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EXAMINING THE SEC’S MONEY 

MARKET FUND RULE PROPOSAL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND 

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 113–44 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

GARY G. MILLER, California, Vice Chairman 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

Emeritus 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey, Chairman 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, 

Ranking Member 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

September 18, 2013 .......................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

September 18, 2013 .......................................................................................... 49 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

Bair, Hon. Sheila C., Chair, Systemic Risk Council, and former Chair, FDIC .. 10 

Chandoha, Marie, President and Chief Executive Officer, Charles Schwab 

Investment Management, Inc. ............................................................................ 12 

Gilligan, James P., Assistant Treasurer, Great Plains Energy, Inc., on behalf 

of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ..................................................................... 14 

McCoy, Hon. Steven N., Treasurer, State of Georgia, on behalf of the National 

Association of State Treasurers (NAST) ............................................................ 8 

Stevens, Paul Schott, President and Chief Executive Officer, the Investment 

Company Institute (ICI) ...................................................................................... 15 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Moore, Hon. Gwen ............................................................................................ 50 

Bair, Hon. Sheila C. ......................................................................................... 52 

Chandoha, Marie .............................................................................................. 59 

Gilligan, James P. ............................................................................................ 72 

McCoy, Hon. Steven N. .................................................................................... 84 

Stevens, Paul Schott ........................................................................................ 111 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Garrett, Hon. Scott: 

Letter to the SEC from 12 Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, dated September 12, 2013 ............................................................................................. 123 

Letter from the Mutual Fund Directors Forum, dated September 17, 

2013 ................................................................................................................ 132 

Written statement of the Financial Services Roundtable ............................. 133 

Lynch, Hon. Stephen: 

Letter to the SEC from Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, dated 

September 17, 2013 ...................................................................................... 136 

Letter to the SEC from the Massachusetts Municipal Association, dated 

September 9, 2013 ........................................................................................ 138 

Chandoha, Marie: 

Written responses to questions for the record from Representative Ellison .................................................................................................................. 140 

Written responses to questions for the record from Representative 

Hultgren ........................................................................................................ 143 

Stevens, Paul Schott: 

Written responses to questions for the record from Representatives Garrett and Sewell .............................................................................................. 147 

(1) 

EXAMINING THE SEC’S MONEY 

MARKET FUND RULE PROPOSAL 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Garrett [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Garrett, Hurt, Neugebauer, 

Westmoreland, Huizenga, Grimm, Stivers, Mulvaney, Hultgren, 

Ross, Wagner; Maloney, Sherman, Lynch, Moore, Perlmutter, Scott, 

Himes, Peters, Ellison, Watt, Foster, Carney, and Kildee. 

Ex officio present: Representative Hensarling. 

Chairman GARRETT. Greetings and good morning. This hearing 

of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises is hereby called to order. 

Today’s hearing is entitled, ‘‘Examining the SEC’s Money Market 

Fund Rule Proposal,’’ and I thank all the members of the panel for 

being with us today. We will be looking to you for your comments 

in a moment. 

I also thank the members of our committee who are here to examine this important issue. 

We will now have opening statements, and I will begin by yielding myself 6 minutes. 

Following the events of the financial crisis, in which some of the 

money market funds, as you know, experienced heavy investor redemptions, the SEC had proposed a rule for which the stated intent was making money funds less susceptible to future runs and 

improving the transparency of money market fund risk. 

The process leading to the SEC’s current rule proposal reflects 

the good, the bad, and the ugly of agency rulemaking. In fact, it 

is really a tale of two different rules. 

The first iteration of that would become a current rule proposal 

considered by the SEC more than a year ago, as a cautionary example of agency rulemaking gone wrong, both in terms of process 

and substance. 

As SEC Commissioner Dan Gallagher described it, the original 

proposal was presented to the Commission by the then-SEC Chairman as, ‘‘inviolate fait accompli, having already been fully-baked 

and blessed by other agencies without the input of the Commissioners and lacking in adequate economic analysis.’’ 

2 

But thanks to the efforts of Chairman Issa and his staff on the 

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, we are now 

able to construct a picture of what appears to have been a wildly, 

closely coordinated effort by the SEC Chairman and FSOC and the 

Federal Reserve to develop the substance of the original rule proposal and to exert undue political influence on the Commission to 

accept it. 

To highlight just one example, documents obtained by Chairman 

Issa’s committee appeared to show certain individuals of the SEC 

working together with the Fed to draft a letter for FSOC back to 

the SEC, pressuring the Commission to adopt specific money fund 

reform measures, and then dangling the possibility that FSOC 

would take those matters into its own hands. 

This collaboration appears to have occurred well before the Commission was even set to vote on the original rule proposal. Then, 

after the original rule proposal ultimately failed to gain the support 

of the majority of the SEC Commissioners necessary to bring the 

matter to a vote, what happened? 

The FSOC doubled down, again pressuring the SEC to act on 

specific money market fund reforms by issuing and seeking comment on its own reform recommendations. So, given the significant 

intrusion of banking and systemic risk regulators in the SEC process, it should come, then, as no surprise that the focal point of the 

original rule proposal was a requirement that money market funds 

implement what is commonly called capital cushion, or buffer. 

So while this capital buffer requirement was reportedly designed 

to make money market funds better able to withstand heavy redemptions during times of market stress, I believe that it was, and 

it continues to be, an entirely inappropriate option for money market funds. 

First, money market funds are fundamentally a securities product. And I believe the consumer should think of them as such. 

Forcing money market funds to hold bank-like capital will only foster the false perception and impression among many investors that 

these funds are more like federally-insured bank accounts and security products. 

Second, as the SEC itself has since concluded, the capital buffer 

contemplated in the original rule proposal would likely be insufficient to absorb very large losses on the level experience during the 

financial crisis. But a buffer high enough to do so would be too 

costly to be practical. 

And third, as Commissioner Gallagher has pointed out, the only 

real purpose for the proposed buffer was to serve as the price of 

entry into a emergency lending facility at the Federal Reserve that 

they could construct during any future crisis. 

In short, the buffer would provide additional collateral to provide 

a Fed bailout to the troubled funds. 

With the Obama Administration’s precedent-setting bailouts of 

the auto industry and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, costing literally billions of dollars, we simply cannot afford to extend yet another taxpayer-funded bailout, and the moral hazard that goes with 

it, to money market funds. 

When rulemaking is done correctly, it is a deliberative and 

thoughtful process based off of hard economic pattern. Fortunately, 

3 

the second iteration of the SEC’s money fund proposal, the rule 

proposal that we are going to be taking a look at today, seems to 

be more in line with that standard. 

The current rule proposal sets forth three alternatives, in addition to certain enhanced dislosure requirements, and I will run 

through them. 

First, it has a floating net asset value (NAV) requirement for 

specific types of money market funds called prime institutional 

funds. Second, it has mandatory liquidity fees and discretionary 

temporary redemption gates for all nongovernment money market 

funds during the times of market stress. And third would be a combination of these two alternatives. 

So, unlike the original proposal, the current proposal was informed by the results of a study of money market funds conducted 

by the SEC’s division of economic and risk analysis, which show 

the heaviest redemptions during the financial crisis were where? In 

the prime institutional funds. 

Moreover, I was pleased to see that the current rule proposal 

does not include a capital buffer or alternative that enshrined taxpayer bailouts and makes security products look more like bank 

products. 

I believe that the decision to exclude a capital buffer from the 

SEC’s current rule proposal is very much an important step in resisting the push to remove substantially all of the risk from security products. 

It is what ultimately hurt investors by reducing their ability to 

generate much-needed returns on their investment and their retirement dollars. 

And so, while I may not necessarily agree with every single aspect of the SEC’s current proposals, and I am sure we will hear 

from the panel today, and recognize that many of the important 

questions remain outstanding, I appreciate the SEC’s commitment 

to engage in a thoughtful and deliberate process this second time 

around. 

Ultimately, I believe it is critically important that we strike the 

right balance between ensuring that money market funds can survive during periods of market stress, and preserving their role as 

an important investment and cash management tool for all types 

of investors. To that end, I do look forward to a robust debate this 

morning on the positive, and the negative, of the SEC’s proposals. 

And with that, I yield to the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. 

Maloney, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank the chairman for holding this important 

and timely hearing, and for doing so in such a bipartisan way. 

Nearly 50 million investors use money market funds, which collectively hold about $2.9 trillion in assets. This is a huge market, 

which is why this issue is too important to get bogged down in the 

usual partisan politics. 

The SEC has put forward a thoughtful proposal to reform money 

market funds, and it deserves a serious discussion. To encourage 

this, the chairman and I have tried to ensure that a broad range 

of views are represented on the panel today, and I very much look 

forward to your testimony and to the debate that follows. 

4 

Before we get into the SEC’s proposed reforms, it is important 

to remind ourselves why reform is needed. On September 16, 2008, 

the Reserve Primary Fund, a $62 billion money market fund that 

had invested in Lehman securities, broke the buck, meaning the 

value of its shares fell below $1. 

This was only the second time a U.S. money market fund had 

ever broken the buck in U.S. history. This event sparked a massive, and I would say terrifying, run on the money market fund. 

Never has my phone rung so much off the hook in the middle of 

the night, during the day, ‘‘run on the funds, are we going towards 

a depression, what is happening,’’ but by the end of the week, investors had withdrawn over $300 billion from the prime fund, and 

on September 19th, just 3 days later, really 2 days later because 

they didn’t announce they broke the buck until the end of the first 

day, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserved bailed out 

the entire money market industry by effectively guaranteeing over 

$3 trillion of money market shares. 

I think it is safe to say that obviously, we do not want this to 

happen again, and we look forward to working together to prevent 

it. To its credit, the SEC in 2010 adopted some very substantial 

money market reforms which include the quality of the securities 

that money market funds can hold, and established minimum liquidity requirements for money funds. 

However, as the SEC noted at the time, the 2010 reforms did not 

address the fact that money market funds are still susceptible to 

devastating investor runs that can destabilize the entire financial 

system. 

The question before us today is what reforms are needed to prevent future runs on money market funds. In June, the SEC, under 

the leadership of Chair Mary Jo White, issued a proposed rule that 

is intended to answer this question. The Commission proposed two 

alternatives, both of which take into account the considerable 

progress the SEC made with the 2010 reforms, and they are both 

narrowly focused on the problems that emerged in 2008. 

While most of the attention is focused on the SEC’s floating NAV 

proposal, I am interested in the witnesses’ thoughts on the socalled ‘‘gates and fees’’ proposal. Are liquidity fees a strong enough 

deterrent to prevent runs, and would the prospect of going 30 days 

without access to your money prompt investors to withdraw their 

funds at the first sign of any trouble? These are two questions I 

would like answered in your testimony today, and I look forward 

to exploring other questions during the hearing. 

Thank you for being here, and I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman 

from Virginia, Mr. Hurt, is recognized for 2 minutes. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

holding today’s subcommittee hearing to examine the SEC’s proposed rules for money market mutual funds. I know our panel will 

provide their views on the SEC’s current proposal, but my concerns 

also extend to the process by which we came to this proposed rule. 

After former SEC Chair Schapiro was unable to pass a money 

market fund proposal through the SEC, the FSOC inserted itself 

into the rulemaking process by proposing its own guidelines pursuant to its authority under the Dodd-Frank Act. 

5 

This action by the FSOC raises concern for the development of 

financial regulation in the future and carries significant consequences for government and industry. Congress entrusts financial regulatory responsibility to specific regulatory bodies with specific areas of expertise and jurisdiction. Here, the SEC has overseen the regulation of money market funds for decades, and it understands the product best. Presumably, Congress did not establish 

FSOC’s authority under Section 120 as a means for a new regulatory body to undermine the decisions of the specialized, independent regulatory agency. 

Additionally, as a Commission dominated by political appointees, 

FSOC, armed with this authority, has the ability to pressure regulators whose actions do not align with the current Administration’s 

views. FSOC remains outside of the congressional appropriations 

process, further allowing for this potential politicizing of financial 

regulation outside of appropriate congressional accountability. 

Finally, FSOC is proposing its money market fund rules did not 

establish guidelines for future uses of their enhanced authority, 

thereby leaving the door open to the possibility of numerous encroachments in the regulatory purview of other financial regulatory 

agencies. 

Ultimately, independent agencies with five members must be allowed to work their will. The FSOC’s authority leaves the offending 

regulatory body, in this case the SEC, with the choice of yielding 

or being forced to implement a final rulemaking designated by 

FSOC on any topic, let alone money market funds. 

Either option lessens the effectiveness of regulatory agencies that 

are directly accountable to Congress, and ultimately, to the American people. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I 

look forward to their testimony, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back my time. 

Chairman GARRETT. Mr. Lynch? 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the ranking 

member, as well. 

I would also like to thank the witnesses for their willingness to 

come before the committee and help us with our work. Today, we 

are looking at a proposed rule by the Securities and Exchange 

Commission to impose a floating net asset value on prime institutional money market funds, create liquidity fees and redemption 

gates when a fund falls well below the healthy liquidity levels, or 

some combination of these two things. But before we talk about the 

rule itself, I think it is important to remember why the reforms are 

so necessary. 

First and foremost, money market funds are an important cash 

management and investment tool for a variety of investors, and 

they serve an important role in the overall financial landscape as 

an alternative to big banks. However, as the ranking member 

pointed out, in September of 2008 when the Reserve Primary Fund 

broke the buck, we all realized that there were fundamental structural flaws in the industry that made it susceptible to runs. 

To stop that run, which could have sent the economy off the cliff, 

the Federal Government stepped in and guaranteed investments in 

those funds, exposing taxpayers in an unexpected and troubling 

way. So, we need to find a better way to prevent the kind of panic 

6 

that caused a run on the money market funds back then, but also 

that preserves the important role that they play. 

The SEC issued a rule in 2010 which made money market funds 

more stable and transparent by improving the liquidity and credit 

quality of the securities that those funds hold, and this was a good 

first step, but I support the SEC’s efforts to continue to address the 

weakness in the money market funds exposed by the financial crisis. 

The SEC rule we are examining today is narrowly targeted at 

the weakness exposed by the crisis, while trying to preserve the retail funds and government funds which perform relatively well 

under that stress. I think that is probably the right approach, however I am concerned that some of the definitions the SEC uses to 

separate prime institutional funds from retail funds and government funds may have a negative effect on local governments that 

rely on those money market funds. 

I hope the witnesses here today will help the committee understand the effect that this rule will have on municipal government 

financial ability because this area of money market funds played 

an important public role that we may want to preserve. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. Mr. Hultgren for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Having served in local and State government before my time in 

Congress, I do want to recognize the direct and immediate impact 

the SEC’s reform could have on municipal finance, as my colleague 

has mentioned as well. Money market funds provide a unique and 

widely-used municipal cash management product that may no 

longer be available as the DNA of money market funds has 

changed. 

I am also concerned that the SEC’s inclusion of tax-exempt municipal money market funds will drive away money market investors, dampening these funds’ interest in municipal securities. Currently, over 50 percent of outstanding short-term municipal debt is 

held by money market funds. If this demand dries up, municipalities will see higher issuance costs. 

Finally, I share some concerns highlighted in testimony relating 

to the SEC’s effective subsidy of Federal Government debt. Excluding Treasury and GSE debt from the proposed reforms isn’t bad, 

but giving these products special treatment only enables the Federal Government’s fiscal irresponsibility at the expense of States 

and localities. 

I welcome the witnesses’ testimonies, and I thank the chairman 

for holding this hearing. I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back the time. 

Mr. Perlmutter, the gentleman from Colorado, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And to the witnesses, thank you for being here. 

My first comment is in response to the chairman and to Mr. 

Hurt. The oversight council is doing what it is supposed to do, 

which is to oversee a financial system and to look for places where 

there may be problems and bumps and humps and all of that sort 

of stuff. 

7 

And so to the process, I disagree with the gentlemen in terms of 

their opening. I also would say, just as a matter of record, any assistance to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac came at the end of the 

Bush Administration, so it wasn’t an Obama bailout. 

Now, to get to the substance of the rules, I would like testimony 

today about the floating net asset value proposal, because I think 

we actually floated that. It was floated 3 years ago. 

And from my perspective, having watched the reserve fund break 

the buck, then pursue bankruptcy, which the SEC then had to 

oversee, folks didn’t get a dollar back. They got something less than 

a dollar. And because of the securities-type nature of the investment, I think they got what they deserved. 

And so I know the effort here is to mark everything each day, 

and if something is worth 95 cents that individuals know that, but 

they know going in that they are buying a security. Disclosure was 

part of the rule as it was written 2 or 3 years ago. So I don’t know 

that having a floating net asset value changes the picture very 

much. 

And even though I approve and I applaud the process where the 

oversight council was participating in this rulemaking, I think that 

is appropriate, I would just say that I am not sure that this answer 

is—and this rule is going to make any difference. 

Chairman GARRETT. And finally, for the last word, I believe, Mr. 

Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Chairman Garrett. First of all, let me 

welcome Mr. Steven McCoy, who is the treasurer of the great State 

of Georgia. It is good to have you here. Say hello to the folks back 

home. 

First of all, I do want—I think Mr. Perlmutter really put his finger on it in terms of the floating net asset value. And what we are 

talking about here is a net asset value per share instead of a value 

of $1 per share price. 

Now while proponents of a floating net asset value claim, as I 

understand it, that it would make markets more flexible and allow 

funds and markets to remain open and functioning during a crisis—that is basically that argument, and I appreciate that. 

But we must also at the same time be sure to address concerns 

that such a reform would eliminate prime money market funds, 

and State and local governments in turn would lose a valuable tool 

in money management and would drive up the cost of financing 

short-term borrowing. That to me seems to be the crux of where 

we are. 

What I think what we need to reach for here is a delicate balance 

where we can accommodate both. I just simply want to be able to 

keep regulations in place that are strong, that are effective, that 

protect our consumers, while at the same time being able to quickly 

respond to the ever-changing economic climate and justify a policy 

accordingly where needed. 

And so, I think that is our challenge today. I think we need a 

delicate balance. I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. And before we 

go to—the gentleman from Georgia just entered. While he sits 

down, I just wanted to, without objection, enter into the record a 

letter from the Financial Services Roundtable on this topic, and 

8 

also a letter from the Mutual Fund Directors Forum. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

If the gentleman from Georgia is prepared, we have I believe another minute for the gentleman. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to 

take a moment to welcome Mr. Steven McCoy, the treasurer of my 

home State of Georgia. It is always good to see a Georgian represented on the panel. I look forward to your testimony on how the 

SEC rules impact the way Georgians invest their hard-earned 

money as taxpayers. 

The subject matter of this hearing might be technical, but for me 

the bottom line is we need a broad array of financial products for 

investors of all shapes and sizes to choose. With the Federal Reserve depressing interest rates for savers, many retail and institutional investors choose money market funds because they provide 

a better return on investment. 

Congress, the SEC, FSOC, and yes, even the bank regulators, 

must pursue regulations and policies that create diverse, liquid financial markets. I urge careful consideration of all the unintended 

consequences of this rule. I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back, and I thank the 

gentleman. 

So now, we turn to the panel. There is a gentleman who has been 

recognized twice now for your work in Georgia, the treasurer from 

the State of Georgia, Mr. McCoy, you are recognized. I know most 

of you have been here before, but I always restate this. 

You are recognized. You will be recognized for 5 minutes, and we 

ask you to make sure that when you speak, you pull your microphone as close as you can, so that we can hear you. Make sure the 

light is on. And of course, as you all know, you have 5 minutes. 

The yellow light gives you a one-minute warning, and the red light 

means you are out of time. 

So Mr. McCoy, you are now recognized for 1 minute. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVEN N. McCOY, TREASURER, STATE OF GEORGIA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION OF STATE TREASURERS (NAST) 

Mr. MCCOY. Thank you, Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member 

Maloney, and members of the subcommittee. On behalf of NAST, 

I thank you for providing us the opportunity to testify on the SEC’s 

proposed money market fund reforms. 

NAST is a bipartisan association. It is comprised of all State 

treasurers and State financial officials throughout the country. 

Treasurers, given their role within each State of ensuring proper 

cash management, do have a unique perspective on money market 

fund regulation, and we appreciate being able to share our perspective on this. 

Money market funds are an important investment tool for many 

State and local governments throughout the country. They rely on 

money market funds as short-term investments that provide liquidity, preservation of capital, and diversification of credit risk. 

But then also, as we have heard in the Congressmens’ statements, they are very important to State and local governments 

since we are issuers of short-term debt. And the short-term debt— 

9 

the municipal money market funds are the largest purchasers of 

short-term debt. And any reform that would limit the 

attractiveness of money market funds to purchase municipal bonds 

would—and reducing the demand would increase our financing 

costs. 

But additionally, and the place I would like to spend the most 

of my time today, since I think the other panelists are going to deal 

with the purchasing of money market funds, the two primary 

issues of floating NAV and liquidity in gating, and also with municipal money market funds. 

But one of the things that I would like to focus on is local government investment pools. Most States have created them over the 

years. They go back over 30 years with a history of pools. And they 

are a safe and efficient method of investing State and local government funds. 

Changes to the regulation of money funds, even though local government investment pools (LGIPs) are not registered with the SEC, 

that still these reforms could indirectly impact our operation and 

viability because GASB has two regs, 31 and 59, which require externally-managed pools to be 2a-7 light in order to use amortized 

cost accounting and preserve a stable NAV. 

So what I would like to do is just focus on the potential impact 

on LGIPs of the proposed regs. LGIPs operate for the exclusive 

benefit of governmental entities within each State. They are distinguished from money market funds in that they are not open to the 

public. 

Instead, LGIPs serve only governmental entities that otherwise 

would have difficulty investing public funds safely and efficiently. 

This is both large and small government entities that, while these 

State statutes governing LGIPs differ, LGIPs generally accept deposits from cities, counties, colleges, school districts, authorities, 

public hospitals, and various commissions and boards. 

In some cases, like Georgia, we also commingle the State’s shortterm assets in our local government investment pool to create 

economies of scale so the local governments can benefit from the 

economies of scale that we use, and they can also benefit from our 

credit research and our experienced investment officers. 

LGIPs are often used by participants to invest funds that are 

needed on a day-to-day basis or on a near-term basis. And so even 

though they are exempt from SEC regulation under the Investment 

Company Act of 1940 because of sovereign ownership, the SEC’s 

proposed changes could have some unintended consequences that 

would indirectly impact our ability to continue to offer these safely 

and efficiently. 

For instance, converting an LGIP to a floating NAV or imposing 

liquidity fees and gatings, both would be in violation of many of the 

States’ statutes, and also prudent investment policies. As government entities, we cannot tolerate loss of principal on operating 

funds, trust funds or bond proceeds because we have no method of 

replenishing losses. 

So we have to be very careful to preserve capital and have liquidity. We need it to make—so liquidity constraints, preservation of 

capital and preservation of liquidity is very important to us. That 

we cannot accept liquidity constraints that could prevent us from 

10 

funding or local governments from funding critical public needs, of 

paying debt or other obligations when due. 

Local government investment pools hold money, provide an attractive yield, and provide liquidity so that all participants know 

their money is there and available and safe. Some may point to 

bank deposits as an alternative, but States typically require collateral on bank deposits. And so those—they have to be collateralized 

sometimes, in our State for instance, at 110 percent with marketable securities. 

So the cost associated with collateralizing public bank deposits 

limits many banks from providing competitively-priced alternatives. Also, the availability of eligible collateral will limit the 

amount of bank deposits, collateralized deposits that banks, especially in smaller communities, would accept. 

In wrapping up, I would like to say that we appreciate the opportunity. We have asked that the SEC include a comment just that 

they do not intend this to be applicable to LGIPs. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCoy can be found on page 84 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. And now, we welcome back Ms. 

Sheila Bair, the former Chair of the FDIC, who is now Chair of the 

Pew Charitable Trusts, Systemic Risk Council. Welcome once again 

to the panel. And you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA C. BAIR, CHAIR, 

SYSTEMIC RISK COUNCIL, AND FORMER CHAIR, FDIC 

Ms. BAIR. Thank you, Chairman Garrett, and Ranking Member 

Maloney. As a number of Members have noted, 5 years ago this 

week, the Reserve Primary Fund, a massive money market fund 

that held just 1.3 percent of its assets in Lehman Brothers debt, 

announced it would break the buck, and the financial markets 

froze. 

In just 2 days, the $62 billion fund received requests from investors to return approximately $40 billion of their money. The money 

fund quickly depleted cash reserves and tried to sell assets. This 

not only further depressed the value of its holdings, but depressed 

the value of other money market mutual funds as well. 

Because the Reserve did not have capital or a deep-pocketed parent who could subsidize its losses, the fund had to reprice its 

shares going from $1 to 97 cents. Reserve investors waited months 

for full access to the remaining cash and, based on recent press reports, the dispute between the SEC and the Reserve is still ongoing. 

The run on Reserve, however, quickly spread to other money 

market funds. During this week, 5 years ago, investors withdrew 

$310 billion from prime money market funds. 

To meet these requests, other money funds, just like the Reserve, 

began to sell more securities into illiquid markets, further reducing 

their values and putting other money funds, stable $1 NAV, at 

risk. 

Many sponsors subsidize their funds to defend the $1 NAV. Further fearing redemptions, many funds limited new investments to 

cash, Treasuries, and overnight loans. 

11 

U.S. corporations and municipalities seeking to access the shortterm markets for cash were out of luck. Short-term interests rates 

spiked and credit markets froze. 

On September 19th, the government stepped in with massive 

and unprecedented taxpayer support. The Federal Reserve created 

a special liquidity facility to aid money market funds and the 

Treasury Department used the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) 

to guarantee trillions of dollars in shareholders’ money fund holdings. 

Almost every money fund opted to this after-the-fact insurance 

policy created almost overnight by the Federal Government. While 

the bailout worked to calm the short-term markets in 2008, Congress prohibited the Treasury Department from again using the 

ESF to guarantee money funds. 

And while some modest reforms were put in place in 2010, the 

core structure risk and money funds that nearly brought the financial system down in 2008 still remain and threaten our financial 

system today. 

The core structural risk is a special SEC rule that allows money 

funds to price their shares at one dollar even when the value of 

their underlying assets is not worth a dollar. 

This special treatment called the stable NAV is what makes 

money funds different from other mutual funds and so susceptible 

to destabilizing runs. It effectively pays first-movers to run and 

imbeds losses on remaining shareholders. 

Even if shareholders don’t want to run, they do not want to risk 

paying for someone else’s losses. 

While the SEC recently proposed some modest changes to the 

structure of money market funds, the proposed reform options have 

too many holes and exceptions to adequately protect the financial 

system. 

One proposed option, the limited floating NAV option, would 

leave the structural risk in money funds that cater to retail investors or invest large portions of their assets in agency securities, including Treasuries, the Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, 

and Freddie Mac. 

As we know, these assets are not free from risk, but the SEC 

proposal is treating them as if they are. 

Moreover, this special treatment for money funds that make investments in those firms over firms that make investments in 

other U.S. companies effectively further subsidizes Treasuries, the 

Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, over 

private market competitors. 

That is a mistake at a time when the government should be 

working to reduce government subsidies which distort capital allocation. This goes in the opposite direction. 

The other ‘‘gates and fees’’ approach is actually worse than current law because it will encourage investors to run sooner in order 

to avoid the ‘‘gates and fees.’’ 

A better approach is to treat all money funds like other mutual 

funds and require a simple, floating NAV. As seen during the 2008 

crisis, the rigidity and destabilizing effects of a stable NAV can 

shut down markets and make crises even worse. 

12 

A floating NAV is much more flexible and allows funds and markets to remain open and functioning in a crisis. Moreover, while 

other crises may occur, they would no longer be caused or exacerbated by the stable NAV. 

Finally, a strong floating NAV approach, as outlined in my written testimony, would help level the playing field for investment 

companies and investors by helping ensure that investment decisions and competitive outcomes are based on the quality of asset 

allocation decisions not the moral hazard of potential sponsor support. 

This is the same, simple, regulatory framework that applies to 

all other mutual funds, a framework that the SEC has implemented successfully and without systemic risk or taxpayer bailouts 

since 1940. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bair can be found on page 52 of 

the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. 

And next, we will hear from Ms. Chandoha, the president and 

CEO of Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARIE CHANDOHA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CHARLES SCHWAB INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC. 

Ms. CHANDOHA. Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member Maloney, 

and members of the subcommittee, my name is Marie Chandoha. 

I am president and chief executive officer of Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc., the asset management business of the 

Charles Schwab Corporation. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss Schwab’s 

perspective on the SEC’s money market fund proposal. Schwab is 

one of the largest managers of money market funds, with 3 million 

accounts and nearly $170 billion of assets. 

The vast majority of these assets are held by individual investors. Approximately 88 percent are held in sweep funds which automatically invest cash balances while providing investors with convenience and liquidity. 

These sweep accounts allow retail investors to easily buy and sell 

stocks, bonds, and mutual funds and also allow them to write 

checks and pay bills electronically. 

Even in the current environment of historically low yields, individuals continue to use money market funds as a central element 

of their financial lives. 

We generally support the SEC’s reform proposal. It is a serious 

and substantial proposal that strikes the right balance between reducing the likelihood of runs while also preserving money market 

funds as an extremely important cash management vehicle for individual investors. 

We further support combining the two alternatives that the SEC 

has proposed requiring institutional money market funds to move 

to a floating net asset value and allowing, but not mandating, a 

fund’s board to impose redemption gates or liquidity fees if necessary during times of stress. 

13 

We believe that redemption gates and fees could be a useful 

mechanism for an orderly liquidation of a fund that is in trouble. 

We agree with the SEC that the rule should focus on the greatest 

areas of risk by proposing a clear distinction between institutional 

and retail investors. Retail money fund investors have shown no 

propensity to run. Even in the financial crisis of 2008, retail investors did not run. Runs have been triggered by institutional investors who have large amounts of cash in the funds and who have 

the resources and technology to redeem very quickly. 

Targeting the area of greatest risk is the goal of any sensible regulation and we believe that the SEC has achieved that with their 

proposal. However, we do think that the proposed rule has a number of areas that can be modified in order to maintain the viability 

of this crucial investment product for the individual investor. 

Let me make two brief points. First, municipal money market 

funds should continue to have a stable NAV. These funds are much 

more liquid than prime funds and therefore much more resistant 

to runs. 

Both the SEC’s analysis and our own experience shows these 

funds have been resilient in times of stress. Even in the midst of 

the 2008 financial crisis, municipal funds did not experience the redemption levels of prime funds. 

Second, the tax problems related to a floating NAV must be resolved before implementation so that investors are not forced to 

track and report hundreds of capital gains and losses. That would 

be an administrative nightmare for taxpayers. 

While we support the proposal, the rule is likely to result in significant outflows from prime money market funds. On one hand, 

this will reduce the size of the industry which ultimately reduces 

the systemic risk, but it is not clear where the outflows would go 

as investors still need to invest their cash. 

Some would undoubtedly flow to government and Treasury 

money market funds, but there is some question as to whether 

there would be enough of these type of securities to absorb the 

inflows. 

We also want to observe that the cost of implementation and the 

potential impact of the reforms on the financial system are both 

significant. We urge the SEC to carefully analyze whether these 

costs are outweighed by the benefits. 

In our comment letter, we list some recommended changes that 

would ameliorate some of these costs while still achieving the policy goals of this reform. Even with these changes, the costs remain 

significant. 

In closing, let me be clear. The SEC has proposed a serious set 

of reforms that will have enormous ramifications for the money 

fund industry. They will be costly for Schwab and other firms to 

implement, and they represent a fundamental overhaul of a product investors of all types have relied on for more than 4 decades. 

But we do support the proposed reforms because they are targeted at the most serious risks. Other regulators have called for a 

one-size-fits-all approach that would destroy the product for individual investors. We believe the SEC has found a tough yet pragmatic solution that will boost investor confidence, deter destabilizing runs, and ensure that individual investors can continue to 

14 

rely on this critically important product. Thank you very much for 

inviting me to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chandoha can be found on page 

59 of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. 

Next up, for 5 minutes, we will hear from Mr. Gilligan, who is 

representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES P. GILLIGAN, ASSISTANT TREASURER, 

GREAT PLAINS ENERGY, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

Mr. GILLIGAN. Good morning, Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member Maloney, and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss the potential impact of the SEC proposal 

on money market funds on the business community. 

My name is James Gilligan, and I am the assistant treasurer of 

Great Plains Energy Incorporated, which is the holding company of 

Kansas City Power & Light Company and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company based in Kansas City, Missouri. Our 

electric utilities serve over 830,000 homes and businesses in 47 

counties in Missouri and Kansas. 

I also serve as the chairman of the Association for Financial Professionals Government Relations Committee, and I am here today 

testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 

thousands of corporate financial professionals who are tasked with 

managing their companies’ cash flows and ensuring that they have 

the working capital and liquidity necessary to efficiently support 

their operations. 

There are several important points I wish to stress to the subcommittee today. Money market funds have existed for over 4 decades. These funds are used by businesses throughout the United 

States to meet their cash management and short-term funding 

needs. 

They are an integral part of a tightly interwoven system for lowcost, short-term business financing of unrivaled liquidity and efficiency. This system has served the American economy well, and 

provides a competitive advantage for American businesses in global 

markets. 

The Chamber and the corporate treasury community believe that 

the major rule changes to money market mutual fund regulations 

that were implemented in January 2010 were well-conceived and 

strengthened the product to withstand significant market stress. 

As the SEC considers moving forward with additional regulation, 

it is incumbent on the Commission to take a balanced and datadriven approach to further strengthen money market funds while 

preserving the critical role they serve for U.S. businesses and nonprofit organizations. If the floating NAV proposal is adopted for institutional prime money market funds, it would fundamentally 

alter the product, eliminating stability and liquidity, the key attributes that attract investors. 

Thus, money market funds would no longer remain a viable investment option to many treasurers and financial professionals. 

Consequently, with fewer investors and less capital to invest, 

15 

money market funds would no longer remain a significant purchaser of corporate commercial paper. The reduced demand would 

drive up borrowing costs significantly by forcing companies to fund 

their day-to-day operations with less efficient and more costly alternatives. 

Currently, Great Plains Energy offers interest rates to investors 

on our commercial paper in the current range of 30 to 70 basis 

points. 

If, instead, we had to use our revolving credit facilities with our 

banks for overnight borrowings, those borrowings would be priced 

at the prime rate, plus a spread, which at current rates, is at least 

3.3 percent, or 330 basis points—10 times higher than where we 

can place overnight commercial paper. In addition, the company would be required to borrow at least $1 

million, whereas commercial paper can be sold in increments of 

$100,000; and to request a more comparable LIBOR-based borrowing from our bank group would require 3 days prior notice, 

have a minimum term of 30 days, and be for a minimum amount 

of $5 million, and it would still be at a rate of about 125 basis 

points higher than our commercial paper for the same term. 

This is a cheaper option, but again, it is up to 4 times more expensive than commercial paper. 

The SEC’s proposal acknowledges that a floating NAV will not 

necessarily reduce the risk of widespread redemptions during times 

of market stress, and given the uncertainty as to whether this proposal will protect against a run on money market funds, we believe 

it is inappropriate to implement the proposal since it will undermine the value and key attributes of money market funds while 

driving up costs drastically. 

The Chamber does support greater transparency with respect to 

the holdings of money market funds and the daily disclosure of a 

shadow NAV that many funds currently report—provide investors 

with the benefits of a floating NAV without jeopardizing the viability and utility of money market funds. 

In conclusion, the cost of the floating NAV far outweighs the benefits and is another case of where the medicine may kill the patient. This concludes my statement and I am happy to answer any 

questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilligan can be found on page 72 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. 

And finally, from the Investment Company Institute, Mr. Stevens is recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE INVESTMENT COMPANY 

INSTITUTE (ICI) 

Mr. STEVENS. Thank you, Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member 

Maloney, and members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be 

with you this morning. 

The SEC rulemaking that you are examining really is vitally important to some 61 million individual investors, and literally thousands of institutions in our country, including businesses, State 

and local governments, and nonprofits that depend, today, on 

16 

money market funds as a low-cost, efficient cash management tool, 

and one that provides a high degree of liquidity, stability of principal value, and a market-based yield. 

For 5 years, ICI and its members have worked diligently with 

the SEC, with the Congress, and with other regulators to develop 

ideas about how to make money market funds more resilient under 

even the most adverse market conditions. 

I would observe that the SEC has 40 years of success in regulating these funds. Its expertise and its experience mean, in our 

judgment, that the Commission is in the best position to implement 

any further reforms. 

In our work on money market funds, we stress two principles 

consistently. First, the reforms should preserve the fundamental 

characteristics that make money market funds so valuable to investors and to the economy, as you have heard on the panel this morning. 

And second, that we should preserve choice for investors by insuring a continued robust and competitive money market fund industry. 

Now, applying those two rules to the SEC’s rulemaking, those 

two principles, I would offer 5 summary conclusions. By the way, 

I would note for the subcommittee’s benefit, we did file yesterday 

about an 80-page comment letter on these, so this is, in fact, just 

the top line. 

First, we agree with the Commission that there really is no reason to apply structural changes to funds that invest primarily in 

Treasury or other government securities—collectively, government 

money market funds. 

Second, funds that invest primarily in short-term debt of State 

and local governments should be exempted from these structural 

changes. The characteristics that the SEC attributes to government 

funds apply with equal force to those of tax-exempt municipal 

funds. 

There is no evidence that investors in tax-exempt money market 

funds redeem en masse during periods of market stress. Moreover, 

these funds hold the great majority of their assets in highly liquid 

securities that can be liquidated to make redemptions. 

Experience also shows that credit deterioration in securities 

issued by one jurisdiction does not tend to affect other jurisdiction’s 

securities. Given the vital role that they play in financing State 

and local governments, tax-exempt funds should not be subjected 

to disruptive and expensive structural changes. 

Third, in discussions with our members and their shareholders, 

one thing has become crystal clear—combining the SEC’s two proposals would render money market funds entirely unattractive to 

investors. 

The Commission’s proposals, in effect, confront investors with a 

choice: sacrifice stability, in the case of floating net asset values on 

prime institutional funds; or face the prospect of losing liquidity 

under extreme circumstances, through the proposal for liquidity 

fees and redemption gates. 

We have found that some investors place more of a premium on 

principal stability, while others value ready access to liquidity more 

strongly. But, and I want to emphasize this, virtually every ICI 

17 

member tells us that no investor would purchase a floating value 

money market fund that was also subject to constraints on liquidity. Investors have, frankly, other less onerous options readily 

available to them. 

Fourth, if regulators do feel that it is necessary to require some 

money market funds to float their values, it is critical that we address the significant burdens on investors in the tax and accounting treatment of gains and losses. This will require action by 

Treasury, the IRS, and perhaps even by the Congress. 

Unless these issues are resolved in advance, investors are unlikely to accept floating value money market funds and significant 

disruption of short-term credit markets is highly likely. 

And fifth, we support the Commission’s recognition that its proposal should be appropriately targeted, and that funds intended for 

retail investors should be exempt from any requirement to impose 

floating NAVs. We have significant concerns, however, about the 

practicality and costs of the SEC’s proposed definition of retail 

funds, based on daily redemption limits. 

Instead, we recommend the use of Social Security numbers as 

the fundamental characteristic to identify investors eligible to invest in retail funds. This approach would be far less costly than 

other methods of defining retail funds and far easier for investors 

to understand. 

In the 5 years since the financial crisis, the fund industry has 

strongly supported the SEC’s efforts to make money market funds 

ever more resilient, even as they continue to play their valued and 

important role for investors in the economy. We appreciate deeply 

the support that many members of this committee and subcommittee have shown for our efforts. I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stevens can be found on page 

111 of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. And I thank the panel. 

We will now go to questions, and I will recognize myself for 5 

minutes. 

And I will start, I guess, with Mr. McCoy. My general question 

is going to be what your opinion is of the effect of these rules on 

municipal money market funds; but, something you brought up 

during your testimony with regard to the LGIPs, and you said 

something about the banks that are—is there is an 

overcollateralization requirement? So, can you answer both of those 

questions, just quickly on the overcollateralization? 

Mr. MCCOY. Yes. On the collateralization requirement, there, 

local investment pools no longer could remain 2a-7 like— 

Chairman GARRETT. Yes. 

Mr. MCCOY. —to be stable value. One of the alternatives a lot 

of people look at is moving money into banks. 

Chairman GARRETT. Right. 

Mr. MCCOY. The problem is, banks have to post collateral in 

mark-to-market daily to secure public deposits. And at 110 percent 

level, the cost of the bank, both has to be a bank that is willing 

to accept a public deposit, pay some rate of interest comparable to 

any other investment; but also, the availability. 

18 

We have found, recently, two colleges, as their deposits grew 

larger, working with a smaller community bank, they did not have 

collateral sufficient to cover those deposits, and they did ask that 

the accounts be moved to larger banks. 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay, I can agree with that— 

Mr. MCCOY. Probably in a lot of smaller communities, there are 

not banks available— 

Chairman GARRETT. I get where you are going. Okay. 

Mr. MCCOY. And then, on the other, on the municipal money 

market funds that we have, we do feel like that municipal security—short-term securities, should receive the same treatment as 

the U.S. Government obligations, as to have an exemption for them 

in that they are not retail funds. A lot are institutional investors, 

so they cannot qualify under the retail exemption the SEC has proposed. So, we have asked that they receive an exemption. 

Chairman GARRETT. All right, great. Thank you. 

Ms. Bair, you raised the point—an interesting one with regard 

to if you have the gates and the restrictions on there that may accelerate the withdraws, right? 

Can’t a thing be said, or can’t it be said with regard to a floating 

NAV that if you have a floating NAV as the investor sees it—‘‘oops, 

it is down, it broke the buck, so to speak, and all of the sudden, 

that is my first cue to pull out as well,’’ so is one worse than the 

other? 

Ms. BAIR. That is going to be true with any mutual fund. Frequently, what you find what you get into downturned situations is 

that people take their money out of lots of mutual funds. They reprice, they go into Treasuries, they fly to safety. 

The issue is whether the government is going to give them an 

incentive to run. And so with the stable NAV, they are, because 

you are a smart, one of the so-called smart money and you are seeing, ‘‘Oh, the assets in this fund are only worth 97 cents, I can still 

get out at a dollar—I am going to go out. The government is giving 

me an affirmative incentive to run.’’ 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay. 

Ms. BAIR. That is the inherent source of instability. 

Chairman GARRETT. Another question—another point you raised 

during your testimony, do you believe now that the law would prohibit a bailout, if you will, and assure of the funds? 

Ms. BAIR. I do. 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay. That is because of— 

Ms. BAIR. Because of the—yes, that was put into law—was it the 

TARP legislation, I think— 

Chairman GARRETT. Yes. 

Ms. BAIR. There is a specific statutory ban, and remember ranking others have affirmed— 

Chairman GARRETT. So, what about— 

Ms. BAIR. It has no intention to bail them out, they don’t feel like 

they have authority to— 

Chairman GARRETT. Yes, well, they don’t have any intention to 

bail out of things. 

So, what about under Section 13.3, would they be—if they were 

not an individual firm or—but as a same last time, if it is systemic 

to the entire economy and the Fed identifies an entire industry 

19 

that needs to be preserved or protected under 13.3, wouldn’t they 

have the authority to do so there? 

Ms. BAIR. If it is generally available, that is right. But there are 

special prohibitions for money market funds. So, I think, that is 

really— 

Chairman GARRETT. So, it is a question of which law prevails, 

whether they—with the prohibitions, or— 

Ms. BAIR. I don’t know. I think that the more—the greater likelihood is if we leave this structural instability in place, and we have 

another problem, they are going to be coming to Congress and asking you to vote for a bailout. 

That is what is going to happen, because I don’t think they feel 

like they have the authority to do it, and so, it is going to be on 

Congress’ head, to vote or not. This is the way it was in court and 

a lot of you face some tough reelections; some of you lost those, because of that vote. 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay. So many more questions. Can you 

kind of speak to the issue? 

Mr. Stevens, I think you brought it up with regard to the shadow 

NAV, and the effect—the positive effects that could have, and the 

transparency element, and I guess if you want to do them and you 

answered one of my questions already, would simply transparency, 

and I know— 

Would simply the transparency aspect of the rule and putting in 

some temporary limitation gates be adequate? 

Mr. STEVENS. If I could take the first part of that, I really would 

recommend to the subcommittee a report that Dennis Beresford, 

who is a former Chairman of the FASB, has prepared. And it examines how we maintain a stable NAV and money market funds. 

It is done through something called amortized cost evaluation of 

the securities in the portfolio. 

Amortized costs is an accounting convention which is 40 years 

old. It is not a fiction; it is a convention. In fact, it is a convention 

that Ms. Bair has recommended very strongly be applied to the 

banking industry. But apparently in our context, it is not a convention, but a fiction. The reality is that as Beresford’s report points 

out, the mark-to-market value of these portfolios fluctuates from $1 

only infinitesimally on average, maybe a basis point or so up and 

down. 

