomon) introduced the following joint 
    resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
    allowing the President to veto any item of appropriation or any 
    provision in any Act or joint resolution containing an item of 
                             appropriation.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

                              ``Article--

    ``Section 1. The President may disapprove, in any Act or joint 
resolution containing an item of appropriation, any item of 
appropriation or any provision. If an Act or joint resolution is 
approved by the President, any item of appropriation or provision 
contained in the Act or joint resolution that is not disapproved shall 
become law. The President shall return, with his objections, any 
disapproved item of appropriation or provision to the House in which 
the Act or joint resolution containing such item or provision 
originated, and may group such disapproved items or provisions for 
reconsideration by the Congress. The Congress may reconsider any item 
of appropriation or provision disapproved under this article in the 
manner prescribed under section 7 of article I for Acts disapproved by 
the President. The Congress may consider such disapproved items or 
provisions separately or as grouped by the President upon return of the 
disapproved items, but may not consider such disapproved items or 
provisions in any other grouping.
    ``Section 2. This article shall take effect at noon on the third 
day of January of the first odd-numbered year beginning after the date 
of the ratification of this article.''.
                                 <all>
```
§ 19.215 Which nonprocurement transactions are not covered transactions? The following types of nonprocurement transactions are not covered transactions: ( a ) A direct award to— ( 1 ) A foreign government or foreign governmental entity;
( 2 ) A public international organization;
( 3 ) An entity owned (in whole or in part) or controlled by a foreign government; or
( 4 ) Any other entity consisting wholly or partially of one or more foreign governments or foreign governmental entities.
( b ) A benefit to an individual as a personal entitlement without regard to the individual's present responsibility (but benefits received in an individual's business capacity are not excepted). For example, if a person receives social security benefits under the Supplemental Security Income provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1301 *et seq.,* those benefits are not covered transactions and, therefore, are not affected if the person is excluded.
( c ) Federal employment.
( d ) A transaction that the Department of the Treasury needs to respond to a national or agency-recognized emergency or disaster.
( e ) A permit, license, certificate, or similar instrument issued as a means to regulate public health, safety, or the environment, unless the Department of the Treasury specifically designates it to be a covered transaction.
( f ) An incidental benefit that results from ordinary governmental operations.
( g ) Any other transaction if the application of an exclusion to the transaction is prohibited by law.