alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
www.gpo.gov

### §564n. Protection of minors, persons non compos mentis, and other members needing assistance; guardians; other adequate means; trusts; annuities; assistance factors; contests

Prior to the transfer of title to, or the removal of restrictions from, property in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter, the Secretary shall protect the rights of members of the tribe who are minors, non compos mentis, or in the opinion of the Secretary in need of assistance in conducting their affairs, by causing the appointment of guardians for such members in courts of competent jurisdiction, or by such other means as he may deem adequate, without application from the member, including but not limited to the creation of a trust of such member's property with a trustee selected by the Secretary, or the purchase by the Secretary of an annuity for such member: *Provided, however*, That no member shall be declared to be in need of assistance in conducting his affairs unless the Secretary determines that such member does not have sufficient ability, knowledge, experience, and judgment to enable him to manage his business affairs, including the administration, use, investment, and disposition of any property turned over to such member and the income and proceeds therefrom, with such reasonable degree of prudence and wisdom as will be apt to prevent him from losing such property or the benefits thereof: *Provided further*, That any member determined by the Secretary to be in need of assistance in conducting his affairs may, within one hundred and twenty days after receipt of written notice of such secretarial determination, contest the secretarial determination in any naturalization court for the area in which said member resides by filing therein a petition having that purpose; the burden shall thereupon devolve upon the Secretary to show cause why such member should not conduct his own affairs, and the decision of such court shall be final and conclusive with respect to the affected member's conduct of his affairs.

(Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, §15, 68 Stat. 722; Pub. L. 85–132, §1(j), Aug. 14, 1957, 71 Stat. 348.)

#### Amendments

1957—Pub. L. 85–132 inserted provisions allowing Secretary to act without application from member to create a trust or purchase an annuity for such member, by setting out factors for determination by Secretary before he declares a member to be in need of assistance, and by providing for contest of such secretarial determination by member.

#### Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in section 565a of this title.
#### In the Matter of Mark Kaminsky, Appellant, et al., Petitioner, v Village of Briarcliff Manor, et al., Respondents.

[805 NYS2d 631]

In a hybrid proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Planning Board of the Village of Briarcliff Manor, dated August 12, 2003, which granted site plan/steep slope permit approval for the proposed construction of a single-family house on certain real property owned by Heather B. McVeigh, and an action for a judgment declaring, among other things, that certain restrictive covenants which allegedly limited and restricted construction along Ridgecrest Road are valid, the petitioner Mark Kaminsky appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester *471County (DiBella, J.), entered April 23, 2004, which, inter alia, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by adding thereto a decretal paragraph declaring, inter alia, that certain restrictive covenants which allegedly limit and restrict construction along Ridgecrest Road are invalid; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The challenged resolution of the Planning Board of the Village of Briarcliff Manor has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition *(see Matter of Ifrah v Utschig,*98 NY2d 304, 308 [2002]; *Matter of O’Connell v Knowlton,*21 AD3d 1105 [2005]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Since this is a hybrid proceeding and an action, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment, we modify the judgment by adding thereto a decretal paragraph declaring, among other things, that certain restrictive covenants which allegedly limited and restricted construction along Ridgecrest Road are invalid *(see Lanza v Wagner,*11 NY2d 317 [1962], *appeal dismissed*371 US 74 [1962], *cert denied*371 US 901 [1962]). H. Miller, J.P., Cozier, Ritter and Dillon, JJ., concur.
IB

House Calendar No. 6

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 50

[Report No. 104–10]

To designate the visitors center at the Channel Islands National Park,

California, as the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino Visitors Center’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 11, 1995

Mr. GALLEGLY (for himself, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. WOLF, Mr. DORNAN, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. COX of California, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska,

Mr. BEILENSON, Mr. HERGER, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. MCKEON, Mr.

ROHRABACHER, Mr. MOORHEAD, and Mr. DOOLITTLE) introduced the

following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Resources

JANUARY 27, 1995

Reported with amendments, referred to the House Calendar, and ordered to

be printed

[Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert the part printed in italic]

JOINT RESOLUTION

To designate the visitors center at the Channel Islands National Park, California, as the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino

Visitors Center’’.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HJ 50 RH

1 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

2 The visitors center at the Channel Islands National

3 Park, California, is designated as the ‘‘Robert J. Lago4 marsino Visitors Center’’.

5 SEC. 2. LEGAL REFERENCES.

6 Any reference in any law, regulation, document,

7 record, map, or other paper of the United States to the

8 visitors center referred to in section 1 is deemed to be

9 a reference to the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino Visitors

10 Center’’.

11 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

12 The visitor center at the Channel Islands National

13 Park, California, is designated as the ‘‘Robert J. Lago14 marsino Visitor Center’’.

15 SEC. 2. LEGAL REFERENCES.

16 Any reference in any law, regulation, document,

17 record, map, or other paper of the United States to the visi18 tor center referred to in section 1 is deemed to be a reference

19 to the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino Visitor Center’’.

