### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 3, 200 8

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v

. A N D R E D A V IS

Appeal from t he Criminal Court for Shelb y County No. 06-07425 Jame s C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

No. W2007-01442-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed November5, 2008

The de fenda nt, Andre D avis, was c onvicted by a S helby C ounty jury of voluntary manslaughte r, a Class C felony. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the defe ndant t o fourtee n and one- half ye ars a s a Range II I, pe rs ist e nt o ff

e nd e r. In thi s a

pp e a l a s o f righ t, the de fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t th e evi de nc e is ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio n f

or vo lun tary ma ns laug hte r, that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in admi tting a non-testifying witness’s statement fr om a police r eport to impeac h the def endant’ s testimony, that the trial court er red in e xcluding evidenc e of the victim’s prior acts of violenc e and gang af filiation, that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, a nd that these c umulative

err ors deprived the def

endant of his right to a f

air trial and due proce ss. Following our review, we aff irm the judgment of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cr im ina l C our t i s A ff ir me d.

D. K EL LY T HOMAS , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I P TO N , P.J., and A LA N E. G LE NN , J, joined.

Phy lli s Al uk o (o n app e a l) ; Ru sty W hit e a ndW ill ia m Y on klo ws ki ( a t tria l) , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t Pu bli c De fe nd e rs , atto rn e ys fo r a pp e lla nt, An dr e Da vis

.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., At torne y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Da vidH. Fin dle y, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney Ge nera l; James Wax and M ichelle Par ks, Assistant District Attorneys Ge nera l, attorneys for appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

Th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l sh ow s th a t on Ma y 3 1, 20 05 , th e de fe nd a nt s ho t th e vic tim
, Char li e G ip s o n , a f

te r a c o n f r o n tati o n in th e v ic ti m’ s y ar d

. T h e d e f e n d a n t t e s ti f

ie d th a t h is f

r ie nd, An tw on Th omp so n, te le ph on e d h im o n th e e ve nin g o f M a y 3 0 a ndtol d the de fe nd a nt that the vic tim had attac ked Thompson with a knife during a home inva si o n an d robbery. The de fenda nt advised Thompson to telephone the police to report the i ncident. Thompson reportedly told the defe ndant that the police a

rrived to take a re port but showed little interest in investigating the case

.-2-

The ne xt morning, the victim made t h re at en i n g gestures towa rd the de fenda nt from the victim’s front yar d. The defe ndant, Thompson and another friend, Christopher

Bridges, approa ched the victim. The def

endant wa lked to t h e h o m e ar m ed with a big stick and a pistol. Witnesses testified that the victim felt threatened a nd ran to the ba ckyar d of the re sidence . The de fenda nt pu rs ue d th e vic tim

fr om an a djo ini ng ya

rd

. Th e de fe nd a nt te sti fi e d tha t the vic tim app ro a c he d h im with what he thought to be a gun, so he fired his pistol while retre at i n g. Other w itnesses rec alled hearing two shots fired. F orensic e vidence showed that a bullet ricoche ted from a

tree and struck the victim. Memphis Pol ice Of fi ce r B o b b y J ones found the vic tim in t he yar d bleeding fr om the chest. The victim identified the defe ndant as his shooter be fore bleeding to death at the s cene

. The defe ndant testified that he only fired his gun beca use he w anted to sca

re the victim. He also stated that he wa s sorry for

what had ha

ppened and did not intend to kil l the victim.

Ba se d u po n th is e vid e nc e , th e jury co nv ic te d the de fe nd a nt o f v olu nta ry ma ns laug hte r a s a le s s e r in c lu d e d o f

f e n s e o f th e in d ic te d o f

f e n s e , f ir s t d e g r e e mu r d e r

. T h e tria l c o u r t s entenc ed the defe ndant to fourtee n and one-half years as a R ange I II, pe rsistent offe nder ba sed upon its findings that th e de fe nd a nt h a d a

pr e vio us his tory o f c ri min a l c on vic tio ns be yo nd that ne c e ssa ry to e sta bli sh his sentencing ra nge, the defe ndant employed a firea rm during the commission of the offe nse and the def endant had no hesitation about committing a crime in w hich the risk to human life wa s high. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) , (10) & (11) (2003).

