alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
www.gpo.gov

### §1291. Disposition of funds

The funds appropriated by the Act of December 26, 1969 (83 Stat. 447, 453), to pay a judgment in favor of the petitioners, the Delaware Tribe of Indians in docket 298, and the Absentee Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma, and others, in docket 72, together with any interest thereon, after payment of attorney fees, litigation expenses, and such expenses as may be necessary in effecting the provisions of this subchapter, shall be distributed as provided herein.

(Pub. L. 92–456, §1, Oct. 3, 1972, 86 Stat. 762.)

#### References in Text

Act of December 26, 1969, referred to in text, is act Dec. 26, 1969, Pub. L. 91–166, 83 Stat. 447, known as the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1970. Chapter IX of the act, set out at 83 Stat. 453, appropriated the funds referred to and was not classified to the Code.
### UNITED STATES NAVY

- MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

R.Q. WARD, J.A. FISCHER, T

. J

. STINSON

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

NATHAN M. KARANJA

CONSTRUCTION ELECTRICIAN THIRD CLASS (E

- 4), U.S. NA VY

NMCCA 201400202

GENERAL COURT

- MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 28 Feb ruary 2014

. Military Judge: CAPT Andrew H. Henderson, JAGC. USN

. Convening Authority: Commander, Navy Region Southwest, San

Diego, CA

. Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: CAPT J. M. Nilsen,

JAGC, USN

. For Appellant: CDR Christopher Roper, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: Mr. Brian Keller

, Esq

.

11 September 2014

---------------------------------------------------

OPINION OF THE COURT

------------------------------------------------- --

After careful consideration of the record, submitted

without assignment of error, we affirm the findings and sentence

as approved by the convening authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform

Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).

For the Court

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court
#### John Scotto, Appellant, v Luigi Marra, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[806 NYS2d 603]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), dated November 4, 2004, which granted the motion of the defendant Luigi Marra, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the supplemental verified complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the *544motion is denied, and the supplemental verified complaint is reinstated insofar as asserted against the respondent.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained when he was bitten by two dogs owned by the defendant Luigi Marra. The two dogs, which were unleashed and running loose, attacked the plaintiff as he was walking his own dog on a public street.

The Supreme Court erred in granting Marra’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the supplemental verified complaint insofar as asserted against him since he failed to submit evidence in admissible form to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Marra failed to establish that the unsigned deposition transcripts of the various witnesses submitted in support of the motion were forwarded to them for their review pursuant to CPLR 3116 (a). Hence, the transcripts were not admissible *(see Santos v Intown Assoc.,*17 AD3d 564, 565 [2005]; *Lalli v Abe,*234 AD 2d 346 [1996]; *Palumbo v Innovative Communications Concepts,*175 Misc 2d 156 [1997], *affd*251 AD2d 246 [1998]).

Even if the transcripts had been admissible, the plaintiff nevertheless raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Marra could be liable under a negligence theory, since he admitted to a violation of Village of Valley Stream Code § 4-11, which requires that a dog off the premises of the owner be restrained by a leash and fitted with a muzzle. The plaintiffs submissions were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Marra violated this ordinance and whether the violation was a proximate cause of his injuries *(see Faller v Schwartz,*303 AD2d 624 [2003]; *McCullough v Maurer,*268 AD2d 569 [2000]; *Lisi v MRP Holdings,*238 AD2d 316 [1997]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Luciano and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### Country Harbor Realty, Inc., Respondent, v Daniel Sullivan et al., Appellants.

[804 NYS2d 790]

In an action to recover a real estate broker’s commission, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, Jr., J.), dated December 17, 2004, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and, upon searching the record, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“Although it is not disputed that the plaintiff was not involved in any of the negotiations that led to the sale, a broker, in order to qualify for a commission, need not necessarily have been involved in the ensuing negotiations or in the completion of the sale” *(Buck v Cimino,*243 AD2d 681, 684 [1997]; *see Greene v Hellman,*51 NY2d 197, 205-206 [1980]).

The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff created an amicable atmosphere in which negotiations proceeded and generated a chain of circumstances, including, but not limited to, the purchaser’s right of first refusal in the initial March 18, 2002, contract of sale, which led to the October 25, 2002, contract of sale. Therefore, the plaintiff established its entitlement to summary judgment as the procuring cause of the sale, and the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Dagar Group v Hannaford, Bros. Co.,*295 AD2d 554, 555 [2002]; *Friedland Realty v Piazza,*273 AD2d 351 [2000]; *Buck v Cimino, supra*at 684-685).

Although the plaintiffs purported cross motion was defective *(see*CFLR 2215), the Supreme Court had the authority to search the record and award summary judgment to a nonmoving party with respect to an issue that was the subject of the motion before the court *(see Osborne v Zornberg,*16 AD3d 643, 645 [2005]; *Lacy v New York City Hous. Auth.,*4 AD3d 455, 456 [2004]; *Micciche v Homes by Timbers,*1 AD3d 326, 327 [2003]; CPLR 3212 [b]).

*607The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Adams, J.P., Luciano, Mastro and Lunn, JJ., concur.
xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?