Amend the title so as to read: ‘‘Joint resolution to

designate the visitor center at the Channel Islands National Park, California, as the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino

Visitor Center.’’.

House Calendar No. 6

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 50

[Report No. 104–10]

JOINT RESOLUTION

To designate the visitors center at the Channel IsJ. Lagomarsino Visitors Center’’. lands National Park, California, as the ‘‘Robert

JANUARY 27, 1995

Reported with amendments, referred to the House

Calendar, and ordered to be printed
###### Editorial Note on Part 301

#### Editorial Note:

In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations.

References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

#### § 301.7601-1 Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects.

Each district director shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees under his supervision and control to proceed, from time to time, through his district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed.

[T.D. 7297, 38 FR 34803, Dec. 19, 1973]
#### PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY, Petitioner v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation, et al., Intervenors

No. 01-1144.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

May 28, 2002.

Before GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This petition for review was considered on the record from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and on the briefs filed by the parties. The court has deter*545mined that the issues presented occasion no need for a published opinion. It is

*ORDERED AND ADJUDGED*that the petition for review be granted.

The Commission ruled that Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. sold capacity on its pipeline to PSE & G at a discounted rate not required by competition. According to the Commission, the “most important” indication that Transco did not need to give PSE & G the discount in order to keep the latter’s business was that PSE *&*G had agreed to pay the maximum rate for the remainder of the twenty-year contract in the event the Commission disallowed the discount rate. But as the contract between PSE *&*G and Transco reveals, and as the Commission now concedes, PSE & G had in fact agreed only that under such circumstances it would pay the maximum rate for three years and would thereafter be released from the contract.

The Commission now characterizes this mistake as harmless error, but because the Commission based its order primarily upon a fact that turns out to have been wrong, we cannot say with any confidence how it would have ruled in the absence of that factor. We therefore remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings based upon the correct reading of the contract.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
www.gpo.gov

### §416f. Dedication of land for public purposes

Individual or tribal owners of trust or restricted Indian land on the San Xavier and Salt River Pima-Maricopa Reservations may, with the approval of the Secretary, dedicate land to the public for streets, alleys, or other public purposes under those laws of the State of Arizona that are applicable to the dedication of land for public purposes.

(Pub. L. 89–715, §7, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1113.)

#### Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in section 416i of this title.
exv10w17wii



 







Exhibit 10.17(ii)




	 	 	 
	

	 	Top SpinMedical (Israel) Ltd.
Global Park, 2 Yodfat St., North Industrial Zone
Lod, Israel
Phone: 972-8-9200033
Fax: 972-8-9281233  
	 

	 	
	 

	 	
	 

	 	
	 

	 	






	 	 	 
	To:

	 	Date: December 29, 2005
	TopSpin Medical Inc. (the “Company”)
	 	 
	2 Yodfat St., Lod
	 	 
	Israel
	 	 






Re: Loan Agreement




Dear Sir,





	1.	 	On June 21, 2001, the Company and TopSpin Medical (Israel) Ltd., the Company’s fully
owned subsidiary (the “Subsidiary”), have entered into an Intercompany Loan Agreement, a
copy of which is enclosed as Exhibit A herewith (the “Original Agreement”; all
capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined herein, shall have the meaning ascribed to
them in the Original Agreement).






	2.	 	Under the Original Agreement the Company has extended to the Subsidiary a Convertible
Loan in accordance with the terms set forth in the Original Agreement.






	3.	 	As of December 31, 2005 the loan amount under the Original Agreement consists of a
principal amount of US$ 18,247,671.69 and accrued interest of US$ 1,544,570.57 on the
principal amount.






	4.	 	The Subsidiary requests that, as of the date hereof, the Company shall waive any interest
payments due to the Company in connection with the amounts extended by the Company to
Subsidiary until December 31, 2005 under the Convertible Loan in accordance with the terms
of the Original Agreement, totaling an aggregate interest amount of US$ 1,544,570.57 as of
December 31, 2005.
	 
