alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of David P. Walker, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[803 NYS2d 284]

*753Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed July 19, 2004, which ruled that claimant’s request for a hearing was untimely.

By notice of determination dated January 22, 2004, the Department of Labor found claimant ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits for the period November 3, 2003 through November 23, 2003 because he did not comply with registration requirements. The reverse side of the notice advised claimant that a request for a hearing must be made within 30 days of the date of the mailing of the notice. Claimant, however, waited until March 20, 2004 to request a hearing and it was not received by the Department until March 26, 2004. As a result, the Administrative Law Judge found the request untimely and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board upheld this decision. This appeal ensued.

We affirm. Labor Law § 620 (1) (a) provides that a claimant aggrieved by a notice of determination has 30 days from the date of the mailing of such notice to request a hearing, unless the claimant suffers from a physical or mental condition preventing a timely request, in which case the period may be extended *(see Matter of Hedo [New York City Dept. of Personnel Commissioner of Labor],*19 AD3d 985, 985 [2005]). Here, claimant testified that he did not receive the notice until he returned from a business trip the weekend of February 21, 2004. Notwithstanding the proviso on the back of the notice, he did not immediately request a hearing, but waited nearly 30 days thereafter. Inasmuch as claimant did not present a valid excuse for failing to comply with the 30-day requirement *(see Matter of Shell [Commissioner of Labor],*16 AD3d 940 [2005]) and did not demonstrate that a physical or mental incapacity prevented him from doing so *(see Matter of Jarrett [Commissioner of Labor],*13 AD3d 965 [2004]), we find no reason to disturb the Board’s decision.

Mercure, J.P., Spain, Carpinello, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
www.gpo.gov

### §278a. Annual report to Congress; examination of books and accounts

The Gorgas Memorial Institute shall make to Congress, on April 1 of each year, a full report of the operation and work of the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory during the fiscal year ending the preceding September 30, and shall include therewith a complete statement of the receipts and expenditures of said laboratory for such fiscal year. The books and accounts of the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory shall at all times be open to examination by the Comptroller General of the United States.

(May 7, 1928, ch. 505, §3, 45 Stat. 491; Pub. L. 95–426, title VII, §701(a), Oct. 7, 1978, 92 Stat. 991.)

#### Amendments

1978—Pub. L. 95–426 substituted “on April 1 of each year” and “during the fiscal year ending the preceding September 30” for “annually, on the first Monday in December” and “up to the first of November next preceding”, respectively.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE 10-QSB FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 FOR DBS  INDUSTRIES,
INC.  AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN  ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO  SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                                  0000857502
<NAME>                                       DBS INDUSTRIES, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                      DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                           MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                                     351,574
<SECURITIES>                                                     0
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<COMMON>                                                     5,801
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                            15,630,040
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         1,525,040
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                             1,721
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                         (1,279)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                        (1,525,482)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    (1,525,482)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                  0
<CHANGES>                                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                           (1,525,482)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                  (.11)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                (.11)


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard W. Torturica, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[803 NYS2d 459]

Appeal, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, from an order of the Jefferson County Court (Lee Clary, J), dated November 21, 1995. The order denied defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment in appeal No. 2.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Same memorandum as in *People v Torturica*(23 AD3d — [2005]). Present—Green, J.P, Gorski, Smith, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
§ 100.13 Notices. ( a ) Additional information and procedures about the United States Mint's redemption of bent or partial coins can be found on the United States Mint's website.
( b ) Criminal penalties connected with the defacement or mutilation of U.S. coins are provided in 18 U.S.C. 331.
( c ) The Director of the United States Mint may provide information pertaining to any bent or partial coin submissions to law enforcement officials or other third parties for purposes of investigating related criminal activity or for purposes of seeking a civil judgment.
( d ) Whoever intentionally files a false claim seeking reimbursement for uncurrent, bent or partial coins may be held criminally liable under a number of statutes including 18 U.S.C. 287 and 18 U.S.C. 1341 and may be held civilly liable under 31 U.S.C. 3729, *et seq.*
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TOMLINSON BLACK NORTH

IDAHO,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

GERALDINE KIRK-HUGHES, an

individual doing business as KirkHughes and Associates, doing business

as Kirk-Hughes, LLC, doing business as

Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC,

 Defendant - Appellant,

 and

KELLY POLATIS, an individual;

DOES 1-10; DELANO D. PETERSON,

 Defendants.

No. 08-35900

D.C. No. 2:06-cv-00118-RHW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge, Presiding

FILED

NOV 13 2009

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
page 2

 ** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Submitted November 5, 2009** 

Portland, Oregon

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, FISHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

In Idaho, an express agreement bars recovery for unjust enrichment only if it

is enforceable and covers the same subject matter. Vanderford Co., Inc. v.

Knudson, 165 P.3d 261, 272 (Idaho 2007). The jury reasonably could have found

that the agreement between the parties in this case did not apply to the transaction

that was the subject of dispute. Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing

to grant Kirk-Hughes judgment as a matter of law. Nor did the existence of an

express agreement bar an award of damages. “An award for unjust enrichment

may be proper even though an agreement exists.” Bates v. Seldin, 203 P.3d 702,

706 (Idaho 2009). 