So the value is, in fact, I think a reality, and Beresford’s report 

makes it clear that this is a fair way to value money market funds. 

It is not a fiction. 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay, I am going to try to contain my time 

as I do with everybody else, so I appreciate that motion. If you can 

give me some further answers on the rest of the questions, I would 

appreciate it. 

Mr. STEVENS. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentlelady from New York is recognized. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. On the liquidity fee proposal, of the 

fees that are intended to deter investors from withdrawing their 

money in times of stress, and I would like to ask James Gilligan, 

in the SEC’s proposal, the maximum size of the liquidity fee would 

be 2 percent, and as an investor, do you think a 2 percent liquidity 

20 

fee would be enough to deter you from withdrawing your money 

during times of crisis? 

Mr. GILLIGAN. Recall in my testimony, I am not a net investor, 

so this is speculation on my part, but I think that liquidity gates 

and redemption limitations are not palatable to corporate treasurers in any sense of the word, and they would not be attracted 

to investing in money market funds to begin with. 

That is our point, that this could destroy the product of money 

market funds and have repercussions that are far more extensive 

than what are being contemplated by imposing that. I don’t frankly 

know if a 2 percent liquidity limit will keep people from redeeming 

or not. They are not going to like that there is going to be a gate 

on their redemptions, period. 

Mrs. MALONEY. There is some proposal to raise the amount that 

the 2 percent is not doing the job of, Ms. Bair, you testified that 

this would not help, that this would make the problem worse. Do 

you want to elaborate, and Mr. Stevens, your comment on this too? 

Ms. BAIR. I do think it would make it worse. The prospect of the 

agencies will again give affirmative incentive to people to get out 

before the gates and fees go down, and I worry that again, that is 

going to be the more sophisticated investors who understand what 

is going on. 

That is why you saw retail not running, although I don’t know 

that we can assume that won’t happen again. One of the reasons 

retail didn’t run is because the government quickly put a program 

in place, but they are going to be left, because, so a product that 

is designed for giving people the impression they have ready access 

to their cash, that their cash is fully protected, all of a sudden they 

are going to have to pay a lot of money to get their money out or 

perhaps even have to wait 30 days. But I think from an investor 

perspective, that is very ill-advised. 

And the thought, I think the industry is being somewhat inconsistent by suggesting that as a good approach. On the one hand 

they say, ‘‘Well, this is a very, very important market,’’ which it is. 

It is a huge market, despite potentially destabilizing. But on the 

one hand, they say, ‘‘this is very important,’’ but then it is okay to 

lock it down for 30 days, and not let people pay their bills or make 

their payroll or whatever. That makes no sense to me, so I think 

this is not a good option. I hope the SEC drops it. It is an alternative to the floating NAV, and I think it is very ill-advised. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And Mr. Stevens, your position on the liquidity 

and fees? 

Mr. STEVENS. Thank you, Mrs. Maloney. 

The reality is that the SEC staff report agreed with us in our 

recommendation with respect to the consideration of the liquidity 

gates and fees, that if you cast your mind back to 2008, it is the 

recommendation that would have stopped a cascade of redemptions. 

But I would say that in the industry, no one would wish to flirt 

with the triggers that would impose those gates or those fees. As 

the SEC has conceptualized it, if a fund’s weekly liquidity falls to 

15 percent of its portfolio, it would then be required to consider 

these two measures. That would mean that weekly liquidity had 

fallen by 50 percent. 

21 

The requirement, if it were adopted into a rule that would be internalized by portfolio managers across the industry, would be to 

stay very well north of 15 percent liquidity. In fact, if you look 

across taxable money market funds today, their required weekly liquidity is $700 billion. Their actual weekly liquid assets maintained in their portfolios as of July was $1.3 trillion. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And I would like to get Mr. McCoy’s comment on 

this, and also, does anyone know where these fees go? The rule was 

very vague in where these fees go. Where do they go? Does anyone 

know? Just in the general Treasury? It doesn’t say where it goes. 

Ms. BAIR. They go back into the fund. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Pardon me? 

Ms. BAIR. They go back to the fund. 

Mrs. MALONEY. They go back to the fund, and would be distributed among the other people? 

Ms. BAIR. Yes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. McCoy, your position on the— 

Mr. MCCOY. I know that is correct on money market funds. 

There is a concern on most of investment pools as to who we even 

legally impose liquidity fees, or gates in that could we actually take 

money from some local governments that are behaving one way, 

they want their money out, and pay it to others that are staying 

in. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And on the floating NAV, can anyone estimate 

the average variability in the NAV of time funds if the SEC adopts 

the floating NAV plan. What does it mean? If it is near $1 or near 

$10, would they shift to that area? Any comments— 

Mr. STEVENS. Can I take a try at it? Actually, in order to force 

these funds’ portfolios to float, for their NAVs to vary, the SEC is 

actually proposing a valuation method which is not characteristic 

of mutual funds, generally. It would require these funds to basis 

point round their portfolios 4 places to the right of the decimal. 

That requirement is intended to force a float which the normal 

pricing of mutual funds’ experience would not display. 

So it shows you the portfolios here are really quite stable, and 

in order to make them float at all, the SEC has to depart from 

what is the convention with respect to other funds. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. Any other comments? 

Chairman GARRETT. No, and with that, the gentleman from Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask Chairman 

Bair, who obviously is very familiar with what happened in 2008 

and was on the ground, if either or both of these proposals were 

in place in 2008, can you kind of walk us through what you think 

would have been the effect, and whether or not this would have 

had, either of them would have had a positive effect, why or why 

not? 

The second thing I was hoping you could also offer up is your 

view of how this regulatory proposal fits into what is being developed overseas and in other countries, and how that affects our competitiveness? 

Ms. BAIR. Right. So I think the gates and fees would have made 

it worse. I think the floating NAV—look, if we never had this special SEC rule that allows a stable NAV, I don’t think you would 

22 

have seen such a huge shadow market develop. I don’t think you 

would have seen other financial institutions that were relying on 

short-term money, so I think if we had that, the money fund industry from the get-go would be smaller, and I think it would have behaved like other money funds. 

You would have seen a lot of redemptions. You would have seen 

a flight to quality. You see, that is how markets work. They reprice 

in times of stress, but no, I don’t think we would have had or seen 

the implosion that we had in 2008. 

This proposal, I believe, is weaker than what they are talking 

about in Europe. They are saying do a floating NAV or have 3 percent capital. If you want to have a stable NAV, you want to promise your investors you are going to have a dollar no matter what, 

put some capital behind it. They are saying 3 percent, so— 

Mr. HURT. So what is your view of the effect of our competitiveness, and what is available to the folks that Mr. Gilligan is speaking for in terms of having an efficient marketplace, and being able 

to have the most choices for the least cost? 

Ms. BAIR. So look, implicit government subsidies always allow 

people to do business more cheaply. Guarantees of that capital behind them always allow people to do business more cheaply, but 

those models work until they don’t, and they don’t work in times 

of distress. So I think you need to think how it works in good 

times, which is it saves everybody money, and how it works in bad 

times, when it costs taxpayers, we know it did cost or forced them 

to take a lot of risk. Fortunately, it didn’t end up costing anything. 

So I think that those are the tradeoffs you have to make, and 

again Europe is being tougher, and they don’t seem to be worried 

about putting themselves in a less competitive position to us. 

Mr. HURT. I also wanted to ask Ms. Chandoha, Mr. Gilligan and 

Mr. Stevens about what Mr. Gilligan testified to, and that was that 

the floating NAV proposal would deprive significant choices and 

impose significant costs. 

Ms. Chandoha, you testified that clearly the imposition of these 

rules or the floating NAV proposal would lead to migration out of 

money market funds. How do you respond to that concern that the 

cost is greater than the benefit at the end of the day? Are you able 

to respond to that, and then I would love to hear follow up from 

Mr. Gilligan and Mr. Stevens on that question. 

Ms. CHANDOHA. We really feel the 2010 reforms strengthened the 

money fund industry, but there still remain some perceived risks 

in the money fund industry. We think the SEC has taken an approach to identify the remaining areas of risk in the money fund 

industry, and we feel that the proposal will have an impact on corporate treasurers. I think there was an eloquent discussion of that, 

and we do think that there will be shrinkage of the industry. So 

there will be some costs, but it will reduce some of the perceived 

risks of the industry. 

Mr. HURT. Okay. 

Mr. GILLIGAN. My response is, the floating NAV is not a solution 

to what I think the problem is that is trying to be solved, which 

is a run on money market funds. 

I implore everyone to consider, even if you go back to 2008, when 

the reserve fund broke the buck, and we had a flight to quality 

23 

from investors who withdrew significant amounts of money from 

money market funds—all money market funds. The commercial 

paper market froze in 2008. So, that is an example that I hold out 

to you of what I think will happen to money market funds for different reasons. 

You impose these new regulations, they make them unattractive 

to investors, you will see them move funds out of the money market funds. You will see a complete freeze-up of the commercial 

paper market, like we saw in 2008, which will drive companies like 

mine to higher-cost alternatives, which will have an immediate impact on borrowing costs—which, in our industry, will eventually— 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. 

Mr. GILLIGAN. —get passed down into our rate payers— 

Mr. HURT. Got it. 

Mr. GILLIGAN. —and out of the pocketbooks. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Gilligan. 

Mr. Stevens, I apologize, but my time has expired. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. 

Next, Mr. Ellison is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wanted to thank 

all the panelists. 

Ms. Chandoha, I have a question for you. And I want to thank 

you for being here today. 

In 2011, Schwab became the first and only brokerage to insert 

clauses into your customer service contracts banning your customers from participating in any class-action lawsuit against your 

company. This is in addition to the requirement in your agreements, which is also used by other brokerages, mandating that disputes with individual clients be settled through arbitration. 

Your regulator, FINRA, is challenging the legality of your classaction waiver as a violation of its member rules. And I believe your 

firm issued a statement on your Web site on May 15th—which I 

can’t locate now, by the way—announcing a temporary suspension 

of the practice pending the resolution of the FINRA action against 

you. 

My question is why Schwab, alone among brokers, feels that its 

clients should have to give up their right to participate in its class 

actions? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. I run the Asset Management Subsidiary of the 

Charles Schwab Corporation. The broker-dealer is a different subsidiary, so I am not the right person to answer that question. I am 

not very familiar with that particular issue. But we can certainly 

have someone get back to you on that, and answer that question. 

Mr. ELLISON. I would appreciate that. I would just like to put a 

few other questions on the record for you. Maybe you can answer 

them, maybe you can’t. But I would like to also know why Schwab 

can’t put an end to this practice of not allowing their customers to 

participate in any class-action lawsuit. 

And then also, if Schwab is successful in stopping FINRA’s legal 

challenge, is Schwab planning to re-insert the class-action waiver 

into the account agreements? Are those questions you can answer? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. Those aren’t questions that I can answer, but we 

will certainly take those questions back, and we will have someone 

get back to you on that. 

24 

Mr. ELLISON. And also, I am curious to know if Schwab is going 

to re-evaluate whether taking away the right to go to court is fair 

to customers. So, I assume you can’t answer that question, but I 

assume also that you will bring it back to the people who can. 

Ms. CHANDOHA. Yes, we will. 

Mr. ELLISON. And I would also just like to express my concern 

about small investors having access to the courts. Putting aside the 

question of whether or not it is legal, I would like to know whether 

you believe, or whether you can get back to me on whether or not 

you believe it is fair for small investors to be forced to waive all 

rights to go to court to settle disputes before a dispute even occurs 

or can be understood against a company of significant size such as 

Schwab? 

Again, I am sure, this is for the record, and I am urging you to 

take it back. And I also want to express my concern that Charles 

Schwab believes it can establish a trusted relationship with clients 

while requiring every single one of its clients to give up its legal 

rights to go to court before they can work with you. 

So, I would like to just put those questions on the record. I will 

submit them to you in writing. And I just want to make it clear 

that this is an issue I am quite concerned about. Actually, we have 

crafted some legislation to address the issue. And I just want to 

underscore that we believe that the small investor needs to have 

a voice, and our concern about the practices in which Schwab is engaged. 

So, thank you for being as responsive as you can today. But 

please convey to your colleagues this is an ongoing issue, and this 

is not going to be dropped. 

Also, I would like to point out that I think this whole issue underscores why Congress sought to restrict the use of these contracts 

in Dodd-Frank, Section 921, and why we probably should have 

gone further. And it is also, again, why I introduced H.R. 2998, the 

Investor Choice Act, which would prohibit such forced arbitration 

contracts, when used by brokers to abridge the rights of their clients. 

And so, Mr. Chairman, whether by statute or the legislation or 

rule, the Federal Government has a duty to see that arbitration is 

not abused, and that investor rights are not further eroded by 

these types of clauses in broker-dealer contracts. 

So, thank you. 

I think I have—I am on my yellow light, so I would like to direct 

a question to Chairwoman Bair. 

Could you offer your views, ma’am, on how you would evaluate 

this proposed rule from the SEC with the three proposed reform alternatives set forth by the Financial Stability Oversight Council? 

Mr. HURT [presiding]. Mr. Ellison, what I am going to do is, I am 

going to ask that the witness respond in writing. And if we have 

time at the end, we can— 

Mr. ELLISON. Oh, yes. I see we are at the red light— 

Mr. HURT. So, time has expired. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. I yield back the time I don’t have. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Ellison. 

Next, Mr. Stivers is recognized for 5 minutes. 

25 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

witnesses for being here. 

I want to follow up on something that the chairman of the subcommittee asked before he left. And I would like all the witnesses 

to sort of go down and give me their view of this issue. 

I believe that a floating net asset value will actually exacerbate 

the problem, because it will encourage people to redeem as soon as 

possible, because the risk is that your money will be worth less tomorrow, or 5 minutes from now, or whatever. 

So, I guess I want to ask all the way down the panel what your 

view is on that. I believe it makes the problem worse, not better, 

as far as rush to redemption. Could each witness tell me their opinion on whether they think it makes the problem better or worse? 

Mr. MCCOY. We believe it would make the problem worse. And 

as institutional investors, we are concerned that it would make the 

problem worse. We also believe that the nuances of daily pricing— 

it will create some problems and confusion in the marketplace. It 

does not give time for any pricing errors to be reconciles and mitigated before damages are done. 

And so, we do think there are a lot of issues. We think it would 

make the problem worse. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

Ms. BAIR. A floating NAV would make the problem—it deals with 

the core problem, which is that, with a stable NAV, if it is only 

worth 97 cents, you can pull out of the dollar. You are given an 

affirmative incentive to run. 

Markets reprice all the time, but if you get with a floating NAV, 

if you get it out, you will have to take a loss. 

Ms. CHANDOHA. We do think a floating NAV will increase the 

transparency. Schwab voluntarily chose to disclose our shadow 

NAV’s earlier this year, so we do think that helps transparency, 

and reduces the surprise factor. So, if there is a discrepancy between the— 

Mr. STIVERS. My question is, will it increase the race to redemption, not does it increase transparency. Could you answer that 

question? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. Yes. I do think it helps mitigate the run risk. 

Mr. STIVERS. Okay. 

Mr. GILLIGAN. I agree very strongly with you, sir. And also, I 

would echo the comments of Mr. McCoy. 

Mr. STEVENS. We actually saw during the financial crisis funds 

that had floating net asset values per share experience massive redemptions. French money funds that had variable NAV’s experienced them. Short-term bond funds in the United States experienced them. 

And more generally, we think that what happened with the Reserve Primary Fund was not attributable to its ‘‘breaking a buck.’’ 

It was a flight to quality. It was a flight to Treasuries and other 

quality instruments that was characteristic of the broad market. 

Two-thirds of all the dollars that flowed out of U.S. prime funds 

during that period flowed into Treasury and government agency 

funds. So, I don’t think it was a fear of the ‘‘breaking the buck.’’ 

It was a general preference for safer assets. And if the Reserve PriVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:51 May 01, 2014 Jkt 086679 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\86679.TXT TERRI
26 

mary Fund had been floating at the time, you still would have 

found that a factor. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

Ms. Bair, if the floating net asset value results in a massive 

change in the size of the money market mutual funds market, 

which it probably will, from, say, $3 trillion to $1 trillion, and $2 

trillion flows into banks that are government-insured with a government guarantee, doesn’t that exacerbate the too-big-to-fail problem we have? 

Ms. BAIR. The deposit limit is $250,000, so those are going to be 

uninsured deposits. And I don’t know if that is where it is going 

to go. I am skeptical of some industry, not every one—some industry’s predictions that this is going to result in a massive downsizing 

of the money fund industry. There will be some downsizing. 

Mr. STIVERS. But there is a government guarantee up to 

$250,000. 

Ms. BAIR. Up to $250,000. And there is also—the banks—unlike 

the—banks aren’t perfect. And I am not singling out money funds. 

There are a lot of reforms I would like to see with banks. The deposits—we do not have a systemic problem with deposits. Deposits 

have not run. Because we have a whole elaborate system of deposit 

insurance of access and Federal reserve lending. Banks have to 

hold capital and unsecured debt, which by statute, take first loss 

before you can get to deposits. 

So, that part of the banking system works well. 

Mr. STIVERS. But it makes the banks bigger if the funds flow to 

the banks? That is correct, isn’t it? 

Ms. BAIR. If those deposits flow into banks, yes, it will. Yes. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

The next question I have is for the two treasurers, Mr. Gilligan, 

and then the State treasurer, about what would happen—what 

would you do if you didn’t have a stable net asset value in money 

market mutual funds? Would you be able to use them to invest in? 

Mr. Treasurer? 

Mr. MCCOY. At the State of Georgia, our focus would be—because—at the local governments cannot invest in straight and in 

privately managed money market funds. They can invest in the 

State and local government investment pool. 

If we could not operate the stable value, we would explore how 

to operate as a stable value. 

It may not be a 2a-7 light fund, but we could not under the current State laws, and I don’t think it would be prudent to change 

our State laws to take away the preservation of principal as a top 

priority to actually move to a floating NAV. So we would explore 

how to restructure local government investment pools, as I think 

other States would too. 

I think also I would like to comment— 

Mr. HURT. Mr. McCoy? 

Mr. MCCOY. —on your other question. Banks are—there are 

also— 

Mr. HURT. Mr. McCoy? 

Mr. MCCOY. —bank stiff funds. 

27 

Mr. HURT. The time of the gentleman has expired. Thank you for 

your answer. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I realize it is a bit unfair to my colleagues to just walk in right before it is time for my 

questions. I just arrived at the airport half an hour ago. It was 

pretty meaningless anyway. 

In crisis circumstances, the funds may have been worth quite a 

bit different than the exact $1. But today, how big is the variation? 

Are we talking about every fund being between a dollar and a 

tenth of a penny or minus a tenth of a penny? Or if we really knew 

the shadow NAVs, how big a difference is there? Chairman Bair? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. I can answer that question. The variability is 

very minuscule. It is out several decimal places and is in the range 

of a tenth of a penny. So, it is very tiny. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But if you have $10 million to invest and you just 

have to move your money from a fund where you are down a tenth 

of a penny per dollar over to a fund where you are up a tenth of 

a penny per dollar, if you have $10 million, that— 

Ms. CHANDOHA. There are very few funds right now which are 

below a dollar. Most funds are above a dollar. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Above a dollar by more than a tenth of a penny? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. In that range. But it is very, very small around 

a dollar. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Could we meet the needs for stable investment vehicles if we had a fixed dollar on U.S. Government investing funds, 

Mr. McCoy? 

Mr. MCCOY. For governments, no. Local governments and State 

governments, no. In fact, we would run into a problem if it was a 

government-only fund during a period like we had last September, 

I think it was September 28th, when Treasuries went into negative 

rates for a short period of time when there was a flight to quality. 

We cannot buy a security that would have a loss in principal. 

And so actually when you have negative interest rates, which we 

have seen in some European countries and we have seen for one 

day in U.S. short-term Treasuries, that they really would not be 

even applicable or eligible for us to purchase. 

Ms. BAIR. I think—was your question with this, a stable NAV 

with government funds, would that actually meet the need of having payment processing which would be less risky than prime 

funds? And I think that is a question— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. Thank you for restating the question. 

Mr. MCCOY. But from our perspective, it would be that we could 

not necessarily manage a local government investment pool with 

government only and meet the qualifications because we may have 

to— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Because of what? 

Mr. MCCOY. Because the requirement of the amount of U.S. 

Treasuries that we would have to keep short, if we see a flight to 

quality that we—for instance, managing a local government investment pool, some of the— 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can interrupt, are you referring to circumstances where the government paper has a negative yield? 

28 

Mr. MCCOY. That is one. Also, we do have some other requirements for State governments in managing pools. For instance, our 

bank deposits would not qualify. So there are a lot of issues with 

local government investment pools that is not an option. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does anyone else on the panel have a comment 

on that? 

Ms. BAIR. I think that is a great question. As I say, I think there 

are significant downsides to letting—using a stable NAV for government funds which I articulated in my testimony. 

But I do think for those who suggest that the SEC’s proposal is 

somehow going to disrupt the ability of large corporations or municipalities or whatever to have a place for—with a stable NAV for 

payment processing, they could use government funds under the 

SEC proposal. I think that is a good thing to note. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I want to yield the rest of my time to the 

gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay, thank you. This is going to be a great opportunity. First of all, I want to thank all of the panelists. You have 

offered some very thoughtful testimony here. 

Ms. Bair, in your expanded written testimony, you really do 

point to the stable NAV as the culprit and the inducement to run. 

Now if Mr. Stevens and what my colleague Mr. Sherman has suggested, if this differential is very small, isn’t that an insurable 

risk? 

If the delta is so small, why can’t we have insurance for those 

parties investing in these funds so that if we did bump up against 

the dollar the insurance would kick in? There wouldn’t be an inducement to run. The delta would be insured and we wouldn’t have 

the flight to quality that we see now, or am I just moving the goal 

post? 

Mr. HURT. Mr. Lynch, I think your time has expired. Mr. Sherman’s time has expired. What I would like to do is recognize Mr. 

Hultgren for 5 minutes, and then the witness can answer your 

question. 

Mr. LYNCH. Sure, that’s great. Okay, fair enough. Thank you. 

Mr. HURT. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 

being here again. I think this is a very important topic that I certainly want to understand, and I know my colleagues do as well. 

And just to recap, I think my understanding is pretty clear from 

your testimony, from the questions that certainly for investors two 

of the most attractive features of money market funds are stable 

NAV and also liquidity. 

It also seems fair to say that these features, if they are compromised by floating the NAV or imposing gates or fees, we would 

likely see—most of you had said this—we would see money flow out 

of the products and we would see less demand for money market 

funds. 

Mr. Stevens, I wondered, this movement out of money market 

funds, would that also be seen in institutional prime funds as well 

as municipal funds? 

Mr. STEVENS. I think it would be across-the-board, assuming that 

the requirements were applied uniformly, particularly if they were 

29 

applied in combination. And we have given a lot of thought over 

these past 5 years to where the money would go. 

One of the convictions I think, particularly for retail investors, is 

that it would flow into bank deposits and probably be concentrated 

in the largest of our banks. With respect to institutions which have 

more alternatives, there are private funds that they could use. 

There are offshore vehicles that they could use. None of them have 

the transparency or the regulation that are characteristic of today’s 

money market— 

Mr. HULTGREN. Treasurer McCoy, if I can ask you a quick question, if we expect an exodus of investors from municipal tax-exempt 

funds, couldn’t this mean a cost spike for State and local government financing? 

Mr. MCCOY. It would. Anything that would reduce the demand 

for our issuance of bonds would increase our borrowing cost. 

Mr. HULTGREN. So it is really—the potential is the new rules 

could indirectly burden our constituents, the taxpayers, with highest costs for States and municipalities. Is that true? 

Mr. MCCOY. Absolutely. It would drive up our borrowing costs. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Okay. Mr. Stevens, jumping back to you, quoting 

from your testimony, the SEC—as you stated—released proposals 

to exempt government money market funds from further structural 

reform because of, among other things, the following: Government 

money market funds are not susceptible to the risks of mass investor redemptions. Their securities have low default risk and high liquidity, and interest rate risk is generally mitigated. 

Could the same be said of municipal funds as well? 

Mr. STEVENS. Yes. In fact, we believe that the municipal security 

market reflects many of those same characteristics. In addition, we 

have looked at the Detroit bankruptcy, the experience in September of 2008, and the problems in Orange County historically 

and have discovered that those major shocks in the market did not 

precipitate outflows en masse from tax-exempt money market 

funds. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Ms. Chandoha, in your testimony, I gather that 

you would agree with ICI’s conclusion that municipal money market funds are particularly resilient, to quote your testimony, and 

don’t pose a systemic risk. Is that true? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. That is true. I agree with what Paul said, that 

the municipal money funds are much more liquid than prime 

funds, so they are far more resilient. They proved that in the financial crisis. We didn’t really see flows there. 

They are also—they represent 10 percent of the whole money 

fund industry, so they are very small relative to the entire industry, but yet have outsized importance for State and local governments to finance themselves. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Okay. Treasurer McCoy, I wonder if you could 

help me further understand. I have met with some State treasurers, but I want to ask if you could briefly lay out the implications 

of the SEC’s proposal for local government investment pools, or 

LGIPs. 

The LGIP structure won’t be familiar to everyone here, and I believe the effects of the SEC’s alternative proposals certainly could 

pose a significant risk to participants in LGIPs, potentially harmVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:51 May 01, 2014 Jkt 086679 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\86679.TXT TERRI
30 

ing the finances of those municipal entities. Could you tell us just 

briefly—I only have a few seconds left—if you see this as a potential harm and a concern we ought to have? 

Mr. MCCOY. I think every State that manages an LGIP would 

look at this very seriously. 

I think that we will—as State treasurers, we would work with 

GASB to see if we could encourage GASB to change their rule to 

be more like the office of the OCC rule for bank stiff funds, which 

does describe—or require a stable NAV by using amortized cost accounting. So it would, we would be moving in that direction to see 

if we couldn’t get some relief there. 

Mr. HULTGREN. My time is about to run out. I am going to ask 

if I can follow up with some written questions and ask for your response. One in particular is NAST, concerned with the SEC’s proposed elimination of the 25 percent basket, returning to a 10 percent limit, effectively could cap municipal debt held by a single 

MMF regardless of creditworthiness. 

So I have some questions about the impact, again, on taxpayers, 

on our constituents. My time has expired, and I yield back. Thank 

you all very much. 

Mr. HURT. The gentleman’s time has expired. And the Chair now 

recognizes Mr. Lynch for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Again, if I could go back to my question, 

Ms. Bair, it is sort of two dimensional. One is, would we be able 

to ensure the risk of breaking the buck to remove that inducement 

to run? 

And the other is, by creating an insurable situation there, you 

would allow the insurance company to actually look at the quality 

of the assets within the fund in setting the insurance rate. Is that 

something you had considered? And I do appreciate the courage of 

your position. You are not the most popular person in the room, 

but I do appreciate your candor, your honesty. 

Ms. BAIR. So this would be using a private insurance or government insurance program? 

Mr. LYNCH. Either way. The SEC is now talking about fees— 

Ms. BAIR. Right. 

Mr. LYNCH. Redemption fees— 

Ms. BAIR. Right, right. 

Mr. LYNCH. If you are going to charge them. 

Ms. BAIR. Right. I think if policymakers decide that we need the 

fund industry as it is because of the payment processing services 

it provides, especially for large corporate users and governments, 

to do it up front with some type of insurance program that you pay 

for is the best way to do it. 

I am not advocating that, but I am saying if you want this industry to continue the way it has been, which now has an implicit government guarantee, frankly, a guarantee without any capital behind it, nothing behind it except kind of a wing and a prayer, that 

would be the way to go. 

I am not advocating that, but if you want this industry to continue the way it is with the stable NAV for a wide variety of large 

corporate users in particular, that would be a better approach than 

to leave things the way they are. 

31 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. And let me ask you, Ms. Chandoha has 

recommended—and again, this is for you, Ms. Bair—in her testimony that municipal MMFs, money market funds, be exempt from 

the floating NAV requirement. 

And there is a public purpose in terms of the municipals that is 

undeniable, and I worry. I have a letter here from the Massachusetts Municipal Association. I will ask unanimous consent to enter 

that into the record. 

And also, a letter from Governor Patrick— 

Mr. HURT. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. LYNCH. —arguing against the floating NAV. So, what are 

your thoughts on that in terms of exempting them? 

Ms. BAIR. I don’t like the government securities generally, so I 

would take it all out. I would say that the argument is stronger for 

a Treasury-only fund than it is for GSEs. 

And I am sorry you have credit risk with municipal debt, you do. 

You certainly have interest rate risk with all of them. So, no, I 

would just like to get rid of that exception for government funds. 

But I certainly wouldn’t want to expand it. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. And, lastly, again, this has been touched on 

several times. I just looked at the size of the 10 biggest banks back 

in 2008, for those that are still around and a lot of them are not. 

On average, they have increased 40 percent in size between 2008 

and 2013. 

And I am just concerned about this too-big-to-fail problem. If we 

are going to create safeguards, that does induce folks to get out of 

money markets, and if they do run to banks, are we creating even 

a bigger problem on that end? 

Ms. BAIR. I don’t know where the money would go. I don’t know 

that it would go to the largest banks. I think, typically, when I was 

at the FDIC, we saw a lot of volatility with community bank deposits depending on where the money fund rates—returns were. 

So, I think there is—definitely if you are worried about competitive issues, it is not clear to me at all that this is going to be benefiting the big banks. I would say, though, this is— 

Mr. LYNCH. If I could, I think in the money market space, we 

have seen the size of sponsors— 

Ms. BAIR. Certainly, on the retail level— 

Mr. LYNCH. Influence. 

Ms. BAIR. On the institutional level— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Ms. BAIR. Yes, you would assume that very large accounts, I 

would assume, would go to the larger banks. For the retail level, 

I don’t know if that is the case. 

So, look, this is not about—I think there is a perception—or 

those who want to keep the status quo want people to think this 

is bank-driven or bank regulator-driven. 

This is system stability-driven. I don’t think the big banks are 

not supporting this. A couple have weighed in on the side of the 

fund industry because they have their own money funds. They 

have more deposits than they know what to do with already. So, 

I don’t think they are driving this. I think what this is about is system stability. You have a banking system, albeit imperfect, and it 

needs changes, too. 

32 

But, on the deposit side, it worked pretty well, and the reason 

is because you have a number of safeguards like deposit insurance, 

like Federal Reserve Board lending, like capital and unsecured 

debt that takes first loss before deposits would ever be hurt, which 

is why deposits mostly suck even the uninsured stuff. 

So, it is whether you want a shadow bank or not. You have a 

shadow bank that works in good times and it doesn’t work in bad 

times. So, if you want to keep this, then you are right, go with 

some kind of government— 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you— 

Ms. BAIR. —insurance program for that. 

Mr. LYNCH. I yield back. Thank you for your courtesy. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Ms. Bair. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Mulvaney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I fully admit that this is not something which is readily intuitive 

to most folks. I am not very familiar with it, so I appreciate all of 

you taking the time to help us get up to speed. 

When I deal with things that I don’t readily understand, I like 

to go back to the very beginning of the issue. 

And it strikes me that we are here and the SEC is proposing 

these rules, if I get this right, in order to prevent future runs on 

money market accounts. That is a fair statement, right? 

But yet, I hear Mr. Stevens then turn around and tell me that 

there was no run in 2008 on these money market funds, there was 

no run when Orange County went under on these money market 

funds several years ago. 

Mr. Stevens, you are shaking your head no, but I thought you 

said that there was no run on these accounts several years ago. 

Is this a solution looking for a problem? Why are we even talking 

about these things? 

Mr. STEVENS. No, I believe, Congressman, what I said was that 

the problems experienced in prime money market funds in 2008 

have been attributed to one fund breaking a dollar. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Right, just one. 

Mr. STEVENS. Just one. The reality is that before the Reserve 

Primary Fund broke a dollar, 13 major financial institutions had 

collapsed or required a government bailout. 

Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, and the day the Reserve Primary Fund broke a buck, AIG was taken out. There was not a 

characteristic of money funds that was at issue. It was, in fact, a 

general flight to quality by all investors in the market. Remember, 

in those days, the banks wouldn’t even lend to one another. 

So, what we saw is investors, very deliberately, leaving exposure 

to commercial paper and other assets that were opaque, including 

bank assets, bank-issued debt, and they were moving instead to the 

safety of Treasury and government agency securities, and one of 

the ways that they did so is by investing in Treasury and government agency money market funds. 

We interpret this to mean that it wasn’t a structural issue with 

money market funds. It was, in fact, a basic problem in the commercial paper markets that all investors, including ours, were reacting to. 

33 

So, we certainly had outflows, but the commercial paper markets 

were experiencing them across-the-board. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you for that clarification. 

And to the extent that this is something which needs to be dealt 

with, tell me, Mr. Stevens—and I heard Mr. Gilligan say that a lot 

of funds have already offered—are starting to offer shadow NAVs. 

We have heard other folks testify today about funds offering voluntary—or talking about proposing voluntary gates and fees. 

Doesn’t that voluntary system solve the problem just as well? 

If you had a shadow NAV with voluntary gates and fees, doesn’t 

that accomplish the same thing? 

Mr. STEVENS. We think disclosure can go a long way without 

having a requirement that we float the NAV to inform investors, 

since that is what many proponents of a floating NAV argue, to 

make them clear in their own minds that this is an investment 

product that can change in value. 

Some of our members have voluntarily started to do that. If the 

SEC were to require it across-the-board, that is something we could 

support. 

Mr. MULVANEY. So my understanding is that if you do the shadow NAV instead of actually mandating it, it does avoid some accounting and tax issues. 

Mr. STEVENS. Yes, if you allow the transactional value to remain 

stable within the confines of the current rule, what you have is, 

you are sparing investors the need to keep track of infinitesimal 

capital gains and losses over time. Money market funds aren’t like 

other mutual funds in the sense that you may buy a mutual fund, 

a stock or a bond or a hybrid fund today, and hold it for a long 

period of time. 

But, for a money market fund, you can be in and out of that constantly. Certainly, Schwab’s customers are a great example of that, 

in Marie’s testimony. 

And if you had a floating NAV, each one of those would have to 

keep track of minuscule gains and losses each time and report 

them to Uncle Sam. It would be a paper chase nightmare for tax 

compliance. 

And that is one of the reasons, I think, that money market funds 

are so popular because of the convenience that they provide 

through that stable $1.00 per share value base. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Mr. Stevens. 

Mr. McCoy, I want to get back to you very briefly. I have 45 seconds left. At the very end of your testimony, you were saying something very interesting to me which is the impact especially of these 

proposed rules on small and rural communities. 

Could you finish that testimony please because that—you just 

described most of my district? 

Mr. MCCOY. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Those will be the communities we think will be most impacted, 

that your large metropolitan communities gain great benefit from 

local government investment pools, but many of those could adapt 

more easily. 

They have larger financial institutions in their community that 

they have banking relationships with that would work with them 

to accept deposits. Also, they do have some trained investment 

34 

staff, and with very good systems, they could move to develop to 

buy securities directly. 

The smaller ones will not have the staff or the resources to look 

for alternatives. They will end up taking more concentration risk 

in securities instead of having a diversified portfolio in a local government investment pool. 

And often not have banks that would have sufficient collateral to 

accept their deposits. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Mr. McCoy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HURT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Wisconsin, Ms. 

Moore, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing here today. I can’t remember 

if it was Mr. Gilligan or Mr. Stevens who indicated that were we 

to float the NAV, there would be a lot of institutional investors that 

would flee from the money market funds and would go to alternative products. 

So, you guys are going to have to remind me who said that. 

And I guess I would like to know, what that would be? We have 

heard a lot discussion here today that they wouldn’t necessarily go 

to banks. Banks are overcapitalized, they have record deposits and 

don’t really necessarily want the money. 

So, thank you for helping me recall who said that. 

Mr. GILLIGAN. Yes, ma’am. I think I spoke to that. 

I think the answer to your question is I don’t really know where 

these deposits are going to flow to; no one really knows. 

Ms. MOORE. Would they go off-shore perhaps? 

Mr. GILLIGAN. They definitely could go off-shore. I think they will 

go to a number of different places. I think funds will flow to banks, 

which has been stated already have a lot of deposits and have 

grown in size. 

I think there will be some off-shore movement into nonregulated 

funds. I think there will be some transition into muni funds, govi 

funds, but I don’t even know that they are going—those funds are 

going to have the capacity or underlying financial instruments to 

take the prime institutional money that will free up—that will 

move out of there. 

So, it is a good question. No one knows. 

Ms. MOORE. And then, I would ask Ms. Bair, are we pooling risk 

into—you said that they wouldn’t necessarily go to the biggest 

banks, but you acknowledged that they probably would. 

Are we just moving risk into government-backed banking institutions? Wouldn’t risk pool there, if it were to go to those banks? 

Ms. BAIR. Again, the banking system is made, first and foremost, 

for a safe place to put ready cash; cash you need to move in and 

out on a quick basis, that maintains stable value—that is what 

banks are supposed to do. Money funds are somewhat of a shadow 

bank in that regard. 

So, the fact that it would go to banks is not—that is what the 

banking system is supposed to do. I think Mr. Gilligan has some 

good arguments with the suggestion that money fund investors are 

35 

going to go to some shadow hedge fund in the Cayman Islands, it 

just doesn’t pass the lab test. 

Money market fund investors are somewhat risk-averse. They 

are going to be looking for safe places. And so, I can’t believe that 

this is going to go into the shadow sector; we have already talked 

about Europe, which is proposing tougher standards. So, I do think 

he has some good, very good arguments, which he has articulated 

very well. 

This one, I don’t see any shadow banks out there that are going 

to be attractive to the kind of investors who put money in money 

funds. 

Ms. MOORE. Okay, thank you for that. 

I have a couple of other questions for whoever wants to answer— 

feels adequate to answer it, I would invite them to answer it. Do 

we have any clarity from the IRS on the accounting consequences 

of floating the NAV? 

Yes, sir, Mr. Stevens? 

Mr. STEVENS. Congresswoman, we have had discussions on behalf of the industry with both Treasury and the IRS. They are certainly aware of the issues that we have focused our concerns on if 

we go to a floating NAV. And, they have tried, at least, to be forthcoming. 

One problem is something called the wash sale rule—if you are 

transacting and you are in and out, and you sustain a period of 

losses and then you reinvest, they have said that they would waive 

the wash sale requirements, but the taxpayer would still have to 

keep track of all of the transactions in order to determine whether 

they are within the exemption that is being discussed. 

So, the administrative burdens are going to remain. And while 

that is at least promising, it doesn’t really resolve the heart of the 

problem. 

Ms. MOORE. Right. We are obviously going to see the money market fund really shrink considerably. And if the only investors in 

there would be maybe municipal bonds, who are treated more like 

corporate bonds than they are Treasury bonds, what impact will 

this have on changing or maintaining the low-risk profile of municipal bonds? 

Mr. MCCOY. The question is whether the change on the municipal bonds—I am trying to make sure I understand the question— 

as to the impact on municipal bonds— 

Ms. MOORE. If they are just a primary customer, as everybody 

else is gone—I am assuming that others would leave and go to big 

banks—does that change the risk profile? 

Mr. MCCOY. It would not change the risk profile of the bond 

issuers, it would change the appetite of the investors. And— 

Ms. MOORE. Okay. 

Mr. MCCOY. So, it would remove the largest purchaser of tax-exempt bonds if the—if municipal money market— 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. McCoy. 

Mr. MCCOY. —demand there are a large purchaser. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. McCoy. 

Ms. MOORE. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Mr. HURT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Wagner for 5 minutes. 

36 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

witnesses. 

This is going to be directed to Mr. Stevens. If the logic behind 

the SEC’s proposal for floating NAV was simply to provide more 

transparency or to remove the unique ability of money market 

funds to hold their NAV constant, then I think, perhaps, the SEC’s 

proposal might have some level of merit. But, as we know, that is 

not the primary argument that the SEC made. 

As they noted in their rule proposal, the floating NAV is designed primarily to ‘‘address the incentive of money market fund 

shareholders to redeem shares in times of fund and market stress.’’ 

The SEC believes that this would, I guess, address any contagion 

or systemic risk issues surrounding money market funds. 

So, my question, Mr. Stevens, is does the solution fight the problem? If there are real concerns about investor redemptions and systemic risks during times of stress, is a floating NAV the appropriate response? 

Mr. STEVENS. We have been on record on this subject continually 

since 2009, and it has been remarkable how many voices there are 

who say that all we need to do is float the net asset value per 

share. Certainly, some voices at the SEC, and the Federal Reserve 

Bank Presidents recently have said that is the prescription. 

We have always wondered whether that would stop a massive redemption out of a money market fund vehicle in the circumstances 

that we faced in 2008 when basically, people were trying to flee 

from a certain asset class and to find a safer haven for their investor dollars. 

Nonetheless, it remains one of the two core proposals that the 

SEC has put in place. And so, our members have been trying to 

figure out which is better, from the point of view of the investors 

we are serving—a floating NAV per share, or redemption gates and 

fees? 

Mrs. WAGNER. If a floating NAV caused investors to pull money 

out of money market funds, is it reasonable to believe that a lot 

of the money would flow into FDIC-insured bank accounts? 

Mr. STEVENS. We have been on the record about where the 

money would go to, and it is a complex analysis. For retail customers, they really will have no alternative, I think, except for deposits. So, they will go to banks. 

Institutions have lots of other alternatives, and while Ms. Bair 

kind of dispenses with the notion that there are offshore and other 

kinds of markets, those actually already exist for institutional investors, and they don’t have the transparency, they don’t have the 

regulations around them. 

But if they can provide a current money market rate of return 

and a stable net asset value for large investors, they will be a very 

attractive alternative to uninsured bank deposits, for example. 

Mrs. WAGNER. So, if we are looking at money market reform 

from the standpoint of taxpayer protection, the SEC’s proposal 

could actually create a scenario where funds flow from a product 

that currently does not enjoy a taxpayer guarantee to bank deposits, which have an explicit taxpayer backing. Is that correct? 

Mr. STEVENS. We have expressed that concern, as well. 

37 

Mrs. WAGNER. Wouldn’t this end up creating more risk for taxpayers and perhaps even exacerbate the too-big-to-fail problem? 

Mr. STEVENS. It certainly—remember, we are talking about $2.6 

trillion in—that is intermediated through money market mutual 

funds today. That is a big number. 

And so, if a substantial portion of that were to go back into the 

banking system, some substantial portion of that clearly would be 

going to our largest banks. I think, to the extent that raises the 

concern you are suggesting, it may create a risk elsewhere. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Gilligan, you have an important perspective in this debate 

in that you are here representing Main Street companies that both 

invest in money market funds but also issue commercial paper that 

is bought by money market funds and is essential to financing operations. 

You noted in your testimony that, ‘‘Corporate treasurers and financial professionals understand the risk of investing in money 

market funds, and that investments in these funds is not guaranteed by the U.S. Government.’’ Do you believe the SEC’s proposal 

for floating NAV will somehow uncover hidden risks of money market funds that corporate treasurers and other institutional investors aren’t already aware of? 

Mr. GILLIGAN. Absolutely not. And I argue a little bit with this 

notion that investors believe there is an implicit guarantee, anyway, of money market funds. I don’t believe that, and I don’t think 

the majority of investors believe that. Where that comes from, I 

don’t know. 

By definition, institutional investors are sophisticated enough to 

understand the underlying risk and the shadow NAV takes that 

into account. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Gilligan. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you— 

Mr. HURT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perlmutter for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Bair, I don’t like being at odds with you. We went through 

all of this together 5 years ago today, I think, is when we began 

to see a run on money markets. And the reserve fund broke the 

buck today or tomorrow, 5 years ago. 

So, this net asset value floating—Mr. Hurt asked a question and 

I want to just follow up on that—Lehman Brothers is, say, at 10 

o’clock on a Sunday night, is at 20 bucks per share, and reserve 

has it as an asset trading; by Monday morning, it is 2 bucks a 

share. Okay? 

So, in a time of crisis—because that week was Merrill Lynch, 

AIG, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, Washington Mutual and then 

the money markets—in 5 days. 

The net asset value piece, I don’t understand how it makes a dif- ference. Because all of a sudden, they have gone from $1.2 per 

value, down to 97 cents. And the net asset value is just going to 

tell you that. 

My feeling, and I guess I am very laissez-faire on this—Colorado 

counties lost a ton of money in the reserve fund. They went into 

bankruptcy; they got 93 cents back, Okay? 

38 

What different does this make at all when you really are in a financial crisis like that? I think the insurance that—and I want to 

thank you for that—was posted over those couple of days, that is 

what stopped the run. Not the fact that people could say, ‘‘Oh geez, 

it is 97 cents, I want my money back.’’ 

So, please— 

Ms. BAIR. So, a couple of things. We had an unstable system develop because of the stable NAV. We wouldn’t have had such a 

large shadow banking sector; we wouldn’t have had so much financial institutional reliance on money fund financing to begin with. 

So I think there is that. 

