Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about 

joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and 

recommendations of national security professionals and the Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the 

SOF community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security 

decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. 

JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those 

who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational 

priorities: 

• Preempting global terrorist and chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, and explosive threats

• Enhancing homeland security

• Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conven-

	 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies. 

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and 

curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the 

staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by

its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military 

communities.

The JSOU portal is http://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Major General Steven J. Hashem, President

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education

The Apollinaire Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Institutional 

Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution Stanford 

Univ. and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of the Jebsen Center for 

Counter-Terrorism Studies, The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

George Emile Irani

Ph.D., International Relations

Toledo International Center for 

Peace and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force

USAFSOS Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies and JSOU Associate Fellow

Brian A. Maher

Ed.D., Education

JSOU Vice President

Michael C. McMahon

Lt Colonel, U.S. Air Force

JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department Director

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

Kenneth H. Poole

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU

Associate Fellow

Joseph A. Stuart

Ph.D., Educational Leadership

JSOU Dean of Academics

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History

Courage Services, Inc. and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

William S. Wildrick

Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow
The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2007

Executive Report

JSOU Second Annual 

Symposium

Irregular Warfare: 

Strategic Utility of SOF

30 April – 3 May 2007

Hurlburt Field, Florida
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2765; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting

written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. 

For more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director 

of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@

hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-20-2
The symposium was an academic exercise; the views of 

the participants are their individual perspectives and do 

not represent the U.S. Government or their respective 

organizations. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

Executive Report, JSOU First Annual Symposium (2–5 May 2006)

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise,

December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community,

January 2007, Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.


Foreword

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Strategic Studies 

Department held its second annual academic symposium 

on “Irregular Warfare: The Strategic Utility of Special Operations Forces (SOF)” in May 2007. This topic is relevant based on the 

ongoing worldwide conflict and the emphasis that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review places on irregular warfare. 

The symposium presentations and discussions clearly showed 

no current consensus exists on the topic of irregular warfare. Some 

participants embraced it as a new, more effective way to describe the 

long-term conflict for which the U.S. and its partners are engaged,

while others challenge whether it is even a type of warfare. These 

disagreements aside, a consensus was achieved concerning the need 

to emphasize our opponents’ “logic of action” versus their tactics. In 

other words, what do our opponents in the current conflict hope to

gain—what are their goals? By overemphasizing the enemy’s use of 

terrorism as a tactic, we may not be harnessing our national power 

properly to defeat their long-term objectives. 

Once we obtain a better and more in-depth understanding of our 

opponents, the greatest challenge is to develop U.S. and its partners’ 

long-term capabilities to defeat the enemy. As the term implies, irregular warfare is not traditional major-combat operations, and the military’s role in it is significantly different. Ultimately, winning in irregular

warfare is achieved by winning control and allegiances of populations. 

In this situation—kinetic, violence is of limited value. Engagement and 

capacity-building is ultimately more effective, but these actions require 

a long, continuous process that is difficult, given America’s predilection for short, rotational engagement activities and operations. 

Although the symposium may have raised as many questions as it 

answered, it is through discussing and arguing these issues that the 

Department of Defense (DoD), as our nation’s military arm, will come 

to develop the best capabilities to win this Long War. However, DoD 

will not prevail in an irregular war by itself. The next, and perhaps 

more challenging problem set, is how will the rest of the U.S. Government rise to the challenge facing the U.S.? Will the DoD’s interagency 

partners adapt their organizations, skill sets, and procedures to more 
vi

effectively participate in irregular warfare or will the traditional view of 

warfare as primarily or solely a military activity continue to prevail?

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
vii

Symposium Agenda 

Monday, 30 April 

0800–1400 Pre-Symposium JSOU Fellows Meeting

Tuesday, 1 May 

0815–0825 Opening Remarks

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, president, JSOU and 

director, Center for Knowledge and Futures (SOKF), United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

0825–0845 Keynote address

Validity of Irregular Warfare (IW) as a Model and discussion 

Mr. Wade Ishimoto, senior advisor to Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

0915–1115 Panel 1, Validity of IW as a Model and discussion

Moderator: Dr. Harry R. Yarger (Colonel, USA, Ret.), professor of National Security Policy, Department of National 

Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College

Panelists: 

Colonel Mark Boyatt (USA, Ret.), former commander of 3rd 

Special Forces Group and assistant commandant of the 

John F. Kennedy (JFK) Special Warfare Center and School

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hasler (USA), Joint and Army

Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special 

Warfare Center and School 

Dr. David Tucker, associate professor, Department of 

Defense Analysis and co-director of the Center on Terrorism 

and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School

Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro (Brazilian Army, 

Ret.), former commandant of the Combined Arms School 

and third deputy chief of staff of Doctrine, Plans and Strategy, Brazilian Army General Staff

Dr. Michael Vlahos, senior staff member, National Security 

Assessment Team of the National Security Analysis Department, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

1130–1240 Luncheon speaker

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (USMC, Ret.), author of The 

Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century, 

numerous articles, and opinion pieces and currently reading for Doctor of Philosophy degree in Modern History at 

Oxford University
viii

1300–1515 Panel 2, SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015 and 

discussion

Moderator: Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (USA, Ret.), 

founding director of the Jebsen Center for Counterterrorism 

Studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts University and former 

chair of the Department of Social Sciences and founding 

director of the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point

Panelists:

Colonel Walter M. Herd, former commander of the Combined 

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan and current 

commander of the U.S. Army Accessions Support Brigade

Colonel David Hopley (U.K. Royal Marines, Ret.), former 

commander of the British Special Boat Service as well as 

deputy commander and component commander of U.K. 

Special Forces 

Colonel Raymond Palumbo (USA), director, J5 Strategy, 

Plans and Policy, Center for Special Operations (CSO), 

USSOCOM

Colonel Chris Sorenson (USA), chief, J32 Special Operations 

Division, Operations Directorate, United States Northern 

Command

1545–1645 Keynote address

The Interagency Process, SOF, and IW and discussion

Brigadier General Leslie L. Fuller (USA, Ret.), former commander Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, commander Special Operation Command-Europe (SOCEUR), and chief of staff for NATO Forces 

in Afghanistan

Wednesday, 2 May

0800–1115 Panel 3, The Interagency Process, SOF, and IW and discussion

Moderator: Colonel James F. Powers, Jr. (USA, Ret.), director, Office of Homeland Security for the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania

Panelists:

Ms. Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, president and chief executive 

officer of LEG, Inc. and former Director for Combating Terrorism, White House National Security Council staff

Ambassador Timberlake Foster, foreign policy advisor to the 

commander, Air Force Special Operations Command
ix

Mr. Prakash Singh, former director general of Border Security Force, India 

Colonel Robert B. Stephan (USAF, Ret.), Assistant Secretary 

of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, National 

Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security

1130–1300 Luncheon speaker

Dr. John B. Alexander (Colonel, USA, Ret.), author of The 

Warrior’s Edge, Future War, and Winning the War and currently a private consultant

1315–1445 Breakout sessions 1 and 2

1500–1600 Keynote address

SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015 and discussion

Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson (USN), deputy commander, 

USSOCOM

1615–1700 Breakout session 3

Thursday, 3 May

0830–1130 USSOCOM CSO Update (Secret)

xi

Key Insights

• The term “irregular warfare” is often a barrier to understanding 

in our present fight because we fail to distinguish adequately

between the method (i.e., tactic) and logic of action. 