The district court also did not err by submitting the issue of unjust

enrichment to a jury. A court may, “with the parties’ consent, try any issue by a

jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c)(2). Kirk-Hughes consented to trial by jury, and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting her last-minute change of

heart. Cf. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
page 3

The award of attorney’s fees to Tomlinson was proper. The sale of property

for the purpose of development was a “commercial transaction,” Idaho Code § 12-

120(3), and the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that fees are appropriate in cases

almost exactly like this one, see Erickson v. Flynn, 64 P.3d 959, 966–67 (Idaho Ct.

App. 2002). 

AFFIRMED.
39950.

#### COLONIAL STORES, INC. v. OWENS.

Decided February 15, 1963

Rehearing denied February 28, 1963.

*Glover & Davis, Smith, Kilpatrick, Cody, Rogers & Mc-Clatchey, Barry Phillips, Thomas E. Joiner,*for plaintiff in error.

*Sanders & Mottola, Willis G. Haugen,*contra.

Eberhardt, Judge.

The petition here is strikingly like that in *Redding v. Sinclair Refining Co.,*105 Ga. App. 375 (124 *437SE2d 688). The only substantial difference that we can see is that in *Bedding*it was alleged that the placing of the sign on the sidewalk was negligence *per se*under the provisions of a city ordinance. Here there is no ordinance. But we think, under the facts alleged, that whether it was negligence as a matter of fact so to place and maintain the sign is for the jury. The distinction between the situation here and parking lot cases, such as *McMullan v. Kroger Co.,*84 Ga. App. 195 (65 SE2d 420); *Ely v. Barbizon Towers, Inc.,*101 Ga. App. 872 (115 SE2d 616); *McHugh v. Trust Co. of Ga.,*102 Ga. App. 412 (116 SE2d 512); and *Carmichael v. Timothy,*104 Ga. App. 16 (120 SE2d 814) is readily apparent. In none of those cases was the distraction of a crowd, signs on store windows, etc. involved, nor was the injury complained of one that might have been reasonably foreseeable by those who owned or maintained the parking lots. We think that here the defendant, from its knowledge that crowds of people gather in the area where the sign was placed— which it must have had from past experience—was sufficient to bring within the range of foreseeability the likelihood that some one of them might be tripped by the sign supports, and a jury may well conclude that the defendant should have anticipated it. The facts place the case in a category close to that of *National Bellas-Hess Co. v. Patrick,*49 Ga. App. 280 (175 SE 255); *McCrory Stores Corp. v. Ahern,*65 Ga. App. 334 (15 SE2d 797); *Tinley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 70*Ga. App. 390 (28 SE2d 322); *Lane Drug Stores, Inc. v. Story,*72 Ga. App. 886 (35 SE2d 472); *Delay v. Rich’s, Inc.,*86 Ga. App. 30 (70 SE2d 546); *Moore v. Kroger Co.,*87 Ga. App. 581 (74 SE2d 481); and *Rich’s, Inc. v. South,*91 Ga. App. 487 (85 SE2d 774), but as Judge Custer pointed out in *Redding,*supra, the distraction calculated to divert attention from the impending peril lifts it out. See *Glover v. City Council of Augusta,*83 Ga. App. 314 (63 SE2d 422); *Stanfield v. Forrest Five &c. Stores,*95 Ga. App. 739, 741 (99 SE2d 167) and citations. If there had been no distraction here, or if the jury should not find it to have existed, the conclusion seems inescapable that the distinction would fade away.

It is likewise a jury question as to whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety when she *438suffered the injury. *Big Apple Super Market of Rome v. Briggs,*102 Ga. App. 11 (115 SE2d 385); and *Redding,*supra.

The overruling of the general demurrer was proper.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Bussell, J., concur.*
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

April 28, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 129314(40) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, ADRIANNE NISWONGER, as Next Friend Justices 

of JOHN M. CLARK,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 129314 

 COA: 251885 

Ingham CC: 02-002054-NO

QUALITY DAIRY COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s order of 

January 31, 2006 is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the 

order was entered erroneously. 

CAVANAGH, J., would grant reconsideration. 

KELLY, J., would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would reverse the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the Ingham Circuit Court’s October 16, 

2003 denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition for the reasons stated by the 

circuit court. 

d0424 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

April 28, 2006 

Clerk
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Initial Review Group, Biobehavioral and Behavioral Sciences Subcommittee.                    

*Date:*                         February 24-25, 2009.                    

*Time:*                         9 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                     

*Place:*                         Embassy Suites Washington DC, 1250, 22nd Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.                    

*Contact Person:*                         Marita R. Hopmann, PhD, Scientific Review Administrator, Division of Scientific Review, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, NIH, 6100 Executive Boulevard, Room 5B01, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 435-6911,                         *hopmannm@mail.nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.864, Population Research; 93.865, Research for Mothers and Children; 93.929, Center for Medical Rehabilitation Research; 93.209, Contraception and Infertility Loan Repayment Program, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: January 23, 2009.