	5.	 	Please confirm your agreement to the above with your signature hereunder.





  /s/
Erez Golan

TopSpin Medical (Isracel)

By:
Erez Golan          
             





We confirm and agree to the aforesaid:




/s/ Erez Golan

TopSpin Medical Inc.

By: Erez Golan
Su n Countr y slo t exemptio n Docke t

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t t o ou r hom e hav e made thi s all possible . H e wa s abl e t o fl y hom e fo r hi s sister s colleg e graduation , hi s brother s surgery , Thanksgivin g and Easter . Thes e trip s wer e possibl e fo

r th e abov e mentione d reasons . W

e ar e s o thankful tha

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r m y famil y t o tak e advantag e o f M y husban d an d younges t

so n jus t complete d thei r

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d m y famil y th e abilit

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e fo r no t onl y m y famil y but severa l other s i f thi s servic e i s interrupted . I d o hop e th e official s involve d ar e abl e t o mak

e th e adjustment s necessar

y to keep thi s route . I f

it mean s changin g th e arriva l and departur

e time s fo r th e servic e the n pleas e mak e thos e adjustment s and keep thi s rout

e going ! I a manxiously awaitin g to boo k afe w trip s thi s summe

r fo r th e Lansin g to D C rout e a s m y so n wil l workin g in D C ove r th e summer . Pleas e do wha t need s to b e done t o kee

p thi s route alive . Sincerely re n Eibl e keible@comcast.net
39476.

#### ROGERS v. McELROY.

Decided May 30, 1962.

*John M. Morrow,*for plaintiff in error.

*Robert D. Tisinger,*contra.

Frankum, Judge.

1. Whether or not a jury should be sent out to view property involved in litigation is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court. *Moore v. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,*180 Ga. 335 (178 SE 711); *Bibb County v. Reese,*115 Ga. 346 (41 SE 636); *City of Rome v. Herron,*26 Ga. App. 39 (105 SE 379); *Shahan v. American Tel. &c. Co.,*72 Ga. App. 749 (35 SE2d 5). See Green, Ga. Law of Evidence, § 85. The record in the instant case does not show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying defendant’s motion that the jury be sent to view certain property involved in the controversy between the parties.

2. The evidence supports the verdict. The court did not err in overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
#### § 15.737-17 Motions and requests.

Motions and requests may be filed with the Director or with the Administrative Law Judge.
#### Laura Calabro, Respondent, v General Insurance Company of America, Doing Business as Safeco, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 441]

In an action for a judgment declaring that the defendant is obligated to defend and indemnify Sunrise Psychiatric Clinic, Inc., in connection with an underlying action entitled *Calabro v Sunrise Psychiatric Clinic,*commenced in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, under index No. 12274/04, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Woodard, J.), entered September 29, 2004, as, in effect, denied that branch of its cross motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the documentary evidence tendered in support of that branch of its cross motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint “failed to resolve all factual issues and conclusively dispose of the plaintiffs claims as a matter of law” *(Wright v Evanston Ins. Co.,*14 AD3d 505 [2005]; *see*CPLR 3211 [a] [1]). Accordingly, that branch of the motion was properly denied.