ANALY SIS

Initial to our revie w, we must addre ss the effec t of t he ti meliness of t he defenda nt’s motion for ne w t rial. The trial court entered judgment in this case on April 3, 2007. As noted by the state
, the re cord r efle cts that the def endant’ s motion for new trial wa s filed one day late on May 4, 2007. In his reply brie f, the de fenda nt acknowle dges bot h the untimely filed motion for new tria l and the subsequent untimely filed notice of appea l. He now a sks this court to waive the timely filing of the notice of a

ppeal in an e ffort to address e ach issue a lleged on appe al.

The thirty-da y filing deadline of a motion for new trial is mandatory, jurisdictional, a nd may not be extende d. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 45(b); State v. Ma rtin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Consequently, “[ a] motion for ne w trial which is n o t t i m el y fi l ed is a nullity.” State v. Dodson, 780 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) . Subsequent revie w or c onsiderations by the trial court or agre ements of pa rties to hear

a late-filed mot ion will not validate the motion for the purposes of appellate revie w. Id.; State v. Da vis, 748 S.W.2d 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Failure to f ile a tim e ly m oti on fo r n e w t

ri a l will re su lt in the wa ive r of a ll ap pe llate iss ue s tha t w ou ld r e su lt in the granting of a

new tria l. Dodson, 7 8 0 S

. W.2d at 780; S tate v. Williams, 675 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). Howe ver, while t his court cannot revie w t hose grounds upon which a new trial was soug ht, we may

revie w those issues which would r esult in dismi ssal. Tenn. R. App. P . 3(e) ; Wil liams, 675 S.W .2d at 501; se e also State v. Givhan, 616 S.W .2d 612, 613 (Tenn. Cr i m

. Ap p. 1980). Ther efor e, we conclude that the def endant’ s issues reg ardingthe admission of evidenc e have been w aived a

nd that only the issues related to the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e and the propriety of the trial cour

t’s sentenc ing ma

y be re viewed. Al so , c on tr ary to the de fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt i n h is r e ply brief, e videntiary issues wa ived by the fa ilure to file a timely motion for new tr i al ca nnot be-3-

revie wed pur suant to this court’s waive r of a timely filed notice of a

ppeal. Such issues would not result in the dismissal of the case and ar e ther efor e wa ived.

Additionally , we a dvise that Rule 4(a) of the T en n es s ee Rules of Appellate Procedur e

re qu ir e s th e fi lin g of

a no ti ce of appea l w ith in t hir ty da y s o f t he e ntr y of jud g me nt o r, purs ua

nt t o Rule 4(e) , the entry

of an or der denying motion for new trial. B eca use the de fenda

nt’s motion for new tria l was a nullity , it did not t oll the thirty -day period for filing the notice of a

ppeal. The ref

ore, the not ice of appea l in this case was also untimely

. See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; Davis, 748 S.W.2d at 207. Th e tim e ly fi lin g of a no tic e of

a pp e a l is not a pre requisite to the j urisdiction of t his court, and this court may waive the require ment in the interest of justice. T enn. R. App. P. 4(a) . I n thi s ca s e, we co n cl ude that the inter est of justice require s that we wa ive the timely filing of the notice of a ppeal in orde r to revie w the suff iciency of the evidenc e and the propriety of the trial c ourt’s imposition of sentence.

Sufficiency of the E

videnc e

The de fenda

nt contends that the e vidence is insufficient to support his conviction for voluntary manslaug hter. The crux of his claim on appea l is that the jury should have found that he did no t c omm it a

kn ow ingand

int e nti on a l ac t but inst e a d ac te d in sel f- de fe ns e . The de fe nd ant a lso asks this court to “we igh and evaluate the evidenc e” to deter mine “whe ther sufficient evidence wa s introduced to a

uthorize the jury

to rejec t [ his] claim of sel f- d ef ense.” The state c ontends that the

e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the jur y ’s ve rd ic t.

