alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 9 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
H. J. RES. 9

      Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to require that 
congressional resolutions setting forth levels of total budget outlays 
   and Federal revenues must be agreed to by two-thirds vote of both 
  Houses of the Congress if the level of outlays exceeds the level of 
                               revenues.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

   Mr. Solomon introduced the following joint resolution; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
      Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to require that 
congressional resolutions setting forth levels of total budget outlays 
   and Federal revenues must be agreed to by two-thirds vote of both 
  Houses of the Congress if the level of outlays exceeds the level of 
                               revenues.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:

                              ``Article--

    ``On the question of agreeing, in either the House of 
Representatives or the Senate, to a concurrent resolution of the two 
Houses of the Congress which sets forth an appropriate level of total 
budget outlays of the Federal Government for a fiscal year and a 
recommended level of Federal revenues for that fiscal year or of 
agreeing, in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, to a 
report of a conference committee on such a concurrent resolution, the 
affirmative vote of two-thirds of Members present and voting (a quorum 
being present), shall be required for agreeing to the question, if the 
appropriate level of total budget outlays set forth in such concurrent 
resolution or recommended in such conference report exceeds the 
recommended level of Federal revenues set forth in such concurrent 
resolution or recommended in such conference report.''.
                                 <all>
```
Date Meeting Agencies/Organizations Represented

December 15-16, 2008FL Estuary Nutrient Criteria Meeting: Collaboration Steering Committee Meeting (Penscola, FL) EPA,FDEP

March 11, 2009 March 18, 2009 March 25, 2009 April 1, 2009 April 15, 2009 April 29, 2009 October 14, 2009 October 28, 2009 November 11, 2009 December 2, 2009 December 16, 2009

May 6, 2009 Face-to-Face Meeting (Atlanta, GA) EPA, FDEP

June 10, 2009 The Use of USGS SPARROW model for Downstream Protection (Teleconference) EPA, USGS, FDEP

June 29 - 30, 2009 The Use of USGS SPARROW model for Downstream Protection (Tallahassee, FL) EPA, USGS, FDEP

August 28, 2009 FL Estuarine/Coastal Nutrient Criteria (South Florida) EPA, USGS, NOAA, FDEP, SFWMD, FIU

January 6, 2010 January 20, 2010 February 3, 2010 March 3, 2010 April 14, 2010 April 28, 2010 May 12, 2010 May 26, 2010 June 23, 2010 July 7, 2010 July 21, 2010 August 4, 2010

March 17, 2010 Face-to-Face Meeting (Pensacola, FL) EPA, FDEP

December 1, 2010 Overview of NEP Approaches for Nutrient Management in SW Florida Estuaries EPA, Tampa NEP, Sarasota NEP, Charlotte Harbor NEP, Janicki Environmental

December 8, 2010 Approaches for Numeric Nutrient Criteria Development in Florida Estuaries, Coastal waters, and Southern inland Flowing waters EPA, FDEp, SFWMD 2008

2009

Florida Estuary and Coastal Waters Numeric Nutrient Criteria (Reoccuring Teleconference) EPA, FDEP

2010

Florida Estuary and Coastal Waters Numeric Nutrient Criteria (Reoccuring Teleconference) EPA, FDEP

Additional Meetings Additional MeetingsJanuary 5, 2011

January 19, 2011 February 2, 2011 February 17, 2011 March 2, 2011 March 30, 2011 April 6, 2011 April 20, 2011 May 4, 2011 May 18, 2011 June 1, 2011 June 15, 2011 June 29, 2011 July 13, 2011 July 27, 2011 August 24, 2011 Additional Meetings

April 8, 2011 Tampa Bay Estuary Program and EPA Development of Estarine Nutrient Criteria for Tampa Bay (Tampa, FL) EPA, FDEP, Tampa NEP, Sarasota NEP, Tetra Tech, Janicki Environmental

May 24, 2011 Numeric Nutrient Criteria Development in South Florida Marine Waters (Webinar) EPA, NPS, FIU, SERC,Tetra Tech

June 7-8, 2011 Estuarine Criteria Development in the St. Johns Watershed and Indian River Lagoon (Platka, FL)EPA, FDEP, SJWMD, SFWMD, Indian River Lagoon NEP, Broward County, Tetra Tech, Janicki Environmental

July 12-13, 2011 Criteria Development in South Florida Estuarine and Coastal Marine Waters (Palm Beach, FL) EPA, NPS, FDEP, SFWMD, Charlotte Harbor NEP, FIU, SERC, Miami-Dade DERM, PB CORM, Broward County, Loxahatchee Riverkeeper, Tetra Tech

July 28, 2011 Additional data collection for Loxahatchee Estuary (Teleconference) EPA, Loxahatchee River Keeper

August 31, 2011 Numeric Nutrient Criteria Development in Tampa Bay, Sarasota Bay, and Charlotte Harbor (Washington, DC) EPA, Tampa NEP, Sarasota NEP, Charlotte Harbor NEP, Janicki Environmental, Tetra Tech Florida Estuary Modeling Subgroup (Reoccuring Teleconference) EPA, FDEP 2011

Florida Estuary and Coastal Waters Numeric Nutrient Criteria (Reoccuring Teleconference) EPA, FDEP
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Juan Fernandez, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 254]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leventhal, J.), rendered April 25, 2002, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of manslaughter in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review since he did not specify the ground he now raises on appeal in his motion to dismiss at trial *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10 [1995]; *People v Rourke, 4*AD3d 377 [2004]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *579
      *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]). Crane, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Lifson, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1031 Received in Senate (RDS)]

  2d Session
                                H. R. 1031

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 27, 1996

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
                For the relief of Oscar Salas-Velazquez.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAIVER OF GROUNDS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF REQUESTS FOR 
              CLASSIFICATION AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 204(c) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, the Attorney General may not disapprove a petition 
for classification of Oscar Salas-Velazquez under section 
201(b)(2)(A)(i) of such Act, or an application for adjustment of the 
status of Oscar Salas-Velazquez under section 245 of such Act, on any 
ground relating to a determination that the marriage of Oscar Salas-
Velazquez and Jennifer Christine Brady was entered into for the purpose 
of evading the immigration laws.
