David H. Finifter and Mark A. Prell

Economic

Research

Service

Economic 

Research

Report

Number 157

November 2013

United States Department of Agriculture

Participation in the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 

and Unemployment Insurance: 

How Tight Are the Strands of 

the Recessionary Safety Net?

SNAP UI

SNAP

& UI
Economic Research Service 

www.ers.usda.gov

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on 

the basis of race, color, national origin, age, disability, and, where applicable, sex, marital status, familial 

status, parental status, religion, sexual orientation, genetic information, political beliefs, reprisal, or because 

all or a part of an individual’s income is derived from any public assistance program. (Not all prohibited 

bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of 

program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 

720-2600 (voice and TDD). 

To file a complaint of discrimination write to USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, 1400 Independence 

Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250-9410 or call (800) 795-3272 (voice) or (202) 720-6382 (TDD). USDA 

is an equal opportunity provider and employer.

United States Department of Agriculture

Visit our website for more information on this topic: www.ers.usda.gov/topics/ foodnutrition-assistance/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-(snap).aspx

Access this report online:

www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-economic-research-report/err157.aspx 

Download the charts contained in this report:

• Go to the report’s index page www.ers.usda.gov/publications/

 err-economic-information-bulletin/err157.aspx 

• Click on the bulleted item “Download err157.zip”

• Open the chart you want, then save it to your computer

Recommended citation format for this publication:

Finifter, David H., and Mark A. Prell. Participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 

Program (SNAP) and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the 

Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 

Service, November 2013.

Cover image: Thinkstock
United States Department of Agriculture

Economic 

Research 

Service

Economic

Research

Report

Number 157

November 2013

Abstract

This report provides nationally representative annual estimates for 2004-09 of households’ 

multi-program or “joint” participation patterns in both the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 

Program (SNAP) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, including breakouts of 

household types categorized by household income relative to poverty, race/ethnicity, and 

education level. SNAP and UI are two strands of the Nation’s recessionary safety net—the 

subset of safety-net programs for which participation is responsive to the business cycle. Using 

data from the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population 

Survey, the study found that an estimated 14.4 percent of SNAP households also received UI 

at some time in 2009 (a recessionary year), an increase of 6.6 percentage points from 2005 (a 

full-employment year). Conversely, an estimated 13.4 percent of UI households also received 

SNAP in 2009, an increase of 2.3 percentage points from 2005. SNAP households with lower 

annual income relative to poverty or with householders who did not complete high school were 

relatively less likely to also have UI, indicating that these populations were relatively more 

likely to rely on SNAP benefits alone (without UI). 

Keywords: SNAP, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Unemployment 

Insurance, UI, multi-program participation, social safety net, recessionary safety net 

About the Authors

David H. Finifter is Professor of Economics (Emeritus) at the College of William and 

Mary. Mark A. Prell is a Senior Economist in the Food Economics Division of the 

Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Constance Kelly of the College of William and Mary for research 

assistance and Christopher O’Leary of the W.E. Upjohn Institute, David Stevens of 

University of Baltimore, and Margaret Andrews, John Kirlin, Mark Nord, Laura Tiehen, 

and Michele Ver Ploeg of USDA, Economic Research Service for their comments and 

reviews of this report. We also thank Susmita Pendurthi and Cynthia A. Ray for editorial 

and design assistance. 

David H. Finifter and Mark A. Prell

Participation in the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and 

Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are 

the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?
ii

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Contents

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

SNAP and Unemployment Insurance as Two Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net. . . . . . . 1

Joint Participation Rates: Definitions and Determinants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Data and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Recession Increased SNAP, UI, and Joint Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Recessionary Caseloads and Changes in Joint Participation Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Joint Participation by Household Income Relative to Poverty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Joint Participation by Race/Ethnicity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Joint Participation by Education Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Appendix 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
www.ers.usda.gov

The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides 

nutrition assistance to low-income individuals and households that meet certain eligibility criteria. 

The Unemployment Insurance (UI) program of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) provides 

financial support to experienced workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own. 

SNAP and UI are two strands of the recessionary safety net—the subset of safety-net programs for 

which participation responds countercyclically. Economic downturns result in wider eligibility and 

participation in the two programs, increasing expenditures on program benefits. During the 2007-09 

recession, some households received benefits from only one of these programs, while others 

received benefits from both SNAP and UI (joint participation). 

What Is the Issue?

Households that participate jointly in both programs can improve their ability to sustain food 

expenditures, nutrition, and overall standard of living during times of economic challenge. To 

what extent do SNAP or UI households receive benefits from the other program? How is joint 

participation affected by changing macroeconomic conditions? What types of SNAP households 

tend to rely on SNAP alone, without UI, even in the midst of recession? This report answers these 

and related questions by examining participation patterns at the national level across 2004-09 and 

across households categorized by annual income relative to poverty, race/ethnicity, and education. 

Findings may inform efforts by local SNAP and UI offices to enhance cross-program access for 

eligible participants. 

What Did the Study Find?

• The recession not only increased the number of SNAP households but also altered the mix of 

participating households. An estimated 14.4 percent of SNAP households also received UI at 

some point in 2009 (a recessionary year)—nearly double the estimate of 7.8 percent in 2005 

(a full-employment year). During a recession, households with tight labor market connections

(their members have work histories and earnings sufficient to meet UI-eligibility requirements 

upon unemployment) become a larger component of the SNAP caseload, increasing the overall 

share of SNAP households that also receive UI. 

United States Department of Agriculture

A report summary from the Economic Research Service November 2013

ERS is a primary source 

of economic research and 

analysis from the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, 

providing timely information on economic and policy 

issues related to agriculture, 

food, the environment,and 

rural America.

Find the full report 

at www.ers.usda.

gov/publications/erreconomic-researchreport/err-157.aspx

David H. Finifter and Mark A. Prell

Economic 

Research 

Service

Economic 

Research 

Report 

Number 157

November 2013

United States Department of Agriculture

Participation in the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 

and Unemployment Insurance: 

How Tight Are the Strands of 

the Recessionary Safety Net?

SNAP UI SNAP

& UI

David H. Finifter and Mark A. Prell

Participation in the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and 

Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the 

Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?
• An estimated 13.4 percent of UI households also received SNAP at some point in 2009, an increase of about 

one-fifth over the estimate of 11.1 percent from 2005.

• The share of SNAP households that also receive UI initially increases with householder education until 

reaching a plateau for households with a high school diploma or greater. Conversely, SNAP-only participation—receipt of SNAP benefits without any support from the UI system— is greatest for households with less 

than 9th grade education: 92 percent of this subgroup of SNAP households participated in SNAP alone, with 

no support from the UI system at any time during the year. Thus, households that are most prone to rely on 

SNAP alone are the least well-off, most vulnerable households as measured by education. 

• UI households’ participation in SNAP decreases as education levels increase—e.g., UI households with a bachelor’s degree or higher are less likely to also receive SNAP than those without a high school diploma. 

• Below-poverty SNAP households tend to rely on SNAP alone, without UI, more than SNAP households with 

higher annual income relative to poverty.

How Was the Study Conducted?

This study used household data on SNAP receipt and UI receipt, as well as household characteristics, from the 

Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement, which is administered by the U.S. Census Bureau each year 

in February, March, and April as a supplement to the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). The study used 

an annual timeframe that treats a household as a SNAP, UI, or joint participant if the household was supported by 

benefits from SNAP, UI, or both programs at some time during a given year (not necessarily in the same month). 

www.ers.usda.gov

JPRs for SNAP and UI programs are responsive to economic conditions, 2004-09 

Note: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) is the share of SNAP 

households that also receive Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. The UI JPR is the share of UI households that also 

receive SNAP benefits. 

Sources: JPRs were calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 

Current Population Survey for reference years 2004-09. The unemployment rate is the annual average of the seasonally 

adjusted civilian unemployment rate among all civilian workers, as reported in table B-42 of the Economic Report of the 

President, 2011.

Percent

8.4 7.8

7.0

6.0

9.8

14.4

10.1 11.1 10.5

9.5

12.0

13.4

5.5

5.1 4.6 4.6

5.8

9.3

 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2004 05 06 07 08 09

UI Joint Participation Rate

SNAP Joint Participation Rate

Unemployment rate
1

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Participation in the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and 

Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are 

the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?

David H. Finifter and Mark A. Prell

SNAP and Unemployment Insurance as 

Two Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net 

This report examines multi-program participation patterns for the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 

(USDA) Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the Unemployment Insurance 

(UI) program of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The research was motivated by the 2007-09 

recession and the recognition that households may receive benefits from more than one government 

program as they try to put together the resources to get them through times of economic challenge. 

The recession was the longest of the post-WWII era and unemployment increased sharply (Bureau 

of Labor Statistics, 2010). The economic downturn increased SNAP participation and UI participation, with SNAP providing food assistance to households that meet certain eligibility criteria and 

UI providing financial support to experienced workers who become unemployed through no fault 

of their own. The study examined the extent to which the recession increased joint participation—

multi-program participation in both SNAP and UI.1

The study focused on household-level analysis under the assumption that a household’s pooled 

resources—including household income, SNAP benefits, and UI benefits—are shared among the 

members of a household, touching the lives of everyone in the household. A SNAP, UI, or joint 

household is defined as a household in which (one or more) members receive benefits from, respectively, SNAP, UI, or both programs. Because participation is measured at the household level, these 

households may also be referred to as SNAP, UI, or joint participants, respectively. The report’s 

participation rates (for one program or for both programs jointly) are also primarily measured at the 

household level; the denominators for various participation rates involve U.S. households, SNAP 

households, and UI households.2

The severity of the recent recession, and the lingering unemployment in its aftermath, have focused 

attention on the roles of various government support programs in providing a safety net during a 

1To conduct programmatic research on joint participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 

and Unemployment Insurance (UI) before and during the recent recession, the Economic Research Service (ERS) has 

partnered with several research organizations, some of which examine SNAP and UI receipt using administrative data 

from selected States. This study is a component of the ERS SNAP-UI research program. 

2For our study, we defined the term “participation” to refer to receipt of a program benefit paid by the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), by Unemployment Insurance (UI) or, for joint participation, by both programs. 

In some contexts, employed workers may be deemed to be “participants” in the UI system if they would be eligible to 

receive UI benefits upon losing the job through no fault of the worker. We use the term “UI covered” rather than the term 

“UI participant” to describe these workers.
2

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

period of economic challenges. The study distinguished between two concepts of a safety net. In 

the broadest sense, the social safety net includes the whole set of programs, both means-tested 

and social insurance programs, that aim to protect individuals and households with cash, in-kind 

benefits, and certain tax expenditures such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. To contrast with that 

full array of programs, the study developed the concept of the recessionary safety net—the subset 

of social safety-net programs for which participation is counter cyclical, expanding during economic 

downturns and shrinking during times of economic growth.3 A program in the recessionary safety 

net performs two related functions that can be described as “well-being and stabilization” or as 

“micro and macro.” First, the program fosters well-being at the microeconomic level of the participating household, with government support for program participation increasing during a recession. Second, during a recession, with national participation expanding and the national total of the 

program’s benefits rising, the program helps lift aggregate household spending and keeps the macroeconomic downturn from being as severe as it would have been in the absence of the program (see 

box, “SNAP and UI as Macroeconomic Stabilizers”). 

It is well known that SNAP participation and UI participation each increased in the 2007-09 recession. 

However, little is known about SNAP-UI joint participation—the combined receipt of benefits from 

both programs. Among the programs in the recessionary safety net, SNAP and UI have two features 

that make studying their joint participation patterns an especially promising area for programmatic 

research. First, SNAP and UI are relatively large, with millions of participants in each. Second, the 

dollar values of SNAP benefits and UI benefits can account for a large share of a participating household’s resources, supporting its well-being when earnings or other resources are low.4

The study addressed two broad, interrelated issues: 

(1) joint participation in both SNAP and UI, and

(2) the lack of joint participation; the absence of joint participation can be no less important 

than its presence. 

The study addressed the first issue because joint participants can improve their opportunities to sustain 

a household’s food expenditures, nutrition, and overall standard of living by receiving benefits from 

both SNAP and UI. From the perspectives of USDA and DOL, and many who are concerned about 

the well-being of those with low income and who face unemployment, it is programmatically important to foster joint participation among those who are eligible for benefits from both programs. The 

importance given by USDA and DOL to promoting joint participation is conveyed in a Training and 

Employment Notice issued in March 2009 by the Employment and Training Administration (ETA), 

the DOL agency responsible for administering UI at the Federal level. The Notice stated that ETA and 

the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), the USDA agency that administers SNAP at the Federal level, 

“are working to ensure that the nation’s unemployed and under-employed workers are aware of the full 

range of income assistance available to them and their families during this difficult economic period... 

Food assistance is one more valuable resource to support unemployed or under-employed individuals.” 

(Employment and Training Administration, 2009, pp. 1-2). 

3Although our study focuses only on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Unemployment Insurance, other 

Federal programs are potentially in the recessionary safety net. These include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 

(TANF), Supplemental Security Income for disabled adults and children who have limited income, and Medicaid. 

4This report investigates participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Unemployment Insurance without examining the amounts of benefits. Future research could potentially examine the household benefits levels 

of the two programs, singly and in combination. 
3

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Our study addressed the second issue—the lack of joint participation—by identifying SNAP-only 

households (SNAP households that do not receive UI) and UI-only households (UI households that 

do not receive SNAP).5 The lack of joint participation can be a targeting and distributional issue. 

For example, when examining the most vulnerable households that have the least income or the least 

education, the extent to which they are SNAP-only households captures their reliance on SNAP 

alone (without UI benefits). For SNAP-only households, SNAP is an especially critical resource 

as potentially the largest source of government support—and perhaps the only source (depending 

on participation in programs besides UI, such as cash welfare, housing assistance, etc., which this 

report does not examine). Relatedly, the existence of SNAP-only or UI-only households points to 

a possible “gap in the safety net” if some households are not receiving program benefits (from the 

5Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or Unemployment Insurance (UI) participants may receive 

benefits from government programs besides SNAP or UI, but these programs were not part of our SNAP-UI study. For 

studies that examine relationships between UI and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), see O’Leary and 

Kline (2008, 2010). See Cole and Lee (2004) for a study that examines multi-program participation in SNAP and the 

Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).

SNAP and UI as Macroeconomic Stabilizers 

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) 

respond to the business cycle, with participation and benefits expanding and providing increased 

support during a recession and then shrinking as economic conditions improve and households 

recover employment and income. Government assistance programs that function as macroeconomic stabilizers help sustain aggregate household spending and national production in 

economic downturns, making the downturns less severe than they would be in the absence of the 

programs. The program effects on both Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and on jobs have been 

estimated for SNAP (Hanson, 2010) and for UI (Chimerine et al., 1999). 

New legislation can affect SNAP or UI and provide additional support for household spending 

and national production. A 2010 study on the stabilizing effects of UI explained: “The cyclical 

response of regular UI benefits during recessions is often enhanced through legislation. 

