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86–864 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–200

S. 980—THE EMBASSY SECURITY AND

PERSONNEL PROTECTION ACT OF 2013

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 16, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 3

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1

Miller, Hon. Bill A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High-Threat 

Posts, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ........................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Starr, Gregory B., Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, and Director of 

the Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Bob Corker ... 28

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

S. 980—THE EMBASSY SECURITY AND 

PERSONNEL PROTECTION ACT OF 2013

TUESDAY, JULY 16, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Murphy, Kaine, Corker, 

Flake, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

Today, our real focus is ensuring the security of our missions 

abroad and the safety of our Foreign Service personnel. That has 

always been, and will remain, a priority of this committee. 

Having said that, I hope to have the support of my Republican 

colleagues for The Embassy Security Act I have introduced, named 

for Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty, 

who gave their lives in service to the Nation in Benghazi on September the 11th. The lessons we have learned from the tragedies 

in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Benghazi are emblematic of the 

broader issue we will increasingly face in the 21st century, and it 

will require our full, unequivocal, unwavering commitment to fully 

protect our embassies and those who serve this Nation abroad. 

We have studied what went wrong, we have looked back, and 

now it is time to look forward and do what needs to be done to prevent another tragedy in the future. After Benghazi, the ARB made 

29 recommendations to State and to Congress. While we must do 

our part in overseeing State’s implementation, we must also do our 

part to provide the resources and necessary authorizations to 

ensure full implementation. And we must make whatever investments are necessary to protect our embassies and our missions. 

Such investments are not an extravagance, they are not simply 

another budget item. We must strike the proper balance between 

sealing off vulnerabilities in high-threat areas and continuing to 

conduct vigorous and effective diplomacy that serves the national 

interests. 

The fact is, we can never have absolute security in an increasingly dangerous world unless we hermetically seal our diplomats in 

steel tanks. But, security alone is not our objective. At the end of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

the day, this is not an either/or choice. We need to address both 

the construction of new embassies that meet security needs, and 

we need to do what we can to ensure existing high-risk posts where 

we need our people to represent our interests and where new construction is not an option. 

The ARB stated it clearly, ‘‘The solution requires a more serious 

and sustained commitment from Congress to support State Department needs, which, in total, constitute a small percentage both of 

the full national budget and that spent for national security. One 

overall conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its

part to meet this challenge and provide necessary resources to the

State Department to address security risks and meet mission 

imperatives.’’

The bill I have introduced as part of the solution, ‘‘the serious 

and sustained commitment,’’ it takes the lessons we have learned 

and turns them into action. As I said, total security is next to 

impossible. Our diplomats cannot encase themselves in stone fortresses and remain effective. And disengagement is clearly not an 

option. So, the solution must be multifaceted. It must include 

enhanced physical security around our embassies and ensure that 

our diplomats are equipped with the language skills and security 

training necessary to keep them safe when they come out from 

behind the embassy walls to do their jobs. It also requires us to 

ensure that the persons protecting our missions are not selected 

simply because they are the cheapest available force. Where conditions require enhanced security, this bill gives State additional 

flexibility to contract guard forces based on the best value rather 

than the lowest bidder. 

It also means holding people accountable. When an employee 

exhibits unsatisfactory leadership that has serious security consequences, the Secretary must have the ability to act. This bill 

gives the Secretary greater flexibility in disciplinary actions in the 

future. It authorizes funding for key items identified by the 

Accountability Review Board on Benghazi, including embassy security and construction, Arabic language training, construction of a 

Foreign Affairs Security Training Center to consolidate and expand 

security training operations for State Department personnel so 

that, instead of piecing together our training and facilities up and 

down the East Coast, we streamline them in a single facility that 

can provide comprehensive training to more people. 

And lastly, the bill requires detailed reports from the Department on its progress in implementing all of the recommendations 

made by the Accountability Review Board, and specifically requires 

the identification of, and reporting of, security at high-risk, highthreat facilities. 

At the end of the day, if we fail to act, if we fail to address these 

issues, there will be another incident. The responsibility is ours, 

and the failure to act will be ours, as well. This is a time for solutions. The safety of those who serve this Nation abroad is in our 

hands. 

With that, let me turn to my distinguished ranking colleague, 

who has worked with us to have this hearing, Senator Corker, for 

his opening statement. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

for your efforts to focus on the issue of embassy security and, candidly, just the way you conduct our efforts here in Foreign Relations in a bipartisan way. It is much appreciated. 

And I want to thank the State Department for bringing forth the 

kind of witnesses that, you know, carry the weight on this issue 

that matters to all of us. So, thank you both for being here. 

We have a procedural issue that is occurring at 11 o’clock that 

is semi-important. I may be stepping in and out on the phone, here, 

before that vote. But, I want to thank you both for being here. I 

know our offices have been in contact with you. 

And let me just express a couple of concerns. I do not imagine 

there is anybody here that does not respect what our Foreign Service officers around the world do. And I think we all know, especially after what has happened in Libya, the threat that they are 

under. And we know those threats are taking place all over the 

world. 

I know that the State Department has requested funding for 

numbers of new facilities that take many, many years to build, and 

yet, at the same time, I know we have people today in Peshawar 

and Harat, you know, where we just came from, or at least generally came from, that are under a lot of duress now and, candidly, 

you know, have some security issues. So, I do hope, as we move 

along, we will figure out a way to balance between some of the 

longer term projects that, candidly, are taking place not under very 

serious threat with some of the short-term needs that we have. 

And I know there is also some focus on building a training facility, which I know is very expensive, and yet we are aware that 

maybe there are ways of doing that training in ways that do not 

require, you know, spending hundreds of millions of dollars to build 

it. 

So, I just hope we will move along in an appropriate way. And 

I certainly do not want to rehash the past. I think the chairman 

knows we have tried to move away from some of the things that 

have happened in the past. But, I would like for somebody to 

explain to me, at some point, this ARB that we did have. I know 

we have four employees that were involved in, you know, some reporting on the ARBs. They are still on paid leave, and nothing has 

occurred. And I would like, at some point, to understand how we 

bring closure to that issue. 

But, again, thank you both for being here. I thank you for your 

service to our country. And I hope, in a bipartisan way, we will 

move ahead in a way that certainly does the immediate things that 

are necessary to make sure that our Foreign Service officers are 

safe. 

But, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I am pleased to introduce Bill Miller, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for High-Threat Posts, a new position created 

post-Benghazi. And we also have with us Gregory Starr, the Acting 

Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the 

Diplomatic Security Service. These two officials sit at the nexus of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

policy development and management, and we look forward to hearing their perspective on this legislation and on the best way to secure our embassies and keep our personnel as safe as possible. 

With our thanks for both of you being here, we will begin with 

your opening statements. Your full statements will be included in 

the record. We ask you to synthesize it in around 5 minutes or so, 

so we can have members engage with you in a dialogue. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. STARR, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, AND 

DIRECTOR OF THE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. STARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker. 

I want to thank you for your invitation to appear here today to discuss the future of embassy and diplomatic security. 

We appreciate, and we share, your commitment to enhanced 

security, as evidenced in the recently introduced Chris Stevens, 

Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, Glen Doherty Embassy Security and 

Personnel Protection Act of 2013. 

The attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities last September, and 

subsequent attacks this year, as well, against diplomatic facilities 

and personnel remind us every day that the world is a dangerous 

place for diplomacy. Unfortunately, this is nothing new. Being on 

the front lines of U.S. national security has always been inherently 

risky. However, we strive to mitigate this risk to the maximum 

extent possible. 

The fact remains that we will not, even with the most willing 

and capable government partners—as we have in many places 

around the world—we will not stop terrorists or extremists from 

attacking us in every instance. Rather, we must carefully balance 

this risk against the value of pursuing our national interests in 

these various countries. We have learned some very hard and painful lessons out of Benghazi. We are already acting on those lessons. 

The State Department carries on the business of the American 

Government and its people in 284 locations, many in challenging 

security environments where key U.S. national security interests 

are at stake. Every day, the Department works to protect our people and missions by constantly assessing threats and our security 

posture overseas. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security advances American interests 

and foreign policy by protecting people, property, and information. 

We do this by maintaining a security program that includes analyzing the threats, managing the security situation, and mitigating 

the risks. 

DS constantly researches, monitors, and analyzes threats against 

Americans, our diplomatic facilities, and U.S. diplomatic personnel. 

This information, along with trend analysis and case studies of 

political violence, terrorist acts, and crime, form the basis of the 

threat assessments that we use that are provided to Department 

senior managers to support the operational and policy decisionmaking process. From this analysis, we determine what additional 

security measures, whether they be short term or long term, should 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

be taken to mitigate the potential threats against our diplomatic 

assets. 

From DS analysts in Washington, DC, monitoring the threats 

against our posts to our regional security officers abroad managing 

the security programs at these posts, we strive to provide the most 

secure platform for conducting American diplomacy. Building on 

the recommendations of the independent Benghazi Accountability 

Review Board, the interagency assessment teams that were sent 

out, and our own considerable experience and expertise, the 

Department is diligently working to improve the way we protect 

our diplomats, not only at our highest-threat posts, but at all of our 

facilities around the world. 

Thanks, in large part, to your generous support in 2013 and the 

continuing resolution, progress is well underway. Pursuant to the 

recommendations of the independent Benghazi ARB, we are training more U.S. Foreign Affairs community personnel to deal with 

high-threat and high-risk environments through our Foreign 

Affairs counterthreat course. We are expanding the duration of DS 

high-threat tactical training courses, and incorporating elements of 

that training into other DS courses so that, regardless of a diplomatic securities special agent assignment, we have a flexible cadre 

of agents trained to operate in varying security environments overseas. 

We are hiring 151 new security professionals this and next fiscal 

year—that is 151 total, not each year—many of whom will directly 

serve at, or provide support to, our high-threat, high-risk posts. We 

are also working very closely with the Department of Defense to 

expand the Marine Security Guard Program, as well as to enhance 

the availability of forces to respond, in extremis, to threatened U.S. 

personnel and facilities. 

We recently worked with DOD and the U.S. Marine Corps to elevate personal security—the security that we provide for our people 

overseas—as a primary mission of the Marine Corps security 

guards. Each of these efforts enhances the Department’s ability to 

supplement, as necessary, the host government’s measures in fulfilling its obligations under international law to protect U.S. diplomats and consular property and personnel. The increased security funds you have provided will also support our colleagues at the 

Bureau of Overseas Building Operations in providing facilities for 

additional Marine security guard detachments, as well as the construction of new facilities and security-upgrade projects at some of 

our most critical posts. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security realizes our work in securing 

our posts and protecting our people will never be done. We take 

great pride in our accomplishments. We apply the lessons learned, 

and we look forward to working with Congress on embassy 

security. 

I recognize that my opening remarks are brief, because I wanted 

to allow plenty of time for questions, to answer your specific questions. I will be glad to take those questions after you have heard 

from my colleague Bill Miller, and he will provide his remarks at 

this point. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Corker. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:]

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. STARR

Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished 

committee members. Thank you for your invitation to appear here today to discuss 

the future of diplomatic security. We appreciate and share your commitment to enhanced embassy security as evidenced in the recently introduced ‘‘Chris Stevens, 

Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security and Personnel Protection Act of 2013.’’

Today’s Diplomacy 

The attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities last September, and subsequent attacks 

this year against diplomatic facilities and personnel, remind us that the world 

remains a dangerous place for diplomacy. Unfortunately, this is nothing new. Being 

on the front lines of U.S. national security has always been inherently risky; however, we strive to mitigate this risk to the maximum extent possible. The fact 

remains that we will not, even with the most willing and capable governments as 

our partners, stop terrorists or extremists from attacking us in every instance. 

Rather, we must carefully balance this risk against the value of pursuing our national interests. We have learned some very hard and painful lessons in Benghazi. 

We are already acting on them. 

The State Department carries on the business of the American Government and 

its people at 284 locations, many in challenging security environments where key 

U.S. national security interests are at stake. Every day, the Department works to 

protect our people and missions by constantly assessing threats and our security 

posture. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) advances American interests and 

foreign policy by protecting people, property, and information. We do this by maintaining a security program that includes analyzing threats, managing the security 

situation, and mitigating risks. 

Analyzing Threats 

DS constantly researches, monitors, and analyzes threats against Americans, our 

diplomatic facilities, and U.S. diplomatic personnel. This information, along with 

trend analyses and case studies of political violence, terrorist acts, and crime form 

the basis of threat assessments that are provided to Department senior managers 

to support operational and policy decisionmaking. From this analysis, we determine 

what additional security measures, short-term or long-term, should be taken to mitigate potential threats against our diplomatic assets. 

Managing the Security Environment and Mitigating Threats 

From DS analysts in Washington, DC, monitoring threats against our posts to 

Regional Security Officers abroad managing security programs at those posts, we 

strive to provide the most secure platform for conducting American diplomacy. 

Building on the recommendations of the independent Benghazi Accountability 

Review Board, the Interagency Security Assessment Teams, and our own considerable experience and expertise, the Department is diligently working to improve the 

way we protect our diplomats not only at high-threat, high-risk posts but at all of 

our facilities worldwide. 

Thanks in large part to your generous support in the FY 2013 Continuing Resolution, progress is well underway. 

Pursuant to the recommendations of the independent Benghazi ARB, DS plans to 

train more of the U.S. foreign affairs community to deal with high-risk environments through our Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat course. We are expanding the 

duration of the DS high-threat tactical training course and incorporating elements 

of that training into other DS courses so that regardless of a DS special agent’s 

assignment, we have a flexible cadre of agents trained to operate in varying security 

environments. 

DS is hiring 151 new security professionals this and the next fiscal year, many 

of whom will directly serve at or provide support to our high-threat, high-risk posts. 