    (b) Waiver of Inadmissibility.--Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A), 
(B), and (C) of section 212(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, Oscar Salas-Velazquez may not be considered to be within a class 
of excludable aliens at any time on or after the date of the enactment 
of this Act on any ground relating to--
            (1) a determination that the marriage of Oscar Salas-
        Velazquez and Jennifer Christine Brady was entered into for the 
        purpose of evading the immigration laws; or
            (2) the deportation of Oscar Salas-Velazquez on February 9, 
        1995.
    (c) Denial of Preferential Immigration Treatment for Certain 
Relatives.--The natural parents, brothers, and sisters of Oscar Salas-
Velazquez shall not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any 
right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
    (d) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Number.--Upon the granting of an 
immigrant visa or permanent residence to Oscar Salas-Velazquez, the 
Secretary of State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, 
for the current or next following fiscal year, the worldwide level of 
family-sponsored immigrants under section 201(c)(1)(A) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 27, 1996.

            Attest:

                                                ROBIN H. CARLE,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### In the Matter of Isidro Abascal, Appellant, v New York State Board of Parole, Respondent.

[802 NYS2d 803]

Mugglin, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Canfield, J.), entered March 1, 2005 in Albany County, which *741dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying his request for parole release.

Petitioner is serving a prison term of six years to life, imposed upon his conviction of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree. In September 2003, petitioner appeared before respondent for the second time and his request for parole release was denied. After exhausting his administrative appeals, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking review of respondent’s determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal.

Our review of the record reveals that respondent considered the relevant statutory factors in making its determination (see *Matter of Valderrama v Travis,*19 AD3d 904, 905 [2005]; *Matter of Moore v Travis,*8 AD3d 717, 717-718 [2004]; *Matter of Lomonaco v New York State Bd. of Parole,*302 AD2d 829, 830 [2003]). The record before respondent included petitioner’s educational and vocational accomplishments, and these topics were discussed during the interview with petitioner (see *Matter ofValderrama v Travis, supra*at 905). Petitioner was also given an opportunity during the interview to address his mental health and the factual errors contained in the presentence investigation report, matters about which he now complains (see *Matter of Moore v Travis, supra*at 717). Notably, the record does not indicate that respondent’s determination was based upon either of these factors. Instead, respondent properly considered the seriousness of the offense for which petitioner is currently incarcerated, his criminal history and his poor institutional record of behavior and found that these factors militated against his release at that time *(see Matter of Valderrama v Travis, supra*at 905). As respondent is vested with the discretion to determine whether petitioner’s release is appropriate and there has been no “ ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety,’ ” we will not disturb its determination *(Matter of Silmon v Travis,*95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting *Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole,*50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; *see Matter of Valderrama v Travis, supra*at 905; *Matter of Moore v Travis, supra*at 717-718; *Matter of Lomonaco v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra*at 830).

We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions, including the delay in providing the hearing transcript to him and the imposition of a 24-month hold, and find them to be without merit *{see*9 NYCRR 8006.1 [e]; 8006.2 [a]; *Matter of Tatta v State of N.Y., Div. of Parole,*290 AD2d 907, 908 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 604 [2002]).

*742Cardona, P.J., Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
40075.

#### COMMISSIONERS OF ROADS & REVENUES OF FULTON COUNTY v. DOWIS.

Jordan, Judge.

Error is assigned on the judgment of the Superior Court of Fulton County affirming the award of the Deputy Director of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation who found that the deceased employee died as the result of a heart attack which arose out of and during the course of employment and awarded compensation to the claimant, his widow. It is contended by the employer that the award of compensation was unauthorized for two reasons: (1) because there was no competent evidence of any activity by the deceased employee during working hours which would authorize the finding that his death arose out of and during the course of employment, since the only evidence in this regard was the illegal and incompetent hearsay testimony of the claimant and her son as to statements made by the deceased to them; and (2) because the evidence demanded the finding that the employee’s death was caused by a second heart attack which was wholly unrelated to the attack allegedly sustained by the employee while he was on the job. *Held:*

1. Under the decision of this court in *Moore v. Atlanta Transit*
      *648
      *System, Inc.,*105 Ga. App. 70 (123 SE2d 693), the testimony of the decedent’s wife and her son as to statements made to them by the decedent regarding his activity immediately prior to his heart attack at the place of employment was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule since there were no witnesses to the occurrence; and the evidence including the medical testimony authorized the finding that the heart attack arose out of and during the course of employment.