•	 The Department of Defense (DoD) approved definition for IW is

as follows: 

Irregular warfare is a form of warfare that has as its 

objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining 

or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors 

indirect approaches, though it may employ the full 

range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary’s 

power, influence, and will.

• IW is generational warfare and requires a long-term continuous 

engagement, especially prior to conflict. The key is how one

stays engaged—for example, for generations with 1-year rotations, the interagency process, or domestic popular support.

• Clearly, in order to win the population’s support, the tasks 

found in IW are much broader and larger than a military solution or lead. It will require the U.S. and its allies to harness all 

of the elements of national power to be successful. Unfortunately, not all of the DoD or the interagency supports, yet alone 

embraces, the concept of IW.

• Examples of key concepts follow: Do nations wage IW, defend 

against it, or do both? Do the interagency and our coalition 

partners “buy into” the concept? How do the instruments of 

National Power fit into the model? Should our SOF operate

inside the homeland to defeat a determined enemy? How do 

we conduct horizontal and vertical coordination in this multilateral, multi-agency environment? Do we need a super National 

Security Council for coordination? Is a Goldwater-Nichols-like 

legislative event needed to make the U.S. interagency system 

work? 



JSOU Symposium 2007

Introduction

The JSOU Second Annual SOF Strategic Symposium 1-3 May 

2007—Irregular Warfare: Strategic Utility of SOF—attracted 111 

participants. The event was designed to present and discuss 

issues relevant to the special operations community with perspectives 

from experts on the IW theme. A vigorous dialogue was maintained 

throughout the symposium, giving participants much to consider as 

they returned to their organizations to continue working the issues.

The symposium was framed by three keynote speakers, addressing 

the validity of IW as a model, experiences in the interagency process, 

and perspectives on SOF in the global security environment out to 

2015. Three panels provided the substance and framework for the 

discussions and some thoughts for a way ahead. The panels were 

followed by successful “breakout” groups for more detailed discussion 

and input. In addition, two eminent authors offered perspectives on 

IW and other relevant topics during less formal lunchtime discussions. 

This report summarizes the high points of the keynote addresses, panel 

discussions, and luncheon speakers in order to stimulate the thinking 

of national security professionals and leaders of SOF who could not 

attend the symposium. JSOU would like to thank all who participated 

in this year’s event and is confident that participation was professionally rewarding for all.

JSOU president, Brigadier General Steven Hashem, opened the 

symposium with the USSOCOM perspective. He believes that IW is 

extremely relevant to USSOCOM, DoD, and the entire U.S. Government. Brigadier General Hashem briefly discussed the Quadrennial

Defense Review’s point that “In the post-September 11 world, irregular 

warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the 

United States, its allies, and its partners.” With the decreased likelihood in the near to mid-term of conducting major conventional combat 

operations, the challenge is for the U.S. to develop capabilities that 

address the more nebulous aspects of winning a long-term, irregular 

war. This goal will require an indirect approach with protracted operations conducted on a global scale and focused on the will or support 

of the people. Brigadier General Hashem highlighted that SOF already 

embrace these concepts and ideas, making USSOCOM a natural fit to

support the idea of IW.

Clearly, in order to win the support of the host nation’s population 

and sustain U.S. domestic support for the effort, the tasks found in IW 


JSOU Symposium 2007

are much broader and larger than solely a military solution or lead. 

It will require the U.S. and its allies to harness all of the elements of 

national power to be successful. Unfortunately, not all of the DoD or 

the interagency supports, let alone embraces, the concept of IW. Brigadier General Hashem concluded that the discussion, ideas proposed, 

disagreements, and perspectives of symposium participants are important to USSOCOM staff and senior leadership as they wrestle with 

the Capstone Concept for Special Operations (CCSO) and as the CSO 

synchronizes the current fight. The symposium IW topic and input of

participants are invaluable to SOF and key to success in the Global 

War on Terror. 


JSOU Symposium 2007

Symposium Presentations and Discussion

Mr. Wade Ishimoto, Keynote Address: 

Validity of Irregular Warfare (IW) as a Model

Mr. Ishimoto qualified his remarks as his personal opinion, not those

of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). His address focused on

four major topics:

a.	 Definition of IW

b. United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) IW Special 

Study 

c. The ten IW activities described in the IW Special Study

d. Other hurdles facing the DoD in relation to IW.

Mr. Ishimoto began his discussion on the validity of IW by first

sharing various definitions and acronyms that have proliferated

throughout the government and how that forces others to learn a new 

concept. Likewise, IW may have much in common with other definitions

used within the government, such as unconventional warfare (UW). 

The introduction of IW creates additional confusion. For the purpose of 

discussion, Mr. Ishimoto introduced the Quadrennial Defense Review 

Irregular Warfare Roadmap definition approved by Deputy Secretary of

Defense Gordon England in February 2006:

Irregular warfare is a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the 

goal of under-mining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare 

favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of 

military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in 

order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.

Mr. Ishimoto described the challenges that USJFCOM faced as they 

conducted and published the IW Special Study in August 2006. For 

example, neither the National Security Strategy nor the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism mention IW. Working definitions are not harmonized, coordinated and are often contradictory. 

USJFCOM also concluded that how IW differs from UW is unclear. The 

USJFCOM IW Special Study did describe 10 activities, however, which 

Mr. Ishimoto highlighted with some caveats:

a. Insurgency and counterinsurgency

b. Terrorism and counterterrorism


JSOU Symposium 2007

c. UW—SOF support to General Purpose Forces

d. Foreign internal defense (General Purpose Forces role)

e. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction

f. Transnational criminal activities (not for General Purpose Forces)

g. Civil military operations

h. Psychological operations

i.	 Information operations (Quadrennial Defense Review IW does

not affect IO)

j. Intelligence and counterintelligence.