We are also working very closely with the Department of Defense (DOD) to expand 

the Marine Security Guard program, as well as to enhance the availability of forces 

to respond in extremis to threatened U.S. personnel and facilities. We recently 

worked with DOD and the U.S. Marine Corps to elevate personnel security as a primary mission of the Marine Security Guards. Each of these efforts enhances the 

Department’s ability to supplement, as necessary, the host government’s measures 

in fulfilling its obligations under international law to protect U.S. diplomatic and 

consular property and personnel. 

The increased security funds you have provided will also support our colleagues 

at the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations in providing facilities for additional 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7

Marine Security Guard Detachments, as well as the construction of new facilities 

and security upgrade projects at some of our most critical posts. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security realizes our work in securing our posts and 

protecting our people will never be done. We take great pride in our accomplishments, apply lessons learned, and look forward to working with Congress on 

embassy security. I will be glad to answer any questions you have.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL A. MILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HIGH–THREAT POSTS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MILLER. Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished committee members. Thank you also 

for your invitation to appear here today to discuss embassy 

security. 

I, too, appreciate and share your commitment to enhanced 

embassy security, as evidenced by your recently introduced Chris 

Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy 

Security and Personnel Protection Act of 2013. 

Threats and attacks against our diplomatic facilities and personnel have been a concern since the inception of embassy security, 

almost 100 years ago. To counter these global threats, the Office 

of the Chief Special Agent, the forerunner of Diplomatic Security, 

was formed in 1916. It was not, however, until 1985, in the aftermath of the Beirut bombings, that Diplomatic Security became a 

Bureau within the State Department. 

The DS mandate was solidified when Congress passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. At the 

same time, I was preparing to leave the Marine Corps, where I had 

my position as a Marine Corps officer, and I wanted to continue my 

service to the U.S. Government. And the mission envisioned of DS 

was part of a team—or, demonstrated the part of a team that I 

particularly wanted to join. 

In 1987, I became a DS special agent, and since then, I have 

devoted my 26-year career to fulfilling the mission of DS; that is, 

providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of foreign 

policy. 

Early in my career, I was a part of the Secretary of State’s protective detail. I have also served assignments in our Washington 

field office as the Chief of the Security and Law Enforcement 

Training Division, as the Chief of Counterintelligence Investigations, and as the Director of Contingency Operations. I have managed security programs as a regional security officer, also known 

as an RSO, in Iraq, Pakistan, Jerusalem, the Philippines, and in 

Egypt. 

To demonstrate the depth of my experience and that of a DS special agent, I would like to highlight a few of my accomplishments. 

As an RSO, I dealt daily with the possible terrorist acts that 

impacted the lives of Americans, to include the kidnapping of 

American missionaries in the Philippines, as well as participating 

in the capture of Ramzi Yousef, one of the main perpetrators of the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing. 

When the United States returned to Iraq in 2003, I was asked 

to serve as the first RSO and to manage the volatile security environment as we reestablished our diplomatic presence. Most 

recently overseas, I was the RSO in Cairo, Egypt, during the Arab 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8

Spring. It is an experience that informs my decisionmaking as I 

work to ensure adequate security resources during the ongoing 

transition in Egypt. 

After the September 2012 attacks on our facilities in Libya, 

Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt and Sudan, the Department reviewed 

its security posture and created my position, the Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High-Threat Posts, 

also known as HTP, along with providing a staff of security professionals to support high-threat, high-risk posts. The Department 

assessed our diplomatic missions worldwide and weighed criteria to 

determine which posts are designated as high-threat, high-risk. 

And there are now 27 posts which fall under this designation. This 

designation is not a static process, and the list will be reviewed 

annually, at a bare minimum, and more frequently, when needed. 

As emergent conditions substantially change, for better or for 

worst, at any post worldwide, high-threat, high-risk designations 

will shift, and missions will be added or deleted from this category. 

The high-threat protection directorate that I lead oversees the 

security operations in these high-threat, high-risk posts around

the world. We coordinate strategic and operational planning and 

drive innovation across the broad spectrum of DS missions and 

responsibilities. We continue to work closely, also, with the regional 

bureaus to ensure that everyone has visibility of the security 

threats at our posts. 

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for HTP, I am responsible

for evaluating, managing, and mitigating the security threats, as 

well as directing resource requirements at high-threat diplomatic 

missions. I closely follow developments, continually assess our 

security posture, and take all possible steps to mitigate threats and 

vulnerabilities. 

While the Department has created a position for high-threat, 

high-risk post designations, we must continue to focus on embassy 

security worldwide. I coordinate closely with my colleagues in Diplomatic Security throughout the Department and the interagency 

to ensure that the threats and risk-mitigation strategies are shared 

globally. As you have said, we can never truly eliminate all the 

risks facing our dedicated personnel working overseas who advance 

U.S. interests. However, as the Department has said, we place the 

highest priority on the security of our personnel and will continue 

to take the steps necessary, which, in some instances, include 

extraordinary measures to provide for their safety. 

I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to appear 

before the committee today and discuss the future of our embassy 

security. I’m available to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL MILLER

Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished 

committee members. Thank you for your invitation to appear here today to discuss 

embassy security. We appreciate and share your commitment to enhanced embassy 

security, as evidenced by the recently introduced ‘‘Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, 

Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security and Personnel Protection Act 

of 2013.’’

Threats and attacks against our diplomatic facilities and personnel have been a 

concern since the inception of embassy security almost 100 years ago. To counter 

these global threats, the Office of the Chief Special Agent, the forerunner of diploFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9

matic security was formed in 1916. It was not until 1985, in the aftermath of the 

Beirut bombings, that Diplomatic Security (DS) became a Bureau within the State 

Department. The DS mandate was solidified when Congress passed the Omnibus 

Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. When I was preparing to leave 

my position as a Marine Corps officer and wanted to continue my service to the U.S. 

Government, the mission and vision of DS was a team that I wanted to join. In 

1987, I became a DS Special Agent. Since then, I have devoted my 25-year career 

to fulfilling the mission of DS: providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of foreign policy. 

Early in my career, I was part of the Secretary of State’s protective detail. I have 

also served in our Washington field office, as the Chief of Security Training, Chief 

of Counterintelligence Investigations, and Director of Contingency Operations. I 

have managed security programs as a Regional Security Officer, also known as an 

RSO, in Iraq, Pakistan, Jerusalem, the Philippines, and Egypt. To demonstrate the 

depth of my experience and that of a DS Special Agent, I would like to highlight 

a few of my accomplishments. As an RSO, I dealt daily with possible terrorist acts 

that impacted the lives of Americans, including the kidnapping of Americans in the 

Philippines, as well as the capture of Ramzi Yousef, one of the main perpetrators 

of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. When the United States returned to Iraq 

in 2003, I was asked to serve as the first RSO to manage the volatile security environment as we reestablished our diplomatic presence. Most recently overseas, I was 

the RSO in Egypt during the Arab Spring; an experience that informs my decisionmaking as I work to ensure adequate security resources during the ongoing transition in Egypt. 

After the September 2012 attacks on our facilities in Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, 

Sudan, and Egypt, the Department reviewed its security posture and created my 

position, the Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary of High Threat Posts, 

also known as HTP, along with a staff of security professional to support highthreat, high-risk posts. The Department assessed our diplomatic missions worldwide 

and weighed criteria to determine which posts are designated as high-threat, highrisk—there are now 27 posts which fall under this designation. This designation is 

not a static process and the list will be reviewed annually, at a minimum, and more 

frequently as needed. As emergent conditions substantially change, for better or for 

worse, at any post worldwide, high-threat, high-risk designations will shift, and missions will be added or deleted from this category. The HTP Directorate I oversee 

will lead the security operations in these high-threat, high-risk posts around the 

world, coordinate strategic and operational planning, and drive innovation across 

the broad spectrum of DS missions and responsibilities. We continue to work closely 

with the Regional Bureaus to ensure that everyone has visibility of the security 

threats at our posts. 

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for HTP, I am responsible for evaluating, managing, and mitigating the security threats, as well as directing resource requirements at high-threat diplomatic missions. I closely follow developments, continually 

assess our security posture, and take all possible steps to mitigate threats and 

vulnerabilities. While the Department has created a position for high-threat post 

designations, we must continue to focus on embassy security worldwide. I coordinate 

closely with my colleagues in DS, the Department, and the interagency to ensure 

the threats and risk mitigation strategies are shared globally. 

We can never truly eliminate all the risks facing our dedicated personnel working 

overseas to advance U.S. interests. However, as the Department has said, we place 

the highest priority on the security of our personnel and will continue to take

steps, which in some instances includes extraordinary measures, to provide for their 

safety. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and 

to discuss the future of embassy security. I am available to answer any questions 

you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your testimony. And let 

me start the first round of questions, here. 

You know, I have heard from some of my colleagues that suggest 

that what we need is just greater oversight at State, but we do not 

need any money. The question is, Can you, under the existing 

budget, with no additional revenues, protect, throughout the world, 

and particularly at high-risk posts, the lives of those who are 

assigned to the diplomatic corps representing us worldwide? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10

Mr. STARR. Senator, thank you for going right to the heart of 

what is really important to us, in many ways: giving us the resources to address this. Two parts to this answer. 

The 2013 Continuing Resolution level of funding, plus the generosity of Congress under the increased security proposal, I believe 

gives us the proper level of resources that we can utilize effectively 

now, this year and our 2014 budget request, which essentially rolls 

both of those pots of money into our request, as well. I believe that 

that amount of money gives us the ability to move forward and do 

the things that we need to do. 

The second part of that question is, of course, as all of us have 

mentioned, no, we cannot guarantee that we are going to protect 

every single person, because we are working in highly, highly dangerous areas, in many countries. But, that level of funding, that 

level of resources, combined with the types of actions that we are 

taking, gives us a level of confidence that we have adequate and 

appropriate resources to address the types of threats that we need 

to address. 

Now, it does not mean that we are going to have equivalent levels of security across the board. We are going to prioritize where 

we put our resources—manpower, equipment, technical equipment, 

where we build the new embassies—so we will obviously have 

places where we have lower levels of resources. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. So, let me——

Mr. STARR. But, we will do it to the best we can, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get is, is that, if I zeroed 

out your account in the next year’s budget, what would you do? 

Mr. STARR. If——

The CHAIRMAN. If I zeroed out—if you did not roll over what, as 

you described, the largesse of the Congress, what would you do? 

Mr. STARR. We would prioritize very heavily——

The CHAIRMAN. But, you are not going to be able to secure people 

across the globe——

Mr. STARR. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Understanding the context of

security. 

Secondly, if I cut it in half, what would you do? 

Mr. STARR. I think that would cause a reassessment of where we 

could actually put people, sir. I do not think we would be able to 

stay in the highest-threat locations, where the U.S. national interests are most important. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, there is—so, when the ARB identified—it is 

number 10 of their many recommendations—identified $2.2 billion 

as an appropriate funding level for the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program, which the President’s FY14 budget requested this 

amount, it was not just a number from the sky, it was based upon 

an analysis of the Accountability Review Board about what your 

challenges are, what your needs are, and what you can realistically 

administer over a period of time. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir, that is very fair. 

The CHAIRMAN. And so from a security standpoint, do you have 

a sense of how many new facilities are needed, particularly in highthreat, high-risk locations? 

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Mr. STARR. Sir, within the high-threat list of 27 countries, we 

have a certain amount of them that have gotten new facilities, but 

there still are about 15 of those facilities that we do not have

the proper level of what we call ‘‘post-Inman buildings.’’ There

are other places around the world where we do not have those 

facilities. 

Going back to about 2000, after the 1998 bombings in Dar es 

Salaam and Nairobi, we made a calculation, which we stand to, to 

this day, which is that we needed approximately 175 new facilities 

around the world to be brought up to the highest level of security 

standards. In the past 13 years, we have constructed about 80 to 

90 of those facilities. From 1988 to 1992, under the Inman era, we 

constructed 22 of those facilities. So, we are at about the 110 mark 

out of 175 facilities that we would like to continue working diligently to replace and put new embassies that meet blast standards, 

have their proper level of standoff, as mandated by Congress, have 

the antiram protection, and have the level of protection that we 

seek for our people overseas. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, What are the factors that would 

require the construction of a new facility versus a security upgrade 

at an existing facility? 

Mr. STARR. Primary factor, sir, is that, in many places around 

the world, we do not have facilities that have setback. We cannot 

retrofit many of our buildings to withstand blast or direct attack 

without the ability to move to a new location, acquire setback, and 

build a facility that meets the blast standards. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, finally, where new construction is not an 

option because of the inability to either secure land, find a suitable 

location, or for other reasons, how does the Department seek to 

mitigate risks at high-threat, high-risk facilities? 

Mr. STARR. Many of those locations, we have withdrawn our families, we have cut down and moved our staffing levels to only the 

personnel that we absolutely need, we have worked closely with 

host governments, in many cases, and asked them to close off 

streets around our embassies so that we can try to maintain some 

setback. Many of them have done that for several years, but also 

look to us eventually to move our facilities so they can reopen their 

streets. We work closely in training our personnel and then trying 

to train host-country forces in antiterrorism capabilities. 

It is a variety of things, sir. But, the real one, where we really 

are faced with facilities that do not meet our security standards, 

we work with the host government to try to increase our setback, 

put up additional barriers, and harden the facilities, and then 

make sure that we have only the people necessary, at the post, that 

we need. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, to recap, money is a consideration, here, in 

terms of your ability to say to this committee, ‘‘We are doing as 

best as we can in order to secure our people across the globe.’’

Mr. STARR. I could not say it better, sir. Yes; absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

And then, finally, when we look at new embassy construction, I 

understand it is prioritized on the basis of security. Is that a correct statement, or is that an incorrect statement? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Mr. STARR. The primary driver is security, sir. We provide a list, 

with the Overseas Buildings Office, of our highest priorities. Within that list, as we understand, that obtaining real estate and property deals and then building a facility are a long-range and very 

difficult in certain places, OBO has certain flexibility, but we have 

reinforced with OBO, most recently as a month and a half ago, that 

we want them to relook at our highest-threat posts on the highthreat list and determine whether or not we can make significant 

progress on them. 