Plus, I would like to know, why is it that we had to bail out 

money funds, but not other mutual funds? This was just a matter 

of repricing— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay, and I get—this is where I disagree, because it is at $1.2 Sunday night, and at 97 the next morning; it 

would have have made any difference. That is what then created, 

in my opinion, the run— 

Ms. BAIR. But there was always repricing, there was always 

withdrawal. There were withdrawals in lots of mutual funds. We 

didn’t have to bail out those mutual funds. What was it that was 

unique about money funds that made taxpayers have to come in 

and take huge risks that they have— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. What is unique is they were treated as checking accounts— 

Ms. BAIR. Yes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. And so the real issue— 

Ms. BAIR. They are like banking, or shadow bank— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. As if they are treated as checking accounts, 

should there be insurance—not do you mark-to-market every day. 

Ms. BAIR. That would be another alternative. That is something 

Congress would have to do. 

If you want this alternative to traditional banks, if you want 

them to have some kind of new kind of bank called the money fund 

that is going to have insurance, you will need to charge for that, 

and you probably want to have some first-loss protection like capital, the way we do at banks. Then do that, if that is what you 

want, I am not— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Or it is buyer beware, and so I guess that is 

where I am sort of laissez-faire, because— 

Ms. BAIR. —if they— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Colorado counties took a clobbering. 

Ms. BAIR. Right. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay? And if Colorado counties want to continue to do this, buyer beware. 

Ms. BAIR. They are—can be—would be—were a lot better if they 

see the value of the fund fluctuating every day. It would be a daily 

reminder that they are not guaranteed. The stable NAV— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Let me speak to Mr. McCoy. You are watching 

these things all the time, are you not as a treasurer? You are 

watching the value of your investments? 

Mr. MCCOY. Absolutely. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Every day, so it is more the retail people I am 

worried about, and that is why an insurance fund of some type 

39 

might be beneficial because it would be like an FDIC fund, but I 

just don’t think the marking-to-market every day, which is what 

the net asset value thing is all about, changes the equation. 

Ms. BAIR. But they have to, if they have to sell assets for redemptions. They have to sell at the market, so that is a much more 

accurate reflection of what the value of this fund is worth. I would 

just—a lot of people have asked me, and you did just again. 

What would have made the difference if we had a floating NAV? 

I think the better question is, what would have happened if we 

hadn’t had a taxpayer bailout? This idea that there is only one 

fund that has ever broken the buck. How many funds would have 

broken the buck if taxpayers hadn’t stepped in? And I’m sorry, Mr. 

Stevens, but your industry was in a bit of a panic. I was around, 

and you wanted that bailout, and you bought into it. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. You and I are in complete agreement. 

Ms. BAIR. And I would just like to suggest— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Had you and the Administration, and this was 

the Bush Administration, not stepped in, it would have crashed terribly. 

Ms. BAIR. Yes. And a lot of people would have lost money. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I don’t think this rule changes that. That is my 

point. 

Ms. BAIR. Okay. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. No, I am done. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Scott for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must say, this has been 

a very fascinating hearing, because my eyes have been opened up 

to something of which I have only been dimly, dimly aware. Now, 

from what I have been hearing, is it a fact now that what we are 

saying is if this SEC proposed rule requiring the floating NAV 

asset value to take the place of the dollar, that this would kill the 

prime money market, is that an accurate statement? Does everybody agree with that? 

Ms. BAIR. No, I don’t— 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. McCoy? 

Mr. MCCOY. We figured it would have a significant impact. I 

would not use the word ‘‘kill.’’ This is something that is new 

ground. It is untested, and so we believed it would have a significant negative impact that would be harmful, but this is untested. 

Mr. SCOTT. Tell me, what would you do if you could not invest 

your money in a market fund at that stable $1 per share, or you 

could only invest in government funds? If you had that choice, 

where would you put your money? 

Mr. MCCOY. Yes, for us, the State of Georgia, we are buying securities directly in the marketplace. We have lots of alternatives 

other than money market funds. Your mid and smaller-sized municipal governments have fewer alternatives and so a money market fund, for those who can legally buy private funds, is a very 

good alternative for them. 

Most will—of the local governments would turn to the State and 

local government investment pools which are run as stable value 

by law, and so that’s our issue is that if this has an unintended 

40 

consequence that would cause an impact for a local government investment pool no longer to be able to provide that service, those 

local governments, the smaller ones will have difficult time finding 

comfortable investments that would not increase their risk and reduce their liquidity. 

Ms. CHANDOHA. And I would argue that individual investors 

have fewer choices, so if they are not going to invest in prime 

funds, they could invest in government funds, but the reality is at 

this point in time, there is not enough capacity in government 

funds to absorb that. We have the largest Treasury money market 

fund, and almost 2 years ago we closed that to new investors because there wasn’t enough capacity in that. So we do think individual investors would migrate probably to bank products. 

Mr. SCOTT. So what you are saying, then, is it might not kill the 

prime money market, but it could put it on life support. Now, let 

me ask you, Treasurer McCoy, to explain so the audience will know 

why, if it is important operationally and legally for State and local 

governments to be able to transact with money market funds at the 

$1 level, and what would be the result, for your failure to do so, 

how damaging would that be? 

Mr. MCCOY. That is a very good question. State and local governments, and this is separate from our pension funds, dealing with 

operating funds, bond proceeds and trust funds, we have to preserve the public funds, and that’s our primary responsibility, to 

protect the public funds, and invest them where they are available 

as they are needed, State bond proceeds as they are needed to, or 

bond reinvestments, to make payments to bondholders on time, the 

exact amount that’s needed. 

We have to protect funds, operating funds, teachers, others—employees’ payroll. Deposits were made, we have to safeguard those 

funds, invest those funds. They need to be liquid when they are 

needed for payment. 

If anything that would inhibit that would run afoul of the whole 

purpose of protecting the public’s funds, we do have to protect the 

principal and provide liquidity, and that’s where this would run 

afoul with a lot of State statutes, I know the SEC just referenced 

in their comments that States may need to change their statutes. 

That would be a long and healthy debate for States to determine 

whether it would be prudent to then put local governments’ money 

and State government money at risk because the SEC had changed 

their money market fund reform, or regulations, so there—we will 

have a lot of issues that would come up, that would impact State 

and local governments, and again, these are untested waters. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. McCoy. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Foster, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do any of you know the 

answer to this: Has there ever been an estimate of what the losses 

would have been economy-wide had the government not backstopped the money market industry in 2008? 

Ms. BAIR. No. No. I don’t think they have, but my guess is it 

would have been a lot. 

Mr. FOSTER. Or more than $1 trillion, or is there any way to— 

41 

Ms. BAIR. That I don’t know, but I think a lot of funds would 

have broken the buck. I think a lot of retail and institutional investors would have had to wait a long time to get their money back, 

and when they did get their money back they would have gotten 

a lot less. Again, as we just said earlier, some reserve fund investors still haven’t been paid, so I think the results would have been 

quite cataclysmic, and hurt a lot of institutional— 

Mr. FOSTER. Those will be the direct losses from investors who 

didn’t get their money back. There would be a separate class of 

losses when the markets froze up, and business as usual would 

be— 

Ms. BAIR. Ironically, the bailout helped the investors, but money 

funds still pulled back. They didn’t want to lend any more, and 

that was why we had problems in the wholesale funding market. 

The source of credit that supported other financial institutions 

dried up, so while the bailouts protected the investors, the money 

funds still pulled back, and that’s why we had, one of the big reasons why we had disruptions in wholesale funding markets. 

Mr. STEVENS. Congressman, could I get a word in here, if you 

wouldn’t mind, because I think you are asking perhaps the wrong 

question? 

The issue is what would have happened to the economy if the 

government hadn’t stepped in to try to restore order to the commercial paper markets? We were an investor in those markets. We 

weren’t the only investor, and we weren’t the only investor that 

pulled back. In fact, we re-entered those markets before most. So 

the issue is not, as I have said before— 

Mr. FOSTER. You re-entered them after the government backstopped you. 

Mr. STEVENS. The guarantee program was in place. That is correct, and so from a psychological point of view, that was a very dramatic moment, true. But what ensued thereafter were a series of 

programs that the Federal Reserve maintained in order to get the 

commercial paper markets starting again. 

That wasn’t just for our purposes; it was for all commercial 

paper, investors’ and issuers’ purposes, and that is what got the 

situation resolved. I think it is important, and I would like to respond to a statement, if I can do so now, about the guarantee program. 

The guarantee program is not something our industry asked for. 

We were told it was going to be put into place. When we were told 

it was going to be put into place, we insisted that it be limited in 

time. We also insisted that it be limited in nature. In fact, the 

guarantee program was designed so that if a fund broke a buck, 

the government might pay the difference between the 99 cents and 

the dollar, so the exposure was intentionally limited, and in fact, 

we paid $1.2 billion in guarantee fees and the taxpayer never paid 

a penny on that guarantee. 

Mr. FOSTER. Does anyone have a comment on your comment 

here? 

Ms. BAIR. We all have our revisionist history. You know, gee yes, 

that’s right, the government just, for the fun of it, threw money at 

money funds when they didn’t really need to. I don’t see that the 

money funds pulling back with its—disruption wholesale funding 

42 

markets. There were certainly other factors, but my own agency 

ended up having to take huge exposure guaranteeing the debt of 

large financial holding companies who couldn’t roll their paper 

without some kind of government backstop, so there was quite a 

lot of government support thrown at this. And money funds were 

a significantly exacerbating factor, and I think anything besides 

that is revisionist history. 

So, I am sorry we have to have a different perspective on this, 

but I was there, and I don’t recall anybody objecting in the fund 

industry when the government decided to bail them out. 

Mr. FOSTER. Okay. 

If I could change the subject for a moment, Ms. Chandoha, you 

mentioned that retail investors don’t run, which I thought was interesting. This is, to my thinking, that it was the sophisticated investors who were the ones who actually monitor the asset values 

who actually are the ones who are going to get their money before 

the gates slammed shut, or the fund gets liquidated. Is that really 

the situation we want to be in, and one that you think is good for 

your customers? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. Large institutional investors can lose their 

money more quickly. They also hold larger portions of funds. 

Mr. FOSTER. And they monitor— 

Ms. CHANDOHA. So, they can have a much bigger impact very 

quickly. Retail investors have very small portions for the funds. 

And even if they do move, it has a much smaller impact. 

So, there were some redemptions in retail funds, but much more 

muted than institutional funds. 

Mr. FOSTER. Yes. And has there ever been research by independent parties as to what fraction of money market investors actually understand the risks, and the fact that it is not just like a 

checking account? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. We certainly do a lot of education for our clients. 

There is a lot of disclosure about the nature of money market 

funds. It is a tremendous amount of detail. As I mentioned earlier, 

we have been voluntarily disclosing the shadow NAV’s of our 

money funds since earlier this year. So, we do— 

Mr. FOSTER. My question is, what fraction of the investors actually look at those— 

Mr. HURT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. FOSTER. I yield back. 

Mr. HURT. But I do think that we might have an opportunity, 

Mr. Foster, to get back to you if you would like to stick around. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Carney for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the 

panelists. This is a fascinating discussion—question and answer 

back and forth. And I have heard a lot of things this morning that 

have raised maybe more questions than they have answered. 

For me, I think—Ms. Bair, at one point, you talked—you posed 

a question hypothetically—if we want to see a strong money market fund industry, then you might want to do that. I get the sense 

from some of the things that you have said, directly and maybe implied indirectly, that you think the way the money—that the money 

market fund industry is too large. And you refer to it in a pejorative way as a shadow banking system. 

43 

And I think I understand that, but why do you think it is too 

large, or is playing an inappropriate role currently? 

I am a former secretary of finance at the State level. So, I was 

part of the cash management policy board at the State of Delaware. 

I understand the value for State and local governments on finance 

committees for nonprofit organizations. We used money market 

funds as cash management tools of very valuable, efficient, convenient way to do those kinds of transactions. 

The implications of what you are saying is that—or this change, 

I think, is that people would not see that convenience. Obviously, 

there are tradeoffs there, and so they would migrate to the banks, 

I think, clearly. And maybe that is a good thing, maybe that’s a 

bad thing. 

I would like to know your view of that. I respect your opinion 

considerably, and I would like to know your view on that point 

there in terms of going from this way of doing cash management 

to—back to the regular banks, if you will. 

Ms. BAIR. So, what is the core function of a banking system, any 

banking system in a developed country? It is a place where people 

can put their ready cash. They can access it at any time, and know 

it will keep stable value. To provide that peace of mind, we have 

regulations, we have capital requirements, we have deposit insurance, we have access to the Fed’s discount window to make sure 

that payment processing system works, and is liquid. And that is 

part of it, of the banking system. That is a core piece. That is— 

unlike these crazy derivatives and some of the other things that 

large banks do that give a lot of us heartburn, this is a core function of what they should be doing, so the fact that this— 

Mr. CARNEY. If I may—I have limited time, so—but over the last 

20 to 25 years, all these institutions that I just talked about have 

been migrating away from that into what they consider— 

Ms. BAIR. Well— 

Mr. CARNEY. —more convenient— 

Ms. BAIR. —this was facilitated by a regulatory change made by 

the SEC in the mid-1980s that allowed a mutual fund to basically 

act like a bank. And, it worked until it didn’t. There have been numerous experiences where the bank has been broken, but through 

sponsor support, you don’t see that. We would have had massive 

problems in 2008 if it hadn’t been for government intervention. 

Mr. CARNEY. But ‘‘it worked until it didn’t’’—we have talked 

about why it didn’t. I was not here in the Congress at that period 

of time when the prime fund broke the buck. But we saw much bigger problems in the banking system. We have much larger concerns—I do— 

Ms. BAIR. In the wholesale funding markets, yes. You didn’t have 

systemic—you didn’t have deposit funds. We had a seize-up in the 

wholesale funding markets. 

AIG, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns—we had a 

few banks that had some problems. I don’t want to suggest otherwise, but those are not depository-taking institutions. 

Mr. CARNEY. But your response to, if you want a strong sector— 

which I conclude that you don’t think is the best thing—you ought 

to do it through some kind of capital reserve or some kind of insurance, not through— 

44 

Ms. BAIR. I think they should act like other mutual funds. I— 

with the floating NAV, all the other mutual funds flow through 

NAV. I think money funds—they are mutual funds. They should 

flow through NAV. 

It is the structure, not the funds themselves. You have lots of 

good corporate citizens who are offering these funds. But the inherent regulator structure is an unstable one. This is the classic reform of undoing a bad regulation, which would—is what we got in 

the mid-1980s, which developed—was the foundation for developing 

a very, very large shadow banking sector in the sense that— 

Mr. CARNEY. So, what does the floating NAV address in your 

view? That— 

Ms. BAIR. It tells people that your money is not protected at a 

dollar. It is not a cash equivalent. There are assets underneath it 

that float in value. And if you want to redeem, they are going to 

have to sell those assets for you to get your money back. 

So, it is honesty in accounting. And it is also, at the end, you 

eliminate the first mover advantage, if you have a stable NAV, 

when the underlying assets are not worth that dollar, the more sophisticated investors—in this case, institutional investors in 2008— 

they will run. They will have an affirmative obligation to run, because they can still get out for a dollar, even though that fund is 

now worth only 97 cents. They lock in the losses. And less sophisticated people are left behind. They are the ones ending up holding 

the bag. 

It is a structural weakness that needs to be addressed. 

Mr. CARNEY. I wish I had more time for a fuller discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HURT. And, Mr. Carney, I think you will have that opportunity. 

This has been an excellent hearing. And we certainly appreciate 

the indulgence of the panel. And if it suits your schedule, we would 

love to have you stick around just for a few more minutes. I think 

there are Members who would like to ask additional questions, and 

we will limit those to 2 minutes, if you all can—if you could bear 

with us. 

And so, with that in mind, I will kick it to Mr. Stivers for a period of 2 minutes. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

I really appreciate the indulgence of a quick second round. 

I have two questions. One is for Mr. Stevens. 

A lot of the panelists here seem to ignore the 2010 rule changes 

that changed the investment criteria for money market mutual 

funds, thus making them more stable. 

Can you just spend maybe 30 seconds talking about why that is 

important when you limit what they can invest in, and how that 

keeps the stable net asset value a viable way to go? 

Mr. STEVENS. Thank you, Congressman. 

What the rules did is impose a whole set of heightened risk-limiting conditions on money market funds. And they were almost immediately tested in 2011 during the crisis in the Euro zone, and 

at the time of the debt ceiling controversy and the downgrade by 

one of the ratings agencies of U.S. Government securities. 

45 

We came through that fine in part because of the 2010 amendments. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. I only have a little bit of time. I also 

want to give Ms. Chandoha a chance. 

I am kind of scratching my head with your position, because it 

appears to me, your position is that a floating net asset value is 

great, except where it affects you. You want—you like the exemption on government funds, and you happen to have the biggest government fund in the country. And you want a retail exemption, and 

99 percent of your customers are retail. 

So, help me understand how you sort of put that together, that 

you like a floating NAV, but not where it affects you. You want the 

exemption. 

Ms. CHANDOHA. Certainly, our clients are retail investors. And, 

what we appreciate with the SEC’s review is that they focused in 

on where the potential risks lie in the money fund industry. 

We do believe that regulations should focus in on where the risks 

lie, and not necessarily be a one-size-fits-all approach. 

So, that does benefit us. But we do think that retail investors did 

not run—they are very stable investors—and that retail investors 

should be segregated from institutional investors who do have the 

ability to run and move assets more quickly. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Ms. Chandoha. Thank you— 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of this subcommittee, Mrs. Maloney, for 2 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. 

I would like to ask Ms. Bair and Mr. Stevens—a lot of cities, including mine, New York City, believe that they need the money 

market funds in order to finance their day-to-day operations. They 

depend on them. Do you believe a floating rate would have hurt a 

city’s ability to finance their local projects and their local concerns? 

And in the debate on the floating NAV, is that the only way to 

eliminate the accounting or the cliff effect that you keep talking 

about, Ms. Bair, or are there other ways to eliminate it that 

wouldn’t result in such a radical restructuring of the money market 

industry? 

Mr. Stevens and Ms. Bair? 

Ms. BAIR. So, as I said before, guarantees without capital behind 

them make it cheaper for everybody to do business, but—and especially with implicit government support, which I think has been a 

factor in the money fund industry—that model works until it 

doesn’t. It doesn’t work in times of distress. 

If you don’t want to go to a floating NAV, the next best alternative, I think, is to require capital behind a guarantee. If funds 

want to guarantee a dollar, even when the assets are less than a 

dollar, then force them to have some capital behind that. That is 

the approach being used in Europe. 

I think the simpler, cleaner approach is a floating NAV. And I 

think that you will still have funds that retain a high degree of liquidity, that invest in short-term securities. They will float slightly, 

but they will still float, reminding people they are not guaranteed. 

46 

So, I don’t think they are going to completely go away. But if you 

don’t want to do floating NAV, I think the best next best option is 

capital, which is what the Europeans are doing, basically—proposing. 

Mr. STEVENS. Very quickly, tax-exempt money market funds provide about 70 percent of all short-term municipal finance in the 

United States. If you create the characteristics in those funds that 

investors are not interested in, that source of finance will disappear. And it will have a significant effect on State and local governments throughout the country. 

Witness my colleague here from Georgia today, and the thousands of others—State and local government officials—whose point 

of view about this is very much in the SEC’s records. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Stevens. 

The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Lynch, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, thank you for all your help today. It has been a very 

good hearing. 

Hypothetically, if we did go to the floating NAV, it requires a 

daily evaluation of the underlying assets. And while we have a 10 

percent requirement for—excuse me—we have a 24-hour requirement that 10 percent be redeemable within 24 hours, and then 

there is a—I think is a 30 percent over 7 days. You still have a 

very large body of assets that are less liquid. 

And I am just wondering, in the past, we have had very difficult 

time marking-to-market some of these less liquid assets. Does anybody have a suggestion that might allow us to avoid using internal 

models that, in some cases, in the past—especially during a crisis 

moment, we come up with these, let’s call them, generous valuations on the part of the asset holder that we ran into back in 

2008. Is there any way we can, sort of, manage this within the 

floating NAV scenario? 

Mr. STEVENS. Congressman, I don’t think we have problems valuing these portfolios. The weighted average maturity of the instruments in the portfolio is 60 days or less. You are talking— 

Mr. LYNCH. That is the average, though. 

Mr. STEVENS. The— 

Mr. LYNCH. I am saying— 

Mr. STEVENS. —dollar-weighted average. 

Mr. LYNCH. —you are going to have. I am just asking how confident can investors be that these assets have been valued properly? 

Mr. STEVENS. I think, very highly confident. Our members are 

putting out information, filing with the SEC, about what the markto-market value of these portfolios is. 

Mr. LYNCH. But they are using their internal models. If there is 

no turnover, or if there is not an active market in that asset, we 

don’t have a—we don’t have a market valuation available. So somebody has to approximate that. 

And so, in the past, during a crisis period, we have had some 

very wacky valuations that have not held up over time. 

Mr. STEVENS. Right. 

47 

Mr. LYNCH. And I am just trying to anticipate how we would 

avoid that. 

Mr. STEVENS. These are instruments that are valued according 

to amortized cost. And as I said at the beginning of the hearing, 

it’s a valuation method the Chairman of FASB talked about how 

it applies in the context of money market funds. I think it produces 

a very reliable mark-to-market price that deviates very, very little 

on a— 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Stevens. 

Mr. STEVENS. —between the dollar value. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. 

Ms. CHANDOHA. I would just comment that we have been producing shadow NAVs on our money funds. And we used outside 

pricing services to price those. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Scott, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, very quickly. One point we are missing in the 

first round was on retail funds. And I would like to get a response 

from Ms. Bair, Ms. Chandoha, and Mr. Stevens quickly. The proposed rule defined a retail fund as one that allows share holders 

to withdraw less than $1 million a day. And the retail funds would 

be exempt from the floating net asset value requirement in the 

rule. 

Now, Charles Schwab has proposed that limit be raised to $5 

million. And there have been others who have suggested that the 

retail funds be limited to investors with a Social Security number 

or a particular retirement plan. Can each of you just very briefly 

give me a comment on that, on your definition of a refund fund and 

what changes you might propose in that definition and why? 

Ms. BAIR. I think, as I think they should all float. I think is 

very—one of the problems with trying to describe about retail, is 

very difficult to come up with a definition that can’t be gamed. And I do worry, even with a $1 million redemption daily limit, 

that is still a pretty big size redemption. And people like my mother in Illinois who are not going to be checking their balances everyday are going to be stuck where the people who are more sophisticated are going to be able to get out first with this first-mover advantage, which you have at the Savynap. 

So I think they should all float. But if you are going to keep it 

to retail, make sure it is retail. And don’t let a lot of sophisticated 

money into this fund. 

Mr. SCOTT. Ms. Chandoha, you are Charles Schwab, and you recommended it, so? 

Ms. CHANDOHA. Yes, we do think it makes sense to segregate retail and institutional investors because institutional investors can 

move more quickly. And your mother might be impacted. 

We do think that there are various ways of delineating between 

retail and institutional investors. We made a recommendation 

around the $5 million redemption limit. Social Security numbers 

could be another method for doing that. 

Mr. SCOTT. And, Mr. Stevens, you agree? 

Mr. STEVENS. You and I both, as individual investors, have a Social Security number on every account. That’s an easy, adminVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:51 May 01, 2014 Jkt 086679 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\86679.TXT TERRI
48 

istrable, and very clear line between investors like you and me and 

a hedge fund. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Stevens. 

Mr. STEVENS. Thanks. 

Mr. HURT. I thank the gentleman from Georgia. 

I want to thank everybody on this panel for their participation. 

I do think this was a very good hearing. And I thank you, especially, for indulging us in a second round of questions. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous 

materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

Thank you. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(49) 

A P P E N D I X 

September 18, 2013 

50 


86679.001

Statement 

of 

Representative Gwen Moore 

Examining the SEC's MMF Rule Propsal 

House Financial Services Subcommittee 

on 

Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprise 

Sept 18,2013 

I appreciate the witnesses talking time to provide the committee their 

perspective on money market reform. 

This debate is in a more constructive place than it has been. 

I am very encouraged to see this re-engagement. I believe that a 

cooperative process between regulators and industry will yield the best 

results. 

It is also encouraging that this debate is now happening between the 

primary regulator, the SEC, and industry. I support the Fed and 

Financial Stability Oversight Council weighing into debates, but I think 

that this return to "regular order" is indicative of the healthier process 

we are seeing. 

The witness can address the specifics of the SEC proposals, but one of 

the proposed options, the so-called gate, I understand was used by at 

least one fund during the 2008 crisis with good results. I am curious to 

learn more about this option. 

I look forward to the Q&A, as I want to gain perspective on a few 

questions. 

If the reforms - specifically the floating NAV, which I have lingering 

doubts drive clients from money funds, where will that money 
51 


86679.002

ultimately end up, and will we have actually solved a problem or just 

created a new one? 

I understand that banks have record deposits and may not want more. 

Does the money end up offshore? This is a fear raised by an SEC report, 

but not really answered. 

I also want to understand how the various proposals will impact State 

and local governments - both from the perspective of governments as 

user of money funds, but also from the standpoint that money funds buy 

municipal bonds, which under the proposal will be treated like corporate 

paper rather than Treasury notes. 

We just had a debate on whether it was fair to rate municipal bonds the 

same corporate bonds, as the likelihood of default on an A-rated 

municipal bond was still far less likely than on an A-rated corporate 

bond. 

Does it then make sense for the purposes of money funds to treat 

municipal bonds like corporate bonds? 

Do we have clarity on the tax and accounting consequences on floating 

the NA V from the IRS? 

Again, thank you and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 
52 


86679.003

The Systemic Risk Council 

"Examining the SEC's Money Market Fund Rule Proposal" 

Testimony of Sheila C. Bair 

Chair, Systemic Risk Councill 

Former Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Before the House Committee on Financial Services 

Capital Markets & Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee 

September 18, 2013 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss much needed reforms for money 

market mutual funds. Strong money market fund reform is essential to protecting investors, 

taxpayers and the markets. It has been five years since the Reserve Primary Fund "broke the 

buck" triggering massive runs on money market funds, destabilizing our markets and leading to 

an unprecedented taxpayer guarantee of trillions of dollars in shareholder's money fund 

holdings. While some modest improvements have been made around the edges, money market 

mutual funds continue to operate with a fundamental structural weakness that can destabilize our 

financial markets. 

The Systemic Risk Council (SRC) believes prompt and decisive action is needed to curb system 

risks posed by money market funds. While we commend the Securities and Exchange 

Commission for seeking public comment on a proposed rule, the two primary options set forth in 

the SEC's proposal are not sufficient to address the risks posed by money market funds. The first 

(limited floating NA V) option will create a host of gaming and arbitrage opportunities and the 

second (gates and fees option) could make matters worse. A much better approach would be to 

require a floating NA V for all money market mutual funds. This is the same, simple, regulatory 

framework that applies to all other mutual funds: a framework that the SEC has implemented 

successfully (and without systemic risk or taxpayer bailouts) since 1940. 

The Stable NAV is the Cause of Money Market Funds' Structural Weakness 

Money market funds are used as "cash management" products - often as bank deposit substitutes 

- that, like deposits, are redeemable on demand. Unlike deposits. however, they have no capital, 

no insurance, no access to Federal Reserve liquidity and no legal requirements that their parent 

companies operate as a "source of strength". While the value of their underlying assets change 

1 Systemic Risk Council: The independent non~partisan Systemic Risk Council was formed by CF A Institute and the Pew 

Charitable Trusts to monitor and encourage regulatory refonn of U.S. capital markets focused on systemic risk. The statements, 

documents and recommendations of the private sector, volunteer Council do not necessarily represent the views of the supporting 

organizations. The Council works collaboratively to seek agreement on all recommendations. This fairly reflects the consensus 

views of the Council, but docs not bind individual members. W\Vw.systemicriskcounci1.org 
53 


86679.004

with the market every day like every other mutual fund; unlike every other mutual fund, the SEC 

permits money market funds to price their shares at a $1.00 even when the value of the assets 

underlying the fund are not worth $1.00. As has been highlighted at length by the Financial 

Stability Oversight Council, President's Working Group on Financial Markets, SEC, and others, 

this special exemption creates significant structural instability that - given the enormous role 

played by money market funds in the global lending markets exacerbates crises and can 

threaten the functioning of our financial markets. This structural weakness must be addressed 

head-on: either through strong capital requirements or a floating NA V. While we are pleased that 

the SEC took a step in this direction by proposing a floating NA V for "institutional" "prime" 

money funds, we are concerned that other money funds, including retail and government funds, 

would retain the stable NA V weakness. 

Leaving Stable NAV in Place Will Leave Retail Investors and Markets Unprotected 

Retail investors in stable NA V funds will remain at risk for bearing the costs of first-movers who 

will continue to have an incentive to run at the first sign of trouble. While it is true that runs 

during the 2008 money market fund crisis were concentrated in the institutional prime space, this 

does not mean other (e.g., retail) investors or investment classes were not at real risk. 

Institutional investors often move more quickly than retail investors and, because of the 

instability generated by their run in 2008, the government took quick and unprecedented action 

to guarantee the funds before the instability caused by their structural weakness could spread 

further. In the meantime, Congress has expressly prohibited the government from repeating those 

steps. Accordingly, a decision by the SEC to leave retail investors unprotected in stable NAV 

funds with large first mover advantages would be a mistake. Not only do retail investors often 

lack the ability to monitor fund holdings in real time and react with the speed of institutional 

investors, they are often the most at risk should their fund "break the buck" and be forced to halt 

redemptions and liquidate holdings. As was highlighted with the Reserve Primary Fund2

, 

investors may have to wait a very long time before being able to access all their funds. If the 

SEC does leave the stable NAVin place for retail investors, which I strongly believe is iIladvised, fund companies should at least be required to set aside sufficient loss absorbing capital 

to protect those investors (and their $1.00 NA V) in a crisis. 

Leaving the Stable NA V for "Agencies" Would Further Subsidize Debt Issued by Fannie 

Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks and the U.S. Treasury 

The stable NA V subsidizes 2a-7 eligible assets relative to similar assets that are not eligible. 

Under current law, part of that artificial subsidy is spread among a1l2a-7 eligible issuers (which 

include corporations, municipalities, the federal government and government-sponsored entities). 

To try to address the risks posed by the stable NA V accounting fiction, over time the SEC has 

narrowed the 2a-7 eligible assets, concentrating this subsidy on fewer and fewer issuers (and 

shorter-term debt) - and the proposal would focus it even more. 

2 While the SEC made changes in 2010 to help improve problems identified in the Reserve Fund's disorderly liquidation, those 

refonns remain untested. 
54 


86679.005

By leaving the stable NA V for institutional money market funds that invest in "agencies" 

("government funds") while floating the NA V for institutional funds that invest in corporate debt 

("prime funds"), institutional investors seeking the stable $1.00 will simply move their assets 

from prime funds to government funds, affecting the pricing for the underlying assets. 

The availability of this pool of subsidized cheap, short-term funding will also provide incentives 

for the Treasury and the GSEs (who issue this agency paper) to borrow short instead of long (just 

as many other large financial institutions did during the run-up to the financial crisis). This is a 

perverse incentive: one that creates a potential for significant maturity mismatch and interest rate 

risk in the Government and the GSEs. If these entities become dependent on cheap, short-term 

funding - rather than stable longer-term funding, the potential for sudden contagion from a stable 

NA V money fund crisis grows. While we grant the SEC is not responsible for regulating the 

risks of the Treasury or the GSEs, this phenomenon is a direct result of the subsidy created by 

the SEC through the stable NA V fiction and it risks being even more concentrated now in the 

agency space. 

It is also important to note that the SEC's proposed definition of government funds would not 

eliminate "break the buck" risk from these funds. Not only would the agency debt held in these 

funds continue to face meaningful interest rate risk (and even credit risk for some GSE issuers), 

the proposal would also permit these stable NA V funds to invest up to 20 percent of their 

portfolio in non-agency assets. Not only could this potentially mislead investors who expect 

government/agency funds to be entirely or almost entirely government paper - but whatever "derisking" comes from moving the stable NA V to government/agency assets would be lost as 

money funds use this 20 percent "other" bucket to reach for yield. This would put that stable 

NAV - and the markets - at risk in a crisis (again). 

This Disjointed Approach Could Also Raise Borrowing Costs for Traditional Commercial 

Paper Issuers Relative to Agencies 

By allowing stable NA V to remain for institutional government funds and floating NA V for 

institutional prime funds, the new rules will cause significant money to flow from commercial 

paper issuers to agency issuers. On a relative basis, this will artificially raise the cost of 

borrowing for corporations (whose debt is in the floating NA V "institutional prime" space), and 

artificially subsidize borrowing by the Treasury and these government-sponsored entities (Fannie 

Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks) whose debt is in the stable NA V 

"institutional government" space. At a time when the government should be working to reduce 

government subsidies which distort capital allocation, this approach goes in the opposite 

direction. 

The "Gates and Fees" Approach Could Make the Situation Worse by Moving Up the Run 

The liquidity "gates and fees" option is potentially worse than existing law as it retains the 

existing structural weakness of the stable NAV, but adds increased investor uncertainty about 

potential gating and fees. Because investors who run first can still get their $1.00 - and investors 

who stay could bear the losses of the first movers and the potential for delays accessing their 

funds and new fees - MMF investors will have an incentive to run from these products even 
55 


86679.006

earlier than they do now. In addition to reports that a number of investors object to this approach 

and view the floating alternative as far more palatable3

, there are real risks to markets and the 

payment system if a number of money funds suddenly imposed gates on redemptions in a crisis. 

Not only would issuers face difficulty accessing the short-term markets, but households and 

businesses could find themselves unable to access their money fund assets to pay bills or make 

payrolls. 

The Proposed Enhanced Disclosures Will Help Illustrate the Structural Weaknesses in 

Money Market Funds But Will Not Address the Systemic Risk 

While new disclosures will help better illustrate the structural weaknesses in money market 

funds - the run risks caused by the stable NA V will likely be compounded by several new 

disclosures which will alert investors to liquidity and NA V problems in their funds, giving large 

first movers the opportunity to redeem (at a $1.00) and embedding larger liquidity or capital 

losses on remaining holders. 

Even if an investor does not want to run, because they risk bearing the losses imposed by others 

who do - run risk remains and may be worsened. The structure of the product continues to 

incentivize runs - and the disclosures provide more impetus to run. Because of the stable NA V , 

money market fund runs are rational and not self-correcting through disclosure. Accordingly, 

these improved disclosures may help more investors understand how to game money funds by 

running, but they will not eliminate the structural weakness that causes runs, nor the systemic 

risks that can follow. 

The Best Solution is a Floating NAV for All Money Market Mutual Funds 

A floating NA V for all money market funds would not only address the core structural weakness 

and systemic risks posed by money funds - it would improve market functioning and fair 

competition by applying equally to all issuers and all investors. To the extent certain assets 

perform better than others, investors in those funds will profit. To the extent they perform worse, 

investors will take a loss. Functioning like other mutual funds, this approach does not create new 

run risks - nor does it result in the SEC picking winners and losers among issuers or asset classes 

- as the stable NA V approaches do. A floating NA V (for all funds) is the same, simple, 

regulatory framework that applies to all other mutual funds: a framework that the SEC has 

implemented successfully (and without systemic risk or taxpayer bailouts) since 1940. 

Floating NA V and "Run Risk" 

A number of reform opponents have sought to undercut the floating NA V solution as insufficient 

to address all possible runs, noting that investors may still move to "safety" in a crisis. While 

these are often rational changes in investment decisions, in this context, opponents of a floating 

'See e.g., "'Money Funds Embrace a Rule They Shunned," Andrew Ackerman, WSJ, Aug. 11,2013. 

http://online.wsj.comiarticle/SBIOOOI424127887323446404579006704153363792.html 
56 


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NA V appear to use the tenn "runs" when describing what, in other traditional mutual fund 

(floating NAV) contexts is just a routine move and re-pricing. 

The key point though is that floating funds do not cause runs - stable NAV funds do. To its 

credit, the proposal notes: 

The floating NA V alternative is not intended to deter redemptions that constitute rational 

risk management by shareholders or that reflect a general incentive to avoid loss. 

Instead, it is designed to increase transparency, and thus investor awareness, of money 

market fund risks and dis-incentivize redemption activity that can result from infonned 

investors attempting to exploit the possibility of redeeming shares at their stable share 

price even if the portfolio has suffered a loss. (emphasis added). 

It is true that a floating NA V would not "prohibit" investors (even en masse) from selling shorttenn 2(a)-7 eligible assets because of changes in the market place. Our markets are constantly repricing assets (often by the millisecond). If new infonnation arises, or events occur - markets reprice and sometimes investors sell assets in bulk and at the same time. This can occur in any 

asset4 - at any time. This re-pricing occurs all the time in many stocks and bonds: many of which 

are held by floating NA V mutual funds without destabilizing effects. 

The Stable NAV Causes & Exacerbates Runs - While the Floating NAV Does Not 

As noted at length by the SEC, President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Financial 

Stability Oversight Council and others, the stable NA V provides positive incentives that 

encourage first movers to run - and because of the $1.00, it provides little, if any, incentive not 

to run. If a fund's assets are worth less than a $1.00 - and you can redeem at $1.00 - the 

remaining shareholders are effectively paying first movers to run. This embeds pennanent losses 

in the fund for the remaining holders. Those shareholders can then be paid back eventually by 

sponsor support or suffer pennanent losses when the fund breaks a buck. Over the short-tenn, 

and particularly in a crisis, the potential upside for NOT running remains ONLY a $ 1.00. 

Accordingly, an investor gets a certain $1.00 if they run, but only a possible 1.00 if they stay 

(and it could be less and delayed through fund liquidation, gates, etc). Accordingly, investors 

have every incentive to run on a money market fund at the first sign of trouble. 

The floating NAV by contrast does not pay people to run. If a fund's assets are worth less than 

$1.00 (e.g., $0.98), its price is less than $1.00 ($0.98). Accordingly, the investors' choice is 

between 0.98 now or the potentially upside or downside tomorrow: just like other mutual funds. 

Moreover, because of forward pricing, the floating NA V - unlike the stable NA V -- re~uires that 

investors bear some of the liquidity and capital costs associated with their redemptions. This is a 

dramatic change in run dynamics. Not only does floating NA V not actively pay first movers to 

4 Including Treasuries, govcrnment~sponsored agency debt or rcpos collateralized by such debt 

5 Some money market fund reform opponents have argued that asset managers will still sell liquid assets first - giving first 

movers an advantage - but this argument does!lQ! undennine the fact that the floating NAV is much better than stable NAV in 

this regard. That same liquidity dynamic occurs in a stable NA V product now AND the stable NA V product effectively pays 

investors to run. The floating NAV product does not pay investors to run- and it prices in (albeit imperfectly) the liquidity and 

capitals cost of the redemptions. 
57 


86679.008

run (the difference between the real NA V and the $1.00), it helps limit their incentives to run 

(through forward pricing). 

The SEC Floating NA V Rules Must Prohibit Gaming 

Given the size of the existing stable NAV market, fund companies may try to find new ways 

around the SEes floating NAV rules. While we cannot guess all the possible ways, we urge the 

SEC to be vigilant against such efforts. Two tools used in the past have been (I) sponsor support 

and (2) amortized cost accounting. 

Prohibit Sponsor Support. The Proposal notes that: 

... money market funds' stable share price, combined with the practice of fund 

management companies providing financial support to money market funds when 

necessary may have implicitly encouraged investors to view these funds as 'risk-free' 

cash. However, the stability ... has been due, in part, to the willingness of fund sponsors 

to support the stable value of the fund. 

While this is true, unfortunately, it has also been due to the SEC's willingness to allow such 

support. While the proposal includes more disclosure of support - the final rule should expressly 

prohibit sponsor support. The proposal seems to view the disclosure of sponsor support as being 

a negative for a fund company (as if investors will penalize a fund company for supporting 

them). Investors, particularly in a crisis, however, view the possibility of sponsor support as a 

positive. Accordingly, permitting continued sponsor support - even with greater disclosure - will 

give investors more reason to move assets to particular funds - not less; with a potentially 

unfounded expectation that the sponsor will always protect them even though the sponsor has no 

legal obligation to do so and is not required to set aside capital to make good on that expectation. 

Allowing sponsor support to continue incentivizes investment based on a fund sponsor's 

likelihood of support, rather than based on asset allocation decisions. This moral hazard results in 

an unfair advantage for funds with large sponsors (often large, complex financial institutions and 

bank holding companies) at the expense of funds with smaller independent sponsors. This leads 

to distorted markets when those expectations are met - and potentially catastrophic consequences 

if the expectations cannot be (as with the Reserve Fund). 

The SEC should prohibit sponsor support so money market funds actually float, so investors get 

the real benefit - or loss - from asset allocation choices - and so investment companies compete 

fairly and equally with each other based on those investment choices - NOT based on the 

possibility that a parent company may provide support. 

Investment companies are legally separate from their sponsors and should compete with each 

other equally. tfthe SEC continues to permit sponsor supPOrt it must require that sponsors put 

money market funds on their balance sheet. 

As we learned with SIVs during the financial crisis, off-balance sheet vehicles should only be 

off-balance sheet if their risks cannot come back even during a crisis. Investors (and regulators) 
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86679.009

need full information about these public companies, their balance sheets and their potential 

future exposure - including whether they might be called upon to support a multi-billion dollar 

money market fund. 

Amortized Cost Accounting. The proposal would also continue to allow money funds to use 

amortized cost for debt instruments that have 60 days or less to maturity. While we understand 

this exemption is limited, the SEC should make sure that this exception is not abused or gamed 

by clarifying that this approach only works if it accurately reflects the value of the portfolio 

overall- not just asset by asset._ 

Unlike traditional mutual funds, 60-day paper could represent a relatively large percentage of a 

money fund's assets (and theoretically a fund company could game the entire rule by only 

investing in 60 day paper) - and even "small" differences in asset by asset pricing (on an 

amortized cost basis vs. a mark-to-market basis) could result in a meaningful difference in a 

fund's value overall- particularly in a more normalized interest rate environment. Investor 

behavior is based on fund valuation overall not the price of individual fund assets. If investors 

can run at the amortized cost $1.00 - rather than the lower real mark-to-market value - they can 

still game the fund, embed losses on others and risk sudden drops in price and rising 

redemptions. 

Conclusion 

We have strongly urged the SEC to require a floating NA V for all money market mutual funds 

and I would encourage Members of the Committee to do so as well. As seen during the 2008 

crisis, the rigidity and destabilizing effects of a stable NA V can shut down capital formation for 

issuers who rely on money market funds for short-term funding. A floating NAV would make 

markets much more flexible and allow funds - and markets to remain open and functioning in a 

crisis. Moreover, while other crises are sure to occur, they would no longer be caused or 

exacerbated by the stable NA V. Finally, a strong floating NA V approach, as outlined here, 

would help level the playing field for investment companies and investors by helping ensure that 

investment decisions and competitive outcomes are based on the quality of asset allocation 

decisions not the moral hazard of potential sponsor support. This is the same, simple, regulatory 

framework that applies to all other mutual funds: a framework that the SEC has implemented 

successfully (and without systemic risk or taxpayer bailouts) since 1940. 
59 


86679.010

Written Statement of Marie Chandoha 

President and Chief Executive Officer, 

Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. 

Before the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government-Sponsored Enterprises 

"Examining the SEC's Money Market Fund Rule Proposal" 

September 18,2013 

Chainnan Garrett, Ranking Member Maloney, and members of the Subcommittee, my name is 

Marie Chandoha, and I am the president and chief executive officer of Charles Schwab 

Investment Management, Inc., the asset management business of the Charles Schwab 

Corporation. Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today to discuss Schwab's 

perspective on the SEC's money market fund proposal. 

Schwab is one of the largest managers of money market fund assets in the United States, with 3 

million money market fund accounts and $168 billion in assets under management as of June 30, 

20 J 3. The overwhelming majority of Schwab's fund offerings are used by retail investors who 

use money market funds to manage their cash. Approximately 88% of Schwab's money market 

fund assets are in sweep funds. with the balance in purchased funds. Sweep accounts 

automatically invest idle cash balances while providing investors with convenience, liquidity and 

yield. These sweep accounts facilitate trading in brokerage accounts, allowing individuals to 

seamlessly buy and sell stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. Individuals also can write checks, pay 

bills electronically and use debit cards on these accounts. Even in the current environment, with 

historically-low yields on money market funds, our retail clients continue to value the 

convenience of this product. 

Overview of Our Position 

We generally support the SEC's refonn proposal because it strikes the right balance between 

reducing the likelihood of runs while also preserving money market funds as an extremely 

important cash management tool for individual investors. At the same time, we believe the 

proposed rule has a number of significant areas that need resolution before the rule is finalized. 

We believe a careful cost benefit analysis regarding the cost of implementation and the impact 

on the larger financial system, should be undertaken. 

