alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1


                                                                      Exhibit 15



December 13, 1996

The Caldor Corporation
Norwalk, Connecticut

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim financial
information of The Caldor Corporation (Debtor-In-Possession) and subsidiaries
("Caldor") for the periods ended November 2, 1996 and October 28, 1995, as
indicated in our report dated December 13, 1996; because we did not perform an
audit, we expressed no opinion on the information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended November 2, 1996, is
incorporated by reference in a) Registration Statement No. 33-44996 of Caldor on
Form S-8, b) Registration Statement No. 33- 41321 of Caldor on Form S-8, c)
Registration Statement No. 33-51510 of Caldor on Form S-8, d) Registration
Statement No. 33-67438 of Caldor on Form S-8, and e) Registration Statement No.
33-84526 of Caldor on Form S-8.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under
the Securities Act, is not considered a part of the Registration Statement
prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an
accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP



New York, New York
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-13-0000787 18-DEC-2013 08:32 AM
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 10-QSB
FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 FOR DBS INDUSTRIES, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         128,199
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               244,156
<PP&E>                                          73,277
<DEPRECIATION>                                  50,758
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,725,621
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,245,807
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,383
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,807,701
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,725,621
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               404,464
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,678
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (406,142)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (406,142)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (406,142)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.07)
        

</TABLE>
§ 44.6091-1 Place for filing returns. ( a ) *In general.* Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, a return on Form 730 or Form 11-C shall be filed with any person assigned the responsibility to receive returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office that serves the legal residence or principal place of business of the person making the return.
( b ) *Returns of individuals outside the United States.* The returns on Form 730 and Form 11-C of individuals (whether citizens of the United States, citizens of possessions of the United States, or aliens) outside the United States having no legal residence or principal place of business in the United States shall be filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Cincinnati, Ohio 45999, or as otherwise directed in the applicable forms and instructions.
( c ) *Returns filed with service centers.* Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, whenever instructions applicable to returns filed on Form 730 of Form 11-C provide that the returns be filed with a service center, the returns shall be so filed in accordance with the instructions.
( d ) *Hand-carried returns.* Returns which are filed by hand carrying shall be filed with any person assigned the responsibility to receive hand-carried returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office as provided in paragraph (a) of this section. See § 301.6091-1(c) of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Admininstration) for provisions relating to the definition of hand carried.
[T.D. 6370, 24 FR 2614, Apr. 4, 1959, as amended by T.D. 7630, 44 FR 40498, July 11, 1979; T.D. 8442, 57 FR 48185, Oct. 22, 1992; T.D. 9156, 69 FR 55746, Sept. 16, 2004]
§ 1026.540 Voluntary information sharing among financial institutions. ( a ) Refer to § 1010.540 of this chapter.
( b ) [Reserved]
Order entered October )0 , 2012

In The 

## Court of appeals:4 jfiftb 3Bit4tritt of Mexat4 at riallass

No. 05-12-00839-CR No. 05-12-00840-CR JUAN FRANCISCO TURCIOS, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F11-70886-P, F11-70896-P



### ORDER The Court ORDERS the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why appellant's brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings and recommendations and determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeals, whether appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant's presence at the hearing, the trial court shall conduct the hearing in appellant's absence. See Meza v. State, 742 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which may include appointment of new counsel.DAVID L. BRIDG JUSTICE We 

### ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include written findings and recommendations, to this Court within 

### THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. The appeals are 

### ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The appeals shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are received, whichever is earlier.
#### Joseph Altmann, Appellant, v Mary Ellen Finger, Respondent.

[804 NYS2d 796]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated December 6, 2002, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Shapiro, J.), dated June 29, 2004, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was to appoint a receiver for the purpose of managing and selling the two condominium units that are part of the marital estate, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of the same order as denied those branches of his cross motion which were for a money judgment in the amount of $50,000, to require the defendant to pay the receiver’s fees, and for an award of an attorney’s fee.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

*592The parties stipulated that the two condominium units that are part of the marital estate would be sold if neither party-purchased the interest of the other within specified periods of time. Since the failure of the parties to do so was undisputed, as was their acrimonious relationship, a hearing was unnecessary, and the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the cross motion which was to appoint a receiver for the purpose of managing and selling the two condominium units *(see Martinucci v Martinucci,*288 AD2d 444 [2001]; *Shapiro v Shapiro,*141 AD2d 534 [1988]).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Prudenti, P.J., S. Miller, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur.
###### Editorial Note on Part 10

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear by T.D. 9359, 72 FR 54544, Sept. 26, 2007.

#### § 10.21 Knowledge of client's omission.

A practitioner who, having been retained by a client with respect to a matter administered by the Internal Revenue Service, knows that the client has not complied with the revenue laws of the United States or has made an error in or omission from any return, document, affidavit, or other paper which the client submitted or executed under the revenue laws of the United States, must advise the client promptly of the fact of such noncompliance, error, or omission. The practitioner must advise the client of the consequences as provided under the Code and regulations of such noncompliance, error, or omission.
www.gpo.gov

### §262r–1. Transmission to the Congress of operating summaries of the multilateral development banks

The Secretary of the Treasury shall transmit to the Congress, on a monthly basis, current copies of the Monthly Operating Summary of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, showing the loan proposals or appraisal reports under consideration and the status of those loan proposals or appraisal reports within the Bank. The Secretary of the Treasury shall also transmit to the Congress, at such times as may be appropriate, comparable documents prepared by the other multilateral development banks which show the loans or credits under consideration in the other multilateral development banks.

