Filed 11/1/16 Certified for Publication 11/29/16 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re CHARLOTTE V., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B269633

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK81121)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Emma Castro, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Patrick K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Erica Edelman-Benadon, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

Jennifer C. (Mother) appeals from the termination of her 

parental rights over her daughter, Charlotte V., on the ground 

the juvenile court failed to comply with the strict notice 

requirements specified in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 

(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et 

seq.) We affirm.

FACTS

Charlotte is the daughter of Mother and Mario V. (Father), 

born in 2011. A juvenile dependency petition was filed on July 3, 

2013, alleging Mother and Father endangered Charlotte‟s 

physical health and safety, as provided under Welfare and 

Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b). The petition 

alleged Mother repeatedly rammed her car into Father‟s while

Charlotte was sitting in the back seat of Mother‟s car on June 27, 

2013. Mother also brandished a loaded handgun at Father. 

The handgun was within Charlotte‟s reach inside the car. 

Mother and Father wrestled for the handgun. Father was 

arrested for concealing a firearm and Mother was arrested for 

child endangerment. 

The juvenile court ordered Charlotte detained and placed 

with her maternal uncle. Charlotte was ultimately placed with a 

foster family after the dependency investigator discovered the 

uncle was allowing Mother to stay with Charlotte after her 
3

release and failing to monitor Mother‟s contact with her, which

violated the court‟s orders. 

The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family 

Services (DCFS) filed a first amended petition on September 16, 

2013, which added allegations that Mother and Father had a 

history of engaging in violent altercations in Charlotte‟s presence

and that Father had a history of alcohol abuse, rendering him 

incapable of providing adequate care. Mother and Father filed 

waivers pleading no contest to the amended petition on 

November 15, 2013. The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over 

Charlotte on November 15, 2013. The court ordered reunification 

services for both parents, including drug testing and anger 

management and parenting classes. Over the course of the next 

18 months, Mother and Father were irregular in complying with 

the reunification plan and in visiting with Charlotte, although 

they were always appropriate during their visits. DCFS 

recommended terminating reunification services on January 23, 

2015. At the contested 12-month review hearing on April 17, 

2015, the juvenile court found Mother and Father were not in 

compliance with the case plan and ordered family reunification 

services terminated. The juvenile court then set a Welfare and

Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to determine a 

permanent plan for Charlotte. 
4

DCFS recommended on August 14, 2015, that Mother and 

Father‟s parental rights be terminated and Charlotte‟s foster 

parents be allowed to adopt her. DCFS noted the foster family 

had cared for Charlotte since 2013 and Charlotte called them 

“momm and papi.” At the permanent plan hearing on January 7, 

2016, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence 

Charlotte was adoptable and that no exception to adoption 

applied. Mother appealed on January 7, 2016. 

DISCUSSION

Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights on 

the sole ground DCFS failed to provide sufficient information to 

the Blackfeet Nation to determine whether Charlotte is an Indian 

child. Mother contends the termination order should be reversed 

and the case remanded to ensure compliance with ICWA. We 

disagree.

I. Proceedings Below

Charlotte‟s Indian ancestry was first addressed in the 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition, which noted 

she may be a member of the Blackfeet Nation. Mother indicated 

in a parental notification of Indian status that she had Indian 

ancestry through the Blackfeet Nation and provided a copy of her 

tribe identification card indicating Mother had membership in 

the Blackfoot Confederacy through the Ammskapi Pikuni. The 

card contained Mother‟s picture, ID number, height, weight, and 
5

date of birth. On the back of the card, it showed Mother‟s 

“Blackfeet Blood” quantum to be 7/32 and her “total degree” of 

Blackfeet ancestry to be 9/32. Father indicated he had no Indian 

ancestry. Charlotte‟s uncle, Richard Cruz, and cousin, Heather 

New Robe, reported to DCFS the family was Blackfoot on their

mother‟s side. As a result, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to 

investigate Mother‟s claim and provide the dates and places of 

birth for Mother‟s relatives as far back as possible. 