I can give you one example, sir. After 30 years of trying to find 

land for a new facility in Beirut and start the construction of a new 

facility, we believe we are going to be successful in the next couple 

of years. It looks like we have a land deal, and it looks like we are 

going to be able to actually replace the facility in Beirut that we 

have been trying to replace for many, many years. 

The CHAIRMAN. Great. 

And, for those of us who are not acronym proficient, OBO is? 

Mr. STARR. I am sorry, sir. It is the Office of Overseas Buildings 

Operations. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you. And thank 

you both for coming here. 

And I know the chairman has asked, sort of, a line of questions 

that—which I expected that he would. And when we had the hearing—I guess, the first hearing, with the leadership that put forth 

the ARB, I mean, immediately they were talking about money. And 

it seems like whenever there is a problem, that is the first place 

we go. And I understand we may need to look at that. 

At the same time, as we look at your plans, I know you currently have $1.4 billion, and you have asked for $800 million more. And 

I see that we are spending a huge amount of money on facilities 

at The Hague, Oslo, Port Moresby. And even in places where we 

have construction underway, like Beirut, the new Embassy will not 

be ready for another 6 years. And, at the same time—so, this is a 

lot of money that is being spent in places that, candidly, the security issues are not necessarily urgent, like we have in some of the 

places I mentioned earlier, in Pakistan and Sudan. 

So, it just seems to me that, from the standpoint of the immediate security issues that our personnel has, and all of us, including you, wanting them to be safe, our priorities are not aligned 

with what it is we are hoping to do for our outstanding Foreign 

Service officers. And I just wish you would respond to that. 

Mr. STARR. Sir, I appreciate the point that you are making. And, 

in very many ways, on an everyday basis, we are trying to address 

the immediate security concerns, through programs like increased 

training of our personnel and our officers; lessons that we learned 

from Benghazi, like, you know, How do we increase our fire safety 

awareness and how do we provide safety?—or, How do we provide 

countermeasures to fire as a weapon? In those places where we 

cannot get new facilities, we are doing security upgrades and working our host governments, to the best that we can. 

But, I think it is clear that, while we are doing the immediate 

and short-term needs that we need to be addressing, we are also 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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asking for the ability to address the long-term needs so that, as we 

move forward in the future, we put ourselves, overall, in a better 

position. 

In 1997, our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were 

essentially rated as low-threat posts. We did not know, at that 

point, that we were going to be seeing the phenomenon of terrorism 

working outside of the small Middle East number of posts that we 

were mostly concerned with. 

Today, we know that global terrorism is exactly that: global. It 

is a worldwide phenomenon. We do not know where we are going 

to be, a decade from now. We did not foresee the Arab Spring rise. 

We did not really foresee, in many cases, the challenges that we 

would be facing through the Middle East. 

So, our best answer, on a long-term basis, is, while we are 

addressing the short-term, immediate needs that we have to for our 

personnel and their safety, is also to address the long-term needs 

so that we put ourselves, overall, in a better position. 

As I said, when we looked at our facilities from a vulnerability 

standpoint, back in 2000, we looked at it and said we need probably 175 new facilities. The facility in Oslo does not have any setback. It has no blast resistance. It is not bullet resistant. It provides a very low level of safety for our personnel. I hope to be able 

to replace even facilities in countries like that, as we go along, for 

the future. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I mean, is the answer yes or no? Are you going to use some of this $800 million to harden and deal with 

some of the immediate issues? Yes or no? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. We are going to try to address our immediate issues and our long-term issues. But, it is a combination of 

both. But, certainly our immediate issues come first. We sent out 

combined State Department and military ISAT teams to look at our 

highest threat-level posts in the aftermath of Benghazi. We have 

dedicated an immense amount of resources to trying to upgrade 

even further those places that we have on our high-threat list, and 

continue to do that. 

Senator CORKER. What about the training facility? I have

received some calls from folks, other Senators about this. I understand training now takes place in facilities that are already built, 

though I have not visited them, personally. You can share with me 

your own experiences—but, why would we go ahead and—you 

know, at a time when we need capital to harden facilities to deal 

with some of the longer term needs you are talking about—why 

would we be expending so much money to build a new training 

facility, when apparently those needs are being taken care of in 

another existing facility? 

Mr. STARR. Thank you for that question, Senator. This is a question that is very close to my heart. 

We are currently using a leased facility that is, on weekends, a 

racetrack facility in West Virginia. We use it 5 days a week. We 

can train approximately 2,500 Foreign Service officers a year in 

what we call ‘‘fact training,’’ the types of training that—not for DS 

agents like Bill and myself, but for regular Foreign Service officers. 

We give them high-speed training in driving vehicles, antiram 

training. We give them training—basic firearms training on how to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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make weapons safe, first-aid training. We expose them to explosives so that the first time they hear a bomb going off, they can 

understand that, if they have survived it, what their next responsibility is—you know, deal with themselves and then deal with others and first aid. This level of fact training, we have found through 

the years, has definitely saved lives overseas and prepared our people to serve in the environments that we are sending them. 

Regretfully, the 2,300 people that I can train per year does not 

come close—does not even meet the number of people that we have 

at our high-threat posts, alone. We have certain of our high-threat 

posts where we can only give our people a 4-hour online course and 

say, ‘‘Please take this course.’’

So, the capacity of the current facility that we are leasing in 

West Virginia cannot meet our training needs. Our long-term goal, 

given where we are putting people out overseas, is to train every 

single Foreign Service officer every 5 years on the types of hardskills security training that we believe Foreign Service officers 

need; and, in many cases, their adult family members, as well. 

So, the current facility does not meet our requirements, does not 

even meet our highest threat-level requirements, and is a leased 

facility that, at some point, may not be available to us. 

So, we are seeking to put, in one place, close to where we have 

our partners, the Marine Corps, military, intelligence community, 

and the rest of the Foreign Service training apparatus—we are 

seeking to build a hard-skills training center where we can put 8 

to 10,000 people a year through this type of training. We believe 

that that will give us the ability—in addition to hardening our 

facilities, the most important side—training our people before they 

go overseas. 

Senator CORKER. And if I could just ask one last question. You 

know, we have talked at a 30,000-foot level here about capital 

expenditures. And I know we are going to be in much more detail 

between our staffs. I mean, we now have talked a little bit about 

training, and I understand how important that is, and we certainly 

plan to get into more details with you there as we move ahead. 

I guess the last piece is, then, you know, you require people within the State Department to execute. And again, I know we have 

had a situation where the State Department has reviewed functions. We had four personnel that have been put on leave and are 

still being paid. And, just for what it is worth, it does feel that 

there is a degree of lack of accountability, to put it nicely. And I 

just wonder if you might address that, also. Because you build 

great facilities, you train well, but, if people do not execute and 

there is not that accountability, we still have breakdowns and people are in situations that they should not be in. So, could you 

address that issue for us today? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. 

I think my first answer would be—is that Bill Miller, sitting next 

to me, and my coming back after 4 years at the United Nations and 

29 years in Diplomatic Security, there is nobody that takes this 

responsibility more seriously than we do. 

The people that we manage and the staffs that we have, the 

agents that we train, the security protective specialists, the engineers, the people that we have in Diplomatic Security are dedicated 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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and ready to give their lives to protecting our people overseas. And 

I will simply say that you will not find anybody more ready to take 

the responsibility or make the decisions that have to be made than 

myself or Bill Miller or the rest of my senior staff in Diplomatic 

Security. 

I understand that there are still questions about the four individuals. I was not here at the time. I do understand that it is complex, 

because there are sets of rules and procedures within the Foreign 

Service about disciplining people. It is my clear understanding that 

this entire issue is at the Secretary of State’s level, that he is getting recommendations on how to deal with this, and he will, finally, 

make the decision on what is going to be the outcome with the four 

people there. 

I will tell you, sir, that three of those four individuals, I know 

well and have worked with closely. These are people that have 

given their careers to Diplomatic Security, as well, and the security 

of the Department of State. And I have a great deal of admiration 

for them. It does not excuse the fact that we had a terrible tragedy 

in Benghazi. And I think that the Secretary and his staff will make 

the proper decisions on the disposition of those cases. 

But, I do want to tell you that that is the same management 

team that was in place when our embassies were attacked in Cairo, 

in Tunisia, in Khartoum, all through the years that we have had 

multiple attacks in Yemen, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq. Those people performed admirably. And it is my hope that their entire career 

is not blotted by one single action, because they are, in many ways, 

as dedicated as we are. 

But, I will tell you that Bill and I will do our absolute best, and 

we will bear whatever responsibility needs to be taken. 

Senator CORKER. Well, listen, I thank you for that. And I just 

would say that, look, I do not think anybody here is on a witch 

hunt. And, candidly, I could not pick these four individuals out of 

a lineup. I do not know that I have ever even met them. I do think 

it is important for the culture of the State Department and, candidly, for the U.S. Government in general, that either, you know, 

it be stated that these people made mistakes that should not have 

been made and are held accountable, or not. And again, whatever 

is the right decision, I think we will all be there. But, this sort of 

vague place that we are in probably needs to end soon. 

And again, I thank you for your response, and I hope the Secretary of State will deal with this quickly, because it has been a 

long time. But, I thank you, and I look forward to working with 

you and the chairman as we move ahead. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Corker. 

Because this is—I take this obligation very seriously. At least on 

my watch, to the extent that I can, I am not going to have anybody 

exposed and at risk as a result of inaction by this committee. So, 

I am going to, at times here, engage in a followup so that we have 

a sequential record that makes the facts. There are two things that 

Senator Corker said and you responded to that I want to get a little clarity, so I will hope my colleagues will indulge me as I move 

to them next. 

He asked you a very good question—you know, immediate needs 

versus long-term needs. And you responded that you are working 

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on immediate needs. Of course, ‘‘immediate needs’’ means to the 

extent that you can mitigate what exists at a post, because if you 

do not have a setback, you are not going to be able to mitigate that 

fully until you have a new site and a new construction. If you do 

not have a setback, and you are talking about hardening—OK, fine, 

but hardening without a setback has limited capabilities. 

So, when you say, in the balance between what some may view 

as the long term, which you described as, hopefully, getting to a 

point in which all of our locations are as best protected under the 

threats that we could envision today, regardless of where they are 

located in the world, because we do not know where the next highrisk posts will be, where the movement of a terrorist activity will 

take place, and then we will all regret that, well, we did not think 

that an Oslo meant that much, by way of example. So, when you 

say you are mitigating, you are mitigating—correct me if I am 

wrong, here, and I would like the record to reflect whatever it is 

that—what are you mitigating in the short term—what are you 

capable of mitigating in the short term if you have an embassy or 

other site that is not fully living to the specifications of what you 

and the Congress have devised as what is a secure location? 

Mr. STARR. Mr. Chairman, what we can mitigate in those locations is, first, a function of what our analysis, in terms of the 

threat and the overall situation in the country, tells us. In a place 

like Oslo today, we have a full-functioning staff and a fully functioning embassy, despite the fact that we do not have a setback or 

a secure facility. The reason we can do that is that we have excellent cooperation from the host government, we do not have information that indicates to us that we are running a tremendously 

high risk by leaving them in this facility for the time being, and 

we have national security imperatives that we are carrying out, 

Foreign Service officers working on different things every single 

day. 

But, to give you another example, sir, is—in Cairo today—and 

Cairo is a—not an Inman building; it is a pre-Inman building, but 

quite a robust facility—when the situation changed dramatically in 

Cairo, when we saw specific threats, when we saw the social 

upheaval happening on the ground—in the last several weeks, we 

have evacuated what we call ‘‘ordered departure.’’ We have moved 

out all of our families and we have moved out all nonessential personnel, nonemergency personnel. And these are the types of things 

that we can do to mitigate threats, where we do not have a facility 

that necessarily meets, you know, the highest level of standards. 

There are things that we can do, in terms of, as I say, asking 

the host government to block off streets for us, if they will cooperate——

The CHAIRMAN. I gather that. I do not want to cut you short, 

but——

Mr. STARR. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What I am trying to get to is Senator Corker’s concern—or at least it seems to me his concern, as 

expressed at various times now, and today as well—between the 

immediate and the long term. To the extent—Is this a fair statement? To the extent that you can mitigate something in the immediate term, you are seeking to do that. Is that a fair statement? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Mr. STARR. Absolutely, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, that does not mean that mitigation of the 

immediate is the desired goal, because, in fact, you may not be able 

to mitigate beyond—if you do not have a setback, if you do not 

have a hardened facility, if you do not have all the other elements 

that are in play for what we consider a fully secured facility. Is 

that a fair statement? 

Mr. STARR. Exactly. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, that gives us a little balance as 

to what the immediate versus the long term means. 

With reference to the question of employees, I agree. I agree in 

accountability, and I agree in performance. Now, I read the ARB’s 

recommendation, number 23, which said that, ‘‘The Board is of the 

view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior officials in relation to the security incident under review should 

be a potential basis for discipline recommendations by future 

Accountability Boards, and would recommend a revision of Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this 

end.’’ In essence, when they were here, as well, and testified to this 

question, they said, ‘‘Under the existing statutory authority, there 

are limitations.’’ What is the proof point that you have to have in 

order to discipline somebody? 

So, I do not know if you have had the opportunity to look at section 203 of the legislation that I have promoted, S. 980, that I 

believe satisfied the ARB’s recommendation in that regard, which 

would then give the Secretary the authority to fire individuals who 

have exhibited unsatisfactory leadership in relation to a security 

incident. Do you believe that that section would give the Secretary 

that ability? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir, I do. I believe it is important to give that 

additional flexibility, and I think that helps us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Cardin, thank you for your forbearance. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just 

concur with your observation. 

Our committee has a very important responsibility for oversight. 