(Pub. L. 95–118, title XVII, §1702, as added Pub. L. 101–240, title V, §541(a), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2516.)

#### Definitions

The definitions in section 262r of this title apply to this section.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gabriel Borgwin, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 912]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ambrosio, J.), rendered October 23, 2003, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the delay in sentencing was not due to any prosecutorial neglect *(see People v Drake,*61 NY2d 359 [1984]; *People v McNeil,*237 AD2d 622 [1997]; *People v Headley,*134 AD2d 519 [1987]; *cf. People ex rel. Harty v Fay,*10 NY2d 374 [1961]; *People v Reyes,*15 AD3d 868 [2005]). Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 380.30 (1).

Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s purported waiver of the right to appeal was not knowing and intelligent *(see People v Brown,*13 AD3d 548 [2004]; *People v Rose,*236 AD2d 637 [1997]; *People v Rolon,*220 AD2d 543 [1995]). Accordingly, we have considered the defendant’s contention that the sentence imposed was excessive, and find it to be without merit *(see People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816 [1984]). Cozier, J.P., Krausman, Goldstein and Lunn, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Martin Andrew SANGER, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 01-30106.

D.C. No. CR-00-60091-1-AA.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 10, 2002.*

Decided June 17, 2002.

Before RYMER, T.G. NELSON and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Martin Andrew Sanger appeals his conviction following his conditional guilty plea to one count of firearm possession by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Sanger contends that police lacked probable cause to arrest him because, at the time of his arrest, he was suspected to be a passenger in a vehicle that had been reported stolen. We review de novo whether probable cause supported a suspect’s warrantless arrest. *United States v. Buckner,*179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir.1999). Sanger’s contention fails. After reviewing the record, we conclude that, even assuming Sanger was arrested, the totality of the circumstances support a finding that Sanger’s relationship with the vehicle’s driver was more substantial than that of driver and passenger and that the officers had probable cause to believe Sanger was involved in criminal activity. *See id.*at 837-39 (concluding that passenger’s presence in a car of suspicious provenance loaded with commercial quantity of drugs can support an inference that the passenger was connected to criminal activity); *cf. Rohde v. City of Roseburg,*137 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that stolen vehicle report, alone, created probable cause to arrest driver, but not passenger, “absent some indication of a relationship more substantial than that of driver and passenger”). The relationship between Sanger and the driver was one among several facts comprising the totality of circumstances supporting probable cause to arrest Sanger.

Sanger also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and that our decision to the contrary in *United States v. Davis,*242 F.3d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam) was erroneous. We decline to address this contention. *See United States v. Gay,*967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that one three-judge panel of this court cannot *897overrule the decision of another, absent intervening Supreme Court authority calling earlier decision into question).

Finally, Sanger raises several “as applied” challenges to the constitutionality of his conviction. All of these contentions are foreclosed by our recent decision in *United States v. Rousseau,*257 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied,*122 S.Ct. 502 (2001) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) constitutional as applied to any defendant found in possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce at any time in the past).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1082

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that certain cash

rentals of farmland will not cause recapture of the special estate tax valuation.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 28, 1995

Mr. ROBERTS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

that certain cash rentals of farmland will not cause

recapture of the special estate tax valuation.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN CASH RENTALS OF FARMLAND NOT

4 TO CAUSE RECAPTURE OF SPECIAL ESTATE

5 TAX VALUATION.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 2032A

7 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax

8 treatment of dispositions and failures to use for qualified

9 use) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following

10 new paragraph:
2

•HR 1082 IH

1 ‘‘(8) CERTAIN CASH RENTAL NOT TO CAUSE

2 RECAPTURE.—For purposes of this subsection, a

3 qualified heir shall not be treated as failing to use

4 property in a qualified use solely because such heir

5 rents such property on a net cash basis to a member

6 of the decedent’s family, but only if, during the pe7 riod of the lease, such member of the decedent’s

8 family uses such property in a qualified use.’’

9 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

10 subsection (a) shall apply with respect to rentals occurring

11 after December 31, 1976.

Æ
#### §§ 1022.610-1022.670 [Reserved]
IB

Union Calendar No. 164

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1163

[Report No. 104–313]

To authorize the exchange of National Park Service land in the Fire Island

National Seashore in the State of New York for land in the Village

of Patchogue, Suffolk County, New York.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 8, 1995

Mr. FORBES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Resources

NOVEMBER 7, 1995

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole

House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

[Omit the part struck through]

A BILL

To authorize the exchange of National Park Service land

in the Fire Island National Seashore in the State of

New York for land in the Village of Patchogue, Suffolk

County, New York.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 1163 RH

1 SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF EXCHANGE.

2 The Secretary of the Interior may exchange all right,

3 title, and interest of the United States in and to certain

4 National Park Service lands in the Fire Island National

5 Seashore in the State of New York, described in section

6 2, for all right, title, and interest of the Village of

7 Patchogue, Suffolk County, New York, in and to certain

8 lands in the Village of Patchogue, described in section 2,

9 without further consideration,–before the expiration of the

10 6-month period beginning on the date of the enactment

11 of this Act.