Jennifer Spaeth,

Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. E9-1966 Filed 1-28-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
Order entered December 15, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-01546-CV

OKLAHOMA SURETY COMPANY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee

V.

STEVE NOVIELLO, ASSIGNEE OF METRO TOWNHOMES & HOMES, INC. AND 

METRO TOWNHOMES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee/Cross-Appellant

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10-00335

ORDER

The Court GRANTS appellant/cross-appellee’s unopposed motion to file a postsubmission letter brief. The letter brief received on December 11, 2013 is considered filed as of 

the date of this order.

/s/ DAVID EVANS 

PRESIDING JUSTICE
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

#### § 224.4 When must a surety corporation appoint a process agent?

A surety corporation must appoint a process agent when either the State where the bond is filed or the State where the principal resides is different from the State where the surety corporation is incorporated. In such a case, the surety corporation must appoint a process agent in each such State that is different from the State where the surety is incorporated.
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

#### § 256.32 What documentation must be submitted to the Judgment Fund Branch to preserve the right to seek interest under 31 U.S.C. 1304(b) in a case where the government has taken an appeal?

31 U.S.C. 1304(b) specifies that a “transcript of the judgment” must be filed with the Secretary of the Treasury. This means that a copy of the judgment must be filed with the Judgment Fund Branch for interest to accrue on a judgment of a federal district court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or the United States Court of Federal Claims. By practice, the successful plaintiff files a copy of the judgment. Whoever submits the judgment should include a cover letter explaining that it is being submitted to preserve interest rights under 31 U.S.C. 1304. A copy of the judgment and cover letter must be sent to the Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Judgment Fund Branch, at the address indicated on the Judgment Fund Web site at *http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/judgefund.*
Amendment No. 1 to Amended and Restated Master Revolving Note



 Exhibit 10.1 
 AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO NOTE 
 This Amendment No. 1 to Note
(“Amendment”), is made, delivered, and effective as of August 10, 2012 by and between MANITEX LIFTKING, ULC, an Alberta corporation (“Borrower”) and Comerica Bank, a Texas banking association
(“Bank”) in order to amend the US$6,500,000.00 Amended and Restated Master Revolving Note (Multi-Currency) dated December 23, 2011, made by Borrower to Bank (“Note”). 

For valuable consideration, Borrower and Bank agree as follows: 
 1. The Note is amended as follows: 
 (a) Effective August 10, 2012, the face
amount of the Note is increased from US$6,500,000.00 to $8,000,000.00. 
 (b) Borrower shall pay to Bank an unused
commitment fee equal to 0.125% multiplied by the daily average balance by which the face amount of the Note exceeded the aggregate amount of outstanding Advances (“Unused Fee”). The Unused Fee shall be payable in arrears on the first
Business day of each fiscal quarter of Borrower, for the quarter most recently ended. The Unused Fee shall be calculated on the basis of a 360 day year, and assessed for the actual number of days elapsed in the period of calculation thereof.

 2. This Amendment is not an agreement to any further or other amendment of the Note. Borrower expressly acknowledges and agrees that except
as expressly amended in this Amendment, the Note, as amended, remains in full force and effect and is ratified and confirmed. The execution of this Amendment shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any Default or Event of Default. 

3. All the terms used in this Amendment which are defined in the Note shall have the same meaning as used in the Note, unless otherwise defined in this
Amendment. 
 4. Borrower waives, discharges, and forever releases Bank, Bank’s employees, officers, directors, attorneys, stockholders,
and their successors and assigns, from and of any and all claims, causes of action, allegations or assertions that Borrower has or may have had at any time up through and including the date of this Amendment, against any or all of the foregoing,
regardless of whether any such claims, causes of action, allegations or assertions are known to Borrower or whether any such claims, causes of action, allegations or assertions arose as result of Bank’s actions or omissions in connection with
the Note, or any amendments, extensions or modifications thereto, or Bank’s administration of the debt governed by the Note or otherwise. 

5. Borrower is responsible for all costs incurred by Bank, including without limit reasonable attorney fees, with regard to the preparation and execution
of this Amendment. 
 [Signature Page Follows] 







 This Amendment No. 1 to Note is executed and delivered as of the Effective Date. 

 

									
	COMERICA BANK	 		 	MANITEX LIFTKING, ULC
					
	By:	 	 /s/ Omer Ahmed
	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ David H. Gransee

	Name:	 	Omer Ahmed	 		 	Name:	 	David H. Gransee
	Its:	 	Portfolio Manager	 		 	Its:	 	VP &CFO


  
 - 2 -
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50528

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MARCELINO MONDRAGON-FIGUEROA, also known as Javier Perez,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:09-CR-89-1

Before SMITH, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Marcelino

Mondragon-Figueroa has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Mondragon-Figueroa

has not filed a response. Our independent review of the record and counsel’s

brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for

leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities

herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 20, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 09-50528 Document: 00511086250 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/20/2010