alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
www.gpo.gov

### §458e. Supplemental assistance to funds provided to local educational agencies

The assistance provided in this subchapter for the education of Indians in the public schools of any State is in addition and supplemental to assistance provided under title IX of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 [20 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.].

(Pub. L. 93–638, title II, §209, Jan. 4, 1975, 88 Stat. 2217; Pub. L. 103–382, title III, §393(c), Oct. 20, 1994, 108 Stat. 4027.)

#### References in Text

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, referred to in text, is Pub. L. 89–10, Apr. 11, 1965, 79 Stat. 27, as amended generally by Pub. L. 103–382, title I, §101, Oct. 20, 1994, 108 Stat. 3519. Title IX of the Act is classified generally to subchapter IX (§7801 et seq.) of chapter 70 of Title 20, Education. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 6301 of Title 20 and Tables.

#### Amendments

1994—Pub. L. 103–382 substituted “title IX of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965” for “title IV of the Act of June 23, 1972 (86 Stat. 235)”.
§ 1028.540 Voluntary information sharing among financial institutions. ( a ) Refer to § 1010.540 of this chapter.
( b ) [Reserved]
#### MARYLAND STEEL COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.

[48 C. Cls., 50; 235 U. S., 451.]

*On the Plaintiff's Appeal.*

The time limit in a contract for the construction of a steamer is orally waived by the Quartermaster General before the expiration of the time fixed by the contract. The contractors complete the work and are paid the contract price, no deduction being made for delay, and the transaction is apparently closed. Four years afterward the defendants deduct from money due to the claimants upon another contract for other and distinct services the liquidated damages prescribed by *402the former contract for the days which exceeded the time limit. This deduction is now asserted by way of counterclaim in this suit.

The court below decides:

I.The waiver of the time limit of a contract may be verbal, *i. e.,*not in writing, though the contract is required *to*be in writing by the act of June 2, 1862, *Revised, Statutes,*sec. 3744.

II.Where time being of the essence of the contract, a contractor fails to perform within the stipulated time, permission to continue performance will operate as a waiver of his breach and will concede to him a reasonable time within which to complete the work, but will not operate as a waiver of the liquidated damages prescribed by the contract.

III. Where it is the fault of the employer which causes the delay of the contractor, it will nullify the provision for liquidated damages and will leave the contractor liable, if at all, for actual damages only. But where the fault is that of the contractor alone the waiver of the time limit by the employer does not relieve the contractor from the payment of the agreed damages for his delay. It simply permits him to continue to perform for a reasonable time, subject to all the other provisions of the contract. The distinction between this case and *United Engineering and Contracting Oo.’s case,*47 O. Ols. K., 489, shown.

IV. Where there is neither concession nor compromise and the one party pays and the other accepts the exact amount due, it is not a payment in accord and satisfaction.

V.Where the Government was entitled to deduct liquidated damages because of the contractors’ failure to perform within the time limit of the contract, and its officers failed to make the de- . duetion on the final settlement, the Government may bring a cross action therefor by way of counterclaim in a subsequent and distinct action.

The court below is reversed and cause remanded with direction to dismiss the counter claim, of the Government and to enter judgment for appellant in the amount claimed by it.

Mr. Justice McKeNNA delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court January 5, 1915.
§ 49.4261-8 Examples of payments not subject to tax. In addition to a payment specifically exempt under section 4261, 4281, 4282, or 4293 of the Internal Revenue Code the following are examples of payments not subject to tax: ( a ) *Exchange of prepaid order, scrip, etc., for tickets.* A ticket issued pursuant to an exchange order, prepaid order, airline pilot order, or scrip, is not subject to tax where the tax is paid at the time of payment for the order or scrip.
( b ) *Caretakers and messengers accompanying freight shipments.* The tax on the transportation of persons does not apply to amounts paid for transportation of freight that includes also the transportation of caretakers or messengers for which no specific charge as such is made.
( c ) *Special baggage transportation equipment.* An amount paid for special baggage transportation equipment is not subject to the tax on the transportation of persons if separable from the payment for transportation of persons and if shown in the exact amount of the charge on the records covering the taxable transportation payment.
( d ) *Circus or show conveyances.* The amount paid pursuant to a contract for the movement of a circus or show conveyance where the amount covers only the transportation of the performers, laborers, animals, equipment, etc., by such conveyances is not subject to the tax on the transportation of persons imposed by section 4261. However, if the contract payment also covers the issuance to advance agents, bill posters, etc., of circus or show scrip books, or other evidence of the right to transportation, for use on regular passenger conveyances, that portion of the contract payment properly allocable to such scrip books or other evidence is subject to the tax on the transportation of persons.
( e ) *Corpses.* The tax on the transportation of persons does not apply to the amount paid for the transportation of a corpse, but does apply to the amount paid for the transportation of any person accompanying the corpse.
( f ) *Miscellaneous charges.* Where the charge is separable from the payment for the transportation of a person and is shown in the exact amount thereof on the records pertaining to the transportation payment, the tax on the transportation of persons does not apply to the following and similar charges: ( 1 ) Charges for transportation of baggage, including incidental charges such as excess value, storage, transfer, parcel checking, special delivery, etc.
( 2 ) - ( 3 ) [Reserved]
( 4 ) Charges for admissions, guides, meals, hotel accommodations, and other nontransportation services, for example, where such items are included in a lump sum payment for an all-expense tour.
( 5 ) [Reserved]
[T.D. 6430, 24 FR 9665, Dec. 3, 1959, as amended by T.D. 6618, 27 FR 11223, Nov. 14, 1962; T.D. 9948, 86 FR 5003, Jan. 19, 2021]
(Superior Court of Cinti.,

