alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lorenzo Tugman et al., Respondents, v PJC Sanitation Service, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[805 NYS2d 607]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant PJC Sanitation Service, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Johnson, J), dated August 12, 2004, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff Lorenzo Tugman did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The scar on the injured plaintiff’s neck, as depicted in photographs in the record, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he incurred a “significant disfigurement” as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Hemmes v Twedt,*180 AD2d 925, 926 [1992]). Consequently, the appellant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied. Adams, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein, Skelos and Dillon, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         576,881
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,959,945
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  8,876,626
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            13,387,881
<PP&E>                                       2,324,726
<DEPRECIATION>                                 769,578
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              30,184,786
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       13,063,235
<BONDS>                                      5,655,231
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        485
<COMMON>                                       321,641
<OTHER-SE>                                  10,442,368
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                30,184,786
<SALES>                                      1,783,857
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,834,515
<CGS>                                        2,707,667
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,602,995
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                90,663
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             116,487
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,794,304)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,794,304)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,794,304)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.59)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.09)
        

</TABLE>
Sustainable & Healthy CommunitiesOffice of Research & DevelopmentMichael Slimak, Ph.D.National Program DirectorA Sustainable CommunityConceptual FrameworkRole of IndividualRole of CollectiveNaturalCapitalConservedCommunitylevel EconomicResilienceBetter HealthOutcomes andIncreased WellbeingRole of IndividualHuman BehaviorRole of CollectiveHuman BehaviorSustainability and CommunitiesA Sustainable Community– Protects and improves the health and well-being ofall residents– Provides opportunities for public & private investments– Social equity enhanced–Conserves its natural resources and promotes open spaceCommunities rarely focus on all of these objectivesSHC is based on the principle that a systems-approachwill improve a community’s ability to simultaneouslyaddress all of these objectivesResearch Designed Around 4ThemesTheme 1: Data and Tools toSupport SustainableCommunity DecisionsTheme 2: Forecasting andAssessing Ecological andCommunity HealthTheme 3: Near-termApproaches forSustainable SolutionsTheme 4: IntegratedSolutions for SustainableOutcomesAs described in the StrategicResearch Action Plan 2012-2016
| (logo) NTS NATIONAL

TAX SEARCH, LLC | 130 S. Jefferson, Suite 300

Chicago, IL 60661

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REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCEWITH APPLICABLE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S REGULATION AB SERVICINGCRITERIA

 

 

For the calendar year endingDecember 31, 2016, National Tax Search, LLC has been a Tax Service Vendor for **WellsFargo Bank** (the “Servicer”).

 

National Tax Search, LLC(“NTS”) is responsible for assessing compliance as of December 31, 2016 and forthe period from January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016 (the “ReportingPeriod”) with the servicing criteria set forth in Title 17, Section 229.1122(d)of the Code of Federal Regulations (the “CFR”). NTS has used the servicingcriteria communicated to NTS by the Servicer to assess compliance with theapplicable servicing criteria. Only servicing criteria 1122 (d) (l)(ii), 1122(d)1(iv), 1122 (d)2(ii), 1122 (d)2(v), 1122(d)2(vi), 1122(d)(4)(xi), and1122(d)(4)(xii) (the “Applicable Servicing Criteria”) are applicable to theactivities NTS performs with respect to the transactions covered by thisreport. NTS has determined that the remaining servicing criteria set forth inItem 1122 (d) of the SEC Regulation AB are not applicable to the activities itperforms with respect to the transactions covered by this report. Thetransactions covered by this report include all tax payments made on behalf ofthe Servicer using NTS’s TaxQ system (the “Platform Transactions”).

 

NTS, as a vendor, has assessedits compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria for the Reporting Periodand has concluded that NTS has complied, in all material respects, with theApplicable Servicing Criteria as of December 31, 2016 and for the ReportingPeriod with respect to the Platform Transactions taken as a whole.

 

Plante& Moran, PLLC, anindependent registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation reporton the assessment of compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria as ofDecember 31, 2016 and for the Reporting Period as set forth in this assertion.