12 SEC. 2. DESCRIPTION OF LANDS TO BE EXCHANGED.

13 (a) NATIONAL PARK LANDS.—The National Park

14 Service lands in the Fire Island National Seashore, in the

15 State of New York, referred to in section 1 are the lands

16 generally depicted on the map entitled ‘‘Fire Island Na17 tional Seashore Land Exchange—Proposed’’, dated Octo18 ber 1994.

19 (b) VILLAGE OF PATCHOGUE LANDS.—The lands in

20 the Village of Patchogue, Suffolk County, New York, re21 ferred to in section 1 are the lands generally depicted on

22 the map entitled ‘‘Village of Patchogue Land Exchange—

23 Proposed’’, dated October 1994.

24 (c) MAPS.—The maps referred to in subsections (a)

25 and (b) shall be on file and available for inspection in the

26 Office of the Director of the National Park Service.
3

•HR 1163 RH

1 SEC. 3. LANDS ACQUIRED BY SECRETARY.

2 The lands in the Village of Patchogue that are ac3 quired by the Secretary of the Interior under section 1

4 shall be added to and administered as part of the Fire

5 Island National Seashore.
A Union Calendar No. 164

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R.1163

[Report No. 104–313]

A BILL

To authorize the exchange of National Park Service

Patchogue, Suffolk County, New York.State of New York for land in the Village ofland in the Fire Island National Seashore in the

NOVEMBER 7, 1995

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Commitordered to be printed tee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and
#### In the Matter of Joseph T., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Nassau County Department of Social Services, Ap*483pellant; Roseanne T., Respondent. In the Matter of Michelle T., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Nassau County Department of Social Services, Appellant; Roseanne T., Respondent.

[805 NYS2d 87]

In related neglect proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the petitioner, Nassau County Department of Social Services, appeals from so much of an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Marks, J.), dated January 18, 2005, as granted that branch of the respondent’s motion which was to preclude it from offering “any evidence gathered from or obtained as a result of a sealed report in this matter.”

Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the respondent’s motion which was to preclude the petitioner from offering “any evidence gathered from or obtained as a result of a sealed report in this matter” and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion only to the extent of precluding the petitioner from offering the sealed report in this matter as evidence in the underlying neglect proceedings; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The State Office of Children and Family Services deemed “unfounded” allegations in a report to the New York State Child Abuse and Maltreatment Registry regarding the respondent and her two children, Joseph T. and Michelle T. Accordingly, the report was sealed in compliance with Social Services Law § 422 (5).

The petitioner was not barred from commencing and maintaining a Family Court Act article 10 proceeding against the subject of the report based on the same set of facts contained in the sealed report (see Social Services Law § 422 [11]; § 424 [11]; *Matter of Diane P.,*110 AD2d 354 [1985]). The provision in the order precluding the petitioner “from offering any evidence gathered from or obtained as a result of [the] sealed report in this matter” goes beyond the scope of Social Services Law; § 422 (5) and is contrary to Social Services Law § 422 (11) and § 424 (1). Thus, we modify the order accordingly.

*484In light of our determination, we need not address the petitioner’s remaining contentions. Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Luciano and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### Ernst Lurker et al., Appellants, v Annette Pellikaan et al., Respondents.

[808 NYS2d 9]

*277Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.), entered August 20, 2004, which granted defendants’ motion for a new trial on damages unless plaintiffs stipulated to decrease the jury’s awards for past pain and suffering from $450,000 to $75,000, future pain and suffering over 15 years from $250,000 to $50,000, and loss of services from $50,000 to $25,000, unanimously modified, on the facts, to increase the amounts to which plaintiff must stipulate to avoid a new trial to $275,000 and $150,000 for past and future pain and suffering, respectively, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs right foot was run over by an SUV( causing him to sustain a Lisfranc fracture involving comminuted fractures of the second and third metatarsal, a widening of the space between the first and second metatarsal, and displacement of the first, third and fourth metatarsals. Surgery, which involved a three-day hospitalization and a day visit six months later to remove the hardware, was successful. Plaintiff was not ambulatory the first two months after the accident, experienced much pain the first six weeks after the surgery, during which time he underwent physical therapy two or three times a week, but was ambulating without aid within six months. At the time of trial less than two years after the accident, the 67-year-old plaintiff was walking without a limp, and while he testified to continued pain and resulting loss of enjoyment of life, the only objective sequela of the injury is some numbness and neuropathy of the pad underneath the big toe, some enlargement of the foot due to calcification around the healed bone, and some decreased range of motion in the toes. Under the circumstances, the damage awards, as reduced by the trial court, deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation to the extent indicated (CPLR 5501 [c]). Concur—Saxe, J.P., Ellerin, Williams, Catterson and Malone, JJ.