alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1088 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 1088

    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that the 
employment taxes shall not apply to amounts paid by certain State funds 
                   as compensation for unpaid wages.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 1, 1995

 Mr. DeFazio introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that the 
employment taxes shall not apply to amounts paid by certain State funds 
                   as compensation for unpaid wages.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF STATE FUNDS PROVIDING COMPENSATION FOR UNPAID 
              WAGES.

    (a) In General.--For purposes of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (relating to employment taxes) and title II of the Social 
Security Act, in the case of an individual who receives any payment 
from a State wage security fund by reason of unpaid wages, with respect 
to such payment--
            (1) such individual shall be treated as not being an 
        employee of such fund, and
            (2) such fund shall be treated as not being an employer of 
        such individual.
    (b) Exceptions.--
            (1) Maximum benefits.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to 
        payments made to an individual in excess of the maximum amount 
        of payments permitted to be made to an individual from the fund 
        under the rules in effect on January 1, 1995.
            (2) Only compensation for unpaid wages from private 
        employers.--Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to 
        unpaid wages attributable to services performed by the 
        individual for a State or any agency or instrumentality 
        thereof.
            (3) Withholding of income tax required.--Subsection (a) 
        shall not apply for purposes of chapter 24 of the Internal 
        Revenue Code of 1986.
    (c) State Wage Security Fund.--For purposes of this section, the 
term ``State wage security fund'' means any State fund the sole purpose 
of which is to pay compensation to individuals who have performed 
services for any employer in such State but who did not receive 
compensation from such employer for such services by reason of the 
employer ceasing to exist or ceasing to operate the facility at which 
such individual was employed.
    (d) Effective Date.--The section shall apply to all periods 
beginning before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act; 
except that subsection (b)(3) shall apply only to amounts paid after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Joel BOLDEN and Len Silvia, Appellees v. J & R INCORPORATED, Appellant

No. 01-7050, 01-7103.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

May 17, 2002.

Before SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This cause was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and was briefed and argued by counsel. It is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is hereby affirmed. Appellant appeals from the judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages for racial discrimination. While appellant raises several assignments of error, with one possible exception, appellant waived each of them for failure to make timely and effective objections in the District Court. *See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson,*737 F.2d 1, 31 (D.C.Cir.1984). The sole issue not plainly waived is whether the punitive damages awarded in the District Court were excessive. Because appellant has not established that the jury verdict was “beyond all reason” or “so great as to shock the conscience,” *Langevine v. District of Columbia,*106 F.3d 1018, 1024 (D.C.Cir.1997), we will affirm the judgment awarding the amount found by the jury.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. *See*F.R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
#### § 48.4222(c)-1 Revocation or suspension of registration.

The district director or the Director of International Operations, as the case may be, is authorized to revoke or temporarily suspend, upon written notice, the registration of any person and the right of such person to sell or purchase articles tax free under section 4221 of the Code in any case in which he finds that (1) the registrant is not a bona fide manufacturer, or a purchaser reselling direct to manufacturers or exporters; (2) the registrant is for some other reason not eligible under these regulations to retain a Certificate of Registry; (3) the registrant has used his registration to avoid the payment of any tax imposed by Chapter 32 of the Code, or to postpone or interfere in any manner with the collection of such tax; (4) such revocation or suspension is necessary to protect the revenue; or (5) the registrant failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph (c) of § 48.4222 (a)-1, relating to the evidence required to support a tax-free sale. The revocation or suspension of registration is in addition to any other penalty that may apply under the law for any act or failure to act.

(Secs. 4222 (72 Stat. 1284; 26 U.S.C. 4222) and 7805 (68A Stat. 917; 26 U.S.C. 7805) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); secs. 4051, 4052, 4061 and 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (96 Stat. 2174, 2175 and 2173; 68A Stat. 917; 26 U.S.C. 4051, 4052, 4061, and 7805) and secs. 522 and 523 of the Highway Revenue Act of 1982 (Pub. L. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2185, 2186))

[T.D. 7536, 43 FR 13522, Mar. 31, 1978, as amended by T.D. 7753, 46 FR 2999, Jan. 13, 1981; T.D. 7882, 48 FR 14362, Apr. 4, 1983]
Order entered January 13, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01528-CV

KEN PAXTON IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

STATE OF TEXAS AND THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellants

V.

ARNIEKA SIMMONS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-07822

ORDER

The reporter’s record in this accelerated appeal is overdue. Accordingly, we ORDER

Antionette Reagor, Official Court Reporter for the 68th Judicial District Court, to file the 

reporter’s record by January 23, 2020.

We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order to Ms. Reagor and all 

parties.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE
Presidential Documents

40055 

Federal Register 

Vol. 74, No. 152 

Monday, August 10, 2009 

Title 3— 

The President 

Memorandum of August 6, 2009 

Assignment of Function Under Section 601 of the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 

Memorandum for the Secretary of Homeland Security 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution 

and the laws of the United States, including section 301 of title 3, United 

States Code, I hereby assign to you the function of the President under 

section 601, title VI, Division A of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–5). 