And I appreciate the two witnesses that are here. It is our responsibility to review the steps that you have taken and resources that 

you have. But, we also have a responsibility to make sure that 

tools are available for embassy security. And that is a responsibility of the entire Senate. The Appropriations Committee has the 

responsibility on the resources. This committee has the responsibility as to whether the policies are right. And I just want to 

applaud the chairman for S. 980. I think that gives us a way to 

make sure that you have the adequate tools in order to manage the 

security of our embassies. And the chairman’s followup questions, 

I think, underscored some of those issues, and I thank you very 

much, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue, but also 

recognizing the dual responsibility we have on oversight and to 

make sure that the tools and resources are available. 

I want to follow up on facilities, because I have had a chance to 

visit many of our embassies. And there is a common theme, except 

for the very new embassies, when you are able to talk frankly with 

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ties, that they could be better. And I know that you did a review 

and a list was compiled several years ago, and I know that we have 

also made progress. And I expect that this list is updated by circumstances in country, et cetera. But, is it time for us to do 

another evaluation, globally, of our facilities, recognizing that circumstances have changed? 

I, personally, believe we need to do a better job. Oslo is an important ally, a friend. I have been to that embassy. I understand that 

it is not a high-risk area, but they should have adequate facilities, 

based upon the security needs and efficiency factors. And, in many 

embassies around the world, the United States does not have the 

combination of space, efficiency, and security that is ideal for us to 

carry out our mission. 

Mr. STARR. Sir, I believe that is an accurate statement. It is, in 

many cases, more than just security, but certainly security is our 

overriding factor at this point. But, I believe you are accurate when 

you say that, in many cases, we do not have either the space or 

the types of facilities that we need. 

That is why, when we build new facilities, the primary thing that 

we are trying to achieve is security, but the Office of Overseas 

Buildings looks clearly at what our staffing levels need to be, 

where we are going to be in the future, what types of operational 

and functional space we need; and that includes things like much 

larger consular operations, in many places. We have many other 

agencies in our embassies, as well. And that is all wrapped into 

what it is that we are doing and how we build buildings and where 

we build buildings. 

So, sir, I could not agree with you more. It is a combination of 

factors. But, we believe we still need probably at least another 75 

or so major buildings. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that we look at a 

way in that we can get an updated realistic inventory of what we 

need, globally, to meet the challenges. 

I really do applaud former Secretary Clinton and President 

Obama for recognizing the important role that our diplomatic missions play in our national security. They need to have the resources 

in order to be able to carry that out in a safe manner, in an efficient manner. And I just think we could use a better blueprint 

than the one that was developed 5 or 6 or 7 years ago. 

Mr. STARR. Senator Cardin, I will take that back, and I am sure 

the Office of Overseas Buildings Operations, and probably with us, 

would be willing to come up and work with any of your staff and 

give you the information that you would like. 

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate that. 

Let me move on to a second issue on security, and that is the 

confidence and support that we have from the local government 

and authorities. I know that it varies by country. And that is evaluated as part of the security mission that you have to undertake. 

Can you just briefly outline how the confidence we have in the 

local government’s ability to respond or to work with us on security 

issues, factors into the equation on our security needs? 

I wanted to give Mr. Starr a break. So, Mr. Miller, if you could 

respond that, that would be good. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Mr. MILLER. I appreciate that, sir. I was beginning to feel a little 

left out. [Laughter.] 

If I could go back a moment to the ISAT teams that went out 

in November, I led one of those teams as we went about assessing 

our various missions, the 19 missions that we very quickly assessed 

and felt that were our most vulnerable at that time. One of the 

things, one of the legs that we were assessing was our host nation’s 

willingness and capability to defend the mission in accordance with 

their Vienna requirements. As we look at that, we have to roll that 

into ‘‘If it’s weak on one leg, we have to strengthen the other.’’ And 

that would be our ability to withstand an attack, say, for instance, 

as we did for quite some time in Khartoum and in Tunisia, about 

8 hours as those facilities were attacked in early September, as 

well. 

So, if we have a weakness on one side, we have to be able to 

mitigate that by strengthening on another. It is not always possible, however. And that calls into play, then, a greater requirement for our diplomatic cadre to work with the host-nation political 

counterparts to ensure that they live up to their responsibilities, 

just as we do here for them in the United States. 

It is something that we try to address, where we can, with training, through our antiterrorism assistance programs and other bilateral training programs that the U.S. Government provides to help 

bolster their own professional capabilities and, hopefully, build it 

up to the point where we can trust, as we do in most places, their 

ability to secure us. 

Senator CARDIN. I would just make one observation. I would hope 

that we engage the political apparatus of our country at the highest levels if we need more cooperation from host countries. 

I want to ask one more question on one of the ARB recommendations to address language capacity. Could you just briefly update 

us as to how that recommendation is being implemented? 

Mr. MILLER. Certainly. And as this applies primarily to the

capacity for Arabic language skills, the Foreign Service Institute 

has been working very diligently with the rest of the Department, 

to include with Diplomatic Security, to assess what our language 

requirements are for our special agents as they engage with their 

host-nation counterparts. 

We anticipate, I believe, that the first class begins this next 

month, or early September, to give those skills, or the opportunity 

to acquire the skills for our special agents in such a way that they 

will be able to work in an emergency situation. Realizing that it 

is a long-term process to acquire proficiency that allows them to 

converse proficiently, that process can be upward of 2 years for 

someone like myself, shorter for those who are a little brighter. 

But, it is a very difficult process. We are hoping to achieve that 

with a short-term objective with our immediate security language 

course in Arabic. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Cardin. 

And, Mr. Miller, feel free to join in on any answers that you 

want. We want a full record, as much as possible, so do not hesitate to jump in. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. And I apologize for not being here. 

And I apologize if this has been asked and answered probably three 

times by now with regard to the legislation that has been introduced. 

Assuming that legislation were in place and implemented, would 

it have affected the outcome in Benghazi, simply because it was not 

an embassy or even a consulate? Would it have made a difference 

there or—in your opinion? 

Mr. Starr. 

Mr. STARR. Benghazi was at a threat level that we should have 

reprioritized what we were doing within our existing capabilities. 

I thank the chairman for introducing this legislation. In the long 

term, it will help us on a number of different fronts. But, I am not 

going to sit here and tell you that the tragedy in Benghazi could 

have been avoided, had we had this legislation. I think that was 

a question that we did not understand the situation that we were 

in, and perhaps we should have had more resources or we should 

have made a decision to evacuate that post earlier. 

But, you know, we very much appreciate this legislation. It will 

help us in many, many ways. It will strengthen our capability to 

stay in places where the threats are greater. But, I am not going 

to blame Benghazi on the lack of this legislation. 

Senator FLAKE. Do you have anything to add? 

Mr. MILLER. No, sir. 

Senator FLAKE. OK. 

Benghazi was a particular situation there, given the makeup of 

the government and the situation just to—you know, the newness 

of all this. What lessons have we learned from that, that can be 

applied elsewhere, in terms of our relationship with a host nation? 

The host nation did not even know this facility was there, I understand, or they were not informed of it. What protocols have we put 

in place, if any, after that, to make sure we have better cooperation 

with the host nation, in terms of security needs? 

Mr. MILLER. One of the chief issues, I think, that we have realized, and was addressed in the ARB, was the fact that all of our 

facilities should meet OSPB standards—Overseas Security Policy 

Board standards—for physical security. In this instance—and I was 

not in a position to know why—but, in this instance, they were not 

met. There were no waivers that were granted. That has been rectified. We will not have a temporary facility that has not been 

signed off on at the highest levels, wherein a balance of our 

national security interests and the diplomatic imperatives are 

weighed against the security threat. So, I would say that is one 

positive outcome of the ARB. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And, to our witnesses, I appreciate you being here today. 

My first hearing as a Senator was the hearing with Secretary 

Clinton to talk about the Benghazi incident and the ARB recommendations, and it was a very memorable one; I will never forget 

that first hearing. I reviewed the ARB in advance of the hearing, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

to prepare—and, Mr. Chair, I imagine you know this—there are so 

many recommendations that you kind of personally fix upon a couple, and there are a couple that I was particularly interested in. 

One was the recommendation about the expansion of the Marine 

Security Guard program. And the second was the recommendation 

about training of our State Department personnel. 

In the packet of materials that we were given for this hearing, 

there is a New York Times graphic, where there is a summary, as 

of May 20, how far along we are in meeting the ARB recommendations. And there is sort of a spectrum in each of these various recommendations, from, basically, ‘‘not started’’ to ‘‘completed.’’ And in 

each of the recommendations, there is sort of a New York Times 

assessment of where we are. 

The Marine Security Guard one is sort of lower than the midpoint, but the lowest one, the one that is most near ‘‘not even 

started yet,’’ is the recommendation about: to improve the training 

of employees headed to high-threat posts and expand the number 

of posts where additional security training is required. 

Assistant Secretary Starr, you talked about the issue, in 

response to questioning from Senator Corker, about the need for 

the training facility for State Department employees. And you and 

I have met about this previously. And the chairman’s proposed legislation addresses this. But, just to give some history for everyone 

here, the State Department began trying to find a training facility 

to replace the racetrack, that was used during the week, about 4 

years ago. They began this long before Benghazi, long before the 

ARB. And there has been a 4-year effort that considered 80 different sites for this training facility, and it eventually dwindled 

down, whittled down—some communities did not want it—and 

with the particular requirements, largely to involve a facility that 

would be close to partners, synergy with the Marine Security 

Guard and others, it dwindled down and there was a preference for 

expanding this program at a Guard base—a National Guard base 

in Virginia, Fort Pickett. And that was, basically, the preference 

that we were moving toward before Benghazi and before the ARB. 

After the incident at Benghazi, the ARB report has a recommendation, recommendation number 17, that specifically focuses upon 

the need to move out of this rented facility and find a permanent 

facility for embassy training. 

In February, just a few months ago, the State Department communicated to Congress and indicated that they were about to issue 

an EIS for Fort Pickett, but, in April, there was another letter that 

suggested this was now delayed, largely because of an inquiry from 

the OMB about whether or not we could maybe do this kind of a 

half version or a knockoff version at some other facility. And I 

gather that there has been some exploration of an existing facility 

in Georgia that would not have the synergies with the Marine 

Security Guard Program, that would not have synergies with the 

other intelligence agencies with whom our Department of State 

staff worked. 

So, it appears that this process that was moving forward before 

Benghazi and before the ARB to actually require this training capacity is now, after Benghazi and after the ARB, being thrown into 

kind of a question-mark status. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22

It would be ironic—that is the wrong word. It would be tragic if 

a process that was moving toward better training, optimizing training for Secretary of State—or Department of State staff before 

Benghazi and before the ARB, would be now slowed down, watered 

down, diluted after we know what we know as a result of those 

horrible incidents on September 11, 2013. 

And so, Secretary Starr and Mr. Miller, what I would like to 

ask—Assistant Secretary Starr—what I would like to ask you is, 

From the State Department’s standpoint, is it still your professional belief that the site that was identified by the Department of 

State at Fort Pickett is the most consistent with both the desire to 

increase training and also most consistent with the ARB recommendation that was forwarded to Congress by the committee? 

Mr. STARR. Senator Kaine, thank you for your question. The 

answer is simple: yes, sir. We still believe that the site that we 

chose at Fort Pickett gives us the best ability to train the numbers 

of personnel that we need to train; to incorporate our partners in 

the various other U.S. Government agencies, that are critical to our 

training, into that training; to build the synergies that we have 

with our own Foreign Service Institute and our own training regimens up here. Yes, sir, we still believe that is the best answer. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Miller, from your standpoint? 

Mr. MILLER. I can only echo what Assistant Secretary Staff said. 

We have to have the synergy in order to develop the relationships 

with our training partners as well as for the students who are 

going through. And we both could give you numerous examples of 

opportunities that foreign affairs officers have had to participate in 

actual lifesaving events, where they have benefited from the training that they had at the racetrack, which has so well served us 

throughout my career. But, we can do better. And if we can do better, we absolutely have to, because we are talking about people’s 

lives. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. I do not have any other questions. 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, the security of brave men and women serving our 

Nation overseas is critically important. To me, the Accountability 

Review Board made it clear that the State Department did not give 

the mission in Benghazi the personnel and resources needed to ensure their security. So, I just wanted to make sure that we are 

learning from those failures and implementing real reforms. 

With regard to risk mitigation, I understand that we must accept 

a certain amount of risk to operate in areas like Benghazi. The 

Accountability Review Board stated, ‘‘Risk mitigation involved

two imperatives: engagement and security, which require wise 

leadership, good intelligence and evaluation, proper defense, and 

strong preparedness, and, at times, downsizing indirect access,’’ 

they say, ‘‘and even withdrawal.’’

So, the question: What are the factors that the Department of 

State considers when determining whether a location is simply too 

dangerous to support a diplomatic presence? 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Senator. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23

We look at three basic questions: the host nation’s capability and 

willingness, as I said earlier. We look at the current threat 

streams, those threats which have developed, that we are aware of, 

that direct themselves to our facilities. And then, we also look at 

the physical presence that we are able to maintain, based on our 

physical security posture at post. And, as we balance those three 

and any possible mitigation, we then move forward with our diplomatic engagement. If we cannot balance those three, then we have 

to assess those options which you have just addressed. 

Senator BARRASSO. Are there posts, currently, that you have 

identified as needing to either be downsized or closed? 

Mr. MILLER. I can point back to Bangui, which we evacuated late 

last fall—late December. We are constantly evaluating other posts. 

A good example is our U.S. Embassy in Cairo, over the past month, 

as they have gone through the large disturbances, not only in 

Cairo, but throughout the country. So, it is a constant evaluative 

process that we go through and assess, then, what our next steps 

may possibly be. 