A notice of child custody proceeding for Indian Child was 

sent via certified mail on August 29, 2013, to the Blackfeet Tribe 

of Montana as well as the Secretary of the Interior and the

Bureau of Indian Affairs to inquire about Charlotte‟s status. 

The notice showed Mother‟s name, address, birth date and place, 

and tribal affiliation, as well as a copy of her tribe identification

card. It indicated that Mother lived on a reservation or federal 

trust land in Browning Montana between October 1999 and 

January 2005. It also showed Charlotte received her 

immunizations in an Indian health clinic or U.S. Public Health 

Service hospital in Browning, Montana. The notice included the 

name of Mother‟s mother, Rita Devereaux, whom she claimed 

had Blackfeet ancestry, but no other identifying information. A 

subsequent notice added maternal grandfather‟s name and 

address as well as maternal uncle‟s identifying information along 

with the previously mentioned information. 
6

In letters dated September 9 and 26, 2013, the Blackfeet 

Tribe notified DCFS that it was unable to find Charlotte, Mother, 

Father, maternal uncle, maternal grandfather, or maternal 

grandmother in the tribal rolls. The letters were standardized 

form letters which included a blank space to fill in the names of 

the individuals searched. According to the letter, Charlotte was 

not an Indian Child as defined by ICWA. However, it noted that

if more ancestry information was forthcoming, the tribe would 

review the tribal rolls again. At the six-month review hearing 

held on May 16, 2014, the juvenile court found Charlotte was not 

an Indian child and ICWA did not apply. 

II. ICWA

ICWA was enacted “to protect the best interests of Indian 

children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 

and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards 

for the removal of Indian children from their families and the 

placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will 

reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for 

assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family 

service programs.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) 

To that end, specific notice requirements to the applicable 

tribes are triggered when the juvenile court knows or has reason 

to know that an Indian child is involved in a dependency 

proceeding. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) California law tracks ICWA for 
7

all intents and purposes relevant to this case. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, §§ 224.2-224.3; Tina L. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 262, 266.) 

“Notice is a key component of the congressional goal to 

protect and preserve Indian tribes and Indian families. Notice 

ensures the tribe will be afforded the opportunity to assert its 

rights under the Act irrespective of the position of the parents, 

Indian custodian or state agencies. Specifically, the tribe has the 

right to obtain jurisdiction over the proceedings by transfer to the 

tribal court or may intervene in the state court proceedings. 

Without notice, these important rights granted by the Act would 

become meaningless.” (In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 

1414, 1421.) Among other things, notice to potentially affected 

tribes must include “[a]ll names known of the Indian child‟s 

biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, or 

Indian custodians, including maiden, married and former names 

or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses, 

birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment numbers, 

and any other identifying information, if known.” (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 224.2, subd. (a)(5)(C); 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(d)(3) (2012); see 

25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) Notice requirements are strictly construed 

and must contain enough information to allow a meaningful

review of the tribal records. (In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 

Cal.App.4th 571, 576.) 
8

Under ICWA, no foster care placement or termination of 

parental rights proceeding may be held until at least 10 days 

after the tribe receives notice. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); see Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (d).) The Indian tribe determines 

whether the child is an Indian child, and its determination is 

conclusive. (In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 702.) 

The juvenile court must determine whether proper notice was 

given under ICWA and whether ICWA applies to the proceedings.

(In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 506.) 

We review the trial court‟s findings for substantial 

evidence. (In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 404.) 

“„On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in 

favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the 

benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in 

support of the order.‟ [Citation.]” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 

Cal.App.4th 1517, 1525.) “Mere support for a contrary conclusion 

is not enough to defeat the finding [citation]; nor is the existence 

of evidence from which a different trier of fact might find 

otherwise in an exercise of discretion [citation].” (In re H.E.

(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 724.) Deficiencies or errors in an 

ICWA notice are subject to harmless error review. (In re S.B. 