Specifically, during recessions, typically there has been some form of federally financed UI 

benefit extensions. Thus, the regular program together with federally financed temporary benefit 

extensions can have a substantial impact in cushioning the negative effects of recessions on the 

U.S. economy.” (Vroman, 2010, emphasis added). For example, UI benefits were extended by the 

Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC) program established by the Supplemental 

Appropriations Act of 2008, expanded by the Unemployment Compensation Extension Act 

of 2008, and extended by a series of successive Acts. The EUC program is “a Federal temporary extension of unemployment compensation for unemployed individuals who have already 

collected all regular state benefits for which they were eligible.” (Employment and Training 

Administration, 2012). Similarly, national legislation in 2008 provided a temporary increase 

in SNAP benefits for all SNAP participants and expanded eligibility for jobless adults without 

children (Nord and Prell, 2011). Thus, some portion of the increased support that SNAP and 

UI provide during a recession to households and the economy—the “automatic” component—

would occur even in the absence of changes to the program. However, the full amount of support 

includes the effects of legislated changes to program benefits and eligibility that may themselves 

be prompted by recessionary conditions.
4

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

other program) for which they are eligible. A lack of joint participation points to the possibility for 

enhanced outreach and coordination between local SNAP and UI offices to promote joint participation. At the same time, from the front-line perspective of a local SNAP office, joint participation 

does add to the volume and complexity of the workload (see box, “Joint Participation in SNAP and 

UI Complicates SNAP Administration”).

To address the two broad issues involving the presence and the absence of joint participation, the 

study had two research goals. The first was to examine the extent of joint participation between 

SNAP and UI nationally, particularly in recessionary conditions. That is, how “tight” are these two 

strands of the recessionary safety net? How does joint participation during the recession compare 

to joint participation at full employment? The study developed national estimates for four measures 

of joint participation: the number of joint households supported by both SNAP and UI, and the 

numbers of joint households as a share of, respectively, U.S. households, SNAP households, and UI 

households. The last two measures were central to the study:

• We define the SNAP Joint Participation Rate (SNAP JPR) as the share of SNAP households

that are joint households (i.e., the share of SNAP households that also receive UI).6 Some 

SNAP households are financially needy specifically because of unemployment and may receive 

UI benefits. 

• Similarly, the UI Joint Participation Rate (UI JPR) is defined as the share of UI households that 

are joint households (i.e., the share of UI households that also receive SNAP). Some UI households meet SNAP’s income-eligibility limits because each UI household has an unemployed 

worker who is not receiving earnings (and a household with only one earner loses all earnings 

when that earner becomes unemployed). 

The SNAP JPR and UI JPR are complementary measures that each adopt a “perspective” of either 

SNAP or UI as the lens through which to examine joint participation (i.e., which one serves as the 

“base” program). Each measure is of interest. A SNAP (or UI) household that participates in UI (or 

SNAP) has greater well-being by augmenting its resources. Furthermore, a larger SNAP JPR can be 

desirable because a larger value reflects greater SNAP targeting toward the working poor. The study 

expanded SNAP’s customary notion of the program’s “working poor” to include SNAP households 

with recent earnings (even if earnings in the current month are zero) and thereby considered SNAP 

households that receive UI to be among the working poor.7 Working poor households historically 

participate in SNAP at lower rates than other households and constitute an important target population for SNAP (Castner and Schirm, 2005; Food and Nutrition Service, 2008). 

The second research goal was to examine patterns for SNAP-only and UI-only participation among 

subgroups of households categorized by three characteristics: household annual income relative to 

poverty, race/ethnicity (of the householder), and education (of the householder). For example, the 

study examined the extent to which SNAP households with various levels of education also receive 

6The Food and Nutrition Service and others use the term “SNAP Participation Rate” to express the number of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participants as a share of the number who are estimated to be eligible for the 

program. In contrast, this study’s two Joint Participation Rates do not integrate eligibility criteria into their definitions. 

7The customary notion of “working poor” in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program refers to current monthly 

earnings; this terminology serves to distinguish those who have labor market connections from, say, retired couples with 

no earnings. Those who receive Unemployment Insurance (UI) had earnings in the recent past (as a requirement for UI 

eligibility) and, unlike retired people, are likely to have earnings again. Due to these labor market connections, we use 

the term “worker” to describe UI recipients—as does the UI program—despite the absence of current monthly earnings.
5

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

UI and, reciprocally, the extent to which they are SNAP-only participants. Do households with less 

than a high school education participate in SNAP alone, without UI, more than other households 

do? Even during a recession? Do households with a college education tend to participate in UI alone, 

without SNAP, more than other households do? 

To address its research goals, the study used nationally representative annual data for 2004-09 to 

estimate: 

1. The extent of joint participation during the 2008-09 recession;8

2. How SNAP, UI, and joint participation patterns changed over time as macroeconomic 

conditions worsened from earlier years; 

3. How joint, SNAP-only, and UI-only participation patterns varied across subgroups of 

households during the recession; and

4. How joint, SNAP-only, and UI-only participation patterns for subgroups of households were 

affected as macroeconomic conditions worsened from earlier years.

8According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which provides authoritative dating of business 

cycles, the recession began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. In this report, we provide results and analysis that 

are based on annual data. For consistency with our empirical work, our discussion dates the recession as 2008-09 rather 

than 2007-09 even though the NBER dating of the recession includes 1 month in 2007. 

Joint Participation in SNAP and UI Complicates SNAP Administration

Three broad activities can potentially become more complicated for a local Supplemental Nutrition 

Assistance Program (SNAP) office when a household receives Unemployment Insurance (UI):

• SNAP benefit determination. Because UI benefits count as part of household income in 

SNAP, SNAP rules require the local SNAP office to decrease the amount of SNAP benefits it 

issues to the SNAP household based on the level of UI benefits received in the same month.1 

• Churning. SNAP administration is more difficult and (re)application-processing costs are 

higher because of churning—transitions between SNAP participation and nonparticipation over short periods of time (e.g., a few months). SNAP households that also receive UI 

contribute to churning. Receipt of UI by a SNAP household is an indicator that (1) the household recently experienced one labor market transition, from employment to unemployment; 

(2) the household may possibly experience a second labor market transition—from unemployment back to employment—and may exit from SNAP; and (3) the household may re-enter 

SNAP in the future, especially if unemployment recurs following re-employment. 

• Recertification. Even before any re-employment—and the earnings that it would bring— a 

UI-receiving SNAP household for which the prospect of re-employment may be imminent 

poses administrative challenges for SNAP. Recertification by the local SNAP office that a 

SNAP household continues to be income eligible may be more frequent for UI-receiving 

SNAP households than for other SNAP households (e.g., those on fixed incomes).

1Resources and well-being for a Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) household increase with 

Unemployment Insurance (UI) receipt despite the adjustment in SNAP benefits (i.e., the decrease in SNAP benefits 

is smaller than the amount of UI benefits). 
6

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

The study’s findings can inform policy decisions on managing and coordinating the two programs, 

and better serve households that may be accessing only one program when they are eligible for 

both. Altogether, joint participation and the lack of joint participation have implications for issues of 

program design, administration, targeting, and access over the business cycle and across subgroups 

of households. These issues are of interest to officials and managers in SNAP and UI and to the 

programs’ multiple stakeholders, including those seeking to promote program outreach and better 

understanding of the roles of the SNAP and UI programs in the Nation’s social safety net. 
7

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Joint Participation Rates: Definitions and Determinants

SNAP eligibility is determined at the household level, while UI eligibility is determined at the level 

of the individual worker. Yet, the unemployed worker who receives UI benefits is not the only person 

in the household who is better off because of UI. We assumed that UI benefits and SNAP benefits—

like household income—are typically shared among household members. Accordingly, in this study, 

we typically define participation at the household level: a household is a UI (or SNAP) participant 

when one or more members receive UI (or SNAP) benefits.9 We supplement our household-level 

estimates of participation with estimates of the number of people who reside in households that 

receive benefits from SNAP, UI, or both programs.

While the number of joint households, given by J, is one measure of joint participation, our study’s 

two key measures are the SNAP Joint Participation Rate (SNAP JPR) given by J/S (where S is the 

number of SNAP households), and the UI Joint Participation Rate (UI JPR) given by J/U (where U is 

the number of UI households). Each JPR represents a share, a prevalence, or a probability—whichever interpretation and term is most applicable for a particular context. For example, letting H be the 

number of U.S. households and P(X) be the probability of X, the SNAP JPR is: 

( ) ( ). ( ) ( ) 1 | ( ) ( )

      = = = = =      

J

J H P J P U and S SNAP JPR P U S

S S P S P S

H

Thus, the SNAP JPR is equivalent to P(U|S)—the probability of participating in UI conditioned on 

participation in SNAP (or the share of SNAP households that receive UI). Similarly, the UI JPR is 

equivalent to P(S|U).10

We outline a few of the major rules by which eligibility for UI and SNAP is determined.11 The eligibility rules reflect that SNAP and UI are designed, respectively, as a means-tested program and as 

social insurance.12 We describe two figures that provide partial schematics illustrating flows into 

9An alternative to a household-level approach would be to count the number of unemployed workers who receive 

Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits as “UI individuals” and to count them as “joint individuals” if they also receive 

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. If each UI household has one and only one UI individual, 

then the number of joint individuals would equal the study’s count of joint households. If, instead, some UI households 

have two (or more) UI individuals, the number of joint individuals will exceed the number of joint households. We do not 

expect that this alternative approach would affect the study’s major findings.

10Our study’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) and Unemployment 

Insurance (UI) JPR each measure participation in a second program by participants in a given program. For previous 

research that uses a variety of data sources and methodologies to examine participation among eligibles, see Cunnyngham 

et al. (2011) for SNAP, Anderson and Meyer (1997) for UI, Zedlewski (2002) for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 

(TANF), Witte and Queralt (2002) for child-care subsidies, and Remler et al. (2001) for a cross-program review of findings.

11A more complete treatment of eligibility criteria for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program can be found 

in Food and Nutrition Service (2010). The Employment and Training Administration provides an annual compilation of 

State unemployment insurance laws at http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp. Nicholson (1997) and Anderson 

(1997) also provide discussion of UI eligibility.

12Means-tested (or need-based) programs target benefits to those with limited income and provide transfers for no payment or service in return (Congressional Research Service, 2006). They are typically financed from general tax revenues. 

In contrast, a “social insurance” program typically is not means-tested and links benefits to contributions that were paid 

into a fund established specifically for the program. While it is customary to categorize programs as either a “meanstested” or a “social insurance” program, any particular program can blend features from either category. Most broadly, 

even “means-tested” programs have a social insurance aspect in the sense that “coverage” is provided socially, through 

general tax revenues. 
8

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

UI eligibility and SNAP eligibility; we use the term “partial schematic” because the figures capture 

only some of the many complex rules for eligibility in UI or SNAP.

UI Eligibility (Figure 1). The goal of the UI program is to provide benefits to an “experienced 

worker” who loses a job through “no fault” of the worker. As a result, UI eligibility is affected by the 

person’s employment background (the amount of their work experience and whether their job was UI 

covered) and the way the person became unemployed (whether they were “laid off” for “no fault” of 

the worker, “fired for cause,” or quit voluntarily). Figure 1 shows that a person can become unemployed through various flows in the labor market. Only some unemployed people are UI eligible. 

Before becoming unemployed, a UI-eligible person must first be employed in a UI-covered job—one 

for which the employer is required to pay UI taxes. Bassi and McMurrer (1997) note that in recent 

years more than 90 percent of civilian employment has been covered by UI; non-covered workers 

include some workers in agriculture and domestic service, self-employed workers, and employees of 

religious organizations.13 Bassi and McMurrer concluded their review of coverage-policy issues stating:

“While most workers who face a risk of involuntary unemployment are covered 

under the UI system, those workers who remain uncovered are found disproportionately at the low end of the wage distribution and often work in jobs for which 

there is a significant risk of unemployment. Many are workers who have a substantial attachment to the labor force and are workers for whom UI benefits would 

represent a critical component of income support when unemployed” (Bassi and 

McMurrer, 1997, p. 60).

The passage stated that these non-covered workers are “disproportionately at the low end of the 

wage distribution.” If that remains true, then the safety-net function of SNAP can be especially 

important to households with non-covered workers.14

To be UI eligible, an unemployed worker must also have gained sufficient “experience.” Requirements for “experience” vary across States. Common criteria include the number of quarters of 

employment in a worker’s recent work history and the amount of earnings. One phenomenon that 

limits work experience is sporadic employment, by which a worker moves back and forth between 

unemployment and short-lived jobs. Sporadic employment creates interrupted work experience, 

which is prone to become limited work experience, impinging on accumulation of sufficient experience for UI eligibility even if each job is UI covered. Given that most civilian employment is covered 

by UI, the unemployed with limited experience may outnumber the unemployed who are not covered 

by UI. The safety-net function of SNAP is important for both limited-experience and non-covered 

workers—without access to UI, these workers may rely on SNAP during their unemployment spells 

as their major form of government support.

13Bassi and McMurrer state, “A large percentage of agricultural workers remain uncovered by the UI system as a result 

of the ‘small farm’ exclusion, which exempts small farm employers from coverage requirements. This is the most significant remaining gap in the coverage of wage or salaried workers” (Bassi and McMurrer, 1997, p. 56, emphasis added). 

They continue with a qualification: “It should also be noted that eight states have expanded their agricultural coverage 

provisions beyond the federal requirements of the 1976 UI amendments. A large percentage of the nation’s farm workers reside in these eight states, which include the major farm labor states of California, Florida, and Texas” (Bassi and 

McMurrer, 1997, p. 57). 

14Even if non-covered workers tended to be at the low end of the wage distribution in the 1990s, it is possible that the 

tendency has been reduced if there has been an increase in self-employment among higher income workers. 
9

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Finally, an experienced worker in a UI-covered job must lose the job through “no fault” of the 

worker (e.g., due to a slowdown in business) to be UI eligible. The figure uses the term “laid off” 

to refer to this case and the term “fired for cause” to cover termination of employment for a reason 

considered to be the fault of the worker (e.g., late for work). People unemployed for other reasons 

(e.g., those who voluntarily quit or are new entrants or re-entrants to the labor force) are not eligible 

for UI.15 

SNAP Eligibility (Figure 2). The poverty guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) are a monetary measure of household needs based on the number of people 

in the household. A household’s income relative to poverty (IRP) is the ratio of the household’s 

monetary income and the poverty guidelines. To be income-eligible for SNAP, a household’s (gross) 

monthly income (earnings, unearned income including UI, and transfer benefits) must be at or below 

130 percent of poverty (with exceptions).16 

15The statement and the figure require a qualification. A labor force “re-entrant” who could be eligible for Unemployment Insurance (UI) is an experienced worker who is laid off from a UI-covered job, leaves the labor force for a short 

while, and then rapidly re-enters by beginning an active job search. This case of rapid re-entry is implicitly included in 

the blue arrow showing a direct link to UI eligibility for an experienced worker laid off from a UI-covered job. In contrast 

to this case, most re-entrants—such as a college student seeking a summer job or a spouse who starts looking for a job 

after a period of full-time child rearing—are much less likely to have the (recent) work experience to be UI eligible.

16Strictly speaking, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) has two tests on (monthly) household 

income. In addition to the gross income test, SNAP also has a separate limit on “net income” relative to poverty, with 

“net income” defined as gross income less certain deductions and household expenditures. Net income must be below 100 

percent of the poverty guidelines. All households must meet the net income test, but households with a member age 60 or 

more, and households with a disabled member, do not need to meet the gross income test; see Food and Nutrition Service 

(2010) for details. The data we use for our study support analysis of income relative to poverty based on gross income. 

For the remainder of our report, we concentrate on gross income and do not further consider net income. In addition, depending on household circumstances, SNAP also has an eligibility test involving household assets that we do not consider 

because our data source has no asset information. In addition, we do not consider eligibility restrictions on immigrants, 

strikers, students, and other household classifications. 

Figure 1

Labor market flows and individual’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) eligibility 

Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.