Senator BARRASSO. Could I ask about the Inspector General’s 

audit of June 30, came out—2013—released its audit of compliance 

with physical and procedural security standards at select highthreat-level posts. And I am concerned that it has been 10 months 

since the terrorist attacks in Benghazi, yet the Inspector General 

found that there are high-threat-level posts are failing to comply 

with security standards. I do not know if you have seen the audit 

yet. Can you explain to the committee why these problems are happening, and what the plan and timeline is for, you know, remedying these issues? 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. I think it is important that we do point 

out some differences that we may have with the Office of Inspector 

General when they do provide a report, as this one. I think it is 

important to note that the high-threat, high-risk posts that I am 

responsible for leading and supervising the management of their 

programs, I do not believe they visited any of those posts. When 

they are referring to high-threat, that is a very often-used and notwell-defined term. So, as they look at the various recommendations, it should be parsed very carefully when we look at the HTP 

posts for which I am responsible. 

I will say that we are continuing to work with the OIG to 

address their concerns. We want to ensure that our people do have 

the best-possible protection, and we value the OIG’s perspective. 

But, I know DS, or Diplomatic Security, is working with the OIG 

to find common ground. 

Senator BARRASSO. Well, thank you for that clarification. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Let me thank both of our witnesses, not just for your testimony, 

but for the incredible service that you are providing our country. 

It is an extremely difficult time, and obviously the safety of our 

personnel is an important responsibility. So, we thank you very 

much. 

We also appreciate your willingness to work with this committee. 

There has been a lot of questions asked that I think will involve 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24

us working together to make sure that we have safe facilities and 

personnel in the right place, et cetera. 

As I said earlier, we have a responsibility, not only of oversight, 

but to be your partners, and we look forward to working with you 

to protect the dedicated men and women who serve our Nation in 

foreign posts around the world. 

With that, the committee will stand adjourned.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The committee will come to order. I 

apologize for the confusion. 

I understand that facility training had a indepth discussion, I 

assume. Is that correct? So, let me ask, if I may, a couple of questions, just to conclude, then. 

One is, I want to go back to the questions that Senator Flake 

raised with you. And, for my purpose, they are not Benghazispecific, but they are about temporary and mixed-use facilities. My 

understanding is that the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi was a 

temporary facility, and that the Overseas Security Policy Board 

standards for facilities apply to all facilities, including temporary 

facilities. 

In a report that the ARB issued, the State Department noted 

that it would reissue this long-established policy to all posts by 

January of this year. Do we know, was that policy reissued? 

Mr. MILLER. It was reissued. I believe it was January the 23rd. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. And how are the Overseas Security Policy 

Board standards enforced at temporary facilities? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, when we move back into a country—and this is 

really where we are going to experience temporary facilities—one 

of the things that we are going to have to do is determine what our 

presence is going to be, and then we are going to have to determine 

what facilities are available and whether or not we can balance the 

need versus the safety. 

Part of the process is looking closely at what facilities are available, what it will cost to do those facilities, and whether or not we 

have the ability to do it. 

We are currently not in Somalia. We send temporary-duty personnel into Somalia because we do not have a facility that we think 

could meet our requirements at the moment. And I think that, perhaps, is the best judgment I can give you. 

We are very vocal and very clear when we think that we do not 

have an answer that can meet the security requirements. 

We are very concerned about places like Goma. We only allow 

temporary-duty travel in, working very closely with the United 

Nations. We do not have a facility that meets our needs there at 

the moment. 

Should the Department make a determination that we need to go 

back into those places, we use the integrated planning cells to 

determine what we need to have. We have to make a determination 

whether we have the internal resources to meet those needs or 

have to come to Congress for a supplemental to do it. We have 

developed certain new tools to help us. 

One of the things we learned out of Iraq, when we had many, 

many people in trailers in many places, and then we would take 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25

these trailers and we would put sandbags around them, and then 

we would put overhead cover, and then we would put walls around 

them—we have developed something called ‘‘a hardened-alternative 

trailer system,’’ which is a highly blast-resistant, bulletproof 

trailer, at this point, that provides a high degree of overhead protection built right in. So, we are trying to develop new tools that 

will give us reasonably safe and secure accommodations, and even 

offices, in these temporary-type situations. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, let me go to part B of this particular 

Benghazi-type set of circumstances. And that is: In instances where 

a facility is shared or is used principally by a U.S. Government 

agency other than the Department of State, how does the interagency process address security needs at that facility? Who takes 

the lead? 

Mr. STARR. The individual agency will be responsible for upgrading the facility, but it still is upgrading to the OSPB, the Overseas 

Security Policy Board, standards. And if they do not meet

the standards, they go through the same waiver and exception 

processes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. 

Now, I want, for the records purposes, to establish something 

that I think we, on the committee, know—you, certainly, in the 

Department, know—but I do not think the general public knows. 

And that is the Marine Guard attachment to embassies. Until 

now—correct me if I am wrong—the Marine Guard attachments to 

embassies was, in essence, for the security of sensitive and classified documents. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. That is essentially correct, sir. The staffing levels of 

marines that we were putting in facilities was essentially to meet 

that requirement: 24-hour protection for classified assets and operations and information. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, most people see the Marine Guards—

I think even Members of Congress, when they visited abroad—and 

thought that somehow they were about protecting the embassy, its 

personnel, and whatever else, including documents, was in there. 

But, that really was not the core focus. Their core focus, up until 

a new recent agreement, was to give the time, should an embassy 

be overrun, for the purposes of being able to deal with classified 

documents. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. STARR. That is correct, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, I understand that, at least at 

high-threat posts, there is an additional mandate or responsibility 

that we have asked the Marines to perform. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And what would that be? 

Mr. STARR. We have renegotiated the Memorandum of Agreement with the Marine Corps between the Department of State and 

clearly emphasized that our new mandate is equal protection for 

our personnel and our facilities in our embassies while protecting 

classified information. 

Sir, if I may——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. STARR. Even when we had our smaller numbers assigned to 

our detachments, in many cases, you know, six or seven marines, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26

and the primary responsibility was protection of classified information, there was not a marine out there, and there was not an RSO 

out there, that did not understand that, in extremis, their job was 

to protect the people. But, we were not staffing with enough 

marines, necessarily, to take on that role. And what we are working with the Marine Corps is in—particularly in our high-threat 

locations, to increase the numbers of marines at each one of these 

posts so that they are better capable of doing the defense portion, 

as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate you expounding upon that, because 

I did not suggest to mean that marines would stand by and see 

people killed. But, certainly there was no staffing level to be able 

to accomplish that, particularly at high-threat posts. 

Is the new Marine understanding that has come together with 

the State Department on high-threat posts or globally? 

Mr. STARR. The Memorandum of Agreement is global. The reality 

is that we are concentrating on our highest-threat-level posts and 

increasing our marine staffing at those locations. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

And then, finally, I want to get to host-government capacity. The 

Accountability Review Board found that the Libyan Government’s 

response to be profoundly lacking on the night of the attacks. A 

host government’s support posture relies on both the host government’s capacity as well as their will. Those are two—critically important. You can have the will but not have the capacity; you can 

have the capacity but not have the will. They both need to be there. 

So, as we look beyond Libya—and we are looking, now, globally—

how do you assess these variables? How do you quantify them? 

How do these determinations go into your overall security assessment? And is the provision that we have included in the legislation 

which deals with the question, not of the lowest cost, but the best 

cost for performance, as well, to give you the flexibility, particularly 

in places where that will be critical to security, a desired 

flexibility? 

I know there are multiple questions in there, so——

Mr. STARR. let me take the last part of it and then turn to Bill 

on part of this. 

On the contracting, sir, we believe that it is critical. And we 

thank you very much for recognizing that the situations in almost 

all of our posts are different. And, in certain cases, where we do 

not have, perhaps, the level of support, because of willingness or 

capability, from the host government, situations may arise where 

the idea of lowest-cost technically acceptable contracting is not 

going to give us the guard force that we think that we could get 

if we had another instrument to contract with. 

So, we want to thank you. We do believe that adding this capability, not just at our high-threat posts, but where we believe there 

is a clear indication that this will increase significantly our security 

capabilities, it gives us a tool to do that, sir. 

So, yes, I think it is an important step that allows us to address 

some of the inherent capabilities when we do not necessarily have 

the level of support from our host government that we would like. 

On the specific——

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The CHAIRMAN. How about the questions of, How do you assess 

the host-government’s ability, willingness? How do you quantify it? 

How do you make those determinations to factor in your overall 

security assessing? 

Mr. MILLER. To some extent, it is a subjective call. But, we quantify it, as much as we possibly can, through our various partners 

with us at the embassy who help to assess the training that the 

host services have received. Historically, in many posts, we have a 

relationship that has gone back for a number of decades, and we 

can quantify, then, what our expectation should be and how well 

they can live up to those expectations. 

In some instances, because of recent instability, that expectation 

has been nullified. And then it is a matter of us taking the opportunity, as I said in my opening statement, to go to extraordinary 

measures, above those measures which are standard. And, in those 

instances of—the best-value contracting gives us the opportunity

to achieve a level of competence with our local guard forces that

we would not necessarily be able to achieve with the host-nation 

services. 

Mr. STARR. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think we can quantify the 

capabilities pretty well by working closely with our Defense colleagues or intelligence colleagues, our own security staff. We can 

see pretty well, and make a pretty good determination of, the capabilities of the host government. 

Much more subjective is this question of what is the particular 

willingness at a time. And we are much more sensitive, the entire 

Department is, to having a better analysis capability and having 

our political officers and our ambassadors really weighing in on 

what is the particular host-government desire to help us in a particular time. 

There are certain places where we could have a great deal of 

willingness on a Tuesday afternoon, and, in some cases, by Friday 

afternoon it may not be there. And this is, I think, part of the 

dilemma, but it is also part of our solution, which is for our security personnel, Bill and I and others, to work much more closely 

with our regional bureaus and with our ambassadors. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have one final question, and that is on the 

question of intelligence and its use, integration into your analysis, 

and to looking at changing events, which might indicate a different 

threat level, that we may not have traditionally thought of as necessarily looking at a different threat level. In the new paradigm in 

which we live in, which, unfortunately, requires us to think outside 

of the box, you know, the terrorists have to get only lucky once; we 

have to get it right 100 percent of the time. That is a tough challenge, but that is our challenge. 

How are you integrating the use of intelligence? Are you receiving the flow of information that is essential, I would think, for you 

to continue to make an analysis on an in-real-time ongoing basis 

so that you can adjust accordingly where you need to? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. The relationship across the spectrum of

intelligence community and us has broadened and deepened. We 

have officers that—from other agencies—that are working with us 

at our desks, in our offices, now. The level of coordination that goes 

on, in terms of discussion of threats, is deeper and wider, and held 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28

both at the working level and at the national security staff level. 

The coordination that we have with our regional bureaus now—

every weekday morning, and Saturdays and Sundays as necessary, 

we start off looking at the threats that have come in most recently. 

In those same meetings, we have representatives from the regional 

bureaus of the Department of State so that we are linking up the 

political with the intelligence that is coming in. 

If I can say one thing, sir, that—one major strategic lesson that 

came out of Benghazi. One of the observations of the ARB was that 

there was no specific intelligence in Benghazi to indicate that there 

was a threat—going to be a threat that night. And I think it—you 

can lull yourself into a position, where, if there is no specific intelligence, you say, ‘‘OK, we must be OK.’’ I think one of the major 

changes that has happened is that we are much more aware of the 

larger atmospherics in these countries—the political, the social, 

what is going on in terms of Web activity, social networking—trying to keep abreast of what we see is going on in that country, in 

addition to whether or not we have specific intelligence threats, is 

a much deeper, much broader effort than we have had before, as 

well. 

So, I think it is really both sides. It is the intelligence side that 

is deeper, broader, and more important to us, but it is also keeping 

much more abreast of what is really happening in that location, 

and melding the two into our decisionmaking, and then what we 

do as recommendations further up in the Department. 

The CHAIRMAN. And when you say that your use or access or universe of intelligence is deeper and wider, are you referring to that 

deeper and wider as post-Benghazi? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

All right. With that, and seeing no other members before the 

committee, with the thanks of the committee both for your service 

and for the men and women who serve under you in protecting our 

diplomats abroad, you have the thanks of the committee. We look 

forward to a continuing engagement with you as we try to move 

this legislation forward. 

The record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow. 

And, with that, the hearing now is truly adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GREGORY STARR TO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

LONG-TERM EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION VERSUS IMMEDIATE THREAT MITIGATION

The Department is requesting and S. 980 would authorize an $800 million increase from the $1.4 billion we currently spend on new embassy construction in the 

Capital Security Cost Sharing Program (CSCSP). In his testimony, Acting Assistant 

Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Gregory Starr, informed the committee that this 

increase would be spent on addressing immediate security deficiencies at existing 

posts that are not able to initiate new construction. Yet in May, committee staff 

were briefed about the 2013 and 2014 build plans to spend the total $2.2 billion for 

embassy construction, and State indicated plans to use the entire funding for longterm, new construction projects such as new embassy and consulate construction, 

Marine Security Guard quarters, and land acquisition.

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Question A. Since S. 980 authorizes $2.2 billion for CSCP, which is used to fund 

new construction projects, what specific amount from this fund would be used for 

immediate threat mitigation in high-risk, high-threat posts that are not currently 

under construction for more secure facilities and how is that reflected in the 2013 

and 2014 build plans that were provided to the committee?

Answer. There are 27 posts designated as High-Threat High-Risk. The Bureau of 

Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has either completed or has under construction new, secure facility projects at 12 of these posts. Further, the Department’s FY 2013 plan includes $462 million for design and construction of new Embassy compounds at three posts (N’Djamena, Nouakchott, and 

Beirut) designated as High-Threat High-Risk. 

Site searches for the remaining 11 posts designated as High-Threat High-Risk are 

underway, but without a site, construction cannot be scheduled for a specific fiscal 

year and it would be premature to allocate funding. Once sites are acquired at any 

of those locations, the capital project schedule can be revised to include construction 

award at those posts as soon as possible. 

