U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

86–588PDF 2014

AL–QAEDA’S RESURGENCE IN IRAQ:

A THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 5, 2014

Serial No. 113–116

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Mr. Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran, Bureau 

of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................... 6

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Brett McGurk: Prepared statement ................................................................ 10

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Material submitted for the record .......................................................... 57

Responses from Mr. Brett McGurk to questions submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Alan S. Lowenthal, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of California ......................................................................................... 58

(1)

AL–QAEDA’S RESURGENCE IN IRAQ: A 

THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

This morning we consider al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Iraq. An unfortunate reality is that al-Qaeda in Iraq, now known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIS as you see it in the papers, is growing steadily in size, it’s growing steadily in power and 

influence and its militant ranks have blossomed. 

Last summer, ISIS carried out attacks on two different prisons 

in Iraq and in those attacks freed hundreds of experienced alQaeda fighters and leaders. The group is now able to carry out approximately 40 mass casualty attacks every month. 

Multiple car bombings struck the capital this morning. The nearly 9,000 deaths in Iraq last year made it the bloodiest since U.S. 

forces departed in 2011. 

The civil war in neighboring Syria only further strengthens this 

group. Militants are able to flow freely between Iraq and Syria, 

providing ISIS an advantage as it works to advance its regional vision of a radical Islamist state. 

Their gains have been dramatic. Last month, these fighters took 

advantage of a security vacuum in Anbar Province, entering the 

cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in columns of trucks mounted with 

heavy machine guns and raising the black flag over government 

buildings. 

Of course, Anbar Province is where U.S. Marines fought so hard 

to push out al-Qaeda. In recognizing those and other great sacrifices, I should note that this committee benefits from the firsthand experiences of Mr. Kinzinger, Mr. Cotton, Mr. Perry, Mr. 

DeSantis, Mr. Collins and Ms. Gabbard, all of whom served with 

distinction in Iraq. 

This threat is evolving. Earlier this week, al-Qaeda’s central 

leadership declared that those operating in western Iraq and Syria 

were no longer an affiliated group. 

We will see how this power struggle develops, but ISIS’ independence is a reflection of its unprecedented resources, including 

2

weapons and personnel and cash and its resulting operational 

strength. 

This is a threat to Iraq but also to us. ISIS has reportedly been 

actively recruiting individuals capable of travelling to the U.S. to 

carry out attacks here. 

While al-Qaeda in Iraq has been powered by prison breaks and 

by the Syrian civil war, it has also been fuelled by the alienation 

of much of the Sunni population from the Shi’a dominated government in Baghdad. Al-Qaeda has become very skilled at exploiting 

this sectarian rift and Maliki’s power grab has given them much 

ammunition. 

This is a point that Ranking Member Eliot Engel and myself 

raised and underscored with President Maliki when he visited 

Washington last fall. 

This committee will play a central role as the United States 

moves to send military equipment to help the Iraqis fight these terrorists. Appropriate intelligence can be shared as well. 

But Iraqis should know that their relations with Iran and the 

slow pace of political reconciliation with minority groups raise serious congressional concerns. 

While we may not be—as head of state, while he may not be up 

to it, Maliki must take steps to lead Iraq to a post-sectarian era. 

The Iraqi Government is far from perfect and only the Iraqis can 

control their future. 

But if we don’t want to see an Iraq with large swaths of territory 

under militant control, and we should not, then we must be willing 

to lend an appropriate hand. 

And I’ll now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Engel, for any 

opening comments. Mr. Engel from New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing on al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Iraq and the threat this poses to U.S. security interests. I appreciate the close collaboration that we have working on 

this and so many other issues on this committee. 

Last month, al-Qaeda extremists occupied the city of Fallujah 

and parts of Ramadi in Iraq’s Sunni-dominated Anbar Province. To 

be sure, this has serious implications for Iraq’s security but it also 

has a deeper, symbolic meaning for Americans. 

As all of us know, U.S. Marines fought two bloody battles to secure Fallujah during the Iraq war. I want to acknowledge our 

brave men and women in uniform who lost their lives, as well as 

their families who continue to grieve their losses every day. It 

breaks my heart when I see what’s happening in Iraq today. 

Iraq continues to be ravaged by sectarian violence and the situation is getting worse. Last year, more than 8,500 Iraqis were killed 

in bombings, shootings and other violent acts, the most since 2008. 

