alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1071

To direct the Secretary of the Army to deposit $1,400,000 into the Judgment

Fund of the Department of Justice to cover those costs of the project

for flood control, Lost Creek, Columbus, Nebraska, which are in excess

of the $4,000,000 limit on projects carried out under section 205 of

the Flood Control Act of 1948.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 28, 1995

Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska introduced the following bill; which was referred

to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of the Army to deposit $1,400,000

into the Judgment Fund of the Department of Justice

to cover those costs of the project for flood control,

Lost Creek, Columbus, Nebraska, which are in excess

of the $4,000,000 limit on projects carried out under

section 205 of the Flood Control Act of 1948.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXCESS COSTS OF LOST CREEK FLOOD CON4 TROL PROJECT, COLUMBUS, NEBRASKA.

5 The Secretary of the Army shall deposit $1,400,000

6 into the Judgment Fund of the Department of Justice to
2

•HR 1071 IH

1 cover those costs of the project for flood control, Lost

2 Creek, Columbus, Nebraska, which are in excess of the

3 $4,000,000 limit on projects carried out under section 205

4 of the Flood Control Act of 1948 (33 U.S.C. 701s).

5 SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

6 There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out

7 this Act $1,400,000 for fiscal year 1995.

Æ
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                           5
<MULTIPLIER>                                    1,000
       
<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   9-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         Feb-28-1998
<PERIOD-START>                            Feb-23-1997
<PERIOD-END>                              Nov-29-1997
<CASH>                                          8,181
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 124,480
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                    29,116
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              196,426
<PP&E>                                      1,356,490
<DEPRECIATION>                                720,351
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              1,075,972
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         151,996
<BONDS>                                       489,443
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                          439
<OTHER-SE>                                    394,387
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                1,075,972
<SALES>                                        88,561
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              736,746
<CGS>                                          52,781
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 503,520
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             21,951
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               104,062
<INCOME-TAX>                                   40,584
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            63,478
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                   63,478
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    1.51
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    1.51
        

</TABLE>
§ 1021.620 Due diligence programs for private banking accounts. ( a ) Refer to § 1010.620 of this chapter.
( b ) [Reserved]
427 A.2d 1214

#### Commonwealth v. Little, Appellant.

*612Submitted June 12, 1978.

John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;

Edward G. Rendell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before JACOBS, P. J., and HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and HESTER, JJ.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

JACOBS, former P. J., did not participate in the consideration and decision of this case.
#### Nanny Alexander, Plaintiff, *against*Joseph Meyers and Solomon Marcus, Defendants.

[Special Term.]

(Decided August 23d, 1878.)

Whether or not a plaintiff should be allowed to prosecute *in forma pauperis*is discretionary with the court.

Leave to so prosecute will be denied where the action is upon a tort committed in another State, of which both plaintiff and defendant are residents, and there is unreasonable delay in presenting the application.

Motion for leave to prosecute *in forma*pauperis, and to vacate an order requiring plaintiff to file security for costs or to show cause, &c., and staying plaintiff’s proceedings. The facts appear in the opinion.

*David*Levy, for the motion.

*Armstrong Sf Briggs,*opposed.

Joseph F. Daly, J.

Defendant having procured an order requiring plaintiff to show cause why she should not file security for costs, being a non-resident of this State, she now makes a counter-application to be allowed to sue *in forma pauperis*(Code, sec. 458, &c.).

The prayer of plaintiff’s petition should be denied for the reasons:—

First: The cause of action is for wrongful conversion of plaintiff’s goods at Augusta, Georgia, in the year 1875, in *113which place both defendants'and plaintiff reside ; the action was commenced in 1877 in this city. I deem it contrary to the policy of the law to encourage, by such an order as is here asked for, the bringing of actions in this State for torts committed in another State, where plaintiff and defendants are residents of such other State, and were so when the wrong complained of was committed. It has been doubted whether such an order can be made in favor of a non-resident plaintiff *(Thomas*v. Wilson, 6 Hill, 257.—Per Bronson, J.). If a person complaining of an injury inflicted in the country where such person and the wrong-doer then and still reside choose to prosecute in a foreign tribunal, it should be under the usual liability for costs.

Second: The action was commenced in September, 1877 ; issue has been joined, and the application should be denied on the ground of delay in making it, under the decision in *Florence*v. *Bulkley*(1 Duer, 705.—Bosworth, J.). It is discretionary with the court, in all cases, to make an order allowing a party to sue *in forma pauperis*(Graham’s Pr. 916).