To maximize the impact of the proposal, Schwab recommends that the final rule combine the 

two altematives proposed, subject to the recommended changes outlined below, for maximum 

effectiveness: requiring institutional prime funds to have a floating net asset value (NA V), and 

allowing a fund's board to impose liquidity fees and gating of all prime. municipal and 

govemment money market funds whenever the board believes doing so is in the best interest of 

the fund. 
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86679.011

Tn our comment letter to the SEC\ we offer a number of recommendations in an attempt to 

strengthen the proposal. An overview of our key recommendations follows: 

1. We recommend that the daily redemption limit for retail investors, which serves as the 

dividing line between "institutional investors" and "retail investors," be increased from 

$1 million to $5 million per business day. We also recommend that the Commission 

create a "Large Trade Order Notification" system that would allow retail investors to 

redeem more than the maximum daily redemption amount provided they have 

requested and received approval from the fund for such a transaction at least three days 

in advance. 

2. We recommend that municipal (tax-exempt) money market funds be exempted from the 

floating NA V proposal. 

3. We request that the rule confirm the treatment of registered investment advisers in the 

context of the definition of "retail" and "institutional" investor. 

4. We recommend that retirement accounts (Individual Retirement Accounts and 

employer-sponsored 401(k) and similar plans) and educational accounts such as 529 

plans be exempted from the rule. 

5. We recommend that the tax issues identified by the Commission in its proposal be 

resolved by the appropriate regulator prior to the rule taking effect. 

6. While generally supporting the Commission's proposed enhancements to disclosure, 

Schwab has a number of recommendations for changes. 

Alternative One - Floating NA V for Institutional Prime Funds 

Tn its proposal, the Commission calls for requiring certain institutional prime money market 

funds to move from a stable NA V to a floating NA V, while permitting retail prime money 

market funds, Treasury money market funds and Government money market funds to retain their 

stable $I-per-share price. Schwab has long opposed a broad floating NAV for all money market 

funds as a lethal blow to the product. We believe that what limited risk there is of a run in a 

money market fund lies with institutional investors. Chairman White articulated this view 

concisely in her opening statement at the Commission's Open Meeting at which it voted 

unanimously to propose the rule: "This floating NA V proposal specifically targets the funds 

where the problems during the financial crisis occurred: institutional, prime money market 

funds.,,2 

J Comment letter from Marie A. Chandoha, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (the "Schwab comment 

letter"), to SEC proposed rule, "Money Market Fund Reform: Amendments to Form PF," File No. S7-03-13, 78 

Federal Register at 36834, June 19,2013. Available at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-l3/s70313-109.pdf. 

2 White, Mary 10, "Opening Statement at the SEC Open Meeting," June 5, 2013. Available at: 

http://www.sec.govlNews/SpeechIDetaiVSpeech/1365171575546#.UhFnBz ZPDY. 

2 
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86679.012

While we continue to oppose a broadly-applied floating NA V for the entire money market fund 

industry, we believe a targeted solution such as the one put forward by the Commission would 

make the product less susceptible to destabilizing runs yet preserve this critically important 

product for retail investors. A floating NA V would reduce the "first-mover advantage." Runs in 

money market funds can be triggered when institutional investors who have the ability to redeem 

large amounts of shares believe that a fund may be in danger of seeing its share price fall below 

$1 per share and they redeem their shares. There is an incentive to be first to redeem because 

investors who are slower to redeem have a higher chance of getting less than $1 per share return 

on their investment if the fund's share price does "break the buck." We agree with the 

Commission's assessment that a floating NAV would reduce the incentive to redeem shares and 

would result in greater appreciation of the risks in money market funds by making gains and 

losses more apparent to investors. 

Where the Commission once appeared to have an unrealistic goal in mind for money market 

fund reform namely, eliminating any possibility of a run - there is now an acknowledgement 

that such a goal is impossible. No regulatory solution short of banning an entire product can 

eliminate the risk of a run, and the floating NA V is no perfect panacea. If a crisis is bad enough, 

investors in a floating NA V fund will run, even at the risk of getting less than $1 per share 

return. But the targeted floating NA V proposal the Commission has put forward accomplishes 

the critical goals: reducing the risk of a run and reducing the impact such a run would have on 

retail investors. 

Distinguishing Between "Retail" and "Institutional" Investors 

We believe the proposed $1 million Redemption Limit for distinguishing between "retail" and 

"institutional" investors is too low and we recommend that the limit be increased to $5 million. 

Our concern is for operational complexities and the negative client experience that will result if 

the limit is set too low. If the client experience is poor or has complexities, clients will move out 

of retail prime funds in large numbers. Prime retail money market funds with a daily redemption 

limit need to maintain most of the value proposition of to day's money fund or clients will 

abandon the product. At a threshold of $5 million, this value proposition for retail investors can 

be better maintained, yet this threshold is still low enough that it would not include institutional 

investors. 

There are numerous circumstances in which a retail investor might find himself needing to move 

more than $1 million out of money market fund in a single day. The Commission's proposal 

notes some: "a retail investor may make large redemption requests when closing out their 

account, rebalancing their investment portfolio, paying their tax bills, or making a large purchase 

such as the down payment on a house."} To that list, we would add other examples, including 

the sale or purchase of a small business and the transfer of assets from one firm to another. 

The example of transferring assets from one firm to another is a useful illustration of how 

cumbersome the rule could be for clients. A client with a $50 million portfolio, including $5 

million in a prime money market fund, decides to transfer that portfolio from Financial Services 

Company X to Schwab. Under the current proposal, the client could only sell out of his position 

378 Fed. Reg. at 36859. 

3 
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86679.013

in the prime money market fund in $1 million increments, a process that would take 5 business 

days. That cash would then be transferred to Schwab, where we would sweep that cash into a 

money market fund that night. If the cash was swept into a prime fund, the new client would not 

be able to diversifY right away; rather, he would again be limited to $1 million daily redemptions 

in order to then purchase shares of a stock, bond, mutual fund or other investment product. This 

kind of client experience is simply untenable. To avoid such a scenario, Schwab would 

undoubtedly prohibit the incoming cash from being swept into a prime money market fund and 

would instead sweep the cash into a Treasury or government money market fund, potentially at a 

lower yield. 

Schwab's heavy use of money market funds as the sweep vehicle presents a host of other 

challenges. Given that a client can use a variety of mechanisms to access the funds in his sweep 

account, including writing a check, withdrawing cash at an automatic teller machine, and using a 

debit card to make a purchase, it is not clear how a client whose aggregated activitics exceed the 

redemption limit during a given day should be treated. For example, if a client with $1.5 million 

in prime money market fund assets makes an online purchase of $995,000 worth of shares in a 

stock, and on the same day his $10,000 donation check to his alma mater clears, he pays three 

bills totaling $750 via electronic bill payment, and withdraws $100 in cash at an ATM, he has 

exceeded the daily redemption limit by $5,850. Schwab will be required to reject certain of these 

client transactions to ensure compliance with the daily dollar threshold, resulting in an 

unsatisfactory client experience and likely negative external impacts to the client that derive 

from the canceled cash transactions. Moreover, a client will have to self-monitor his cumulative 

money fund withdrawals for a given day, which could be overwhelmingly complicated as it 

could include pending withdrawals from previous days' activity, the clearing of previously 

written checks, and the settlement of executed trades across all of the shareholder's accounts. 

Need for a "Large Trade Order Notification" System 

Schwab strongly supports the addition of a mechanism for retail investors to redeem more than 

$1 million (or more than whatever daily redemption limit the Commission ultimately settles 

upon in the final rule) in a single day, provided the investor gives advance notice of their intent 

to do so. We call this a "Large Trade Order Notification" system, or LTON. We believe this is 

an important addition to the rule because it benefits retail investors and will help alleviate 

investor anxiety when an unusual circumstance arises - a house sale, a small business sale, a 

transfer of assets from one finn to another, or other event that warrants a significant movement 

of cash in and out of a money market fund - while also allowing the fund manager enough time 

to prepare for the larger-than-usual redemption without affecting the fund or other investors. 

We recommend that the Commission adopt an L TON that requires the investor to provide the 

fund with infonnation about his or her intention to redeem in excess of the daily redemption 

limit, including the amount of the redemption and the date of the redemption, with a minimum of 

three business days advance notice. We believe that there should be no limit on the amount of 

the redemption, but that the fund manager should be granted the discretion to reject all or part of 

the redemption request if the request is so large as to potentially put the fund at an inappropriate 

level of risk. For example, a fund manager could decide to decline a redemption request if it 

would cause the fund to fall below the required 30% weekly liquidity level under Rule 2a-7 or 

4 
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86679.014

otherwise have an adverse impact on the fund. We suggest giving the fund manager broad 

discretion on this point. 

Exception for Municipal (Tax-Exempt) Money Market Funds 

Schwab believes strongly that municipal (tax-exempt) money market funds should be exempted 

from the floating NA V requirement. A key reason to exempt tax-exempt money market funds 

from the proposal is that these funds are much more liquid than prime funds and are significantly 

less susceptible to runs. An examination of the performance of municipal money market funds 

during the 2008 financial crisis underscores this point. As seen in Figure I, municipal money 

market funds - both national funds and state-specific funds - were remarkably stable during the 

financial crisis, particularly when compared with prime funds. 

Figure 14 

2,500 

2,000 

1,500 

1.000 

500 

Industry MMF AUM by Category 

(May 2008 - January 2009 in $6) 

May-J8 Jun-OS Jul-08 Aug-08 Sop-OB Oct-08 Nov·08 Joo-08 Ja1·09 

In Figure 2, which shows the month-over-month change in assets under management in different 

types of funds from June 2008 through January 2009, we can see that during the worst month of 

the crisis - September 2008 municipal money market funds dropped only 8% industrywide, as 

compared to a 22% drop in assets in prime funds. 

4 nata for Figures 1 and 2 compiled using end-of-month assets under management data from iMoneyNet 

(www.iMoneyNet.com) 

5 
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86679.015

Figure 2 

40% 

35% 

30% 

25% 

20% 

15% 

-10% 

-15% 

Month-over-Month Industry MMF AUM Change by Category 

(June 2008 - January 2009) 

.' Gcvemment ....... Prim e ......,MJni National ........ Muni State 

The experience with Schwab's proprietary municipal money market funds during the crisis 

shows that these funds are particularly resilient. Schwab's largest tax-exempt fund is the 

nationally-diversified Schwab Municipal Money Fund Portfolio, which in August 2008 

accounted for nearly half of all municipal money market fund assets under management at 

Schwab. Between August 2008 and December 2008, the largest weekly outflow the fund 

experienced was 5.1 % of assets - far below the minimum weekly liquidity requirement of 30%. 

Only one of Schwab's eight municipal money market funds experienced an outflow of greater 

than 10% in any week during the crisis, still well below the weekly liquidity requirement. 

Indeed, Schwab's municipal money market funds typically hold much more than the required 

30% in weekly liquidity; for the first seven months of2013, Schwab's Municipal Money Fund 

(SWXXX) held weekly liquid assets ranging from 68% to 72% of total assets. 

Another compelling reason to exempt tax-exempt money market funds from the proposed 

reforms is that the product as a whole does not pose a systemic risk. Municipal money market 

funds comprise just over 10% of total money market fund assets -- $267.06 billion out ofa total 

of $2.622 trillion as of August 14,2013.5 Despite its relatively small size, the municipal money 

market is critically important to the financing of state and local governments because the money 

fund industry is the largest investor in short-term municipal securities. We do not believe that a 

product of this size, yet with outsized importance to the economy, warrants the complex and 

costly operational challenges that would be presented by trying to comply with the daily 

redemption limit envisioned by the Commission's proposal. We urge the Commission not to 

rely on the current rule proposal's assumption that most tax-exempt funds would qualifY for the 

retail money market fund exception to the floating NAY, and instead specifically exempt 

municipal money market funds from the proposal. 

5 "Money Market Mutual Fund Assets," a weekly report compiled by the Investment Company Institute, August 15, 

2013. Available at: http://www.ici.org/research/stats/mmfimm 08 15 13. 

6 
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86679.016

Treatment of Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs) 

The Charles Schwab Corporation's Advisor Services business provides trading, custody, 

technology, practice management and other support services to nearly 7,000 registered 

investment advisers. Registered investment advisors are not shareholders of record, and thus, by 

the terms of the proposed rule the Redemption Limit would not and should not apply; rather, the 

proposed rule would require that the Redemption Limit be applied to the investment adviser's 

underlying clients, either by the financial intermediary that custodies the underlying clients' 

assets or the investment adviser itself. Registered investment advisers typically bundle the 

transactions of their many retail clients into a single transaction, much in the same way that a 

financial intermediary holding an omnibus account bundles trades of its underlying customers. 

A registered investment advisor, however, is not an "omnibus account holder" as defined under 

the proposed rule. 

We do not believe it is or should be the Commission's intent to apply the Redemption Limit to 

registered investment advisers. Retail investors who choose to engage the services of a 

registered investment adviser should not be excluded from retail funds in which they otherwise 

would be permitted to invest. Indeed, if registered investment advisers are subject to the 

redemption limit, it would be penalizing the retail client who has elected to outsource their 

investment management to a professional rather than handle it themselves. We are concerned, 

however, that because the proposed rule does not expressly consider the treatment of registered 

investment advisers, there could be a lack of clarity as to its application relative to these advisers. 

As such, we respectfully ask that the Commission confirm our understanding of the proposed 

rule as it relates to registered investment advisers. 

Tax Treatment of Floating NA V Money Market Funds 

We share the widely-held view that the tax implications of moving to a floating NAV are 

significant and need to be resolved before the rule takes effect. Shareholders in a floating NA V 

fund would experience small gains or losses on the sale of their shares and would be required to 

track those gains and losses for determining their tax burden. Given that clients may make 

hundreds of transactions within a money market fund every year, the burden on tracking this 

information seems wildly out of proportion with the potential revenue gain for the Treasury. 

We applaud the efforts of the Commission to work with the Department of the Treasury and the 

Internal Revenue Service on this issue. Earlier this year, the Treasury Department issued a 

proposed Revenue Procedure6 that addresses one aspect of the tax implications for a floating 

NA V fund - the wash sale rule. The proposal includes a de minimis exception from the loss 

disallowance rule if the loss is less than 0.5% of the taxpayer's basis. While we support this 

proposal, we note that it does not eliminate the requirement to track compliance with the wash 

sale rule. We recommend that the IRS simply exempt floating NA V money market funds from 

the wash sales reporting rules. 

With regard to the reporting of gains and losses, some of the issues could be ameliorated if the 

6 "Application of Wash Sale Rules to Money Market Fund Shares," Internal Revenue Service Notice 2013-48. 

Available at: http://www.irs,gov/pub/irs-droP/n-I3-48.pdf. 

7 
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86679.017

IRS were to issue guidance allowing net information reporting by funds and summary income 

reporting by shareholders. But, again, these steps do not relieve funds of the burden of tracking 

literally hundreds of thousands of transactions per day and reporting gains and losses to 

investors. At Schwab, between March 16,2013, and June 25, 2013, we conducted an average of 

365,000 sweep transactions per day, with a peak day of 1.1 million sweep transactions. The 

burden of tracking and reporting the gains and losses within each of those transactions presents a 

systems issue that would be prohibitively expensive to develop and implement. 

To illustrate the de minimis gains and losses at stake, we analyzed our largest money market 

fund, the Cash Reserves Fund (SWSXX) to estimate the net gain or loss realized by shareholders 

who redeemed during a particular period. Since Schwab began calculating daily mark-to-market 

NAY of the fund in March 2013, there has been little price fluctuation. Between March 25, 

2013, and July 23, 2013, the range of the daily NAY of this fund spanned $1.000132 to 

$1.000179. With that narrow ofa fluctuation, the daily gains and losses offset one another, 

resulting in a negligible gain over the time period. As of July 23, 2013, the fund had more than 

$37 billion in assets and more than 700,000 investors. That infinitesimal gain is spread out 

among each of those investors. In other words, on a per-investor basis, the net gain was a 

fraction of a penny - an amount that could not be remitted to the Treasury anyway. 

Given the operational burdens of tracking and reporting this information and the negligible 

impact to the Treasury in tenns of revenue, we urge the Commission to continue working with 

the IRS to eliminate this tracking altogether unless the gain or loss on any transaction exceeds 50 

basis points. 

Alternative Two Standby Liquidity Fees and Gates 

The Commission proposes, as an alternative to the floating NA V for institutional prime money 

market funds, imposing two provisions for money market funds that encounter distress. Funds 

would be allowed to continue to transact at a stable, $1-per-share price under normal conditions, 

but when the weekly liquid assets of a non-government money market fund drop below 15% of 

the total assets, the fund would be required to institute a liquidity fee and would be permitted to 

impose a redemption gate. 

Schwab's recommendation is that the Commission should permit the fund's board to impose 

either a liquidity fee or redemption gates whenever it determines that doing so is in the best 

interest of the fund and its shareholders. Instead of having the 15% weekly liquidity level as the 

trigger for an imposition of fees andlor gates, the proposal should require the fund's board to 

meet when the fund's weekly liquidity hits 15%, if it has not already done so. The fund must 

then issue a public statement from the board indicating that it has met as required, that it has 

determined that redemption gates andlor liquidity fees are to be imposed or not imposed, and its 

reasons for the decision it has made. 

We believe that gating and redemption fees can be a powerful tool if a fund is under serious 

stress and heading towards liquidation. In such a scenario, these tools would help facilitate an 

orderly liquidation and ensure that shareholders are treated fairly, as there would be less 

opportunity for first mover advantage. We believe that this is the only circumstance in which it 

8 
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86679.018

would be reasonable to impose gates and/or fees, as we have a hard time seeing how any fund 

that actually imposed fees and or redemption gates would ever be able to recover and be a viable 

fund again. Investor trust in that fund would be lost. We see the fees and gating proposal, then, 

as an interim step toward orderly liquidation of a fund. 

We also believe that the board should have more discretion over when to impose gates andlor 

fees, rather than having a mandatory trigger of reaching 15% weekly liquidity. There are 

situations in which a fund could be under stress without reaching the proposed trigger point. For 

instance, the liquidity of a fund could be high, but a default of a creditor in the portfolio could 

put the fund in a highly-stressed scenario. In such a situation, the board might believe it is in the 

best interest of the shareholders to gate the fund and impose liquidity fees. It should have the 

ability to do so. 

Moreover, a hard trigger could lead to "pre-emptive" runs on funds as they approach the weekly 

liquidity threshold. With the increased transparency of money market funds, investors can keep 

close track of a fund's weekly liquidity levels. Sophisticated investors will likely redeem from 

the fund as it approaches the 15% weekly liquidity trigger, though it is not clear at what point 

they will begin redeeming - it could be 20%, or 18%, or some other number. The result could be 

a run that sends the fund more rapidly below the trigger point, from which we have already 

asserted the likelihood of recovery is minimal. By giving the board discretion to impose fees 

and/or gates at any time, this risk is mitigated. Moreover, since there is no certain point at which 

fees or gates must be imposed, it lessens the likelihood of a run. 

We agree with the Commission that liquidity fees would add an important disincentive to early 

redeemers. As discussed earlier, a key concern of the Commission is that early redeemers have 

an advantage over other investors when a fund is under stress, since they will get a full return on 

their investment and later redeemers may not. A liquidity fee would force early redeemers to 

pay for the costs of their redemption, without knowing whether the fund was actually going to 

experience losses or not. This is a powerful disincentive. 

While we agree that the proposed liquidity fee of 2% would be a strong disincentive to redeem 

during a crisis, we also support the provision in the rule proposal to allow the fund board to 

increase or decrease this fee if it determines that circumstances warrant such action. The latter 

provision gives the board needed flexibility. 

We also note that there are several operational challenges, particularly for sweep funds, that arise 

with the possibility of fees andlor gating, which further supports providing the board discretion 

to impose fees and gates rather than subjecting funds to a hard trigger. As envisioned by the 

Commission, once a fund imposes a liquidity fee, that fee would be taken out of each client 

transaction. However, at Schwab, our money market fund sweep clients are able to use debit 

cards, make withdrawals of cash at automatic teller machines, write checks, and use electronic 

bill pay to access their money market fund assets. 

If a mandated liquidity fee is imposed on a fund during the course of the day, and the client 

makes a series of transactions that day, we would have to impose the liquidity fee on each 

transaction retroactively. For example, if the client writes a check tied to his or her sweep fund 

9 
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86679.019

holdings to make a $100 purchase at the grocery store and uses a debit card to buy a $4 cup of 

coffee at Starbucks, at the end of the day Schwab would have to impose a $2.08 liquidity fee on 

those transactions. The funds could be withdrawn from the client's remaining balance in the 

fund and the client notified of the fee, but this would be a cumbersome and time-consuming 

process. Alternatively, Schwab could bounce the check, which could potentially trigger 

additional fees, not to mention frustrate the client. 

The Commission notes in its proposal that it chose to require the fee, rather than make it fully 

discretionary, because of concerns that "a purely discretionary trigger creates the risk that a fund 

board may be reluctant to impose restrictions, even when they would benefit the fund and the 

short-term financing markets.,,7 We believe that this view does not take into account that fund 

boards have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the fund's shareholders. As noted 

above, imposing fees or gates is, in our view, tantamount to commencing an orderly liquidation 

of the fund. But not every instance of a drop in weekly liquidity will warrant such drastic action. 

We urge the Commission to empower fund boards to impose liquidity fees and/or redemption 

gates whenever it believes doing so is in the best interest of the fund, and to require the board to 

meet and determine whether or not fees and/or gates are warranted if the fund hits 15% weekly 

liquidity and the board has not already taken any action. 

Exemption for Retirement and Education Accounts 

We believe that retirement and education accounts should either be allowed unlimited 

redemptions, or, perhaps more simply, exempted entirely from both alternatives in the proposal. 

Accounts such as Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRAs"), employer-sponsored defined 

contribution retirement plans (such as 401(k) plans and 403(b) plans), and 529 college savings 

plans are designed for individuals and serve no purpose for institutional investors. We believe 

the risks in these types of accounts are minimal. 

Defined contribution plan sponsors often select money market funds as a capital preservation 

fund investment alternative. In virtually all plans, this is the only stable NA V investment option. 

Some plans even require a stable NA V investment option within the capital preservation 

category. A floating NA V money market fund is likely to be unworkable as an investment 

option in a defined contribution plan. 

The major issues for these accounts, however, arise with the Commission's Alternative Two, 

which contemplates imposing liquidity fees and redemption gates in certain circumstances. The 

proposal has a number of unintended consequences for retirement plan participants and sponsors. 

For example, the proposal may inadvertently cause a plan participant to violate the Minimum 

Required Distribution rules. Participants in qualified retirement plans and Individual Retirement 

Accounts generally must begin receiving distributions by April I following the year in which the 

participant Of IRA holder reaches age 70 liz. Failure to make the distribution may result in 

disqualification for the retirement plan or IRA and excise taxes for the participant or IRA holder. 

The imposition of a redemption gate may cause the plan or the IRA to fail to make a timely 

distribution if all or some of the assets from which the distribution needs to be taken are held in a 

money market fund that has a gate in place. 

7 78 Fed. Reg. at 36884. 

10 
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86679.020

In our comment letter to the SEC, we outline several other common situations in which potential 

unintended consequences could impact a plan participant. Similar complexities arise in 

education accounts, such as 529 plans. We believe that many plan sponsors would avoid these 

issues by simply declining to use any money market fund that has even the potential of being 

subject to liquidity fees and/or redemption gates. A movement by retirement plans away from 

prime money market funds and into money market funds not subject to the proposed rules, such 

as Treasury or government funds, would further exacerbate the concentration within those types 

offunds. rfplan sponsors did not believe that such funds were adequate for the plan's needs, it 

could increase desire for other types of stable-value products, in an environment where the 

supply of such funds is diminishing. In addition, a plan sponsor's selection of a government 

money market fund as the cash sweep vehicle for a plan would not necessarily be the most 

appropriate vehicle for retirement plan assets that are already tax-exempt while held in the plan's 

trust. 

As a result of the complexities that arise in the context of an employer-sponsored plan, IRA or an 

education account, we recommend that these types of accounts be exempted from both 

alternatives in the Commission's proposed reforms. 

Combining Alternative One and Two 

Schwab supports combining the two alternatives proposed by the Commission - with the 

recommended changes outlined in this letter - into a single final rule because the two alternatives 

together provide a larger set of tools to deter runs in money market funds. The first alternative 

applies only to institutional prime money market funds. The second alternative, the liquidity and 

gating proposal, would be available as an option, should the fund board determine it is necessary, 

to prime, municipal and government money market funds. Together, we believe the two 

alternatives cover a broader array of products and could prove effective at deterring destabilizing 

runs. 

Enhanced Disclosure Requirements 

Generally, Schwab believes that more disclosure and transparency is better for individual 

investors. Of course, all regulators struggle with achieving an appropriate balance between 

providing the right amount of information to investors to help them make informed investing 

decisions and overwhelming investors with so much disclosure that they do not read or absorb 

any of it. It is Schwab's view that the Commission's call for enhanced disclosure has, for the 

most part, achieved the proper balance, with the exception of some elements of the rule proposal 

where we believe that the cost and complexity of producing the information far outweighs the 

benefits to investors or to the Commission. Proposed disclosures around instances of sponsor 

support would provide investors with useful context for analyzing the stability of the fund, 

though we would note that not all instances of sponsor support are indicative of a fund under 

even mild stress, let alone nearing the point of breaking the buck. Requiring daily disclosure of a 

fund's current net asset value, which Schwab began voluntarily making available in February 

2013, would be a very valuable tool for investors. 

Il 
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86679.021

There are elements of the proposed disclosure requirements, however, that we believe are not 

appropriate. In our comment letter, we recommend that the SEC eliminate the requirement to 

provide new, detailed information with respect to every portfolio holding a costly process that 

we do not believe would result in useful information for investors. We also believe that 

disclosing the total percentage of shares held by the 20 largest shareholders of record could lead 

to misperceptions of the concentration risk in a fund, since a financial intermediary could be 

reported as a significant holder of fund shares despite the fact that no one underlying investor has 

any meaningful number of shares. There are also several examples of disclosure requirements 

in which the proposed time period for making the information available is simply unrealistic. 

Cost Analysis of Com plying with the Proposed Rule 

As required by law, the Commission has included in its proposed reforms an analysis of the costs 

of compliance. We find the Commission's conclusions to significantly underestimate those 

costs. In some areas, the Commission's estimates are low by multiple orders of magnitude. We 

cite below some representative examples of the anticipated costs of the proposed reforms. 

One area in which we believe the Commission has not adequately considered the cost of its 

proposal is in the development of a floating NA V institutional prime money market fund. The 

Commission staff's estimate for the systems modifications necessary to support a floating NAV 

money market fund in the proposal ranges from $1.2 million to $2.3 million.s By contrast, given 

the complexities of developing the operational capability to support our sweep features, we 

estimate that the one-time cost will exceed $10 million. 

We also believe that the Commission has not adequately considered the costs of educating and 

training employees to understand the new rules, or the costs of communicating the rule changes 

to clients. We estimate these costs to be in a range of at least $4 million in advance of the new 

rules taking effect, and at least $500,000 in annual costs thereafter. The Commission's proposal 

does not include a specific estimate of education, training and client communication costs. 

Rather, the proposal embeds these costs as part of its estimates of the costs of developing the 

systems to support floating NA V funds, daily redemption limits, gates and fees, and other 

aspects of the proposal. We believe this leads to a serious underestimation of the 

communications and education challenges that funds will face if these rules were to be approved. 

Potential Repercussions of Money Market Fund Reform 

While Schwab generally supports the SEC's reform efforts, especially in the context of other 

proposals that have been considered, the reforms being proposed would bring about fundamental 

changes to money market funds, at significant cost. Those changes have potentially significant 

repercussions on the larger financial system that warrant careful consideration by the 

Commission. Among the most significant is the degree to which the proposal would reduce the 

number and size of prime money market funds by driving those assets elsewhere. 

The question then becomes what is the impact on other products if prime money market funds 

experience a sharp decline in assets. In particular, we believe the impact on government money 

g 78 Fed. Reg. at 36871. 

12 
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86679.022

market funds will be significant. Government money market funds would undoubtedly absorb 

the majority of the assets that move out of prime money market funds if a daily redemption limit 

were to be imposed on the latter. But it is not clear that government money market funds have 

the capacity to handle this amount of inflows. Portfolio managers of government money market 

funds would likely find themselves in a frantic competition to purchase a dwindling supply of 

securities. The combination of tight supply, high demand and low interest rates will continue to 

put pressure on government funds. It will become increasingly challenging for these funds to 

maintain a positive rate of return for investors. 

Alternatively, assets could flow to other types of products, such as bank products or ultra-short 

funds and exchanged-traded funds. None of these products are regulated by Rule 2a-7. Many of 

the largest banks are likely to be reluctant to absorb these dollars because ofthe impact on their 

capital ratios, the lack of short-term investment options, and the fact that they must pay deposit 

insurance based on their assets. 

Another potential concern is that the transition to a new regulatory regime for money market 

funds could itself spark a destabilizing run of the very kind the rules are intended to prevent. We 

expect that, if the Commission finalizes a rule calling for institutional prime funds to have a 

floating NA V, there will be a quick exodus by institutional investors from prime funds to 

government funds or other products that do not have the new restrictions. This could lead to 

worry by other investors that the large redemptions are either indicative of a problem in the fund 

or will lead to liquidity concerns within the fund as it seeks to meet those redemptions and 

those investors could then also seek to redeem. 

We believe it is incumbent upon the Commission to carefully weigh these potential impacts on 

the broader financial system as it considers a final rule. 

Conclusion 

The SEC has proposed a serious set of reforms that will have enormous ramifications on the 

money market fund industry. They will be costly for Schwab and other firms to implement, and 

they represent a fundamental overhaul of a product investors of all types have relied upon for 

four decades. But we support the proposed reforms because they target the reform where the risk 

exists and reform will have its greatest impact: institutional prime funds. By exempting retail 

investors from the floating NAV, the Commission is acknowledging both that the product is of 

critical importance to retail investors and that these investors are not likely to cause a run. We 

believe that this proposal, when combined with increasing the ability of fund boards to impose 

redemption gates and/or liquidity fees to facilitate orderly liquidation of a distressed fund, will 

produce a stronger, more robust money market fund industry. Other regulators have called for a 

one-size-fits-all approach that would destroy the product for individual investors. We believe the 

SEC has found a tough yet pragmatic solution that will boost investor confidence, deter 

destabilizing runs, and ensure that individual investors can rely on this critically important 

product for generations to come. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to offer Schwab's perspective on this important issue. 

I would be happy to respond to any questions. 

\3 
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86679.023

Statement 

of the 

U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce 

ON: "SEC Proposal on Money Market Funds" 

TO: U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital 

Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises 

BY: James P. Gilligan 

DATE: September 18, 2013 

The Chamber"s mission is to adyance human progress through an ('conomic. 

political and social system based on individual freedom, 

incentive, initiative, opportunity and responsibility. 
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86679.024

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world's largest business federation 

representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and 

regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations. The Chamber is 

dedicated to promoting, protecting, and defending America's free enterprise system. 

More than 96% of Chamber member companies have fewer than 100 

employees, and many of the nation's largest companies are also active members. We 

are therefore cognizant not only of the challenges facing smaller businesses, but also 

those facing the business community at large. 

Besides representing a cross-section of the I\merican business community with 

respect to the number of employees, major classifications of American business--e.g., 

manufacturing, retailing, services, construction, wholesalers, and finance-are 

represented. 'The Chamber has membership in all SO states. 

The Chamber's international reach is substantial as well. We believe that global 

interdependence provides opportunities, not threats. In addition to dle American 

Chambers of Commerce abroad, an increasing number of our members engage in the 

export and import of both goods and services and have ongoing investment activities. 

The Chamber favors strengthened international competitiveness and opposes artificial 

U.S. and foreign barriers to international business. 

Positions on issues are developed by Chamber members serving on 

committees, subcommittees, councils, and task forces. Nearly 1,900 businesspeople 

participate in this process. 

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86679.025

Good morning Chainnan Garrett, Ranking Member Maloney, and Members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the potential impact of 

the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposal regarding money market 

mutual funds (11MMFs) on the business community. 

My name is James Gilligan, and I am the Assistant Treasurer of Great Plains 

Energy Incorporated. Great Plains Energy is the holding company of Kansas City 

Power & Light Company and KCP&L Greater "Missouri Operations Company. 

These utilities operate under the brand name KCP&L. Our electtic utilities serve over 

830,000 customers in 47 counties in Missouri and Kansas with a combined diverse 

generation platform of more than 6,600 ~1W of capacity. I am also a former member 

of the Board of Directors for the Association for Financial Professionals (AFP) and 

currendy serve as the Chainnan of its Government Relations Committee. AFP's 

membership includes more than 16,000 fInancial professionals employed by over 

5,000 companies and organizations. I am here testifying on behalf of the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce and the thousands of corporate treasury offIcials and fInancial 

professionals who are tasked with managing their companies' cash flows and ensuring 

that they have the working capital and liquidity necessary to effIciently support their 

operations. 

Key Points 

There are several important points I wish to stress to the Subcommittee. 

• At the outset, we must be mindful that with respect to money market mutual 

funds, the SEC is not operating in a vacuum. MMMFs have existed for over 

four decades. These funds are used by businesses throughout the United States 

to meet their cash management and short-term funding needs. They are an 

integral part of a tightly interwoven system for low-cost, short-term business 

ftnancing of unrivalled liquidity and efftciency. This system has served the 

American economy well, and provides a competitive advantage for American 

businesses in global markets. 

• The Chamber and the corporate treasury community believes that the major 

rule changes to ~1MMFs regulations that were implemented in January 2010 

were well conceived and strengthened the product to withstand signifIcant 

market stress. As the SEC considers moving forward with additional 

regulation, it is incumbent on the Commission to take a balanced and datadriven approach to further strengthen MMMFs while preserving the critical 

3 
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86679.026

role they serve for U.S. businesses, state and local governments, non-profit 

organizations, and for the economy as a whole. 

• The SEC's proposed alternative to mandate a floating net asset value (NAV) 

for institutional prime money market mutual funds would fundamentally alter 

the product, eliminating the key benefits companies derive from investing in 

these funds-stability and liquidity. If the floating NA V alternative is 

implemented, money market mutual funds would no longer remain a viable 

investment option to many treasurers and financial professionals. 

Consequently, Vv-ith fewer investors and less capital to invest, money market 

mutual funds would no longer remain a significant purchaser of corporate 

commercial paper. The reduced demand would drive up borrowing costs 

significantly by forcing companies to fund their day-to-day operations with less 

efficient and more costly alternatives. It is important to note that the 

rulemaking in question is discretionary and not mandated by law like the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, but it will require 

fundamental changes to existing business operations across the country. 

• The Chamber believes the SEC has not substantiated that a floating NAVis 

the appropriate solution to the problem the Commission is seeking to solve. 

Even in its proposal, the SEC acknowledges a floating NA V will not 

necessarily reduce the risk of Vv-idespread redemptions during times of market 

stress. Given the uncertainty as to whether this proposal will protect against a 

"run" on money funds, we believe it is wholly inappropriate to implement the 

proposal since it will undermine the value of money market mutual funds while 

driving up costs drastically, harming corporate growth and job creation. 

• The Chamber supports greater transparency with respect to the holdings of 

Ml\1MFs The daily disclosure of a "shadow NA V" that many mutual fund 

companies currently report provide investors with the benefits of a floating 

NA V-real time information regarding the estimated value of fund holdingswithout jeopardizing the viability and utility of l\1i\£MFs. 

Why Money Market Mutual Funds are Important 

l\1.lViMFs playa critical role in the U.S. economy because they work extremely 

well to serve the investment and short-term funding needs of businesses across 

America. l\1i\L.lViFs are a critical component of the technologically advanced, real time 

cash management systems that businesses use to ensure liquidity efficiently and at a 

4 
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86679.027

low cost. These efficiencies and savings translate into greater resources for business 

development and growth. 

Corporate treasurers rely on Ml\1MFs to efficiently and affordably manage their 

company's cash balances, which fluctuate on a daily, weekly, monthly or other 

periodic basis. Depending on the nature of the business, a company's cash balance 

can vary significantly-swinging from hundreds of dollars to hundreds of millions of 

dollars in the red or the black. A corporate treasurer's job is to ensure there is 

sufficient liquidity to meet working capital needs and money market mutual funds are 

the most liquid, flexible, affordable, and efficient way to do that both in terms of 

investing excess cash and obtaining short-term financing. 

Money Market Mutual Funds as an Investment 

As part of treasurers' efforts to ensure adequate working capital for their 

organizations, they are also typically responsible for directing tl1e investment of their 

company's cash and pension assets. To do this, treasurers consider all available 

investment alternatives with the goals to protect principal, ensure liquidity, and 

prudently maximi7:e returns. These considerations cause treasurers to gravitate 

toward money market mutual funds because of the stability and liquidity they provide. 

For companies with cash surpluses, MMMFs offer a stable $1.00 price per share that 

facilitates efficient accounting of frequent investments and redemptions. The stable 

net asset value also allows investors to avoid tax implications. Investments in 

M.L\{MFs can also be made and redeemed on a daily basis without fees or penalties, 

which promotes the liquidity and efficiency necessary to meet working capital needs. 

These funds also offer a diversified and expertly managed short-term 

investment vehicle that allows companies to invest in one fund while diversifying 

exposure to a number of underlying short-term investments. Additionally, investment 

advisors to money market mutual funds perform the credit analysis of the underlying 

assets so that treasurers and their staffs don't have to spend tin1e and resources 

analyzing the credit worthiness of multiple individual investments, and can instead just 

assess the credit quality of the mutual fund itself. 

It is important to know that corporate treasurers and financial professionals 

understand the risk of investing in money market mutual funds. Moreover, we 

understand that investments in these funds are not guaranteed by the U.S. 

Government. \Ve are professional stewards of our companies' cash, and we take our 

responsibilities seriously. t-1l\1MFs are attractive to us because they offer a high 

degree of transparency that enables us to quickly and accurately gauge the degree of 

risk associated with each fund. 

5 
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86679.028

Money Market Mutual Funds as a Short-Term Financing Source 

MMMFs also represent a major source of funding to the corporate commercial 

paper market in the U.S. As the SEC notes in its proposal, prime :MlvL"'vfFs held 

46.4% of outstanding nonfInancial commercial paper as of December 31, 2013. 

Without robust MMl\1Fs, demand for commercial paper would drop signifIcantly and 

the commercial paper market would be substantially less liquid. This source of 

fInancing is vital to companies across America as commercial paper is an easy, 

effIcient, and affordable way to quickly obtain short-term fInancing. Commercial 

paper programs permit businesses to access the debt markets at the time funds arc 

actually needed and for the specifIc amount required. The resulting effIciencies have 

enormous implications for how American businesses operate. U.S. businesses operate 

with approximately $2 trillion in cash reserves. This represents 14% of the U.S. gross 

domestic product. By contrast, EU companies carry cash reserves of 21 % of EU 

GDP. If U.S. businesses needed to carry EU-Ievel reserves to ensure access to 

needed operating funds, they would have to carry an additional $1 trillion in reserves. 

This is money that would no longer be available for business development, expansion 

and job creation. 

For Great Plains Energy, and other companies in capital intensive businesses, 

the commercial paper market is a cornerstone to ftnancing the maintenance and 

expansion necessary to meet the needs of our 830,000 customers. In the last three 

years, GPE has invested approximately $1.7 billion in infrastructure improvements 

and new generation facilities. We are anticipating spending another $2 billion in the 

next three years. In 2010 we completed construction of a new power plant that was 

the largest single construction project in the State of Missouri during its four-year 

construction period. That project alone created thousands of jobs for skilled laborers 

in the Kansas City metropolitan area during difftcult economic times. The 

commercial paper market is an important part of the ftnancing mix for the costs 

associated with these massive projects. 

GPE also uses the commercial paper market to ensure day-to-day liquidity. We 

operate two commercial paper programs that have a combined available capacity of 

just over $1 billion. Commercial paper, as a liquidity tool, provides signifIcant cost 

savings to GPE in the form of lower interest payments on borrowed funds. 

Currently, GPE offers interest rates to investors on our commercial paper in the 

current range of 30 to 70 basis points. If instead, we had to use our revolving credit 

facility with our banks for overnight borrowings, those borrowings would be priced at 

the Prime Rate plus a spread, which at current rates is at least 3.30% (or 330 basis 

points), signifIcantly higher than where we can place overnight commercial paper. In 

6 
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86679.029

addition, the company would be required to borrow at least $1 million, whereas 

commercial paper can be sold in increments of $100,000. To request a more 

comparable, LIB OR-based funding from our bank group would require 3 days prior 

notice, have a minimum term of 30 days and be for a minimum amount of $5 million 

and it would still be at a rate about 125 basis points higher than our commercial paper 

for the same term. 

Higher interest rates are not the only costs associated \vith reliance on 

revolving credit facilities. Because of the time requited to obtain a facility, businesses 

will need to seek financing in an amount sufficient to cover theit greatest possible 

need for operating cash. As a result, businesses will have to pay for credit facilities 

that are larger than they will likely need on an ongoing basis. Our banks provide these 

credit facilities to serve as backup lines for commercial paper issuance. If we need to 

obtain revolving credit facilities that will be drawn upon in the ordinary course of 

business, the price of these facilities will likely increase. Most banks prefer not to 

fund these low-priced credit facilities for investment grade companies. They would 

rather lend to lower-rated companies that do not have the same access to public 

markets because they can earn higher returns. Ibis competition for bank lending 

capacity will only serve to drive up the cost of revolving loan facilities 

2010 Changes to Rule 2a-7 

The Chamber supported changes made just three years ago to money market 

mutual fund regulation through Rule 2a-7. These changes greatly strengthened these 

funds. Importantly, they increased the liquidity requirements for money market 

mutual funds. Funds are now required to meet a daily liquidity requirement such that 

10 percent of the total assets can be liquidated into cash in one day and 30 percent 

within one week. This large liquidity buffer makes it very unlikely a wave of 

redemption requests-even at the rate seen in the 2008 financial crisis-would force a 

fund to sell assets at a loss prior to their maturity. 

Despite the fact that the 2010 refonns have only recently been implemented, 

advocates of further regulation have focused much attention on the need to do more. 

While tlle Financial Stability Oversight Council and financial regulators have argued 

for additional regulation, including the implementation of capital requirements to 

buffer any losses, theit approach focuses on mitigating systemic risk without any 

analysis of the implications of overlaying a bank-like regulatory structure onto the 

capital markets. Such action works at cross purposes with the mission of the SEC to 

promote efficient, competitive capital markets and capital formation. Therefore, it is 

incumbent upon the SEC to take a data-driven approach to its rulemaking to 

7 
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86679.030

ensure that the rule does not produce more harm to investors, the capital markets and 

the economy than the benefits it 'will reap. 

While we in concept support further strengthening of money market mutual 

funds to protect investors, it must be done in a way that preserves the critical roles 

these funds play in d1e U.S. economy. As discussed below, we believe that the 

floating NA V alternative, or any combination that includes a floating NA V, will 

essentially undermine the ongoing viability of these funds for institutional investors 

and inflict so much collateral damage on the cotporate commercial paper market that 

it will threaten business expansion and job creation during an already fragile economic 

recovery period. 

Floating Net Asset Value 

Under the SEC's proposal, prime funds for institutional investors will be 

required to move to a floating NA V. The use of amortized cost accounting and 

"penny rounding" would no longer be allowed. Instead of rounding the NA V to the 

nearest half penny with a $1.00 price per share, the NA V will be calculated using 

"basis point rounding"--out to four decimal places to $1.0000. As discussed earlier, 

one of the primary reasons why cotporate treasurers and other financial professionals 

invest in MMMFs is because of the stable $1.00 price per share. 

Loss ojStable Value 

The most important attribute that Ivllvh\;[Fs offer to cotporate treasurers is 

stability of principal value. In fact, the Association of Financial Professionals recendy 

released a survey of senior finance and treasury officials at a broad range of 

companies showing that 68% of respondents indicated that the safety of principal is 

the most important short-term objective of their organization. Without this stability, 

many complications and costs arise for U.S. companies. 

Loss olLiquidity 

Almost equally important to cotporate treasurers is the ability to have liquid 

investments. Because of the proposed elimination of amortized cost accounting, it 

may be much more difficult to redeem l\ic\1MF shares and execute intra-day 

settlements as funds would have to price d1e underlying portfolio holdings using 

market based prices constandy throughout the day. If market prices are not readily 

available, or it is cost prohibitive, funds may not be able to setde with investors until 

later in the evening or the following day. In essence, liquidity for companies with 

investments could be impaired. 

8 
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86679.031

Financial Reporting, Tax, and System Issues 

The floating NAV presents another significant concern as gains and losses will 

arise from the redemption of a floating fund. Although the Internal Revenue Service 

(IRS) earlier this summer proposed relief from wash sales rules related to a floating 

NAV, companies must still expend resources to track these gains and losses to ensure 

that these are de minimis (for purposes of the IRS wash sale rule) and for fmancial 

reporting purposes. Tracking gains and losses from the redemption of money market 

mutual funds will require additional manpower and modifications to treasury and 

accounting systems to build in this capability. 