I should note that on Monday of this week, the senior leadership 

of al-Qaeda excommunicated and disowned their affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, as a result of that group’s tactics in Syria. For the purpose of this hearing, ISIS remains a threat 

to stability in Fallujah, other areas of Anbar Province and the 

whole of Iraq. 

3

Some may argue that the lack of an enduring U.S. troop presence 

in Iraq has contributed to the resurgence of violence, especially 

Sunni terrorism related to al-Qaeda. 

But let’s be honest. The dire security situation in Anbar Province 

is much more about Iraqi politics than it is about the United 

States. 

In any case, the direct use of U.S. military force in Iraq is virtually unthinkable at this point. We’ve withdrawn from Iraq and 

we aren’t going back. Although we no longer have boots on the 

ground, however, the U.S. does maintain a huge stake in Iraq’s security, and I believe we should continue to provide appropriate assistance to the Iraqi military in their fight against ISIS. 

But we must also recognize that the current situation in Anbar 

cannot be resolved through military means alone. An all-out assault on Fallujah by the Iraqi security forces would play right into 

hands of ISIS, reinforcing the perception among Sunnis that they 

have been systematically victimized by Prime Minister Maliki’s 

Shia-led government. 

To defeat al-Qaeda, the Iraqi Government must take a page out 

of our play book from the Iraq war and enlist moderate Sunni 

tribes in the fight. I understand that Vice President Biden recently 

discussed this issue with Prime Minister Maliki, encouraging him 

to incorporate tribal militias fighting ISIS into the Iraqi security 

forces and to compensate those injured and killed in battle. 

By taking these steps, I am hopeful that Maliki can begin to 

bridge the widening sectarian gulf in Iraq. The deterioration of 

Iraq’s control over Anbar is also linked to larger regional dynamics. 

We saw how al-Qaeda in Iraq expanded its franchise into Syria, 

and we now see violence from that brutal war spilling back into 

Iraq. This has strengthened ISIS and served as a recruitment vehicle for thousands of foreign fighters. 

The slow bleed in Syria has been a clear hindrance to progress 

in Iraq. Iran’s nefarious influence in the region also contributes to 

instability. It is well known that some senior Iraqi officials have a 

very cozy relationship with Iran, and Iraq has not done nearly 

enough to prevent Iranian overflights that deliver weapons to 

Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria. 

In order to stabilize Iraq, the Iraqi Government will need to be 

a more responsible actor in the region. Chairman Royce and I made 

that—emphasized that point when we met with Mr. Maliki several 

months ago. 

The discussion today is important to understand how we can encourage a political solution in Iraq that will give Sunnis a meaningful stake in the future of their country. This is the only viable way 

to build a safer future for Iraq while helping to curb Iranian influence and hopefully reducing the violence in Syria. 

I’d like to thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Brett McGurk, one 

of the foremost experts on Iraq, for being here today to address 

these issues with us. 

Mr. McGurk, I look forward to your testimony and our discussion. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We’ll hear for a minute 

from Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the Middle East Subcommittee, 

4

followed by Mr. Ted Deutch, who is the ranking member of that 

subcommittee. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and in 

addition to the biggest issue, which is that we don’t have al-Qaeda 

on the run, there are two issues which I continue to be very concerned about. 

First, is the safety of the residents of Camp Liberty. They still 

have very little protection. When last you testified, Mr. McGurk, 

192 T-walls were up. Then the big progress supposedly is that 43 

T-walls are now up in addition. This is out of 17,500 T-walls. Twalls save lives. Put them up. 

Number two, the Iraqi Jewish archives—Ted Deutch and I and 

many other members are very concerned, don’t want them to be 

shipped back. The Iraqi Government incorrectly states that these 

papers are theirs. 

That is not true and we hope that you continue to work on that 

and the bigger issue that brings us together is that, obviously, 

since the departure of our troops al-Qaeda’s reemergence has 

caused Iraq to be—to take a very worrisome turn for the worse. 

We’ve sacrificed so much blood and treasure there to watch it descend into full sectarian violence and al-Qaeda’s safe haven so 

we’ve got to rebuild our influence there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

We’ll go to Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Engel for holding this extremely timely hearing. 

