[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13806

Non-Argument Calendar

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CHRISTOPHER J. HRANEK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CONSOLIDATED CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, 

in individual and official capacity, 

MIKE WILLIAMS, 

Sheriff, in individual and official capacity, 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

in individual and official capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00913-BJD-PDB

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Hranek, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, 

appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 civil complaint, brought against the City of Jacksonville 

(“City”), the Florida Department of Corrections, Division of 

Health Services (“FDOC”), and Sheriff Mike Williams (collectively 

“Defendants”). Before the district court, Hranek alleged that the 

Defendants had violated the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments, during his time as a pretrial detainee. He clarified 

that, although he is currently a state prisoner, he was a pretrial detainee at the time of injury. He stated that the Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and safety by 

denying him medication and access to medical staff, and that he

was denied his First Amendment right to file a grievance. The district court dismissed Hranek’s complaint without prejudice under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1), during its in forma pauperis (“IFP”) screening for failure to state a claim and improperly 

joining claims. On appeal, Hranek argues that the district court 

prematurely dismissed his § 1983 civil complaint without allowing 

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21-13806 Opinion of the Court 3

discovery or an opportunity to amend. He also disputes that he 

failed to state a deliberate-indifference claim under the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments and that his claims were unrelated.

We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim, 

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), applying the same 

standards that govern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissals. See Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th 

Cir. 2001). “We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any 

ground that appears in the record.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, 

Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its 

face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A plaintiff must provide more 

than labels and conclusions to show that he is entitled to relief. Id.; 

see also Oxford Asset Mgmt. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of 

facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent 

dismissal.”). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Nonetheless, we have concluded that 

“[w]here a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a 

plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint 

before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice,” unless 

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the plaintiff has indicated that he does not wish to amend his complaint or if a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a 

valid claim. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 

F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (emphasis added).

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, they still 

must suggest some factual basis for a claim. Jones v. Fla. Parole 

Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). Issues not briefed 

by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 

518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Passing references to an issue 

do not suffice. Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 

1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989). Both counseled and pro se litigants are 

required to conform to procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 

F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). The leniency given to pro se litigants 

“does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a 

party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-

69 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a district court shall dismiss a case 

brought IFP “at any time” if the court determines that the action 

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Likewise, under § 1915A(b)(1), a district shall 

identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 

of the complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

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To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was deprived of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law by “a person” acting under the color of state law. 

Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Municipalities and other local government entities are considered 

“persons” within the scope of § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Sheriffs are also considered “persons” subject to suit in their individual capacities under § 1983. See 

Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.5 (11th Cir. 1992). State 

agencies are not “persons” under § 1983. Edwards v. Wallace 

Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). 

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to include “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” under § 1983. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 

that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 

without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A government officials’ treatment of pretrial detainees is governed by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while treatment of convicted prisoners is governed by the Eighth Amendment. Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th 

Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by LeFrere v. Quezada, 588 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2009). However, because the legal 

standards for the provision of medical care are the same under both 

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amendments, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment cases can be 

used interchangeably in the deliberate-indifference analysis. Id.; 

see also Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The 

Eighth Amendment—and therefore the Fourteenth also—is violated when a jailer ‘is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of 

serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury.’”). 

However, in establishing § 1983 liability, a prisoner cannot 

rely on theories of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. See Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115-16 

(11th Cir. 2005). Supervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the 

supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. 

Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). The causal 

connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse 

puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the 

alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. Id. The deprivations that 

constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences. Id. 

The Supreme Court in Board of County Commissioners of 

Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) described the circumstances under which a municipality can be held liable under § 1983. 

Id. at 403–04. This liability is sometimes referred to as Monell liability as the theory derived from Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under this theory, the 

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plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy or custom” that caused 

his injury. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403. Such a “policy” must result 

from the decisions of the relevant legislative body, or of “those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.” Id. at 403–04. And such a “custom,” even if not “formally 

approved by an appropriate decisionmaker[,] may fairly subject a 

municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is 

so widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. at 404. In other 

words, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that, through its deliberate 

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury 

alleged.” Id. 

In this case, the district court properly dismissed Hranek’s 

complaint for failure to state a claim. Because Hranek fails to reference or otherwise present an argument concerning his First 

Amendment claim and makes no more than a passing reference to 

his Ninth Amendment claim, Hranek has abandoned these issues. 

The district court properly dismissed Hranek’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim, because he failed 

to allege a sufficient factual and legal basis to infer that the Defendants were liable for any misconduct. Hranek’s allegations against 

FDOC fail because FDOC, a state agency, is not a “person” under 

§ 1983. Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1524. Similarly, Hranek’s allegations 

against the City and Sheriff Williams fail because Hranek did not 

plead facts sufficient to subject either the City or Sheriff Williams 

to Monell liability. For example, Hranek did not allege that the 

Sheriff participated in or authorized the alleged constitutional 

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violations. Nor did he allege a municipal policy or facts establishing a history of widespread violations of such constitutional rights 

that might have put the City and Sheriff on notice of the need to 

correct such abuse. Additionally, because the district court dismissed Hranek’s complaint without prejudice; had the authority to 

screen, and procedurally dismiss, complaints filed IFP “at any 

time”; and was not required to otherwise serve as Hranek’s de facto

counsel, it did not err in failing to sua sponte grant Hranek leave to 

amend his complaint or to obtain discovery. Accordingly, we affirm, and we need not consider whether Hranek’s claims were 

properly joined. 

AFFIRMED. 

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