*327The defendant’s remaining contentions are either improperly raised for the first time on appeal *(see DeLeon v New York City Tr. Auth.,*5 AD3d 531, 532-533 [2004]), or without merit. Florio, J.P., Crane, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.7701(b)-9 Effective/applicability dates of §§ 301.7701(b)-1 through 301.7701(b)-7. ( a ) *In general.* Except as indicated in paragraph (b) of this section, §§ 301.7701(b)-1 through 301.7701(b)-7 apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1984. For the rules applicable to earlier taxable years, see §§ 1.871-2 through 1.871-5 of this chapter.
( b ) *Special rules* — ( 1 ) *Green card test-residency starting date.* If an alien was a lawful permanent resident throughout 1984 (regardless of whether the individual was physically present in the United States), or was physically present in the United States at any time during 1984 while a lawful permanent resident, the individual will be considered to have been a resident of the United States during 1984 for purposes of applying the provisions of section 7701(b)(2)(A) and § 301.7701(b)-4 such that the individual will, if he meets the substantial presence or green card test in 1985, be considered a resident of the United States as of January 1, 1985, regardless of when the individual was first present in the United States in 1985.
( 2 ) *Substantial presence test-years included.* For purposes of applying the substantial presence test for calendar years 1985 and 1986, days of presence in 1984 will only be counted for aliens who had been residents under prior law (§§ 1.871-2 through 1.871-5 of this chapter) at the end of calendar year 1984. Days of presence in 1983 will only be counted for aliens who had been residents under prior law at the end of both calendar year 1983 and 1984.
( 3 ) *Professional athletes.* For purposes of applying the substantial presence test, only days of presence in the United States after October 22, 1986, shall be excluded for individuals described in § 301.7701(b)-3(b)(5) (professional athletes).
( 4 ) *Procedural rules and filing requirements.* The procedural rules and filing requirements described in §§ 301.7701(b)-7(b) and 301.7701(b)-8 shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1991.
( 5 ) *Possessions and territories.* For purposes of applying section 7701(b) and the regulations under that section, § 301.7701(b)-1(d) applies to taxable years ending after April 9, 2008.
[T.D. 8411, 57 FR 15253, Apr. 27, 1992, as amended by T.D. 9391, 73 FR 19377, Apr. 9, 2008]
#### Kenneth F. Schuhmann, Jr., Respondent, v Michael McBride, Defendant, and Matty Beans Café, Inc., Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 779]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Matty Beans Café, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Oliver, J.), dated August 17, 2004, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

On the evening of September 14, 2001, the plaintiff and his cousin went to the appellant’s restaurant. During the course of the evening, the manager of the restaurant, also a part-owner, was informed by a customer that the plaintiff and his cousin were intentionally flooding the bathroom. The manager confronted the plaintiff about this, and an argument ensued. Following the argument, the plaintiff left the restaurant and walked across the street to his vehicle. The defendant Michael McBride, the manager’s estranged husband, followed the plaintiff out of the restaurant and assaulted him. The plaintiff commenced this action against McBride and the appellant to recover damages for personal injuries.

*543Given the conflicting testimonies of the plaintiff, the restaurant manager, and another witness, a trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences as to whether McBride was employed by the appellant *(see Castronovo v Doe,*274 AD2d 442, 443 [2000]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and according the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference *(see Negri v Stop & Shop,*65 NY2d 625, 626 [1985]), a triable issue of fact exists as to whether McBride was employed by the appellant at the time of the assault.

Nevertheless, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the appellant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that even if it employed McBride, his actions in assaulting the plaintiff were not incidental to the furtherance of the appellant’s business interests and fell outside the scope of his employment *(see Brancato v Dee & Dee Purch.,*296 AD2d 518, 519 [2002]; *Vega v Northland Mktg. Corp.,*289 AD2d 565, 566 [2001]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with regard to whether McBride was acting within the scope of his employment *(see Rausman v Baugh,*248 AD2d 8 [1998]; *see also Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Accordingly, the appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been granted. Florio, J.P., Krausman, Skelos and Covello, JJ., concur.
§ 1010.670 Summons or subpoena of foreign bank records; termination of correspondent relationship. ( a ) *Definitions.* The definitions in § 1010.605 apply to this section.
( b ) *Issuance to foreign banks.* The Secretary or the Attorney General may issue a summons or subpoena to any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in the United States and may request records related to such correspondent account, including records maintained outside of the United States relating to the deposit of funds into the foreign bank. The summons or subpoena may be served on the foreign bank in the United States if the foreign bank has a representative in the United States, or in a foreign country pursuant to any mutual legal assistance treaty, multilateral agreement, or other request for international law enforcement assistance.
( c ) *Issuance to covered financial institutions.* Upon receipt of a written request from a Federal law enforcement officer for information required to be maintained by a covered financial institution under paragraph (a)(2) of § 1010.630, the covered financial institution shall provide the information to the requesting officer not later than 7 days after receipt of the request.
( d ) *Termination upon receipt of notice.* A covered financial institution shall terminate any correspondent relationship with a foreign bank not later than 10 business days after receipt of written notice from the Secretary or the Attorney General (in each case, after consultation with the other) that the foreign bank has failed: ( 1 ) To comply with a summons or subpoena issued under paragraph (b) of this section; or
( 2 ) To initiate proceedings in a United States court contesting such summons or subpoena.
( e ) *Limitation on liability.* A covered financial institution shall not be liable to any person in any court or arbitration proceeding for terminating a correspondent relationship in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.
( f ) *Failure to terminate relationship.* Failure to terminate a correspondent relationship in accordance with this section shall render the covered financial institution liable for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per day until the correspondent relationship is so terminated.