An appe llate cour

t’s standard of

revie w when the defe ndant questions the sufficie ncy of the

e v id e n c e o n a

p p e a l is “ w h e th e r , a f

te r v ie w in g th e e v id e n c e in th e li g h t mo s t f av o rable to the
prosec ution, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the cr ime beyond

a re a so na ble do ub t.” Jac ks on

v. Vi rg ini a

, 44 3 U .S. 30 7, 31 9, 99 S. Ct. 2 78 1, 27 89 (1 97 9) (e mph a sis in orig inal). The a

ppellate c ourt does not rew eig h the evidence; rather, it presumes that the jury has resolved a ll conflicts in the testimony and dra wn all re asonable infere nces f rom the evide nce in f

avor of the state. See State v. Sheff ield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. Questions reg arding witness cre dibilit y , conflicts in testimony , and the weig ht and value to be g iven to evidenc e we re r esol v ed b y t h e j u ry . See State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . A g uilty verdic t removes the presumption of innoce nce a nd repla ces it with a presumption of g u i l t , an d o n appeal the def endant ha s the burden of

illust ratingwhy

the evidenc e is insufficient to support the jury ’s v er d ict. I d.; State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . This standard a pplies to findings of guilt based upon direct e vidence , circ umstantial evidenc e, or a combination of both direc t and circ umstantial evidence . State v. Penderg rass, 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1999).-4-

A conviction for

voluntary

manslaug hter re quires proof beyond a re asonable doubt that the de fe nd ant i nte nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

kil le d th e vic tim“ in a

state of pa ssi on pr od

uc e d b y a de qu a te provocation sufficient to lead a rea sonable person to act in an irra tional manner.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211( a). T h e evidence pr esente d shows that the def endant involved himself in a confr ontation with the vi ctim, whom the defendant believed had previously assaulted a friend a nd who had g ener ally

been a threatening individual in the community

. He approa ched the victim armed with not only a stick but a lso a pistol for the purpose of, acc ording to the defe nd an t , h av i n g a dis c us sio n. I n sp ite of his avo we d fe ar of the vic tim , th e de fe nd ant f oll ow e d th e re tr e a tin g vic tim to the victim’s backyard where he ultimately fired his pistol toward the vic t i m

. Al though the defe ndant claimed he felt threa tened by the victim and t houg ht that the victim had a we apon, the evidenc e re veale d that the vi ctim was unarmed at the t ime of the incide nt. Despite the de fenda nt’s argument to the cont ra ry

on appea l, it was within the jury ’s province to rejec t his theoryof selfdefe nse. We conclude that the evide nce is suff icient to support his conviction for voluntary manslaug hter.

Sentenc ing

The de fenda

nt also contends that the tria l court er red in its application of e nhance ment fac tors. He does not dispute his status as a Rang e I I I , persistent off ender but contends that the trial court should not have imposed a sentenc e of f

ourtee n and one- hal f y ea rs , n ear ly the maxim um

a llo we d f or his ra ng e c la ssi fi c a tio n. Th e de fe nd ant w a s c on vic te d o f v olu nta ry mans l a u ght e r, a Cla ss C f e l o n y , w i t ha

p o s s i b l e s e n t e n c e o f

t e nt o f i f t e e ny e ar s a s a

R an g e III
, p e r s i s t e n t o f

f e n d e r

. In

arr iving at the leng th of sentenc e, the tria l court i mposed the following enhanc ement fa ctors found in Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-35-114 (2003):

(2) The defe ndant has a prev i o u s history

of cr iminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to thos e nec essar y to establish the appropr iate ra ng e;

(10) T h e defenda

nt possessed or e mploy ed a f irea rm, explosi ve devic e or othe r deadly wea pon during the commission of the offe nse; and