Mr. Ishimoto also gave three questions for symposium participants 

to consider in discussions and future study: Do we wage IW, defend 

against it, or do both? Does the interagency buy into the concept? How 

do the instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) fit in?

Panel 1, Validity of IW as a Model

Moderator: Dr. Rich Yarger (Colonel, USA, Ret.)

The role of this first panel was to challenge the symposium participants’ thinking as to what the IW model is or is not and what needs 

to be known about IW in order to understand SOF’s strategic utility 

in such an environment. Panelists were invited to examine and offer 

perspectives on the validity of IW as a model by contemplating: What 

is it, what might it be, what is it not, or what should it be? Both theoretical and practical standpoints were presented. In general, panelists 

concluded that IW is a useful model, but the SOF and conventional 

communities must develop a better appreciation of what IW is and 

what it means to wage IW.

Colonel Mark Boyatt (USA, Ret.)—Validity of IW as a Model

As background information, Colonel Boyatt introduced four key documents and studies concerning IW: 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

and Quadrennial Defense Review Irregular Warfare Roadmap, Joint 

Warfighting Center, USJFCOM; Irregular Warfare Special Study, 4 

August 2006; and the USMC/USSOCOM Multi-Service Concept for 

Irregular Warfare, Version 2, 2 August 2006. For discussion purposes, 

he used the working definition that Mr. Ishimoto had shared from the

IW Roadmap.

From Colonel Boyatt’s perspective, IW is not a model but rather 

an umbrella, an attitude, or a context of thinking. He believes that 

rather than require a definition, think of IW as a “basket” in which to


JSOU Symposium 2007

put anything that is not “regular” and helps separate ideas/concepts. 

It includes a collection of “tools,” which he defined as the 10 aspects

outlined in the USJFCOM IW Special Study. IW is essentially warfare 

for the “human terrain,” and to be successful one has to be engaged for 

at least a generation, vice hours, days, or even years. Boyatt described 

it as generational warfare. The key is how one stays engaged—for 

example, for generations with 1-year rotations, the interagency process 

(which should not be led by DoD), or domestic popular support. His 

solution is depicted in Figure 1. 

The strategic end state must be clearly defined. This end state

should lead to a strategic campaign plan with a series of short-term, 

achievable, interagency agreed-upon tactical level goals. The tactical 

goals are geared to the rotations of units and individuals (including the 

interagency support mechanisms) that build over the course of years 

to achievable operational level goals. The operational goals ultimately 

support and finally achieve the desired strategic end state.	

Colonel Boyatt concluded that the strategic utility of SOF in IW 

lies in the understanding that IW is generational warfare and requires 

long-term continuous engagement, especially prior to conflict. Army

Special Forces and Civil Affairs are designed, organized, trained, and 

equipped for long duration engagement. The other elements of SOF 

provide support on-call with short duration or situational shaping 

engagements in support of Special Forces and Civil Affairs. The Special 

Forces mission is to accomplish goals and objectives by, with, through

Figure 1. Campaigning 

Each line has short-term, achievable, interagency coordinated 

goals geared to rotations of personnel (every unit/organization/

commander/supervisor is given achievable goals). These goals 

are integrated steps in a long-term strategic campaign. 


JSOU Symposium 2007

indigenous or surrogate elements in a manner that is perceived as 

legitimate and moral.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hasler, USA—Conventional, Irregular, 

and Unconventional Warfare

CW4 Hasler described the doctrinal divide within the SOF community 

regarding terminology. Words do matter and often one term becomes 

confused with another; the definition of a term is sometimes confusing,

and all terms are usually misused in discussions and context. From 

October 2006 to January 2007, Army SOF conducted an analysis of 

the terms concerning ”war,” how they relate to each other, and their 

expression or characterization in current joint and Army doctrine. 

Terms that were discussed included conventional, unconventional, 

regular, irregular, traditional, nontraditional, symmetric, asymmetric, 

fourth generation, unrestricted, insurgency, resistance, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.

The purpose of the effort was to achieve better clarity and understanding of the terms and how they relate to each other, especially the 

relationship of UW to IW. Army SOF is the functional proponent for UW 

(a core task) but not for IW. The Global War on Terror (GWOT), development of IW and counterinsurgency doctrine, and the widespread misuse 

of military doctrinal terms was causing confusion inside and outside 

of Army SOF. Doctrine matters for three reasons: a) terms are easily 

manipulated, b) agreed-upon meanings of terms have serious mortal and 

organizational consequences, and c) terms connote organizational heritage and purpose, which stakeholders value and attempt to safeguard. 

The development of IW initially seemed to be redundant with much of 

Army SOF extant capabilities and possibly threatened core Army SOF 

roles and missions. Two indicators of this redundancy follow:

a.	 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review significant theme of IW

appeared to suggest a future that morphed Army SOF away 

from traditional roles

b. Seven of 14 IW component activities already existed or were 

broken out from core Army SOF tasks. 

The following definitions were used to better clarify joint and Army

doctrine:

a. Conventional or traditional warfare is a form of warfare between 

states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an 

adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making 

capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change 


JSOU Symposium 2007

in an adversary’s government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an adversary’s government. It generally assumes that the people indigenous to the 

operational area are non­belligerents and will accept whatever 

political outcome the belligerent governments will impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian interference in 

those operations. — IW Joint Operating Concepts Version 1.0 

(Final Draft), February 2007 recommended definition

b. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate 

actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. 

— Office of Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff, 1 December 2006

c. Unconventional warfare is operations conducted by, with, or 

through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an 

insurgency, or conventional military operations. — Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 23 January 

2007

d. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military 

agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken 

by another government or other designated organization to 

free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and 

insurgency. — Joint Publication 1-02, Field Manual 3-24

e. Counterinsurgency is those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. — Joint Publication 1-02, Field 

Manual 3-24

Dr. David Tucker—IW and the Strategic Utility of SOF

Dr. Tucker provided his views on the idea of IW and explained how it 

can be used to describe the strategic utility of SOF. Conflict, especially

in the realm of IW, takes place amongst a population, which makes 

SOF roles and missions particularly important. Conventional warfare 

is usually conducted according to certain rules or conventions and 

against “similar’ opposing conventional forces. These warfare conventions are very explicit on how people kill each other and what is or is 

not a valid target. However, conventions do change over time based on 

several factors, such as the lethality of weapons, new technology and 

tactics, and capabilities between opponents. For example, people who 

lack the power to compete conventionally against their enemy usually 

have to use other means, whether it is called “unconventional warfare” 


JSOU Symposium 2007

or “irregular warfare.” Therefore, to see the strategic utility of SOF, one 

should take the concept of IW and tie it into the roles and missions of 

SOF as it applies to two distinctive sets: 

a. SOF conducting operations unilaterally vice operations in the 

support role to General Purpose Forces

b. Whether it is a direct action mission or an indirect mission 

conducted through the population (by, with, through).