Emboldened by instability within Iraq’s Government in the searing conflict, al-Qaeda affiliated—the number of al-Qaeda affiliated 

fighters in Iraq has now reached levels not seen since 2006. 

Al-Qaeda and Iraq’s offshoot, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, 

is now the primary perpetrator of the worst violence, and as my 

colleagues have noted al-Qaeda has now disavowed the Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria for its use of tactics deemed to be too violent. 

Let me say that again. Al-Qaeda, one of the world’s worst and 

most brutal terrorist groups, has disowned this group for being too 

extreme. I fear the siege of Anbar and Fallujah in January has definitively turned the page from simply ladling this spillover from 

the Syrian conflict to a full scale resurgence of terror in Iraq. 

Various reports count the number killed in January at close to 

1,000. I’m particularly concerned for the 140,000 who fled their 

homes as rockets were indiscriminately fired at needed humanitarian aid. The security risks posed by this resurgence are too 

great to ignore and, Deputy Assistant Secretary McGurk, I hope 

today you’ll be able to shed light on what level of assistance we’re 

providing the Iraqis and our comprehensive strategy to prevent the 

growth of the security threat. 

And I look forward to that testimony and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Now, lastly, we’ll go to Judge Ted Poe of Texas, chairman of the 

Terrorism Subcommittee, followed by Brad Sherman for a minute 

of California, who’s the ranking member of that subcommittee. 

5

Mr. POE. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is back, certainly not on its last legs. 

The United States has paid a high price to help liberate Iraq from 

the menace of al-Qaeda. 

It’s frustrating that al-Qaeda is gaining ground back in Iraq. AlQaeda’s resurgence is directly related to Prime Minister Maliki’s 

mishandling of his government. Incompetence and corruption seem 

to be the norm. 

He centralized power, alienated the Sunnis and brought back 

Shi’a hit squads. He has allowed Iranian-supported operatives to 

kill MEK Iranian dissidents now on seven occasions without consequences. 

The last time you were here, Mr. McGurk, you testified before 

my subcommittee and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen’s subcommittee. I predicted that there would be another attack. 

Seven days after you testified in December, Camp Liberty was 

attacked again. All this chaos has created an environment ripe for 

al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is reestablishing a safe haven to plan and 

launch attacks outside the region. 

That is a totally unacceptable trend. The question is what is the 

United States going to do, and I yield back the remainder of my 

time. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. In the 1940s, we occupied countries. No one 

doubted our right to occupy. We took our time, we created new governments and those governments created new societies. 

At various other times we’ve invaded countries, achieved a limited military objective or as much as could be achieved at reasonable cost and we left. The first example of that was Thomas Jefferson’s military intervention in Libya. 

In Iraq and Afghanistan, we established a bad example. The 

world and even some in the United States doubted our right to occupy so we hastily installed Karzai in Afghanistan and in Iraq we 

installed a structure which is now presided over by Mr. Maliki. 

It is not surprising that Afghanistan and Iraq continue to be 

problems since we have—we hastily handed over governance to 

those who are ill prepared. Iraq is not the most important Arab 

state strategically. It does not become more important in the future 

because we made a mistake in the past that cost us dearly in blood 

and treasure. 

We should not compound that mistake. On the other hand, Iraq 

is important in part because of its proximity to Iran, which I believe is one of the greatest threats to our national security. 

Finally, I agree with several of the prior speakers that we need 

to with regard to Camp Liberty and the T-walls, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Iraq and Iran Mr. Brett McGurk. Prior to this current 

assignment, Mr. McGurk served as a special advisor to the national 

security staff and as senior advisor to Ambassadors Ryan Crocker, 

Chris Hill and James Jeffrey in Baghdad. He also served as a lead 

negotiator and coordinator during bilateral talks with the Iraqi 

Government back in 2008. 

Without objection, by the way, your full prepared statement will 

be made part of the record and the members here will have 5 days 

6

to submit any statements or questions or any other extraneous material for the record. 

And Mr. McGurk, if you would please summarize your remarks 

and then we’ll go to questions. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRETT MCGURK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR IRAQ AND IRAN, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you. 

Good morning, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel and 

members of this committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss 

the situation in Iraq with a focus on al-Qaeda’s primary offshoot 

in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL. 