Special Term, 1899.)

#### CINCINNATI (City) v. M. SULLIVAN.

Where the typography of the property furnishes all necessary local service drainage, and a tile sewer, constructed by the property owner, receives and discharges the surface and other drainage upon the premises into a trunk sewer, there is sufficient local drainage, within the meaning of sec. 2380, R. S., to exempt the property from the sewer assessment.

*John V. Campbell,*for Plaintiff.

*Charles F. Dolle,*for Defendant.

Jackson, J.

From the agreed statement of facts herein I am constrained to find that the property of defendant was provided with sufficient local drainage, under section 2380, Revised Statutes, prior to the construction of the sewer for which assessment is sought to be enforced.

The facts show that the typography of the property in question furnished it with all necessary local surface drainage; and also that a “burnt sewer tiling of sufficient size, being a twenty-four inch drain,” had been laid in the bed of the creek by defendant in the rear of his property. It appears that this burnt sewer tiling effectually received and discharged into a trunk sewer “the surface and other drainage” of defendant’s premises. It also appears that the defendant’s frame dwelling house on the premises was connected with the burnt sewer tiling by an open brick gutter. I therefore think the defendants property should be releived from the burden of assessment on the authority of *Wiswell*v. *Cincinnati,*45 Ohio St. 407, and *Toledo*v. *Railway Co.*4 C. C. 113.
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.6222(b)-3 Partner receiving incorrect schedule. ( a ) *In general.* A partner shall be treated as having complied with section 6222(b)(1)(B) and § 301.6222(b)-1 with respect to a partnership item if the partner— ( 1 ) Demonstrates that the treatment of the partnership item on the partner's return is consistent with the treatment of that item on the schedule prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service and furnished to the partner by the partnership showing the partner's share of income, credits, deductions, etc.; and
( 2 ) Elects in accordance with the rules prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section to have this section apply with respect to that item.
( b ) *Election provisions* — ( 1 ) *Time and manner of making election.* The election described in paragraph (a) of this section shall be made by filing a statement with the Internal Revenue Service office issuing the notice of computational adjustment within 30 days after the notice is mailed to the partner.
( 2 ) *Contents of statement.* The statement described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall be— ( i ) Clearly identified as an election under section 6222(b)(2);
( ii ) Signed by the partner making the election; and
( iii ) Accompanied by copies of the schedule furnished to the partner by the partnership and of the notice of computational adjustment. The partner need not enclose a copy of the notice of computational adjustment, however, if the partner clearly identifies the notice of computational adjustment. Generally, the requirement described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be satisfied by attaching to the statement a copy of the schedule furnished to the partner by the partnership. However, if it is not clear from the information contained on the schedule that the treatment of the partnership item on the schedule is consistent with the partner's treatment of such item on the partner's return the statement shall also include an explanation of how the treatment of such item on the schedule is consistent with the treatment on the partner's return with respect to the characterization, timing, and amount of such item.
( c ) *Effective date.* This section is applicable to partnership taxable years beginning on or after October 4, 2001. For years beginning prior to October 4, 2001, see § 301.6222(b)-3T contained in 26 CFR part 1, revised April 1, 2001.
[T.D. 8965, 66 FR 50546, Oct. 4, 2001]
# L_2022131EN.01000901.xml

| 5.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 131/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 131/9

---

Corrigendum to Regulation (EU) 2019/2175 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments, Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds, and Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on information accompanying transfers of funds

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 334 of 27 December 2019
  )

| 1. | On page 128, Article 4, point 11, concerning the addition of paragraph 13 in Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014: |
| --- | --- |

1.

On page 128, Article 4, point 11, concerning the addition of paragraph 13 in Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014:

for:

‘13.   The Commission ...’,

read:

‘14.   The Commission ...’.

| 2. | On page 129, Article 4, point 11, concerning the addition of paragraph 14 in Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014: |
| --- | --- |

2.

On page 129, Article 4, point 11, concerning the addition of paragraph 14 in Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014:

for:

‘14.   Where the procedure outlined in paragraph 13 ...’,

read:

‘15.   Where the procedure outlined in paragraph 14 ...’.