Most treasury workstations used for managing corporate cash do not have 

accounting systems in place to track NAVs on each transfer into and out ofMM1\1Fs. 

Treasury workstations would need to be upgraded to accommodate these changes, 

and that investment would significantly lag behind the timing of implementing 

floating NA V s. As a result, corporate treasurers would likely decide to simply 

withdraw I\1i\£.\1F investments until the systems issue is resolved, unless adequate 

transition periods are granted. Some companies will decide to withdraw permanently, 

rather than incur the expenses and inefficiencies associated with investing in floating 

NA V funds. At the very least, the systems upgrade costs would force a reallocation of 

capital expenditure away from more economically productive uses like business 

expansion and job creation. In a report released by the Chamber earlier this year, 

Treasury Strategies estimated that the upfront cost to move from a stable to a floating 

NA V would be between $1.8 and $2 billion with new annual operating costs from $2 

to $2.5 billion 

Even putting the systems issue aside, many treasurers would refrain from 

returning to MI\UvfFs to avoid having to record the gains and losses on each 

investment that would flow through quarterly earnings results. Corporate treasurers 

diversify fund investments, and as such, are typically in multiple lvUv£.\1Fs at any given 

time. Tracking the capital gains and losses on each fund where investments and 

redemptions occur frequently is very complex. Treasurers currently do not have the 

manpower (or resources) to track tllls, nor do we have the desire to expend limited 

resources doing so. We would simply find other, less efficient places for our cash. 

Taken as a whole, the operational challenges associated with investment in floating 

NA V funds would outweigh the potential return for many treasurers. 

9 
81 


86679.032

LrsueJ with Investment Polides and other Covenants and Agreements 

In addition to the operational difficulties a floating NAV would create, the 

SEC's proposal raises a more fundamental problem arising from the fact that many 

treasurers are precluded from investing in variable rate instruments. The board of a 

company has a fiduciary obligation to ensure that the company's available cash is 

invested in investment vehicles with appropriate liquidity and credit risk. As such, 

many boards allow investment of cash only in stable value products where there is a 

low degree of risk of loss as funds intended for liquidity purposes are the lifeblood of 

any company. If the Commission adopts a floating NAV requirement, many U.S. 

companies would have to review, assess, and in many cases, revise their companies' 

investment policies if currently only stable value investments are permitted for cash. 

The process of rewriting a company's policy is complex because it requires the input 

of senior executives and ultimately approval by the company's board of directors. 

For some companies, rewriting corporate policies in this regard \\;'il! only be the 

starting point. Companies may also have debt covenants or other agreements that 

require cash collateral to be invested in a stable NA V product. Companies would 

need to spend time and resources to review these agreements, and if found in possible 

violation, they would then have to renegotiate the contract with the counter party, get 

them to agree to the change, and then incur legal costs to write and execute a new 

agreement. Litigation costs could also arise if the parties could not reach a negotiated 

resolution to the issues associated with the SEC mandating a floating NA V. 

Accounting Classification 

Uncertainty remains about classification of investments in floating NA V funds 

for financial reporting purposes. In its proposal the Commission simply states that it 

believes that an investment in floating NA V money market mutual funds would still 

qualify as a cash equivalent. While the SEC ultimately has accounting standard setting 

authority and enforcement authority over financial reporting and disclosure violations 

of publicly traded companies, it would be helpful for the Commission to issue formal 

guidance on the matter and direct the Financial Accounting Standards Board to 

conform the Commission's position to existing accounting standards. Witl10ut tlus 

formality, independent auditors of many companies may be reluctant to take a sinUlar 

"iew, and possibly risk placing companies' balance sheets in a weaker cash position. 

Liquidity Fees and Gates 

The second alternative contemplated by the SEC is a mandatory 2% liquidity 

fee if a fund's weekly liquidity level falls below 15%. Additionally, if fuis liquidity 

10 
82 


86679.033

threshold is triggered, the fund's board would have the ability to halt redemptions 

altogether by lowering a "gate." However, it will be left to the discretion of the board 

to reduce or eliminate the liquidity fee if it deems it to be in the best interest of the 

shareholders. 

The corporate treasurer community has mixed views regarding this proposed 

alternative. While the liquidity fee and gate is intended to protect investors, its 

implementation will come \Veith a steep price. If a company's treasurer invests the 

company's excess cash in a vehicle where a 2% fee on the cash balance is in fact 

assessed or where the company cannot gain immediate access to its cash because a 

redemption gate is lowered, it will send a signal to the company's shareholders dlat 

the company is negligent in the management of its cash, or in worse case, impact 

liquidity to the degree of jeopardizing operations. Nevertheless, many corporate 

treasurers, including myself, do not take issue with this alternative because the risks it 

presents are realized only when certain liquidity thresholds, which are well below the 

levels set by the 2010 changes to Rule 2a-7 described above, are crossed and the gate 

is the only mechanism that will truly stop a run on the fund. Therefore, we view dus 

alternative as placing even greater emphasis on our responsibilities as a steward of our 

company's cash to assess the risks of investing in a particular ~L.\1MF and to monitor 

on an ongoing basis the mix of investments and liquidity levels in each such fund to 

ensure prompt access to cash when needed to meet working capital needs. 

Disclosure 

The SEC has also proposed additional enhancements of disclosures made to 

investors regarding the condition and operations of a ~L.\1MF. In conjunction with 

the liquidity fees and gate proposal., the SEC proposes to require funds to disclose 

daily and weekly liquidity levels. In addition, funds would also have to disclose daily 

current NA V per share, inflows and outflows, and portfolio holdings. In general, we 

support additional disclosures that may be helpful for investors to better understand 

the risks of investing. However, the SEC should be careful not to be so onerous in its 

disclosure requirements that funds incur significant costs for additional disclosures 

that will be of lillie or no usc to investors beyond the information that is already 

available, especially when these investors may ultimately bear the burden of the 

additional costs associated with new disclosures that may be of litde practical value. 

Summary! Conclusion 

In summary, corporate treasurers are very concerned about a sizable 

contraction of the 2a-7 MMMF industry that is likely to result from the changes 

currendy contemplated by the SEC. On the investing side, corporations would be 

II 
83 


86679.034

forced to withdraw from prime money market funds to ensure full access to their 

money, avoid the recordkeeping and systems modification burden imposed by 

floating NAVs, and forgo the investment policy changes some of the SEC's proposals 

will trigger. Companies will instead invest in less flexible bank investment product." 

other unregulated funds, or individual securities. In so doing, they would lose the 

efficiency, liquidity, and risk diversification benefit of the 2a-7 structure and increase 

individual counterparty risk. On the funding side, a decrease in 2a-7 capacity would 

lead to higher costs and less liquidity for commercial paper issuers and place greater 

stress on banks to make up the difference with additional lending. There would be 

greater uncertainty in the daily activities of treasury departments, and that uncertainty 

would likely lead to more caution in planning capital investments to grow businesses 

and create jobs. 

Rule 2a-7 money market mutual funds are much more than an investment 

product. Over the last four decades, NfMMFs have become a crucial component in a 

highly integrated system that provides low cost and efticient short-term financing for 

American businesses. This system has been the gold standard structure around the 

world for many years. Structural changes, like floating the NA V, will not make 

MM1\1Fs any less vulnerable to runs, but they will jeopardize the economic viability 

and utility of MMc\1Fs. Without MMMFs, borrowing costs for many businesses could 

increase dramatically. American business could be forced to stoc.k-pile cash reserves, 

rather than putting this cash to use innovating, growing, and creating jobs. With the 

reforms implemented in 2010 to provide greater liquidity, safety, and transparency, 

these funds have proven to be very stable and attractive investments during a time of 

great upheaval in global markets related to the European sovereign debt crisis. 

Altering the structure and nature of money market mutual funds would take away a 

vital short-term cash management tool for companies throughout the country. 

Thank you. 

12 
84 


86679.035

Testimony of Steve McCoy 

State Treasurer, Georgia 

On Behalf of the 

National Association of State Treasurers 

before 

The House Subcommittee on Capital Markets 

and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 

Committee on Financial Services 

on 

"Examining the SEC's Money Market Fund Rule Proposal" 

September 18, 2013 

Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member Maloney and members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for providing the National Association of State Treasurers (NAS1) the opportunity to testify on the 

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) ptoposal to reform money market 

funds. I am Steve McCoy, Treasurer for the State of Georgia, and Chair of the Banking and Cash 

Management Committee of NAST. 

NAST is a bipartisan association that is comprised of all state treasurers or state finance 

officials with comparable responsibilities, from the United States, its commonwealths, territories and 

the District of Columbia. 

State Treasurers, given their important tole within the states of ensuriog proper cash flow 

management, have a unique perspective on money market fund regulation. 

Importance of Proposed MMFs Reform to States 

Money market funds (MMFs) are an important investment and cash management tool for 

many state governments, their political subdivisions and respective instrumentalities. State and local 

governments tdy upon MMFs as short-term investments that provide liquidity, preservation of 

capital, and diversification of credit risk. Many that use MMFs for short-term investing and cash 

1 
85 


86679.036

management needs have few viable alternatives that have the same ot similat features of safety, 

return, liquidity and diversification of credit risk. 

Also, as issuers of municipal debt, states rely on MMFs to buy shott-term securities issued by 

states, local governments and authorities. MMFs ate by fat the largest purchasets of these short-term 

bonds, and if teforms limit the attractiveness of MMFs as an investment product, the demand fot, 

these bonds will decrease and the financing costs - borne at taxpayer expense - would increase. 

Additionally, many states manage Local Government Investment Pools (LGIPs) to provide a 

safe and efficient investment for state and local government entities. However, changes to the 

regulation of money market funds, even though they ate not registered with the Securities and 

Exchange Commission, could indirectly impact the operation and viability ofLGIPs as a result of 

the Government Accounting Standatds Board (GASB) Statements 31 and 59 requiting externally 

managed pools to be "2A-7 Like" in order to use amottized cost accounting. 

Alternatives if MMFs are Not Viable Investments for State and Local Governments 

State Treasurers find MMFs an attractive investment when compared to bank deposirs or 

investing directly in commercial paper. Treasurers, as financial stewatds of their respective states, 

have been able to use well-regulated MMFs to improve reMn. State Tteasurers also recognize that 

MMFs ate not guaranteed or backed by the federal government, but MMFs ate very ttanspatent and 

the SEC's 2010 amendments to Rule 2a-7 have made these funds safer and less subject to 

redemption pressure during periods of stress. 

Bank deposits ate only insured up to $250,000 and state stattttes typically require public fund 

deposits to be collateralized by marketable securities specified as eligible for pledging. For instance, 

in the State of Georgia, statutes require most state and local government deposits in banks to be 

secured by marketable securities valued not less than 110% of the deposits after the deduction of the 

amount of deposit insurance. The cost associated with collateralizing public bank deposits limits 

banks from providing competitively priced alternatives. 

Investing directly in commercial paper also has transaction costs, custodial fees, less flexibility, and 

limited liquidity as it does not have an active secondaty matket. Importantly, another critical 

2 
86 


86679.037

distinction between MMFs and commercial paper is that MMFs allow for greater diversification of 

credit risks, whereas commercial paper tends to reduce the number of positions an investor has in its 

portfolio and requires investment staff with credit research training and resources. 

NAST Support for 2010 amendments to Rule 2a-7 

In 2010, the Commission adopted, and NAST fully supported, amendments to Rule 2a-7 

that increased the l'esiliency of money market funds. The changes increased liquidity and credit 

quality requirements, enhanced disclosures to require reporting of portfolio holdings monthly, 

shortened portfolio maturities, and permitted a suspension of redemptions if a fund broke the buck 

01 is at imminent risk of breaking the buck. NAST believes these reforms have made money market 

funds more transparent, less subject to interest rate risk, and less susceptible to redemption demand 

pressure during periods of stress in the fmancial markets. 

SEC's MMF proposal 

The Commission's proposed money market fund reforms include one or a combination of 

the following two alternatives: (1) require a floating Net Asset Value ("FNAV") for prime 

institutional money market funds, with exemptions for government MMFs (those that are invest at 

least 80% of their assets in federal govemment securities) and those considered "retail" MMFs 

(those that liruit each shareholder's redemptions to $1 million per day); andlor (2) require the 

imposition of liquidity fees if a fund's weekly liquid assets fall below a certain threshold (uuless the 

fund's board determines such fee is not in the best interest of the fund), in conjunction with 

permitting redemption suspensions during times of market stress ("Fees and Gates"). The proposal 

also includes disclosure reforms, additional diversification requir'ements, and stress testing reforms. 

NASY has worked with many state and local groups that are similarly concerned about 

implementation of the SEC proposal. Please find attached four letters co-signed by NASY and a 

broader coalition of concerned state and local groups. NASY hopes to work with the SEC and the 

Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) to address the concerns described this testimony 

and in the NASY comment letter, which I have attached to this testimony. 

3 
87 


86679.038

Impacts on States as Investors ofMMFs 

As explained above, states invest in MMFs as an efficient tool for managing large volumes of 

short-term liquid assets. MMFs that seek to maintain a stable net asset value per share are permitted 

investtnents for many states and local governments; however, variable or floating NA V MMFs 

generally are not permitted investtnents. Few other investtnent options permitted of states provide 

the same features MMFs offer: safety; return; liquidity; and stable NA V. NAST is concerned that 

significant changes to the regulation and structure of MMFs could make them less useful or suitable 

as cash management tools, thereby forcing states to turn to less liquid and perhaps lower yielding 

alternatives. 

Impact on States as Short-term Issuers of Municipal Securities 

As issuers of short-term debt, states benefit from municipal MMFs that purchase such shortterm securities. Although bank loans and purchases of notes by banks and other institutional 

investors are at times an option, municipal MMFs offer a reliable low-cost option for municipal 

borrowers. 

If a floating NAVis applied to municipal MMFs it could lead to less investor demand in 

these funds, ultimately resulting in higher funding costs to issuers of short-term issuers of municipal 

securities. While the Commission suggests in its release that most investors in municipal MMFs are 

retail investors and could therefore avail themselves of the retail exemption from the floating NAV 

tequirement, we understand that a significant portion of municipal MMFs balances is made up of 

institutional investors. Since municipal MMFs have been very stable through many market cycles 

and did not experience large redemptions in the 2008 financial crisis, imposing a floating NAV on 

such funds seems entirely unnecessary. 

Indirect Impact on Local Government Investment Pools (LGIPs) 

The SEC's two proposed alternatives, FNAV and! or Fees and Gates, could pose significant 

risks to LGIP participants. First, allow me to provide background on LGIPs and their operation. 

LGIPs have been created by several states and opetated by State Treasurets or authorized 

governing boards for the exclusive benefit of governmental entities within each state. Dulike money 

market funds, LGIPs are not open for investtnent to the public. Instead, LGIPs exist to provide a 

4 
88 


86679.039

service to state and local government entities that otherwise would have difficulty investing public 

funds safely and efficiendy. While each state's statutes governing LGIPs may be different, LGIPs 

generally accept deposits from cities, counties, colleges, school districts, and other state and local 

government entities. In some cases, the states that sponsor LG IPs commingle their own assets with 

those of the other LGIP participants to achieve economies of scale. 

LGIPs are often used by pru:ticipants as shott-term investments for funds that may be 

needed on a day-to-day Or neat-term basis. Therefore, most participants use LGIPs for principal 

preservation and as an efficient cash management tool, including using LGIPs for operating liquidity 

or for investing proceeds used for debt repayment State and local government entities are 

understandably loss averse because of the importance of protecting taxpayer money, but such 

entities may also have legal restrictions, budgetary constraints, investment limitations or liquidity 

requirements as reasons for their low risk tolerance. 

LGIPs ate exempt from SEC regulation under section 2(b) of the Investment Company Act 

because of their sovereign ownership. However, depending on future actions of the Governmental 

Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the Commission's proposed changes to money market fund 

regulation could have the unintended consequence of indirecdy impacting the ability of some states 

to service LGIPs for their state and local government entities. The reason for this is that GASB 

reporting statements 31 and 59 reference the SEC's Rule 2a-7 governing money market funds. 

Therefore, while an LGIP is not registered with the SEC as an investment company, an LGIP that 

operates as a "2a-7 like" pool consistent with GASB rules must operate in a manner consistent with 

the SEC's Rule 2a-7, unless the GASB changes the reporting statements to recognize the unique 

characteristics ofLGIP participants (state and local government entities), sponsors (states) and their 

statutory requirements. 

Converting an LGIP to a floating NAV pool or imposing liquidity fees as a charge against 

participants' account balances would be in violation of some states' statutes and prudent investment 

policies. Governmental entities cannot tolerate loss of principal on operating funds, trust funds, or 

bond plOceeds because they have no method of replenishing such losses. 

5 
89 


86679.040

Furthenuore, LGIPs would be unable to avail themselves of the proposed retail or 

government fund exemptions. 

A very Iatge number of LGIP participants have minimal activity in their accounts Oess than 

$1 million daily). However, other participants have sizable accounts and routinely withdraw more 

than $1 million per day for operating expenses or to make bond payments, malting LGlPs unable to 

operate as "retail" and exempt from the FNA V proposal. 

Most LGIPs would not fit in the government fund exemption. An election by a "2a-7like" 

LGIP to use the government fund exemption would be problematic as it would lower yields and 

likely result in fewer participants and fund balances. In addition, such an LGIP could experience 

problems in an extremely low or negative interest rate environment, which would force LGIPs to 

purchase short-tenu government securities at negative yields. Even at zero or slightly positive rates, 

the overall yield on a government only pool would likely be too low fOl an LGIP sponsor to covet 

operating expenses and result in a loss of principal if the sponsor could not subsidize its operating 

costs. 

Conclusions 

NAST believes the Commission's 2010 MMF tefonus have made MMFS more transparent, 

less subject to interest rate risk, more creditworthy and less susceptible to redemption demand 

pressure during periods of stress in financial markets. While NAST appreciates the Commission's 

efforts in the regulation of money market funds, NAST remains concerned that some of the 

proposed changes will have unintended consequences for: states, cities, counties and other municipal 

entities. If the Commission moves forward with additional changes to Rule 2a-7, we urge the 

Commission to: (a) understand not only the direct impact the rule would have on MMF investors 

and on short-tenu issuers of municipal securities, but also the indirect impact on LGIPs and the 

municipalities that invest in LGIPs; and (b) exempt municipal MMFs from the rule, just as federal 

government MMFs are exempted. In addition, if the Commission significantly modifies Rule 2a-7, 

we urge the GASB to consider the unique characteristics of state and local government entities, 

including their redemption histories, investment policies, and statutory requirements. 

NAST stands ready to work with the Commission, GASB, and Subcommittee on these 

imp01tant issues. 

6 
90 


86679.041

:::::;:: NATIONAL ASSOClAIiON Of-

::;=: STArE THEASURERS 

-

M"..,GaneriwaIa,Va 

Executive Committee 

)oug!A>cey,/viz 

_EJis,Utah 

=ton Estes,Kwt 

:>avid LiIard,Jr,Tem 

<ate Marshat, Nev_ 

WnMiller.OI<a 

3elhPearoe,vt 

nterim Executive Director 

::trisA Hunter 

feadquar!m 

1760AesearttlPatf(Dr 

:ro8ox11910 

-""'gton. KY 40578-1910 

'(859) 244·8175 

, (S59) 244-8053 

)fftCe of Federal Relations 

44 N Gapilol St. NW. Ste 401 

VasIlilgton. DC 20001-1557 

'(202)624-8592 

(202)624-8677 

September 16, 2013 

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary 

United States Securities and Exchange Commission 

100 F Street, N.B. 

Washington, D.C. 20549-1090 

Re: Comment on the Proposed Rulemaking on Money Market Fund Reform 

File No. S7-03-13 

Dear Ms. Murphy: 

The National Association of State Treasurers ("NAST") appreciates the 

opportunity to provide commentS on the proposed rulemaking of the U.S. Securities and 

Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on money market funds ("MMFs,,).l NAST is a 

non-partisan membership organization composed of all state treasurers, or state finance 

officers with comparable responsibilities, from the United States, its commonwealths, 

territories and the District of Columbia. As the chief investment officers of the states, 

state treasurers directly manage billions of dollars in state and local government funds. 

They have a direct stake in their respective states' financial well-being as well as in the 

health of the nation's economy. Treasurers diligently share their expertise in fiscal and 

investment matters with other government officials and with the general public. NAST 

seeks to provide educational conferences and webinars, publications, working groups, 

policy advocacy and support that enable states to pursue and administer sound financial 

policies and practices of benefit to the citizens of the nation. 

We have divided our response into the following sections to address three 

distinct concerns State Treasurers have in regards to the SEC's proposed rule changes. 

These three concerns are: 

I. Impact on Local Government Investment Pools ("LGIPs") 

II. Burden on States as Purchasers of Money Market Funds ("MMFs") 

III. Higher Funding Costs to Issuers of Short-term Municipal Securities 
91 


86679.042

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 2 of12 

I. Impact on Local Government Investment Pools ("LGIPs") 

Because of their sovereign ownership, LGIPs are exempt from SEC regulation under 

section 2(b) of the Investment Company Act. However, the proposed changes to Rule 2a-7, if 

adopted, could significantly harm the financial condition of state and local governments. 

Therefore, we believe it is important to provide comments to the SEC in connection with its 

proposed changes to Rule 2a-7. 

In Section III(A)(6)(C) of the rulemaking release, the SEC requests comment as to the 

potential impact of the proposed rulemaking on LGIPs that operate as cash investment vehicles 

used exclusively for the investment of public funds. 

LGIPs have been created by several states and operated by State Treasurers or authorized 

goveming boards for the exclusive benefit of governmental entities within each state. LGIPs are 

created to provide a service to state and local government entities that otherwise would have 

difficulty investing public funds safely and efficiently. Although enabling legislation of each 

state's LGIP is unique, they all share common objectives to provide safety of capital and 

liquidity while optimizing interest for participating state and local entities. In most cases, they 

are designed to serve as short-term investments for funds that may be needed by participants on a 

day-to-day or near term basis. Most participants use LGIPs for both principal preservation and as 

a cash management tool. Consequently, LGlPs attract public fund investors who are unable or 

unwilling to tolerate even small losses. Such entities can be loss averse for a variety of reasons, 

including general risk tolerance, legal restrictions, budget constraints, investment limitations, or 

liquidity requirements. 

Uulike MMFs, LGIPs are not open for investment to the public. Eligibility to invest in 

LGIPs is determined by state statutes, and accountholders must be approved prior to investing. 

LGlPs are not designed to compete with the private sector for investment dollars. LGIPs accept 

deposits from cities, counties, colleges, school districts, authorities and other government entities 

that need to safeguard operating funds, trust funds, bond proceeds, fiduciary funds, reserve funds 

and other funds that must remain liquid. Additionally, some states that sponsor LGlPs 

commingle their own assets with those of LGIP participants to benefit from economies of scale. 

In such cases, the State that administers the LGIP is often the largest accountholder. 

Many, but not all LGlPs are indirectly impacted by the SEC as a result of references to 

Rule 2a-7 in Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) reporting statements 31 and 

59. Rule 2a-7 allows MMFs to use amortized cost to report net assets. A "2a-7 like" pool is not 

registered with the SEC as an investment company, but nevertheless has a policy that it will, and 

does, operate in a manner consistent with Rule 2a-7. Also as GASB 31 explains, governmental 

external investment pools that are "2a-7 like" pools are permitted to report their investments at 

amortized cost. GASB 59 (issued June 2010) clarified GASB 31 to indicate that a "2a-7 like" 

pool, as described in GASB 31, is an external investment pool that operates in conformity with 

SEC Rule 2a-7 as promulgated under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. 

According to GASB 59, to qualifY as a "2a-7 like" pool, the pool should satisfY all SEC 
92 


86679.043

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 3 of12 

requirements of Rule 2a-7, including that a group of individuals fulfills the functions of a board 

of directors. 

State and local governments are pennitted to use amortized cost accounting to value 

short-term debt instruments with a remaining maturity of up to one year that are held directly or 

through a single-government pool ("internal pools"). Under current GASB and many states' 

accounting guidance, LGIPs that accept investors from more than one governmental entity 

("external pools") are also pennitted to use amortized cost to value portfolio assets under any of 

several different sets of conditions. GASB Statements 31 and 59 prescribe use of amortized cost 

by external pools to confonn to most Rule 2a-7 requirements. This method is available to those 

LOIPs that voluntarily comply with Rule 2a-7 and operate as "2a-7 like" external pools. The 

specific conditions of Rule 2a-7 referenced in the guidance supportive of this accounting 

treatment include asset quality, portfolio maturity, liquidity, and diversification requirements. 

These conditions in the current Rule 2a-7 help assure the stable asset value of LGIP portfolios. 

LGIP participants have limited investment alternatives that vary from state to state. 

Individual state statutes specifY eligible investments, which typically include, but are uot limited 

to, collateralized bank deposits, U.S. treasuries and agencies, and in some states, MMFs. Should 

some LGIPs that operate as "2a-7 like" pools find themselves unable to adjust to the proposed 

Rule 2a-7 changes, they may have to scale back or cease operations. This would cause 

participants to seek other legally eligible investment alternatives for potentially billions of 

dollars. Numerous governmental entities, many with little or no investment experience would 

face losing the most reliable and cost-effective investment vehicle they have depended on, some 

for nearly forty years, without a problem. Should such disruption occur, most local government 

participants would likely look to their local banks for investing the cash. However, acceptance of 

governmental deposits is costly and burdensome to banks due to the high cost of collateralizing 

public bank deposits, a common requirement among most states to safeguard public funds. 

Banks without an existing relationship with a local government may not have an appetite for 

additional deposits nor offer an attractive interest rate. 

As stated above, public fund bank deposits are typically required by state statutes to be 

collateralized by marketable securities specified as eligible for pledging. For instance, in the 

State of Georgia, statutes require most state and local government deposits in banks to be secured 

by marketable securities valued not less than 110% of the deposits after the deduction of the 

amount of deposit insurance. If participants in Georgia's $9.3 billion LGIP were to seek local 

banks to accept their current LGIP deposits, banks could only accept those funds if they pledged 

over $10 billion in eligible securities as collateral. Many local governments do not have the 

expertise or analytical tools to assess and monitor the fmancial strength of counterparties or 

determine the value and liquidity of pledged securities. 

Also, local governments may not realize that some bank products carry unacceptable 

liquidity constraints imposed per the "Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions 

(Regulation D)" which could prohibit government entities from having immediate access to their 

funds. Unlike private participants, governmental entities typically do not have the capability or 
93 


86679.044

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 4 of12 

authorization to borrow funds to cover temporary shortfalls and therefore liquidity is paramount 

to their investment needs. As stated above, any liquidity constraints imposed by banks could 

result in payment defaults by municipalities. 

Any disruption of LGIPs would force participants into direct investments that may not be 

suitable for their risk tolerance and would reduce their portfolios' diversification compared to 

investing in an LGIP. By pooling funds, participating governments benefit from economies of 

scale, full-time portfolio management, diversification and liquidity. LGIPs have investment staff, 

systems to evaluate securities, custodians for safekeeping assets, and the means to sustain these 

systems and services. Most LGIPs allow for daily or next day liquidity for participants. Also, 

LGIPs are typically low cost providers for budget-strapped governments. For instance, the costs 

to States to administer LGIPs is typically well below the management fees charged by most 

MMFs. 

For the most part, LGIPs are typically buy and hold portfolios. Therefore, many securities 

that fall in the 2a-7 space are not actively traded. A lack of active trading means there is no true 

market value at the end of each day for these securities. 

"Mark-to-Market" is a misnomer in the context of both LGIPs and MMFs. To calculate 

the daily or "shadow" NA V of a money market fund, most pricing services use a matrix to 

determine the value of these securities. Current market prices on a small subset of money market 

instruments that trade are extrapolated by the model to estimate the current value of most LGIP 

assets based on similarities and differences in maturity, credit risk and other historical pricing 

relationships. A set of amortized cost-like assumptions is factored into the model to extrapolate 

among the values of instruments that have different maturity dates. Model pricing is not a true 

market price, is not more accurate in establishing market values, and it is not devoid of amortized 

cost-like assumptions. The difference between this "mark-to-model" pricing of a portfolio and 

amortized cost pricing of the same portfolio is very small, and is not material in the context of 

the value of the shares, particularly where rounded to the nearest cent. It is noted in the SEC 

proposal "that the vast majority of money market fund portfolio securities are not valued based 

on market prices obtained througb secondary market trading because the secondary markets for 

most portfolio securities such as commercial paper, repos, and certificates of deposit are not 

actively traded.'" Thus the calculated NAV would prove to be a very costly and inaccurate 

assessment of the value of an LGIP. State LGIPs cannot afford such changes and the assessments 

would not benefit our participants. LGIP participants would be subjected to confusion, higb 

costs, operational inefficiencies and heightened risk of errors. 

Other LGIPs that are not "2a-7 like" pools are permitted to use amortized cost to value 

short-term money market portfolio assets (i.e. those assets with 90 or fewer remaining days to 

maturity) as well as certain longer-term "non-participating" money market instruments (i.e. nonmarketable debt instruments that do not take market changes into account in redemption 

features). Changes to Rule 2a-7 will not change this. Moreover, as the SEC notes, amortized cost 

'78 FR 36837 Uun. 19, 2013) 
94 


86679.045

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 5 of12 

is not required to maintain a stable net asset value of $lIshare for an LGIP when prices are 

rounded to the nearest penny per share. GASB guidance does not require an LGIP to be a "2a-7 

like" pool in order to round shares to the nearest penny or to attempt to maintain a price of$1 per 

share. However, use of amortized cost to value portfolio assets is far more efficient than using 

"mark-to-model" pricing and is shown to be as reliable. A movement away from amortized cost 

accounting by LGIPs, to the extent indirectly triggered by changes to Rule 2a-7, would impose 

administrative and staffing burdens, significant expenses, slow settlement times, and increases in 

settlement risks for LGlPs. Particularly given the low interest rate environment, LGIPs would be 

unable to obtain fimding from pool earnings to cover such expenses and the possibility of 

obtaining state appropriations in most cases is unlikely given tight state budgets and timing for 

consideration of budget matters. States may also face statutory prohibitions to assessing charges 

against existing participants for modifications that will affect future participants only, a group 

not necessarily composed of the same entities especially if a number of current participants leave 

the pool if the proposed changes were implemented. 

It remains to be seen whether amendments to Rule 2a-7, prohibiting the use of amortized 

cost to value assets with remaining maturity of more than 60 days, as well as effectively banning 

penny rounding, would be applied to a "2a-7 like" LGIP. This could be interpreted as a condition 

for an LGIP using amortized cost to value portfolio assets of up to a year in remaining maturity 

and rounding shares to the nearest cent. Requiring "2a-7 like" LGIPs to use an accounting 

method other than amortized cost for assets with a remaining term over 60 days and not seek to 

maintain a stable NA V, as conditions to using amortized cost or penny rounding, would appear 

to be logically inconsistent. Therefore, such conditions would not seem to be elements of Rule 

2a-7 that "2a-7 like" LGIPs would be required to follow. 

The SEC's two proposed alternatives, floating NA V and/or liquidity fees or gating, for 

amending rules that govern MMFs could pose significant risks to participants in LGIPs to the 

detriment of the financial condition of those municipal entities. As stated in the SEC's current 

money market fimd reform proposal, "We understand that investors use money market funds for 

cash management, and that lack of access to their money market fimd investtnent for a long 

period of time can impose substantial costs and hardships.,,2 If an LGIP were to be gated, 

participants would have to wait for their money scheduled to be withdrawn to meet payroll, 

vendor payments and debt repayments. We acknowledge that over a 40-year period there have 

been a few LGIPS, two that we are aware of, that utilized gating in a crisis while the sponsor 

assessed its options. However, this is not a viable strategy that LGIPs should adopt as a means of 

operation. The problem with liquidity fees and gating alternatives for LGIPs would be that many 

participants could not afford to lose their liquidity or accept loss of principal. Public fimd 

investtnents in LGIPs are typically earmarked for operational liquidity. Most LGIP participants 

do not have liquidity lines or other authorized methods to borrow funds should their operating 

fimds become unavailable due to an LGIP being gated. 

'78 FR 36888 Gune 19, 2013). 
95 


86679.046

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 6 of12 

With some LGIPs dating back to the 1970s, modifications to their structure would be 

highly problematic, expensive, time conswning and uncertain in terms of accomplishing wellintentioned, but unnecessary, modifications. Each state's enabling legislation differs, but many, 

if not most, require the state as its' sponsor to invest with the first priority being safety of 

participants' capital. Managing LGIPs to maintain a stable net asset value clearly satisfies that 

criterion, but converting to a floating NA V or imposing liquidity fees as a charge against 

participants' account balances would be in violation of some states' statutes and prudent 

investment policies. Governmental entities cannot tolerate a loss of principal on operating funds, 

trust funds, or bond proceeds because they have no method of replenishing such losses. State 

Treasurers and legislators would be hard pressed to approve legislation that would potentially 

harm their own local governments and state entities with deposits in their LGIPs. 

Enabling legislation for nwnerous state and local entities allows such governmental 

bodies to invest in their respective state LGIP due to it maintaiuing a stable net asset value that 

protects principal and allows participants to withdraw funds as needed. Thousands of municipal 

bond indentures permit proceeds to be invested in the respective state LGIPs for the same 

reasons. In the proposal, the SEC notes that "Our floating NAV proposal, if adopted, may have 

implications for LGlPs. In order to continue to manage LGIPs, state statutes and policies may 

need to be amended to permit the operation of investment pools that adhere to rule 2a-7 as we 

propose to amend it Because we are unable to predict how various state legislatures and other 

market participants will react . . . we do not have the information necessary to provide a 

reasonable estimate of the impact on LGIPs or the potential effects on efficiency, competition, 

and capital formation. We note, however, that it is possible that states could amend their statutes 

or policies to permit the operation of LGIPs that comply with rule 2a-7 as we propose to amend 

it." Although the SEC may be correct in stating that such statute and policy changes might be 

possible, in many states such actions would be impractical. It would not be feasible for some 

states to embark upon a course that would require legislative and even bondholder approvals in 

order to modifY LGIPs to comply with MMF regulatory changes which, if adopted, could 

actually increase risk for LGIP participants and bondholders. To amend a state's investment 

statutes is time-conswning and uncertain, especially if the objective is to restructure LGIPs that 

have been proven safe and effective. Most state legislatures meet for a few months annually, but 

some state legislatures meet bi-annually. Even more problematic is the burden such changes 

would impose On municipal bond issuers with trust indentures that authorize investments in 

LGIPs in order to protect principal and provide ready access to funds. 

The proposed SEC rule changes classifY MMFs as either retail or institutional and 

provide an exemption for retail funds. Unlike private MMFs, LGIPs are not classified as either 

retail or institutional funds since eligible participants are defined by enabling legislation and 

range in size of account balances and transactions as well as financial sophistication. LGIPs are 

established and designed to serve a variety of unique investors - state and local entities of a wide 

range of sizes and needs - that often have no other permitted investment options that meet their 

investment needs. Most LGIPs experience cyclical asset flows based on tax payments and 

receipts, bond proceeds, and salary and benefit payments, to name a few. State Treasurers, as 

sponsors of LGIPs, must assure participants that portfolios are managed so that sufficient monies 
96 


86679.047

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 7 of12 

are available to fund participants' withdrawal needs and their principal has not diminished. A 

very large number of LGIP participants carry small balances (less than $1 million) and have 

minimal activity in their accounts. However, LGIPs also serve state and local governments that 

have sizeable accounts. Often participants use the LGlPs as a source of operating liquidity (some 

as an alternative to a bank DDA account) or for investing proceeds used for debt repayment. 

Some LGIP participants routinely withdraw more than $1 million per day for operating expenses 

or to make bond payments. For many LGIPs, a small number of shareholders make up a 

substantial percentage of the fund and thus have withdrawals that are in excess of $1 million. For 

example, in the State of Georgia, the Department of Revenue has partnered with the Office of the 

State Treasurer to set up LGIP accounts for those municipalities choosing to have their sales tax 

collections electronically transferred from the Department of Revenue to the LGIP. For the large 

metro counties in Georgia, these monthly deposits are over $10 million per month. Eventually 

these funds are used for operating purposes and the draws for these large metro counties are well 

in excess of $1 million per day. These counties are legally entitled to withdraw their sales tax 

collections as needed without charge or delay. 

Although most LGIP participants do not meet the definition of a retail type shareholder 

based on the size of their withdrawals, their withdrawal history reveals that their behavior more 

closely models a retail type investor than an institutional type investor. As noted on page 73 of 

the SEC proposal, "Institutional shareholders tend to respond more quickly than retail 

shareholders to potential market stresses because generally they have greater capital at risk and 

may be better informed about the fund through sophisticated tools to monitor and analyze the 

portfolio holdings of the funds in which they invest.,,3 However, LGrp participants, like retail 

investors, tend to be more patient. An appropriate assessment of the participants who typically 

use LGrps was given by Kathryn L. Hewitt of the Government Finance Officers Association, as 

cited in footnote 72 of the proposal: "Most of us don't have the time, the energy, or the resources 

at our fmgertips to analyze the credit quality of every security ourselves. So we're in essence, by 

going into a pooled fund, hiring that expertise for us .. .it gives us diversification, it gives us 

immediate cash management needs where we can move money into and out of it, and it satisfies 

much of our operating cash investment opportunities." The profile of many LGIP participants 

more closely models the mindset of retail investors in MMFs, meaning that LGlPs do not 

typically experience heavy redemptions based on participants' fear of credit issues, illiquid 

securities, or safer opportunities outside the LGIP. Furthermore, the stability of LGIPs is 

evidenced by their not being viewed as systemically important and therefore were not offered the 

same government guarantee as were MMFs in September 2008. 

Likewise, most LGIPs do not and cannot fit in the "government only" category. An LGIP 

that traditionally has provided competitive rates to participants would risk tempting participants 

to withdraw funds looking for higher yielding, riskier options if the LGIP moved to convert to 

goverrunent only MMF in order to continue to use amortized cost. Both the lower yields and 

reduced deposits would produce financial hardships on LGlP sponsors who already operate at 

very slim margins. However, an election by a "2a-7 like" LGrp to use the government only 

378 FR 36856 Oune 19,2013). 
97 


86679.048

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

PageS of12 

exemption in the proposed rule changes would be problematic for another reason. Although 

government only MMFs seek to preserve principal and maintain liquidity, an LGIP designed to 

be a "2a-7 like" government ouly fund could experience problems in extremely low or negative 

interest rate environments. Government only funds are required to keep 30% weekly liquidity 

and may be forced to accept negative interest rates that would in effect erode principal. 

Purchasing securities carrying a negative yield, as short term U.S. Treasuries did on September 

28, 2012, would violate state statutes and investment policies that treasurers first consider the 

probable safety of capital when buying any security. As stated above, most LGIPs must invest 

funds considering first the probable safety of capital and then the probable income to be derived. 

In a negative interest rate environment, particularly triggered by a flight to qnality into securities 

backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, LGIPs attempting to operate as 

'government only' type pools would have no alternative but to purchase overnight repos backed 

by U.S. governments or short term U.S. Treasuries at negative yields. Even at zero or slightly 

positive rates, the overall yield on a government only pool would likely be too low to cover 

operating expenses and result in a loss of principal if the sponsor could not subsidize operations. 

Clearly, LGIPs seeking to protect accountholders by maintaining a stable NAV in times of 

market stress should not be constrained by rules requiring it to either violate investment statntes 

and policies designed to preserve principal or lose its ability to use the amortized cost method for 

valuing the pool. 

GASB Statements 31 and 59 do not contemplate Rule 2a-7 providing options for 

sponsors to select from depending on the make-up of their participants, size of participants' 

withdrawals, history of withdrawals during times of financial stress or other factors. We hope 

GASB would provide clarification as to how external pools can continue utilizing amortized cost 

if Rule 2a-7 no longer prescribes a viable methodology for operating a stable net asset value pool 

which, as emphasized, is the primary objective of most LGIPs. 

NAST agrees with the SEC's statements that changes to Rule 2a-7 do not directly or 

immediately apply to LGIPs. However, the SEC's proposals could affect LGIPs indirectly, 

depending on future actions of GASB and on individual states in establishing the operating and 

accounting standards for LGIPs. Changes to Rule 2a-7, whether moving to a floating NAV, 

which prohibits the of use of amortized cost accounting in valuing portfolio assets, or imposing 

gating and liquidity fees, would require considerable time and expense for state and local 

governments. This would depend on the terms of each LGlP's requirements and whether 

sponsors opt to mirror the changes implemented by an amended Rule 2a-7. The process for each 

LGlP's sponsor to analyze the need and suitability of possible statutory or policy changes and, if 

necessary, drafting, lobbying, adopting, disclosing and implementing those changes, would 

burden government sponsors with significant costs in an environment without any revenue 

sources of funding such changes. There is also a great deal of uncertainty that such changes 

would be approved by the respective governmental bodies. 

To the extent that LGIPs were indirectly forced into a floating NA V, or required to 

abandon use of amortized cost accounting, the usefulness of LGIPs to numerous state and local 

government entities would be greatly diminished. This would result in disruption as public sector 
98 


86679.049

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 9 of12 

investors sought to redirect investments with few viable alternatives, especially for small to midsize entities with limited bank or other counterparty willingness to accept collateralized interestbearing deposits. State and local governments would face complex decisions in determining 

viable options for investing funds that have, historically, been deposited into stable value LGIPs. 

Legality, affordability, and suitability among other factors would substantially limit investment 

options for public sector investors. 

Should the SEC adopt its proposed changes to Rule 2a-7 with an effective two-year 

phase-in period for MMFs, LGIPs would be at a distinct disadvantage that may prohibit 

continuation of any LGIP opting to be "2a-7 like". Since GASB regulations do not consider 

multiple options and exemptions for LGIPs to choose among in order to continue using 

amortized cost accounting, any consideration by GASB to amend its Statements 31 and 59 would 

take time to consider, possibly as long as two years. State treasurers could not even consider 

policy or statutory changes until GASB determined whether to amend its current regulations. In 

addition, state legislatures require siguificant time to research, debate, and promulgate legislative 

changes. Bond issuers also would require much time to explore whether indentures could be 

changed to protect bondholders if the prescribed investment in LGIPs would no longer be stable 

NAY. Alarmingly, LGIPs would have to continue to operate under great uncertainty while 

private MMFs adjust to new rule changes. This inequity would be extremely detrimental to 

LGIPs, sponsoring states, and all participants. 

It is also disconcerting that, at a time that the SEC has proposed to put restrictions on 

MMFs to eliminate their using amortized cost accounting, federal banking agencies recently 

amended rules governing the accounting treatment of bank short-term investment funds 

("STIFs''), which are a form of pooled investments used by bank trust departments as a MMF 

alternative to invest cash balances of state and local governments, trust accounts and pension 

plans.' The bank STIF rules were amended to include several aspects of SEC MMF rules, but 

continue to allow the use of amortized cost accounting to value portfolio assets, penny rounding 

to establish unit prices, and allow STIFs to seek to maintain a stable NAY of $l/unit. As with 

Bank STIFs, there appears to be no overriding accounting, policy or legal reason to apply all 

aspects of the SEC's MMF rules to the accounting treatment ofLGIPs. 

II. Burden on States as Purchasers of Money Market Funds 

In addition to providing a response from NAST that addresses concerns associated with 

the effect on LGIPs, we believe it is useful to include insight and other valuable comments 

regarding states that invest in MMF s. 

Many NAST members use MMFs extensively. As investors, states use MMFs as an 

efficient tool for managing large volumes of short-term liquid assets. MMFs that seek to 

maintain a stable value per share are permitted investments for many of our members, which rely 

on these funds to obtain ready liquidity, preservation of capital, and to provide diversification. 

'12 C.F.R 9.18(b) (4) (iii); 77 Fed. Reg. 61237 (Oct 9, 2012). 
99 


86679.050

Ms. Elizabeth M. Mwphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 10 of12 

Variable NAV MMFs generally are not permitted investments for our members for cash 

positions. Few other permitted investment options provide the same features of safety, return, 

liquidity, and stable market history as MMFs that seek to maintain a stable NAV. 

NASI is concerned that major changes to the regulation and structure of MMFs could 

make them less useful or otherwise unsuitable to our members as a cash management tool. 

III. Higher Funding Costs to Issuers of Short-term Municipal Securities 

In addition to providing a response from NASI that addresses concerns associated with 

the effect on LGIPs, as well as comments pertaining to states that invest in MMFs, we believe it 

is useful to include additional insight regarding states as issuers of short-term municipal 

securities purchased by MMFs. 

As borrowers, states benefit from MMFs, particularly municipal funds, as purchasers of 

short-term debt issues. 

Although bank loans and purchases of notes by banks and other institutional investors are 

usually an option, MMFs offer a reliable low-cost option for municipal borrowers. As a result, 

changes to MMF structure and regulation could impose significant costs and burdens on state 

and local governments and indirectly on our citizens. 