Application denied, with $10 costs.
Exh 10.2 First Amendment to Parkway at Oak Hill PSA (1)






Exhibit 10.2


FIRST AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT


THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT (the “First Amendment”) is dated effective as of the 2 day of March, 2012, and is to be and become part of that certain Purchase and Sale Agreement between WELLS VAF-PARKWAY AT OAK HILL, LLC, as Seller therein, and ROROSA, INC., as Purchaser therein, dated as of March 12, 2012, (the “Agreement”) for the purchase and sale of certain property (the “Property”) containing all that tract or parcel of real property located in Austin, Texas and as more particularly described in the Agreement.


WITNESSETH


WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to adjust the Purchase Price as more particularly set forth herein; 
    
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, One and No/100ths Dollar ($1.00) in hand paid and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned hereby agree as follows:


1.     All terms used herein with an initial capital letter and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the Agreement.


2.    The Purchase Price described in Section 2.4 of the Agreement is hereby reduced to Thirty One Million Three Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($31,300,000).


3.    The brokerage commission due to Buyer's Broker set forth in Section 10.1 of the Agreement is hereby reduced by Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000).


4.    This First Amendment may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall constitute an original and all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.  Facsimile signatures shall be considered binding and original signatures.
    
EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN, all other terms, covenants, conditions and obligations of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect, and are hereby ratified and confirmed by the parties.




[SIGNATURES CONTAINED ON FOLLOWING PAGE]




    

1






IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this First Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement to be executed as of the date set forth above.




	
		
	SELLER:










Date: _April 2  , 2012




	Wells VAF - Parkway at Oak Hill, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company


By:Wells Mid-Horizon Value-Added Fund I, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, its sole member


By:Wells Investment Management Company, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, its manager


By: /s/ Douglas P. Williams  
Name: Douglas P. Williams  
Title: Senior Vice President  





	PURCHASER:










Date: _April 2  , 2012
	RORASA, INC., a Texas corporation




By: /s/ Jorge L. Sevilla                    
      JORGE L. SEVILLA, President





















2
#### Benoit Lallemand, Respondent, v William J. Cook, Appellant.

[806 NYS2d 619]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Alpert, J.), dated February 28, 2005, which granted the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a jury *534verdict in his favor on the issue of liability and directed a new trial.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“It is well settled that a jury verdict should not be disturbed unless there is no fair interpretation of the evidence by which the jury could have reached its conclusion” *(Salazar v City of New York,*302 AD2d 580, 581 [2003]; *see Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129 [1985]). “A verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence if there is no ‘valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [persons] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial’ ” *(Aprea v Franco,*292 AD2d 478 [2002], quoting *Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]).

Moreover, “[a] jury’s finding that a party was at fault but that such fault was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause” *(Garrett v Manaser,*8 AD3d 616, 617 [2004]; *see Misa v Filancia,*2 AD3d 810 [2003]). Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s entrance into traffic from a driveway without yielding the right of way as required *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143) was negligence as a matter of law and a proximate cause of the accident *(see Ferrara v Castro,*283 AD2d 392, 393 [2001]; *Palumbo v Holtzer,*235 AD2d 409 [1997]). The plaintiff was entitled to anticipate that the defendant would obey the traffic laws that required him to yield and, contrary to the jury’s implicit conclusion, the plaintiff’s alleged speeding could not have been the sole proximate cause of the accident *(see Lagana v Fox,*6 AD3d 583, 584 [2004]). Adams, J.P., S. Miller, Ritter and Fisher, JJ., concur.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

39–011 2014

113th Congress, 2d Session – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 113–107 

WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIA AS A BENEFICIARY 

DEVELOPING COUNTRY UNDER THE GENERALIZED 

SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

NOTIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIA AS A BENEFICIARY DEVELOPING COUNTRY UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES PROGRAM 

MAY 7, 2014.—Message and accompanying papers referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed 


rfrederick on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with HEARINGE:\Seals\Congress.#13

rfrederick on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with HEARING
(1) 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Consistent with section 502(f)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (the 

‘‘1974 Act’’) (19 U.S.C. 2462(f)(2)), I am providing notice of my intent to withdraw the designation of Russia as a beneficiary developing country under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 

program. 

Sections 501(1) and (4) of the 1974 Act (19 U.S.C. 2461(1) and 

(4)), provide that, in affording duty-free treatment under the GSP, 

the President shall have due regard for, among other factors, the 

effect such action will have on furthering the economic development of a beneficiary developing country through the expansion of 

its exports and the extent of the beneficiary developing country’s 

competitiveness with respect to eligible articles. 