Employed, other

Unemployed

Laid off; fired for cause; quit

Employed in UI-covered job & experienced

Fired for cause; quit

Not in labor force New entrants

Re-entrants

Eligible for UI

Laid off
10

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Not all households with an unemployed worker are income-eligible for SNAP. The figure shows 

employment, unemployment, and monthly income dynamics for households A, B, and C:

• Household A is employed in January, with income equal to 80 percent of poverty, so the household is income-eligible for SNAP. In May, the sole worker becomes unemployed, receiving no 

earnings. Due to, say, a limited work history, the worker is ineligible for UI. In May, income is 

zero so SNAP benefits, which are based on monthly income, would increase in that month.

• Household B begins the year ineligible for SNAP, with monthly income at 160 percent of poverty. 

In March, the sole worker becomes unemployed, monthly income drops to zero, and the household is income-eligible for SNAP until May, when a new job is obtained paying the same as 

the earlier job. If the worker applies for and receives UI in March and April, household income 

would not fall to zero—SNAP counts UI benefits as part of income—but might fall to, say, 90 

percent of poverty, as shown. If Household B also applies for and receives both SNAP and UI, 

then it becomes one of the joint households counted in the SNAP JPR and the UI JPR.

• Household C begins the year with income at 200 percent of poverty. When a worker in Household 

C is unemployed in April and May, household income falls but not by enough to be incomeeligible for SNAP: either the household has a second earner or there are sources of income 

(including UI) besides earnings.

Figure 2

Monthly income flows and household’s income eligibility for SNAP

Note: SNAP refers to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, UI refers to Unemployment Insurance, and 

IRP refers to income relative to poverty.

Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.

Monthly household IRP (percent)

0

50

100

150

200

250

January February March April May June

Household C

Household B

Household A

[Household B with UI]

[unemployed]

[unemployed] [unemployed]

SNAP monthly income limit = 130 percent of poverty
11

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

In summary, all three households experienced unemployment. Of these, only two households—A 

and B—were income-eligible for SNAP for at least part of the year. Of these, only Household A was 

income-eligible for SNAP while employed.

Some factors that may increase the likelihood of joint participation in SNAP and UI are: 

• Unemployment. In times of high unemployment (e.g., during the 2008-09 recession), joint participation can increase because of a rise in the number of households with UI-eligible members and 

more households that are income-eligible for SNAP. 

• Cross-program outreach. There is recognition at the Federal level that UI and SNAP have overlapping participants and that actions taken at local offices can facilitate cross-program access for 

eligible participants (see box, “U.S. Department of Labor Encourages SNAP Outreach at Local 

Unemployment Insurance Offices”). As local program offices administer their program, they can 

also conduct cross-program outreach activities, providing information and referrals to applicants 

on the availability and application procedures for the other program. SNAP outreach at UI offices 

may be especially important under recessionary conditions for two reasons. First, the numbers of 

unemployed and low-income people increase during a recession. The second, more subtle reason 

is that the mix of unemployed people, perhaps especially if the recession is a severe one, may 

include a larger share (compared to times of a strong economy) of people who have little, if any, 

familiarity with SNAP’s availability and application process.17

Some factors that may inhibit joint participation in SNAP and UI are:

• UI coverage and eligibility rules. UI and joint participation reflect, and are constrained by, the 

existing framework of rules for UI coverage and eligibility (e.g., an experienced worker must have 

been laid off from a UI-covered job). If one or another of these rules were eased, the resulting 

increase in UI participation would almost certainly include some who are also SNAP participants, resulting in increases in joint participants and in the SNAP JPR (J/S); the effect on the UI 

JPR (J/U) is ambiguous because both numerator and denominator increase.18

• SNAP eligibility rules. SNAP and joint participation reflect, and are constrained by, the existing 

framework of SNAP eligibility rules (particularly income eligibility). If one or another of these 

rules were eased, the resulting increase in SNAP participation would almost certainly include 

some who are also UI participants, resulting in increases in joint participants and in the UI JPR 

(J/U); the effect on the SNAP JPR (J/S) is ambiguous because both numerator and denominator 

increase. Two SNAP rules related to income can reduce joint participation: 

– Multiple-earner households. If a household’s second earner has sufficiently large earnings, the household would not be income-eligible for SNAP even when one earner is not 

working. Thus, a UI household may not be income-eligible for SNAP despite the unem17Many who became unemployed during 2008-09 and received Unemployment Insurance had held a fairly steady job 

with income that (far) exceeded the income limits in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Thus, they 

may not have participated in SNAP for many years— if ever. 

18Strictly speaking, two opposite perspectives that produce two opposite claims are equally valid. The existing rules on 

Unemployment Insurance (UI) coverage and eligibility both (a) inhibit and decrease UI participation compared to what 

it would be under looser rules, and (b) promote and increase UI participation compared to what it would be under tighter 

rules. For simplicity, our discussion is based on just the former perspective. 
12

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

U.S. Department of Labor Encourages SNAP Outreach at Local Unemployment 

Insurance Offices

The March 2009 Training and Employment Notice (No. 35-09) issued by the U.S. Department 

of Labor was addressed to State workforce agencies, State workforce liaisons, State and local 

Workforce Investment Board Directors, and One-Stop Career Center Managers. Portions (which 

we have excerpted) of the Notice stated:

Purpose. This training and employment notice provides information about the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and describes opportunities for One-Stop Career 

Centers to inform customers of the resources available through SNAP. The Department of 

Labor’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA) and the United States Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service are working to ensure that the nation’s unemployed and under-employed workers are aware of the full range of income assistance available 

to them and their families during this difficult economic period. [emphasis added]

Background. Federal and State governments provide income support programs to help families 

make ends meet when they are unemployed, or when earnings from work are not sufficient to meet 

their needs. While many individuals are aware of income support programs such as Unemployment 

Insurance, Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), many unemployed 

or under-employed workers may not know about other forms of assistance, such as SNAP. SNAP 

helps low-income people and families buy the food they need for good health.

USDA has committed to assuring that all eligible people have access to the nutrition benefits of 

SNAP. To assist in this effort, ETA strongly encourages the public workforce system to include 

SNAP information as part of the work supports that are offered to customers at One-Stop 

Career Centers. [emphasis added]

Role for One-Stop Career Centers. Food assistance is one more valuable resource to support 

unemployed or under-employed individuals during this difficult economic period. Because 

One-Stop Career Centers serve many customers who may also qualify for SNAP, we encourage 

One-Stops to help customers learn about the program and begin the application process. Since 

the One-Stop Career Centers serve millions of people each year, people who would otherwise 

not apply for SNAP may be able to access this valuable assistance. [emphasis added]

In addition, the Notice encouraged managers of One-Stop Career Centers to access online SNAP 

outreach materials and identified other specific activities that could be implemented at the local 

level:

• Reaching out to the local SNAP offices to learn more about eligibility requirements and the 

application process.

• Providing information about SNAP’s eligibility requirements and the application process to 

customers at the One-Stop who may be eligible, including keeping copies of SNAP applications on hand in the One-Stop Career Center and maintaining a list of contact information for 

local SNAP offices.

• Establishing a referral process to ensure that customers are able to quickly begin the SNAP 

application process. While some One-Stops may already have this relationship in place, 

renewing or establishing coordination with local SNAP offices will improve the referral 

process and, ultimately, enhance the services available to One-Stop customers.

• Providing computer access to the SNAP Pre-Screening Tool, located at www.snap-step1.usda.

gov/.
13

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

ployed worker’s lack of earnings. This factor is rooted in the household composition and 

labor force decisions of a household and in SNAP’s design as a means-tested program. 

– UI benefits. The amount of UI benefits received by a household are counted as part of 

the household’s monthly gross income, which can affect both the household’s incomeeligibility for SNAP and the amount of the household’s SNAP benefits (which is based, 

in part, on household income). SNAP-eligible households can make a cost-benefit calculation to decide whether to apply and participate. For given costs (such as the time and 

out-of-pocket expenses of submitting an application), a decrease in SNAP benefits (since 

UI benefits are considered income) may affect that calculation, decreasing SNAP and 

joint participation. 

• Lack of familiarity with the other program. Applicants at one program’s local office may be 

unfamiliar with the other program and its application process. This lack of familiarity may especially affect the extent to which UI households participate in SNAP and be more prevalent during 

a recessionary period.19 At such times, more households (including UI households) that were not 

previously SNAP participants (due to higher income in previous times) are in a range of lower 

income that enables them to receive SNAP benefits—if only they were to apply. 

• Stigma associated with participation. Some people may be reluctant to apply for SNAP or UI 

benefits because of perceived stigma attached with participation in certain government assistance 

programs. Stigma may inhibit joint participation, particularly by affecting SNAP participation. UI benefits, as social insurance, may be widely perceived by many as an “earned right” in 

contrast to SNAP benefits, which are based on need and not on an individual’s contribution to a 

trust fund.20 However, stigma for receipt of SNAP benefits may potentially diminish in periods 

when many others, especially those considered peers, become SNAP participants. While stigma 

is distinct from limited information, outreach may promote program participation by both 

providing information and awareness and by helping to shape public perception of the program. 

• Duration of need expected to be short. Some SNAP-eligible UI households may not apply for 

SNAP because they anticipate short-term rather than long-term unemployment (e.g., a few weeks 

rather than a few months). These households may perceive UI to be a sufficient bridge between 

periods of employment.21

In practice, it can be difficult to disentangle the reasons that may impede SNAP participation by a 

particular UI household. The effects of such factors as limited information, perceived stigma, and 

the household’s expectations about its duration of need are not easily measured. 

19Because some Unemployment Insurance (UI) participants lack recent—or perhaps any—contact with the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), they may find it easier to locate a UI office and apply for UI benefits than 

to become participants in SNAP. For these unemployed workers, a union or former employer may readily provide information on how to apply for UI and online application for UI may be relatively easy. 

20As explained by the Social Security Administration in a review of the historical development of Social Security 

programs, “[T]he contributory financing of social insurance programs would ensure that protection was available as a 

matter of right as contrasted with a public assistance approach whereby only those persons in need would be eligible for 

benefits” (SSA, 1997, p. 1, emphasis added). 

21A study based on monthly longitudinal data from the 1990s provides supportive evidence (Farrell et al., 2003). The 

study found that, compared with Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) households, those households that 

were income-eligible for SNAP but were not SNAP participants had (on average) a larger decrease in monthly incomes 

preceding the study’s reference month and a larger increase in incomes after the reference month. 
14

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

One final influence on our study’s estimates is a statistical factor, distinct from the programmatic 

and behavioral factors mentioned earlier. To measure joint participation, there are two statistical 

metrics that correspond to two timeframes. For example, the “share of SNAP households that also 

receive UI” can be measured using either a monthly timeframe or an annual timeframe; the same 

is true for the “share of UI households that also receive SNAP.” We first consider the effect of using 

alternative timeframes to measure “SNAP participation,” and then examine the effect of the two 

timeframes on “joint participation.” 

The question “How many SNAP participants were there in 2005?” is seemingly simple, but it has 

two answers. Based on data from the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation, 

an estimated 31.7 million people received SNAP benefits “at some time” (in at least one month) 

during 2005, while about 23.1 million people received SNAP benefits in a typical month (Mabli et 

al., 2011). Each of these two metrics—ever-during-the-year SNAP participation (ES) and average 

monthly SNAP participation (S )—has its own uses. 

The extent to which SNAP touches the lives of Americans can be called the “reach” of SNAP, a 

concept that ties closely to issues about SNAP’s role in providing a safety net. The question “How 

widespread is SNAP’s safety net?” is tantamount to asking “How many and what proportion 

of people (or households) receive SNAP benefits?” When assessing SNAP’s “reach,” it can be 

important to recognize that different people use the program at different times during the year. For 

example, FNS states that “SNAP serves substantially more individuals over the course of a year 

than is implied by the monthly average number of participants. About 40 percent more individuals 

participated over the course of a year than participated in an average month, resulting in a turnover 

rate of 1.4 in the mid-2000s” (Food and Nutrition Service, 2012a, p. 11); the estimated turnover 

rate is (ES/ S). Another example is a Census Bureau report that uses American Community Survey 

ACS)data to estimate—for the United States and for each State—the numbers and proportions of 

households that receive SNAP benefits at some time within the past 12 months (Loveless, 2010). In 

addition, FNS uses ACS data to provide estimates of the number of households receiving SNAP (and 

the number not receiving SNAP) for each Congressional District, together with selected household 

characteristics (Food and Nutrition Service, 2012b). Thus, when reporting on the reach of SNAP, 

an annual timeframe (and its associated metric of ever-during-the-year SNAP participation) can be 

especially informative.22

On the other hand, for budgetary purposes, average monthly participation is an informative measure 

of “participation” and the associated cost to taxpayers. SNAP’s average monthly expenditure (in dollar 

terms) is the product of average monthly participation and average monthly SNAP benefits per person, 

making SNAP expenditures and average monthly participation highly correlated. Thus, the annual and 

monthly timeframes, and their associated metrics, can each be informative for its own purpose.23

22Strictly speaking, the annual timeframe of data from the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the 

Current Population Survey, which we use for our study, differs from the 12-month timeframe of the American Community Survey (ACS) data. ASEC respondents report on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) receipt for a 

particular calendar year, while ACS respondents report on SNAP receipt for the 12 months prior to the ACS interview, 

which can occur at any time during a year. 

23Sometimes it can be advantageous to examine the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program’s (SNAP) reach using 

S (rather than ES) because of timeliness or consistency. A year’s S, which is derived from the Food and Nutrition 

Service’s monthly participation data, is available more quickly than a survey-based estimate of ES (which is available 

many months after the end of a year). For the sake of consistency, a study that considers both the cost and reach of SNAP 

may opt to use a single measure of participation for both issues.
15

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Estimates are already available of the “share of SNAP households that also receive UI” in a typical 

month of the fiscal year (monthly timeframe). At the time of SNAP certification or recertification, 

households report income and certain expenditures to SNAP offices for determinations of eligibility 

and SNAP benefits. For this purpose, the States’ SNAP administrative databases collect information 

on receipt of SNAP and UI in the same month—what we call concurrent participation in the two 

programs.24 As part of its Quality Control (QC) System, FNS collects data from the States’ databases on a sample of SNAP households. Based on QC data, the estimated share of SNAP households 

that concurrently received UI in a “typical month” of fiscal 2004 was about 2.5 percent (Castner and 

Schirm, 2005). In successive fiscal years, that share dropped to 1.9, 1.7, and 1.7 percent before rising 

to 2.1 percent in fiscal 2008 and 4.7 percent in fiscal 2009. These 2004-09 data show that the estimated shares of SNAP households concurrently receiving UI increased during the recession. 

The purpose of our study was to examine the extent to which SNAP and UI—both singly and 

together—touch the lives of Americans. To measure the joint reach of SNAP and UI, our study 

adopted an annual timeframe and ever-during-the-year joint participation. Some households participate in both SNAP and UI in some “proximate” time period, even though they may not receive 

SNAP and UI benefits concurrently (in the same month). For example, a household may receive 

UI without receiving SNAP but then, when UI benefits are exhausted, turn to SNAP for additional 

support. To fully portray the joint reach of SNAP and UI, our study counts all households as “joint 

participants” if they received SNAP and UI benefits in the same year (though not necessarily in the 

same month(s)). 