NASI is also concerned that a floating NAV, if applied to municipal MMFs, could lead 

to an exodus of investors from those funds. This would reduce the availability of short-term 

municipal financing and drive up the cost of fmancing short-term borrowing needs. Access to 

short-term fmancing allows some state and local governments to bridge the timing gaps between 

tax revenues and budgeted expenditures. Ihe SEC implies in its release that all investors in 

municipal MMFs are retail investors, and thus these funds could readily avail themselves of the 

"retail" exemption from the floating NA V requirement. We understand, however, that a 

significant portion of the balances in municipal MMFs is made up of institutional investors. 

Moreover, the "look through" provision in alternative one, which would look to the ultimate 

beneficial owners of omnibus accounts to set the daily $1 million redemption limit for a retail 

fund, appears to have many operational and legal complexities that may make it far less suitable 

than the SEC suggests. These two factors could result in many investors leaving municipal 

MMFs and other MMFs not qualifying for the "retail" exemption from the variable NA V 

requirement contained in alternative one. Either outcome would lead to a decline in MMF assets, 

to the significant detriment to our members and their citizens. Given that municipal MMFs have 

been very stable through many market cycles and did not experience large redemptions during 

the 2008 financial crisis, imposing a floating NA V upon them as a means to address investor 

"runs" seems entirely unnecessary. Accordingly, NASI believes strongly that municipal MMFs 

should be similarly exempted from the Floating NAV and the Fees/Gates alternatives as is 

proposed for Government MMFs. 

NASI is also concerned about the potential adverse impact upon our members' access to 
100 


86679.051

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September \6, 2013 

Page 11 of12 

financing from MMFs that could result from the SEC's proposal to eliminate the "25% basket" 

that currently permits MMF s to exceed the 10% limit on securities subject to guarantees and 

demand features from a single provider. Over the past two decades there has been a substantial 

reduction in the number of banks and insurance companies that provide credit support to 

muniCipal obligations. Due to the limited number of credit support providers for municipal 

obligations, the SEC's proposed change may have a particularly adverse impact upon state and 

local government access to financing from MMFs. Given the small number of credit support 

providers, the SEC's proposed change could effectively cap the aggregate amount of municipal 

debt that can be held by any single MMF regardless ofthe underlying credit of the issuers. 

NAST is concerned that major changes to the regulation and structure of MMFs could 

cause a significant shrinkage of the MMF market thereby reducing their funding as a source of 

short-term financing for municipal entities. 

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, as evidenced in our comments above, NAST is concerned that the SEC 

would act to the detriment of state and local governments if it adopts either of the two proposed 

alternatives to Rule 2a-7 or a combination of the two. The most harm would be to the states that 

operate or otherwise have authorized LGIPs. Also, as investors, the value we derive from 

investing in MMF s with stable NA V s would reduce our efficiency and increase our costs. Third, 

MMF purchasers of our short-term debt would be unfairly treated in comparison with MMFs 

purchasing U.S. government obligations and their reduced appetite for municipal debt would 

drive up our cost of capital. As stated by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), "The SEC 

proposal favors financing the federal government over the funding needs of state and local 

governments. It is important to the taxpayer that all governmental financing achieve the lowest 

cost.'''s 

NAST does not believe that further changes to the regulation of MMFs are needed. The 

SEC's 2010 amendments to Rule 2a-7 have worked as designed to significantly enhance MMF 

liquidity, credit quality, risk management, and transparency. Paul Schott Stevens, President and 

CEO of ICI, emphasizes "As members of the commission themselves noted, those 2012 

proposals were drafted without a proper economic study on the impact of the 2010 reforms".6 

We do not believe additional changes are appropriate given the high costs for MMF sponsors to 

implement and administer especially since there is no evidence that the proposed changes would 

enhance the stability ofMMFs or reduce systemic risks in the economy. 

Furthermore, given tltat many state LGIPs operate as "2a-7 like" funds, the excessive 

costs and burdens to implement and maintain the proposed changes and modifications to proven 

cash management vehicles for municipal governments would put many LGIPs at risk of 

5 leI (8/27/13).The Public Investor's Viewpoint [PowerPoint SlidesIRetrieved From; Money Market Fund 

Regulation Webinar 

• Paul Schott Stevens, "Top of the Ninth? The State of Play for Money Market Funds. June 19, 2013, 

httJr/lwwwicj Qrg/pressfOornlspeeches/13 pss crane symposium (accessed 8/27/2013). 
101 


86679.052

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 16, 2013 

Page 12 of12 

participant withdrawals or ceasing operation due to insufficient funding especially in this low 

rate environment It should be made clear by the SEC that any changes to refonn MMFs are not 

intended to affect LGiPs. NAST believes the SEC should not implement any rule change that 

might be interpreted as attempting to coerce LGIPs to choose between compliance with Rule 2a7 or prudently protecting their participants' capital and liquidity. Should Rule 2a-7 changes 

trigger unintended problems for state and local governments, the governments most strapped for 

funds and those in communities least served by large financial institutions will experience the 

greatest financial harm. The financial impact on state and local governments could well harm 

economic growth, market efficiency, jobs creation, competition, and credit worthiness of 

municipal governments across the U.S. 

In summary, the SEC's proposed rule changes would be detrimental to competition, 

efficiency, and capital fonnation for our members as well as cities, counties, and other municipal 

entities. We do not believe additional changes to money fund regulation are needed at this time. 

If further changes are adopted, however, we urge the Commission to (a) include a comment that 

it is not the SEC's intent to promulgate changes to LGIPs, and (b) create an exemption for 

municipal money funds equivalent to that established for U.S. Government MMFs under the 

proposal. As State Treasurers concerned about the financial strength and integrity of states and 

all governmental units within our states, we appreciate this opportunity to offer our views on this 

matter. 

Thank you for your consideration. 

Sincerely, 

Manju S. Ganeriwala 

President, National Association of State Treasurers 

State Treasurer, Commonwealth ofVirgiuia 
102 


86679.053

August 19, 2013 

Government Finance Officers Association 

International City/County Management Association 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and TreasUJelS 

National Association of State Treasurers 

National League of Cities 

National Association of Counties 

U.S. Conference of Mayors 

American Public Power Association 

Council ofInfiastructure Financing Authorities 

The Honorable Mary Jo White 

Chair 

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 

100 F Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20549 

Dear Chair White, 

The undersigned organizations listed above represent state and local governments and public 

infiastructure development agencies that rely on money market mutual funds ("MMMFs") to meet their 

investment and short-term financing needs. Our organizations have long supported efforts to strengthen 

MMMFs while ensuring the preservation of this vehicle for cash management and financing of 

governments' essential short-term needs. 

On June 5, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") approved proposed rules for 

MMMF reform ("Proposal"), which include the option of requiring a floating net asset value ("NA V") for 

institutional prime and tax-exempt funds. We remain concerned about the impact of a floating NA Von 

oUi use ofMMMFs for cash management and on these funds' ability to provide municipal financing. 

Forcing MMMFs to float their NA V s will create significant accounting, opeIational, and tax problems for 

investors and issuers. While we appreciate that the Commission acknowledges these problems, the 

Proposal provides no clear-cut solutions. Accordingly, we believe that it is incumbent upon the 

Commission to work jointly with other bodies and interested stakeholders to make certain that 

accounting, tax, and operational implications are fully addressed before the Proposal is finalized. 

As a next step, we therefore request that the Commission convene a roundtable to discuss the issues that 

the Proposal-and particularly the option of requiring floating NAVs-raises for states and municipal 

governments, financing authorities, businesses, and others who rely on MMMFs for cash management 

and short-term financing. 

Such a roundtable would afford the Commission and accounting and tax authorities an opportunity to 

collectively address the complicated repercussions of requiring MMMFs to float the NA V. Significant 

changes to investment policies, processes, and systems--including in many cases changes to state lawwill be required to implement this alternative. The Proposal concedes as much, noting that the move to a 

floating NA V will necessitate complex and potentially costly changes to numerous financial and 

accounting systems. A roundtable would inform the Commission on the concerns of government finance 
103 


86679.054

The Honorable MaryJo White 

August 19,2013 

Page 2 

officials and the extent to which they may stop using MMMFs if unworkable tegulations ate 

implemented. 

A floating NA V requirement for a broad categolY ofMMMFs could also adversely affect states' ability to 

run local government investment pools ("LGlPs"). Many of these pools model their portfolio 

management on the risk-limiting provisions of SEC Rule 2a-7 in order to offer a stable $1.00 share price. 

Changes to Rule 2a-7 that require a broad category ofMMMFs to float their shate prices could undermine 

the ability of LGlPs to provide cost-effective cash management for local governmental entities. 

Given the many questions raised in the Proposal, we believe that convening a roundtable and continuing 

the dialogue with interested parties will aid the Commission in generating a more informed, effective rule. 

Such an approach will ensure that any potential regulatory changes aimed at MMMF reform will be 

consistent with the Commission's statutory lesponsibility to plOmote efficiency, competition, and capital 

formation. We appreciate the opportunity to continue working with the Commission on MMMF reform, 

and we would welcome the opportunity to discuss the logistical aspects of a roundtable, including 

prospective participants, in greater derail. 

Sincerely, 

Government Finance Officers Association, Dustin McDonald, (202) 393-0208 

International City/County Management Association, Beth Kellar, (202) 289-4262 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, Cornelia Chebinou, (202) 624·5451 

National Association of State Treasurers, Peter Barrett, (202) 624-8.592 

National League of Cities, Lars Etzkorn, (202) 626-3173 

National Association of Counties, Mike Belarmino, (202) 942-4254 

U.S. Conference of Mayors, Larry Jones, (202) 861-6709 

American Public Power Association, John Godfrey, (202) 467-2929 

Council on Infrastructure Financing Authorities, Rick Farrell, (202) 547-1866 
104 


86679.055

Government Finance Officers Association 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasnrers 

National Association of State Treasurers 

American Public Power Association 

Council ofInfrastructure Financing Authorities 

International City/County Management Association 

International Municipal Lawyers Associatiou 

Natioual Association of Counties 

National Association ofHealtb and Educational Facilities Finance Authorities 

National Association of Local Housing Finance Agencies 

National Council of State Housing Agencies 

Natioual League of Cities 

U.S. Conference of Mayors 

February 13,2013 

Amias Gerety 

Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Financial Stability Oversight Council 

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Wasbington, DC 20220 

DOCID: FSOC-2012-0003-0058 

Dear Assistant Secretary Gerety: 

Tbank you for the opportunity to comment on the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Proposed 

Recommendations regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Refonns. The organizations listed above representing 

state and local governments and authorities have serious concerns related to the proposed changes to the structure 

of money market mutual funds (MMMFs), due to ourfoles as investors in these products and as issuers of 

municipal securities that are purchased by these funds. While we have supported and continue to support 

initiatives that both strengthen money market funds and ensure that investors are investing in high-quality 

securities, we would like to voice our concerns about some of the Council's suggestions to alter the structure of 

these funds, especially the proposal to require money market funds to use a floating net asset value (NA V) rather 

than the current stable net asset value. When similar proposals were circulated at the SEC, we opposed them and 

our concerns remain. 

It is also important to note that states invest in MMMFs for a variety of reasons both for themselves as an 

investment tool (as do local governments), and in their role managing local government investment pools 

(LGIPs). If the SEC rules are changed to adopt a daily floatingNAV, states would have to alter their own statutes 

in order to comply, as many state statues cite Rule 2a-7 as the model for their management of the LGIPs. Such a 

change would introduce a complex set of difficulties in tenns of daily accounting that neither the states nor their 

investors (local governments) are readily equipped to handle. 

The fixed NAVis a fundamental feature of money market mutual funds. As investors, many state and local 

governments look to MMMFs as part of their cash management practice. In the Government Finance Officers 

Association's Best Practice, "Use of Various Types of Mutual Funds by Public Cash Managers," governments are 

encouraged to look to money market funds for short-and medium-tenn investments, with appropriate cautions. 

One of the critical reasons for this recommendation is the fixed NAV feature found in these products. In fact, 

many governments have specific policies that mandate that they invest in products with stable values. These 

requirements and the popularity ofMMMFs as a cash management tool reflect the fact that these funds are highly 

regulated, have minimal risk, and are easily booked by the investor. State and local governments currently have 

$127 billion invested in these funds according to the Federal Reserve Bank. 
105 


86679.056

Additionally, changing the fundamental feature of MMMFs from a fixed NA V to a floating NA V would dampen 

investor demand for municipal securities and therefore could deprive state and local governments and other 

borrowers of much-needed capital. Consider that MMMFs are the largest investor in shorHerm municipal bonds, 

holding 73% of all outstanding short-term bonds equaling nearly $271 billion.' Creating a marketplace where the 

NA V changes from fixed to floating would make MMMFs far less attractive to investors, thereby limiting the 

ability of money market funds to purchase municipal securities. Losing this vital investing power could lead to 

higher debt issuance costs for many state and local governments across the country. 

In 2010, the SEC reinforced the regulations covering money market mutual funds. We believe that further 

regulations involving the adoption of a floating NA V would cause many of our members to divest a significant 

percentage of their investments in MMMFs. Our members would then have to look at competing products that, in 

turn, could be more susceptible to market conditions, more difficult to account for and manage, more likely to 

pose greater market risks, and would be more expensive, increasing the costs and fees associated with investing. 

Furthermore, our members have found that commercial banks do not want to take large investments from state 

and local governments, because the cost of collateralization over the FDIC limit is too high. 

To avoid these negative consequences, we believe that any further money market fund reforms must not involve 

eliminating this fundamental feature. 

The FSOC proposals also ask whether any ofthe suggested fwther reforms, if ultimately deemed necessary, 

should exempt particular types of MMMFs, including those funds investing in state and local government 

securities.' While an exemption may help investors in tax-exempt municipal MMMFs, and therefore lessen the 

chance that these funds would shy away from purchasing muniCipal securities, this approach would not assist state 

and local governments that use MMMFs (including prime MMMFsJ) for cash management and investment 

purposes. If the MMMFs that are available for state and local governments to purchase are to be saddled with a 

floating NA V feature, state and local governments would still be likely to refr'ain from purchasing these funds, 

and would have to tum to less safe, less liquid, and less desirable financing options. 

If you have any questions about our comments, please contact Dustin McDonald, Director of the Government 

Finance Officers Association'S Federal Liaison Center at 202-393-0208. 

Thank you for conSidering our concerns. 

Sincerely, 

American Public Power Association, John Godfrey 

Council ofInfrastructure Financing Authorities, Rick Fanell 

Government Finance Officers Association, Dustin McDonald 

International City/County Management Association, Beth Kellar 

International Municipal Lawyers Association, Chuck Thompson 

National Association of Counties, Mike Belannino 

National Association of Health and Educational Facilities Finance Authorities, Chuck Samuels 

National Association of Local Housing Finance Agencies, John Murphy 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, Cornelia Chebinou 

National Association of Stale Treasurers, Peter Barrett 

National Council of State Housing Agencies, Garth Rieman 

National League of Cities, Lars Etzkorn 

U.S. Conference of Mayors, Larry Jones 

, Investment Company Institute and Bloomberg. 

2 The Proposals discuss three alternative reforms: floating NAV (Alternative One); a "minimum balance at risk" paired with a small capital buffer (Alternative Two); and larger capital buffers, perhaps paired with other risk-limiting regulations 

(Alternative Three). 

3 Prime MMMFs are taxable MMMFs that may invest in commercial paper and certificates of deposit issued by financial and non-financial businesses, as well as Treasury and government-agency securities, 
106 


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American Public Power Association 

Council of Development Finance Agencies 

Council of Infrastructure Financing Authorities 

Government Finance Officers Association 

International City/County Management Association 

International Municipal Lawyers Association 

National Association of Counties 

National Association of Local Housing Financing Agencies 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers 

National Association of State Treasurers 

National League of Cities 

U.S. Conference of Mayors 

JW1e 23, 2011 

The HQnQrable SCQtt Garrett 

Chairman, SubcQmmittee 'On Capital Markets and G'Overnment SpQnsQred Enterprises 

Committee 'On Financial Services 

U.S. HQuse 'Of Representatives 

2129 Rayburn HQuse Office Building 

WashingtQn, DC 20515 

The HQnQrable Maxine Waters 

Ranking Member, SubcQmmittee 'On Capital Markets and G'Overnment SpQnsQred Enterprises 

C'Ommittee 'On Financial Services 

U.S. H'Ouse 'Of Representatives 

2344 Rayburn H'Ouse Office Building 

WashingtQn, DC 20515 

Dear Chairman Garrett and Ranking Member Waters: 

We are pleased that the Capital Markets and GQvernment SpQnsQred Enterprises Subcommittee is hQlding 

this hearing tQ look at the mutual funds market. We are particularly interested in mQney market mutual 

funds (MMMFs), due t'O 'Our role as investQrs in these products, as well as issuers of municipal securities 

which are purchased by these funds. The state and l'Ocal government groups listed ab'Ove SUPP'Ort 

initiatives that b'Oth strengthen m'Oney market funds and that ensure invest'Ors are investing in high-quality 

securities. H'Owever, we W'Ould like t'O V'Oice 'Our c'Oncerns about suggested changes t'O the structure 'Of 

these funds, especially any changes fr'Om a stable t'O a fl'Oating net asset value (NA V). 

Changing MMMFs from a fixed NA V t'O a f1Qating NA V W'Ould dampen invest'Or demand f'Or the 

securities we 'Offer and deprive state and local gQvernments 'Of much-needed capital. The fixed NAVis the 

fundamental feature 'Ofm'Oney market funds. Consider that MMMFs are the largest invest'Or in shQrt-term 

municipal b'Onds, h'Olding 56% 'Of all 'Outstanding shQrt-term bonds equaling nearly $352 billi'On.i Creating 

a marketplace where the NA V changes frQm fixed t'O f1'Oating W'Ould make MMMFs far less attractive tQ 

invest'Ors, thereby limiting the ability 'Of m'Oney market funds to purchase municipal securities. LQsing this 

vital investing P'Ower CQuid lead tQ higher debt issuance CQsts fQr many state and local g'Overnments acr'OSS 

the country. 
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86679.058

Additionally, as investors, many state and local governments look to MMMFs as part of their cash 

management practice. In the Government Finance Officer Association Best Practice, "Use of Various 

Types of Mutual Funds by Public Cash Managers," governments are encouraged to look to money market 

funds for short-term investments, with appropriate cautions. One ofthe critical reasons for this 

recommendation is the fixed NA V found in these products. In fact, many governments have specific 

policies that mandate stable values, and money market funds are to be used for their short-term 

investments due to the fixed NA V. Furthermore, MMMFs are a popular cash management tool because 

they are highly regulated, have minimal risk, and are easily booked. 

If the Securities and Exchange Commission were to adopt a floating NAV, the organizations listed above 

expect that many, if not all, of their members would divest a significant percentage of their investments in 

MMMFs and would have to look at competing products that, in turn, could be more susceptible to market 

conditions, more difficult to account for and manage, more likely to pose greater market risks, and mOle 

expensive, increasing the costs and fees associated with investing. 

To avoid these negative consequences, we believe that any money market fund reforms must refrain from 

eliminating this fundamental feature. 

Thank you for considering our concerns and for holding this hearing on mutual funds. 

Sincerely, 

American Public Power Association, Amy Hille, 202-467-2929 

Council of Development Finance Agencies, Toby Rittoer, 614-224-l300 

Council oflnfrastructure Financing Authorities, Rick Farrell, 202-547-1866 

Government Finance Officers Association, Susan Gaffuey, 202-393-8468 

International City/County Management Assnciation, Beth Kellar, 202-2894262 

International Municipal Lawyers Association, Chuck Thompson, 202-466-5424 x711 0 

National Assnciation of Counties, Mike Belarimo, 202-9424254 

National Association of Local Housing Financing Agencies, John Murphy, 202-367-1197 

National Assn. of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, Cornelia Chebinou, 202-624-5451 

National Association of State Treasurers, Kevin Johnson, 202-624-8592 

National League of Cities, Lars Etzkorn, 202-626-3173 

U.S. Conference of Mayors, Larry Jones, 202-861·6709 

i Investment Company Institute, letter to SEC, January 10,2011, page 16. 
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American Public Power Association 

Council of Development Finance Agencies 

Council of Infrastructure Financing Authorities 

Government Finance Officers Association 

International City/County Managers Association 

International Municipal Lawyers Association 

National Association of Counties 

National Association of Local Housing Financing Agencies 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers 

National Association of State Treasurers 

January 10,2011 

Ms. Elizabeth Murphy 

Secretary 

National League of Cities 

U.S. Conference of Mayors 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

100 F St., N.E. 

Washington, DC 20549-1090 

Re: Request for Comment on the President's Working Group Report on Money 

Market Fund Reform (Release No. IC-29497; File No. 4-619) 

Dear Ms. Murphy, 

The organizations listed above are pleased to comment on the SEC's consideration of the 

President's Working Group on Financial Markets report, specifically on possible money market 

reforms, entitled Money Market Fund Reform Options. As we have stated in previous comments 

to the SEC, notably to proposed changes to SEC Rule 2a-7 in 2009, we support initiatives to 

strengthen money market funds and ensure that investors are investing in high-quality securities. 

However, as investors in money market mutual funds (MMMFs), we are concerned about any 

changes that would alter the nature of these products and eliminate or impede our ability to 

purchase these securities. In our additional role as issuers of municipal bonds, we are concerned 

that such changes would dampen investor demand for the securities we offer and deprive state 

and local governments of much-needed capital. 

We are particularly concerned with the issue of whether the SEC should propose or adopt a rule 

that would change the fixed net asset value (NA V) - the hallmark of money market funds - to a 

floating net asset value. We believe that such a move would be harmful to state and local 

governments and the entire MMMF market. The fixed NAVis the fundamental feature of 

money market funds, and changing its structure likely would eliminate the market for these 
109 


86679.060

products by forcing state and local governments, along with many other institutional investors, to 

divest their MMMF holdings. 

Shrinking the market for MMMFs, in tum, would have severe consequences for state and local 

finances. MMMFs are the largest investor in short-term municipal bonds, holding 65% of all 

outstanding short-term bonds equaling nearly $500 billion. I Changing the NAV from fixed to 

floating would make MMMFs far less attractive to investors, thereby limiting the availability for 

money market funds to purchase municipal securities. Losing this vital investing power could 

lead to higher debt issuance costs for many state and local governments across the country. 

Forcing money market funds to float their NA V could thus deprive state and local governments 

of much-needed capital. 

As investors, many state and local governments look to MMMFs as part of their cash 

management practice. In the Government Finance Officer Association Best Practice, "Use of 

Various Types of Mutual Funds by Public Cash Managers," governments are encouraged to look 

to money market funds for short-term investments, with appropriate cautions. One of the critical 

reasons for this recommendation is the fixed NA V found in these products. In fact, many 

governments have specific policies that mandate stable values, and money market funds are to be 

used for their short-term investments due to the fixed NA V. MMMFs are a popular cash 

management tool because they are highly regulated, have minimal risk, and are easily booked. If 

the SEC were to adopt a floating NA V for MMMFs, the organizations listed above expect that 

many, if not all, of their members would divest a significant percentage of their MMMFs and 

would have to look at competing products that, in turn, could be more susceptible to market 

conditions, more difficult to account for and manage, and may pose market risk. 

Therefore, in considering the options presented in the President's Working Group on Financial 

Markets report, we recommend that the SEC and the Financial Stability Oversight Council 

(FSOC) be cognizant of the potential negative effects on state and local governments of any 

proposals that would fundamentally alter money market mutual funds, in particular those that 

would directly or indirectly force these funds to float their NA V s. If the Commission or the 

FSOC does plan to advance the idea of a floating NA V, we request that they provide a hearing 

and formal proposal of rules for comment and thorough discussion. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the SEC's consideration of the recommendations 

made in the President's Working Group on Financial Markets report on money market fund 

reform. If you have any questions about this letter, please contact Susan Gaffuey, Director ofthe 

Government Finance Officers Association's Federal Liaison Center at 202-393-8468. 

I RepOit of the Money Market Working Group, Investment Company Institute, March 2009, pages 18-19 
110 


86679.061

Sincerely, 

American Public Power Association 

Council of Development Finance Agencies, Toby Rittner 

Council ofinfrastructure Financing Authorities, Rick Farrell 

Government Finance Officers Association, Susan Gaffuey 

International City/County Managers Association, Beth Kellar 

International Municipal Lawyers Association, Chuck Thompson 

National Association of Counties, Mike Belarmino 

National Association of Local Housing Financing Agencies, John Murphy 

National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, Cornelia Chebinou 

National Association of State Treasurers, Jim Currie 

National League of Cities, Lars Etzkorn 

u.s. Conference of Mayors, Larry Jones 
111 


86679.062

TESTIMONY OF 

PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS 

PRESIDENT AND CEO 

INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND 

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ON 

"EXAMINING THE SEC'S MONEY MARKET FUND RULE PROPOSAL" 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 
112 


86679.063

I. Introduction 

My name is Paul Schott Stevens. I am President and CEO of the Investment Company 

Institute. the national association ofV.S. registered investment companies. including mutual funds. 

closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts. Members ofI CI manage total 

assets of $15.3 trillion and serve over 90 million shareholders. 

I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Capital Markets and Government 

Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee and offer our 

perspectives on the Securities and Exchange Commission's pending rule proposals on money market 

funds.! Money market funds, which date back to the early 1970s, are one of the most significant and 

successful financial product innovations of the past half century. Today, over 61 million retail 

investors, as well as corporations, municipalities, and other institutional investors, rely on the $2.6 

trillion money market fund industry for a low-cost, efficient cash management tool that provides a high 

degree of liquidity, stabiliry of principal value, aud a market-based yield. Money market funds also serve 

as an important source of direct financing for state and local governments, businesses, and financial 

institutions, and of indirect financing for households. Without these funds, financing for all of these 

institutions and individuals would be more expensive and less efficient. 

Money market funds owe their success, in large part, to the stringent regulatory requirements to 

which they are subject under the federal securities laws including, most notably, Rule 2a-7 under the 

Investment Company Act of 1940. The regulatory regime established by Rule 2a-7 has proven to be 

flexible and effective in protecting investors' interests and maintaining their confidence in money 

market funds. The SEC deserves tremendous credit for crafting these requirements and administering 

them in a manner that has allowed money market funds to thrive and to serve so many investors. The 

SEC also has modernized and strengthened the rule from time to time as circumstances warrantedmost recen tly. and very significantly, in 2010. Indeed, it is the SEC's deep and extensive experience that 

best positions it to consider and implement any further reforms to money market funds. 

In recognition of the importance of money market funds to the global economy and to 

investors, ICI and its members have devoted significant time and effort to considering how to make 

money market funds more robust under even the most adverse market conditions- such as the serious 

liquidity challenges arising in 2007-2008 related mainly to rising concerns about U.S. mortgage credit 

qualiry and the difficulry in determining the value of mortgage-related assets. These concerns created 

uncertainty about the balance-sheet strength oflarge banks and non-bank financial institutions and 

ultimately led these institutions to become wary oflending to one another, even on a short-term basis. 

I See Money Market FundRefOrm;Amendments to FormPF, SEC Release No.IC-30SSl (June S, 2013), 78 FR36834 (June 

19. 2013) ("Release"), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-940S.pd£ Pages referenced in this 

testimony are to the version of the Release on the SEC's website. 
113 


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Since 2008, the SEC and the fund industry have made a great deal of progress toward their 

shared goal of strengthening the resiliency of money market funds. Taking the initiative to respond 

quickly and aggressively to the events of fall 2008, ICI formed a Money Market Working Group to 

study the money market, money market funds and other participants in the money market, and recent 

market circumstances. The March 2009 Report of the Money Market Working Group ("MMWG 

Report") addressed these topics and advanced wide-ranging recommendations for the SEC to 

strengthen money market fund regulation.2 

In 2010, with the industry's strong support, the SEC approved lar-reaching rule amendments 

that incorporated many of the MMWG Report's recommendations and enhanced an already-strict 

regime of money market fund regulation.3 The amended rules have made money market funds more 

resilient by, among other things, imposing tighter credit quality, maturity, and liquidity standards and 

increasing the transparency of these funds. The amended rules also provided for an orderly liquidation 

process in the event that a money market fund proves unable to maintain a stable $1.00 net asset value 

("NA V')-an ability that was not available to the Reserve Fund or any other money market fund 

during the crisis. The 2010 reforms proved their value in 2011 when money market funds-without 

incident-met large volumes of shareholder redemptions during periods of significant market turmoil, 

including a credit event involving the historic downgrade of U.S. government debt. Indeed, so farreaching were these reforms that today's money market fund industry is dramatically different from 

that of2008. These reforms were studied by the SEC staff and their findings generally support our 

views as to the reforms' efficacy.4 Yet, the calls for further reform continue. 

For our part, ICI consistently has supported exploring reasonable options to make money 

market funds even more resilient while preserving the fundamental characteristics of these funds that 

are critical to investors. While we continue to believe that the reforms already adopted by the SEC are 

sufficient, we understand that regulators do not all share that view. 

II. The SEC's Proposals 

We remain committed to working with the SEC on this important issue, but we submit that 

this process should be guided by two principles. First, we should preserve to the greatest extent possible 

those key features of money market funds that have made them so valuable and attractive to investors. 

, See Investment Company Institute, Report a/the Afoney Market Working Group (March 17,2009), available at 

http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppt_ 09 _mmwg.pd£ 

3 See Money Market Fund Reform, SEC Release No. IC-29132 (February 23, 2010), 7S FR 10060 (March 4, 2010). 

4 See SEC Division of Risk. Strategy and Financial Innovation, Re.ponse to Questions Posed /J..v Commissioners Aguilor, 

Paredes, and Galktgher(November 30, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012!moncy.market·funds. 

memo.2012.pd£ 

2 
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Second, we should preserve choice for investors by ensuring a continued robust and competitive global 

money market fund industry. 

With these goals in mind, we are particularly supportive of the SEC's decision not to pursue 

proposals that would require money market funds or their advisers to maintain capital against fund 

losses (also known as NAV buffers) and/or implement a "minimum balance at risk." These concepts 

are deeply flawed. The likeliest impact of aNA V buffer requirement would be to impel money market 

fund sponsors to exit the business, thus depriving investors, issuers, and the economy of the benefits 

these funds provide. Indeed, the SEC itself acknowledged that the significant ongoing costs associated 

with a NA V buffer would directly affect money market fund sponsors or investors and indirectly harm 

capital formation. The minimum balance at risk also has a number of serious drawbacks. Not only 

would it constantly restrict some portion of an investor's holdings without regard to the fund's 

circumstances at the time of redemption, but also it would impose significant operational costs on fund 

complexes. intermediaries, and service providers. Citing these concerns. the SEC notes that a 

"(minimum balance at risk] coupled with a NAV buffer would turn money market funds into a more 

complex instrument whose valuation may become more difficult for investors to understand.'" 

Instead. the SEC is considering two reform alternatives that could be adopted either alone or in 

combination: (i) require prime and tax-exempt institutional money market funds to "float" their net 

asset values ("floating NAV proposal"); or (ii) require all non-governmental money market funds to 

impose liquidity fees of up to 2 percent and to have the option to temporarily suspend redemptions (or 

"gate" tbe fund) upon the occurrence of specified events indicating that the fund may be under stress 

("liquidity fee/temporary gate ptoposal"): 

In the course of our discussions of these proposals with ICI members. and members' 

discussions with fund shareholders. one thing became abundantly clear: shareholders continue to value 

the stability of principal and ready liquidiry provided by money market funds. When pressed to choose 

one or the other of the proposals put forth by the SEC. however, it appears that some investors place a 

higher premium on principal stability. while others more heavily value ready access to liquidiry. To a 

great extent, these differing investor perspectives reflect the circumstances and characteristics of the 

wide range of investors that our member firms serve. It is quite certain, therefore. that combining the 

SEC's two proposals would devastate the industry, rendering money market funds entirely unattractive 

to investors. 

5 Release, 5upra note 1. 

6 The SEC's proposal also includes a number ofless fundamental, yet signi£cant, reforms that would apply under either 

proposal. These include enhanced disclosure and reporting requirements; more stringent diversification requirements; 

enhanced stress testing; and improved private liquidity fund reporting. 

3 
115 


86679.066

On September 17, ICI submitted a comprehensive comment letter to the SEC on its money 

market fund reform proposals? Our views on the key elements of the proposal are briefly described 

below, 

A. No Basis for Fundamental Structural Reforms to Government and T ax-Exempt 

Money Market Funds 

The Release proposes to exempt government money market funds from further structural 

reform because of, among other things, the following: government money market funds are not 

susceptible to the risks of mass investor redemptions; their securities have low default risk and are 

highly liquid in even the most stressful market scenarios; and interest rate risk is generally mitigated 

because government funds typically hold assets that have short maturities and hold those assets to 

maturity.' We agree with the SEC that no case can be made for applying fundamental changes to 

government money market funds. We strongly believe that such changes likewise should not apply to 

tax-exempt funds, for similar reasons. 

There is no evidence that investors in tax-exempt money market funds redeem en masse during 

periods of market stress. Moreover, in the unlikely event that tax-exempt money market funds did in 

fact Sce widespread redemptions, these funds hold the great majority of their assets in highly liquid 

securities that can be sold to meet redemptions. Additionally, because of these securities' structures, 

they are likely more immune ro credit deterioration. Consequently, tax-exempt funds, like government 

funds, should be exempt from both the floating NAV proposal and the liquidity feeltemporary gate 

proposal. Our comment letter supports this position with data from three events: recent developments 

surrounding the City of Detroit, Michigan's 2013 bankruptcy; the financial crisis month of September 

2008; and the defmlt of Orange County, California in 1994.9 

7 Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO, Investment Company Institute. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (September 17, 2013) ("ICl Comment Letter"), available after September 17, 

2013 at http://www.ici.org/pdf/13_ici_mmfJtr.pdf 

8 See Rdease, supra note I, at 66. 

9 See leI Comment Letter, supra note 7. 

4 
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86679.067

Moreover, a fundamental restructuring of tax-exempt funds could compromise the critical role 

that these funds play in providing affordable short-term funding for state and local entities across the 

United States. Tax-exempt money market funds are the largest investors in short-term municipal debt, 

holding $252.7 billion as of}une 30, 2013. This was almost two-thirds of state and local short-term 

debt (64 percent as of June 2013). Requiring tax-exempt money market funds ro restructure 

themselves ro accommodate a floating NA V could be highly disruptive to their investors and the shortterm tax-exempt debt markets. 

Voicing these very concerns, a wide range of state and local government entities have argued 

that a floating NAV would destroy the convenience and simpliciry of tax-exempt money market funds 

for investors, and compromise an important source of financing for many state and local governments. lO 

Indeed, the United States Conference of Mayors recenrly unanimously adopted a resolution that 

expresses opposition to the floating NA V proposal, stating that"[ florcing [money market funds] to 

float their value would likely eliminate the market for those products by forcing investors, including 

state and local governments, to divest their [money market fund] holdings as well as discourage others 

from using these funds."ll Members of Congress also have shared their concerns regarding how new 

regulations on money market funds would impact municipalities' costs ofborrowing. 12 

B. Liquidity Fee/T emporaty Gate Proposal 

The SEC's liquidity fee/temporary gate proposal-i.e., allowing money market funds to 

continue to transact at a stable share price under normal market conditions, but under certain 

circumstances when a fund may be stressed from a liquidity standpoint (i) requiring the fund to 

institute a liquidity fee designed to deter further redemptions and (ii) permitting the fund to 

temporarily suspend redemptions-has the support of various of our members because it promises to 

slow or stop significant fund outflows. These tools, together with enhanced disclosute, directly address 

regulators' concerns about redemption pressures on prime money market funds. 

Under the liquidity fee/temporary gate proposal. if a money market fund's level of "weekly liquid 

assets" were to fall below 15 percent ofits total assets (half the required amount) after the close of 

10 For examples of governments. governm.ent officials, and organizations that have voiced support for maimaining the stable 

NA V for tax-exempt money market funds, see http://www.preservemoneymarketfunds.orglwhat-others-are-sayingl. 

lJ See Letter from Scott Smith. Mayor of Mesa. President, The United States Conference of Mayors, to Mary Jo "White. 

Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission Guly 18.2013), available at http://\\rww.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-

l3/s70313-30.pdf. 

12 For example. during a hearing by the House Committee on Financial Services on the SEC's FY 20 14 budget request, 

Representative Michael G. Fitzpatrick (R-PA) noted to SEC Chair Mary Jo White the importance of money market funds 

to municipalities. "[BJefore I came to Congress, I was a local elected official in Bucks County, [PAJ " .and a lot oflocal 

officials and state officials rely on money market funds as a source of sort of cash management. It's an important tool to have 

in the toolbox." See Overs~r:ht of the SEC:, Agenda, Operations, and FY 2014 Budget Request, Hearing before the House 

Committee on Financial Services (May 16, 2013), available at 

http://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=333327. 

5 
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86679.068

business, the money market fund would automatically impose a liquidity fee in connection with 

redemptions received for processing the next business day. The nonrefundable liquidity fee, which 

would be equal to 2 percent of redemption proceeds, would be paid to the fund by redeeming 

shareholders. A 2 percent liquidity fee would not be imposed, however, if the fund's board of directors 

determines that the fee is not in the best inrerest of the fund or that a lesser liquidity fee is in the best 

interest of the fund. 

Once a money market fund's weekly liquid assets fell below 15 percent of total assets, its board of 

directors also would be permitted to impose a temporary gate. A money market fund that suspends 

redemptions would need to restore the right to redeem within 30 days, although the board of directors 

could determine to restore it earlier. Money market funds would not be able to suspend redemptions 

for more than 30 days in any 90-day period. 

The SEC explains that the liquidity fee/temporary gate proposal is designed to address the 

contagion effects of heavy redemptions in money market funds that had a significant impact on 

investors, funds, and the markets during the financial crisis. Regardless of the incentives to redeem, the 

Release notes that a liquidity fee would make redeeming investors pay for the costs of liquidity and, if 

investors continued to redeem from a fund, temporary restrictions on redemptions would directly halt 

amn. 

To make these tools even more useful to fund boards, our comment letter recommends that the 

SEC expand the circumstances under which a board may impose a liquidity fee or temporarily suspend 

redemptions to cover situations when heavy redemptions are already underway or are clearly 

foreseeable. 

Norwithstanding the support for the liquidity fee/temporary gate proposal, it has potential 

drawbacks. It is unclear how many investors would use a money market fund with liquidity fees and 

gates given the explicit possibility of restricted liquidity, what impact this measure would have on 

certain transaction types; and what tax implications a liquidity fee might have for money market funds 

and their shareholders. There is no question that complex and costly system modifications by fund 

transfer agents and intermediaries would be necessary to handle liquidity fees and temporary gates. We 

anticipate that it may take at least three years to allow the industry to complete the operational and 

other changes necessary to successfully implement liquidity fees and temporary gates. 

C. Floating NA V Proposal 

The SEC's other proposed approach would fundamentally alter prime and tax-exempt 

institutional money market funds by requiring these funds to have a floating NA V instead of a stable 

NA V. SpeCifically, these funds would be required to sell and redeem shares based on the current 

market-based value of the securities in their underlying portfolios and "basis point round" their share 

price to the nearest 11100th of one percent (e.g., the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a 

$1.0000 share price). The Release indicates that the floatingNAV proposal is designed primarily to 

6 
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86679.069

address the incentive of money market fund shareholders to redeem shares in times of fund and market 

stress based on the fund's valuation and pricing methods, and to improve the transparency of pricing 

associated with money market funds. 

ICI has maintained consistently since 2009 that forcing funds ro float their NAVs would not 

achieve such goals. Even assuming that investors are willing to use floating NA V money market funds, 

a floating NAVis unlikely to alter meaningfully investors' behavior during a market crisis. On the 

contrary, there is considerable evidence, as the SEC itself acknowledges, that the outflows from prime 

money market funds during September 2008 were part and parcel of a flight by investors to the quality 

and liquidity of the Treasury market. Indeed, there is evidence, as the SEC also acknowledges, that 

long-term funds (whose NA Vs have always floated) experienced significant outflows during the 

financial crisis. 

1. Loss of Key Benefits Valued by Investors 

The floating NA V proposal would require funds, intermediaries and investors to make very 

significant and costly operational changes to accommodate floating NAV money market funds. 

Forcing money market funds to float their NA Vs would impose significant tax butdens on funds and 

investors. Unlike investors in stable NAV money market funds, those in floating NAV money market 

funds could have taxable gains and losses upon every redemption. Even though those gains and losses 

likely would be very small, they would be subject to tax reporting. This means that funds, 

intermediaries, and most institutional investors would have to build new or expand existing systems to 

track, calculate and report gains and losses, at a significant cost. It bears emphasizing, contrary to some 

media commentary, these changes would be onerous because, among other things, the volume and 

frequency of transactions in money market funds makes this reporting exponentially more difficult 

than it is for other floating NAV mutual funds. The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue 

Service have suggested measures to mitigate these burdens; however, their suggested de minimis 

exceptions and simplified reporting schemes do not go far enough and in some cases may exacerbate the 

problems. We are discussing these concerns with the Treasury Department and the IRS. 

Congressional action may be necessary, however, if regulatory solutions are not possible or are 

inadequate. 

Requiring floating NAVs also complicates the accounting treatment of money market funds 

and could result in the loss of same-day settlement services, which are extremely important to 

institutional investors managing their daily cash. Moreover, the product would be unusable as a sweep 

vehicle. Without these benefits, widespread investor acceptance of a floating NAV money market fund 

product is unlikely. It is critical, therefore, that the changes necessary to alleviate these tax and 

accounting butdens be implemented before any floating NAV requirement takes effect. 

7 
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2. Reduction in Capital Market Funding 

One clearly foreseeable impact of the floating NA V proposal is a reduction in capital market 

funding to the private sector. Requiring prime institutional money market funds ro float their NA V s 

risks precipitating an outflow of hundreds of billions of dollars from prime money market funds to 

other products, including government money market funds. This could result in a major restructuring 

and reordering of intermediation in the short-term credit markets, and the transition is likely ro be 

highly disruptive. Regulatory changes that push assets from money market funds toward other money 

market instruments and uninsured bank deposits would disrupt the capital markets and fail in the long 

run to address the concerns the SEC has raised, such as promoting safer capital markets and reducing 

risks to the economy at large. It also is not clear that regulatory policies that further concentrate 

deposits in the largest banks reduce systemic risks. 

3. Disclosure Achieves Same Goals 

The SEC itself questions whether a floating NA V would help limit widespread redemptions, 

focusing instead on the potential ability of a floating NA V to heighten investors' awareness that these 

funds hold securities whose market values fluctuate. If this is the goal, it could be achieved more simply 

and at less cost by requiring these funds to publish their daily mark-to-market values. 

Regulators might argue that such costs are justified by the benefits of reducing risks to the 

financial system. Because the operational changes reqUired are so extensive, difficult and costly to make, 

many sponsors, intermediaries, and instirutional investors will not make them, potentially resulting in 

increased assets in unregulated products or a risky buildup of uninsured deposits in the banking system. 

These disincentives to offer floating NA V funds would be compounded by additional regulatory 

requirements. Like all long-term funds, prime and tax-exempt institutional money market funds would 

have to float their NAVs bur, unlike long-term funds, these funds would still be required to adhere ro 

Rule 2a-7 and a proposed pricing standard that is 10 times more stringent than the pricing standard for 

other floating NA V products. 

4. Retail Fund Exception 

If the SEC nevertheless determines, despite our longstanding concerns, to require funds to float 

their NA V s, we agree that the reach of that action should be reasonably tailored and that it is 

appropriate to exempt "retail" funds from the floating NA V requirement. Money market funds 

provide retail investors access to investments not otherwise affordable or accessible, such as commercial 

paper issued in minimum denominations beyond the reach of the average investor. Maintaining the 

availability of prime stable NAV money market funds for retail investors, therefore, is particularly 

important because those funds provide diversification and a market-based rate of rerum that is not 

otherwise available through a bank deposit account. 

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We have significant concerns, however, that the SEC's proposal to define retail funds through a 

redemption limit would impair investor liquidity and be more onerous operationally than other 

methods. Instead, we recommend using a social securiry number ("SSN") as the fundamental 

characteristic to identifY an investor eligible to invest in a retail money market fund. Under this 

recommended approach, any account opened by a fund or intermediary that has captured an SSN as a 

(tax) identification component for the registered owner or beneficial owner of an account would 

qualifY for investment in a stable NA V retail money market fund. This approach would capture a very 

large percentage of the retail investors who invest in money market funds directly. It also would include 

accounts whose underlying beneficiaries have an SSN, such as those invested in tax-advantaged savings 

accounts, retail brokerage, and certain trust accounts whose beneficiaries have SSN s that are held in the 

name of intermediaries on fund transfer agent records. Importantly, using SSNs would be far less costly 

to implement than other methods of defining retail funds, including the SEC's proposed daily 

redemption limit. 