L\_2020010EN.01000401.xml


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| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 10/4 |

---

Corrigendum to Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA

(
[Official Journal of the European Union L 135 of 22 May 2019](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOL_2019_135_R_TOC)
)

On page 74, Article 62(5), point (a) :

for:

| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘(a) | in paragraph 1, the following point is inserted: | | | | --- | --- | | “(da) | Interoperability Advisory Group;”;’, | |

read:

| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘(a) | in paragraph 1, the following point is inserted: | | | | --- | --- | | “(db) | Interoperability Advisory Group;”;’. | |

---
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

February 6, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135007 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135007 

 COA: 277736 

Wayne CC: 05-005879-01

ANTHONY TYRONE SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 30, 2007 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of 

granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for 

consideration as on leave granted, of: (1) whether the circuit court erred in admitting the 

testimony of Latrice Lewis under MRE 404(b); (2) whether the error in admitting the 

testimony, if any, was reversible; (3) whether the testimony was admissible under MCL 

768.27a; and (4) whether the prosecution’s failure to rely on MCL 768.27a precludes 

sustaining its admission based on that provision. 

s0130 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

February 6, 2008 

 Clerk
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT DONNA LYNN B R

ADLEY, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. C AREM ARK

R X LLC , De fe nda

nt - Appe lle e . No. 13-15677 D.C . No. 2:11-c v-00980-SR B M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ariz o na Susa n R . B olton, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

Nove m b e r 18, 2014 ** B e fore : LEAVY, FISHER , a nd N.R . SM ITH, C irc uit Judge s. Donna Ly nn B ra dle y a

ppe a ls pro se from the distric t c o urt’ s sum

m ary judgm e nt in he r e m

p l oym e nt a c tion a lle ging a ge an d se x disc rim ination, a nd re ta lia tion, in c onne c tion with her te rm ination. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re v ie w de n ovo. Haw n v . Ex e c . J e t Mgmt., Inc . , 615 F.3d



# FIL ED DEC 4 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).1151, 1155 (9th C ir. 2010). W e a ffirm .

The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d sum

m a ry judgm e nt on B ra dle y ’ s a ge disc rim ination c la im

be c a use B ra dle y

fa ile d to ra ise a ge nuine disputeof m ate ria l fa c t a s to whe the r she wa s pe rform ing he r job sa tisfa c torily , or whe the r she wa s re pla c e d by

a substa ntia lly y ounge r e m

ploy e e with e qua l or infe rior qua lific a tions. Se e She ppard v . Dav i d Ev ans &Assoc s. , 694 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th C ir. 2012) (se tting forth e le m e nts of prim a fa c ie c a se of disc rim ination unde r the Age Disc rim i nation in Em

ploy m e n t Ac t). The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d sum

m a ry judgm e nt on B ra dle y ’ s se x disc rim ination c la im

be c a use B ra dle y

fa ile d to ra ise a tria

ble disputea s to whe the r she wa s qua l ifie d for the job, or whe the r sim ila rly situa te d m e n we re tre at e d m ore favora bly . Se e Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc
. , 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th C i r. 2002) (se tting forth e le m e nts of prim a fa c ie c a se of se x disc rim ination unde r Title VII). The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d sum

m a ry judgm e nt on B ra dle y ’ s re ta lia tion c la im be c a use B ra dle y

fa ile d to ra ise a

tria ble disputea s to whe the r the re wa s a

c a usa l link be t

we e n any prote c te d a c tivity

and he r te rm ination. Se e id. a t 1064 (se tting forth e le m e n ts of prim a fa c ie c a se of re ta lia

tion unde r Title VII). AFFIRM E D.
1 3 - 1 5 6 7 7 2
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.6103(l)(2)-2 Disclosure of returns and return information to Department of Labor for purposes of research and studies. ( a ) *General rule.* Pursuant to the provisions of section 6103(l)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code and subject to the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section, officers or employees of the Internal Revenue Service may disclose returns and return information (as defined by section 6103(b)) to officers and employees of the Department of Labor for purposes of, but only to the extent necessary in, conducting research and studies authorized by section 513 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
( b ) *Procedures and restrictions.* Disclosure of returns or return information by officers or employees of the Service as provided by paragraph (a) of this section will be made only upon written request to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by the Administrator of the Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs of the Department of Labor describing the returns or return information to be disclosed, the taxable period or date to which such returns or return information relates, and the purpose for which the returns or return information is needed in the administration of title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and designating by title the officers and employees of such department to whom such disclosure is authorized. No such officer or employee to whom returns or return information is disclosed pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (a) shall disclose such returns or return information to any person, other than the taxpayer by whom the return was made or to whom the return information relates or other officers or employees of such department whose duties or responsibilities require such disclosure for a purpose described in paragraph (a), except in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.
(Secs. 6103 and 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (90 Stat. 1667, 68A Stat. 917; 26 U.S.C. 6103 and 7805))
[T.D. 7723, 45 FR 65571, Oct. 3, 1980]
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ 

Case No. 5D2023-2974 

LT Case No. 2023-CF-000794

_____________________________ 

WILLIE B. LAWSON, 

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

_____________________________ 

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County. 

