IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1652

Filed May 1, 2019

CHRISTOPHER DEWAYNE JOHNSON,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Shawn Showers, 

Judge.

Christopher Johnson appeals the dismissal of his application for 

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Steven E. Goodlow, Albia, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
2

DOYLE, Judge.

A jury convicted Christopher Johnson of first-degree murder for the 2010 

killing of his wife. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. 

State v. Johnson, No. 11-1055, 2012 WL 2819366, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 11, 

2012). Johnson filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR), alleging his 

counsel was ineffective. He now appeals the PCR court’s ruling denying him relief.

We review the PCR court’s finding that Johnson failed to establish his 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. See Lamasters v. State, 821 

N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). In order to succeed on an ineffective-assistance 

claim, a PCR applicant must establish that counsel breached a duty and prejudice 

resulted. See id. at 866. We may affirm a ruling rejecting an ineffective-assistance 

claim if either element is lacking. See id.

Johnson’s PCR application alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to: (1) present defenses of intoxication and diminished responsibility, (2) 

strike more women from the jury, (3) investigate and rebut the medical examiner’s 

conclusion that the victim was likely strangled and rendered incapacitated before 

she was stabbed, (4) depose a State’s witness, (5) take adequate steps to ensure 

Johnson testified at trial, and (6) argue for lesser-included offenses of voluntary or 

involuntary manslaughter during closing argument. Most of these complaints stem 

from counsel’s trial strategy. Even though his trial counsel was ultimately 

unsuccessful, we are unable to find these strategic decisions amount to ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001) 

(“[C]laims of ineffective assistance involving tactical or strategic decisions of 

counsel must be examined in light of all the circumstances to ascertain whether 
3

the actions were a product of tactics or inattention to the responsibilities of an 

attorney.”). Rather, it is more reasonable to attribute Johnson’s conviction to the 

overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 

Of the two claims that do not fall under the purview of counsel’s trial 

strategy, both fail. The record plainly shows the blame for Johnson’s failure to 

testify at trial cannot fall on trial counsel, who fulfilled his duty. Johnson’s decision 

to not testify was his alone. As the PCR court noted:

[T]rial counsel was an experienced, felony criminal defense attorney 

when he represented [Johnson]. Trial counsel told [Johnson] what 

his trial strategy was and why counsel wanted [Johnson] to testify. 

Trial counsel’s approach on his client’s decision to testify is exactly 

what a good criminal defense attorney should do. An attorney can 

advise a client whether or not he should take a plea deal but he/she 

can never force their client to take a plea. In the same vein, a criminal 

defense attorney can only suggest to his client what his advice is 

regarding testifying. Trial counsel took adequate steps to make sure 

his client made an informed decision on testifying. Any attempt to 

“ensure” his client testified would have likely been improper, as that 

decision is solely up to the defendant.

Finally, even if we were to assume counsel breached a duty in failing to depose 

one of the State’s witness,1 Johnson has failed to demonstrate that this failure 

prejudiced him in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting a finding of guilt. 

Johnson also argues that regardless of the outcome as to each individual 

ineffective-assistance claim, the cumulative effect of these errors taken together 

entitles him to a new trial.2 Iowa recognizes that the cumulative effect of counsel’s 

 

1 We note that Johnson acknowledged at the PCR hearing that the witness’s statement to 

the police, which was included in the minutes of evidence, was essentially identical to his 

trial testimony. Further, Johnson acknowledged receiving the minutes and seeing the 

statement in advance of trial.

2 Johnson argues the combined effect of counsel’s errors created “structural error” that 

effectively denied him his right to counsel, which requires no specific showing of prejudice. 

Structural error occurs when an error affects the framework of the legal proceeding in such 

a way as to render the criminal adversary process “presumptively unreliable.” Lado v. 
4

errors may prejudice a defendant even though no individual instance is sufficient 

to establish prejudice. See State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Iowa 2012). 

However, we only consider the cumulative prejudice of claims for which we have 

determined that counsel failed to perform a duty or for which we analyzed only 

under the prejudice prong. See id. Here, only Johnson’s claim regarding counsel’s 

failure to depose a witness falls under this criterion. There simply are no other 

claims under which to aggregate prejudice.

Because Johnson has failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective, we 

affirm the dismissal of his PCR application.

AFFIRMED.

 

State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). When structural error occurs, 

the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice because doing so “would be a speculative 

inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” Id. (citation omitted). For 

instance, counsel’s failure to file an appeal against the defendant’s wishes or to respond 

to a motion to dismiss a PCR application is the type of error affecting a defendant’s ability 

to participate in the adversarial process that results in structural error. See id. at 252-53. 

It appears that Johnson’s argument concerns cumulative error rather than structural error.