In measures of “SNAP participation,” an annual timeframe consistently results in a higher estimate 

than a monthly timeframe. However, an annual metric is not statistically “biased” compared to a 

monthly metric—it is only that the two metrics measure different things. Similarly, for joint participation in SNAP and UI, a metric based on ever-during-the-year joint participation exceeds a metric 

based on concurrent participation alone. That is, the study’s SNAP JPR estimates can be expected to 

exceed those cited earlier based on the QC’s monthly timeframe: to reflect the joint reach of SNAP 

and UI over the course of a year, the SNAP JPR is supposed to be larger.25

The SNAP JPRs and UI JPRs we estimate in this report using ASEC data are meant to complement, 

rather than replace, the important monthly information provided in the QC data. Together, these two 

sources of data provide a better understanding of the complex issues surrounding joint SNAP and UI 

participation than either source can provide on its own. 

24Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program offices collect data on Unemployment Insurance (UI) receipt because UI 

benefits are considered income. In contrast, the UI program makes no use of information on SNAP benefits and does not 

collect this information in its State administrative systems. Survey data are essential for any estimate of the share of UI 

households that also receive SNAP. 

25The estimated Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Joint Participation Rates can differ from the Quality 

Control figures for reasons besides the use of different timeframes (e.g., time period—calendar year versus fiscal year, 

geographical coverage—exclusion versus inclusion of U.S. territories, unit of analysis—household versus person, survey 

item nonresponse, and imputations for missing values). 
16

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Data and Methodology

The study’s two research goals were to examine joint participation across the business cycle and 

across subgroups of households. The Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement (formerly, 

the Annual Demographic File) was identified as the best source of data to help meet these goals 

because ASEC data span several years and the large sample size supports estimation for subgroups 

of households. The ASEC is administered by the Census Bureau each year in February, March, and 

April as a supplement to the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), a nationally representative survey of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the United States. The sample size of 

ASEC is large (about 97,000 households in 2010) and has been collected for many years. ASEC data 

collected in 2005-10 provide information applicable to calendar years 2004-09, a study period that 

includes both full-employment and recessionary conditions.

The U.S. Census Bureau uses ASEC data for national poverty estimates. Reflecting that purpose, the 

ASEC data refer to the conditions, experiences, and behaviors of households and their members in 

the (previous) calendar year. Using ASEC’s annual data, our study’s definitions of “SNAP participation” and “UI participation” are based on receipt (aggregated to the household level) of program 

benefits “at some time during the year.” The study also defined a household as a “joint participant” 

when the household received SNAP and UI, each at some time during the year (though not necessarily in the same months). 

It is recognized that a monthly timeframe can also be of interest. Of course, monthly longitudinal 

data would be needed to examine monthly participation dynamics, which is left for future research. 

Monthly data would also support estimates of “same-month” (strictly concurrent) SNAP and UI 

participation, which would likely be smaller than our annual estimates that include all manner of 

intra-year dynamics. Each set of estimates can be informative and, methodologically, neither is 

a biased measure of the other—the two sets simply examine multi-program participation using 

different timeframes.

The 2010 ASEC included two questions aimed at gathering information on SNAP participation 

(Census Bureau, 2010b, p. D-88):

• Q87. “Did (you/ anyone in this household) get food stamps or a food stamp benefit card at any 

time during 2009?” and 

• Q87a. “At any time during 2009, even for one month, did (you/ anyone in this household) receive 

any food assistance from (State Program name)?” 

For our study, we define the household as a “SNAP participant” if there is an affirmative response in 

the ASEC’s yes/no household-level variable HFOODSP, which the ASEC data dictionary describes 

as “Did anyone in this household get food stamps at any time in [previous calendar year]?”26

(Census Bureau, 2010b, p. 8-4).

The household member who is the respondent to the ASEC answers the following item on behalf of 

all other household members (Census Bureau, 2010b, p. D-20): 

26We note that the Annual Social and Economic Supplement does not distinguish between the regular Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and SNAP’s Disaster Assistance component. 
17

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

• Q51A1. “At any time during 2009 did (name/you) receive any State or Federal unemployment 

compensation?”

ASEC follow-up questions on amount and frequency are posed if a household member is reported as 

receiving State or Federal unemployment compensation.27 For our study, we defined the household 

as a “UI participant” if there is an affirmative response in the ASEC’s household variable HINC-UC, 

which is a yes/no recode at the household level of receipt of unemployment compensation benefits 

(Census Bureau, 2010b, p. 8-5).

Our study also examined differences of joint participation patterns across subgroups of households, 

focusing on three characteristics: household annual income relative to poverty (IRP),28 race/

ethnicity, and education level. The household’s annual IRP is the ratio of the household’s monetary 

income to the poverty guidelines issued by HHS. To measure the household’s monetary income, 

we used ASEC’s household variable HTOTVAL, which combined income of all members of a 

household from all sources. The poverty guidelines issued by HHS are defined on a fiscal-year basis 

(October through September), while household income recorded in ASEC is defined on a calendaryear basis. When converted from annual to monthly figures, IRP is the basis of the incomeeligibility guidelines of SNAP. For our study, we calculated household IRP for a calendar year based 

on the poverty guidelines of the fiscal year.29

Race/ethnicity and educational attainment are each an individual-level characteristic in ASEC data. 

To conduct our household-level analysis, our study adopted a standard approach that treats the race/

ethnicity and the educational attainment of the household reference person in ASEC (the “householder”) as the characteristic of the household. 

To reflect the multi-stage, stratified design of the CPS and ASEC, we obtained estimates of standard 

errors using the replicate weights and the methodology of Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) as 

described in Lee and Forthofer (2006), Lohr (1999), and U.S. Census Bureau (2009, 2010a). Our 

study used annual sets of 160 replicate weights, which the Census Bureau calculated and made available for the ASEC. 

The samples for the annual ASEC and the monthly CPS are drawn from lists of addresses. In these 

census surveys, a “household” is an address-based concept, referring to people living together.30

27The Annual Social and Economic Supplement does not distinguish between different unemployment insurance programs such as regular State programs and extended benefits programs. Other smaller, specialized unemployment insurance programs include one for ex-service members and another for unemployed former civilian Federal employees (State 

and local government employees are covered under the regular State programs (Basi and McMurrer, 1997)). 

28Poverty guidelines are a monetary measure of household needs based on the number of people in the household. 

Poverty guidelines are revised annually to account for changes in the cost of living and are calculated separately for 

mainland United States, for Alaska, and for Hawaii. 

29An alternative would be to calculate a weighted-average “calendar-year” set of poverty guidelines from 2 consecutive 

fiscal years and to use those to calculate a “weighted-IRP” (income relative to poverty). If we had shifted from using IRP 

to using a weighted-IRP, our statistical results would have changed little, if at all, for two reasons: (1) IRP and weightedIRP differ very little for any single household, and (2) our study grouped households into seven broad income “categories.” 

Whether we used IRP or weighted-IRP, (nearly) every household in the sample would be in its same income category. 

30Household composition changes over time. In the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program and Unemployment Insurance receipt, like other information, is collected for those who 

are members of the household at the time of the ASEC interview. Longitudinal data could be better suited to examining how recessionary conditions—and the potential for some nonmembers to become household members following job 

loss—may affect household composition. 
18

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

For our study, we adopted a “Census household” as our unit of analysis, which we simply call a 

“household” and discuss as if it were the same as a “SNAP unit” (a group of people who buy food 

and prepare meals in common). The local SNAP office collects information from an applicant, 

including the number of people in the SNAP unit and their incomes, to determine eligibility for 

SNAP and the amount of SNAP benefits. We recognize that people in the SNAP unit can differ from 

people in the Census Bureau’s definition of household. However, there is not sufficient data in the 

ASEC to identify the SNAP unit with precision.

Previous research has found that survey data are subject to underreporting on the extent to which 

households receive program benefits from SNAP, UI, and other government support programs.31

ASEC data that record receipt of SNAP or UI benefits, as reported by sampled households, do not 

fully capture all instances in which sampled households actually received program benefits. As 

a result of underreporting, our study’s sample-based national estimates of joint participation are 

“conservative”—they almost certainly underestimate the actual (but unknown) number of households that received benefits from both SNAP and UI. All of the study’s results are likely to be 

affected to some extent by underreporting and need to be interpreted accordingly. 

31For an analysis of underreporting of transfers in the Current Population Survey and other household surveys, see 

Meyer et al. (2009), Wheaton (2007), and Lynch et al. (2008). 
19

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Recession Increased SNAP, UI, and Joint Participation 

Our study examined the extent to which U.S. households, and the people living in them, received 

SNAP benefits, UI benefits, or benefits from both programs as joint participants. 

In 2009, the last year of our 2004-09 study period (and the year with the most severe recessionary 

conditions), nearly 1 in 10 U.S. households (9.4 percent or 11 million) were SNAP participants (table 

1). In the same year, about 1 in 10 U.S. households (10.0 percent or 11.8 million) were UI participants.32 An estimated 1.6 million households (5.7 million people) were joint participants, receiving 

both SNAP and UI benefits at some time during the year. 

The 2009 estimated share of U.S. households that were joint participants is 1.3 percent (if the share 

of “joint participation” is based on people instead of households, about 1.9 percent of the U.S. population was supported by both SNAP and UI benefits). While 1.3 percent may be considered by some 

to be small, it nevertheless represents more than a million households and over 5 million people. 

The estimate of 1.3 percent is also affected by underreporting of SNAP and UI receipt. Furthermore, 

because it compares the number of joint households with the number of all U.S. households, its 

magnitude reflects a large denominator that (by definition) includes U.S. households that were 

neither unemployed nor low income in 2009. In contrast, the SNAP JPR and UI JPR compare joint 

participants to the number of either SNAP participants or UI participants, thus excluding U.S. households that were neither unemployed nor low income.33

Participation in each program increased in the recession, but UI participation increased by relatively 

more. Our study’s measure of the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions is the difference 

between estimates for 2009 (the most severe year of the recession in our study period) and 2005 (a 

year of full-employment conditions).34 From 2005 to 2009, the share of U.S. households receiving 

SNAP rose by about 2.7 percentage points (from 6.7 to 9.4 percent). This change represents an 

increase of about 3.3 million SNAP households (from 7.7 to 11.0 million). The share of U.S. 

households receiving UI rose by about 5.3 percentage points (from about 4.7 to 10.0 percent), 

representing an increase of about 6.5 million UI households (from 5.4 to 11.9 million). The share 

32Previous research on Unemployment Insurance (UI) typically: (a) uses individual workers rather than households as 

the unit of analysis, and (b) defines the UI recipiency rate as the ratio of UI recipients to the total number of unemployed 

people. Strictly speaking, there are several UI recipiency rates. In practice, the measure of UI “recipients” is typically 

approximated by the number of UI claimants who submit a claim for UI benefits, a figure in UI administrative data that 

includes some claimants who do not receive UI benefits. However, Wandner and Stengle note, “The Advisory Council on 

Unemployment Compensation has recommended using a measure of weeks compensated under the regular unemployment insurance program, rather than using weeks claimed, as only about 85 percent of unemployed workers initially 

claiming benefits eventually receive them” (Wandner and Stengle, 1997, p. 23, emphasis in original). Most commonly, 

a measure of recipiency covers the regular State programs of UI, but can also cover extended benefit programs and programs for Federal employees and ex-military personnel (Wandner and Stengle, 1997). 

33The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) JPR necessarily exceed the ratio of joint households to all U.S. households because the SNAP households or UI 

households (in the denominators) are each a subset of U.S. households. 

34It is possible to derive other measures of business-cycle effects using other pairs of years to make comparisons. For 

example, estimates for 2009 could be compared to estimates for 2007, the year prior to the 2008-09 recession. The estimated number of Unemployment Insurance households reaches its study-period minimum in 2007 (at about 4.8 million), 

making the 2007-09 difference larger than the 2005-09 difference. Methodologically, we did not choose the year(s) of 

comparison in order to make the business-cycle effects especially large (or small). Instead, we chose our reference year 

to be 2005 based on the analysis of the Congressional Budget Office (2010) that identifies 2005 as a year of full employment, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) differing from full-employment (potential) GDP by less than $5 billion or 

0.05 percent of potential GDP; these differences were smaller than for any other year in our study period.
20

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 1 

Estimated U.S. households with recipients of SNAP benefits, UI benefits, 

or both and estimated people living in recipient households, 2004-09

Unit Total1 With SNAP 

recipient(s)2 With UI recipient(s)3 With both SNAP and UI recipient(s)4

1,000 1,000 Percent 1,000 Percent 1,000 Percent

Households:

 2009 117,616 11,020 9.37 11,785 10.02 1,582 1.34

 (300) (169) (0.14) (148) (0.12) (56) (0.05)

 2008 117,261 9,064 7.73 7,367 6.28 885 0.76

 (290) (151) (0.13) (117) (0.10) (40) (0.03)

 2007 116,881 7,628 6.53 4,837 4.14 458 0.39

 (289) (140) (0.12) (96) (0.08) (29) (0.02)

 2006 116,131 7,282 6.27 4,870 4.19 513 0.44

 (273) (128) (0.11) (111) (0.10) (29) (0.03)

 2005 114,510 7,690 6.72 5,374 4.69 597 0.52

 (304) (152) (0.13) (99) (0.09) (37) (0.03)

 2004 113,476 7.202 6.35 5,952 5.24 604 0.53

 (294) (130) (0.12) (116) (0.10) (36) (0.03)

People:5

 2009 304,280 34,469 11.33 36,192 11.89 5,711 1.88

 (75) (482) (0.16) (471) (0.15) (214) (0.07)

 2008 301,483 27,740 9.20 22,408 7.43 3,132 1.04

 (75) (427) (0.14) (359) (0.12) (151) (0.05)

 2007 299,106 22,828 7.63 14,243 4.76 1,615 0.54

 (62) (436) (0.15) (298) (0.10) (108) (0.04)

 2006 296,824 21,826 7.35 14,500 4.89 1,809 0.61

 (61) (398) (0.13) (334) (0.11) (111) (0.04)

 2005 293,834 22,915 7.80 15,939 5.42 2,053 0.70

 (59) (434) (0.15) (312) (0.11) (122) (0.04)

 2004 291,166 21,995 7.55 17,617 6.05 2,176 0.75

 (64) (394) (0.14) (341) (0.12) (130) (0.04)

Note: SNAP refers to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and UI refers to Unemployment Insurance. 

Estimated standard errors based on Balanced Repeated Replication methodology and a Fay coefficient of 0.5 

are reported in parentheses. 

1Estimated total number of households in the United States, inclusive of households residing in group quarters 

and people living in them. 

2Estimated number of households in which one or more members received SNAP benefits at some time during 

the year.

3Estimated number of households in which one or more members received UI benefits at some time during the 

year.

4Estimated number of households in which one or more members received SNAP benefits at some time during 

the year and one or more members received UI benefits at some time during the year.

5Estimated number of people living within each household category. 

Sources: Calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 

Current Population Survey for reference years 2004-09.
21

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

of U.S. households receiving both SNAP and UI (joint households) rose by about 0.8 percentage 

points (from 0.5 to 1.3 percent), representing an increase of about 1.0 million joint households (from 

0.6 million to 1.6 million). The 2005-09 increase in UI households exceeds the increase in SNAP 

households which, in turn, increased by more than joint households. 

We expected that joint households increased in the recession, given that SNAP households and UI households each increased. However, it is not so clear what patterns to expect for the SNAP JPR (J/S) and the 

UI JPR (J/U). Mathematically, either of these measures could rise or fall over 2005-09, depending on 

whether joint participation increased proportionately more or less than SNAP and UI participation.

Although the number of SNAP households fluctuated a bit, the decline in joint households was 

sufficiently large that the SNAP JPR (J/S) declined early in the study period (fig. 3). Then, in 2008, 

the SNAP JPR rose to about 9.8 percent and rose further in 2009. In the most severe recessionary 

conditions of the study period, about 1 in 7 (14.4 percent) of SNAP households also received UI. 