Lisa D. Herndon, Judge. 

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and John M. Selden, 

Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Daniel P. 

Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee. 

August 16, 2024 

WALLIS, J.

In this Anders appeal,1 we affirm Appellant’s judgment and 

sentence. However, the written judgment reads that Appellant 

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2

“entered a plea of Not Guilty” to the crime of “Grand Theft of Motor 

Vehicle.” The record establishes that Appellant proceeded to a 

trial where he was found guilty of the crime of Theft of Statutory 

Property—Motor Vehicle. Accordingly, we remand this case for 

the trial court to correct the scrivener’s error in the written 

judgment to reflect the crime for which Appellant was found and 

adjudicated guilty, after a trial, of Theft of Statutory Property—

Motor Vehicle. See Anderson v. State, 374 So. 3d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2023).

AFFIRMED. REMANDED with instructions.

HARRIS and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
IA

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 34

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to limit

the terms of office for Members of Congress.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. MCCRERY introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to

the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States to limit the terms of office for Members of Congress.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, to be valid only if ratified

6 by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States

7 within seven years after the date of its submission by the

8 Congress:
2

•HJ 34 IH

1 ‘‘ARTICLE—

2 ‘‘SECTION 1. No person may serve any portion of a

3 term as Representative if at the completion of that term

4 the person would have served as a Representative for more

5 than six and one-half terms.

6 ‘‘SECTION 2. No person may serve any portion of a

7 term as Senator if at the completion of that term the per8 son would have served as a Senator for more than two

9 and one half terms.

10 ‘‘SECTION 3. No person holding office on the date

11 of the adoption of this article of amendment shall be pre12 vented by reason of this article of amendment from com13 pleting that person’s term of office.’’.

Æ
#### Elias NUNEZ-CRUZ and Myriam Guadalupe Luna-Vega, Petitioners, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General,* Respondent.

No. 00-70687.

INS Nos. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ] & [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 10, 2002.**

Decided June 14, 2002.

Before O’SCANNLAIN, BERZON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 Under the permanent rules of the IIRIRA, the Attorney General is the proper party in this action, and the caption has been so changed.

**

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM***

Elias Nunez-Cruz and Myriam Guadalupe Luna-Vega, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), dismissing their appeal of the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying their applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). We have jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Petitioners’ contention that applying the standards for cancellation of removal to their case constitutes impermissible retroactive application of section 240A is without merit. *See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft,*291 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.2002).

Petitioners’ contention that the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act violates equal protection is foreclosed by *Ram v. INS,*243 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir.2001).

Lastly, Petitioners challenge the IJ’s decision to deny their application for voluntary departure. Because Petitioners did not present this contention to the BIA on appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction due to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. *Rashtabadi v. INS,*23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir.1994).

PETITION DENIED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Marsha Norman, Appellant, v Timothy Dykman, Respondent.

[808 NYS2d 80]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated November 17, 1997, which incorporated but did not merge the terms of a stipulation of settlement, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McNulty, J.), dated March 22, 2004, as denied her motion for a downward modification of her maintenance and child support obligations, the appointment of a Law Guardian for the parties’ children, and a hearing on the issue of custody, and granted the defendant’s motion for arrears in the sum of $77,500.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that continued enforce*359ment of her obligation to pay maintenance under the parties’ stipulation of settlement, which was incorporated but not merged into their judgment of divorce, would create an “extreme hardship” *(Matter of Ross v Ross,*297 AD2d 286, 287 [2002]; *see Pintus v Pintus,*104 AD2d 866, 867-868 [1984]; *see also*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]). She also failed to establish a substantial, unanticipated, and unreasonable change in circumstances warranting a reduction in child support *(see Matter of Boden v Boden,*42 NY2d 210, 213 [1977]; *Praeger v Praeger,*162 AD2d 671, 673 [1990]; *Nordhauser v Nordhauser,*130 AD2d 561, 562 [1987]). Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of her motion which was for a downward modification.

Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for the appointment of a Law Guardian *(see Riccio v Riccio,*21 AD3d 1107 [2005]; *Dodaro v Dodaro,*269 AD2d 420 [2000]). In addition, the Supreme Court properly found that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a hearing on the issue of custody *(see Nash v Yablon-Nash,*16 AD3d 471 [2005]; *Matter of Timson v Timson,*5 AD3d 691 [2004]).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit, Adams, J.P., Luciano, Skelos and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### § 31.3102-2 Manner and time of payment of employee tax.

The employee tax is payable to the district director in the manner and at the time prescribed in Subpart G of the regulations in this part. For provisions relating to the payment by an employee of employee tax in respect of tips, see paragraph (d) of § 31.3102-3.

[T.D. 7001, 34 FR 998, Jan. 23, 1969]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                       5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                          0
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   0
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                0
<PP&E>                          0
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           2,815,000
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        1,409,000
<OTHER-SE>                      (4,224,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    0
<SALES>                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                0
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                101,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (101,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (101,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (101,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                     (0.01)
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</TABLE>