Finally, regulators should be concerned that the transition from stable to floating NAV could 

be destabilizing to the financial markets because it could require money market funds to potentially 

shed hundreds of billions of dollars of money market instruments as their investors redeem in favor of 

other products. If the SEC's proposed changes are adopted, mitigating transitional impacts to 

shareholders must be a primary goal for regulators. With all that needs to be considered and 

accomplished by funds, intermediaries, and invesrors, the industry needs a significant transition period 

with a compliance date of the later of at least 3 years follOWing issuance of final SEC rules; or January 1 

of the calendar year that begins at least 12 months after final tax guidance is issued or, if needed, new 

legislation has been passed. 

D. Potential Combination of Floating NAVand Liquidiry Fee/Temporary Gate 

Proposals 

The SEC also is considering whether to combine the floating NA V and the liquidiry 

fee/temporary gate proposals into a single reform package. If the proposals are adopted in combination 

with each other, prime and tax-exempt institutional money market funds would be required to transact 

at a floating NA V and, in addition, all non-government money market funds would be required to 

impose liquidiry fees (unless waived by the board) and permitted to impose temporary gates in certain 

circumstances. 

We strongly oppose the combination of these two proposals. The combination of the two SEC 

proposals will produce a fimd that lacks both the share price stabiliry and the assured redeemability of 

today's money market fund. The result: a fund that nobody will want because nobody will need. 

Instead, institutional investors would seek out other cash management investment alternatives that 

offer principal stability (e.g., government money market funds, investment products not registered 

under the Investment Company Act such as separatc accounts or unrcgistered cash management pools, 

or uninsured bank deposits) or that have neithcr potential restrictions on redemptions nor the yieldlimiting restrictions ofRulc 2a-7 (e.g., all other mutual funds). Although for cash management 

9 
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purposes these options are not as ideal as money market funds, for many investors they are far more 

attractive than a floating NA V fund that also may not always provide ready liquidiry. The principal 

impact of such a combination, therefore, would be to shrink dramatically, perhaps to extinction, the 

assets of prime and tax-exempt institutional money market funds. 

A combination of the floating NA V proposal and the liquidiry fee/temporary gate proposal also 

would undermine the attractiveness of retail money market funds. Under the SEC's proposal, a money 

market fund would be exempt from the floating NA V requirement if it does not permit a shareholder 

to redeem more than $1 million per day. It is simply overkill to add additional structural reforms to a 

fund that already restricts the daily liquidity available to investors. 

From an operational standpoint, the combination of the two proposals would be extremely 

burdensome and cost prohibitive for the industry. Funds, transfer agents, intermediaries, institutional 

investors and others would incur significant operational costs that include establishing or modifying a 

wide range of systems and procedures ro process transactions at floating NAVs (not to mention the 

necessary changes to accommodate increased recordkeeping, accounting and tax reporting burdens). 

Then, in addition, they would incur costs in establishing or modifying systems and related operational 

changes to administer a liquidiry fee and temporary gate. 

It is informative to consider the SEC's own estimated costs of its proposals. Using the Release's 

estimated one-time and ongoing costsI3 to implement the floating NA V and liquidiry fee/temporary 

gate proposals, we estimate the following costs would be incurred: 

• Funds and their transfer agent service providers would incur olle-time costs ranging hom 

approximately $400 to $712 million, and allllual ollgoillg costs of approximately $40 to $137 

million to implement both proposals. These estimates do 1I0t illelude one-time and ongoing 

costs for intermediaries, institutional investors, or others affected by the proposed changes . 

• The cost for the industry (including funds, transfer agents, intermediaries, institutional 

investors, and service providers) to implement both proposals would be 2 to 2 Y, times the 

estimated costs fot funds, with total one-time costs ranging from approximately $800 million 

to $1.75 billion, and allllual ollgoillgeosts of apprOXimately $80 to $350 million. 

Again, the key issue is not the size of these costs relative to potential benefits of reducing any 

potential risks that regulators believe money market funds may pose. Instead, the key fact is that these 

costs are so large that they will encourage the use ofless regulated alternatives, an outcome that would 

not benefit investors, the economy or the financial system. 

n See Release) supra note 1, at 107, l26, 129.203. and 227. In discussions regarding the one-time and ongoing annual costs 

estimated in the Relea...;;e. our members have indicated that those cost estimates are low when compared to their own 

estimates. 

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E. Enhanced Disclosure and Reporting 

ICI consistently has supported efforts to increase the public disclosure of money market fund 

porrfolio information and risks, and to enhance the SEC's access to money market fund data. Our 

supporr for further disclosure and reporring enhancements turns on whether money market funds are 

permitted to maintain a stable NA V. We offer our overall support for enhancing the disclosure 

requirements for stable NA V money market funds. If the SEC requires money market fund NA Vs to 

float, however, the proposed disclosure requirements would be unnecessary and we oppose them. 

Furthermore, we question the benefit of the current level of money market fund disclosure and 

reporting-which is far more detailed and frequent than that for any other floating NA V funds-for 

money market funds that are required to float their NAVs. 

We appreciate the opportunity to share our views with the Subcommittee. We remain 

committed to working with Congress and the SEC as they seek to address this important issue in the 

best possible way for the millions of American investors who rely on money market funds as an effective 

cash management tool and as an indispensable source of short-term financing for the U.S. economy. 

11 
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-

= - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON'" 

600 ATLANTIC AVENUE. BOSTON MA 02210 

WWW.BOSTONFEO.ORG 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

Attention: Elizabeth M. Murphy 

100 F Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20549-1090 

September 12, 2013 

ERIC S. ROSENGREN 

PRESIDENT AHD 

CHIE"'" EXEC0TlVE OFFICER 

PHONE 6ll:973.3090 

Re: Securities and Exchauge Commission '8 Mouey Market Fuud Reform; Ameudmeuts to Form 

PF (the "Proposal"), SEC File No. S7-03-13, 78 FR 36833, Juue 5, 2013. 

I am writing on behalf of the 12 Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, all of whom are signatories to this 

comment letter. We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the Securities and Exchange 

Commission's ("SEC") Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Fonn PF release (the "Proposal") 

issued on June 5, 2013.' The SEC took a very important step towards Money Market Mutnal Fund 

("MMMF") reform by issuing this Proposal, which includes two principal reform alternatives: (i) a 

floating net asset value per share ("NA V") requirement for prime institntional MMMFs, and Oi) stand-by 

liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates for non-government MMMFs that breach a pre-detennined 

trigger.' 

We applaud the SEC Commissioners' and staffs continued efforts in this area. We believe the SEC is 

well-positioned to implement meaningful reforms that not only better protect investors but also address 

the risks to financial stability posed by MMMFs. In our previous comment letter to the Financial 

Stability Oversight Conncil ("FSOC"), we noted that more than one of the FSOC's proposed alternatives 

could address these risks.3 Accordingly, we welcome the inclusion of the floating NAV alternative in the 

CWTent Proposal. We strongly support this alternative, especially if certain enhancements are undertaken. 

However, we do not support the stand-by liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates alternative, as 

these mechanisms do not meaningfully reduce the risks that MMMFs pose to financial stability. 

We briefly discuss the risks to financial stability posed by MMMFs, particularly prime MMMFs, in 

Section r. 4 Section II offers observations on the floating NA V alternative, including several suggestions 

for increasing its effectiveness. Section III outlines our concerns with the stand-by liquidity fees and 

temporary redemption gates alternative. Finally, Section IV discusses tlle proposed enhancements to 

portfolio disclosure and diversification requirements. 

I The vieW'S expressed in this letter are ours and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . 

.2 On page 69 of the Proposal, the SEC noted that the '''retail'' exemption from the floating NAV alternative would likely cover most tax-exempt 

MMMFs, because the tax benefits offered by such funds are "only enjoyed by individuals." On page 198 of the Proposal, the SEC noted that a 

government MMMF may choose to impose a liquidity fee or temporary redemption gate, if ito:; ability to impose such measures was previously 

disclosed in its prospectus. 

J Federal Reserve Bank Presidents' Comment Letter to the FSOC submitted on February 12, 2013. The FSOC proposed three reform 

alternatives: (i) a floating NA V requirement, (ii) NAV buffer of up to 1 percent and a Minimum Balance at Risk, and (iii) Risk-based NAV buffer 

of 3 percent and other measures. See FSOC, "Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Refonn," November 2012. 

4 Prime MMMFs invest primarily in non-government debt instruments such as commercial paper, certificates of deposit, time deposits, and 

floating rate instrument;;. As of June 30, these instruments accounted for approximately 75 percent ofptime MMMFs' assets. Based on data 

from iMoneyNet 
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86679.075

Section I Risks to Financial Stability Posed by MMMFs 

MMMFs serve an important function in the short-term credit markets by acting as intermediaries between 

investors seeking a highly liquid, diversified fixed income investment, and a variety of corporate and 

government entities seeking short-term funding. As a result, disruptions in MMMFs' ability to function 

as credit intermediaries can have a significant negative impact on the broader financial system. 

On numerous occasions over the past few years, government officials and academics have discussed the 

risks that MMMFs pose to financial stability.' These risks were also highlighted in the FSOC's 20\3 

annual report. As currently structured, MMMFs permit redemptions and purchases at a constant NA V 

(generally $1.00), take credit risk, and have no mechanism to absorb losses.6 Investors therefore have an 

incentive to "run" from a fund when they perceive its market-based NA V to be less than its transaction 

(or reported) NAV. The risks associated with this structure were evident in September 2008, when 

investors fled from prime MMMFs into government MMMFs, exacerbating disruptions in the short-term 

credit markets.7 The U.S. Government used mUltiple approaches to restore liquidity to credit markets, 

some of which targeted MMMFs directly and many of which indirectly helped to restore MMMFs to 

normal functioning.s 

In 2010, the SEC amended Rule 2a-7, enacting several new or enhanced requirements aimed at 

strengthening the stability ofMMMFs: Despite these important changes, MMMFs remain a significant 

risk to financial stability. Indeed, a November 2012 study by SEC staff found that the Commission's 2010 

reforms were "not sufficient to address the incentive to redeem when credit losses are expected to canse 

funds' portfolios to lose value or when the short-term financing markets ... come under stress. ,,10 As 

such, we strongly urge the SEC to proceed with additional reforms. 

5 See, e.g., Eric Rosengren, "Money Market Mutual Funds and Financial Stability," April 2012; William Dudley, "Fixing Wholesale Funding to 

Build a More Stable Financial System," February 2013; Squam Lake Group, "Reforming Money Market Funds," January 20ll; Sheila Bair, 

"Statement by the Systemic Risk Council em Money Market Fund Refonn," July 2012; International Monetary Fund, "April 2013 Global 

Financial Stability Report," April 2013; Daniel Tarullo, "Financial Stability Regulation" October 2012; Sallie Krawcheck's FSOC Comment 

Letter; Mary Schapiro, "Remarks at the Financial Stability Oversioht Council Meeting," November 2012; Patrick McCabe. Marco Cipriani, 

Michael Holscher, Antoine Martin, "The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posted by Money Market 

E:l!ru.lli," July 2012; Henry Paulson's PWQ Comment Letter; International Organization of Securities Conunissions, "Money Market Fund 

Systemic Risk Analysis and Refonn Options." April 2012. 

6 Different categories of MMMFs take varying levels of credit risk. We [oca.:; on prime MMMFs, where the greatest credit risk can be taken and 

where the risks to financial stability appear to be the greatest. For more on credit risk in prime MMMFs, See Eric Rosengren, "Money Market 

Mutual Funds and Financial Stability," April 2012. 

i In the week after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck on September 15,2008, investors redeemed approximately $321 billion or 16 

percent ofasscts from prime MMMFs. Based on iMoneyNet data. 

The Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility ("AMLF") and Temporary Guarantee Program ("TGP") 

directly benefitted MMMFs. Other government programs, such a,<; the Commercial Paper Funding Facility ("CPFF'), indirectly benefitted 

MMMFs. Specifically, the AMLF, announced on September 19,2008 by the Federal Reserve Board, " ... was designed to provide a market for 

Allep that M"M:MFs sought to sell." The CPFF, announced on October 7, 2008 by the Federal Reserve Board, provided a liquidity backstop to 

domestic issuers of commercial paper. For more on these Federal Reserve Programs, See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 

Regulatol)' Refonn Facilities and Promms, 2008. The TGP, announced on September 19,2008 by the u.s. Department of Treasury, guaranteed 

tbe NA V per share of eligible MM.M"Fs. For more on the TGP, refer to U.s. Department of Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee 

Program for Money Market Funds, September 2008. 

9 20 I O's amendments to Rule 2a-7 tightened weighted average maturity limits; enacted new Daily Liquid Assets ("DLA "), Weekly Liquid Assets 

("WLA"), and weighted average life requirements; enhanced holdings disclosure requirements; introduced new Rule 22e-3, which penuits a 

MM1vfF to suspend redemption...; and postpone payment of proceeds in order to facilitate an orderly liquidation; and introduced "know your 

customer" and stress testing requirements, among other changes. SEC, "Money Market Reforms' Final Rules" Investment Company Act Release 

No. IC·29132, May 2010. 

10 Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation, "Response to Ouestions Posed by Commissioners Aguilar Paredes and Gallagher," SEC, 

November 2012. The quotation is from page 44 ofthe SEC's Proposal. 

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Section II Observations on Alternative 1: Floating NA V Requirement 

Under this alternative, prime institutional MMMFs would be required to process purchases and 

redemptions based on the currcnt market-based value of the securities in their portfolios, rounded to the 

nearest IIl00th of a percent." These funds would continue to be limited to investing in short-tenn, high 

quality, dollar denominated instruments. Government and retail MMMFs are exempt from this 

alternative. 

We agree with the SEC's position that a floating NAV requirement, if properly implemented, could 

rccalibrate investors' perceptions of the risks inherent in a fund by "making gains and losses a more 

regularly observable occurrence."l2 Because a constant NA V MMMF generally draws risk-averse 

investors, it is likely that given an appropriate transition period, the investor base would either change or 

become more tolerant of NAV fluctuations, lowering the risk of destabilizing runs. Indeed, a floating 

NA V fund may actually attract investors seeking a higher yield for their cash investment during times of 

broad financial market stress. 13 

Further, the floating NAV alternative reduces investors' incentives to redeem by tempering the "cliff 

effect" associated with a fund "breaking the buck." The first mover advantage is reduced because 

redemptions would be processed at a NAV rel1ective of the market-based value of the fund's underlying 

securities. 

Section II.A Issues to be Addressed to Further Enhance the Floating NAV Alternative 

While we are supportive of this alternative, we have identified several issues that should be addressed to 

further enhance its efficacy. 

Proper Valuation of Money Market Instruments is Critical 

The effectiveness of a floating NAV option depends on funds' ability to properly value money market 

instruments. To the extent that investors believe that a fund's "true" market-based NAV is below its 

reported NA V, they will be incented to redeem before other investors. 

One often-mentioned challenge to valuing non-government related money market instruments is the 

infrequency of secondary market transactions for such instruments.'4 Even under the current fixed NA V 

regime, however, funds are able to value such instruments using a combination of matrix pricing and 

model-based valuation methodologies." As such, MMMFs subject to the floating NAV requirement 

would also be able to value their portfolio securities on a daily basis for the purposes of computing a 

II As discussed below, Ml\.fMFs subject to the floating NAV requirement would be permitted to apply the SEC's 1977 Valuation guidance, under 

which securities with remaining or fmal maturities of no more than 60 days can be valued at amortized cost, in circumstances where the 

amortized cost accurately reflects the securities' fair value, as dctennined using market factors. See Footnote 18. 

11 Page 53 of the Proposal. Separately, as noted in our FSOC Comment Letter (Footnote 3) MMMF sponsor support may reduce investors' 

awareness of the risks in MMMFs by creating a perception of stability. 

U As noted in our Comment Letter to the FSOC (Footnote 3). Others have made similar observations, See, e.g., Thrivent Financial's FSOC 

Comment Letter, in which they argued that a FNAY potentially offers higher returns in a rising rate environment. during times of weak market 

liquidity, and in the face of credit events. 

14 See, e.g., John Hawke, Jr., "Economic Consequences of Proposals to Require Money Market Mutual Funds to "Float" Their NAY," November 

2012;; and Samuel Hanson, David Scharfstein, and Adi Sunderam, "An Evaluation of Money Market Fund Refonn Proposals," Harvard 

University, December 2012. 

I, See, generally Footnote 14; loan Swirsky, "TIle Guide to Rule 2a-7. A Map Through the Maze for the Monev Market Professional," May 

2008. 

Page 3 of9 
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86679.077

transaction NAV.'6 While the resulting prices may serve as a natural starting point for market-based 

NA V computations required under this alternative, we encourage the SEC to continue its efforts to 

increase the transparency of fixed income markets to further enhance price discovery." 

MMMFs subject to the floating NAV alternative would be permitted to apply the SEC's 1977 valuation 

guidance, under which securities with remaining or final maturities of 60 days or less can be valued at 

amortized cost, in circumstances where the amortized cost accurately reflects the securities' fair value as 

determined using market factors." Because MMMFs are required to maintain a weighted average 

maturity of 60 days or less under current rules, it is likely that a fimd would be permitted to apply this 

guidance to a majority of its portfolio assets." As such, any uncertainty in applying the guidance could 

have a significant impact on a fund's overall valuation. We urge the SEC to continue monitoring fimds' 

procedures for determining that amortized cost accurately reflects fair value, as inappropriate valuation 

procedures could reduce the efficacy of the floating NA V alternative both in reducing run risk and in 

recalibrating prime MMMF investors' risk expectations. 

Retail Exemption Poses Challenges 

The SEC proposes to exempt prime retail MMMFs, defiued as those with a daily shareholder redemption 

limit of $1 million or less, from the floating NAV requirement. The SEC supports this exemption by 

inferring that retail investors are less likely to run during times of financial market stress than institutional 

investors. While it is true that in aggregate, retail MMMFs did not experience large-scale redemptions 

during the financial crisis, some individual retail funds did experience redemptions above historical nornlS 

during the week that the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck. 20 Although one may speculate that these 

heightened redemptions could have become a more widespread run, this possibility was forestalled by 

Government intervention that supported the MMMF market. Government intervention notwithstanding, 

some retail MMMF sponsors' actions during the financial crisis suggest that they were concerned about 

runs. Certain sponsors chose to support their retail MMMFs, presumably to forestall runs that could 

occur if investors feared that a fund would "break the buck."" Also, some retail flU1ds participated in the 

16 Indeed, earlier this year, some large MMMF complexes (voluntarily) began daily reporting of the market-based NAV per share of their 

MMMFs. See, e.g., announcements from: Goldman Sachs Asset Manaoement; Fidelity Investments; and JP Morgan Asset Management. 

l7 As noted in our FSOC Comment Letter (Footnote 3), we agree with those who have pointed out that certain money market instruments lack an 

active secondary market. However, primary markets may also provide useful infonnation to enhance price discovery. More generally, we 

encourage the SEC to continue its efforts to enhance transparency in the fixed income market.., inclusive of markets for money market 

instruments. Recent efforts include the SEC's April 16, 2013 Fixed Income Roundtable, in which a pane! discussed " ... potential ways to 

improve the transparency and efficiency of fixed income markets." SEC's Fixed Income Roundtable Relca.<ie. In addition, the SEC issued a 

Report on the Municipal Securities Market on July 2012, which provided recommendations for potentia! consideration aimed at improving the 

municipal securitic,,"i market. 

18 SEC, Valuation ofOcht Instruments by Money Market Funds and Certain Other Open-End Investment Companies, Investment Company Act 

Release No. 9786, May 1977. 

19 As of month end June 30, prime lvIMMFs allocated 55 percent of their portfolios to securities with a tlnal maturity of 60 days or less. Prime 

institutional MMMFs allocated 56 percent of their portfolios to such securities. Based on data from Crane Data. 

2(; Figure 3 from Lawrence Schmidt, Allan Timmennann, and Russ Wermers, "RWls on Money Market Mutual Funds," January 1,2013. Also, 

in its FSOC Comment Letter, IP Morgan notes, "Although it is evident that runs are slower to hit retail funds than institutional MM[MjFs, retail 

funds are not immune to a run on their assets, and so should be subject to the same regulatory protections." 

11 In reviewing the direct (i.e., cash contributions or an outright purchase of distressed securities) sponsor support instances from 2007 to 2010, 

we find that of the 78 distinct prime MMMFs that received support, no less than 30 were classified as "retail" MMMFs. Based on category 

classifications reported on iMoneyNet from January 2008 through January 2012. Direct sponsor support instances were obtained from: Steffanie 

Brady, Ken Anadu, and Nathanjel Cooper, "The Stability of Prime Money Market Mutual Funds: Sponsor SuPPOrt from 2007 to 201 J ," Federal 

Reserve Bank of Boston, August 2012. 

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AMLF, which was introduced to help MMMFs holding asset-backed commercial paper meet investors' 

redemption demands.22 

More broadly, a structural incentive would remain for investors in retail MMMFs that are exempt from 

the floating NA V requirement to be the first to redeem during times of stress. While retail investors did 

not en masse act on this incentive dnring the crisis, it seems imprudent to assume that their behavior in 

the future will be the same as in the past." Accordingly, we find it appropriate that all prime MMMFs, 

including those characterized as "retail," be subject to the floating NA V requirement. 

We are also concerned that the $1 million redemption threshold may not fully exclude institutional 

investors from retail funds, as services might emerge to spread large cash balances across numerous 

MMMFs eligible for the retail exemption?4 The entry of institutional investors into "retail" funds would 

likely increase the run risk to which the retail investors are exposed. 

Risk Profile of Government MMMFs May Change 

The SEC proposes an exemption to the floating NA V requirement for MMMFs with at least 80 percent of 

total assets in cash or U.S. government-related securities (including repurchase agreements collateralized 

by U.S. government-related securities). Although such a threshold is consistent with current rules 

defining government MMMFs (including Treasury-only MMMFs), we are concerned that using this same 

threshold for the purposes of a floating NA V exemption may fundamentally alter the actual risk profile of 

such funds. 25 It is noteworthy that despite the possibility of holding up to 20 percent of their portfolio in 

non-government-related securities, government MMMFs' actual allocation to such securities was 

significantly less. Specifically, as of month -end June 2013, each of the ten largest government MMMFs 

held more than 99 percent of its portfolio in U.S. government-related securities.'6 

Given a new opportunity to attract investors willing to take on credit risk but seeking a stable NA V 

MMMF, portfolio managers may increase their allocation to non-government-related securities. They 

may also select individual corporate securities with a higher risk profile - resulting in heightened risk for 

this class of funds. In order to avoid such unintended consequences, we enconrage the SEC to consider 

more stringent requirements for the "government" exemption. For example, the SEC could consider 

tightening the diversification requirements for government MMMFs or could increase the minimum 

percentage of U.S. government-related securities required to claim the exemption. 

Section II.B Some Concerns Associated with a Floating NA V Requirement Abated 

We acknowledge certain concerns raised by industry participants related to this option. However, the 

design of the actual Proposal as well as recent steps taken by the IRS may have eliminated the most 

significant of these concerns. 

21 Of the 189 M:MMFs that participated in the AMLF. no less than 44 (approximately 23 percent) were classified as retail MMtvfFs. Based on 

data from iMoneyNet, SEC filings, and the Federal Reserve Board's List of AMLF participants. The "retail" classification is based on category 

classifications reported on iMoneyNet from January 2008 through January 2012. Refer to Footnote 8 for more information on the AMLF. 

:.'.1 The SEC made a similar observation in page 75 afthe Proposal. 

24 The SEC made a similar observation in page 78 of the Proposal. See, also, BlackRock's FSOC Comment tetter. 

~5 SEC, Investment Company Names· Final Rule. Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24828, March 200t. 

26 The funds reviewed were the 10 largest publicly available government MMMFs, which accounted for approximately 34 percent of total 

government MMMF assets as {)fmonth-end June 2013. Based on data from iMoneyNet, and fund companies' monthly holdings report. 

Page 5 of9 
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Tax Consequences Minimized 

Some have voiced concern that under a floating NAV, investors who actively usc their MMMFs as a 

transaction account could incur significant tax compliance burdens related to the tracking of capital gains 

and 10sses.27 However, the Proposal notes that mutual funds that do not transact at a stable NAV (or their 

intermediaries) are already required to provide information on gains and losses to most shareholders, and 

these information reporting requirements would extend to floating NAV MMMFs." As most MMMF 

sponsors also offer other (non-MMMF) mutual funds for which they already perform such tracking, the 

ability to leverage existing infrastructure would likely reduce the costs of extending such activities to 

MMMFs.29 Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") recently prescribed circumstances under 

which an investor's realized losses from the sale of shares of a floating NAV MMMF would be exempt 

from the wash-sale rule, thereby minimizing the cost of compliance associated with this rule.3o 

Govcl1lmenl MMMFs Remain an Option for CNA V Investors 

The simplicity afforded by a constant NAV is often cited to suggest that investors may discontinue using 

MMMFs if the constant NAV feature is eliminated.31 However, investors preferring a constant NAV 

MMMF may continue to invest in such vehicles by purchasing shares of government MMMFs, which 

would not be subject to the floating NAV requirement." For those investors whose investment policy 

statements ("IPS") prohibit investments in a variable NAV MMMF, the two-year compliance period may 

provide sufficient time to re-evaluate their cash management needs.33 Such investors would have the 

option of either amending their IPS to permit investments in a variable NA V fund or migrating to a fixedNAV governmentMMMF. 

Section III Observations on Alternative 2: Liquidity Fees and Temporary Redemption Gates 

Under this alternative, non-government MMMFs would be permitted to "transact at a stable share price 

under normal market conditions," but would be required to impose a stand-by liquidity fee of no more 

than two percent34 on all redemptions if a fund's Weekly Liquid Assets ("WLA") were to fall below 15 

percent of total assets, unless the fund's directors (including a majority of the fund's independent 

directors) determined that such action was not in tlle best interest of the fund. In addition, the fund's 

directors (including a majority of the fund's independent directors) may opt to "gate" the fund upon 

breaching the WLA threshold, if they detelmine tllat such action is in the best interest of the fund. 

21 See, generally, Treasury Strategies' FSOC Comment Letter; the Investment Company Institute's FSOC Comment Letter; UBS Global Asset 

Management, Inc. '$ FSOC Comment Letter. 

}g Page 117 of the Proposal further notes that the U.s. Treasury Department and the IRS arc considering other possible relief such as allowing 

swnmary income tax reporting by shareholders. The Proposal also requested comment (page 119) on mutual funds' tax reporting practices for 

shareholders exempt from information reporting - contemplating whether funds can use existing infra.structure to facilitate such reporting for 

exempt shareholders in a floating NA V MMMF. 

~9 Of the tcn largest MMMF sponsors as of year-end 2012, each managed assets in non-2a~7 mutual funds. Others have made similar 

obscrvations,jor, e.g., in its FSOC Comment Letter, Thrivent Financial (See Footnote 13) notes: "Non-money market mutual funds must already 

report the basis and holding period of redeemed shares. Expanding this to cover money market funds will require effort, but the operational 

apparatus exists." 

)0 See IRS Notice 2013-48. Some industry participants have noted that such an exemption "would be necessary to retain the operational 

effectiveness of the product and reduce the cost of compliance," JP Morgan's FSOC Comment Letter. See Footnote 20. 

3!See, general/yo Fidelity Investments' FSOC Comment Letter; U.S. Chamber ofCommcrcc's FSOC Comment Letter; The Greater Pittsburgh 

Chamber ofCommercc's SEC Comment Letter. 

J~ The SEC made a simllarobservation on page 67 of the Proposal. 

n The SEC made a similar observation on page 499 of the Proposal. 

J4 Two percent is referred to as the "default option." The Proposal noted that a fund's directors may also detennine that a lower fee would be in 

the best interest of the fund. Page 174 of the Proposal. 

Page 6 of9 
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86679.080

Stand-by liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates do not meaningfully address tbe risks to financial 

stability posed by MMMFs.35 This option does not eliminate run risk as investors could have an incentive 

to redeem before tbeir fund breaches the WLA threshold (similar to the incentive to run under the status 

quo as described in Section 1).36 Because investors are unable to predict how other investors would react 

once a fund's WLA level begins to deteriorate, their safest option may be to run in advance of tbe fund 

breaching the trigger. Further, because of the relative homogeneity in many MMMFs' holdings," the 

imposition of a liquidity fee or redemption gate on one fund may incite runs on other funds which are not 

subject to such measures. 

Another relevant consideration is the degree of investor concentration in some MMMFs. For example, of 

tbe five largest prime institutional MMMFs as of month-end June 2013, three had at least two 

shareholders each with a 5 percent or greater stake in the fund (across all share classes). 38 Such investor 

concentration may result in an otherwise sound fund approaching or breaching the 15 percent WLA 

threshold if one or two large investors redeem for idiosyncratic reasons unrelated to the fund itself. Other 

investors in that fund may run if they are concerned about the potential imposition of fees or gates. 

Investors in other MMMFs may in tum run if they perceive that tbeir funds are similar (e.g., similar 

portfolio composition, similar maturity profile, similar investor concentration) to tbe fund that 

experienced tbe initial run. The result could be a broader MMMF run tbat takes place absent initial 

distress at any particular fund. 39 As this represents a new run mechanism that does not exist under the 

status quo, the fees-and-gates alternative may actually increase run risk relative to not enacting further 

reform. 

Lastly, we are concerned witb tbe potential loss of liquidity (for up to 30 days) associated witb tbe 

imposition of temporary redemption gates, as both households and businesses use MMMFs extensively as 

transaction accounts.<o 

Section IV Observations on Other Reforms Proposed 

In addition to tbe two principal alternatives, tbe SEC proposes other enhancements, such as new and more 

frequent disclosures, and tightened diversification requirements. We support these additional reform 

elements and briefly discuss tbelli below. 

We strongly support the enhanced disclosure requirements contained in tbe Proposal. As proposed, 

MMMFs would be required to disclose current and historical instances of sponsor financial support; Daily 

Liquid Assets ("DLA") and WLA levels; current NA V rounded to the fourth decimal place; and daily net 

flows.4l The SEC also proposes to require MMMFs to promptly file (within one business day) a new 

35 Liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates notwithstanding, we recognize the importance of maintaining a fund board's ability to suspend 

redemptions in order to liquidate a fund - as specified in 2010's amendments to Rule 2a-7, Refer to Footnote 9 for morc on 2010's amendments 

to Rule 2a~7 

)(, The Proposal acknowledges this shortcoming but identifies other benefits of the liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates alternative (Page 

166 of the Proposal). We believe, however, that this shortcoming is substantial and outweighs the perceived benefits identified. 

3"1 M of month-end June 2013, the twcuty largest corporate issuers accounted for approximately 44 percent of prime MMMFs' assets under 

management. Based on data from SEC Fonn N-.MFP. As there are few large corporate issuers in v.rhich MMMFs invest, it is unavoidable that 

there \viII be significant overlap across different funds' portfolios. 

JS Of these three funds, the three largest investors accounted for no less than 15 percent of combined assets across all share cla.."ses. We excluded 

affiliated investors from this analysis because (to the extent that such investors have full discretion over such investments) they may opt not to 

redeem fearing such action may destabilize tbe fund. Based on data from fund compatrie5' Statement of Additional Infonnation ("SA!"). 

39 As the Proposal notes, fund managers could reduce this risk by holding additional liquidity commensurate with their degree of investor 

concentration. However, this may not be a practical option for all funds. 

40 It is likely that such restricted access to MMMF investments would come at a time when liquidity needs are greatest. 

4! Some fund complexes have voluntarily begun reporting daily market based NAV (Footnote 16) and daily DLA and \VLA levels (See, e.g., 1P 

Morgan's daily DLA and WLA disclosure announcement), and some report portfolio holdings more frequently than monthly. 

Page 7 of9 
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Form N-CR when certain significant events occur, and to eliminate Form N-MFP's 60-day public 

dissemination delay.42 

We encourage the SEC to implement additional steps to enhance disclosure such as requiring weekly or 

even daily disclosures of portfolio holdings. During times of stress, uncertainty regarding portfolio 

composition could cause a MMMF's investors to redeem if they believe the fund could be exposed to 

distressed assets. More frequent disclosure alleviates this uncertainty. 

In addition, we suggest that the SEC consider requiring MMMFs to publicly disclose their tcn largest 

investors on a weekly or monthly basis.4J Such disclosure would allow investors to better assess the 

shareholder concentration risk in the fund. A fund with a small number of large investors is more likely 

to experience large redemptions, and is thus more exposed to liquidity risk compared to a less 

concentrated fund. 

Finally, we support the SEC's proposal to reduce issuer concentration risk by requiring MMMFs to 

consider the aggregate exposure of affiliated issuers for the purposes of the 5 percent issuer 

diversification requirement. As noted in the Proposal, a MMMF could be in compliance with the current 

requirement even if its aggregate exposure to affiliated entities exceeds the 5 percent limit. We suggest 

that the SEC consider if even tighter diversification limits and/or sector diversification requirements are 

necessary to reduce issuer concentration risk. 

Conclusion 

On November 19, 2012, the FSOC presented three reform alternatives as part of its Proposed 

Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform. In a comment letter submitted to the 

FSOC on behalf of the Presidents of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks on February 12, 2013, we noted that 

all three alternatives had "the potential to increase the resiliency of MMFs and reduce their susceptibility 

to runs." Of these three presented alternatives, the SEC has chosen to present the floating NAV 

alternative in their current proposal. Accordingly, we continue to fully support this alternative and urge 

the SEC to pursue this option and consider ways in which the benefits of a floating NA V conld be 

enhanced, such as continuing to monitor funds' procedures for detennining that amortized cost accurately 

reflects fair value and eliminating the "retail" exemption. 

We continue to believe that the liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates alternative does not 

constitute meaningful reform and that this alternative bears many similarities to the status quo. Investors 

will still have an incentive to be the first to redeem and the price of those carly redemptions (before the 

trigger is breached) may still be inaccurate and unfair to remaining shareholders if such redemptions 

occur under a fixed NA V regime. 

We understand that among the many comment letters the SEC will receive on this Proposal, our position 

supporting the floating NAV alternative may well be in the minority, as it has been throughout this 

important debate. Indeed, to the extent that the fees and gates alternative resembles the status quo, it 

would be an attractive option if the only goal were to minimize the costs of adjustment within the MMMF 

4:! Significant events would include: a portfolio security default or insolvency, sponsor support., and WL-\ levels falling below 15 percent (under 

the liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates alternative). 

43 We note that the identity of individual shareholders need not be disclosed, but rather the size of their investment in the fund. Under current 

requirements, all mutual funds disclose shareholders that own 5 percent or more of the outstanding shares of a class of funds. This information is 

repOlied annually in mutual funds' SAl with significant lag. 

Page 8 of9 
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industry. From a financial stability perspective, however, we believe that the floating NAVis the far 

bettcr choice. 

We are grateful for the opportunity to comment on this Proposal and, again, applaud the SEC 

Commissioners and staff for moving forward with this initiative. We welcome the opportunity to 

elaborate on or further discuss any aspect ofthis letter. 

President Eric S. Rosengren 

Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 

President William C. Dudley 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York 

President Charles I. Plosser 

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 

President Sandra Pianalto 

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 

President Jeffrey M. Lacker 

Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 

President Dennis P. Lockhart 

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 

President Charles L. Evans 

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 

President James B. Bullard 

Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis 

President Narayana R. Kocherlakota 

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 

President Esther L. George 

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 

President Richard W. Fisher 

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 

President John C. WillianlS 

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 

Page 9 of9 
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86679.083

September 17,2013 

The Honorable Scott Garrett 

Chairman 

MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS FORUM 

Tbe FORUMfor Fli;>;!) !;>;DEPENDENT DIRECTORS 

House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and 

Government Sponsored Enterprises 

2129 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Chairman Garrett: 

We appreciate your holding a hearing on September 18 entitled "Examining the SEC's 

Money Market Fund Rule Proposal." As the Subcommittee considers the SEC's 

proposal, the Mutual Fund Directors Forum would like to provide you with comments we 

submitted to the SEC, and ask that our letter be included with the hearing record. 

The letter can be found at 

http://www.mfdf.org/images/uploads/newsroomIMMF Reform 20130916.pdf. 

Thank you for your assistance. 

1501 M SI. NW, Suite 1150 • Washington, DC 20037-1174 • T: 202.507.4488 • F: 202.507.4489 

www.mfdf.com 
133 


86679.084

NANCIAL 

EIZVI 

U E 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ROUNDTABLE 

for 

The House Financial Services Committee, 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises 

Hearing: 

"Examining the SEC's Money Market Fund Rule Proposaf' 

September 18, 2013 

The Financial Services Roundtable represents 100 integrated financial services 

companies providing banking, insurance, and investment products and services to 

the American consumer. Member companies participate through the Chief 

Executive Officer and other senior executives nominated by the CEO. FSR 

member companies provide fuel for America's economic engine, accounting 

directly for $98.4 trillion in managed assets, $1.1 trillion in revenue, and 2.4 

million jobs. 
134 


86679.085

FSR urges the Securities and Exchange Commission to preserve viability of 

MMMFs for cash management, and financing of state and local governments, 

pension plans, and companies. 

On 19 June 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") 

proposed that any prime institutional money market mutual fund ("MMMF") either float 

the net asset value ("NA V") of its shares ("Alternative I "); or impose a stand-by liquidity 

fee of2% if the fund's weekly liquid assets fall below 15% and impose a redemption gate 

if the fund's liquidity levels fall below the 15% weekly liquid asset threshold 

("Alternative 2"), subject to the fund's board determination that imposing fees or gates 

would be in the best interest of the fund (collectively, the "Proposal"). The Commission 

also suggested that it may adopt either alternative or some combination of the two 

alternatives without further specification of the terms of the proposed combination. The 

Commission proposed further diversification, disclosure, and reporting requirements for 

MMMFs. See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Securities Act 

Release No. 9,408 [File No. S7-03-13], 78 FEDERAL REGISTER 36,834 (June 19,2013), 

available here. A summary ofFSR's comments is below. 

Reform must not harm the fundamental attractiveness of MMMFs to investors or to 

government or corporate borrowers who rely on MMMFs for competitive, shortterm financing. In its comments on the proposed reforms, FSR urged the Commission 

to preserve the viability of MMMFs as (l) flexible and convenient ways for individuals 

and corporate treasurers to manage their daily cash needs; and (2) cost-effective ways to 

financ·e short-term obligations at competitive market rates for governments at all levels 

(federal, state and local), companies, pension plans, hospitals, and other not-for-profit 

entities. A regulation that would combine Alternatives I and 2 may result in an excessive 

and possibly insurmountable deterrent to investors and the industry. See FSR's Comment 

Letter, available here (the "FSR Letter"). 

Reform must address the accounting, tax, and operational issues raised by the 

proposed regulatory regime. FSR also met with the Commission's Chief Accountant 

and other senior Staff, and the Technical Director for the Financial Accounting Standards 

Board ("F ASB") to review accounting and financial reporting issues raised by the 

Commission's proposals. The FSR Letter urged the Commission, FASB, and the 

Governmental Accounting Standards Board to codify the treatment of MMMFs as "cash 

equivalents" if the Commission were to adopt either of its proposed reform alternatives. 

Although the Department of the Treasury (the "Treasury") and the Internal Revenue 

Service have proposed an exemption from the "wash sale" rules for de minimis 

redemptions from floating NAV MMMFs, the proposal fails to minimize the substantial 

operational burdens associated with a floating NAV. See Application of Wash Sale Rules 

to Money Market Fund Shares [Notice 2013-48], available here. Accordingly, FSR 

recommended that the Commission coordinate with Treasury an exemption from the 

"wash-sale" rules for floating NA V funds to eliminate burdensome tracking of de 

minimis purchase and redemption transactions. 

2 
135 


86679.086

Based on a recent study, FSR noted that also Commission failed to consider fully the 

operational costs to implement Alternative \, which estimates range from (a) $1.8 to $2 

billion in up-front costs for institutional investors to modify their business process 

operations and systems; and (b) $2 to $2.5 billion dollars in annual operating costs. See 

CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS, Operational Implications of a 

Floating NAV across Money Market Fund Industry Key Stakeholders (Summer 2013), 

available here. 

The Commission should exempt "municipal funds" and "retail funds" from both 

proposed reform alternatives. FSR noted that an exemption for municipal securities or 

tax-exempt MMMFs ("Municipal Funds") would be appropriate because Municipal 

Funds are neither vulnerable to the perceived run risks associated with institutional prime 

MMMFs, nor are they a source of potential financial contagion. 

FSR also supported an exemption for retail funds, which would ensure that individual 

investors do not bear the burden of mitigating the run-risk perceived to be presented by 

institutional investors. FSR does not support defining the retail funds exemption based 

on a redemption restriction of $1 million per day; however, it urged the Commission to 

establish an inflation-adjusted "daily redemption-limit" of at least $2 million to $5 

million, because it believes an increase would enable many individual investors to 

continue using MMMFs to manage their cash needs. Finally, FSR urged the Commission 

to exempt individual investors from the $1 million daily redemption limit if they give 

advance notice of their redemptions. FSR believes an "advance-notice" exemption would 

maintain investors' access to their cash for predictable outflows, such as buying a home. 

Other points made in the FSR Letter include: 

• ERISA Plans should be exempted from Redemption Gates. Redemption 

gates may render MMMFs unsuitable for ERISA plans if fiduciaries cannot 

redeem shares while a gate is "down." 

Liquidity Fees should represent the fund's cost of redemptions. If and when 

a fund's board of directors-in the exercise of its business judgment--determines 

that a liquidity fee or a redemption gate is in the best interests of a fund, the 

amount of the liquidity fee should be representative of the actual cost of 

redemptions to the fund. 

• The Commission must solicit public comments on the particulars of a 

"combined Alternative 1 and Alternative 2." Although several FSR members 

are not necessarily opposed to a potential combination of Alternatives I and 2, 

the Commission failed to propose for comment the particulars of a potential 

combination. A regulation that would combine Alternatives 1 and 2 may result 

in an excessive and possibly insurmountable deterrent to investors and the 

industry. In the absence of meaningful guidance on the terms of any proposed 

combination of Alternatives 1 and 2, FSR stated it was unable to provide 

substantive comments without greater clarity on the composition of a rule that 

would combine some elements of both alternatives. 

3 
136 


86679.087

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 

STATE HOUSE· BOSTON, MA 02133 

(617) 725-4000 

DEVAL L. PATRICK 

GOVERNOR 

September 17, 2013 

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

Secretary 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

100 F Street, N.E. 

Washington, DC 20549 

RE: Comment Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission on 

Money Market Fund Reform; File No. 87-03-13 

Dear Ms. Murphy: 

On June 5, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") 

released a proposed rule that would amend the regulatory structure 

for money market mutual funds (MMFs). I commend the SEC for 

their diligence in addressing this important issue to investors. 

As Governor of Massachusetts, I have worked to create a 

business environment that facilitates economic growth and job 

creation. To that end, I am fully supportive of regulation that 

encourages capital creation and allows businesses and governments 

to finance projects in a fair and equitable manner. I am, however, 

concerned that the SEC's currently proposed MMF rule may have a 

negative impact on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the 

cities and towns I represent as Governor. 

Massachusetts and its municipalities regularly issue short-term 

debt securities that are primarily purchased by money market mutual 

funds. In fact, in 2012 the Commonwealth and its municipalities sold 

over $3.5 billion in short-term notes at very attractive financing rates. 

This short-term debt is used to provide capital for projects throughout 
137 


86679.088

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 

September 17, 2013 

Page Two 

the entire state, including school construction, transit projects, water 

and sewage treatment facilities and other vital public services. 

I am concerned over the current SEC proposal's inclusion of 

new regulations for municipal MMFs, including removing the stable 

$1.00 net asset value and allowing for fees and redemption gates. 

As you are well aware, many investors have indicated they would no 

longer use MMFs if these types of changes are made to the basic 

structure of the MMF product. I believe that less investment in MMFs 

will lead to less availability of capital and a limitation on the ability of 

MMFs to purchase debt from municipalities, subsequently leading to 

increased borrowing costs for state and local governments. As 

funding from MMFs contracts, financing costs for municipalities in 

Massachusetts would rise and important public projects would either 

be more expensive or potentially delayed. 

Further, the SEC rightly recognizes the negative impact new 

regulations would have on MMFs that invest in U.S. Treasury and 

government securities by excluding these MMFs from the floating 

NAV or the redemption gates and fees alternatives. I believe that 

municipal issuers of debt should not be treated differently than federal 

entities, and am concerned that including municipal MMFs in the 

SEC's proposed regulations would put local governments at a 

financing disadvantage to the federal government in the capital 

markets. 

As the SEC moves forward with consideration of this proposal, I 

urge you to take into consideration the important role MMFs play in 

meeting the financing needs of states and municipalities, and request 

that municipal MMFs be excluded from new regulations under the 

SEC proposal. 