Dr. Tucker examined the strategic utility of SOF under both of these 

conditions. He concluded that SOF in the support role (to conventional 

forces) was not maximizing their strategic utility. It is clearly not the 

most unique and certainly not a strategic level contribution. Likewise, 

the direct missions that SOF conducts unilaterally are also not capitalizing on SOF’s strategic utility. The capture or killing of high value 

targets are of limited strategic utility and are not crucial to success. 

However, the conduct of independent, indirect missions is where the 

strategic utility of SOF makes the greatest impact. SOF’s greatest 

contribution to IW is following the indirect approach that capitalizes 

on the SOF serviceman’s maturity, unique training, local knowledge, 

cultural sensitivity, and rapport with the population. Therefore, the 

SOF strategic utility in the future should increase in relation to their 

employment in IW. 

Major General Alvaro Pinheiro (Brazilian Army, Ret.)—Validity of IW as 

a Model

General Pinheiro initially qualified his remarks as his personal opinions, not the official position or policy of the Brazilian government. He

focused on the following key points:

a. Controversies between Clausewitz’s theory and IW 

b. Terrorism and urban warfare

c. Offensive operations against irregulars

d. Intelligence in IW

e. Human dimension in IW

f. Leadership in IW.

Many armies of the world are largely influenced by the thoughts

of General Carl von Clausewitz. Some have concluded that it does 

not matter if the conflict is largely of a regular or irregular character;

they are both governed by exactly the same concepts if viewed strategically. Major General Pinheiro shared that this way of thinking is 

dangerous; and in an IW environment, a tactical failure very often has 

dangerous strategic consequences. One must understand the changing 


JSOU Symposium 2007

environment of conflict, especially the Clausewitz concept of a Center

of Gravity. 

The Center of Gravity concept—“the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”—was developed during the early 

19th century. However, modern life has changed significantly and is

based on a system of systems that include national and local governments, law and order, media, society, economy, and the military. All of 

these systems have a virtual or physical Center of Power, which is not 

exactly a Center of Gravity. In an IW context, these Centers of Power 

vary in size and importance according to the type of operation and the 

particular operational environmental conditions. Often, the national 

Center of Gravity has moved into a big city. Because “irregulars” recognized long ago that they could not compete with conventional military combat power and technologies, they chose other domains and 

spheres of influence that could give them a significant advantage, such

as urban areas. 

The links between terrorism and urban warfare are very strong and 

must be understood. Today most terrorist organizations and resources 

are found in cities. Their targets are also in the cities, and the terrorists use the city systems to their advantage. Therefore, the GWOT has 

all the urban warfare ingredients. Some key considerations for offensive operations against irregular forces in this environment follow:

a. Build mixed forces that are small, agile, and lethal. 

b. Gain and maintain the initiative, using all dimensions of 

national power to keep proactive and constant pressure. 

c. Understand that one cannot play nice; it is a battle to kill. 

d. Use relevant force but prevent inappropriate use of physical 

violence to maintain and demonstrate high moral standards.

Intelligence is also crucial to any successful campaign against 

irregular forces. Perhaps more than ever, intelligence drives operations. In IW, the levels of intelligence are blurred; the focus is clearly 

on the tactical level; requirements for coordination and sharing are 

high at all levels; and human intelligence (HUMINT) prevails over all 

other methods of intelligence collection—for example, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).

The greatest and most constant factor in IW is the human 

dimension. IW is essentially “psycho-social warfare.” Learning to deal 

with the human and cultural complexities is the key point. It includes 

infinite patience and a cultural awareness that is more than a

rudimentary language capability. Cultural awareness is absolutely 
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essential and is truly a force multiplier. Soldiers must understand that 

winning the acceptance of the local populace will enhance their intelligence collection, and building these bonds of trust offers more force 

protection than body armor.

With respect to leadership in an IW environment, leaders at all 

levels must be capable of facing a conventional enemy one moment, 

then shifting to an irregular threat the next, before transitioning to 

providing reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and the establishment of local governance. All of these tasks must be performed by the 

same commander simultaneously. “Winning the peace” is as important 

as “winning the war.”

Major General Pinheiro concluded that in an operational environment characterized by insurgence violence, terrorism, and political 

and religious extremism, IW serves as a valid model for not only SOF 

but all conventional supporting or supported forces involved. 

Dr. Mike Vlahos—Validity of IW as a Model

Dr. Vlahos suggested that the two periods when nonstate actors challenged nation states were during late antiquity (5th-7th centuries) and 

early modernity (13th-15th centuries). During these periods, the established world system was in flux. Established authorities were losing

power while new identities were rising. Three reasons for the salience 

and success of rising nonstate actors during these times follow:

a. Established nation state losing military effectiveness 

b. Rising power of nonstate actors

c. Capacity of nonstate actors to better employ technology developments.

It was nation states and their military forces that shaped the rule 

sets of war over the centuries. The rules were always rooted in the 

assumption that the enemy was “like us”—for example, that “legitimate” nation states go to war with other nation states. Now these rules 

cannot be applied to nonstate actors. This difficulty is partly due to

the fact that in eras when nation states are supremely dominant, they 

could overwhelm nonstate entity with relative ease. However today, 

as in late antiquity and early modernity, our simply projecting nation 

state rule sets of war onto nonstate actors actually works in their 

favor—especially because we keep believing that these rule sets are 

the solution.

Not only can the nonstate enemy ignore our rules, he can turn our 

orthodoxies against us. Moreover, nonstate actors in eras of system 
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change have some special advantages. One is that they tend to be 

more united by their sense of identity, and this motivation is enhanced 

by their passionate commitment to it. Think of it as “identity power.” 

War for the nonstate actor is a celebration of identity. Their struggle is 

actually elevated by the narrative of their “mythical heroes versus the 

great evil.” Thus in helping them sacrifice themselves, we are building

the new “river of their people,” a kind of collective passage through 

which sacred identity is realized.