Until sites can be acquired and new projects are underway, the Department will 

take steps to increase the physical security at these posts. As described in the 

response to question B, funding for this type of immediate security upgrade comes 

from outside the Capital Security Cost Sharing program. For example, a $34 million 

project in Tripoli funded from Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance 

Overseas Contingency Operations (ESCM/OCO) and other agency contributions is 

underway to include a perimeter wall, compound access control facilities, compound 

emergency sanctuaries, and other security enhancements recommended by the 

State-Department of Defense (DOD) Interagency Security Assessment Team (ISAT). 

Additionally, OBO has also obligated $26 million of FY 2013 ESCM/OCO funding 

to implement immediate security upgrades at 19 posts (13 of which are designated 

as High-Threat High-Risk) in response to the recommendations of the ISAT.

Question B. If funding for immediate threat and security mitigation for U.S. personnel serving at unsecure posts that are not eligible or able to initiate new construction for safer facilities does not come from the CSCP account, what account 

does such funding come from and how much money is specifically allocated to such 

immediate threat mitigation in FY 2013 and 2014?

Answer. The Department has several options to mitigate security concerns at 

posts that are not immediately scheduled to receive Capital Security funding for the 

construction of new facilities. 

Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Funding Options: 

First and foremost is the Compound Security Program which provides physical 

security upgrades to existing facilities. These upgrades include perimeter walls, 

compound access control facilities, vehicle barriers, mantraps, compound emergency 

sanctuaries, and forced-entry/ballistic-resistant doors and windows. Our plan for the 

FY 2013 Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) appropriation 

includes $85.3 million for the Compound Security Program and the FY14 budget 

request includes $101 million. Since the inception of the Compound Security program in 1999, Congress has provided nearly $2 billion, allowing the Department to 

undertake security upgrades and enhancements at many posts worldwide. 

In addition to the Compound Security Program, security enhancements may be 

incorporated into larger renovation projects that are funded from OBO’s Maintenance Cost Sharing (MCS) and Major Rehabilitation Programs. The FY 2013 appropriation provides an overall program level of $270 million for MCS program, which 

is cost-shared between the Department ($156 million from the ESCM appropriation) 

and other agency contributions ($114 million) to support maintenance requirements 

at functional facilities occupied by multiple agencies. In FY 2013, the Major Rehabilitation Program provides $35.3 million from the ESCM appropriation for Stateonly functional and all residential facilities. The Department’s FY 2014 budget 

request includes $35 million for the Major Rehabilitation Program and $130 million 

for the Department’s share of the MCS program, which totals $167 million with 

other agency contributions. 

Construction of new facilities that is driven by factors other than security, and 

is therefore not eligible for Capital Security funding, is funded from the Strategic 

Capital program with the ESCM account. While security vulnerability is not the 

reason for undertaking these projects, all facilities will be constructed to the Department’s security standards. Our plan for the FY 2013 ESCM appropriation includes 

$69.9 million in Strategic Capital to fund the Department’s share of the second 

phase of the new NATO headquarters facility in Brussels. There is no Strategic 

Capital funding in the FY 2014 budget request. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The Department also has the authority to retain the proceeds from the sale of 

excess and underutilized properties and use them to purchase or construct new 

facilities. New Embassy facilities in Berlin and Luanda were funded from proceeds 

of sale, as is the new London Embassy project. 

Diplomatic Security (DS) Funding Options: 

In FY 2013, the Department, through the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, has allocated $27.3 million of FY 2013 funds for Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) account for physical security 

upgrades to mitigate security vulnerabilities at certain high-threat high-risk posts. 

In addition to the $27.3 million of funds available for high-threat, high-risk physical security upgrades, $177.5 million of ‘‘undistributed’’ D&CP/WSP funds are available to meet emerging security needs as they arise, for a total of up to $204.8 million as needed to mitigate physical security concerns outside of CSCS. 

In FY 2014, if fully funded, the President’s request would provide funds within 

the D&CP/WSP account to mitigate physical security concerns on an as-needed 

basis.

Question. What actions is Diplomatic Security taking to monitor requests from 

overseas posts seeking security exceptions and waivers and to ensure that such exceptions and waivers are only granted where absolutely essential? Who is the most 

senior Department officer that is required to authorize security exceptions and waivers for high-threat posts?

Answer. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 

(SECCA) requires that all newly constructed/occupied overseas U.S. diplomatic 

facilities possess a 100-foot setback from their perimeter, and that all U.S. Government operations be collocated on one chancery or consulate compound. Any deviation from these SECCA provisions requires a waiver from either the Secretary (all 

newly constructed chancery and consulate buildings that do not meet SECCA 

requirements) or the Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic Security (all other requests). 

In addition to SECCA’s requirements for colocation and setback, security standards are established by the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), an intergovernmental board comprised of representatives from all agencies that operate in an overseas environment under Chief of Mission authority. The Board is chaired by the 

Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. OSPB physical security standards include standards for doors, perimeter walls, compound access controls, etc. 

The Department strives to meet as many OSPB security standards as we can in 

all facilities. New construction rarely poses a problem, but it can be a challenge to 

retrofit an existing facility. OSPB exceptions may be granted by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. If an exception to an OSPB standard is needed, the 

requestor must explain the justification for such an exception. All areas that fall 

short of the required standards must be identified and mitigating measures must 

be described to explain how the facility will address the shortfall. 

There are times when U.S. national interests require our immediate presence. In 

these circumstances, we must find a suitable facility and enhance security to the 

maximum extent possible. Time and the limits of construction feasibility circumscribe our ability to retrofit an existing structure to meet our full standards. In the 

future, secure expedient facilities will likely remain a critical need, and we continue 

to examine how to best meet this need based on the totality of the operating environment and host country capabilities.

Question. According to testimony from Secretary Clinton before the committee, 

she and other senior leaders at the Department were never briefed on pleas from 

Ambassador Stevens for increased security personnel. Specifically, the Secretary, 

when asked whether she participated in meetings regarding the deteriorating security in Libya, she stated that ‘‘. . . with specific security requests, they did not come 

to me. I had no knowledge of them.’’ The Secretary also testified that ‘‘the ARB 

made very clear that the level of responsibility for the failures that they outlined 

was set at the Assistant Secretary level and below.’’

• Under the new procedures the Department put in place after the Benghazi

attacks, what are the specific roles and decisionmaking requirements, if any, of 

each of the top three officials at State (Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under 

Secretary for Management) for addressing security requests and crises at highrisk, high-threat posts, like in Benghazi, and how will that role and involvement in decisionmaking be documented?

Answer. Decisions on security requests from posts are made by consultation within the Department. Working with Regional Security Officers and other officials at 

posts, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Regional Bureaus, their staff, Department 

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leadership, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security interact daily to ensure that 

threats and security needs not only at the high-threat, high-risk posts, but worldwide, receive the appropriate scrutiny and response. Secretary Kerry has noted that 

we can never provide a 100-percent risk-free operating environment. Nevertheless, 

the Department is determined to take measures to mitigate risks whenever and 

wherever possible. The Department works every day to balance security with the 

ability of our diplomats to get out and do their jobs. 

We are working to ensure that our risk-management process for high-threat locations is institutionalized, repeatable, and transparent. Reviews of the U.S. Government presence and mission, and our security posture, will take place at least annually following the update of the high-threat, high-risk posts list. This process will 

also provide for such reviews on an ad hoc basis in the event the security situation 

in a location deteriorates. 

This review for each location determined to be a high-threat, high-risk post will 

be documented via a memorandum approved by the highest levels of the Department.

Question. Based on briefings and information provided by the State Department, 

we understand that OMB rejected the Department’s $950 million proposal for a consolidated facility and directed the Department to undertake a review of existing 

training capabilities associated costs.

• Is that process completed, and if so, and what has been determined?

Answer. Because of the ongoing, serious fiscal challenges facing the U.S. Government, including the order of sequestration, which went into effect on March 1, the 

administration asked the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of State (DOS) to perform additional due diligence to determine the best use 

of taxpayer funds. As a result, the Department is conducting additional cost studies 

for the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) project. The Department 

has also been asked to work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 

evaluate whether any training capacity for DOS personnel is available at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA. Further work on 

the FASTC project at Fort Pickett has been put on hold, pending the results of the 

additional due diligence effort with FLETC. 

Based on information FLETC has provided to date, the Department does not 

believe FLETC has excess training capacity available to provide the necessary and 

timely platform for a dedicated DOS training facility. DOS continues to support Fort 

Pickett as the best location to build FASTC. The Department is committed to an 

open and transparent process and will provide more information to the committee 

as it becomes available and decisions are made regarding the future of FASTC.

Question. Is there no combination of existing government or private sector training facilities (including but not limited to federal law enforcement training centers 

and DOD facilities like the Naval Support Activity Charleston) that could be combined to provide the same training that a brand-new FASTC facility would provide?

Answer. Since 2009, the Department of State and the General Services Administration (GSA) have invested considerable time and effort in reviewing over 70 properties, including the Department of Defense (DOD) facilities and law enforcement 

facilities before identifying 1,500 acres of land on and near Fort Pickett, an underutilized military base located in Blackstone, VA, that meet our specific requirements 

for a hard-skills training facility. 

Over the last 2 years, the Department of State and GSA have worked extensively 

to conduct environmental studies, start negotiations for land use agreements, secure 

community support at Fort Pickett, and ultimately reassess the scope of the FASTC 

project at Fort Pickett. Through these efforts, it was determined that a smaller platform at Fort Pickett was more fiscally prudent. 

The proximity of Fort Pickett, which allows the Department to maintain and 

strengthen synergies due to its proximity to Department Headquarters, the National 

Foreign Affairs Training Center (also known as the Foreign Service Institute), DOD, 

and the Intelligence Community (IC), cannot be overstated. The evolving overseas 

mission and continually changing worldwide security environment requires greater 

coordination with our partners, particularly DOD on the ‘‘new normal,’’ and positioning FASTC at Fort Pickett will allow the Department to meet this need well into 

the future.

Question. Has the State Department requested, initiated, or completed any internal or external cost analyses of its different options for future training of diplomatic 

personnel, including an analysis of alternatives like using existing government or 

private sector facilities? If the answer is yes, please provide any and all materials 

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indicating or discussing these cost analyses, including any internal correspondence 

discussing cost analyses, whether or not such analyses were ever completed.

Answer. Since 2009, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of State (DOS) have undertaken an extensive process in the search for a possible site for the proposed Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC). Over 

70 sites have been evaluated for their potential to meet the needs of the security 

and law enforcement training for the State Department. Project costs, as well as 

socioeconomic and environmental impacts are just a few of the many variables evaluated as part of the site selection process. 

Currently, security and law enforcement training functions for the State Department are conducted in approximately 19 separate leased and contracted training 

facilities dispersed around the country. The fact that the existing training facilities 

are widely geographically separated creates difficulties in managing and coordinating activities. Additionally, because the existing training facilities are located in 

leased space or contracted facilities, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) must 

modify or adjust training to fit within the limitations of the facility. The lack of a 

dedicated training facility also results in scheduling inefficiencies, increased costs, 

and decreased productivity. DS security and law enforcement training courses often 

need to be postponed or canceled at the existing training facilities as they must compete for time and space with other Federal agencies’ activities, including training 

requirements of the military. In addition, there are very few commercially available 

training centers to accommodate the specialized training needs of DS. The development of the FASTC would establish a consolidated hard-skills training center from 

which DS could efficiently conduct training for a wide array of participants, including the foreign affairs community and DS personnel to meet increased demand for 

well-trained personnel. Consolidation would also meet the directives of a June 2010 

Presidential Memorandum, ‘‘Disposing of Unneeded Federal Real Estate,’’ which 

directs U.S. Government agencies to eliminate lease arrangements that are not cost 

effective and to pursue consolidation of operations. 

As part of the Master Planning process, the Department of State and GSA developed a detailed cost estimate to construct FASTC at Fort Pickett. Additionally, a 

socioeconomic impact analysis was completed as part of the Draft Environmental 

Impact Statement. This analysis indicated a substantial economic benefit would be 

realized by Ft. Pickett/Nottoway County, and the surrounding area. 

Because of the ongoing, serious fiscal challenges facing the U.S. Government, 

including the order of sequestration, which went into effect on March 1, the administration asked GSA and the Department to perform additional due diligence to determine the best use of taxpayer funds. Accordingly, the Department reassessed the 

scope of the FASTC project; determining a smaller, hard-skills-only training platform at Fort Pickett was more fiscally prudent. Preliminary estimates indicate that 

project construction costs could be reduced by approximately $375 million to $461 

million. Additionally, the annual per-student cost could be reduced by over 50 percent compared to the cost of current hard-skills training methodologies. 

The Department is happy to provide a briefing on the FASTC Project, including 

cost estimates and cost benefit analysis.

Question. What contingency plans were in place for Benghazi?

Answer. As the independent Accountability Review Board on Benghazi noted in 

their report, following the initiation of the attack on the Special Mission Complex 

(SMC), the Diplomatic Security Agents immediately reacted according to their emergency plan. ‘‘ Following the SMC’s emergency plan, Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) 1 entered Villa C to secure the Ambassador and the Information Management Officer (IMO) in the safe area and to retrieve his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and 4 

moved to retrieve their kits, which were located in Villa B and the Tactical Operations Comman (TOC) . . . From Villa C, ARSO 4 ran to his sleeping quarters in 

Villa B to retrieve his kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3 ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 

had last seen the Ambassador, and where ARSO 2’s kit was located.’’ (ARSO 2’s 

sleeping quarters were in the TOC, making him the designated ‘‘TOC Officer’’ in 

their emergency react plan.) Additionally, the Regional Security Office was responsible for planning and conducting evacuation operations of Chief of Mission personnel in the event of a significant attack or substantial deterioration of local security. As such, the office had developed a written evacuation plan which depending 

on security conditions and specific threat information may have meant the evacuation of personnel from the compound to the Annex, to the east toward Tobruk or 

from the country entirely. 