Sincer I¥.--
138 


86679.089

MASSACHUSE'ITS 

MUNICIPAL 

ASSOCIATION 

September 9, 2013 

ONE WINTHROP S<LUARE, BOSTON t MA 02110 

617-426-7272 ., 800-882-1498 .. fax 617-695-1314 .. www.mma.org 

The Honorable Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

100 F Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20549 

RE: File Number S7-03-13- Money Market Fund Reform 

Dear Secretary Murphy: 

Ou behalf of the 351 cities and towns of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the 

Massachusetts Municipal Association appreciates the opportunity to offer comment on the 

proposed rule changes regarding the regulation of money market mutual funds (MMMFs). We 

respectfully oppose the proposed rule changes, and we are very concerned that the proposals 

would harm local governments by takiug away an important cash management tool, increasing 

market instability, and making municipal bonds less attractive to investors. We urge the SEC to 

retain a fixed NAVas an important component of both established municipal financial practices 

and continued economic growth. 

We understand that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed switching 

from a fixed net asset value (NA V) for MMMFs to a floating NA V, and has proposed 

implementing investor redemption restrictions. These proposed regulatory changes would 

require MMMFs to sell and redeem shares based on the present market-based value of the 

securities in their underlying portfolios, and would also make it more difficult for investors to 

redeem MMMFs. 

Money market mutual funds with a fixed NA V arc a common cash management tool for local 

governments. Because the funds have a fixed NA V, they arc considered both stable and low-risk 

- a necessity for local government investment. A floating NA V would decrease stability and 

increase risk, making MMMFs a far less attractive, or even impossible, cash management option 

for local governments. Additionally, a fixed NA V allows local governments to utilize automated 

accounting software. Many local governments simply to do not have the internal capacity to 

manage the financial complexities of a highly variable floating NAV system, and could 

experience problems with purchases and redemptions. Ironically, the adoption of a floating 

NA V could make less regulated or more risky cash management vehicles more attractive to 

municipalities from an administrative perspective. 

Money market mutual funds are characterized by principal stability, liquidity, and payment of 

short-term yields. A fixed NAV is a primary component of this stability, and a change to a 

floating NA V would only decrease stability and create uncertainty - making MMMFs far less 
139 


86679.090

attractive to investors. The ensuing instability would cast a shadow on MMMFs and jeopardize 

financial recovery at the municipal level. 

Robust municipal MMMF demand for short-term bonds increases demand in the long-term 

municipal bond market, resulting in lower financing costs for crucial local government capital 

projects. Municipal bonds are widely used to finance critical infrastructure projects in 

communities nationwide. Approximately 90 percent of municipal bond financing over the past 

decade went toward schools, hospitals, water infrastructure, sewer facilities, public power 

utilities, roads and mass transit. Last year, municipal bonds financed $179 billion in state and 

local infrastructure projects nationwide. If the municipal bond market becomes less attractive to 

investors due to changes in the MMMF market, state and local borrowing costs would increase 

significantly. This would have a major chilling effect on local capacity for growth and 

development. Because MMMF demand and municipal bond demand arc linked, it is essential to 

retain the attractiveness and stability of fixed NA V MMMFs. 

The SEC has not proposed subjecting Treasury and government money market funds to further 

regulation, recognizing that these funds have largely different characteristics from prime MMFs. 

Municipal MMFs behave similarly to Treasury and government funds during times of market 

stress, maintaining high levels of asset liquidity. They did not experience the same runs during 

the financial crisis of2008 that prime MMFs experienced. Given the highly negative 

consequences that would result, there is no compelling reason to regulate municipal MMFs as if 

they were prime MMFs, rather than regulating them similarly to the Treasury and government 

MMFs with whieh they share numerous characteristics. 

Thank you for the opportunity to bring these concerns to your attention. We appreciate the work 

that you do to promote financial stability and market recovery. We urge the Commission to 

carefully consider the negative impacts that the adoption of a floating NA V would create for 

local government. Please reject the proposed rule changes and retain the current regulations. If 

you have any questions, please do not hesitate to havc your staff contact Catherine Rollins or 

John Robertson ofthc MMA at 617-426-7272 or by email at and 

Thank you very much. 

Sincerely, 

~~ Geoffrey C. Beckwith 

Executive Director 
140 


86679.109

February 21,2014 

Hon. Keith Ellison 

U.S. House of Representatives 

2244 Rayburn HOB 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Congressman Ellison, 

The purpose of this letter is to respond on behalf of Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. to the 

additional questions you sent our witness, Marie Chandoha, following her testimony at 

the September 18, 2013 hearing on money market fund reform held by the House 

Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored 

Enterprises. Since Ms. Chandoha's responsibilities as President and CEO of Charles 

Schwab Investment Management (CSIM) do no involve Schwab's broker-dealer 

customer agreements, I am responding to your questions regarding mandatory arbitration 

and related issues. 

Question 

In 2011, Schwab became the first and only brokerage to insert clauses in your customer 

service contracts banning your customers from participating in any class action lawsuit 

against your company. This is in ADDITION to the requirement in your agreements, 

which is also used by other brokerages, mandating that disputes with individual client be 

settled through arbitration. Your regulator FINRA, is challenging the legality of your 

class action waiver as a violation of its member rules. And I believe your firm issued a 

statement on your website on May 15 (which I note, I can no longer locate) announcing a 

temporary suspending of this practice, pending resolution of the FINRA action against 

you. 

My question is why Schwab, alone among brokers, feels that its clients should have to 

give up their right to participate in class actions? 

Schwab Response 

Schwab does not believe it appropriate to comment on what other broker-dealers mayor 

may not feel about their customers' participation in class actions. It is evident, however, 

that Schwab is only one of many companies in many industries which acted to amend 
141 


86679.110

Hon. Keith Ellison 

PageZ 

their arbitration agreements to include a class action waiver following the landmark 

decision of the United States Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. Schwab 

is aware of credit card companies, banks, phone companies, auto makers, and retailers 

adopting such provisions. 

Schwab has come to the conclusion that class action litigation is not an efficient, 

effective, or fair procedural method for resolving customer disputes. Schwab's 

experience and a number of well-supported academic studies show that class actions are 

slow to be resolved, that a substantial percentage of filed actions never survive motions to 

dismiss, almost no such cases go to trial, and those that result in a settlement return very 

little to the class members, especially when compared to the size of the attorneys' fees 

awarded to class counsel. Because of the size of putative classes and the large potential 

exposure to defendants inherent in class actions, many defendants settle cases in which 

they have meritorious defenses to avoid the risk of a large adverse verdict. In contrast, 

Schwab's experience with arbitration, especially with FINRA's forum, is that cases move 

quickly, efficiently, and fairly, and that customers have low-cost methods to resolve 

small disputes. 

Ouestion 

Why don't you put an end to this abusive practice - not temporarily - but permanently? 

Schwab Response 

For the reasons stated above, Schwab does not regard class action waivers as abusive and 

indeed believes that individual arbitration is a far more fair, efficient and cost-effective 

forum for all parties involved. 

Ouestion 

If you are successful in stopping FINRA's legal challenge, are you planning to reinsert 

the class action waiver in your account agreements, or are you going to reevaluate 

whether taking away the right to go to court is fair to your customers? 

Schwab Response 

Schwab will evaluate its position after it has the opportunity to review the ruling on 

FINRA's appeal. 
142 


86679.111

Hon. Keith Ellison 

Page 3 

Question 

I am very concerned about small investors having access to the courts. Putting aside the 

question of whether or not it is legal: do you believe it is fair for small investors to be 

forced to waive all their rights to go to court to settle disputes, before the dispute even 

occurs or can be understood? Against a company of your size? 

Schwab Response 

Schwab believes that it is entirely fair for it and its customers to agree to resolve any 

disputes through individual arbitration, which has proven to be fair, efficient and costeffective. Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration blossomed throughout the securities industry 

after the United States Supreme Court decided the Shearson v. McMahon case in 1987. 

That case held that the federal securities laws did not prohibit mandatory pre-dispute 

arbitration. Since that time, tens of thousands of arbitrations have been held before 

arbitration panels operating under rules adopted by NASD, New York Stock Exchange, 

FlNRA, American Stock Exchange, Pacific Stock Exchange and others. The arbitration 

rules of each forum are reviewed and approved by the SEC. There are no properly 

supported studies which have found any material patterns of bias or unfairness in these 

arbitrations. Schwab believes that arbitration is fair to both sides no matter the size of the 

claim or the size ofthe respondent broker-dealer. 

Thank you for this opportunity to respond to your questions. 

Sincerely, 

Senior Vice President, Legislative and Regulatory Affairs 

Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. 
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November 26,2013 

Hon. Randy Hultgren 

U.S. House of Representatives 

332 Cannon HOB 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Re: Committee On Financial Services 

Dear Congressman Hultgren, 

charles 

SCHWAB 

The purpose of this letter is to respond on behalf of Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. to the 

additional questions you sent our witness, Marie Chandoha, following her testimony at 

the September 18, 2013 Hearing on Money Market Funds Reform by the above-named 

committee. Since Ms. Chandoha's responsibilities as President and CEO of Charles 

Schwab Investment Management (CSIM) do no involve Schwab's broker-dealer 

customer agreements, I am responding to your questions regarding mandatory arbitration 

and related issues. 

Question 

"Mandatory" arbitration between customers and their broker-dealer is hard wired into 

FlNRA rules, which require broker-dealers to arbitrate disputes if the customer elects. 

Broker-dealers gain the same right by including arbitration clauses in customer contracts. 

If the goal is to ban mandatory arbitration, would you agree that customers and brokerdealers are entitled to fair and eqnal treatment, whether the mandatory arbitration is 

imposed through FlNRA rules, or through an arbitration clause in a customer contract? 

Schwab Response 

Schwab agrees that it would be unfair to subject broker-dealers to mandatory arbitration 

at the election of a customer under FlNRA rules, but at the same time to prohibit brokerdealers from including provisions in agreements that mandate arbitration of all customer 

disputes. Pre-dispute forum selection is a matter of contract and commercial 

reasonableness, in which the parties define their rights and obligations at the outset of 

their relationship. In contrast, plaintiffs' lawyers and other proponents of ending 

mandatory arbitration seek to provide customers with unilateral, post-dispute choice of 

forum. However, to subject one of the parties to a dispute to the preferred forum of the 

other party based on a perceived tactical advantage would greatly undermine the fairness 

ofthe proceedings. The elimination of pre-dispute arbitration agreements from broker-
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Hon. Randy Hultgren 

November 26,2013 

Page 2 

customer contracts also could lead to litigation over whether FINRA rules purportedly 

requiring brokers to arbitrate at the election of a customer are enforceable under the 

Federal Arbitration Act in the absence of a contract between the customer and broker. 

A system of unilateral choice also raises risks for customers and the viability of FINRA 

Dispute Resolution as a forum. Plaintiffs' lawyers, for whom civil litigation is more 

lucrative, would be incented to push their clients to file disputes in court, to the detriment 

of cost and efficiency and the interests of customers whose claims would be better served 

in arbitration. Moreover, the tendency for plaintiffs' lawyers to litigate claims (especially 

larger ones) in court will inevitably present resource challenges and downsizing for 

FINRA's forum, to the likely detriment of the program generally and certainly at the 

expense of customers with smaller claims. 

Question 

Please describe the benefits to customers in the current securities arbitration system. 

Would it be sound policy to replace a system that works well in favor of an entirely new 

approach where no effort has been made to study and understand the prospective risks? 

Schwab Response 

FINRA Dispute Resolution offers customers and brokers a cost-effective, prompt, and 

fair forum for resolving disputes on an individual basis. Over the years, this forum has 

been very responsive to consumer and industry feedback. It has modified existing 

procedures and added new ones to allow it to address legitimate concerns voiced by both 

investors and the industry. Customers can initiate cases with a small up-front fee based 

on the size of the claim. Neutral arbitrators are selected by both sides from lists 

providing background and prior case histories. Arbitrators employed by or with previous 

ties to the securities industry are classified as industry arbitrators, and customers are free 

to strike them from the list and have a panel of three public arbitrators. The arbitrators 

are typically well-trained and familiar with the rules and regulations of the industry and 

with the types of products generally at issue in arbitration cases. Discovery is fucused and 

limited so as to be a tool for resolution of cases rather than a weapon to extract a 

settlement. Arbitrators are encouraged to set cases for hearing in a prompt and fair 

manner so that a customer using this forum can expect a resolution of his or her case far 

more promptly than in most court settings. FINRA Dispute Resolution has a set of 

streamlined procedures for small disputes that cut the cost, paperwork and time needed to 

reach resolution. In contrast to Court proceedings,arbitration offers a much higher 
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Hon. Randy Hultgren 

November 26,2013 

Page 3 

degree of finality because hearing dates are not typically postponed multiple times and 

awards are not appealable except in extreme and unusual circumstances. Moreover, 

FlNRA Rules require prompt payment of monetary awards without the necessity of 

judgment collection procedures. The system is the product of decades of experience and 

innovation and should not be discarded without demonstrable evidence that an alternative 

would produce better results. 

Question 

Would H.R. 2998, the "Investor Choice Act of2013," introduced on August 2, 2013, 

effectively eliminate arbitration as a dispute resolution option for investment advisor 

clients? Would the customer of an investment adviser have any mechanism to compel 

arbitration if the investment adviser did not agree to resolve a dispute using arbitration? 

How would this system protect aggrieved customers of an investment adviser? 

Schwab Response 

Because investment advisors are not subject to mandatory, rule-based arbitration, the 

elimination of arbitration provisions in agreements between customers and investment 

advisors will limit customers either to proceedings in court or to a forum that both parties 

might agree upon after a dispute has arisen. 

Question 

Would H.R. 2998 create a further bifurcated standard for dispute resolution as between 

broker-dealers and investment advisers? Does it make sense to have a bifurcated system? 

Schwab Response 

As this question recognizes, there already exists a ''bifurcated'' system for dispute 

resolution because broker--dealers are subject to mandatory, rule-based arbitration and 

investment advisors are not. This current system creates a problem in the case where an 

investor has a custodial relationship with a broker-dealer, but where disputed investments 

in the custodial account are directed by an independent investment advisor. Unless both 

the custodian and advisor have arbitration agreements designating the same forum, the 

investor must pursue the custodian in one forum (likely FINRA) and the advisor in 

another (perhaps AAA or in court). This result creates inefficiencies, and incentivizes 

customers to bring claims against custodians in arbitration when the investments at issue 
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Hon. Randy Hultgren 

November 26, 2013 

Page 4 

were made by -- and the alleged losses caused by -- the advisor. This problem has been 

compounded by guidance from FINRA stating that it will administer the arbitration of 

disputes involving investment advisors but will require a post-dispute arbitration 

agreement to do so. We believe FINRA should enforce pre-dispute arbitration 

agreements between customers and their investment advisors that designate FINRA as 

the arbitration forum, particularly where a FINRA member broker-dealer is a party to the 

proceeding. H.R. 2998 could make this problem worse by eliminating pre-dispute 

arbitration agreements between customers and advisors, and thereby ensuring separate 

proceedings against custodians and advisors. 

Thank you for this opportunity to respond to your questions. 

s;n1it~ 

J(lal 

Senior Vice President, Legislative and Regulatory Affairs 

Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. 
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86679.095

Investment Company Institute 

November Z7, Z013 

Follow-up Questions for Mr. Paul Stevens on House Financial Services Committee 

Hearing: 

Examining the SEC's Money Market Fund Rule Proposal- September 18, z013 

Questions from Congressman Garrett 

Question 1 

It was suggested at the hearing that the SEC's proposal to allow retail money market 

funds to continue to maintain a stable NA V will put retail investors at risk because certain 

investors "will continue to have an incentive to run at the first sign of trouble." Is this 

correct? 

ICIAnswer 

It is important to recognize that the SEC's proposal to allow retail money market 

funds to maintain a stable NA V would separate institutional investors, who can have 

highly variable cash balance needs, from retail investors, whose cash balances tend to be 

more stable. Retail investors did not redeem heavily from retail money market funds 

following Lehman Brothers failure in September 2008. This indicates that by segmenting 

institutional and retail investors there is little reason to be concerned that retail investors 

will be put at risk. 

Questionz 

Ms. Sheila Bair has argued that the SEC's proposal to allow government money market 

funds to maintain a stable NAV would provide a subsidy to the U.S. Treasury as well as 

GSEs, which will create perverse incentives in the market through maturity mismatch and 

interest rate risk. Do you agree with this point of view? Should the SEC require 

government money market funds to have a floating NAV? Why or why not? 

ICIAnswer 

No, we do not agree that allowing government money market funds to maintain a 

stable NAV would encourage the Treasury and GSEs to take on too much interest rate 

risk. The U.S. Treasury is able to make its financing decisions that are optimal for the 

U.s. taxpayers. The GSEs and their regulator can manage the interest rate risk of the 

GSEs regardless of the interest rates offered on short-term instruments. 

The suggestion that the ability of money market funds to buy and hold Treasury 

and agency securities somehow contributes to maturity mismatch and interest rate risk is 
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misplaced. Given its funding needs, the Treasury generally issues debt securities along 

the full range of the yield curve, with considerations given to when spending is likely to 

occur, when tax revenues are expected to be received, and the slope of the yield curve. If 

anything, contrary to Ms. Bair's contention, the Treasury recently has issued relatively 

more intermediate- to long-term debt and less short-term debt (i.e., T-bills) in order to 

lock in low-cost long-term funding. 

The SEC has proposed to exempt government money market funds from further 

structural reform because, among other things, government money market funds are not 

as susceptible to the risks of mass investor redemptions as other money market funds 

may be; their securities have low default risk and are highly liquid in some of the most 

stressful market scenarios; and interest rate risk is generally mitigated because 

government funds typically hold assets that have short maturities and hold those assets to 

maturity. Importantly, during periods of financial stress, government money market 

funds typically experience inflows, rather than outflows. These funds' asset values also 

tend to appreciate, rather than depreciate, in times of stress. Indeed, the SEC staff found 

that government funds received "abnormally large daily net inflow during the calendar 

week [September 15-19,2008] of the crisis .... We agree with the SEC that no case can be 

made for applying fundamental changes to government money market funds. 

Question 3 

Several panelists indicated that tax-exempt money market funds provide significant 

short-term funding to states and municipalities for which borrowing costs could rise if 

the SEC does not provide a carve-out for tax-exempt money market funds from its rule 

proposal. Please provide figures on the total dollar funding that tax-exempt money 

market funds supply to states and municipalities. Is the funding that tax-exempt money 

market funds supply more important to specific states, regions, or types of 

municipalities? Also, please provide information on the twelve largest recipients of 

funding from tax-exempt money market funds. 

ICIAnswer 

Funding provided by tax-exempt money market funds does vary by state; states 

with larger populations generally receive greater total dollar financing. For example, the 

state of New York and municipalities in New York received $38.5 billion in financing from 

tax-exempt money market funds as of July 31, 2013, which amounted to about $2,000 in 

financing per person in the state of New York. Massachusetts received less finanCing in 

dollars, $10.5 billion, but because of its smaller population that amounted to almost the 

same amount per person ($1,600) in that state. 

, See SEC Division of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation, Response to Questions Posed by 

Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher (November 30.2012) ("SEC Staff Study") , available at 

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-market-funds-memo-2012.pdf.at12. 

2 
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Top 12 States by Tax-Exempt Money Market Fund Investments 

Municipal Securities, top 12 states, dollar billions, July 31, 2013 

Rank State Investment 

1 CA $40.7 

2 NY 38.5 

3 TX 20·9 

4 IL 12.8 

5 MA 1O.~ 

6 FL 9.2 

7 PA 8·7 

8 NJ 7·3 

9 OH 6·9 

10 NC 5·3 

11 GA ~ 

12 MI 4-7 

Source: ICI tabulatIOns of SEC Form N-MFP data 

Funding that state and local governments receive from tax-exempt money market 

funds is used for a variety of purposes, such as providing financing for general obligation 

bonds, providing interim financing through tax or revenue anticipation notes, or helping 

finance housing, water systems, or other infrastructure (see table below). 

Top 12 Issuers Held by Tax-Exempt Money Market Fund Investments 

Municipal Securities, top 12 issuers, dollar billions, July 31, 2013 

Rank Issuer Investment 

1 State of Texas 

2 New York Housing Finance Agency 

3 State of New York 

4 California Community Development Authority 

5 Illinois Development Finance Authority 

6 New York Municipal Water Finance Authority 

7 New York Dormitory Authority (DASNY) 

8 State of California 

9 New York Housing Development Corporation 

10 California Health Facilities Finance Authority 

11 New York Transitional Finance Authority 

12 Massachusetts Health & Educational Facilities Authority 

Source: ICI tabulatIOns of SEC Form N-MFP data 

Question 4 

Amortized cost valuation has been referred to as a fiction that encourages investors to 

"game" money market funds and promotes runs. But during the hearing, Mr. Stevens 

3 

$5·3 

5·3 

4-7 

4-7 

3·7 

3.2 

3.0 

2·7 

2.6 

2·5 

2·4 

2·3 
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indicated that amortized cost accounting is a standard practice used by essentially all 

firms. Can you please provide details on the kinds of firms other than money market 

funds that use amortized cost accounting, under what circumstances, and under what 

authority (e.g., is this determined by a company's internal policies or FASB)? 

ICIAnswer 

Amortized cost is the purchase price of a security adjusted for accretion of 

discount or amortization of premium. Accretion of discount involves increasing the value 

of the security ratably over its life so that at maturity its amortized cost value is equal to 

the maturity value. All companies other than investment companies use amortized cost 

to value securities that are "cash equivalents," including banks and insurance companies. 

Even the Federal Reserve System uses amortized cost to value all of it holdings of 

Treasury and agency securities, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation uses 

amortized cost to value securities held by the National Liquidation Fund. 

Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) define cash equivalents as shortterm, highly liquid securities that are both (i) readily convertible to known amounts of 

cash, and (ii) so near their maturity that they present insignificant risk of changes in value 

because of changes in interest rates. 2 Generally only investments with original maturities 

of three months or less satisfy this definition. Securities commonly considered cash 

equivalents include Treasury bills, commercial paper, and money market funds. Because 

their maturity is limited to three months or less, the amortized cost value of cash 

equivalents is the same as, or not materially different than, their market value. 

Treasury bills, for example, are a type of security that is typically valued at 

amortized cost. Treasury bills are referred to as "discount instruments" because they are 

issued at a price that is less than their maturity value. The increase in value from original 

issuance to maturity represents interest income to the holder of the Treasury bill. Under 

amortized cost a Treasury bill is initially valued at its cost (i.e., the acquisition price). 

Cost is increased ratably over the life of the bill such that at maturity its amortized cost is 

equal to the maturity value. 

GAAP requires all companies (other than investment companies) to use the 

amortized cost method of valuation for long-term debt securities in certain 

circumstances. Companies that invest in debt securities must classify those securities 

into one of three categories: trading, available for sale, or held-to-maturity. Debt 

securities classified as held-to-maturity are valued at amortized cost.3 The justification 

for using amortized cost valuation for debt securities classified as held-to-maturity is that 

2 FASB Accounting Standards Codification 305-10-20. 

3 FASB Accounting Standards Codification 320-10-35-1. Debt securities classified as held-to-maturity are 

subject to impairment testing (e.g., for credit losses). If the impairment is other than temporary, the 

amortized cost value of the security is adjusted to reflect the impairment. 

4 
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no matter how market interest rates fluctuate, the holder will recover its recorded 

investment and thus realize no gain or loss when the issuer pays the amount promised at 

maturity. Companies holding debt securities classified as held-to-maturity typically have 

a "hold to collect" business model, as opposed to short-term trading to realize changes in 

value. 

Investment companies other than money market funds also may use amortized 

cost to value short-term debt securities. SEC Accounting Series Release 219 permits 

mutual funds (e.g., equity funds, bond funds) to value securities maturing in 60 days or 

less at amortized cost.4 Thus, fluctuating NAV funds, which often invest a small portion 

of their assets in short-term fixed income securities, routinely use amortized cost to value 

debt securities with a remaining maturity of 60 days or less. 

Questions 

Ms. Sheila Bair suggested in September 2008 after Lehman Brothers failed, causing the 

Reserve Fund to break a dollar, other money market funds caused the wholesale funding 

markets to seize up. 'Is this consistent with your understanding of financial market events 

during that period? What evidence is there one way or the other on this issue? 

ICIAnswer 

The notion that money market funds caused short-term credit markets to freeze 

conveniently ignores altogether the context of those events-what Federal Reserve 

Chairman Ben Bernanke has described as "the worst financial crisis in global history, 

including the Great Depression." This crisis had reached a critical stage long before 

September 2008: at least 13 major institutions had gone bankrupt, been taken over, or 

been rescued during the 12 months before Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail, triggering 

Reserve Primary's problems. 

The commercial paper markets began to seize up before prime money market 

funds experienced significant outflows and continued to suffer lack of liquidity long after 

those outflows abated. On September 15, when Lehman announced its bankruptcy, 

commercial paper markets were hit hard. Lehman had been one of the largest 

commercial paper dealers, and its bankruptcy eliminated a key source of liquidity in the 

market. Merrill Lynch also was a large commercial paper dealer, and its emergency sale 

to Bank of America negatively affected the market. 

On the same day that Reserve Primary broke the dollar, American International 

Group (AIG) collapsed and was rescued-signaling that even investment-grade firms 

could fail almost without warning. Following these events, concerns rapidly spread in 

4 SEC Accounting Series Release 219, Release No. 1C-9786 (May 31, 1977). 

5 
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financial markets that the debt of numerous other large investment and commercial 

banks posed much greater risk than previously thought. 

In this maelstrom, investors everywhere reacted to the widespread uncertainty 

over the stability of financial institutions and the lack of predictable government policy 

responses to a crisis gripping the global banking system. Money market fund investors 

were not the only investors reacting to these market events-they were simply among the 

most easily observable market participants. 

On the day of Lehman's bankruptcy, investors began pulling back from longerdated paper. From the middle of September through late October, commercial paper 

market issuance was heavily weighted to paper with four days or less to maturity. 

Financial issuers of commercial paper were particularly hard hit, and most issuers were 

unable to issue paper with maturities extending much beyond a month. For example, in 

the four weeks after Lehman collapsed, on average, only 14 issues of financial paper with 

maturities beyond 40 days reached the market each day, compared with a daily average of 

140 in early September. The daily dollar volume of new financial paper issuance with 

these maturities was equally impaired, averaging $152 million, compared with $2.9 billion 

during the first half of September. Prime money market funds sold some commercial 

paper to meet redemption requests, but other investors also were large sellers in 

September, and these investors continued to reduce their commercial paper holdings. 

Outstanding commercial paper declined by $185 billion during September. Money market 

funds reduced their holdings by $164 billion and investors other than money market 

funds reduced their holdings by more than $170 billion. The Federal Reserve's AssetBacked Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) offset 

about half of the overall investor pullback in the market. 

The commercial paper market continued to contract through much of October, 

even though money market funds became net buyers during this time. It was not until 

the Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility, or CPFF, became operational in 

late October that outstanding commercial paper started to expand. For the month of 

October as a whole, total outstanding commercial paper grew by $29 billion with money 

market funds increasing their commercial paper holdings by $43 billion. As is evident, 

other investors continued to pull back from this market and more than offset money 

market funds' purchases in October. 

Elsewhere in the short -term markets, it is clear that a variety of market 

participants were pulling back their exposures to financial institutions. For example, in 

September 2008 the repurchase agreement market shrank by $400 billion. In that case, 

money market funds did not contribute at all to the contraction: instead, money market 

funds increased their holdings of repos, by a little over $90 billion during that month. 

Even during the week between September 16 and 23, money market funds 

expanded their lending in the repo market by $67 billion. During the last four months of 

6 
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2008, the repo market shrank by $1.6 trillion. During this same time, money market funds 

increased their supply of credit to the repo market by $44 billion. 

Clearly, some investors other than money market funds had to account for the 

pullback in the repo market and the subsequent difficulties of financial institutions in 

obtaining this type of short-term wholesale funding. 

Banks also quit lending to each other. Interbank lending by commercial banks fell 

more than 30 percent, or nearly $145 billion, on a seasonally adjusted basis. The stresses 

were reflected in the spread between the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate 

(LIBOR) and the overnight index swap (OIS) rate, a traditional measure of the health of 

the banking sector. The LIBOR-OIS spread jumped from less than 100 basis points on 

September 12,2008, to nearly 370 basis points one month later, as banks pulled back from 

lending to each other. (We now know that, if anything, the LIBOR-OIS spread may have 

understated the pressures in the banking system, based on reports that certain banks 

participating in the LIBOR survey were underreporting their funding costs.) 

What hit the short-term credit markets in September 2008 was a flight to safetythat is, a near-universal retreat by all investors from securities issued by financial 

institutions. Charges that money market funds caused those markets to freeze are a 

startling mischaracterization of the crisis. 

Question 6 

The SEC proposal does not require money market funds to hold capital. But aren't money 

market funds just shadow banks-they engage in maturity and liquidity transformation? 

A case can be made that money market funds act like banks but do not have the same 

kinds of protections as banks such as capital, access to the Fed's discount window, 

deposit insurance and so forth. Doesn't this suggest that the SEC require money market 

funds to hold capital? 

ICIAnswer 

The terms "shadow banks" and "shadow banking" generally have been used to refer 

to credit intermediation involving leverage and maturity transformation outside of the 

traditional banking system. Describing money market funds as "shadow banks," however, 

simply does not accurately reflect their activities or operations and incorrectly equates 

money market fund shares and bank deposits. Money market funds are not banks. 

Unlike banks, money market funds do not make loans or use other forms of debt 

financing, do not use leverage, and generally are much more highly restricted than banks 

in the kinds of assets they may hold. 

Furthermore, the term "shadow" inappropriately suggests that money market 

funds lack transparency or are unregulated. This is not the case for money market funds. 

Indeed, the very term "shadow bank" implies that any credit intermediation that involves 

7 
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86679.102

entities and activities outside the traditional banking system is inherently inappropriate 

and therefore best eliminated or subsumed within the banking system. We find this view 

particularly inappropriate given the perennial banking crises that occur despite numerous 

global efforts to increase bank capital and reduce risk. 

Non-bank financial intermediaries, such as money market funds, playa variety of 

important roles in the financial system. These roles may share some similarities with the 

role that banks play-but there are also critical differences and those differences should 

be respected. In our judgment, simply evaluating the regulation of what clearly are 

capital market activities solely through a banking lens distorts and ignores the very 

substantive regulation and oversight to which these entities are subject through the 

securities laws. Rather, banks and capital markets have existed alongside one another in 

the United States for centuries, with parallel bodies of regulation and oversight that have 

arisen to address specific financial and investor risks associated with each type of credit 

intermediation. The U.S. financial system and our economy at large have thrived on the 

benefits that banks and capital markets provide.5 

In truth, money market funds are stringently regulated by the Securities and 

Exchange Commission. As mutual funds, they are governed by substantive provisions 

that not only protect shareholders, but also guard against systemic risk. Mutual funds are 

regulated under all four of the major U.S. securities laws: the Securities Act of 1933, which 

requires registration of the mutual fund's shares and the delivery of a prospectus; the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which regulates the trading, purchase and sale of fund 

shares and establishes antifraud standards governing such trading; the Investment 

Advisers Act of 1940, which regulates the conduct of fund investment advisers and 

requires advisers to mutual funds to register with the SEC; and, most importantly, the 

Investment Company Act of 1940, which requires all mutual funds to register with the 

SEC and to meet significant operating standards.6 Thus, the extensive regulatory 

framework applicable to mutual funds, although different from bank regulation, is 

stringent and robust. 

Unlike other mutual funds, money market funds also must comply with an 

additional set of regulatory requirements under Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company 

Act that are designed to limit the fund's exposure to certain risks governing the credit 

quality, liquidity, maturity, and diversification of a money market fund's investments. 

Indeed, these requirements have always ensured that the degree ofliquidity, maturity, 

and credit transformation of money market funds is modest. The 2010 amendments to 

5 For a history of the successful co-existence of the U.S. banking and securities industries, see Letter from 

Paul Schott Stevens, President & CEO. Investment Company Institute, to Secretariat of the Financial 

Stability Board (June 3, zon) at Appendix A. 

6 Mutual funds are also subject to oversight by state securities commissions and self-regulatory 

organizations. such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Association ("FINRA"). FINRA is a self-regulatory 

organization that oversees broker-dealers that distribute mutual fund shares and mutual fund advertising. 

8 
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86679.103

SEC rules governing money market funds have made such transformation even more 

modest. Today's money market funds are stronger and more resilient than the funds that 

were available in 2008. The 2010 amendments directly and meaningfully addressed this 

"transformative" concern through, among other things, new liquidity requirements and 

new maturity limits. (See ICI answer to question from Congresswoman Terri Sewell 

below) 

The active oversight of money market funds by the SEC clearly demonstrates that 

they are not vehicles without regulatory attention. Indeed, imposing bank-like regulatory 

requirements, such as capital, on money market funds would alter fundamentally the 

money market fund business model. A money market fund, like every other mutual fund, 

provides investors a pro rata interest in the fund, whereby fund investors share in the risk 

and rewards of the securities held by the fund. All of the fund's shares are equity capital. 

Although the default risk of the highly diversified, short-term portfolios held by money 

market funds is low, it is shared equally by all fund investors. Imposing capital 

requirements on a fund adviser, for example, would transform the essential nature of a 

money market fund by interposing the adviser between the fund and its investors. 

Requiring all fund advisers to take a first-loss position would be a radical departure from 

the current agency role that fund advisers play. The mutual fund structure, including 

that of money market funds, is designed so fund advisory fees compensate the adviser for 

managing the fund as a fiduciary and agency and for providing ongoing services that the 

fund needs to operate. Advisers are not compensated for bearing investment risks of the 

fund. 

Shifting investment risks from fund investors to advisers would require advisers to 

dedicate capital to absorb possible losses of the funds that they manage. Some advisers 

would have to raise new capital in the market. Others could perhaps shift capital from 

other parts of their businesses. Either way, all advisers would have to earn a market rate 

of return on such capital. If they cannot earn that rate of return, they would find better 

business alternatives, such as seeking to move investors to less-regulated cash 

management products where investors still must bear the risks of investing. This would 

do little to reduce systemic risk but instead would reduce choice and competition. The 

consequences would include significant disruptions in a crucial source of short-term 

funding for businesses, colleges and universities, nonprofit organizations, government 

agencies, and financial institutions, as well as redirected investor money to less regulated, 

opaque cash pools. 

Question 7 

Money market funds asked for and received a guarantee from the federal government 

after Lehman Brothers failed. Doesn't that suggest that money market fund investors 

now believe that the federal government implicitly guarantees money market funds? In a 

future crisis, what's to prevent money market funds from again asking for and receiving a 

9 
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government guarantee? Does the Dodd-Frank Act specifically prohibit the federal 

government from providing any kind of guarantee for money market funds? 

ICIAnswer 

During September 2008, the financial crisis reached a critical stage, characterized 

by severely reduced liquidity in the global credit markets and insolvency threats to 

investment banks and other institutions. In response, the Federal Reserve announced a 

series of programs and facilities designed to stabilize the market, which had ceased to 

function even for very short-term, high-credit securities. The Treasury also announced its 

Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds ("TGP"), which temporarily 

guaranteed existing account balances in money market funds that qualified for and 

elected to participate in the Program. The TGP was backed by Treasury's Exchange 

Stabilization Fund. 

ICI did not ask for this, or for any other federal guarantee. ICI did, however, playa 

significant role in limiting the reach of the TGP. It urged from the outset that the 

guarantee not be open-ended, as Treasury originally contemplated, but instead restricted 

to account balances as of September 19-the date of the program's original 

announcement. ICI was concerned that markets would be further disrupted under the 

TGP by significant flows of money into guaranteed prime money market funds from 

banks, Treasury funds, and other cash-like products. Massive dollar flows in the other 

direction could create yet another wave of volatility when the TGP ended. The TGP 

expired on September 18, 2009, without receiving a single claim. Instead, Treasury-and, 

as a result, taxpayers-received an estimated $1.2 billion in fees paid by participating 

money market funds.? Other than the one year TGP, money market funds have never 

been insured or guaranteed by the FDIC or any other government agency. No such 

guarantee is in place today. 

Congress erected barriers to future guarantees or support programs for money 

market funds. In the Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008, Congress barred the Treasury 

from using its Exchange Stabilization Fund "for the establishment of any future guaranty 

programs for the United States money market mutual fund industry." In addition, in the 

Dodd-Frank Act, Congress limited the Federal Reserve's ability to establish the types of 

programs and facilities it used to stabilize the market in 2008. As a result, Congress has 

erected significant barriers against the renewal of any sort of guarantee or support 

program for money market funds. 

QuestionS 

It was suggested at the hearing that money market funds suffered runs during the 2007-

2008 financial crisis, but banks did not have deposit runs. Is this correct? 

7 See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg293.asPX. 

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ICIAnswer 

No, this is not correct. Certain banks did suffer deposit runs. Two prominent 

examples include: IndyMac Bank8 and Washington Mutual Bank.9 Many more banks 

failed and were closed by the FDICo 

Question 9 

It was suggested at the hearing by Sheila Bair that industry asked for the Money Market 

Fund Guarantee program [to bel put in place by the Department of Treasury in 2008. 

Can you please elaborate about the industry's role in the MMF guarantee program and its 

costs to taxpayers? 

ICIAnswer 

As noted above in our answer to Question 7, the money market fund industry did 

not ask for the TGP or any other form of support during the financial crisis. In fact, ICI 

worked with Treasury and other regulators to limit the reach of the TGP, urging that the 

guarantee be limited and temporary. 

Question from Congresswoman Terri Sewell (AL-07) 

The SEC implemented reforms to money market mutual funds in May 2010. Could you 

please explain some of the changes made to money market mutual funds at that time and 

the effects these changes have had on investors and the funds themselves? 

ICIAnswer 

The SEC's 2010 amendments to money market fund regulation have made these 

funds even more stable, liquid, and transparent than ever before. 

8 For discussions concerning IndyMac Bank, see e.g., 

http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/947.Pdf; 

http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/173.-140/-358143-I.html; 

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=92578023: and 

http://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=2EnaU7D800M. 

9 For discussions concerning Washington Mutual Bank, see e.g., U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (January 20U), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOFCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf, at 365 ("In the eight days after Lehman's bankruptcy, depositors pulled $16.7 

billion out of Washington Mutual, which now faced imminent collapse."); 

http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2oo9/10/report-wamu-bank-run-rumors-were-true.html. 

>0 See http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individuallfailed/banklist.html;see also generally, Your Bank Has Failed: 

What Happens Next?, 60 Minutes, CBS (March 8, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/yourbank-has-failed-what-happens-next/ (includes interview with FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair). 

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Liquidity 

The 2010 amendments directly and meaningfully addressed the liquidity challenge 

faced by many money market funds during the financial crisis by imposing for the first 

time explicit minimum daily and weekly liquidity requirements. Under the new 

requirements, money market funds must maintain a sufficient degree of portfolio 

liquidity to meet reasonably foreseeable redemption requests. In addition, all taxable 

money market funds are required to hold at least 10 percent of their portfolios in assets 

that can be turned into cash within a day, and all funds must hold at least 30 percent in 

assets that are liquid within a week. The amendments also require funds, as part of their 

overall liquidity management responsibilities, to have "know your investor" procedures to 

help fund advisers anticipate the potential for heavy redemptions and adjust their funds' 

liqUidity accordingly, and to have procedures for periodic stress testing of their funds' 

ability to maintain a stable NAV. Indeed, the SEC staff found that the new liquidity 

requirements have made money market funds "more resilient to both portfolio losses and 

investor redemptions. "n 

In practice, prime money market funds have exceeded the liquidity minimums by 

a significant margin, and now hold twice as much in weekly liquid assets as the heaviest 

redemptions they faced in the worst week of the financial crisis in September 2008. 

Indeed, the ongoing fragility of the markets since the 2007-2008 crisis-attributable to a 

variety of factors, including regulatory uncertainty, the u.s. federal debt ceiling crisis in 

mid-2011 and 2m3, and conditions in European debt markets-has prompted many 

money market fund managers to hold larger amounts ofliquidity as a way to mitigate 

risks. 

Moreover, the liquid assets that now make up much of prime money market funds' 

portfolios are overnight repurchase agreements and Treasury and other government 

securities-exactly the types of securities that anxious investors want to buy in a crisis 

and the types of assets that government money market funds hold. For every dollar that 

flowed out of prime money market funds in September 2008, 61 cents went back into 

Treasury and government money market funds. In a future crisis, to match investors' 

shifting demands, government money market funds and other investors would be ready 

buyers of many of the liquid assets that prime funds wish to sell. This is in sharp contrast 

to 2008, when prime money market funds held far fewer Treasury and agency securities 

and sought to sell commercial paper and similar assets that did not have a ready market 

in the wake of a wave of financial institution failures. 

In fact, many of the asset classes that make up prime money market fund 

portfolios today constitute "high-quality liquid assets" for purposes of the Basel III 

Liquidity Coverage Ratio ("LCR"). According to the Basel Committee on Banking 

U See SEC Staff Study at 37. 

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Supervision, LCR-eligible assets have the following liquidity-related characteristics: (i) 

they are traded in active and sizeable markets; (ii) they have committed market makers; 

(iii) they have low market concentration; and (iv) they are "flight to quality" assets, i.e., 

"historically, the market has shown tendencies to move into these types of assets in a 

systemic crisis."12 In fact, the Basel Committee has proposed that internationally active 

banks be required to hold the same assets that money market funds hold to protect 

against illiquidity. Indeed, the overnight repurchase agreements and Treasury and other 

government securities that now make up much of prime money market funds' portfolios 

are precisely the asset classes favored by the LCR framework.'3 

Maturity 

In addition to the new liquidity requirements, the 2010 amendments require that a 

money market fund's weighted average maturity ("WAM") and weighted average life 

("WAL") cannot exceed 60 and 120 days, respectively.14 The SEC Staff Report found that 

the new maturity limits have "improved the resiliency of money market funds to interest 

rate shocks."'5 These requirements reduce liquidity and maturity transformation to very 

low levels. 

Increased Disclosure 

By requiring more frequent and vastly more detailed disclosure of money market 

funds' holdings, the 2010 amendments have made money market funds one of the most 

transparent financial products in the United States. On a monthly basis, these funds now 

must disclose every security they hold, every piece of collateral backing repurchase 

agreements, as well as other salient information, including their mark-to-market NAV. 

Many funds voluntarily are providing more portfolio holdings and mark-to-market value 

disclosure than what is required. Regulators, analysts, and investors have been using this 

additional data to closely scrutinize fund portfolios. This heightened scrutiny has at 

times led regulators and analysts to highlight potential risks in particular fund holdings. 

The additional disclosure also has led certain advisers to avoid investments that, although 

exhibiting stable credit fundamentals, may raise investor concerns. Thus, the discipline 

" See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 

Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 5 (December 2010), available at 

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl88.pdf . 

'3Id. at 8 (permitting banking organizations to hold unlimited amounts of"Levell" assets for purposes of 

the LCR, which includes claims on or claims guaranteed by sovereigns). 

'4 The introduction of a limit on money market funds' W AL has strengthened the ability of money market 

funds to withstand shocks and meet redemption pressures. Unlike a fund's WAM, a portfolio's WAL is 

measured without reference to interest rate reset dates. The WAL limitation thus restricts the extent to 

which a money market fund can invest in longer-term adjustable-rate securities that may expose a fund to 

credit risk. 

'5 See SEC Staff Study at 30. 
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of far greater disclosure, consistent with the SEC's historical approach to protecting 

investors, in itself has had a strong palliative effect. 

Board Powers 

The 2010 amendments also created a powerful new tool for money market fund 

boards of directors. If a money market fund cannot meet redemptions without breaking 

the dollar, the 2010 amendments, through new Rule 22e-3 under the Investment 

Company Act, allow the fund's board to liquidate the fund in an orderly mannerwithout a fire sale of portfolio securities or a first-mover advantage for early redeemers.'6 

In September 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund's board did not have the ability to 

promptly suspend redemptions-leading to a chaotic response when the fund broke the 

dollar. Now, the SEC has given money market fund boards a mechanism that will, in the 

SEC's own words, allow for the "orderly liquidation of fund assets" for a troubled fund and 

"reduce the vulnerability of investors to the harmful effects of a run on the fund, and 

minimize the potential for disruption to the securities markets."'7 

To use this power, a board must decide to liquidate the fund. By suspending 

redemptions, the board helps protect all shareholders and ensures that "sophisticated" 

investors can't exit first and inflict losses on those remaining behind. The new rule 

recognizes that a money market fund's share price can decline in value, and provides for 

an orderly liquidation of the fund's securities in a manner that best serves all of the fund's 

shareholders. 

,6 The board continues to have the option to instead reprice the fund's shares and allow the fund to remain 

open but with a floating NAV. 

'7 See Money Market Fund Reform, SEC Release No. 1C-29132 (February 23,2010),75 FR 10060 (March 4, 

2010) at 10088. 

o