---
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order
Lansing, Michigan
April 28, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 129314(40) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, ADRIANNE NISWONGER, as Next Friend Justices of JOHN M. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 129314 COA: 251885 Ingham CC: 02-002054-NO QUALITY DAIRY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s order of January 31, 2006 is considered , and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

C AVANAGH , J., would grant reconsideration.

K ELLY , J., would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinsta te the Ingham Circuit Court’s October 16, 2003 denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition for the reasons stated by the circuit court.

d0424 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
April 28, 2006
Clerk
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Kedra L. Small, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[804 NYS2d 145]

Rose, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed April 28, 2004, which, upon reconsideration, inter alia, ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was not totally unemployed.

Upon losing her job under circumstances not at issue, claimant, an attorney, applied for unemployment insurance benefits. Throughout the applicable time period, claimant was *874self-employed, seeking and accepting assignments from the assigned counsel and law guardian programs. In addition, she actively sought her own clients. During conversations with representatives from the Department of Labor, as well as in all the forms that she filed with the local unemployment insurance office, claimant disclosed these facts, but she failed to accurately report the days on which she worked. Although claimant was initially awarded benefits, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ultimately found that she was not totally unemployed during the relevant time period and, therefore, she was found ineligible to receive benefits and charged with a recoverable overpayment of $12,555 *(see*Labor Law § 597 [4]). In addition, claimant’s right to receive future benefits was reduced on the basis that she made willful false statements *(see*Labor Law § 594). Claimant’s sole argument on appeal is that, since she made full disclosures of her self-employment to the Department, her benefits are not recoverable and her right to receive future benefits should not be reduced.

During the hearing, claimant admitted that she failed to accurately report all of the days on which she worked *(cf Matter of Todino [Ross],*59 AD2d 638 [1977]; *Matter of Oster [Levine],*53 AD2d 740 [1976]) and, therefore, the Board properly found that the benefits were recoverable. With respect to the forfeiture of future benefits, Labor Law § 594 requires willfulness, which means “knowingly, intentionally and deliberately making a false statement” *(Matter of Schulman [Commissioner of Labor],*9 AD3d 647, 648 [2004], *lv denied*4 NY3d 708 [2005]; *accord Matter of Vasta [Commissioner of Labor],*268 AD2d 653, 653 [2000]), and this is a question for the Board to resolve *(see Matter of Caron [Commissioner of Labor],*8 AD3d 864, 865 [2004]). Although claimant disclosed her private legal practice to the Board, she admittedly misrepresented the days that she actually worked. Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that claimant made willful false statements to obtain benefits *(see id.).*

Cardona, P.J., Mugglin, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          23,418
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  137,915
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (28,775)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      17,706,579
<DEPRECIATION>                             (6,126,056)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,720,180
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          610,380
<BONDS>                                     12,767,512
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<OTHER-SE>                                   7,342,228
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,720,180
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,703,038
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,797,398
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                20,786
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             688,297
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,803,443)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,803,443)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,803,443)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (90.24)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (90.24)
        

</TABLE>
www.gpo.gov

### §677w. Presentation of development program for full-blood group to eventually terminate Federal supervision

Within three months after August 27, 1954, the business committee of the tribe representing the full-blood group thereof shall present to the Secretary a development program calculated to assist in making the tribe and the members thereof selfsupporting, without any special Government assistance, with a view of eventually terminating all Federal supervision of the tribe and its members.

(Aug. 27, 1954, ch. 1009, §24, 68 Stat. 877; Pub. L. 93–608, §1(15), Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1969.)

#### Amendments

1975—Pub. L. 93–608 struck out requirement of an annual progress report, through the Secretary, by the tribal business committee representing the full-blood group.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

October 27, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 136609 Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 136609 

 COA: 280880 

Iron CC: 03-008361-FH 

THOMAS SCOTT PALMER,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 30, 2008 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

d1020 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 27, 2008 

 Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7479

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ABDI MOHAMMED UMAR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, Chief District Judge. (2:10-cr-0056-MSD-FBS-5; 2:16-cv00392-MSD)

Submitted: June 16, 2020 Decided: June 23, 2020

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Abdi Mohammed Umar, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Abdi Mohammed Umar seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on

his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) motion based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 

(2015). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2018). A certificate of appealability will 

not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2) (2018). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that 

the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Umar has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion for a certificate of appealability 

and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                           GTECH HOLDINGS CORPORATION

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
                         PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of GTECH Holdings Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending November 22, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Date hereof (the "Report"), I, W.
Bruce Turner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C section 1350, as adopted pursuant to sections 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.

                                       GTECH HOLDINGS CORPORATION

Date: January 5, 2004                  By /s/ W. Bruce Turner
                                       -------------------------------------
                                       W. Bruce Turner
                                       President and Chief Executive Officer