Appendix table A-1 supplements figure 3 by providing annual estimates of the SNAP JPR and the 

UI JPR and the standard errors of the estimates.35

35In addition, the table reports t-statistics for the test of whether an estimate is statistically significantly different from 

its 2005 estimated value for years 2007-09. 

Figure 3

JPRs for SNAP and UI programs are responsive to economic conditions, 2004-09 

Note: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) is the share of SNAP 

households that also receive Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. The UI JPR is the share of UI households that also 

receive SNAP benefits. 

Sources: JPRs were calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 

Current Population Survey for reference years 2004-09. The unemployment rate is the annual average of the seasonally 

adjusted civilian unemployment rate among all civilian workers, as reported in table B-42 of the Economic Report of the 

President, 2011.

Percent

8.4 7.8

7.0

6.0

9.8

14.4

10.1 11.1 10.5

9.5

12.0

13.4

5.5

5.1 4.6 4.6

5.8

9.3

 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2004 05 06 07 08 09

UI Joint Participation Rate

SNAP Joint Participation Rate

Unemployment rate
22

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

The figure shows the UI JPR fluctuated between 10.1 percent in 2004 and its minimum value (in the 

study period) of 9.5 percent in 2007. With the onset of the recession, the UI JPR rose to 12.0 percent 

in 2008 and to 13.4 percent in 2009. The 2005-09 increase in the UI JPR was a statistically significant 2.3 percentage points (from 11.1 to 13.4 percent). 

Major findings about business-cycle effects are:

• The SNAP JPR and the UI JPR each increased under recessionary conditions, with the SNAP 

JPR increasing from 7.8 to 14.4 percent and the UI JPR increasing from 11.1 to 13.4 percent, each 

of which is statistically significant36;

• The SNAP JPR increased by more than the UI JPR (6.6 versus 2.3 percentage points).

These findings can be explained as a mathematical consequence of proportionate changes in SNAP, 

UI, and joint participation (based on table 1) that occurred over 2005-09:

• The SNAP JPR (J/S) and the UI JPR (J/U) each increased because the proportionate increase in 

joint households (165 percent, from 597,000 to 1,582,000) exceeded the proportionate increases 

in SNAP households (43 percent, from 7,690,000 to 11,020,000) and UI households (120 percent, 

from 5,374,000 to 11,785,000).

• The SNAP JPR increased by more than the UI JPR because the denominator of the UI JPR rose 

proportionately more than the denominator of the SNAP JPR (120 percent versus 43 percent). 

In summary, SNAP, UI, and joint participation (measured by numbers of households or as shares of U.S. 

households) each increased during the economic downturn. Moreover, during the recession, the overlaps

in SNAP and UI participation also increased the share of SNAP households receiving UI (SNAP JPR) 

and the share of UI households receiving SNAP (UI JPR). The recessionary safety net grew.

36An estimated result is statistically significant when it is unlikely to be due to chance associated with sampling error. 

Following the practice of the Census Bureau (2010b, p. G-9), we adopt the 0.10 level of significance to make determinations of statistical significance.
23

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Recessionary Caseloads and Changes in Joint 

Participation Rates 

Although both the SNAP and UI JPRs increased during the recession, the SNAP JPR increased by 

relatively more, reflecting the proportionate changes in SNAP, UI, and joint participation. To explore 

factors that drove those proportionate changes and the meaning of the recessionary safety net, we 

consider changes in caseload composition and introduce the key concept of a “recessionary caseload.”

Even under full-employment conditions, SNAP or UI still have some participation, which we refer 

to as full-employment caseloads for SNAP and UI and designate by the symbols S* and U*. If the 

economy were perpetually at full employment, SNAP and UI caseloads could each be roughly 

constant over time at S* and U*.37 However, recessionary conditions in 2008 and 2009 increased the 

SNAP and UI caseloads above their full-employment levels. We define the recessionary caseload

for a program (either SNAP or UI) as the difference, given by ΔSt and ΔUt, between the program’s 

annual caseload, St and Ut, and its full-employment caseload, S* and U*; the same distinction 

between recessionary and full-employment caseloads can be made for the joint households:

(1a) ΔSt = St – S* 

(1b) ΔUt = Ut – U*

(1c) ΔJt = Jt – J*

which can easily be re-expressed as:

(2a) St = S* + ΔSt

(2b) Ut = U* + ΔUt

(2c) Jt = J* + ΔJt

According to equation (2), a program’s annual caseload can be broken down into its full-employment 

caseload and its recessionary caseload.38 The recessionary caseload is a “marginal” caseload that is 

added to the full-employment caseload. The marginal SNAP households in the recessionary caseloads represent “net additional” households (households that were part of the caseload in 2009 but 

not in 2005).39 

37Factors such as population growth cause gradual annual changes in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or Unemployment Insurance full-employment caseloads. Over the course of a decade or two, even gradual annual 

changes accumulate, resulting in important increases in S* and U* over time. For our shorter 2004-09 study period, we 

consider S* and U* fixed, thereby treating these factors as negligible in order to concentrate on business-cycle effects. 

38Our decomposition of a caseload mirrors other decompositions in economics, e.g., the Gross Domestic Product, the 

unemployment rate, and the Federal budget deficit can each be decomposed into an estimated full-employment component and a cyclical component. 

39The Annual Social and Economic Supplement data used for our study are not a long-term panel data set, and we 

cannot identify—and for our study we do not need to identify—which individual Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 

Program (SNAP) households in 2009 are “new” to the caseload in the sense that they never participated before or were 

not participants in 2005. Our data are able to estimate “net additional” SNAP households and that is all that our study 

required. 
24

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 2 provides an example of the JPR for the SNAP recessionary caseload; the JPR for the UI 

recessionary caseload is analogous. In 2005, 14 of 200 SNAP households also received UI (the 

SNAP JPR was 7 percent). During the recessionary year of 2009, a larger share—25 out of 250 (or 

10 percent)—of the SNAP caseload received UI. From full employment to recession, the SNAP 

recessionary caseload was 50 (250-200 SNAP households) and the joint recessionary caseload was 

11 (25-14 households). With 11 net additional joint households and 50 net additional SNAP households in 2009, just over one-fifth (22 percent) of the net additional SNAP households also received 

UI—a ratio that we define as the Joint Participation Rate for the SNAP recessionary caseload. The 

ratio does not mean that 22 percent of all SNAP households in 2009 were joint participants—just 22 

percent of the net additional households. 

In the example, the driving factor that increases the SNAP JPR for the overall SNAP caseload is 

that the JPR for the SNAP recessionary caseload exceeded the SNAP JPR for the full-employment

caseload in 2005 (22 versus 7 percent). As the net additional SNAP households joined the caseload 

in 2009, the mix of SNAP households changed. A portion of the 2009 SNAP caseload—the portion 

consisting of the net additional SNAP households—received UI at a greater rate than the 2005 

SNAP caseload, which resulted in the increase in the SNAP JPR (from 7 to 10 percent). 

To better understand the example and how a changing composition of the SNAP caseload helps 

explain the increase in the SNAP JPR, there are two cases to consider. The first case is based on 

an assumption that is not represented by the table’s example. Suppose that SNAP households in 

the full-employment caseload in 2005 and SNAP households in the recessionary caseload in 2009 

have identical “profiles” of characteristics—that is, the two caseloads have the same distributions 

of households exhibiting various conditions, experiences, characteristics, and behaviors. Then, 

by supposition, the same percentage of SNAP households receive UI in both the full-employment 

caseload and the recessionary caseload—i.e., the SNAP recessionary caseload JPR in 2009 and the 

SNAP JPR in 2005 would be equal (say at 7 percent). If so, then, as SNAP’s net additional households enter the caseload in 2009, their entry makes no difference to the overall caseload’s mix of 

characteristics and that entry makes no difference to the SNAP JPR, which would stay steady over 

time (at 7 percent). 

Table 2

Example defining the JPR for the SNAP recessionary caseload 

Year

Joint 

caseload

SNAP 

caseload

SNAP 

JPR 

(“average”)

Joint 

recessionary 

caseload

SNAP 

recessionary 

caseload

JPR for 

the SNAP 

recessionary 

caseload

(“marginal”)

J S J

S

ΔJ ΔS ΔJ

ΔS

2005 (full 

employment) 14 200 0.07

2009 (recession) 25 250 0.10 25 – 14 =11 250 – 200 =50 11/50 =0.22

Note: A recessionary caseload is the difference between the measured caseload for a given year and the caseload at 

full employment (2005 for this report). The definition for a recessionary caseload is applicable for the Supplemental 

Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), for Unemployment Insurance (UI), and for the joint caseload (those households 

that receive both SNAP and UI). The Joint Participation Rate (JPR) for SNAP’s recessionary caseload is the ratio of the 

joint recessionary caseload to the SNAP recessionary caseload. 

Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.
25

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

For the second case, suppose the profiles of characteristics for the full-employment and recessionary 

caseloads are different. In particular, the overall SNAP caseload at full employment contains a relatively high proportion of households with limited labor market connections that impede UI receipt—

e.g., the elderly poor who are retired; the disabled poor who may not be employed; and workers who 

do not meet UI-eligibility requirements if they were to become laid off because they have short work 

histories or low earnings. There are some households in the SNAP full-employment caseload with 

a UI-receiving worker who, before becoming unemployed, had tight labor market connections (i.e., 

their work histories and earnings are sufficient to meet UI-eligibility requirements), but they are 

relatively few; in 2005, the SNAP JPR is relatively low at 7 percent. In contrast, the net additional 

SNAP households have relatively more households with tight labor market connections. Importantly, 

a feature of recessions is an increase in layoffs throughout the economy—including among those 

with tight labor market connections.40 Thus, under recessionary conditions, we expect that the share 

of net additional SNAP households that also get UI will be relatively greater compared to UI receipt 

among the overall SNAP caseload at full employment (22 versus 7 percent in the example). Because 

the SNAP recessionary caseload drives changes in the overall caseload, the mix of household types 

in the overall SNAP caseload changes: during a recession, the households with tight connections 

and greater UI receipt become a larger share of the SNAP caseload, increasing the overall share of 

SNAP households that receive UI. This caseload-composition effect of a changing mix of SNAP 

households is consistent with the estimated increase in the SNAP JPR in 2009 compared to 2005. 

Values for the JPRs of recessionary caseloads are added to estimated SNAP and UI JPRs (fig. 4) to 

account for our two major findings about business-cycle effects. The figure explains why both SNAP 

JPRs and UI JPRs increased during the recession, and why SNAP JPRs increased by more than UI 

JPRs. To highlight the effects of the recession, the figure compares the recessionary years 2008 and 

2009 with the full-employment year 2005; 2006 and 2007 are omitted.41

The figure depicts the “average” JPRs for the overall caseload and the “marginal” JPRs for the recessionary caseload. Economic principles establish that when a marginal value exceeds an average 

value, the average rises. For 2008, the estimated JPR for SNAP’s recessionary caseload is about 

21 percent, which exceeds the estimated 7.8 percent SNAP JPR for the overall SNAP caseload at 

full employment in 2005. Once the net additional SNAP households enter the mix in 2008, their 

relatively high JPR pulls up the SNAP JPR in 2008 for the caseload as a whole. Thus, because the 

marginal value exceeds the average value, the SNAP JPR increases from 7.8 to 9.8 percent in 2008. 

This process is compounded even further the next year. In 2009, nearly 3 in 10 (29.6 percent) of the 

net additional SNAP households also receive UI, which raises the overall caseload’s SNAP JPR in 

2009 to 14.4 percent. 

The UI JPR rose from 11.1 to 12.0 percent between 2005 and 2008 because the JPR for the UI recessionary caseload of 14.5 percent exceeded the UI JPR in 2005. The JPR for the UI recessionary 

caseload of 15.4 percent in 2009 brought that year’s UI JPR to 13.4 percent. 

40As shown in figure 1, the combination of a tight labor market connection (in a UI-covered job) and a layoff together 

confer Unemployment Insurance (UI) eligibility—either factor without the other is insufficient to result in UI receipt. 

41Appendix table A-2 contains the recessionary caseloads and their associated Joint Participation Rates (JPRs) for 

every year in the 2004-09 study period. The appendix provides additional details on the measurement of recessionary 

caseloads, the relationships among the JPRs for the recessionary and full-employment caseloads, and properties and 

results of the JPR for a recessionary caseload.
26

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

While the quantitative magnitudes differ, the qualitative relationships between the JPR and the 

recessionary caseload JPR are the same for SNAP and for UI. Our first major finding for businesscycle effects was that the SNAP and UI JPRs both rose in the recession. This finding occurs because 

the JPRs for the recessionary caseload (a marginal value) exceeded the JPRs for the full-employment caseload (an average value), increasing the JPR for the overall caseload. 

Our second major finding was that the SNAP JPR rose more than the UI JPR (6.6 versus 2.3 

percentage points). This result is also explained by the relationship between marginal and average 

values—only now, relative magnitudes need to be taken into account: a difference between a 

marginal and an average value that is relatively large increases the average by more than a smaller 

difference. The difference between the JPR of the SNAP recessionary caseload in 2009 and the 

SNAP JPR at full employment is relatively large—21.8 percentage points (29.6 less 7.8 percent)—

and increases the SNAP JPR by a relatively large amount. In contrast, the difference between the 

JPR of the UI recessionary caseload in 2009 and the UI JPR at full employment is relatively small— 

4.3 percentage points (15.4 less 11.1 percent). Therefore, while the SNAP and UI JPRs both increase 

in the recession, the SNAP JPR increases more than the UI JPR.42

42The appendix examines these relationships in mathematical detail.

Figure 4

SNAP and UI JPRs (“average”) and the JPRs for their recessionary caseloads (“marginal”)

Percent

7.8

9.8

14.4

11.1

12.0

13.4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

SNAP recessionary caseload 

JPRs ("marginal")

SNAP JPRs ("average") 

UI JPRs ("average")

UI recessionary caseload JPRs ("marginal") 

2005 (full employment) 2008 (recession) 2009 (recession)

21.0

15.4

14.5

29.6

Note: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) is the share of SNAP 

households that also receive Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. The UI JPR is the share of UI households that also 

receive SNAP benefits. The SNAP recessionary caseload JPR is the ratio of the joint recessionary caseload to the SNAP 

recessionary caseload. The UI recessionary caseload JPR is the ratio of the joint recessionary caseload to the UI

recessionary caseload. 

Sources: Appendix tables A-1, A-2.
27

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Joint Participation by Household Income Relative to 

Poverty

As we examine differences within and across subgroups, research and policy issues that emerge 

consider which types of households are most likely to receive both SNAP and UI, and which types 

of households are more likely to rely on SNAP alone or UI alone. 

We use household annual IRP as our measure of household income because the poverty thresholds 

are adjusted for the number of people in the household and for price inflation, and because they are 

the basis of SNAP’s monthly income-eligibility guidelines. 

Generally, UI JPRs (the shares of UI households that receive SNAP) are likely to decrease as annual 

IRP increases. Two factors play a role in this decrease: 

• Monthly income variability and SNAP eligibility. SNAP’s income-eligibility rule limiting 

household (gross) income to 130 percent of poverty (with exceptions) applies to monthly income. 

Some households with chronically low income have monthly income at or below 130 percent 

every month of the year; as a result, they also have annual IRP below 130 percent. Some households with IRP above 130 percent of the poverty level on an annual basis can be eligible for and 

receive SNAP for part of the year. Their monthly income variability may result in temporarily 

low monthly IRP at or below SNAP’s monthly limit. As a household’s annual IRP increases 

above 130 percent, the probability becomes smaller that the household will experience a drop in 

income large enough to make it income eligible for SNAP based on monthly income. Thus, UI 

households with annual IRP above 130 percent receive SNAP at a positive (rather than zero) rate 

that diminishes with income.