 

National Tax Search, LLC, asVendor to Servicer

 

 

/s/ Lori D. Eshoo

Lori D. Eshoo, President/CEO 

January 23, 2017
Exhibit 32.2




CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Birch Branch, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lei Wang, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act of 1934; and(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





BIRCH BRANCH, INC.





Date: May 16, 2011




By:
/s/ Lei WangLei WangChief Financial Officer
Second Amendment Agreement to the Marketing Agent Agreement



 Exhibit 10.3 
 UNITED STATES GASOLINE FUND, LP 
 AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO MARKETING AGENT
AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment No. 2 dated as of July 30, 2012 to the Marketing Agent Agreement, by and among United
States Gasoline Fund, LP, a Delaware limited partnership (the “Fund”), United States Commodity Funds LLC, formerly Victoria Bay Asset Management, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, as General Partner of the Fund (the “General
Partner”) and ALPS Distributors, Inc., a Colorado corporation (the “Marketing Agent”). 
 WITNESSETH

 WHEREAS, the Fund, the General Partner and the Marketing Agent entered into a Marketing Agent Agreement
dated as of February 15, 2008; 
 WHEREAS, the Marketing Agent Agreement was amended by the Fund, the General
Partner and the Marketing Agent effective March 24, 2008 (collectively, the “Agreement”); and 
 WHEREAS, the Fund,
the General Partner and the Marketing Agent wish to amend the Marketing Agent Agreement. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in
consideration of the mutual covenants and agreement herein contained, the Fund, General Partner and the Marketing Agent hereby agree as follows: 
  

	 	1.	 Notices. Section 10.7 of the Agreement entitled “Notices” is amended to change the address of the General Partner
effective August 1, 2012 to the following: 


 United States Commodity Funds LLC 

1999 Harrison Street, Suite 1530 
 Oakland, California 94612 
  

	 	2.	 Except as specifically set forth herein, all other provisions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 



[SIGNATURES ON FOLLOWING PAGE] 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto has caused this Amendment No. 2 to be
duly executed as of the date first written above. 
 UNITED STATES GASOLINE FUND, LP 

    By: United States Commodity Funds LLC, as General Partner 

 

	
	 /s/ Howard Mah

	 Name: Howard Mah

	 Title: Management Director


 UNITED STATES COMMODITY FUNDS LLC 

 

	
	 /s/ Howard Mah

	 Name: Howard Mah

	 Title: Management Director


 ALPS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 
  

	
	 /s/ Thomas A. Carter

	 Name: Thomas A. Carter

	 Title: President
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                           GTECH HOLDINGS CORPORATION

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
                         PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of GTECH Holdings Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending August 27, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the Date hereof (the "Report"), I, W.
Bruce Turner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to sections 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



Date: October 4, 2005                   /s/ W. Bruce Turner
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        W. Bruce Turner
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 20 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 20

  Permitting the use of the rotunda of the Capitol for a ceremony to 
    commemorate the days of remembrance of victims of the Holocaust.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 25, 1995

  Mr. Yates submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
              referred to the Committee on House Oversight

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
  Permitting the use of the rotunda of the Capitol for a ceremony to 
    commemorate the days of remembrance of victims of the Holocaust.

Whereas, pursuant to such Act, the United States Holocaust Memorial Council has 
        designated April 23 through April 30, 1995, as ``Days of Remembrance of 
        Victims of the Holocaust''; and
Whereas the United States Holocaust Memorial Council has recommended that a one-
        hour ceremony to be held at noon on April 27, 1995, consisting of 
        speeches, readings, and musical presentations as part of the days of 
        remembrance activities: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That the rotunda of the United States Capitol is hereby authorized to 
be used on April 27, 1995 from 8 o'clock ante meridian until 3 o'clock 
post meridian for a ceremony as part of the commemoration of the days 
of remembrance of victims of the Holocaust. Physical preparations for 
the conduct of the ceremony shall be carried out in accordance with 
such conditions as may be prescribed by the Architect of the Capitol.