Because of the tumultuous conditions and natural disasters faced periodically 

around the world, the Department has robust contingency planning at all posts; this 

planning involves the interagency, including the Department of Defense. Generally, 

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when the Department is faced with evacuating post personnel, we seek to inform 

private U.S. citizens in that country, under a ‘‘no double standard’’ policy, and may 

urge our citizens to leave the country. Typically, U.S. Government employees and 

citizens will leave via commercial aircraft; on occasion we have asked airlines to add 

flights to their schedules. If commercial aircraft are not available or lack capacity, 

we have a process in place to charter aircraft. Our third option is military aircraft; 

DOD is always receptive to any Department requests. 

U.S. diplomatic missions maintain an Emergency Action Committee (EAC), which 

is comprised of members of the country team, including DOD elements present at 

post. The EAC is chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission and validated by the Chief 

of Mission. The EAC also reviews security policies, such as post’s travel policy, 

which may recommend particular modes of transport and prohibited times and/or 

locations of travel, and develops post’s Emergency Action Plan (EAP). The EAC 

must review the capabilities and limitations that may impact post’s ability to operate, to communicate with the private U.S. citizen community, and to carry out post 

plans in response to a crisis. 

In addition, the Crisis Management Training (CMT) division of State’s Foreign 

Service Institute provides training in crisis management and emergency preparedness for over 100 overseas posts each year. The CMT division’s mission is to help 

prepare U.S. Government employees and teams operating within the foreign affairs 

community to effectively respond before, during, and in the aftermath of all crises. 

The CMT division distributes guidance on lessons learned and best practices developed from past crises; provides example EAPs; and has developed distance learning 

courses for Crisis Management.

Question. Were these contingency plans implemented when the Benghazi compound was attacked, and if so, what went wrong?

Answer. Emergency react plans were implemented as the Accountability Review 

Board on Benghazi noted in their report: ‘‘Following the SMC’s emergency plan, 

Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) 1 entered Villa C to secure the Ambassador and the Information Management Officer (IMO) in the safe area and to 

retrieve his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and 4 moved to retrieve their kits, which were located 

in Villa B and the Tactical Operations Command (TOC) . . . From Villa C, ARSO 

4 ran to his sleeping quarters in Villa B to retrieve his kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3 

ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 had last seen the Ambassador, and where ARSO 

2’s kit was located.’’ (ARSO 2’s sleeping quarters were in the TOC, making him the 

designated ‘‘TOC Officer’’ in their emergency react plan.) The report further states, 

‘‘Around the same time, the temporary duty (TDY) Regional Security Officer (RSO) 

working in the TOC heard shots and an explosion. He then saw via security camera 

dozens of individuals, many armed, begin to enter the compound through the main 

entrance at the C1 gate. He hit the duck-and-cover alarm and yelled a warning over 

the radio, and recalled no such warning from the February 17 or Blue Mountain 

Libya (BML) guards, who had already begun to flee to points south and east in the 

compound, toward the Villa B area. ARSOs 1 and 2 heard an attack warning from 

the BML guards passed on over the radio. The TDY RSO also alerted the Annex 

and Embassy Tripoli by cell phone.’’

The Regional Security Office in Benghazi was responsible for planning and conducting evacuation operations of Chief of Mission personnel in the event of a significant attack or substantial deterioration of local security. As such, the office had 

developed a written evacuation plan which depending on security conditions and 

specific threat information may have meant the evacuation of personnel from the 

Benghazi compound to the Annex, to the east toward Tobruk, Libya or from the 

country entirely. Additionally, if it was determined an attack warranted the full 

evacuation of the compound, RSO staff ‘‘will contact the Annex and notify them of 

the intention to relocate.’’ 

With respect to coordination with the Annex, the ARB weighed in by noting that 

‘‘just prior to receiving the TDY RSO’s distress call shortly after 21:42 local time, 

the head of Annex security heard multiple explosions coming from the north in the 

direction of the SMC. The Annex security head immediately began to organize his 

team’s departure and notified his superiors, who began to contact local security elements to request support. The Annex response team departed its compound in two 

vehicles at approximately 22:05 local time. The departure of the Annex team was 

not delayed by orders from superiors; the team leader decided on his own to depart 

the Annex compound once it was apparent, despite a brief delay to permit their continuing efforts, that rapid support from local security elements was not forthcoming.’’

The interagency also worked quickly and collaboratively to respond to the attack 

in Benghazi on September 11, and the ARB stated that ‘‘Washington-TripoliFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Benghazi communication, cooperation, and coordination on the night of the attacks 

were effective. . . .’’

The ARB further went on to state ‘‘The interagency response was timely and 

appropriate, but there simply was not enough time given the speed of the attacks 

for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference. Senior-level interagency 

discussions were underway soon after Washington received initial word of the 

attacks and continued through the night. The Board found no evidence of any undue 

delays in decisionmaking or denial of support from Washington or from the military 

combatant commanders. Quite the contrary: the safe evacuation of all U.S. Government personnel from Benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack and subsequently 

to Ramstein Air Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. Government coordination and military response and helped save the lives of two severely wounded 

Americans.’’

The Department is working more closely to coordinate with the Department of Defense and other interagency colleagues as we adjust our posture in light of the new 

landscape we face today around the world. However, operating overseas presents 

unique challenges, and there is never a complete guarantee of safety—but in the 

face of ever-evolving threats, the Department strives to provide the most secure 

environment possible for the conduct of America’s foreign policy.

Question. Why would an independent review by the inspector general regarding 

the Department’s contingency planning be of concern to the Department?

Answer. The Department has no concerns with independent review by the inspector general of any of the Departments operations. The Department appreciates the 

recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in their audits and 

inspections of our various bureaus, offices, and programs. We take all reports and 

recommendations seriously, prioritize the OIG findings and address the corresponding recommendations accordingly.

Question. Please explain the coordination between the State Department and 

Department of Defense in coordinating drills at U.S. overseas posts as it pertains 

to Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams also known as FAST. How often are these 

drills conducted?

Answer. A robust training program is essential for emergency preparedness. 

Providing post personnel with skill sets and essential information for emergency 

situations leads to an efficient and cohesive response to emergencies. The post’s 

Emergency Action Committee is responsible for conducting drills, including their 

preparation, execution, and evaluation. Drills provide an opportunity to practice and 

evaluate the responses to emergencies. Emergency Action Committees are compromised of representatives of all U.S. Government agencies at post, including when 

applicable, Department of Defense representation. 

The Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachment, led by the Regional Security Officer (RSO), is trained to respond to an array of contingencies and many of these are 

practiced in set drills. These drills include: internal defense, fire, bomb, mass 

casuality, emergency destruction, and intruder. Drills are conducted on an established schedule and must be reported to the Department per established policy. 

Coordination of training with other United States Marine Corps (USMC) elements 

such as USMC Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) or USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are facilitated by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) routinely in training scenarios in the continental United States (CONUS) and occasionally in theater. In CONUS, DS Special Agents with overseas experience are called 

upon to brief MEU personnel prior to deployment. DS Special Agents are involved 

in a yearly contingency exercise with the Quantico-based USMC Expeditionary Warfare School and DS Special Agents engage with the MEUs as role players in table 

top exercises. Forward deployed USMC elements are also provided exposure to DS 

and embassy security contingency planning through geographic command theater 

exercises. A DS Special Agent (LNO) is assigned to each geographic command and 

is involved in joint-planning and exercise of contingency plans. Most frequently, DS 

LNOs are involved in rehearsal of concept and broader theater exercises that target 

the prospect of noncombatant evacuation planning. 

When FAST has been deployed to U.S. diplomatic facilities, it falls under the 

operational control of the Chief of Mission through the RSO. When the RSO conducts drills with the MSG Detachment and with mission staff, the RSO familiarizes 

the FAST with the drill scenarios and enlists the FAST participation in some level 

or aspect of the mission drill.

Question. What is the step-by-step process by which FAST assistance is requested, 

approved, deployed?

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Answer. The Department of State requests military assistance through official 

correspondence between the Executive Secretaries of the Department of State and 

Department of Defense. When requesting such assistance, the Department of State 

defers to the Department of Defense to determine the appropriate type and level of 

assistance necessary. The Department of State refers the Senator to the Department 

of Defense for information in the decisionmaking process to approve or deploy 

FASTs.

Question. How many current Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) personnel have 

criminal records?

Answer. DS agents undergo a background investigation and have been determined suitable for the position and issued a security clearance prior to employment. 

In addition, they go through clearance reinvestigations every 5 years. Federal security clearances are governed by Executive Order 12968, and adjudicated under the 

‘‘Government-wide Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 

Classified Information.’’ Adjudicative Guideline J-Criminal Conduct is one of the 13 

guidelines used in making an access determination. That guideline provides that 

security concerns may be raised, and a person may be disqualified from holding a 

security clearance, for a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses. The guideline also lists conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 

(a) So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior occurred, or it

occurred under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does 

not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 

(b) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those 

pressures are no longer present in the person’s life; 

(c) Evidence that the person did not commit the offense; and 

(d) There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to 

the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive 

community involvement. 

These considerations, and others, are taken into account when determining 

whether a prospective DS agent with a criminal record should receive a clearance, 

and whether a current agent should maintain their clearance if an offense is committed. Each case is judged on its own merits. It is important to note that an offense 

that might result in a criminal record could include, but is not limited to, jaywalking, public intoxication, shop lifting, and driving under the influence. 

We can determine that since entering the Department, 46 of the 1,930 DS agents 

(less than 2 percent of agents) have been arrested at some point over the course 

of their career. The criminal records for these individuals are mostly alcohol or 

domestic incident related. If a DS agent commits a misdemeanor offense, the 

Department determines the nature of the security concern and whether it can be 

mitigated. An agent who is convicted of a felony will lose their security clearance, 

and disciplinary action will be taken to remove them from their position. 

Furthermore, all Department employees, including those in DS, must immediately 

report information of a potentially derogatory nature, including adverse involvement 

with law enforcement agencies, to the Director, Office of Personnel Security and 

Suitability. Depending on the nature of that involvement, it could lead to the suspension and revocation of the employee’s security clearance.

Question. How many current DS personnel are not permitted to engage in sensitive assignments because of their prior criminal records or involvement?

Answer. Currently, 3 of the 1,930 Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) Special 

Agents have been removed from law enforcement duties due to criminal charges or 

pending charges, or nonfelony convictions during their employment with DS.

Question. How many current DS personnel have been removed from sensitive 

assignments or other duties because of misconduct or other inappropriate workplace 

behaviors?

Answer. Currently, 19 of the 1,930 Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) Special 

Agents have been removed from sensitive assignments or other duties because of 

misconduct or other inappropriate workplace behaviors.

Question. How many DS personnel have been terminated or relieved of duties

because of post-hire revelations of prior criminal records or involvement?

Answer. We have reviewed records for the last 5 years and find that no DS personnel have been terminated or relieved of duties based on prior criminal records 

or involvement.

Question. Are individuals with criminal records legally eligible to work for DS?

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Answer. In most circumstances, individuals with criminal records are not automatically barred from working for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. There are a 

number of ways, however, in which a criminal record may render an individual 

ineligible to serve as a Diplomatic Security Special Agent. 

The existence of a criminal record may result in the denial of a federal security 

clearance, which is a prerequisite for a variety of positions with the Federal Government, including DS Special Agents, who are required at hiring to be eligible to be 

granted access to Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented information (TS/SCI). DS 

Special Agents also are sworn Federal Law enforcement officers and must be eligible 

to possess a firearm. The Lautenberg amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922, states a person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor crime of domestic violence may not possess a firearm, which would also bar employment as a Diplomatic 

Security Special Agent. 

In addition, candidates for DS Special Agent positions must pass a suitability review. DS works under the direction of the Bureau of Human Resources Office of 

Recruitment, Examinations, and Employment (HR/REE) in the recruitment and 

assessment of DS Special Agents. 

If agent candidates pass all phases of pre-employment screening/testing (application prescreening, written and oral assessments), they are given a conditional offer 

of employment and provided with the security and medical clearance paperwork. 

Once clearances are obtained, candidates will undergo the final suitability review 

process. Candidates must pass the final suitability review before being placed on the 

hiring register and assigned an entrance on duty date. 

The final suitability panel consists of two members—an examiner from HR/REE 

and a former Special Agent subject-matter-expert from DS. Both panel members 

review the reports of investigation prepared by the Office of Personnel Security and 

Suitability (DS/SI/PSS) and make a suitability determination, based on the Final 

Review Panel (FRP) criteria. If the panel members are not in agreement, the HR/

REE Director assigns a third individual to serve as the tie breaker. If the candidate 

fails the final suitability review, their candidacy is terminated. 

Terminated candidates may appeal a finding of unsuitability. Appeals must be 

submitted in writing within 60 days of receiving a denial letter, or the candidate 

must request an extension in writing from the HR/REE Director. As outlined in the 

FRP denial letter, an appeal must provide new or additional information that specifically addresses the grounds for denial as laid out in the letter, which clearly indicates that the panel’s decision was based on inaccurate information, and thus was 

in error. An appeals panel consisting of two assessors with no previous contact with 

the case will adjudicate appeals. 

In adjudicating the case, the panel is limited in its review to the reasons for the 

initial denial of suitability cited in the letter to the candidate and must base its 

decision only on the new information provided by the candidate in the appeal. The 

chair of the panel will draft a report of findings, and the approval or denial letter 

for the HR/REE Director’s signature. If the panel fails to reach consensus, the HR/

REE Director will make the final determination. 

In assessing candidates’ suitability, the panel applies the Department’s Standards 

for Appointment and Continued Suitability, which are set out in the Foreign Affairs 

Manual (FAM). The FAM 4130 states that ‘‘criminal, dishonest, or disgraceful conduct’’ may constitute grounds for disqualifying an applicant based on suitability. 

During the suitability review, the panel considers such factors as criminal history, 

past drug or alcohol abuse, and misconduct in prior employment. Although a past 

criminal violation does not automatically disqualify a person for service, it would be 

a strong indicator against employment and would be scrutinized intently, considering the nature of the offense, the age when it occurred, and any extenuating circumstances. Because DS Special Agents serve as law enforcement officers, they are 

held to a higher standard than other applicants and their suitability review is more 

stringent.