Creative use of new technology does not mean that the nonstate 

actor will necessarily equal us on our terms—meaning, in our highend weaponry and capabilities. But it is highly effective operationally, 

and it forms a collective motivation and reinforcement on one hand, 

and a path to potential actual victory as well. Consider current innovations—the Internet, cell phones, and improvised explosive devices: 

perhaps the ultimate precision-guided ordnance. Nonstate actors ultimately benefit from a much less rigid culture of war, which enables

them to be consistently adaptive. We in contrast are locked into the 

technical solution, which is in the end no more than a massive expenditure of misplaced energy and effort. The solution is in the heart of the 

enemy and thus in our understanding of him.

Dr. Vlahos concluded that IW is a literary trope—a convention that 

serves our needs—but the reality is that what we are facing is only 

another form of war, which we are yet unwilling to understand.

Panel 2, SOF in the Global Security Environment of 2015

Moderator: Brigadier General Russ Howard (USA, Ret.)

This panel addressed the inherent assumption that in 2007 we can 

influence SOF in 2015. Not surprisingly, the consensus was that we

are already working within the constraints of the current Five Year 

Defense Program, and essentially we are already building and executing 

the programs that will exist in 2015.

Colonel Walter Herd, USA—Strategic-Level Unconventional Warfare

SOF is well postured to conduct UW at the tactical and operational 

levels. Colonel Herd’s assertion is that SOF needs to grow the tactical 

and operational level expertise to the strategic level. The U.S. is currently 

involved in a global unconventional war, but our unconventional warfare 

capabilities lie within a handful of U.S. Army Special Forces Groups. 

This essentially means that the expertise ends at the colonel/captain 

(O6) level, and no higher tactical or operational commands exist at the 
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general officer level, especially for Special Forces. The Special Forces

general officer often ends up commanding organizations focused on

the “service-like” responsibilities of USSOCOM. We need to develop 

them into strategic-level thinkers for UW.

Colonel Herd used an analogy to demonstrate his concept of strategic UW. He recalled the Mark Twain novel Tom Sawyer and how 

Tom was able to accomplish his goal of painting the fence—a classical example of strategic UW. Tom identified the main effort within his

resources that got the local kids to do the work and accomplish the 

goal in less time with less effort. In IW, we need to get the indigenous 

people to “paint their own fence.” Identifying that main effort requires 

strategic UW thinking; the goal is to successfully work by, with, and 

through the indigenous people to accomplish the objectives.

Colonel David Hopley (U.K. Royal Marines, Ret.)—Coalition Perspective 

in 2015

Colonel Hopley discussed the coalition perspective for the future. In 

many ways, we have already put in motion the conditions and assets that 

will shape the environment in 2015. He gave several examples of what 

that environment could look like. The nuclear club will have expanded, 

and most likely Afghanistan and Iraq will still be battlefields.

We must understand the nature of the threat and how it changes. 

We also need to understand how we measure success in order to determine if we are winning. Colonel Hopley indicated that Europe is focused 

more on internal issues at home, not Iraq or Afghanistan. They face 

different threats, and the effect of the Iraq War on Europe is that most 

conclude: it is an “unjust war.” The cultural mixes are very different in 

Europe, and the immigrants have strong historical ties to the motherland. National identity is eroding and changing in Europe. In addition, 

the media and several nongovernmental organizations—for example 

the court of Human Rights—are changing opinions in Europe. Rising 

economical powers—such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China—could 

also cause the shifting of both economical and political power. 

Regardless, the U.S. still has a powerful lead in technology, force 

structure, and communications. However, the danger is the “bar” may 

now be raised too high for effective interoperability in coalition operations, especially with respect to SOF. SOF must recognize what it does 

well and make those investments for the future. SOF should also be 

more like a shopping cart where you can select what you need for the 

task at hand. Interoperability across the spectrum of conflict will be

vital. 
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Colonel Ray Palumbo, USA—SOF in the Global Security Environment of 

2015 from the USSOCOM Perspective

Modern SOF has undergone several epochs during its development 

according to Colonel Palumbo:

a.	 The first period, classified as the “struggling years,” was from

World War II until Desert One.

b. The second epoch, a time of “gestation,” was from Desert One 

to the Nunn/Cohen Amendment. 

c. The next epoch was after the implementation of Nunn/Cohen 

in 1987 up to September 11, 2001 which was a “developmental” 

period. 

d. The current or fourth epoch, known as the “earning years,” 

started immediately after 9/11 and has continued as SOF 

fights the “long war” against terrorism.

What is ahead for SOF in 2015? Colonel Palumbo described what 

he thought would be the similarities and differences between now and 

2015, assuming that SOF remains in the fourth epoch. USSOCOM’s role 

in the GWOT will remain unchanged. Likewise, USSOCOM’s strategy 

on the GWOT will probably remain the same. The mission of SOF, its 

core tasks, its standards, and the SOF truths will also be unchanged 

he believes. A final similarity will be the size of the force and the fact

that SOF will continue to be a low density/high demand asset.

The differences between now and 2015 are several changes in the 

global posture of SOF, which should include less SOF in the Central 

Command’s area of responsibility. USSOCOM’s “synchronization” 

role in the GWOT will be more mature, including more interagency 

and intelligence savvy. Finally, by 2015, the Global Counterterrorism 

Network will be more developed and mature.

After a review of USSOCOM’s mission, SOF core tasks, and SOF 

truths that remain unchanged, a discussion developed around the 

“growth of SOF.” The size or numbers do not change significantly, even

after the transfer of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations to the 

Army Reserve. Growth will occur with the addition of the Marine Special 

Operations Command as well as growth in the other components and 

the USSOCOM headquarters. What changes is the educational process 

for the future joint SOF warrior, who will be prepared for global expeditionary employment with the ability to synchronize operational and 

strategic activities. 
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In the future, joint SOF warriors must possess the intellectual agility 

to conceptualize creative, useful solutions to ambiguous problems and 

produce coherent options. SOF must not only train for discrete skill 

development and employment but also receive educational and experience opportunities for multiple skill comprehension, synthesis, and

application at the operational and strategic levels of this global war. 

A twofold projection of the envisioned joint SOF warrior of the future 

follows:

a. Will be far more diverse in capability, education, training, 

ethnicity, age, and other characteristics.

b.	 Will be proficient in interagency and international relationships 

and increasingly capable of operating for extended periods of 

time in diverse regions of the world. 

Colonel Palumbo reviewed the current USSOCOM strategy for the 

GWOT. This framework takes into account the friendly capability, the 

enemies’ capability and intent, and the environment in which we fight.