Decided April 18, 1963.

*Harold Sheats, Martin II. Peabody,*for plaintiff in error.

*R. Beverly Irwin, Jack M. Smith,*contra.

2. The medical testimony further authorized the finding that the second heart attack suffered by the deceased at his. home resulted from an extension of the heart condition precipitated by the first attack and constituted one illness; and the employer’s contention that the evidence demanded the finding that the second heart attack was wholly unrelated to the first is without merit.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas Iddings, Appellant.

[805 NYS2d 210]

Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (James R. Harvey, J.), rendered January 6, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02 [1], [4]). We reject defendant’s contention that County Court abused its discretion in determining that a prosecution witness was competent to provide sworn testimony *(see People v Muldrow,*273 AD2d 814, 815 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 891 [2000]). Also contrary to defendant’s contention, the court properly denied defendant’s challenges for cause with respect to three prospective jurors. Those prospective jurors stated unequivocally that they would set aside their beliefs about weapons and determine the case based on the evidence presented to them *(see generally*
      *1133
      *People v Chambers,*283 AD2d 904, 906 [2001], *affd*97 NY2d 417 [2002]). Defendant further contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials because those statements were rendered involuntary as a result of his intoxication. We reject that contention inasmuch as the evidence presented at the suppression hearing establishes that defendant was not “intoxicated to a degree of mania or of being unable to understand the meaning of his statements” *(People v Benjamin,*17 AD3d 688, 689 [2005]). The contention of defendant with respect to prosecutorial misconduct on summation is not preserved for our review, and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see generally People v Procks,*258 AD2d 951, 952 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 976 [1999]). Contrary to defendant’s further contentions, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), and the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Gorski, Smith and Lawton, JJ.
# L_2019100EN.01000501.xml

| 11.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 100/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 100/5

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/574

of 4 April 2019

entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications ‘Paška sol’ (PDO)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Croatia's application to register the name ‘Paška sol’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Croatia's application to register the name ‘Paška sol’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Paška sol’ should therefore be entered in the register, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Paška sol’ should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name ‘Paška sol’ (PDO) is hereby entered in the register.

The name specified in the first paragraph denotes a product in Class 2.6. — salt, as listed in Annex XI to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 (3).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 4 April 2019.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Phil HOGAN

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 449, 13.12.2018, p. 17.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 179, 19.6.2014, p. 36).

3

---
#### Phyllis Leder, Respondent-Appellant, v Robert Horowitz et al., Appellants-Respondents.

[806 NYS2d 212]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Joseph, J.), dated November 3, 2004, as denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Robert Horowitz, Steven B. Tannenbaum, and Horowitz, Tannenbaum & Silver, EC., and the plaintiff cross-appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of same order as denied her cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the appeal by the defendant Vickie R. Silver is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as she is not aggrieved by the portions of the order appealed from *(see*CFLR 5511); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

*627Contrary to the contention of the defendants Robert Horowitz, Steven Tannenbaum, and Horowitz, Tannenbaum & Silver, EC. (hereinafter the defendants), the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to this case because the issue of whether the plaintiff consented to settle the underlying action to recover damages for personal injuries for the sum of $50,000 was never adjudicated *(see generally Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co.,*65 NY2d 449 [1985]; *Augustine v Sugrue,*8 AD3d 517 [2004]; *Jimenez v Shippy Realty Corp.,*213 AD2d 377 [1995]). Additionally, the plaintiff properly pleaded, in the alternative, that she did not consent to the settlement, and that if she had consented to the settlement, she was essentially compelled to settle the underlying action due to the defendants’ negligence *(see*CPLR 3014).

The defendants, as the movants, failed to submit evidence sufficient to establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320 [1986]). The plaintiff likewise failed to meet her initial burden on her cross motion *(id.).*Even if the affidavit of the plaintiffs expert was admissible, it was insufficient to establish the elements of legal malpractice as a matter of law *(see Amona v Orange & Rockland Util., Inc.,*17 AD3d 386 [2005]). Under the circumstances, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the plaintiff consented to the settlement and whether, but for the defendants’ alleged negligence, the plaintiff would have obtained a larger recovery in the underlying action *(see generally Keeley v Tracy,*301 AD2d 501 [2003]; *Aversa v Safran,*303 AD2d 700 [2003]; *Ippolito v McCormack, Damiani, Lowe & Mellon,*265 AD2d 303 [1999]; *Zasso v Maher,*226 AD2d 366 [1996]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them and properly denied the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Schmidt, J.P., Adams, Luciano and Covello, JJ., concur.