Question. Is DS functionally a federal law enforcement agency?

Answer. Yes. To counter global threats, the Office of the Chief Special Agent, the 

forerunner of diplomatic security, was formed in 1916. It was not until 1985, in the 

aftermath of the Beirut bombings, that DS became a Bureau within the State 

Department. Diplomatic Security (DS) Special Agents are sworn federal law enforcement officers who are responsible for the security of U.S. Government personnel, 

property, and sensitive information throughout the world. DS Special Agents are 

also responsible for the protection of the Secretary of State, certain foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, and others as designated by the Secretary of State. 

Major activities include protective services, management of security programs for 

Foreign Service posts, criminal investigations, and background investigations. 

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The Diplomatic Security Service operates under several statutory authorities, 

including: The Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act, signed in 1986, which is the basic 

authorizing legislation. Under this act, the Secretary of State has responsibility to 

develop policies and programs for the protection of all U.S. Government personnel, 

including military personnel who fall under Chief of Mission authority, on official 

duty abroad; security at U.S. diplomatic missions abroad; and security at State 

Department facilities in the United States. 

In addition, 22 U.S.C. § 2709 provides Special Agents of the Diplomatic Security 

Service with the authority to conduct criminal investigations concerning passport or 

visa fraud. DS agents have the statutory authority to protect visiting foreign dignitaries, the Secretary of State, and other official representatives of the U.S. Government as directed. The statute also gives DS agents the authority to carry firearms 

and to obtain and execute federal search and arrest warrants. 

The National Intelligence Reform Act gives DS the lead authority in the United 

States for developing a plan to stop U.S. visa and passport fraud worldwide. In April 

2005, a new law was signed by President George W. Bush, which expanded legal 

authorities for DS agents. DS Agents are also authorized to make arrests without 

a warrant for any federal offense committed in their presence or for probable cause. 

These expanded authorities are a tremendous benefit to DS agents in that they 

immediately enhance DS’s effectiveness in fulfilling its critical law enforcement role.

Question. Have any State Department personnel ever instructed any DS personnel 

or other State Department personnel to make exceptions to otherwise applicable hiring rules and regulations, or otherwise take any actions outside the normal course 

of their duties, with respect to the hiring of an individual with a criminal record 

to work in DS? If the answer is yes, please provide their names and all correspondence and documents related to such requests.

Answer. No; there is no record that any State Department personnel have ever 

instructed any DS personnel or other State Department personnel to make exceptions to otherwise applicable hiring rules and regulations, or otherwise take any 

actions outside the normal course of their duties, with respect to hiring an individual with a criminal record to work in DS.

Question. Please provide a detailed analysis comparing the benefits State Department personnel would receive under S. 980, as introduced (e.g., death gratuity, supplemental life insurance, survivors education, intern gratuities, and retroactive payments) to comparable benefits for: 

(a) Current FSO benefits; 

(b) Benefits for DOD service members; 

(c) Benefits for federal employees in the intelligence community serving overseas; and 

(d) Benefits for other non-FSO federal civilian employees. 

Please include in this analysis the amounts paid into any such benefit programs 

by each category of beneficiaries.

Answer (a). The death gratuity and associated benefits that are payable to the 

designated beneficiaries of a Department of State employee who is killed in the line 

of duty are highly variable, and depend largely on such factors as the employee’s 

current salary, total years of creditable service, the total life insurance coverage 

selected, the number of surviving dependents, and how long the survivors live to collect benefits. The various benefits and options available can be found in the 

attached tab regarding compensation available to families of Foreign Service and 

Civil Service Employees.

Answer (b). As of July 2012, our understanding of the broad outlines of certain 

relevant Department of Defense benefits to service members is as follows:

Death Gratuity: $100,000 or one year’s salary, whichever is greater 

Burial Costs: up to $8,800

Insurance: $400,000

Educational Benefit: $936 per month for full-time attendance (per spouse/child) [up 

to 45 months] 

Children (per child): $486 per month (up to age 22 if still in school) 

Social Security Benefits: [per SSA entitlement] 

Pension: average of 3 high salary x 75% x 55%

We refer you to the Department of Defense for more detailed information.

Answer (c). The Department of State does not possess this information. We refer 

you to the individual agencies, which would be better positioned to provide the information.

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Answer (d). The chart provided in the attached tab also discusses the benefits 

available to Civil Service employees, regardless of agency (only Title 22 authorizations are limited to the Foreign Service). We refer you to individual agencies for 

additional information.

ATTACHMENT:

COMPENSATION THAT MAY BE PROVIDED TO ELIGIBLE FAMILIES OF DECEASED U.S. PERSONNEL: 

U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE (FS) EMPLOYEES, CIVIL SERVICE (CS) EMPLOYEES, AND FOR THOSE 

EMPLOYEES KILLED IN THE LINEOF DUTY AND/OR A TERRORIST INCIDENT 

FECA5 U.S.C 

8133–8137.

Central benefit: Surviving spouse receives monthly—

50% of employee’s 

salary; if dependent 

children, 45% of 

salary plus additional 15% for each 

child up to a total 

of 75% of salary. 

Reductions: Monthly 

survivor benefits are 

reduced if: employee 

was covered under 

FERS or FSPS and 

survivors receive SS 

benefits based on 

deceased’s Federal 

employment. 

Length of survivor 

benefits: Tax-free 

spousal monthly 

benefit is paid for 

life or until remarriage if before age 

55. 

Funeral or burial expenses: Contingent 

upon written approval by DOL. Usually, several months 

are required for 

processing. DOL 

pays up to $800 to 

personal representative. DOL pays up to 

$200 to personal 

representative.

Retirement 

benefits.

Survivor annuity: Paid 

based on applicable 

retirement system: 

FERS, CSRS, FSRDS, 

FSPS. Not payable if 

FECA payments are 

made. 

Election choice: If FECA 

benefit is chosen 

over retirement annuity, survivors may 

receive a lump sum 

payment of the 

deceased’s contributions to relevant 

retirement fund. 

FECA benefit: Most survivors choose FECA 

benefits because 

FECA pays a higher 

amount and are tax 

exempt.

Social Security. Survivor benefits: Payable to qualifying 

surviving spouses 

and dependent children. Dependent 

parents and former 

spouses may qualify. 

Benefit Amount: Lump 

sum of $255 is payable to qualifying 

surviving spouse. If 

no qualifying 

spouse, lump sum is 

paid to children eligible for benefits. 

Otherwise no lump 

sum is payable. 

Benefit condition: 

Amount depends on 

SS earnings and 

number of survivors 

eligible for benefits.

Title VI, Section 

651 of Public 

Law 104–208 

(The Omnibus 

Consolidated 

Appropriations 

Act of 1996).

Death Gratuity (for 

funeral and burial 

expenses): Up to 

$10,000 payable to 

personal representative of deceased 

employee. 

Reduction: Payment 

must be reduced by 

amount of DOL payment toward funeral 

and administrative 

expenses (up to 

$1,000). 

Benefit reality: Since 

FECA typically pays 

out $1,000 for 

funeral and administrative expenses, 

State’s death gratuity payment is 

usually $9,000 and 

is taxable. FECA provision (*8102a) 

cited below effective 

1/2008 increased 

the death gratuity 

payment up to a 

maximum of 

$100,000 offset by 

other death gratuities paid out.

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39

COMPENSATION THAT MAY BE PROVIDED TO ELIGIBLE FAMILIES OF DECEASED U.S. PERSONNEL: 

U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE (FS) EMPLOYEES, CIVIL SERVICE (CS) EMPLOYEES, AND FOR THOSE 

EMPLOYEES KILLED IN THE LINEOF DUTY AND/OR A TERRORIST INCIDENT—Continued

*FECA 8102a 

(Section 1105 

of Public Law 

110–181) January 2009.

Death gratuity: The 

USG pays a death 

gratuity of up to 

$100,000 to or for 

the survivor prescribed by subsection (d) immediately upon receiving official notification of the death of 

an employee who 

dies of injuries incurred in connection 

with the employee’s 

service with an 

Armed Force in a 

contingency operation. 

Benefit Amount: The 

death gratuity payable under this 

section shall be 

reduced by the 

amount of any death 

gratuity provided 

under section 413 of 

the Foreign Service 

Act of 1980, section 

1603 of the Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act 

for Defense, the 

Global War on Terror, 

and Hurricane 

Recovery, 2006 

[unclassified], or any 

other law of the 

United States based 

on the same death. 

Beneficiary Reality and 

Form: For an employee who has no 

surviving spouse or 

child and is eligible 

to receive the death 

gratuity, the employee may designate any one or 

more of his/her parents or brothers or 

sisters to receive 

specific shares of 

the gratuity.

Section 413 of 

Foreign Service 

Act, 22 U.S.C. 

3973.

Death gratuity: Payment equal to one 

year’s salary of the 

employee at the time 

of death. Surviving 

dependents of Federal employee who 

dies as a result of 

injuries sustained in 

the performance of 

duty abroad. 

Recipient: Surviving dependents of Federal 

employee who die as 

a result of injuries 

sustained in the 

performance of duty 

abroad. 

Condition: Death must 

be first accepted by 

DOL, in writing, with 

qualifying FECA provision noted, before 

State can authorize 

payment. 

Complications: Processing by DOL may 

take several months. 

Complications 

should be expected 

if terrorism or foul 

play is involved. 

Nexus between death 

and employment 

must be established.

Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, 

5 U.S.C 5570 

and 22 CFR 

192.

Benefit: Payment provided if President 

(through DOJ–FBI) 

determines that 

death was caused 

by hostile action and 

resulted from individual’s relationship 

with the Government. 

Reduction: Payment 

must be reduced by 

any other amount 

payable by USG in 

connection with 

death or disability. 

Benefit Reality: Because of other payment authorized 

above, including 

FECA and Section 

413 of FS Act authorizing 1-year salary, this benefit is 

rarely paid because 

of the offset provision of the law. 

Delegated Authority: 

Secretary of State, in 

consultation with the 

Secretary of Labor. 

Department regulation provides death 

benefit payment for 

either an employee 

or a family member 

of an employee is 

equal to 1 year’s 

salary of the principal at the time of 

death.

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COMPENSATION THAT MAY BE PROVIDED TO ELIGIBLE FAMILIES OF DECEASED U.S. PERSONNEL: 

U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE (FS) EMPLOYEES, CIVIL SERVICE (CS) EMPLOYEES, AND FOR THOSE 

EMPLOYEES KILLED IN THE LINEOF DUTY AND/OR A TERRORIST INCIDENT—Continued

Income Tax Relief 

26 U.S.C. 692.

Federal Income Tax: Not 

applicable, if death 

resulted from injury 

incurred outside the 

U.S. in a terrorist or 

military action for 

the tax year of the 

death and any prior 

taxable year in the 

period beginning 

with the last taxable 

year ending before 

the year in which 

the injury was 

incurred.

Life Insurance: 

Federal Employees Group 

Life Insurance 

(FEGLI).

Payment: Basic Life 

Insurance equal to 

an employee’s rate 

of annual basic pay 

(rounded to the next 

$1,000) plus $2,000, 

or $10,000, whichever is greater. USG 

Payment: 1

⁄3 of the 

cost of Basic Insurance. 

Optional Insurance 

benefits: Employees 

may also be entitled 

to additional optional coverage payment, if employee 

elected it before 

death and paid the 

full cost of Optional 

Insurance. 

Accidental Death: Pays 

additional benefits 

for those who elected Basic Life Insurance and Option A. 

Beneficiary: Unless employee designates a 

specific beneficiary, 

the benefit is paid 

according to the 

order of precedence 

mandated by law. 

Proceeds of FEGLI 

policies paid to designated beneficiaries 

are not taxable as 

income to the beneficiary.

Federal Employees Health 

Benefits Program (FEHBP).

Eligibility: Eligible survivors may continue 

enrollment if deceased employee 

was enrolled for self 

and family at the 

time of death. 

Condition: At least one 

family member is 

entitled to a monthly 

annuity as the survivor of the deceased employee.

Thrift Savings 

Plan (TSP).

Payment: Employee’s 

TSP accounts are 

distributed according 

to the employee’s 

Designation of Beneficiary form. 

Federal Tax: To postpone paying federal 

tax, all or any part 

of the payment may 

be made to an IRA.

Unpaid Compensation 

(Final pay and 

unused Annual 

Leave).

Payment: Designated 

survivor(s) of USG 

employee who are 

killed may receive 

lump sum-payment 

covering final pay 

and unused annual 

leave from the employee’s agency.

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COMPENSATION THAT MAY BE PROVIDED TO ELIGIBLE FAMILIES OF DECEASED U.S. PERSONNEL: 

U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE (FS) EMPLOYEES, CIVIL SERVICE (CS) EMPLOYEES, AND FOR THOSE 

EMPLOYEES KILLED IN THE LINEOF DUTY AND/OR A TERRORIST INCIDENT—Continued

Emergencies in 

the Diplomatic 

and Consular 

Services 

Authority.

Payment: Section 4 of 

the Department of 

State Basic Authorities Act, 22 U.S.C. 

2671, provides that 

the Secretary is 

authorized to make 

expenditures for 

‘‘unforeseen emergencies arising in 

the diplomatic and 

consular service. 

Past Practice: DOS 

used this authority 

to make expenditures related to the 

Nairobi bombing. 

Collective Expenses: 

DOS paid for collective expenses on behalf of all American 

victims (ie., costs of 

arrival ceremony of 

surviving family 

members, meeting 

for families, and 1-

year anniversary 

commemoration 

ceremonies). 

Payments to families: 

DOS used this authority for airfare, 

local transportation, 

lodging, and other 

miscellaneous expenses associated 

with the arrival 

ceremony, funeral 

arrangements, and 

anniversary commemorations. 

Revised November 2011

Æ

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