                                 <all>
```
2011 authorization from Decision XXI/11

U.S. authorization from Decision XXI/11 2,055,200 8.1%2,055,200 8.1% - Maximum allowable new production/import 1,855,2007.3% 1,855,200 7.3% = Minimum allowable CSA 200,000 0.8% 200,000 0.8%

Calculate supply chain factor U.S. authorization (1) 2,055,200 8.1% 2,055,200 8.1% - Reduction for uptake of alternatives 00.0% 0 0.0% = One year's CUE need 2,055,200 8.1% 2,055,200 8.1% x Percentage of year's production to recover 58% 58% = SCF to meet that need 1,192,000 4.7% 1,192,000 4.7%

Calculate stocks (= CSA) Existing pre-phaseout inv on 1/1/10 ("ES") 3,062,674 1,802,715 - 2010 CSA Use ("D") 719,676 - 2010 Group II Use 804,0003.1% 0.0% - SCF (6) or Group 2 max 1,192,0004.7% 1,192,000 4.7% = stocks =CSA 346,998 1.4% 610,715 2.4%

Calculate carryover Reported as produced/imported in 2009 2,273,600 2,273,600 - Reported as sold in 2009 2,200,733 2,200,733 = Unsold carryover 72,867 72,867

Calculate new production (=CUA) Total U.S. authorization (1) 2,055,200 8.1% 2,055,200 8.1% - CSA (10) 346,998 1.4% 610,715 2.4% - Carryover (13) 72,8670.3% 72,867 0.3% - Research 00.0% 0 0.0% - uptake of alternatives 00.0% 0 0.0% = New production 1,635,335 6.4% 1,371,618 5.4%

Calculate total amount allocated CUA (14) 1,635,335 6.4% 1,371,618 5.4% + CSA (3) 346,998 1.4% 610,715 2.4% = Total 1,982,333 7.8% 1,982,333 7.8% Initial Calculation Calculation with New Inventory
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEITH HUGH JENSEN,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, Warden,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 12-16681

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00512-DAD

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Dale A. Drozd, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 13, 2014

San Francisco, California

Before: RIPPLE,** SILVERMAN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges. 

Keith Hugh Jensen appeals from the district court’s order conditionally

granting his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on his claims of constitutional

error under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Jensen argues that the

FILED

MAY 15 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
-2-

remedy ordered by the district court is insufficient to redress his constitutional

injury and that the appropriate remedy is vacatur of his conviction unless the state

initiates proceedings to retry him within 90 days. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

“A district court’s determination of the appropriate remedy for a

constitutional violation on a habeas petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” 

Johnson v. Uribe, 700 F.3d 413, 424 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617

(2013). “[A] district court abuses its discretion ‘when it makes an error of law,

when it rests its decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when we are left

with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of

judgment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedy

permitting the state to dismiss the sentence-enhancing prior prison-term allegations

and resentence Jensen accordingly. This remedy puts Jensen in the position he

would have been had the constitutional violation never occurred, see Chioino v.

Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009), while recognizing the “considerable

resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution,” Lafler v.

Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388-89 (2012). A new trial on the substantive counts is
-3-

unnecessary to “neutralize the taint” of the violation because Jensen was not

prejudiced by the introduction of evidence concerning his prior prison terms. See

id. at 1388. Similar evidence would have been introduced regardless of the

enhancement allegations, because his criminal history was used for impeachment

purposes. The court admonished the jury not to consider Jensen’s prior prison

terms in determining his guilt on the substantive counts, and strong evidence

supported the convictions. Moreover, the failure to bifurcate the proceedings was

not a constitutional violation in and of itself. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,

568 (1967).

AFFIRMED.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1176

To nullify an executive order that prohibits Federal contracts with companies

that hire permanent replacements for striking employees.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 8, 1995

Mr. GOODLING (for himself, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. HOEKSTRA,

Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. MCKEON, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr.

BARRETT of Nebraska, Mr. CASTLE, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. SAM

JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr.

KNOLLENBERG, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. WELDON of Florida, Mr.

FUNDERBURK, Mr. SOUDER, Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. DOOLEY, Mr. PARKER, Mr. DEAL of Georgia, Mr. BREWSTER,

Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. ZELIFF, Mr. ROHRABACHER, and Mr. EWING) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities

A BILL