• Participation choices of SNAP-eligible households. Annual IRP reflects some combination 

of low monthly incomes (low monthly IRP) and the number of months in which monthly IRP 

was low. A lower annual IRP is associated with greater household needs. Also, SNAP benefits 

increase as a household’s income decreases (other factors constant). Altogether, we expect that, 

as a SNAP-eligible household’s annual IRP falls, the probability increases that it will choose to 

apply for and receive SNAP. Alternatively, we expect that SNAP participation falls as a SNAPeligible household’s annual IRP increases.

A UI-only Participation Rate is the share of UI households that are not joint participants; because 

every UI household either receives only UI or also receives SNAP, the UI-only Participation Rate 

and the UI JPR sum to 100 percent. Concerns about low SNAP participation can arise if there is 

a low UI JPR—or, correspondingly, a high UI-only Participation Rate—specifically among lower 

income households that are likely to be SNAP eligible. This consideration highlights the importance 

of supplementing aggregate analysis with subgroup analysis of households at various levels of household income.43 

Generally, SNAP JPRs (the shares of SNAP households that receive UI) are likely to increase with 

annual IRP, at least across some initial range of income. Factors that play a role in this increase are:

43The effects of underreporting of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits are especially germane here if 

propensities to underreport vary across households with different levels of income. 
28

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

• UI eligibility. Households with higher IRP may be more likely to have members who are UI 

eligible than households with lower IRP. It is possible that higher IRP households are more likely 

to have UI-eligible members even if they experience unemployment less often than lower income 

households do. Relative to households with lower annual IRP, households with higher IRP may be 

more likely to have members who have:

- Earnings from work (versus retirement income, disability income, SNAP, or other 

resources); 

- Jobs that are UI covered (versus non-covered jobs in agriculture or domestic service 

jobs, which tend to have workers with lower IRP); 

- Work “experience” as measured by their State UI program (versus having limited labor 

market connections with sporadic employment in low-paying jobs); and 

- Greater likelihood of job loss due to “no fault” of the worker (versus “fired for cause”).

For some combination of these four factors, SNAP households with lower IRP are relatively less 

likely to receive UI because their connections to the labor market are weaker, precluding UI eligibility. Indeed, these weaker labor market connections result not only in lower UI eligibility and 

lower SNAP JPRs but also in the lower household incomes by which we are categorizing these 

SNAP households as “lower IRP” in the first place. 

• Participation choices by UI-eligible households. Barriers to UI application and participation—

such as limited information or familiarity, limited physical access, or concerns about participating in UI—may be rarer among higher IRP households than among lower IRP households. 

The SNAP-only Participation Rate is the share of SNAP-receiving households that are not joint 

participants; because every SNAP household either only receives SNAP or also receives UI, the 

SNAP-only Participation Rate and the SNAP JPR sum to 100 percent. An issue for SNAP’s role in 

the safety net is the extent to which SNAP households may be SNAP-only households, especially

among households with low annual IRP. 

We chose seven IRP subgroups to examine joint participation patterns. The seven subgroups consisted 

of households with IRP in the ranges of: less than 50 percent of poverty, 51-99 percent of poverty, 

100-149 percent of poverty, 150-199 percent of poverty, 200-249 percent of poverty, 250-299 percent of 

poverty, and 300 percent of poverty or more. The seventh subgroup (300 or more percent of poverty) 

contains more than half of U.S. households (52.8 and 55.1 percent in 2009 and 2005, respectively). 

Thus, our results cover all U.S. households while focusing on distinctions among households with 

IRP below median household (the median household at the 50th percentile is contained in the seventh 

subgroup while the other six subgroups divide the lower half of the income distribution). 

Estimated SNAP JPRs and UI JPRs across IRP subgroups for both 2009 (solid lines) and 2005 

(dashed lines) are in figure 5. In 2009, the estimated UI JPRs are negatively related to IRP. UI JPRs 

fall from an estimated 57.1 percent in the first subgroup (less than 50 percent of poverty) to 1.8 

percent in the seventh subgroup (above 300 percent of poverty). The decline in UI JPRs is substantial (55.3 percentage points across all seven subgroups) and is more than double the change in the 

SNAP JPR (19.2 percentage points, from 6.7 to 25.9 percent). 

To determine whether the negative relationship between the UI JPR and income is statistically 

significant, we conducted six t-tests on the difference between each successive pair of the seven 

estimated UI JPRs. The difference between the UI JPR of the first subgroup (less than 50 percent of 
29

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

poverty) and the second (50 to 99 percent of poverty) is not statistically significant. From the second 

subgroup through the seventh, however, each t-test was statistically significant.44 Therefore, for the 

overall statistical relationship, we conclude that the UI JPR is negatively related to IRP. 

The UI JPRs for the first two subgroups (and perhaps the third and even fourth subgroups) are especially important from a SNAP participation perspective. Households in the first two subgroups must

be income-eligible for SNAP: if annual IRP is at or below 100 percent of poverty for the year as a 

whole, then monthly IRP must be at or below the poverty level for some months (and probably most) 

of the year. 

The result that UI JPRs fall with household income points to an important safety-net function for 

SNAP: while SNAP can serve all households that have low monthly income, including UI households, the UI households most likely to receive SNAP are those that have the lowest annual incomes. 

SNAP JPRs, on the other hand, tend to increase across IRP subgroups. In 2009, the SNAP JPR rose 

from a low of 6.7 percent in the first subgroup to 25.9 percent in the seventh subgroup. The increase 

occurs primarily in the lower IRP subgroups, with the SNAP JPR curve flattening for higher IRP 

subgroups. Thus, UI participation among below-poverty SNAP households is below UI participation 

among above-poverty SNAP households. 

A series of t-tests on the differences between the SNAP JPRs of each successive pair of IRP 

subgroups confirms that the changes in SNAP JPRs are statistically significant only across the first 

four subgroups.45 The differences are not statistically significant for any of the remaining three 

pairs.46 The statistical conclusion is that the SNAP JPR curve has two segments: it increases across 

the lower IPR subgroups and then remains steady across the higher IRP subgroups. However, about 

76.3 percent of SNAP households are in the first three subgroups.47 We describe the SNAP JPR 

curve as “initially increasing.” 

For the United States, the 2009 SNAP JPR was 14.4 percent (fig. 4), making the SNAP-only 

Participation Rate 85.6 percent. At the IRP subgroup level, given that the SNAP JPRs are lowest for 

below-poverty households (the first two subgroups), their SNAP-only Participation Rates—at 93.3 

and 89.5 percent—are the highest (by statistically significant amounts). Thus, below-poverty SNAP 

households are more likely to rely on SNAP alone than SNAP households with higher IRP. 

From the declining UI JPRs and the initially increasing SNAP JPRs, we can surmise that subgroups 

of households show different patterns of combining SNAP with UI or, alternatively, exhibiting 

SNAP-only participation. SNAP is especially important in the below-poverty subgroup because 

below-poverty UI households are relatively more likely (than above-poverty UI households) to 

supplement UI with SNAP, and below-poverty SNAP households are relatively less likely (than 

44The t-statistics for the differences in Unemployment Insurance Joint Participation Rates of the six successive pairs of 

subgroups are: -0.81, -4.70, -9.69, -6.47, -9.17, and -5.15. 

45The t-values between the pairs of subgroups were: t = 3.78 for the difference between the first and the second subgroups, t = 5.36 between the second and the third, and t = 6.86 between the third and the fourth. 

46The t-values between the pairs of the remaining subgroups were: t = 0.77 between the fourth and the fifth, t = 0.83 

between the fifth and the sixth, and t = 0.09 between the sixth and the seventh.

47The fourth subgroup could reasonably be classified on either the increasing or the flat segment of the curve inasmuch 

as it is the borderline subgroup. We included it in the flat section. Including it in the increasing section would shift its 11.7 

percent of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) households, raising to 88.0 percent the share of SNAP 

households on the “increasing” segment.
30

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

above-poverty SNAP households) to supplement SNAP with UI. SNAP-only (or UI-only) participation identifies households that would be especially hurt if SNAP (or UI) was not available as a 

nationwide safety-net program. The poorest households tend to be SNAP-only households. About 

nine-tenths of the below-poverty SNAP households are SNAP-only households. 

The SNAP JPR curve shifted upward from 2005 to 2009 (fig. 5); within any given IRP subgroup, 

the share of SNAP households that also received UI increased from 2005 to 2009. A series of seven 

separate t-tests for each of the seven IRP subgroups shows the between-year increase to be statistically significant for each subgroup with the exception of the sixth.48 Based on this evidence, we 

conclude that there is a statistically significant increase in the SNAP JPR curve overall. 

We expected that the numbers and shares of households with UI participation would increase from 

2005 to 2009 among U.S. households in general and among SNAP households in particular. The 

estimated national aggregate SNAP JPR increased from 2005 to 2009 (fig. 4). The additional information provided by figure 5 is that this phenomenon is an across-the-board increase in SNAP JPRs 

48The t-values for the difference between the 2009 and 2005 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Joint Participation Rates for the first through the seventh subgroups are: 2.99, 6.13, 4.91, 4.75, 3.27, 1.58, and 1.96. 

Figure 5

UI and SNAP JPRs by household annual IRP, 2009 and 2005 

6.7

10.5

16.6

22.6

24.9 25.5

25.9

57.1

52.9

38.2

24.6

11.4

6.9

1.8 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

< 50 50-99 100-149 150-199 200-249 250-299 300+

Annual IRP (percent)

SNAP JPRs (2009) 

UI JPRs (2005) 

Note: Unemployment Insurance (UI) Joint Participation Rates (JPRs) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 

(SNAP) JPRs for each year convey the relationships between JPRs and household annual income relative to poverty 

(IRP) for that year. 

Sources: Calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current 

Population Survey for reference years 2004-09.

Percent

UI JPRs (2009) 

SNAP JPRs (2005) 
31

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

for all IRP subgroups. The increase in unemployment due to the recession—and the UI benefits that 

accompanied it—was a general phenomenon and not confined to particular IRP subgroups.49

In contrast to the clear upward shift in the SNAP JPR from 2005 to 2009, the UI JPR does not show 

a clear and consistent shift. The numerical UI JPR changes from 2005 to 2009 were decreases for 

two IRP subgroups (the second and sixth) and increases for the other five subgroups. However, these 

between-year changes are statistically significant only for the increase in the fourth subgroup (t = 

2.03). Thus, we conclude the overall UI JPR relationship is statistically unchanged from 2005 to 

2009—the UI JPR curve remained steady and did not shift.50

49At the same time, it is possible the recessionary effects by various measures, such as increases in unemployment 

rates, were experienced relatively more by households in some subgroups than others. However, it is beyond the scope of 

this study to explore such comparisons. 

50The national aggregate Unemployment Insurance (UI) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) increased from 2005 to 2009, 

even though the UI JPR curve in figure 5 is steady, because there is a shift in the distribution of UI-receiving households 

between the 2 years. In 2009, there were more UI households in the lower income relative to poverty (IRP) categories 

than in 2005 because national production and national income are lower in 2009 than in 2005. The lower IRP categories have a higher UI JPR—the relationship between UI JPR and income is negative in figure 5. Thus, an increase in the 

share of UI households in the lower IRP subgroups increases the aggregate UI JPR, which is a weighted average across 

subgroups of their UI JPRs.
32

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Joint Participation by Race/Ethnicity

Race/ethnicity is an individual-level characteristic in ASEC data. To conduct our household-level 

analysis, we adopted a standard approach that treats the race/ethnicity of the “householder” as the 

race/ethnicity characteristic of the household. Recognizing that Hispanic people can be of any race, 

we define four non-overlapping race/ethnicity categories: non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, 

Hispanic, and Other.51 

Among UI households, non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics are both more likely than non-Hispanic 

Whites to receive SNAP (fig. 6). In 2009, the estimated UI JPRs for non-Hispanic Blacks and for 

Hispanics exceeded that for the non-Hispanic Whites by about 16.6 and 9.8 percentage points, 

respectively, each of which is statistically significant.52 The estimated UI JPRs rose over 2005-09 

for non-Hispanic Whites (about 2.0 percentage points), non-Hispanic Blacks (1.6 percentage points), 

and Hispanics (7.3 percentage points). Of these changes, only the changes for the non-Hispanic 

White and Hispanic subgroups are statistically significant.53

51The category Other combines a variety of race/ethnicity groups that are difficult to separate for statistical analysis 

due to small sample sizes.

52The t-values for the two respective tests are 10.40 and 6.46. The difference between the 2009 Unemployment Insurance Joint Participation Rates for Other and for non-Hispanic Whites of about 1.7 percentage points was not statistically 

significantly different from zero.

53The two respective t-values are 2.47 and 3.5. The Unemployment Insurance Joint Participation Rate for Other 

decreased by about 2.8 percentage points from 2005 to 2009, but the change was not statistically significant. 

Figure 6

UI JPRs by race/ethnicity, 2004-09 

7.9 7.8 7.9

7.0

9.0

9.9

18.5

24.9 24.3

19.0

23.7

26.5

13.2

12.4

11.5

12.2

16.9

19.7

11.8

14.3

9.3

13.4

10.6

11.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2004 05 06 07 08 09

Percent

Note: UI JPRs refer to Unemployment Insurance Joint Participation Rates. 

Sources: Calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 

Current Population Survey for reference years 2004-09.

Non-Hispanic White

Hispanic

Non-Hispanic Black

Other
33

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

In 2009, the estimated SNAP JPRs for non-Hispanic Whites exceeded that for Hispanics by 2.3 

percentage points, which is statistically significant (fig. 7).

54 The increases in SNAP JPRs from 2005 

to 2009 were statistically significant for non-Hispanic Whites (7.4 percentage points), non-Hispanic 

Blacks (5.4 percentage points), and Hispanics (7.7 percent).55

Perhaps the most notable feature of figure 7 is that the SNAP JPR time trends are more clustered 

than the UI JPR time trends (fig. 6) although the two figures are on the same scale. This may be 

attributable to the different effects that household income has on UI JPRs and SNAP JPRs.56 The 

finding that household income is negatively related to UI JPR (i.e., that an increase in household 

income is associated with a lower UI JPR) was illustrated in figure 5. Non-Hispanic White households have a lower UI JPR than Hispanic or non-Hispanic Black households because non-Hispanic 

White households have comparatively higher household income, on average. 

54The t-value is -1.99. The 2009 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rates (JPRs) 

for non-Hispanic Blacks and for Other were not statistically significantly different from the SNAP JPR for non-Hispanic 

Whites. 

55The t-values are, respectively, 7.63, 4.82, and 6.17.

56We recognize that other factors can influence race/ethnicity Unemployment Insurance (UI) Joint Participation Rates 

(JPRs) and that single-factor explanations are typically incomplete. Even so, the results for UI JPRs across race/ethnicity 

categories are consistent with the relationship between UI JPRs and household income.

9.6

8.0

7.8

6.7

11.0

15.4

7.4

8.4 7.3

5.5

8.7

13.8

6.1

5.3 4.7 4.6

8.6

13.1

10.6 9.9

6.5

7.8

9.4

12.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2004 05 06 07 08 09

Figure 7

SNAP JPRs by race/ethnicity, 2004-09

Percent

Note: SNAP JPRs refer to Supplement Nutrition Assistance Program Joint Participation Rates.

Sources: Calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 

Current Population Survey for reference years 2004-09.