Section 502(c) of the 1974 Act (19 U.S.C. 2462(c)) provides that, 

in determining whether to designate any country as a beneficiary 

developing country for purposes of the GSP, the President shall 

take into account various factors, including the country’s level of 

economic development, the country’s per capita gross national product, the living standards of its inhabitants, and any other economic 

factors he deems appropriate. 

Having considered the factors set forth in sections 501 and 502(c) 

of the 1974 Act, I have determined that it is appropriate to withdraw Russia’s designation as a beneficiary developing country 

under the GSP program because Russia is sufficiently advanced in 

economic development and improved in trade competitiveness that 

continued preferential treatment under the GSP is not warranted. 

I intend to issue a proclamation withdrawing Russia’s designation 

consistent with section 502(f)(2) of the 1974 Act. 

BARACK OBAMA. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 7, 2014. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with HEARING
www.gpo.gov

### §1247. Payments to enrollees, heirs, or legatees; protection of the interests of minors and persons under legal disability

Sums payable to adult living enrollees or to adult heirs or legatees of deceased enrollees shall be paid directly to such persons. Sums payable to enrollees or their heirs or legatees who are less than twenty-one years of age or who are under legal disability shall be paid in accordance with such procedures, including the establishment of trusts, as the Secretary of the Interior determines appropriate to protect the best interests of such persons.

(Pub. L. 92–59, §7, July 29, 1971, 85 Stat. 159.)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Cypress Hills Cemetery, Respondent. Douglas Rosenberg et al., Nonparty Respondents; Ravi Batra, Nonparty Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 598]

In an action pursuant to Not-For-Profit Corporation Law §112 to remove the board of directors of the Cypress Hills Cemetery, Ravi Batra, the former temporary receiver, appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated March 1, 2004, as *537granted the motion of the temporary receiver, Douglas Rosenberg, to settle Douglas Rosenberg’s account, and denied certain branches of Ravi Batra’s cross motion.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The Supreme Court properly determined that Ravi Batra, whose temporary receivership in this case terminated simultaneously with the appointment of his successor Douglas Rosenberg, lacked standing to object to Rosenberg’s final accounting *(see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk,*77 NY2d 761, 769 [1991]). Further, Batra lacked standing to challenge the subsequent election of the Cypress Hills Cemetery’s board of directors *(see*N-PCL 618) and any alleged misconduct that may have occurred after his tenure *(see*N-PCL 720 [b]; *Tenney v Rosenthal, 6*NY2d 204 [1959]).

Batra’s remaining contentions need not be addressed in light of our determination. H. Miller, J.P., Goldstein, Mastro and Dillon, JJ., concur.
ARB Transient 55mph Cruise 65mph Cruise

'Brk energy Class 2b-5' '[kWh]' 0.97 0.00 0.00

'Brk energy Class 6-7' '[kWh]' 1.61 0.00 0.00

'Brk energy Class 7' '[kWh]' 3.35 0.00 0.00

'Brk energy Class 8' '[kWh]' 4.55 0.00 0.00

Trk energy Class 2b-5 at wheel' '[kWh]' 2.47 5.56 8.76

Trk energy Class 6-7 at wheel' '[kWh]' 3.49 6.06 9.35

Trk energy Class 7 at wheel' '[kWh]' 6.33 7.83 11.64

Trk energy Class 8 at wheel' '[kWh]' 8.24 8.76 12.74

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 2b-5' [] 39% 0 0

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 6-7' [] 46% 0 0

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 7' [] 53% 0 0

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 8' [] 55% 0 0
Weighted (at wheel) Weighted (Pre-Trans)

0.255

0.424

0.884

1.203

1.021

1.317 Transient

2.170 Proposed Weighting 75%

2.726 Miles 2.84

25% 23%

32% 30%

41% 39%

44% 42%
55 mph 65 mph

9% 16%

4.58 5.41
ARB Transient 55mph Cruise

'Brk energy Class 2b-5' [ws] 0.27 0.00

'Brk energy Class 6-7' [ws] 0.45 0.00

'Brk energy Class 7' [ws] 0.93 0.00

'Brk energy Class 8' [ws] 1.27 0.00

Trk energy Class 2b-5 at wheel' [ws] 0.69 1.54

Trk energy Class 6-7 at wheel' [ws] 0.97 1.68

Trk energy Class 7 at wheel' [ws] 1.76 2.18

Trk energy Class 8 at wheel' [ws] 2.29 2.43

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 2b-5' [] 39% 0

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 6-7' [] 46% 0

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 7' [] 53% 0

'Brk/Traction Energy Class 8' [] 55% 0
65mph Cruise Weighted (at wheel) Weighted (Pre-Trans)