The key is to influence the environment, as part of a U.S. Government

effort, to ultimately dominate the enemy. The two means are shaping 

and stabilizing activities so that our long-term efforts are more effective and creating an environment that is conducive to the friendly 

force (U.S. Government and partners) actions. Working along multiple 

lines of operations, the focus will be on both the direct and indirect 

approaches. 

Colonel Palumbo concluded with a discussion on the Joint Special 

Operations Group concept that is designed to support the strategy 

and be more expeditionary in nature. This goal would include validating requirements during the global synchronization conference, 

then building and deploying the rotational force for each theater based 

on the validated purpose and rotational force capabilities. This focus

would better support the Geographical Combatant Command with a 

well trained, prepared, and tailored force.

Colonel Chris Sorenson, USA—Should SOF Operate Inside the Homeland?

Colonel Sorenson posed an interesting question: “Should SOF operate 

inside the homeland to defeat a determined enemy?” If so, what should 

that role be? Today, the U.S. faces an extremist enemy who has identified the U.S. as the “far enemy” and has fixed their sites on attacking

the homeland. Al Qaeda’s multiphase plan may put the homeland

at danger with proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (e.g., 
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improvised explosive devices and perhaps even weapons of mass 

destruction). Likewise, current terrorist networks who aspire to Al 

Qaeda’s vision may not wait for orders.

Colonel Sorenson expanded on the 911 Commission’s “Failure of 

Imagination” finding by providing some recent examples within the

U.S. and their effects on the American populace. Using the “DC Sniper” 

and previous data suggesting homegrown cells as examples, Colonel 

Sorenson postulated: If multiple events occurred as part of a sustained 

improvised-explosive-device campaign, could law enforcement respond 

to rapidly defeat the threat and at what point does the DoD provide 

assistance to civilian authorities? He has a twofold belief:

a. The national Center of Gravity will be one of the government’s 

skills to secure its people.

b. We must preserve this Center of Gravity with all elements of 

national power as it is the enemy’s key objective.

The current National Response Plan is a good tool for reacting to “an 

event” but is not proactive enough to quickly defeat a determined 

enemy with many attacks over a broad area. The mindset within DoD 

is that the military’s role in the homeland is focused on civil support. 

However, historically the military has operated in the homeland, 

executing different roles during different periods. Colonel Sorenson 

believes that this new period of our nation is no different. A future 

attack on the nation will likely result in a response that will employ 

all elements of national power. The military is appropriate to defeat a 

military attack once it is recognized as such, which could take some 

time. SOF in particular has perfected man-hunting in a foreign environment; and these tactics, techniques, and procedures could be used 

in the domestic environment. This role could be for SOF, especially if 

a sustained campaign by our enemies exhausts Department of Justice 

and state and local law-enforcement resources.

To determine a role for SOF in defense of the homeland will require 

shaping perceptions and exercising integration to assuage law enforcement and public concerns. The framers of the U.S. Constitution and 

congressional action have traditionally limited the role of the federal 

military forces in the enforcement of U.S. laws. Nevertheless, the military has some expressed constitutional and congressional authority to 

enforce these laws under exigent circumstances. When these conditions exist, the President has several authorities to employ DoD inside 

the homeland, and the military is prepared by oath to support and 

defend against all enemies, foreign and “domestic.” Al Qaeda has a
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plan and promises to attack the homeland as soon as preparations are 

ready, but inspired organizations already inside the homeland may 

not adhere to an external authority. Therefore, it is prudent to assume 

that we do not have the luxury of time to define the role of DoD and its

SOF in defense of the homeland.

Brigadier General Les Fuller (USA, Ret.), Keynote Address: The 

Interagency Process, SOF, and IW

Brigadier General Fuller provided a personal account of his experiences in the interagency and coalition operations. During his introduction, he set the stage for his subsequent discussion via two points of 

interest:

a. All SOF operations are IW by nature. Moreover, SOF missions 

involve the interagency process. 

b.	 Changing definitions results in confusion. Even though the

Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a definition, not everyone

knows it. In fact the National Security Strategy document—

published in the same month as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense

Review—and the National Military Strategy Plan for the War of 

Terrorism do not mention IW. 

Brigadier General Fuller defined IW as a violent struggle among state

and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant

populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though 

it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in 

order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Inherently

a protracted conflict will test the resolve of a nation and its partners.

Recalling the DoD definition of IW, Brigadier General Fuller reminded

the audience that IW is about people and the underlying economic, 

political, and cultural or security conditions that fuel the grievances of 

the population. As a result, he said, a U.S. Government agency other 

than the DoD will often lead IW, and that fact is contained in the IW 

Joint Operations Concept.

SOF are successful because they try to understand the dynamics of 

the operational environment and account for social, cultural, political, 

legal, economic, and physical conditions. SOF try hard to understand 

the strengths and vulnerabilities of both partners and adversaries. 

While IW poses significant challenges for the joint forces, we must

remember that our irregular partners and our adversaries both possess 

significant capabilities and vulnerabilities.
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Brigadier General Fuller provided a series of personal vignettes 

dealing with the interagency, coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and international governmental organizations in Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, Stabilization 

Force, NATO Kosovo Force, and NATO in Afghanistan. Some key issues 

that were common in these operations were stovepipe missions; lack of 

cross talk; and different cultures, missions, and rotation cycles. These 

issues resulted in some problems identified with interagency operations:

a. Lack of culture and/or capacity for planning in some agencies

b. Lack of capabilities for deploying and sustaining their expertise 

abroad

c. Lack of adequate institutional linkages or mechanisms for coordinated planning at operational levels across departments and 

agencies. 

The fix is clearly to appoint a lead agency; however, with agencies having different chains of command, priorities, and resources, the 

challenge is how to synchronize everything and get all parties on one 

team. 

Brigadier General Fuller offered some thoughts on the “keys 

to victory” in the interagency. These include the requirement for a 

common picture of our operations, information sharing, a decisionmaking process, speed of operations, and finally having like or similar

priorities. He also shared that each agency has a different mission and 

way of doing business, and their way is not wrong just because it is 

different. Interagency groups need to apply procedures through which 

inputs are converted into outputs. He offered some key challenges to 

be met:

a. Improving horizontal and vertical integration

b. Establishing the legitimacy of decision makers below the President

c. Building departmental capabilities for operational planning 

and execution

d. Institutionalizing interagency expertise

e. Integrating agency cultures

f. Overcoming the mistrust between the agencies.

How do we strengthen the interagency process? Some suggestions 

are to keep talking and avoid pointing fingers. Allow time for action

between agencies and get them on the team by integrating efforts with 
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liaison teams. Build teamwork and share the glory—let them win too. 