Non-Hispanic White

Hispanic

Non-Hispanic Black

Other
34

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

The (positive) effect that household income has on SNAP JPRs is not as strong as its effect on UI 

JPRs. The decrease in UI JPRs across income categories is more than double the increase in SNAP 

JPRs (fig. 5). Moreover, the positive relationship between household income and SNAP JPRs flattens 

out in the higher income subgroups. Altogether, household income creates differences across race/

ethnicity categories in SNAP JPRs, but the differences are smaller than for UI JPRs, resulting in 

(relative) clustering of the SNAP JPRs. 
35

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Joint Participation by Education Level

According to the economic theory of “human capital,” a person acquires a set of skills, talents, and 

knowledge from education. While many factors affect labor market earnings, a person with more 

education earns more, on average, compared to a person with less education—at least during times 

when they both hold jobs. For most households, earnings are, by far, the largest source of income, so 

we expect the results for the effects of education on joint participation to resemble the results for the 

effects of household income on joint participation. 

Education is a long-term characteristic (formal educational attainment remains largely unchanged 

for most people once they reach their late teens or early- to mid-twenties), while income can fluctuate month-to-month (based on job promotion, unemployment, cross-State mobility patterns, 

etc.). SNAP serves all types of low-income households, but households have low monthly income 

for different reasons and durations. A household with members with lower education levels may 

receive SNAP for many months or years, while a household with more highly educated members 

may receive SNAP due to temporary unemployment. Annual household income data cannot readily 

distinguish between these two households because, when both types of households receive SNAP 

in the same year, their annual incomes could be very similar for that year. Education level may be a 

more accurate indicator than current income of the long-term conditions and experiences of various 

SNAP households. 

Like race/ethnicity, educational attainment is an individual-level characteristic in the ASEC data. 

Our study treats the education level of the “householder” as the education characteristic of the 

household and groups educational information from ASEC into five categories: less than 9th grade 

(4.4 percent of U.S. households in 2009), high school/no diploma (7.8 percent of households), high 

school diploma (29.5 percent of households), 1-3 years of college (27.9 percent of households), and 

bachelor’s degree or higher (30.2 percent of households).57

In 2009, the UI JPRs fall from a peak of 25.6 percent (for high school/no diploma) to a low of 

3.7 percent (for the bachelor’s degree or higher category) (fig. 8). Each of the successive differences in UI JPRs between those adjacent pairs of education categories is statistically significant.58

Therefore, we conclude that the overall relationship between UI JPRs and education of the householder is negative. 

The 2009 estimates for SNAP JPRs initially rise across education categories, increasing from about 

8.1 percent for the less than 9th grade category and peaking at 16.9 percent for the high school 

diploma category. After that, the SNAP JPR drops. The differences in SNAP JPRs between adjacent pairs of education categories are statistically significant only for the first two adjacent pairs 

(from less than 9th grade to high school/no diploma and from high school/no diploma to high school 

57For our study, and its focus on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and on lower income, lower education 

households, we chose to keep separate the first two categories rather than combining them into a single “less than high 

school diploma.” 

58The numerical increase across the first two categories is not statistically significant. The t-values are -3.93 for the 

difference between the third and the second categories, -2.68 for the difference between the fourth and the third categories, and -9.31 for the difference between the fifth and the fourth categories. 
36

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

diploma).59 The statistical association between the education level of the household and the SNAP 

JPR has no further increase between education categories after the high school diploma category.60 

The drop in 2009 UI JPRs across education categories (from a peak of 25.6 to 3.7 percent) is nearly 

three times greater than the increase in the SNAP JPRs (from 8.1 to 16.9 percent, before leveling 

out). Thus, as with household income, the effect of education level on UI JPRs is stronger than the 

effect of education level on SNAP JPRs.

The SNAP JPR curve shifted upward from 2005 to 2009; for each successive level of education, 

the SNAP JPR increased by a statistically significant amount.61 In contrast, the responsiveness of 

UI JPRs to recessionary conditions varied across education categories. The 2005-09 increases in UI 

59The t-value is 1.86 for the 2.7 percentage-point difference between the first and second education categories. The 

t-value is 4.89 for the 6.1 percentage-point difference between the second and third education categories. 

60The two successive changes from high school diploma to 1-3 years of college and from 1-3 years of college to bachelor’s degree are each statistically insignificant. So, too, is the full difference of -2.6 percentage points across a broader 

span from high school diploma to bachelor’s degree or higher. 

61From 2005 to 2009, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Joint Participation Rates rose by about 5.2 percentage points for less than 9th grade (t-value 3.98), 4.4 percentage points for high school/no diploma (t-value 3.66), 8.5 

percentage points for high school diploma (t value 7.63), 5.6 percentage points for 1-3 years of college (t-value 4.01), and 

5.5 percentage points for bachelor’s degree or higher (t-value 1.79).

Figure 8

SNAP and UI JPRs vary by householder education, 2005 and 2009

Percent

Note: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) is the share of SNAP 

households that also receive Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. The UI JPR is the share of UI households that also 

receive SNAP benefits. 

Sources: Calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current 

Population Survey for reference years 2004-09. 

8.1

10.8

16.9 16.4

14.2

24.7 25.6

16.0

12.8

3.7

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Less than

9th grade

High school,

no diploma

High school

diploma

1-3 years

of college

Bachelor’s degree

or higher

SNAP JPRs (2009) 

UI JPRs (2005) 

UI JPRs (2009) 

SNAP JPRs (2005) 
37

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

JPRs are statistically significant for only two of the five categories—less than 9th grade and high 

school diploma—which contained about 39.3 percent of all UI households in 2009.62

In summary, UI JPRs fall with the education level of the householder. UI households with less than 

a high school diploma are relatively more likely to receive SNAP to supplement their UI receipt than 

are households with higher education. In contrast, SNAP JPRs rise with education across the three 

lower educational categories. SNAP-only participation—receipt of SNAP without UI—is greatest 

for households with less than a high school diploma. SNAP-only households tend to be the least 

well-off, most vulnerable households as measured by education—a socio-economic determinant of 

lifetime earnings. 

62The 2005-09 increase for less than 9th grade is 9.5 percentage points (t-value 1.81) and the increase for high school 

diploma is 3.8 percentage points (t-value of 2.52). The other increases—3.8 percentage points for high school/no diploma 

(t-value 1.11), 2.1 percentage points for 1-3 years of college (t-value 1.53), and 0.3 percentage points for bachelor’s degree 

or higher (t-value 0.23)—were each statistically insignificant.
38

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Conclusion

The severity of the recent recession, and the lingering unemployment in its aftermath, has focused 

attention on the roles of various government support programs in providing a safety net. The recessionary safety net is composed of those social safety-net programs for which participation is countercyclical, expanding during economic downturns and shrinking during times of economic growth. 

SNAP and UI are two major components of the recessionary safety net. Each program improves the 

well-being of millions of Americans, and the dollar values of SNAP and UI benefits can be sizable 

components of a household’s resources. SNAP and UI function as macroeconomic stabilizers that 

help sustain aggregate household spending and national production in economic downturns, making 

the downturns less severe than they would be in the absence of the programs. 

During the recession, the share of SNAP households that also received UI (the SNAP Joint 

Participation Rate) was about 14.4 percent in 2009—nearly double that of the full-employment 

year of 2005 (7.8 percent). During a recession, households with unemployed workers who had tight 

labor market connections (i.e., their work histories and earnings are sufficient to meet UI-eligibility 

requirements) and greater UI receipt become a larger share of the SNAP caseload (compared to 

households with limited labor market connections), increasing the overall share of SNAP households 

that receive UI. This changing mix of SNAP households is consistent with the estimated increase in 

the SNAP JPR in 2009 (compared with 2005). To help explain these 2005-09 changes, we examined 

the recessionary caseload for SNAP—the difference between the SNAP caseload for a recessionary 

year and the 2005 full-employment SNAP caseload. This difference in annual caseloads represents 

the number of “net additional” or “marginal” SNAP households that are added to the SNAP caseload during the recession. We estimated the 2009 share of the “marginal” SNAP households that 

received UI to be nearly 3 in 10 (29.6 percent), well exceeding the share of 7.8 percent receiving UI 

among “average” SNAP households in the 2005 full-employment caseload. This considerable difference between marginal and average shares nearly doubled the share of SNAP households that also 

received UI from 2005 to 2009. 

In 2009, the share of UI households that also received SNAP (the UI Joint Participation Rate) 

reached 13.4 percent, exceeding its 2005 estimate of 11.1 percent. Although the qualitative patterns 

are similar for UI and SNAP, the 2005-09 increase in the share of UI households receiving SNAP 

(2.3 percentage points) was less than the 2005-09 increase in the share of SNAP households 

receiving UI (6.6 percentage points). The share of the “marginal” UI recessionary caseload that 

received SNAP in 2009 was 15.4 percent, which was above the 11.1 percent share of “average” UI 

households receiving SNAP in 2005 by only 4.3 percentage points (resulting in an increase in the UI 

JPR that was small relative to the near doubling of the share of SNAP households receiving UI).

The study highlights a key point about SNAP: the least well-off, most vulnerable households—as 

measured either by education level of the householder or by the household’s annual income relative 

to poverty—are more likely to be SNAP-only households. For SNAP-only households, SNAP is 

potentially the largest source of government support—and perhaps the only source (depending on 

participation in programs besides UI, such as cash welfare, housing assistance, etc., which this report 

does not examine). 

Future research could adopt a multivariate framework to examine how SNAP JPRs and UI JPRs 

are affected by household characteristics (such as those examined here or by other factors such as 

household composition—e.g., households with children). Another fruitful approach could be the use 
39

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

of monthly longitudinal data to examine intra-year participation dynamics to determine the extent to 

which households receive SNAP and UI benefits in the same month and the extent to which SNAP 

and UI benefits are received in the same year but in different months. Other research could estimate 

SNAP JPRs and UI JPRs at the level of individual States. The estimated JPRs could be dependent 

variables in econometric models that examine the effects of State-level economic conditions and of 

SNAP policies or UI policies that vary across States.

Because both SNAP and UI are “automatic” stabilizers, discretionary legislation is not required for 

the two programs to provide increased support for household spending during an economic downturn. Even so, new legislation can, at times, affect SNAP or UI and provide support over and above

what would otherwise be available. During the 2008-09 period, new legislation provided a temporary 

increase in SNAP benefits and expanded SNAP eligibility for jobless adults without children (through 

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009) and extended UI benefits (through 

successive Acts beginning in 2008). The new legislation raises important policy and research questions about the contribution of “policy” or “economic” factors on SNAP- or UI-participation levels (or 

program expenditures). For example, how much of the 2005-09 increase in SNAP participation was 

due to new legislation and how much of it was due to the economic downturn? While both policymakers and researchers would be interested in this issue, and in findings that address it, no one study 

can accomplish all research objectives. Our study focused on estimating joint participation patterns 

across time and across subgroups, leaving other analyses for future research.

The “policy versus economy” distinction can miss a simple but important point: a recession may itself 

be the motivation for new legislation or for enhanced outreach.63 Therefore, while it can be useful to 

distinguish statistically the policy and economy components of the 2005-09 increase in the SNAP 

caseload, it can be valid conceptually to consider the caseload increase to be due entirely to the recession (inclusive of the caseload’s “ARRA component”). If a recessionary economy prompts a policy or 

programmatic change, then the policy factor is not easily separated from the economic factor. 

It is no contradiction to adopt a policy approach that eschews discretionary legislation during mild 

downturns but responds actively during a severe recession. In 2009, the full amount of support 

provided by SNAP and UI rose because the effects of the new legislation augmented the automatic 

stabilization already built into the programs. 

63This point may be self-evident. After all, as identified in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Plan, two of the objectives of the ARRA SNAP provisions were 

specifically to “create and save jobs” and to “stimulate the economy” (Food and Nutrition Service, 2010). Further, it is 

difficult to imagine that Congress would have passed Emergency Unemployment Compensation in 2008 in the absence of 

an emergency. In this view, if the economy had not been in a recession in 2008 and 2009, then new legislation for Unemployment Insurance and SNAP would not have been adopted.
40

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

References

Anderson, Patricia M. 1997. “Continuing Eligibility.” Unemployment Insurance in the United States: 

Analysis of Policy Issues. O’Leary, Christopher J. and Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: 

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 

Anderson, Patricia M., and Bruce D. Meyer. August 1997. “Unemployment Insurance Takeup Rates 

and the After-Tax Value of Benefits.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3): 913-937. http://

www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2951259.pdf 

Bassi, Laurie J., and Daniel P. McMurrer. 1997. “Coverage and Recipiency.” Unemployment 

Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues. O’Leary, Christopher J. and Stephen A. 

Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 

Castner, Laura A., and Allen L. Schirm. 2005. State Food Stamp Participation Rates for the 

Working Poor in 2002, Final Report. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition 

Service, Office of Research and Analysis. http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/menu/Published/snap/

FILES/Participation/WorkingPoor2002.pdf 

Chimerine, Lawrence, Theodore S. Black, and Lester Coffey. 1999. Unemployment Insurance as an 

Economic Stabilizer: Evidence of Effectiveness Over Three Decades. Unemployment Insurance 

Occasional Paper 99-8. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, 

Unemployment Insurance Service. http://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/99-8

Cole, Nancy, and Ellie Lee. 2004. Feasibility and Accuracy of Record Linkage to Estimate Multiple 

Program Participation: Volume III, Results of Record Linkage. E-FAN-03-008-03. U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/

DataLink-Vol3.pdf 

Cunnyngham, K.E., L.A. Castner, and A.L. Schirm. 2011. Empirical Bayes Shrinkage Estimates 

of State Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation Rates in 2006-2008 for All 

Eligible People and the Working Poor. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service.

Executive Office of the President, Council of Economic Advisors. February 2011. Economic Report 

of the President, 2011. U.S. Government Printing Office. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/

default/files/microsites/2011_erp_appendixB.pdf

Farrell, Mary, Michael Fishman, Matthew Langley, and David C. Stapleton. 2003. The Relationship 

of Earnings and Income to Food Stamp Participation: A Longitudinal Analysis. E-FAN-03-

011. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. http://naldc.nal.usda.gov/

download/45667/PDF

Hanson, Kenneth. October 2010. The Food Assistance National Input-Output Multiplier (FANIOM) 

Model and Stimulus Effects of SNAP. ERR-103. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic 

Research Service. http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/134117/err103_1_.pdf

Lee, Eun Sul, and Ronald N. Forthofer. 2006. Analyzing Complex Survey Data. Thousand Oaks, 

CA: Sage Publications, Second Edition.

Lohr, Sharon L. 1999. Sampling: Design and Analysis. Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury Press.
41

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Loveless, Tracy A. 2010. Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Receipt 

in the Past 12 Months for Households by State: 2008 and 2009. ACSBR/09-8. U.S. Census 

Bureau. http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-8.pdf

Lynch, Victoria, Dean M. Resnick, Jane Staveley, and Cynthia M. Taeuber. January 2008. 

Differences in Estimates of Public Assistance Recipiency Between Surveys and Administrative 

Records. Jacob France Institute: University of Baltimore. http://www.ubalt.edu/jfi/jfi/reports/

TANFJan2008.pdf

Mabli, James, Stephen Tordella, Laura Castner, Thomas Godfrey, and Priscilla Foran. September 2011. 

Dynamics of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation in the Mid-2000s. U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Office of Research and Analysis. http://

www.fns.usda.gov/ora/MENU/Published/SNAP/FILES/Participation/DynamicsMid2000.pdf

Meyer, Bruce D., Wallace K.C. Mok, and James X. Sullivan. 2009. The Under-Reporting of 

Transfers in Household Surveys: Its Nature and Consequences. Working Paper 15181. 