To nullify an executive order that prohibits Federal contracts

with companies that hire permanent replacements for

striking employees.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. NULLIFICATION OF ORDER.

4 Any executive order, or other rule or order, that pro5 hibits Federal contracts with, or requires the debarment

6 of, or imposes other sanction on, a contractor on the basis
2

•HR 1176 IH

1 that such contractor or organizational unit thereof has

2 permanently replaced lawfully striking workers shall have

3 no force or effect.

Æ
39772.

#### PILGRIM HEALTH & LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MILLEDGE.

Decided November 8, 1962

Rehearing denied November 29, 1962.

*78*J. D. Watkins, Ruffin ■& Watkins, J. M. Hinton, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*D. C. Campbell, Jr., H. G. Rawls,*contra.

Jordan, Judge.

A policy of life insurance bearing a given date, and purporting to insure for the future only, cannot be made the basis of an action to recover for a loss occurring on a prior date. *Fowler v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co.,*100 Ga. 330 (3) (28 SE 398). The time when an insurance policy shall become effective is an essential element of the contract *(Boswell v. Gulf Life Ins. Co.,*197 Ga. 269, 29 SE2d 71); and if no time for the commencement of the risk is fixed in the contract of insurance, the provisions of *Code Ann.*§ 56-2429 are to be read into the policy as a term thereof, and the policy runs from midday of the date thereof, as provided in said Code section. *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson,*20 Ga. App. 706 (8) (93 SE 299).

The policies of insurance sued upon in this case wez’e dated November 6, 1961, and it does not appear from the petition and exhibits attached thereto that any express provisions wez’e incorporated in the policies as to the time of the commezzcement of the risks insured agaizist. Construing the pleadings most strongly against the plaintiff, it must be presumed for purposes of zmling on the general demurrer that there were no such provisions. Under these circuznstances, therefore, the effective date of the policies was by operation of law midday of the date of the policies, that is, November 6, 1961. Accoz'dingly, since the petition affirmatively disclosed that the insured died on November 5, 1961, a date prior to the effective date of the policies, recovery could not be had on said policies by the plaintiff beneficiary and the trial court erred in overruling the general demurrer to the petition.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
#### Gerelli Insurance Agency, Inc., Appellant, et al., Plaintiffs, v Donn Gerelli et al., Respondents.

[806 NYS2d 71]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for conversion, the plaintiff Gerelli Insurance Agency, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Rudolph, J.), dated May 17, 2004, which denied its motion to find the defendants in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order of the same court (Barone, J.), contained in an order to show cause dated August 13, 2003, and an order of the same court (Barone, J.), entered September 16, 2003, as amended by an order of the same court (Barone, J.), entered September 29, 2003, respectively.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly declined to find that the defendants were in contempt of an order entered September 16, 2003, as amended by an order of the same court entered September 29, 2003, both of which were issued by Justice Barone, from whom the case had subsequently been transferred. “To sustain a finding of either civil or criminal contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order it is necessary to establish that a lawful order of the court clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect” *(Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y.,*70 NY2d 233, 240 [1987]; *see McCain v Dinkins,*84 NY2d 216 [1994]; *Matter of McCormick v Axelrod,*59 NY2d 574 [1983]; *Vujovic v Vujovic,*16 AB3d 490 [2005]; *Rupp-Elmasri v Elmasri,*305 AD2d 394 [2003]). The party to be held in contempt must have had knowledge of the order *(see*
      *342
      *McCain v Dinkins, supra; Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, supra; Graham v Graham,*152 AD2d 653 [1989]).

The plaintiff alleges that the order entered September 16, 2003, as amended by the order entered September 29, 2003, contained a preliminary injunction which was violated by the defendants. However, the language which purportedly granted the injunction failed to indicate clearly that a preliminary injunction was being granted or to specify precisely what action or actions were being enjoined. Thus, the clear and unequivocal mandate required to sustain a finding of contempt was lacking *(see Vujovic v Vujovic, supra; Rupp-Elmasri v Elmasri, supra; Matter of County of Orange v Rodriguez,*283 AD2d 494 [2001]; *Goldsmith v Goldsmith,*261 AD2d 576 [1999]).

The Supreme Court also properly declined to hold the defendants in contempt of a temporary restraining order contained in an order to show cause dated August 13, 2003 *(see Robinson v Robinson,*11 AD3d 853 [2004]; *People v Asiatic Petroleum Corp.,*45 AD2d 835 [1974]).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Covello, JJ., concur.