You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal 

Register. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, August 6, 2009 

[FR Doc. E9–19281 

Filed 8–7–09; 11:15 am] 

Billing code 4410–10–P 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with MISCELLANEOUSOB#1.EPS</GPH>
#### § 1010.640 [Reserved]
#### Shroyer v. Shroyer

*462
      *McCrea & McCrea,*for plaintiff.

February 18, 1953.

Shughart, P. J.,

The complaint in the above action in divorce was filed on September 3, 1952, and personally served upon defendant on September 17, 1952; on application of counsel for plaintiff, a master was appointed on October 1, 1952,

The Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a master may be appointed to hear the testimony “after the action is at issue”: Pa. R. C. P. 1133(a).

The action is deemed at issue 20 days after defendant has been served personally, where no answer is filed: Pa. R. C. P. 1131(6).

It is apparent that the master was appointed prematurely in this case, since less than 20 days elapsed from the time defendant was served until the appointment was made.

We have heretofore discussed the effect of a premature appointment of a master. See Clendenning v. Clendenning, 2 Cumberland Law Journal 37, and authorities therein cited. We deem it unnecessary to repeat here what was stated therein.

Suffice it to say that no decree in divorce may be based on the report of the master which was filed .

Since more than 20 days have elapsed since the service was made, the action is now at issue; pursuant to Pa. R. C. P. 1133, we shall at this time appoint as master the member of the bar previously prematurely appointed, with directions to him to proceed with the taking of testimony after due and proper notice to defendant, as provided by rules of court.

In the event that defendant in this action shall not appear, it shall be unnecessary to record again the testimony taken in the prior hearing, but the same may be offered in evidence, at the new hearing, as previously recorded; however, should defendant appear in the action, then the testimony is to be taken de novo.
39821.

#### ROBERTSON v. JOHNSON.

Decided November 27, 1962.

*L. D. Bums, Jr., Floyd G. Hoard,*for plaintiff in error.

*Erwin, Birchmore & Epting, Eugene A. Ep-ting,*contra.

Eberhardt, Judge.

The only question presented here is whether plaintiff proved his case as laid against the defendant Johnson. *Code*§ 110-310. The gist of Johnson’s alleged negligence was that he failed to give a proper signal of his intention to stop. The only witness on the trial was plaintiff himself. In *62the factual context presented, it would be physically impossible for plaintiff, who was facing Johnson’s car, to swear that Johnson’s brake lights did not work and he admitted that he could not have seen the signal if given. Barbara Wages, driver of the vehicle following Johnson, was not called to testify.

Where there is nothing to support the only allegation of negligence, a nonsuit is proper and it is not necessary to consider the statutory interpretation of *Code Ann.*§ 68-1647 advanced by plaintiff dealing with a possibility that defendant may have given a signal indicating an intention to turn off the road to the right, as well as one indicating an intention to stop, at the same time.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Carlisle, P. J., and Russell, J., concur.*
<PAGE>
Exhibit 32.1

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Telex Communications Intermediate
Holdings, LLC and Telex Communications, Inc. (collectively, the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended November 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Periodic Report"), Raymond V.
Malpocher, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Gregory W. Richter, as
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:

     (1)  The Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
          all material respects, the financial condition and results of
          operations of the Company as of September 30, 2005.


/s/ Raymond V. Malpocher
------------------------------------------
Raymond V. Malpocher
President and Chief Executive Officer
Dated: November 1, 2005


/s/ Gregory W. Richter
------------------------------------------
Gregory W. Richter
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Dated: November 1, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 FEB-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-30-1996
<CASH>                                         6,337
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               6,337
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 6,337
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          147,052
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       138,534
<OTHER-SE>                                     (279,249)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   6,337
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               6,071
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,071)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.00
        


</TABLE>
(logo) pwc

 

 

**Report of IndependentRegistered Public Accounting Firm**

 

To the Board of Directors, PNCFinancial Services Group, Inc.:

 

We have examined management’s assertion,included in the accompanying Report on Assessment of Compliance with RegulationAB Servicing Criteria, that Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank,National Association (“Midland” or the “Company”) complied with the servicingcriteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission'sRegulation AB for all transactions serviced on the *Enterprise!* LoanManagement System (the “Platform”), as of December 31, 2016 and for the yearthen ended, excluding criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(i)(B),1122(d)(3)(i)(C), 1122(d)(3)(i)(D), 1122(d)(3)(ii), 1122(d)(3)(iii),1122(d)(3)(iv), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company has determined are notapplicable to the servicing activities performed by it with respect to thePlatform. Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with theservicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management'sassertion based on our examination.

