NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0109n.06

No. 18-3585

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRENDA YADIRA CAZARES-HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW 

FROM THE UNITED STATES 

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 

APPEALS

Before: NORRIS, DAUGHTREY, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Brenda Cazares-Hernandez arrived at the United States from 

Mexico and sought admission. When the Department of Homeland Security began removal 

proceedings against her, Cazares-Hernandez conceded removability but applied for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration 

judge (IJ) denied Cazares-Hernandez relief and ordered her removed from the country. The Board 

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. For the reasons stated, we DENY Cazares-Hernandez’s 

petition for review.

I.

In 2015, Cazares-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, arrived at a port of entry to 

the United States and applied for admission, claiming a fear of returning to Mexico.1 That day, 

 

1 Cazares-Hernandez’s daughter, Yatziry, came with her to the United States. Yatziry’s case is 

proceeding separately from Cazares-Hernandez’s.
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the Department of Homeland Security served Cazares-Hernandez with a Notice to Appear, 

claiming that she was an immigrant not in possession of a valid visa or entry document. 

While conceding removability, Cazares-Hernandez filed an application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In support of her 

application, Cazares-Hernandez testified that her brother had been kidnapped by a gang in 2014 

(and presumably murdered, since he has not been seen since the kidnapping) and that a gang 

member threatened to do the same to her if she did not leave the country. Cazares-Hernandez also 

testified that she feared that her former boyfriend, Jose, who is currently in jail in Mexico, would 

harm her if she returned. According to Cazares-Hernandez, Jose was violent with her four times 

in the past and had recently told her by text message that he was furious that she took their daughter 

to the United States. Based on these events, she claimed past persecution or a well-founded fear 

of future persecution due to her purported membership in two social groups—family members of 

victims of cartel violence who have likewise been threatened, and Mexican women who have 

suffered domestic violence and who are unable to leave the relationship.

The IJ denied Cazares-Hernandez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture, and ordered her removed from the country. 

Cazares-Hernandez appealed to the BIA, but the BIA dismissed her appeal. The BIA found 

various flaws in Cazares-Hernandez’s asylum and withholding claims, including that the threat 

from the gang was not “harm rising to the level of persecution,” and that she had not shown that 

she was unable to leave the relationship with her ex-boyfriend. The BIA also found that CazaresHernandez abandoned her claim under the Convention Against Torture by not meaningfully

challenging the IJ’s decision. Cazares-Hernandez petitioned for review of the BIA’s decision in 

this court.
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II.

Cazares-Hernandez’s presentation of the issues, both before the BIA and this court, 

narrows our review of her case. First, we may not consider her claim for protection under the 

Convention Against Torture because she did not adequately present the issue to the BIA. See 

Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nly claims properly presented to the 

BIA and considered on their merits can be reviewed by this court in an immigration appeal.”). 

Second, Cazares-Hernandez has not shown that she is entitled to asylum or withholding based on 

her membership in the purported social group of Mexican women who have suffered domestic 

violence and are unable to leave the relationship because she fails to address a key aspect of the 

rulings below—that even if she had established a cognizable social group, she was not a member 

of that group. The IJ found (and the BIA affirmed) that Cazares-Hernandez failed to show that 

she is unable to leave her relationship with Jose. As the IJ explained, “[Cazares-Hernandez] did 

leave the relationship in 2012, and never returned. In fact, her abuser sits in prison in Guadalajara, 

Mexico.” Cazares-Hernandez’s silence on appeal as to this determination leaves us with no choice 

but to affirm the BIA in this respect. See Hih v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2016) (“An 

appellant abandons issues not raised and argued in his initial brief on appeal.”). 

This leaves only Cazares-Hernandez’s claim that she suffered persecution or has a wellfounded fear of persecution based on the threat made to her by a gang member. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b). Cazares-Hernandez testified that, after the kidnapping of her brother, “I 

was sitting outside with my daughter, when a young man came up, and he said that if I didn’t leave, 

the same thing could happen—the same thing could happen to me that had happened to my 

brother.” She received no other threats.
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To reverse the BIA’s conclusion that this threat did not amount to past persecution or 

support a finding of a well-founded fear of future persecution, “we must find that the evidence not 

only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.” Kaba v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 741, 747 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Such is the effect of the substantial evidence 

standard of review.

Generally, “[p]ersecution requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment 

or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant 

deprivation of liberty.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Although threats alone can sometimes amount to persecution, the cases

recognizing as much “emphasize that they will do so only in exceptional cases.” Japarkulova v. 

Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2010). “Only threats of a most immediate and menacing 

nature can possibly qualify as past persecution.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Cazares-Hernandez does not explain how the single threat made to her qualifies as an exceptional 

circumstance. We, therefore, cannot say that the single threat, even when accompanied with the 

psychological harm associated with the kidnapping of her brother, compels the conclusion that

Cazares-Hernandez suffered past persecution or would face persecution on return to Mexico. 

But even if the evidence compelled such a result, Cazares-Hernandez still would not 

prevail, as she failed to show that the Mexican government was unwilling or unable to protect her.

This is a necessary showing where, as here, her claim is premised on the actions of private actors 

rather than the government. See Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2009). Both the IJ 

and the BIA determined that Cazares-Hernandez failed to meet her burden of presenting such 

evidence. Cazares-Hernandez’s only response before this court is that she “submitted a news 

article . . . [that] proves that the government authorities have been unable to control the cartels.” 
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But that article does not satisfy Cazares-Hernandez’s burden. The article notes the government’s 

ongoing attempts to fight cartel violence and states that, in response to the arrival of a new cartel 

in Cazares-Hernandez’s hometown, the government mobilized “state and federal police officers, 

as well as elements of the Mexican Army,” and opened a preliminary investigation into the matter.

Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the conclusion that Cazares-Hernandez is not 

entitled to asylum or withholding of removal. Her evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion. 

Accordingly, we must DENY Cazares-Hernandez’s petition for review.