0.00 0.071

0.00 0.118

0.00 0.246

0.00 0.334

2.43 0.283

2.60 0.366

3.23 0.603

3.54 0.757

0 25% 23%

0 32% 30%

0 41% 39%

0 44% 42%
Transient

Proposed Weighting 75%

Miles 2.84
55 mph 65 mph

9% 16%

4.58 5.41
#### Aubrey T. Dancy, Respondent, v New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

[806 NYS2d 630]

*513In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (G. Aronin, J.), dated August 3, 2004, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff alleged that on December 16, 2000, he sustained injuries when he slipped on an icy/snowy platform portion of a stairway outside his residence in Queens, which was owned by the defendant. The defendant submitted climatological data showing that two days before the plaintiff’s accident, the weather conditions were freezing rain, ice pellets, and sleet totaling slightly more than one inch of precipitation. In the two hours immediately preceding the accident, only trace amounts of precipitation were reported.

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, it was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint based on the “storm-in-progress” rule. CPLR 4528 provides that “[a]ny record of the observations of the weather, taken under the direction of the United States weather bureau, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated.” The climatological data submitted by the defendant demonstrated that there was no storm-in-progress at the time of the plaintiffs accident *(see e.g. Perlicz v Redeemer Lutheran Church,*229 AD2d 378 [1996]).

Although the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating that no icy/snowy condition existed and that it had no notice of the alleged condition, even without considering the affidavit of the plaintiffs notice witness, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to the existence of an icy/snowy condition and whether the defendant had constructive notice and a reasonably sufficient amount of time to remedy the alleged condition *(see Fox v Kamal Corp.,*271 AD2d 485 [2000]; *Skolnik v Big & Tall Men’s Shop,*257 AD2d 565 [1999]). Adams, J.P., Luciano, Mastro and Lunn, JJ., concur.
§ 48.6421-6 Applicable laws. ( a ) *Penalties, excessive claims, etc.* All provisions of law, including penalties, applicable in respect of the tax imposed by section 4081 shall, to the extent applicable and consistent with section 6421, apply in respect of the payments provided for in section 6421 to the same extent as if these payments were refunds of overpayments of the tax imposed on the sale of gasoline by section 4081. For special rules applicable to the assessment and collection of amounts constituting excessive payments under section 6421, see section 6206 and the regulations thereunder. For the civil penalty assessable in the case of excessive claims under section 6421, see section 6675 and the regulations thereunder. For the treatment as an overpayment of an amount allowable as an excessive credit under section 34 (section 39 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 prior to its revision by the Tax Reform Act of 1984) with respect to amounts payable under section 6421, see section 6401(b).
( b ) *Examination of books and witnesses.* For the purpose of ascertaining ( 1 ) the correctness of any claim made under section 6421 or
( 2 ) the correctness of any credit or payment made in respect of the claim, the Commissioner shall have the same authority granted by paragraphs (1), (2), and
( 3 ) of section 7602, relating to examination of books and witnesses, as if the person claiming credits or payment under section 6421 were the person liable for tax.
[T.D. 8043, 50 FR 32042, Aug. 8, 1985]
#### Jovany Jomarron, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

[806 NYS2d 617]

*528In a claim to recover damages for personal injuries, the claimant appeals from an order of the Court of Claims (Lack, J.), dated September 30, 2004, which denied his motion for leave to file a late claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) and granted the cross motion of the State of New York to dismiss the late claim.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is granted, the cross motion is denied, and the late claim is deemed filed.

“Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) permits a court, in its discretion, upon consideration of certain enumerated factors, to allow a claimant to file a late claim ... No one factor is deemed controlling, nor is the presence or absence of any one factor dispositive” *(Broncati v State of New York,*288 AD2d 172, 173 [2001]; *see Qing Liu v City Univ. of N.Y.,*262 AD2d 473, 474 [1999]). Even if the excuse for failing to file a timely claim is “not compelling,” the denial of a motion to file a late claim may, as here, constitute an improvident exercise of discretion where the delay is minimal, the State suffered no prejudice, and there may be issues of fact as to the merits of the claim *(see Matter of Morales v State of New York,*292 AD2d 455, 456 [2002]; *Marcus v State of New York,*172 AD2d 724, 725 [1991]). Crane, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Lifson, JJ., concur.