(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1162; see also In re Cheyanne F., 

supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
9

III. Analysis

The record here contains substantial evidence of proper 

notice to the Blackfeet Nation. DCFS provided two notices by 

certified mail to the tribe containing information about Mother, 

Father, and Charlotte‟s grandmother and uncle. The Blackfeet 

Nation was given a copy of Mother‟s tribal identification card and 

number as well as information about Mother‟s time at the 

reservation and Charlotte‟s health care at a health clinic on the 

reservation. Since Charlotte claims Indian ancestry from 

Mother, that information would be sufficient for meaningful 

review. Under federal and state law, additional information 

regarding Charlotte‟s grandmother and great-grandparents, from 

whom Mother claims Indian ancestry, was required to be 

provided only if known. There is no indication in the record, 

however, that any other requisite information was known by 

DCFS and not provided to the tribe. Indeed, DCFS indicated, for 

the most part, that Charlotte‟s grandparents‟ and greatgrandparents‟ information was “unknown” but identified them as 

affiliated with the “Blackfeet Tribe of Montana.” As to 

Charlotte‟s maternal grandfather, DCFS listed his tribal 

affilation as “not applicable.” 

Yet, Mother contends the notices were deficient because 

they excluded all information about Charlotte‟s grandmother, 

except for her name, and any information about Charlotte‟s 
10

cousin and great-grandparents, all of whom have Indian 

ancestry. Mother argues DCFS could have gotten this 

information from Charlotte‟s grandfather, uncle, and cousin, 

but failed to do so. 

We are not persuaded by Mother‟s reliance on In re A.G. 

(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1390, for the proposition that reversal is 

required here. In In re A.G., the social services agency admitted 

it violated ICWA‟s inquiry and notice requirements. It made no 

effort to interview family members who were readily available 

and active participants in the dependency proceedings. (Id. at 

p. 1393.) Here, there is no such admission and instead, the 

record supports a finding DCFS interviewed Mother‟s family to 

determine what information was known to them.

In any event, there is no requirement under ICWA or 

California law that information about non-lineal ancestors be 

provided. Thus, DCFS did not violate ICWA by failing to provide 

the tribe with Charlotte‟s cousin‟s information. (25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.11(b) (2003) [“to establish tribal identity, it is necessary to 

provide as much information as is known on the Indian child‟s 

direct lineal ancestors . . .”].) It is unlikely that information 

about Heather New Robe would establish Charlotte‟s Indian 

ancestry when Mother‟s tribal identification card and member 

number did not. 
11

As to Charlotte‟s grandmother and great-grandparents, it is 

speculative to assume Charlotte‟s grandfather, uncle, or cousin 

had the detailed information about these individuals required 

under ICWA. They were very forthcoming about Charlotte‟s 

Indian ancestry. Presumably, they would have provided that

information if it was known. It is not uncommon for an 

individual to be unaware of his or her grandparents‟ or greatgrandparents‟ birthdates or birthplaces or former addresses. 

Certainly, Mother has given no indication she knows any of this 

information. Contrary to Mother‟s assertion, there was no 

indication the maternal grandfather had any Indian ancestry and 

his information, although provided in the second notice, was 

irrelevant to the issue. It is also possible that the maternal 

grandfather was evasive or uncooperative about his wife‟s 

information. 

If Mother had raised the ICWA notice issue in the juvenile 

court, she could have subpoenaed DCFS employees and 

questioned them about their efforts to elicit the required 

information from Charlotte‟s family. In that event, DCFS could 

have introduced additional evidence to show that it had made an 

adequate inquiry. However, Mother did not raise the issue below

and DCFS now lacks that opportunity. At this point, Mother

must take the record as she finds it. The record reveals
12

substantial evidence of ICWA compliance. We therefore conclude 

that Mother has not demonstrated any prejudicial error. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BIGELOW, P.J.

We concur:

RUBIN, J. 

GRIMES, J.
Filed 11/29/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re CHARLOTTE V., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 

 B269633 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK81121)

THE COURT*:

The opinion in the above entitled matter filed on 

November 1, 2016, was not certified for publication in the Official 

Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion should 

be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

____________________________________________________________

* BIGELOW, P. J. RUBIN, J. GRIMES, J.