(1 1) Th e de fe nd ant ha d no he sit a tio n ab out com mittin g a c ri me in wh ic h th e ri sk to human life wa s high.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) , (10), ( 11) (2003) . I n deter mining the leng th of sentenc e, the tria l court stated that it g ave a gre at dea l of weig ht to the defe ndant’s history of cr iminal convictions and the use of a

g un in the co mmissi on of the off ense. H e found f

actor (11) a pplicable ba sed upon evidenc e that the defe ndant fired the gun i nto the backy ard with littl e reg ard for ot her pe rsons prese nt in the are a. The defe ndant takes issue with the application of fac tor (11) be cause , he ar g ues, thereThe s ent enc i ng he ar i ng oc cur r ed on A p ri l 3
, 2 0 0 7

. T h u s , t he t r i al c our t f ol l ow ed St at e v. G om ez , 163 1

S .W .3 d 6 3 2 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 5 ) (G o m e z I) w h ic h h e ld th a t o u r se n te n c in g sc h e m e d id n o t v io la te th e S ix th A m e n d m e n t. G om ez I I w as r el ea s ed on O ct ober 9, 2007.

-5- wa s no e vid e nc e of oth e r pe rs on s pr e se nt in the ba c ky ard wh e n the de fe nd ant fi re d the pi stol. Additionally , the def

endant a rgues t hat t he application of factor (11) violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2431 (2004). The state argues that the trial c ourt place d littl e we ight upon fac tor (11) a

nd that the weig ht of (2) a nd (10) supports the le ng th of the sentenc e.

An appe llate cour

t’s revie w of sentenc ing is de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial cour

t’s deter minat i o n s ar e corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d) ( 2003). As the SentencingCommi ssion Com ments to this s ection note, on a ppeal the b u rd en is on the def endant to show that the sentenc e is improper. This mea ns that if the trial cour

t followed the stat u t ory sentenc ing pr oce d u re , made f indings of f

act that a re a dequate ly

supported in the re cord, a nd g ave due conside ration and pr oper w eig ht t o the fa ctors and pr inciples that are rele vant to sentenc ing under the 1989 SentencingAct, this court may not disturb the sentenc e even if a diffe rent re sult were pref err ed. State v. F letcher , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.

As noted by

the def endant, this o ff

ense was committed prior to the 2005 re visions to t he

se nte nc ing a c t. Are vie w o f the re c or d r e ve a ls that th e de fe nd a nt d id n ot w a ive e x p os t f a c to application of the revisions and that the de fend an t wa s sentenc ed under the forme r ver sion of the

se nte nc ing a c t. See 2005 Te nn. Pub. Act ch. 353, § 18. There fore , the Sixth Amendment prohibition against the use of

judicially determined f

acts, other

than a prior conviction, to incre ase the length of
sentenc e as a n nounced by the United States Supreme Court in Appre ndi v. New Je rsey, 53 0 U .S. 466, 120 S. Ct . 2348 (2000), and its progeny, is implicated in this case and must be addr essed.

Under the law a s it ex isted befor e the 2005 amendments, unless e nhance ment fac tors wer e p r e s e n t , t h e p r e s u mp t i v e s e n t e n c e t o b e i mp o s e d w a s t h e m i n i m u mi nt h e r an g e f o r a C l a s s C f

e l o n y. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (c ) ( 20 03 ). Te nn e ssee’s pre- 20 05 se nte nc inga c t pr ov ide d th a t, proce durally , the trial cour t was to inc rea se the sentenc e within the rang e based on the exis tence of enhanc ement fa ctors and, the n, reduc e the se ntence as appr opriate f or any mitigatingfac tors. I d. at (d), ( e). H oweve r, the Te nnessee Supreme Court rec ently held t hat the trial c ourt’s enha nceme nt of a def endant’ s sentence based on f actor s that had not bee n found by a jury beyond a re asonable doubt vio late d a d e fe nd ant’ s SixthAm e ndme nt r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l a s in te rp re te d b y

the Sup re me Court

. State v. Gomez, 239 S.W .3d 733, 740 (Tenn. 2007) (“G omez I I ”) ( citing Cunning ham v. California, 549 U.S. 2 7 0
, 1 2 7 S