 

Our examination was conductedin accordance with attestation standards of the Public Company AccountingOversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a testbasis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicingcriteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in thecircumstances. Our examination included testing of selected asset-backedtransactions and securities that comprise the Platform, testing of selectedservicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether theCompany processed those selected transactions and performed those selectedactivities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our procedureswere limited to the selected transactions and servicing activities performed bythe Company during the period covered by this report. Our procedures were notdesigned to detect noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurredprior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances oramounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by thisreport. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for ouropinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on theCompany’s compliance with the servicing criteria.

 

In our opinion, management’sassertion that Midland complied with the aforementioned applicable servicingcriteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2016 for the Platform isfairly stated, in all material respects.

 

 

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

 

February 17, 2017

 

 

*PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,1100 Walnut Street, Suite 1300, Kansas City, MO 64106*

*T: (816) 472 7921, F: (816)218 1890 www.pwc.com/us*
EXHIBIT 32.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                            CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                               BIRCH BRANCH, INC.
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Birch Branch, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Michael Schumacher, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my
knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Michael Schumacher
Michael Schumacher
President, Treasurer, Chief Executive Officer,
Chief Financial Officer and Director
February 21, 2005
39760.

#### CADE v. THE STATE.

Frankum, Judge.

This case is controlled by *Cade v. State,*ante. The court did not err in dismissing the defendant’s extraordinary motion for new trial.

*32Decided November 15, 1962.

*Marjorie C. Thurman, Leachman, King ■& Thurman,*for plaintiff in error.

*George D. Lawrence, Solicitor General,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
§ 43.4471-1 Imposition of tax. ( a ) *In general.* Section 4471 imposes a tax of $3 per passenger on a covered voyage as is defined in section 4472.
( b ) *By whom paid.* The tax is imposed on the person providing the covered voyage (the operator of the vessel).
[T.D. 8314, 55 FR 41520, Oct. 12, 1990. Redesignated by T.D. 8422, 57 FR 33636, July 30, 1992]
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 11, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-30368

Summary Calendar

 

HASSAN KHALIL NAIM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT; BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:02-CV-2528

--------------------

Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Hassan Khalil Naim (Naim) appeals the district court’s denial

of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. When

he filed his petition, Naim was in Immigration and Naturalization

Service (INS) custody. He asked the district court to order the

INS to release him because he is a United States citizen or

national not subject to removal and alleging violations of his

rights under the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the

Constitution and violations of international law.

Naim does not challenge the district court’s denial of his
G:\opin-sc\03-30368.opn.wpd 2

habeas petition in his appellate brief. Accordingly, he has

abandoned any such challenge. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy

Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). The district

court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

In his brief, Naim asks this court for a petition for review

of the order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5).

However, he has not filed a timely petition. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(1)-(2). Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to

consider the brief as a petition for review. See Navarro-Miranda

v. Ashcroft, F.3d , 2003 WL 21018847, *4 (5th Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED.
39971.

#### WILENSKY LEATHER COMPANY v. BULEY et al.

Russell, Judge.

1. Where a bill of particulars is the foundation of an action on open account, failure to attach a proper itemization of the account is the subject of special but not general demurrer; however, where the special- demurrer is sustained with leave to amend and no sufficient amendment is filed, the petition is then subject to dismissal. *Code*§ 81-105; *Southern Exp. Co. v. Cowan,*12 Ga. App. 318 (2) (77 SE 208).

2. It is well settled that a ledger sheet attached to a petition, which fails to show what type of merchandise or services *361is involved in the account sued on, and which shows nothing except the defendants’ names and over two hundred amounts identified only by date, is not a proper bill of particulars. *Parker Heating Co. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,*102 Ga. App. 27 (1) (115 SE2d 410); *Kilgore v. Gulf Oil Corp.,*102 Ga. App. 619 (117 SE2d 199).

Decided February 18, 1963.

*Otis L. Davis,*for plaintiff in error.

*Eugene B. Brown,*contra.

3. The defendant here filed three special demurrers to the petition. Ground 1 is too vague and indefinite for consideration; ground 2 was cured by amendment, but ground 3 attacking paragraph 2 because it "sets out an amount of indebtedness upon an open account without setting forth a proper bill of particulars as required by law” is meritorious and was properly sustained by the trial judge, with 15 days allowed in which to amend. The plaintiff failed to amend, defendant renewed his demurrers, and the petition was dismissed. Although each of the orders of the trial court recites that the defendant’s general and special demurrers are sustained, this was error since the demurrers were all special in nature. However, where special demurrers of this nature are sustained and the pleader fails to amend in conformity with the terms of the order, the suit may be dismissed on special demurrer, *Kennedy v. Ayers,*166 Ga. 206, 208 (142 SE 859); *Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Driskal,*148 Ga. 699 (98 SE 265), but such a dismissal is not res judicata on the merits of the case and will not be a bar to a subsequent proceeding for the same cause. *Keith v. Darby,*104 Ga. App. 624 (122 SE2d 463).

The trial court did not err in sustaining the special demurrers to the petition and thereafter dismissing it upon failure to amend.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*