And more specifically for SOF, use UW traits on these agencies to

understand their “culture,” “language,” and “processes.”

Brigadier General Fuller said the combatant commanders and their 

staffs are working exceedingly hard to develop an IW campaign that 

synchronizes all available instruments of national power and partner 

capabilities. However, much more work needs to be accomplished. He 

posed a number of questions for symposium participants to consider:

a. How do we conduct horizontal coordination? How do we functionally pull this together?

b. Is a single interagency system where we need to go?

c. Do we need a super National Security Council to coordinate 

this?

d. Is a Goldwater-Nichols-like event needed to make the interagency system work?

e. How could Congress write the act to make this happen?

Panel 3, The Interagency Process, SOF, and IW

Moderator: Colonel Jim Powers (USA, Ret.)

The third panel focused on the interagency process, the relationship 

with and applicability to IW. Each of the panel members provided their 

insights on the interagency and how well it is or is not working. They 

also discussed a number of recommendations about SOF’s interaction 

within the interagency and how to improve the process.

Ms. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty—National Coordinator for Transnational

Threats and the Counterterrorism Security Group

Ms. Gordon-Hagerty shared experiences from working within the 

National Security Council staff and observing the dynamics of the 

interagency process. She explained that national security is all about 

leadership, taking responsibility, and doing the right thing. It requires 

coordination based on an established common goal, mission, or end 

state. Ms. Gordon-Hagerty also stated that the U.S. Government has 

been working the interagency combating terrorism process very well for 

many years. The National Security Council established the Committee 

on Transnational Threats, which includes the following members:

a. Director of Central Intelligence

b. Secretary of State

c. Secretary of Defense

d. Attorney General
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e. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who 

serves as the committee chairperson

f. Others as the President may designate.

The function of the committee is to coordinate and direct the activities of the U.S. Government relating to combating transnational threats. 

These activities include identifying transnational threats, developing 

strategies to enable the U.S. Government to respond to transnational 

threats identified, monitoring implementation of such strategies, and

ultimately recommending appropriate responses to specific transnational threats. This structure shows the combating terrorism community having a common goal and directed focus—the “coordinating 

subgroup” or “counterterrorism security group.”

When Ms. Gordon-Hagerty worked within the National Security 

Council staff, the U.S. had a national coordinator for transnational 

threats; the current administration decided that the “counterterrorism czar” was not needed for a variety of reasons. The lack of this 

role, however, tended to weaken the interagency effort for combating 

terrorism. The current search for a high powered czar to oversee the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with authority to issue directions to the 

Pentagon, Department of State, and other agencies highlights the need 

for this role to return. Ms. Gordon-Hagerty concluded by stressing 

again that it is all about leadership, taking responsibility, and doing 

the right thing.

Ambassador Tim Foster—Interagency and the Country Team

Ambassador Foster began his remarks by positing that at Department of State (DoS), IW refers to the way other agencies engage in 

the interagency process. He suggested that interagency cooperation 

in establishing DoS’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and

Stabilization (S/CRS) illustrated that view. He noted that based on 

U.S. experience in Iraq in 2003-2004, a twofold consensus developed 

among key policy makers in Washington:

a. The U.S. Government needed a more robust capability to 

manage stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries emerging from conflict.

b. The responsibility for coordinating U.S. Government efforts in 

that regard properly belonged to DoS. 

In July 2004, Congress authorized the reprogramming of funds to 

create S/CRS. The idea was that S/CRS would be a DoS office but

interagency in character and function. Its interagency partners were 
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to include the Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

USJFCOM, ASD SO/LIC, and the Army Corps of Engineers from DoD, 

plus other agencies, including the CIA, Department of the Treasury, 

and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

This arrangement was codified in December 2005 with the

issuance of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, entitled 

Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and 

Stabilization. NSPD-44 specified that DoS shall coordinate and lead

integrated U.S. Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and 

Agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for, and conduct 

stabilization and reconstruction activities.

So what happened? Ambassador Foster asked, noting that after all, 

stabilization and reconstruction are crucial elements of indirect action 

in the GWOT, and they are key areas of the SOF mission. He answered 

that from the beginning, interagency participation and support was 

uneven, and funding problems were severe. Consequently, S/CRS got 

off to a shaky start. While DoS is well-equipped to handle the policy 

coordination role, it does not have the personnel, skill sets, or resources 

to implement stabilization and reconstruction on the ground. USAID 

has those tools to some degree, but DoD is currently best equipped 

to do that job. However, he ventured that the U.S. Government is still 

wrestling with those roles and responsibilities and arguing over who 

staffs Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. 

Ambassador Foster said that no experienced government hand 

maintains that interagency collaboration is easy. It involves battle over 

turf and requires constant effort, all the more so inside the Beltway. 

He added, however, that some agencies protect their turf by not fully 

engaging in the process or by circumventing it. During the first 6 years

of the Bush administration, the interagency process had not worked 

well when it concerned DoS and DoD. 

Ambassador Foster suggested it was more meaningful for SOF 

participants in the symposium to move away from the Beltway and 

discuss the interagency process in the field at the Embassy Country

Team level, where the process veers from the civics textbook version 

somewhat less than in Washington. 

He noted that American embassies are the front line for the 

GWOT in countries that are not combat zones, and SOF are increasingly deployed to noncombat zone countries, most frequently in Joint 

and Combined Exercises for Training, Joint Planning and Assistance Teams, and as Military Liaison Elements. Embassies normally 
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welcome SOF with open arms because they have the reputation of 

being mature professionals, and they bring counterterrorism assets to 

the embassy and capacity-building resources to the host nation. 

Ambassador Foster explained that the composition of the Country 

Team, composed of agency and section heads, varies widely by the 

size of the mission. He stressed that each Country Team is different 

because it is a chemistry of personalities peculiar to itself. He said 

that the most important County Team members from the SOF perspective are the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission and the DoD 

representative, usually the Defense Attach e Attach�� (DATT) but sometimes the (DATT) but sometimes the

Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) chief. 

He encouraged SOF liaison officers not to limit their contact to the

DATT or ODC chief but network with all members of the Country Team 

with counterterrorism responsibilities. That would include, among 

others, the political officer with the counterterrorism portfolio, the

economic officer with the counterterrorism finance and civil aviation

portfolios, the Regional Security Officer, who liaises with the police and

has force protection responsibilities, the Legal Attaché if there is one, 

and the Consular Officer, who manages the visa watch list. 

Ambassador Foster stressed that it was in SOF’s interest to ensure 

ambassadors understand what SOF brings to the table, which is why 

USSOCOM hosts ambassadorial orientation programs several times a 

year.

Mr. Prakash Singh—Insurgencies in India’s North-East —Insurgencies in India’s North-East

Mr. Singh gave his perspective of problems that police and security forces face in India’s North-East. He discussed the root causes 

of several ongoing insurgencies in the areas of Nagaland, Manipur, 

Tripura, and Assam:

a. Union Government’s alleged neglect of the area

b. Feeling of alienation among the various tribal groups

c. Changes in the demographic pattern of the traditional tribal 

areas caused by influx of people from across the borders

d. Assistance provided to rebel groups by countries inimical to 

India

e. Availability of sanctuaries in those bordering countries.

Concerning the government’s strategy, Mr. Singh believes they 

must meet the political aspirations of the ethnic groups. Specifically,

they must give them some degree of autonomy and improve governance. Next, economic development of the area would help reduce 
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dissatisfaction. Finally, engaging the various insurgent outfits in peace

dialogues and coordinating operations with the neighboring countries 

would reduce the insurgents’ capabilities and reach. 

Mr. Singh felt that the reasons for continued unrest in the NorthEast were varied:

a. Tribal groups believe that political concessions are given 

because of weakness within the Government of India. 

b. Widespread corruption among ruling elite, which exists within 

the regional area, is complimented by active involvement of 

foreign intelligence agencies and services. 

c. Neighboring countries permit insurgent groups to set up 

training camps, allowing them to buy/procure arms and supply 

the same insurgent groups.

Colonel Bob Stephan (USAF, Ret.)—National Critical Infrastructure

Colonel Stephan discussed four major topics: the genesis of national 

infrastructure protection, the GWOT and risk management, and the 

role of SOF. The defense of U.S. infrastructure began during World War 

II, evolved during the threat of thermonuclear war in the 1950s, and 

mostly relied on the private sector until President Clinton’s administration. His Presidential Decision Directive 63 established eight critical 

national infrastructure categories and described a partnership between 

the Federal Government, state governments, and the private sector. 

Several key categories were not included—for example, food, agriculture, and dams. Now there are 17 critical infrastructure categories. 

Critical infrastructure protection is difficult, requiring coalitions and

partners. Budgets are tight across the board, which requires one to set 

priorities for resources. Because one cannot protect everything, a riskedbased approach is required. Colonel Stephan remarked that being a “no 

fail operation,” the focus is on determining the priorities and where 

critical infrastructure protection is needed. The threat is especially hard 

to predict. The enemy is decentralized and can make bombs out of very 

common materials. In essence, what we need to protect is very vulnerable and ubiquitous. Consequently, what is required is a “coalition of 

the willing”; in fact, about 85 percent of the effort will have to be voluntary through the private sector. There are many governmental agencies 

involved in the effort, but they have different cultures and never had to 

work together prior to 9/11. The combined effort will require leadership 

at all levels, in both the private and public sectors to have a unity of 

effort. Finally, it will require risked-based adaptive planning.
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How can SOF help? First, continue the fight overseas. The GWOT

is not going away; it is going to be generational. DoD needs to adapt 

and not worry about a peer competitor. Next, continue the liaison with 

other governmental agencies. It helps those other agencies in adapting 

technology, planning, and solutions. Although no direct payback to 

SOF exists, a payback awaits the nation. No one in the government 

can compete with SOF’s “brain power.” The lessons learned on the 

battlefield provide experience that cannot be replicated.

Breakout Groups

The concept of breakout groups was introduced in this year’s symposium. It afforded the opportunity for the three panels to discuss their 

thoughts on the panel topic in a small seminar atmosphere. It also 

allowed for participants to be more involved in the discussions and 

questions, the sharing of insights, and topics for continued research.

Vice Admiral Eric Olson (USN), Keynote Address: SOF in the 

Global Security Environment of 2015

VADM Olson addressed the symposium via video teleconference from 

Washington, D.C. He spoke on the evolution of the IW concept within 

the Pentagon and the importance of the ongoing dialogue on IW. He also 

discussed the impact of the Quadrennial Defense Review on USSOCOM

and the services, including the resulting growth of USSOCOM.

Luncheon Speakers

Colonel Thomas Hammes (USMC, Ret.)

Colonel Hammes offered views on the new (fourth) generation of guerrilla warfare. That is what American forces are encountering in Iraq 

and Afghanistan today and is the way of the future. Essentially, it 

is guerrilla warfare characterized by political aspects executed over 

a long period of time, using communications networks, cell phones, 

and the Internet as tools to demoralize conventional superior military 

states. It is not about smart bombs and spy drones but rather studying 

the enemy and building a flexible, network-like structure for the military focusing on humans.

Dr. John Alexander, PhD. (Colonel, USA, Ret.)

Dr. Alexander discussed his perspectives on the GWOT and the 

changing nature of war. His view is that the nature of war has changed 

at the most fundamental level—the definition of war. With “wars” on
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JSOU Symposium 2007

various topics (e.g., poverty, drugs, cancer), we have lost the essential 

meaning. Dr. Alexander provided ideas on the types of future armed 

conflicts that include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, massive

civil disobedience, direct combat, and “a sea change in the perception of winning.” The shift will be from wars of annihilation to wars for 

ideological dominance. Dr. Alexander also concluded that two global 

conflicts have already begun, one ideological and one economic. In

conclusion, he stated that war is about imposing will, not necessarily 

about killing.

Summary/Next Steps

The Second Annual JSOU Symposium was a success from the standpoint of sharing information and insights from senior government 

officials and panelists. Participants gained an appreciation for the

complexity of the threats we are facing and the ramifications of U.S.

and partner nation courses of action against these complex threats. As 

with most events of this type, much was accomplished outside of the 

agenda activities as new relationships were forged. 

This JSOU summary of presentations and discussions provides 

the following benefits:

a. Serves as a record for those in attendance and a baseline for 

further discussion. 

b. Informs those who could not participate about what transpired 

and invites them to join the dialogue among colleagues on 

topics covered. 

c.	 Facilitates briefing senior SOF leaders about the topics and

encourages them to consider key concepts as they develop 

future plans and operations.

JSOU appreciates the support of the senior and associate fellows 

and friends who contributed to the success of this symposium through 

their presentations and participation in the strategy debate. 

JSOU Symposium 2008

The third annual symposium will be held 28 April – 2 May 2008 at 

Hurlburt Field, Florida. The proposed theme for the 2008 event is “SOF 

in Today’s Complex Environment: Indirect Approaches and Strategies 

in Irregular Warfare.”