. C t

. 856, 860 (2007)) ; see a lso Blake ly , 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S. Ct . at 2536 (“‘ Other than the fac t of a prior conviction, any fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and prove d beyond a re asonable doubt.’” (quoting Appre ndi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. C t. at 2362-63))

. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the tr ial court’s 1 application of e nhance ment fac tor (11) to the de fenda nt’s sentenc e wa s improper.-6-

Regarding the a

pplication of enha nceme nt fac tor (10), we note that the Supreme Court has held that the defe ndant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is not offended w hen the de fenda nt’s
sentenc e is enha nced ba sed on fa cts admitted by the def endant. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S. Ct . at 2537 (“Our prece dents make c lear . . . that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Appre ndi purposes is the m ax i mum sentence a judge may impose solely on the ba sis of the fac ts refle cted in the jury verdic t or admitted by the def endant.” ) (c itation omit ted; emphas i s i n original); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S. Ct . 856, 860 (2007). At trial, the def endant a dmitted to employ ing a fire arm duringthe commission of the offe nse. Thus, whi l e t h e t rial court’s application of enhanc ement fa ctor (10) would normally violate t he S ixth Amendment, the de fenda nt’s admitting to the fac ts upon which this enhance ment fac tor was based re ndere d the trial court’s application of the enha nceme nt fac tor constitutionally permissibl e.

In applying the e nhance ment fac tor of previous criminal history, the trial court noted that the defe ndant had be en convic ted pre viously of re ckless driving, three counts of driving as a habitual
mot or ve hic le of

fe nd e r, fo ur

c ou nts of

po sse ssi onof

c oc a ine wi th the int e nt t o s ell , f e lon in po sse ssi on of a fi re arm , pos se ssi on of mari juana wi th the int e nt t o s e ll, se ve n c ou nts of drivi ng wi th a suspende d license, simple assault, five counts of simple p o s s ession of a c ontrolled substance
, po sse ssi on of

mor e than . 5 g rams c oc a ine wi th i nte nt to s e ll, tw o c ou nts of po sse ssi on of

a de a dly

wea pon, rec eiving stolen property and petit larc eny. The court stated that it “put a great d eal of weight and a

great deal of e mphasis on [the def endant’ s] prior c onvictions.” Our r eview of the prese ntence report r eveals a substantial history of criminal convic tions spanning twenty year s and culminating with the conviction in this case. The ref ore, w e conc lude that the application of enhanc ement fa ctors (2) and (10) support the i mpositi on of t he fourteen a nd one-ha lf yea r sentenc e of inca rce ration and r ender s the Blakely er ror pr esente d b y the application of enhanc ement fa ctor (11) ha rmless beyond a

rea sonable doubt.

CONCLUSION

Becau s e t he def

endant f ailed to file a

timely moti on for ne w trial, the e videntiary issues raised on app eal ha ve be e n w a ive d. Ho we ve r, ha vin g c on c lud e d th a t th e re qu ir e me nt o f a tim e ly filed no t i ce o f ap peal should be w aived in the inter est of justice, we have r eviewe d the issues of sufficie ncy of the evidenc e and the propriety of the sentenc ing. Following our re view, we conclude that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the conviction for voluntary manslaughter but that the trial
court e rrone ously applied one e nhance ment fac tor to the defe ndant’s sentenc e. Howe ver, w e further conclude that the er

roneous a pplication of this enhancement fa ctor wa s rende red ha rmless by the strength of the r emaining enha nceme nt fac tors rega rding the def

endant’ s previous h is to r

y o f c rimin al convictions and his admitted use of a firea rm during the commission of the off ense. The ref

ore, w e

a ff ir m th e jud gme nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.



### ______________________________ D. KEL LY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE