UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ 

)

Michael P. McDonough, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 16-cv-00582 (APM)

)

Sean J. Stackley,

1 )

)

Defendant. )

_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Michael P. McDonough, a former officer in the United States Navy, seeks judicial 

review of a decision of the Board for Correction of Naval Records (“BCNR” or “Board”) denying

his request for reconsideration to alter his military records. Plaintiff served as a nuclear mechanic

in the Navy from 2002 to 2009. After being disciplined for misconduct on a routine audit exam, 

he was demoted and subsequently left the Navy. 

The circumstances of Plaintiff’s departure from the Navy lie at the heart of this dispute. 

According to the Navy, after his demotion, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned. Plaintiff’s military 

records reflect this version of events. The Navy then sought to recoup from Plaintiff certain bonus 

payments paid upon his enlistment and re-enlistment. According to Plaintiff, however, following 

his demotion, the Navy implemented a reduction in force that led to his involuntary removal from 

the Navy, rendering any collection of his bonus payments improper. 

 1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court substitutes as Defendant the acting Secretary 

of the Navy, Sean J. Stackley, for the former Secretary of the Navy, Raymond E. Maybus, Jr.
2

In August 2011, Plaintiff asked the Board to change his military records to indicate that his 

removal was involuntary, which would have the effect of discharging the bonus-payment debt

obligation. The Board denied both Plaintiff’s initial application and his request for

reconsideration, leading Plaintiff to seek review in this court. 

This matter is before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 

Because the Board rendered its decision by adopting an advisory opinion that does not address 

Plaintiff’s arguments, and because the record does not reflect that the Board undertook an 

independent review untainted by the fundamentally flawed advisory opinion, the court finds that 

the Board’s denial was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court denies Defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment, grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and remands this matter

for further consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael P. McDonough served as a nuclear mechanic in the Navy from 2002 to 

2009. Admin. Rec., ECF No. 15 [hereinafter Admin. Rec.], Pt. 1, ECF No. 15-1 [hereinafter A.R. 

Pt. 1], at 17–18; Admin. Rec., Pt. 2, ECF No. 15-2 [hereinafter A.R. Pt. 2], at 198–99; Admin. 

Rec., Pt. 4, ECF No. 15-4 [hereinafter A.R. Pt. 4], at 388–99.2

 Plaintiff received a series of bonuses 

upon his enlistment and reenlistment in the Navy—$12,000 in 2002; $27,304.99 in 2004; 

$42,373.50 in 2008; and $8,474.70 in 2009. A.R. Pt. 1 at 5, 30, 156; Admin. Rec., Pt. 5, ECF No. 

15-5 [hereinafter A.R. Pt. 5], at 410. While serving as a naval officer, Plaintiff was assigned two

Navy Enlistment Classification (“NEC”) codes—3385 and 3377—which indicated his technical 

qualifications. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J, ECF No. 6, Def.’s Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 6-1 

 2 The Administrative Record is cited in five parts. Part 1 covers pages 1–99; Part 2 covers pages 100–199; Part 3 

covers pages 200–299; Part 4 covers pages 300–399; and Part 5 covers pages 400–529. All pin citations are to the 

Administrative Record’s original pagination. 
3

[hereinafter Def.’s Mot.], at 2–3; Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 9, Pl.’s Mem. in Supp., 

ECF No. 9-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.], at 1; A.R. Pt. 1 at 1, 29–30; Admin. Rec., Pt. 3, ECF No. 15-

3 [hereinafter A.R. Pt. 3], at 278–280.

In 2009, Plaintiff was disciplined for misconduct on a routine audit exam, causing him to 

be demoted and leading his commanding officer to request that Plaintiff’s classification codes be 

removed. Def.’s Mot. at 3–4; Pl.’s Mot. at 2; A.R. Pt. 1 at 24; A.R. Pt. 2 at 139–143, 188; A.R. 

Pt. 3 at 284. Plaintiff was discharged from the Navy in September 2009. A.R. Pt. 1 at 16; A.R. 

Pt. 2 at 198–99. His discharge papers listed the reason for his discharge as “reduction in force”

and used separation code “KCC,” which signifies a voluntary departure. A.R. Pt. 1 at 16, 29; A.R. 

Pt. 2 at 198–99; A.R. Pt. 5 at 526. Several months later, the Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service (“DFAS”) sent Plaintiff a bill for $51,194.93—an amount representing the “unearned 

portion of [Plaintiff’s] enlistment or reenlistment bonus.” A.R. Pt. 4 at 366–67. Plaintiff requested 

DFAS review the debt, and the DFAS concluded the debt was valid. A.R. Pt. 1 at 81–85. 

Plaintiff then turned to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (“BCNR” or “Board”). 

He asked the Board to modify his records to reflect that he was discharged from the Navy 

involuntarily due to a force reduction, which, if granted, would relieve him of any obligation to 

repay bonus funds. A.R. Pt. 1 at 1, 15, 20–22, 29–44, 82–85; A.R. Pt. 3 at 202. In response to 

Plaintiff’s application, the Board sought an advisory opinion from the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations (“CNO”), which concluded that Plaintiff had voluntarily left the Navy and that 

recouping his bonus payments was proper. A.R. Pt. 1 at 28–30. Plaintiff’s counsel wrote a letter 

to the Board, dated February 12, 2012, urging it to disregard the advisory opinion. A.R. Pt. 3 at 

260–61. Relying heavily on the CNO’s advisory opinion, the Board then denied Plaintiff’s 

application. A.R. Pt. 1 at 19–23, 29–30. Plaintiff submitted a request for reconsideration
4

(“Motion”), and the Board once again sought an advisory opinion. A.R. Pt. 2 at 123–24, 178–189. 

The CNO recommended denying Plaintiff’s Motion. A.R. Pt. 2 at 113–15. The Board, relying on 

the second advisory opinion from the CNO, denied the Motion. A.R. Pt. 1 at 97–99. 

The Board’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion forms the basis of this lawsuit. See Compl., ECF 

No. 1 [hereinafter Compl.], ¶ 1. In sum, Plaintiff claims that the Board’s decision was arbitrary 

and capricious—in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et 

seq.—because the Board failed to consider any argument he advanced in his Motion. See Compl. 

¶¶ 1, 75–76. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, to which the court now 

turns. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to modify military records “when [he] considers it 

necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552. The Navy carries out this 

function through the Board, which rules on petitions to correct military records. 32 C.F.R. § 723.1. 

A district court may review the decision of a military board of correction using “familiar principles 

of administrative law.” Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see 

also Piersall v. Winter, 435 F.3d 319, 323–24 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing the “well-settled rule 

that the decisions of boards for correction of military records are subject to review under the 

APA”). The court’s role is limited: it must “determine only whether the Secretary’s decision 

making process was deficient, not whether his decision was correct.” Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1511.

In making such an evaluation, the district court owes the military board of correction’s 

decision a heightened degree of deference. Although subject to the APA’s arbitrary and capricious 

standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), courts review board decisions under an “unusually deferential”

application of that standard. Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514; Cone v. Caldera, 223 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. 
5

Cir. 2000). That is because an element of discretion on the part of the military board is built into 

the statutory section authorizing review. Indeed, 

[i]t is simply more difficult to say that the Secretary has acted 

arbitrarily if he is authorized to act “when he considers it necessary

to correct an error or remove an injustice,” than it is if he is required 

to act whenever a court determines that certain objective conditions 

are met, i.e., that there has been an error or injustice. 

Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514 (citation omitted). It is this additional grant of statutory authority that 

warrants the greater deference. Even under such a deferential standard, however, the military 

board must provide the district court with a “reason that [the] court can measure” against the 

arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 1514–15.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the Board’s Decision Was Arbitrary or Capricious

Plaintiff contends that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed 

to address the arguments he made in his Motion for Reconsideration. Pl.’s Mot. at 9–13. The 

court agrees. Even a cursory examination of Plaintiff’s filings and the Board’s decisions 

demonstrates that, when denying Plaintiff’s Motion, the Board rejected arguments that Plaintiff 

advanced not in the Motion itself, but in a filing that preceded it. In other words, the Board’s 

denial was based on an entirely different set of arguments than those contained in Plaintiff’s 

Motion. Accordingly, the Board’s decision to deny reconsideration of its earlier ruling violates 

the APA, even under the “unusually deferential” standard afforded military boards. 

The Board denied Plaintiff’s Motion in a two-page letter that offers little explanation for 

its decision. A.R. Pt. 1 at 98–99. Indeed, the Board’s analysis of the Motion’s merits is only two

sentences long:

After careful and conscientious consideration of the entire record, 

the Board found that the evidence submitted was insufficient to 
6

establish the existence of probable material error or injustice. In 

making this determination, the Board substantially concurred with 

the comments contained in the advisory opinion.

Id. at 99. The CNO submitted the referenced “advisory opinion” by letter dated March 31, 2014

(“March 2014 Advisory Opinion”). Id. at 113–15. Because the Board’s decision essentially rests 

on the March 2014 Advisory Opinion, this court must look to that opinion to determine whether 

the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 

1. The March 2014 Advisory Opinion

As a preliminary matter, the Board did nothing improper by relying on an advisory opinion 

to render its decision. See Roberts v. United States, 741 F.3d 152, 158–59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A 

military board of correction may meet its obligation to provide a reasoned explanation by referring 

to a clearly relevant source, such as an advisory opinion. See id. Trouble arises, however, when 

a board hinges its decision in whole on an advisory opinion that does not satisfy the arbitrary and 

capricious standard. Here, the Board did just that. The March 2014 Advisory Opinion is arbitrary 

and capricious, because it very clearly addresses arguments made in an earlier set of objections 

raised by Plaintiff, rather than addressing the arguments Plaintiff made in his Motion. Because 

the advisory opinion on which the Board relied was itself arbitrary and capricious, so too was the 

Board’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion. 

Several aspects of the March 2014 Advisory Opinion demonstrate that the Board did not 

respond to the arguments raised in Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. First, the March 2014 

Advisory Opinion does not contain the case number assigned to Plaintiff’s Motion—“11442-12.”3 

A.R. Pt. 3 at 205. Instead, it bears the case number “09033-11,” which is the case number assigned 

to Plaintiff’s 2011 application to the Board to correct his records and cancel his purported debt. 

 3 The “12” most likely signifies the year—2012—in which the Motion was filed.
7

See A.R. Pt. 1 at 31; Def.’s Mem. at 5; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 14 [hereinafter 

Pl.’s Reply], at 2. The absence of the Motion’s assigned case number is the first sign that 

something is amiss. 

Second, Plaintiff’s Motion is conspicuously absent from the list of documents that the 

author of the March 2014 Advisory Opinion considered in reaching her conclusion. A.R. Pt. 2 at 

113; Pl.’s Reply at 2. That list identifies three documents: (1) Plaintiff’s initial application to the

Board; (2) an earlier advisory opinion prepared by the CNO, dated October 2011 (“October 2011 

Advisory Opinion”), which the Board received and relied upon when denying Plaintiff’s initial 

application; and (3) a letter from Plaintiff’s counsel that pre-dates the Board’s final decision, in 

which counsel responds to the Board’s October 2011 Advisory Opinion. A.R. Pt. 1 at 20–23; A.R. 

Pt. 2 at 113. Plaintiff’s Motion—which is attached to a letter from David Sheldon to the Board 

for Correction of Naval Records, dated October 17, 2012, see A.R. Pt. 2 at 178–189—is not 

mentioned. The fact that Plaintiff’s Motion is absent from this list is significant evidence that the 

CNO never considered it.

Third, it is plain that the March 2014 Advisory Opinion only responds to arguments 

contained in Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter, dated February 12, 2012, which was sent before the Board 

rejected his initial application. Indeed, the March 2014 Advisory Opinion quotes nearly verbatim 

the arguments raised in the February 2012 letter before rejecting them. The chart below 

demonstrates the parallels.
8

February 2012 Letter March 2014 Advisory Opinion

“The sole basis for the [bonus] recoupment 

efforts . . . was [Plaintiff’s] alleged failure to 

‘satisfactorily complete the designated term of 

enlistment for which the bonus was paid.’” 

A.R. Pt. 3 at 260.

“[Plaintiff’s counsel] writes that the sole basis 

for DFAS’ recoupment efforts are due to 

[Plaintiff’s] alleged failure to ‘satisfactorily 

complete the designated term of enlistment 

for which the bonus was paid.’” A.R. Pt. 2 at 

113–14.

“As argued in the BCNR Memo, DFAS’ 

conclusions are incorrect because, as the 

contracts themselves indicate, the condition 

relied upon by DFAS as triggering 

recoupment must lie within the control of the 

designee and PO2 McDonough was separated 

because of a force reduction.” A.R. Pt. 3 at 

261.

“Mr. Sheldon contends that DFAS’ 

conclusions are incorrect because the contract 

specifies that the action which triggers 

recoupment must be within the control of 

PO2 McDonough and he was separated 

because of a force structure, something not 

within PO2 McDonough’s control.” A.R. Pt. 

2 at 114.

“Further, even the Advisory Opinion’s post 

hoc arguments are misguided. They appear to 

focus on a factual contention that PO2 

McDonough’s NF NEC was removed due to a 

non-judicial punishment. However the 

Advisory Opinion did not produce any 

evidence supporting its contention. Nor did 

DFAS during the course of official hearing 

proceedings and other recoupment efforts. 

After several Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) requests for all documents in PO2 

McDonough’s file, all that has surfaced are 

documents suggesting that removal of PO2 

McDonough’s NF NEC had merely been 

requested. . . . To date, no documents have 

surfaced evincing further removal processing 

or any actual removal.” A.R. Pt. 3 at 261.

“He claims the Advisory Opinion is 

misguided because it focuses on the fact that 

PO2 McDonough’s NF NEC was removed 

due to a JPN [non-judicial punishment]; 

however, no evidence was provided 

supporting this contention. After several 

FOIA requests only documents suggesting the 

removal of the NEC had merely been 

requested and show no further removal 

processing or any actual removal.” A.R. Pt. 2 

at 114.

“In light of the above, the Board should 

disregard the [October 2011] Advisory 

Opinion as it has little utility under the facts 

of this case. The Board should limit its 

consideration to the actual rationale for 

DFAS’ recoupment efforts and refer to PO2 

McDonough’s BCNR Memo for arguments 

justifying PO2 McDonough’s requested 

relief.” A.R. Pt. 3 at 261.

“In light of this, Mr. Sheldon believes BCNR 

should limit its consideration to the actual 

rationale for DFAS’ recoupment efforts and 

refer to [his BCNR Memo] for arguments 

justifying the requested relief.” A.R. Pt. 2 at 

114. 
9

Only one rational conclusion can be drawn from the textual similarities reflected in the foregoing 

chart: The March 2014 Advisory Opinion responds to arguments raised in Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

February 2012 letter, not in Plaintiff’s Motion. 

Fourth, while the March 2014 Advisory Opinion largely parrots the arguments contained 

in the February 2012 letter, it is entirely silent with respect to the arguments advanced in Plaintiff’s 

Motion. Plaintiff made three arguments in his Motion: (1) the Navy did not follow proper 

procedures when removing Plaintiff’s NEC codes, see A.R. Pt. 2 at 185–86; (2) the Secretary of 

the Navy did not authorize the DFAS to recoup Plaintiff’s bonus payments, see id. at 186–88; and 

(3) it is in the interest of justice to stop efforts to collect Plaintiff’s purported debt, see id. at 188. 

These arguments are nowhere referenced in the March 2014 Advisory Opinion. 

Thus, both on its face and in substance, the CNO’s March 2014 Advisory Opinion does not 

give the court any confidence that the opinion’s author laid eyes on, let alone evaluated, Plaintiff’s 

Motion. From citing the wrong case number to quoting from and paraphrasing the wrong letter, 

the March 2014 Advisory Opinion does not address Plaintiff’s Motion. And, because the Board 

relied substantially on the March 2014 Advisory Opinion in its denial of Plaintiff’s Motion, 

without adding any supplemental analysis of its own, the Board’s ruling is arbitrary and capricious. 

Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514–15.

2. Defendant’s Contentions

Defendant advances various arguments to convince the court that the Board actually did 

consider Plaintiff’s Motion on the merits. None are convincing. 

First, Defendant points to the Board’s summation of the evidence it considered, as listed in 

its denial letter. According to that letter, the “[d]ocumentary material considered by the Board 

consisted of [Plaintiff’s] application, together with all material submitted in support thereof, 
10

[Plaintiff’s] naval record and applicable statutes, regulations and policies.” A.R. Pt. 1 at 98. 

Defendant focuses on the Board’s reference to Plaintiff’s “application” as evidence that it fully 

considered Plaintiff’s Motion. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12 [hereinafter 

Def.’s Reply], at 2. The reference to “application,” however, without more, is too ambiguous a 

term for the court to be able to “reasonably . . . discern[]” the Board’s “path” in rejecting Plaintiff’s 

Motion. See Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Board used the 

same exact sentence to describe the materials it considered when it denied Plaintiff’s original 

request to correct records. Compare A.R. Pt. 1 at 20 (“Documentary material considered by the 

Board consisted of your application, together with all material submitted in support thereof, your 

naval record and applicable statutes, regulations and policies.”), with A.R. Pt. 1 at 98 (same). The 

word “application,” therefore, does not carry the weight that Defendant accords it. 

Next, Defendant highlights a passage from the March 2014 Advisory Opinion that, it 

contends, shows the Board considered and rejected Plaintiff’s argument for reconsideration that 

the Navy had not properly removed his NECs—that is, the codes identifying his status as a nucleartrained mechanic. 

Mr. Sheldon writes the NEC removal was requested but no further 

processing was done. Enclosure (6), Block 11 shows the 

rating/NEC P02 McDonough had when he separated, MM-0000. 

This means he did not have his Nuclear Field NEC at separation [or] 

else Block 11 would have read MM-3385. The NEC removal 

process was completed before P02 McDonough’s separation.

Def.’s Reply at 6 (quoting A.R. Pt. 2 at 115) (alteration omitted). That response, however, is 

clearly an answer to Plaintiff’s contention in the February 2012 letter that the removal of his 

“[Nuclear Field] NEC had merely been requested. . . [and] no documents have surfaced evincing 

further removal processing or any actual removal.” A.R. Pt. 1 at 96. On the other hand, the actual 

arguments Plaintiff makes in his Motion concerning the NECs removal are not addressed in the 
11

Board’s final decision. In Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff argued that, under Navy rules, his nuclear 

NECs could be removed only if authorized by the Chief of Naval Operations (“CNO”). A.R. Pt. 

2 at 185. The CNO would then indicate his or her approval by adding a notation in Plaintiff’s

military record, and Plaintiff’s record contained no such notation. Id. at 185–86. Neither of those 

specific contentions are acknowledged in the March 2014 Advisory Opinion. 

Finally, Defendant claims that the Board considered Plaintiff’s third argument—that the 

“interest of justice” warranted forgiveness of Plaintiff’s debt to the Navy—because the denial letter 

states, “[A]fter careful consideration of your request, the Board found insufficient evidence of an 

error or injustice that would warrant the relief you sought.” Def.’s Reply at 9 (quoting A.R. Pt. 1 

at 98). That quoted portion of Board’s letter, however, is taken out of context. The quoted sentence 

reads, in full: “On 27 February 2012, after careful consideration of your request, the Board found 

insufficient evidence of an error or injustice that would warrant the relief you sought.” A.R. Pt. 1 

at 98 (emphasis added). Thus, the quoted sentence refers not the Board’s conclusion as to the

Motion, but rather its denial of Plaintiff’s original application for correction.4

* * *

In summary, there is nothing within either the March 2014 Advisory Opinion or the 

Board’s denial letter of May 16, 2014, that provides a “reason that [the] court can measure” in 

evaluating the Board’s decision against the arbitrary and capricious standard. Kreis, 866 F.2d at 

1514–15. Accordingly, even under the “unusual deference” afforded to military correction boards

in this context, the Board’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion does not pass muster. 

 4 Defendant may have intended to cite a later sentence in the Board’s denial letter, which reads: “After careful and 

conscientious consideration of the entire record, the Board found that the evidence submitted was insufficient to 

establish the existence of probable material error or injustice.” A.R. Pt. 1 at 99. However, this generic language, 

which is also used in the Board’s initial denial letter, see A.R. Pt. 1 at 20, does not enable the court to conclude that 

the Board considered equitable interests in the context of the other arguments Plaintiff made on reconsideration. 
12

B. Harmless Error

Defendant further contends that even if the Board erred by failing to consider the three 

arguments in Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, any such error is harmless. Def.’s Reply at 4–

9. As to Plaintiff’s first contention—that the Navy did not follow correct procedures in removing 

his NECs—Defendant asserts that other documents in the record evidence that the Navy did in fact 

follow the proper procedures and properly removed Plaintiff’s NECs. Id. at 4–7. As to Plaintiff’s 

second argument—that the Secretary of the Navy did not authorize the DFAS to recoup the debt—

Defendant maintains that the record shows that DFAS was authorized to collect the debt. Id. at 7–

8. Lastly, regarding Plaintiff’s third argument—that the Board should forgive Plaintiff’s error and 

his debt to avoid manifest injustice—Defendant responds that, given the Board’s authority to 

“remedy error or injustice,” implicit in its very denial of reconsideration is a rejection of Plaintiff’s 

plea for leniency. Id. at 8–9. 

In asking the court to declare any errors harmless, Defendant asks the court to do exactly

what Kreis holds is improper—pass on the correctness of the Board’s decision. Kreis, 866 F.2d at 

1511. This court’s review is limited to “whether the [Board’s] decision making process was 

deficient, not whether its decision was correct.” Id. (emphasis added). District courts thus should 

avoid the type of merits-based, harmless error analysis that Defendant asks the court to undertake

here. Cf. Coe v. McHugh, 968 F. Supp. 2d 237, 241 n.2 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying harmless error 

rule to a board of correction decision that relied on an outdated regulation whose text in the new 

version had not changed). When a court does find error in the decision-making process, the better 

course is to remand the matter to the military correction board so that it can address any 

deficiencies in the first instance. See Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1512. That is how the court will proceed 

here. 
13

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

and grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Board denying 

Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration is remanded to the Board for further consideration. 

A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

 

Dated: March 16, 2017 Amit P. Mehta

United States District Judge