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w15181 

Nicholson, Walter. 1997. “Initial Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation.” Unemployment 

Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues. O’Leary, Christopher J. and Stephen A. 

Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 

Nord, Mark, and Mark Prell. April 2011. Food Security Improved Following the 2009 ARRA 

Increase in SNAP Benefits. ERR-116. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 

Service. http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/127913/err116.pdf

O’Leary, Christopher J., and Kenneth J. Kline. 2008. UI as a Safety Net for Former TANF 

Recipients: Final Report. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. http://aspe.hhs.gov/

hsp/08/ui-tanf/report.pdf

O’Leary, Christopher J., and Kenneth J. Kline. 2010. Use of Unemployment Insurance and 

Employment Services by Newly Unemployed Leavers from Temporary Assistance for Needy 

Families: Final Report. ETA Occasional Paper 2010-07. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment 

and Training Administration. http://research.upjohn.org/externalpapers/13

Remler, Dahlia K., Jason E. Rachlin, and Sherry A. Glied. 2001. What Can the Take-up of Other 

Programs Teach Us About How to Improve Take-up of Health Insurance Programs? Working 

Paper 8185. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. http://papers.nber.org/

papers/w8185

U.S. Census Bureau. 2010a. Estimating ASEC Variances with Replicate Weights (link is 2010 

Replicate Weight Usage Instruction (MS Word). http://thedataweb.rm.census.gov/ftp/cps_ftp.html

U.S. Census Bureau. 2010b. Current Population Survey, 2010 Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) 

Supplement. http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar10.pdf 

U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. Estimating ASEC Variances with Replicate Weights (link is 2005-2009 

Replicate Weight Usage Instruction (MS Word). http://thedataweb.rm.census.gov/ftp/cps_ftp.html
42

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

U.S. Congressional Budget Office. May 2010. The Effects of Automatic Stabilizers on the Federal 

Budget. http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/114xx/doc11471/05-27-automaticstabilizers.pdf

U.S. Congressional Research Service. 2006. Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons with Limited 

Income: Eligibility Rules, Recipient and Expenditure Data, FY2002-FY2004.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. 2012a. Building a Healthy America: A 

Profile of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/MENU/

Published/snap/FILES/Other/BuildingHealthyAmerica.pdf 

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. 2012b. SNAP Community 

Characteristics. http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/SNAPCharacteristics/default.htm

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. 2010. USDA Food and Nutrition 

Service Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act Plan Update 6/18/2010. http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/recovery/memos/SNAP_

ARRA-Plan.pdf

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Office of Research and Analysis. 2008. 

Food and Nutrition Service Research and Evaluation Plan—Fiscal Year 2009. Alexandria, VA. 

http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/MENU/Published/Research/2009RandE.pdf

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. December 2010. Sizing Up the 2007-09 

Recession: Comparing Two Key Labor Market Indicators With Earlier Downturns. Issues in 

Labor Statistics, Summary 10-11. http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils88.pdf

U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. February 2012. Emergency 

Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC) Program. http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/

unemploy/pdf/euc08.pdf 

U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. March 2009. Training and 

Employment Notice No. 35-09. http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEN/ten2009/ten35-

09acc.pdf

Social Security Administration. 1997. “Historical Development.” http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/

histdev.pdf

Vroman, Wayne. 2010. The Role of Unemployment Insurance As an Automatic Stabilizer During 

a Recession. IMPAQ International. Prepared for U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and 

Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service. http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/

FullText_Documents/ETAOP2010-10.pdf

Wandner, Stephen A., and Thomas Stengle. July 1997. “Unemployment insurance: Measuring Who 

Receives It.” Monthly Labor Review. 

Wheaton, Laura. 2007. Underreporting of Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the CPS and SIPP. 

2007. Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, Social Statistics Section. Alexandria, 

VA. Also available from Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/

UploadedPDF/411613_transfer_programs.pdf
43

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Witte, Ann D., and Magaly Queralt. 2002. Take-Up Rates and Trade Offs After the Age of Entitlement: 

Some Thoughts and Empirical Evidence for Child Care Subsidies. Working Paper 8886. 

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8886

Zedlewski, Sheila R. 2002. Left Behind or Staying Away? Eligible Parents Who Remain Off TANF. 

Series B, No. B-51. Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310571_B51.pdf
44

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Appendix 1

This appendix provides additional detail on the relationships between the JPRs for the recessionary 

and full-employment caseloads for a program and a table with estimates of recessionary caseloads 

and their associated JPRs for every year in the study period. 

We will focus on examining how the SNAP JPR relates to the SNAP JPR for the full-employment 

caseload and the JPR of the recessionary caseload; the relationships for the UI caseloads and JPRs 

are fully analogous. Let the SNAP JPR in any particular year t be designated by πt. Then, using 

equation (1) or (2) from Chapter 5, the SNAP JPR can be expressed as a weighted average given by: 

(1 ) +           = = = + = + −                    

* * *

t t t t * t

t * t t

t t t t t t

J J ΔJ S J ΔS ΔJ ΔJ

π θ π θ

S S S S S ΔS ΔS (A1) ,

where (a) π* is the SNAP JPR at full employment (i.e., the JPR for the full-employment caseload) 

and J* and S* are the full-employment numbers of SNAP and joint households, respectively, and (b) 

the ratio of the joint recessionary caseload ΔJt and the SNAP recessionary caseload ΔSt is the share 

of net additional SNAP households that also receive UI, i.e., the JPR of the recessionary caseload. 

The two weights θt and (1 – θt) that combine these two JPRs reflect the sizes of the full-employment 

SNAP caseload S* and the SNAP caseload in the given year St—their ratio equals θt. 

The relationship expressed by equation (A1) embodies the factors that drive changes in the SNAP 

JPR over time. The SNAP JPR πt —the JPR that pertains to the “average” SNAP household in 

SNAP’s overall caseload—increases when the JPR for the “marginal” net additional SNAP households in the SNAP recessionary caseload, given by (ΔJt

 /ΔSt), exceeds π* (the “previous average” 

SNAP JPR at full employment). For example, the SNAP JPR for 2005 is about 7.8 percent and the 

JPR for the SNAP recessionary caseload in 2009 is about 29.6 percent (fig. 4). The weight θt for 

2009 is about 0.70 (the ratio of the SNAP caseloads for 2005 and 2009 of about 7.69 million and 

11.0 million, from table 1). Based on (A1), the SNAP JPR for 2009 of 14.3 percent follows from 

(0.70)(7.8 percent) + (1-0.70)(29.6 percent). Based on analogous estimates from figure 4 and table 1, 

the UI JPR for 2009 of 13.4 percent follows from (0.46)(11.1 percent) + (1-0.46)(15.4 percent). Given 

that the JPR for the recessionary caseload exceeded the JPR for the full-employment caseload for 

both SNAP and UI, the SNAP JPR and the UI JPR each rose from 2005 to 2009. 

From 2005 to 2009, the SNAP JPR rose 6.6 percentage points, which was relatively more than the 

UI JPR increase of 2.3 percentage points (fig. 4). This result is easily explained by adapting the 

weighted average formula. Using (A1), the difference between the SNAP JPR for a given year and 

the JPR of the full-employment caseload can be expressed as:

( 2) (1 )

   − = −  −       

* t *

t t

t

ΔJ A π π θ π

ΔS .

That is, the increase in the SNAP JPR from 2005 to another year, such as 2009, is larger when the 

JPR for the marginal, net additional SNAP households exceeds the average SNAP JPR at full employment by a larger amount. It is a well-known economic principle that when a marginal value exceeds 

an average value, the average increases. The fully intuitive result in (A2) says something more: when 

a marginal value exceeds an average value by a large amount, then the average will rise by a large

amount. For SNAP, the difference in the two JPRs was 21.8 percentage points (29.6 percent minus 
45

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

7.8 percent) while the differences for UI is a smaller 4.3 percentage points (15.4 percent minus 11.1 

percent). It is little wonder, then, that the SNAP JPR rose by more than the UI JPR.

Strictly speaking, (A2) also contains the term (1 – θt) which potentially means an additional factor 

could help explain why the SNAP JPR rose by more than the UI JPR. The larger (1 – θt), the greater 

the increase in the SNAP JPR or the UI JPR (for any given difference in the JPRs of the recessionary and full-employment caseloads). However, in our results, this term does not happen to 

contribute to the relatively greater recessionary response of the SNAP JPR. The term (1 – θt) equals 

about 0.30 for SNAP, which is less than the corresponding value of about 0.54 for UI. If anything, 

the value of (1 – θt) for SNAP makes the increase in the SNAP JPR smaller than it would have been 

if the SNAP value had equaled the 0.54 value for UI. 

While the definitions, structure, and lessons of (1) and (A1) make sense, the two equations do create 

the possibility of results that are not intuitive. It is possible to have negative values for a year’s recessionary caseload, a JPR of a recessionary caseload, or one of the weights in (A1). 

The definition in (1) of recessionary caseloads and its related discussion might seem to imply that a 

recessionary caseload is always a positive number. However, (1) does allow for a “negative” recessionary caseload if and when, for example, the SNAP caseload for a year is below the full-employment caseload (2005). This possibility mirrors other examples in economics. For example, it is 

possible for a year’s unemployment rate to be below its full-employment rate, resulting in a negative 

unemployment gap. The years 2006 and 2007 had negative unemployment gaps in which the actual 

unemployment rate was 0.3 or 0.5 percent, respectively, below its estimated full-employment level 

according to the Congressional Budget Office. For temporary periods, the economy can have very 

vigorous employment and higher than normal rates of output and income. Table 1 also shows that the 

GDP gap for 2006 was positive, indicating that the economy was producing slightly above its fullemployment capacity (a condition that starts to exert upward pressure on wages and prices). When 

the economy is operating “above” full employment, with unusually high income and unusually low 

unemployment, SNAP and UI participation can be below what they would be at full employment, 

making St < S* and Ut < U* in (1). Thus, the recessionary caseloads can be positive, as we found for 

the recessionary years 2008 and 2009, or negative in temporary periods of over-full employment. 

Appendix table A-2 shows annual values for the SNAP, UI, and joint recessionary caseloads that 

are derived from table 1 as well as the JPRs for the recessionary caseloads. The table exhibits the 

phenomena of negative recessionary caseloads in some years.

Two counter-intuitive possibilities emerge because the share of net additional SNAP households 

that also receive UI is measured as the ratio of the joint recessionary caseload ΔJt and the SNAP 

recessionary caseload ΔSt. First, there is no mathematical or statistical law that forces the joint and 

recessionary caseloads to have the same signs in a given year. Under the recessionary conditions of 

2008 and 2009, it can be expected that both St > S* and Jt > J*, in which case the joint recessionary 

caseload ΔJt and the SNAP recessionary caseload ΔSt are each positive, making their ratio positive 

in turn. However, for economic conditions in years close to 2005, the SNAP and joint caseloads are 

much closer to their full-employment values (as table A-1 shows) and can differ from S* and J* in 

opposite directions. The JPR for the SNAP recessionary caseload happens to have a negative sign in 

2004, when the joint caseload was slightly above its full-employment level and SNAP was below; 

with only about 6,000 more joint households than in 2005, it would not have taken a large swing 

in joint participation to change the SNAP JPR from a negative value (close to zero at -1.3 percent) 

to a positive value. Second, if the joint and SNAP recessionary caseloads have the same sign (both 
46

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

positive or both negative), the JPR of the SNAP recessionary caseload must be positive but it may 

exceed 100 percent if the joint recessionary caseload is larger than the SNAP recessionary caseload. 

This result occurred in 2007 (table A-2). 

While the two weights in (A1) must add to 100 percent—an intuitive and useful property of 

weighted averages—it is possible for one of the two weights to exceed 100 percent, making the other 

weight negative; this non-intuitive property sometimes emerges for a weighted average formula 

depending on the application and the weights involved. In particular, if St is less than S* at full 

employment, then θt exceeds 1.0 and (1 - θt) is less than 0. In our study, estimated SNAP households 

in 2006 and 2007 were below the 2005 estimate of SNAP households; the same pattern occurred for 

UI households.

Appendix table A-1

Estimated SNAP and UI JPRs, 2004-09 

Year SNAP JPR1 UI JPR2

Percent

Std. err.3

(t-statistic)4 Percent

Std err.3

(t-statistic)4

2009 14.35 0.48 13.42 0.46

(10.04) (2.91)

2008 9.77 0.43 12.02 0.49

(3.22) (1.12)

2007 6.00 0.38 9.46 0.57

(-3.04) (-1.93)

2006 7.04 0.39 10.53 0.59

2005 7.77 0.45 11.12 0.64

2004 8.38 0.47 10.13 0.57

1Estimated Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Joint Participation Rate (JPR) is the estimated number 

of joint households relative to the estimated number of SNAP households, i.e., the estimated share of SNAP households that receive UI. 

2Estimated Unemployment Insurance (UI) JPR is the estimated number of joint households relative to the estimated 

number of UI households, i.e., the estimated share of UI households that receive SNAP. 

3Estimated standard errors are based on Balanced Repeated Replication methodology using a Fay coefficient of 0.5 

and sets of 160 replicate weights calculated annually for reference years 2004-09 by the U.S. Census Bureau.

4Reported t-statistics for 2007-09 are each for the two-tailed test of whether the estimate is statistically significantly 

different from the 2005 estimate (not from zero) We do not report t-statistics for 2005 because 2005 estimates cannot 

differ from themselves. We do not report t-statistics for a test of whether 2004 or 2006 values differ from 2005 because 

the data for these years do not meet the statistical assumptions underlying the t-test: the 2004 and 2006 samples of 

the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey are not independent of the 2005 sample 

because the schedule of rotation of households into and out of the Current Population Survey included some households in the 2004 and 2006 samples that were also in the 2005 sample. 

Sources: Calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current 

Population Survey for reference years 2004-09.
47

Participation in SNAP and Unemployment Insurance: How Tight Are the Strands of the Recessionary Safety Net?, ERR-157

Economic Research Service/USDA

Appendix table A-2

Recessionary caseloads for SNAP, UI, and joint households and JPRs for SNAP and 

UI recessionary caseloads, 2004-09

Year Recessionary caseloads JPRs

SNAP 

(thousands of 

households)

UI

(thousands of 

households)

Joint

(thousands of 

households)

For SNAP 

recessionary 

caseload 

(percent)

For UI 

recessionary 

caseload 

(percent)

2009 3,330 6,411 984 29.6 15.4

2008 1,373 1,993 288 21.0 14.5

2007 -62 -536 -140 224.5 26.1

2006 -408 -504 -85 20.7 16.8

2005 0 0 0 n/a n/a

2004 -488 578 6 -1.3 1.1

Note: A recessionary caseload is defined as the difference between the measured caseload for a given year and 

the caseload at full employment (2005 in this report). The definition for a recessionary caseload is applicable for 

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), for Unemployment Insurance (UI), and for the joint caseload. At full 

employment, the recessionary caseload is zero. The Joint Participation Rate (JPR) for SNAP recessionary caseload is 

the ratio of the joint recessionary caseload to the SNAP recessionary caseload. The JPR for UI recessionary caseload is 

the ratio of the joint recessionary caseload to the UI recessionary caseload. 

Sources: Calculated from estimated SNAP, UI, and joint households in table 1 using the methodology of table 3. Derived 

figures in Appendix table A-2 may not match differences based on figures in table 1 due to rounding error.