My brief statement will discuss the threat from ISIL, the current 

situation in Ramadi and Fallujah and how we intend to help the 

Iraqis combat it. 

ISIL is well known to us. Its former incarnation, al-Qaeda in 

Iraq, or AQI, was the focus of U.S. and Iraqi security efforts over 

many years, beginning with the rise of its first leader, Abu Musab 

al-Zarqawi, more than a decade ago. 

Its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is a designated global 

terrorist under U.S. law and we believe is currently based in Syria. 

His mission, as clearly stated in his own statements, is to carve out 

a zone of governing territory from Baghdad through Syria to Lebanon. 

The Syria conflict over the past 2 years provide a platform for 

ISIL to gain resources, recruits and safe havens. While the precise 

number of ISIL fighters in Syria is unknown, Director of National 

Intelligence James Clapper last week testified that there are likely 

26,000 extremist fighters in Syria, including 7,000 foreign fighters. 

Many of these fighters are affiliated with ISIL. 

ISIL in its earlier incarnation, AQI, inflicted mass casualties attacks in Iraq over the years 2011 and 2012. It was not until early 

last year that we began to see a significant increase in its attacks, 

most notably suicide and vehicle bombs. 

Suicide attacks, we assess, are nearly all attributable to ISIL and 

nearly all suicide bombers are foreign fighters who enter Iraq 

through Syria. To give one notable statistic, in November 2012 Iraq 

saw three suicide attacks throughout the country. In November 

2013, it saw 50. 

ISIL is now striking in Iraq along three main lines of operations. 

First, it is attacking Shi’a civilian areas in an effort to rekindle a 

civil war. These are the vast majority of attacks. 

Second, it is attacking Sunni areas to eliminate rivals and govern 

territory. In one 30-day period between September and October, for 

example, ISIL suicide bombers attacked three small towns in 

Anbar Province. 

Third, ISIL is now attacking the Kurds in northern Iraq and disputed boundary areas to incite ethnic tension and rest. ISIL likely 

staged and planned many of these attacks at remote encampments 

in western Iraq. The Iraqis began to spot these camps late last 

summer but proved unable to target them effectively due to 

unarmored helicopters and the lack of other necessary CT equipment which is needed to deny terrorists safe haven. 

7

Today, thanks to close cooperation from this committee and the 

Congress, we’ve begun to address this problem, as I will discuss in 

more detail. By the end of last year, signature ISIL attacks, vehicle 

and suicide bombs matched levels not seen since the summer of 

2007. 

Overall, violence remains far lower mainly because Shi’a militias 

have yet to respond en masse to ISIL provocations. But the risks 

of such reprisals rise as ISIL attacks rise. Also, over the course of 

2013 political instability and continuous unrest in Sunni areas enabled but did not cause ISIL’s rise. 

There was a protest movement that began after a number of 

bodyguards to former Minister of Finance Rafa al-Issawi were detained by Iraqi security forces. These protests placed on the national agenda a number of legitimate demands such as ending the 

process of de-Ba’athification and ensuring criminal due process. 

We supported these legitimate demands and we worked with all 

parties to shape a package of legislation to address them, which is 

now pending in the Iraqi Parliament. Ongoing violence, however, 

has made it difficult for Shi’a and Kurdish blocs to support this 

package of legislation absent concessions for their own constituencies. 

Over the course of the spring and into the summer, the protest 

movement became more militant with al-Qaeda flags spotted in 

protest squares. This accelerated a vicious cycle. 

ISIL exploited unaddressed grievances and increasing violence 

but long overdue reforms further out of reach. This brings us to 

where we are today and how we intend to help the Iraqis fight 

back. 

On January 1, 2014, convoys of up to 100 trucks with mounted 

heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns flying the black flag of 

al-Qaeda entered the central cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. They 

deployed to key objectives, destroyed most police stations and secured vital crossways. The police in both cities nearly disintegrated. 

The domination of these central cities was a culmination of 

ISIL’s 2013 strategy to govern territory and establish 7th century 

Islamic rule. In Fallujah, days after seizing central areas, ISIL declared the city part of an Islamic caliphate. 

This message, however, is not popular in Anbar Province. In 

Ramadi, in the hours after ISIL arrived in force tribal leaders organized and asked for funds and arms from the central government 

to retake their streets. 

The government responded with money, weapons and assurances 

that tribal fighters would enjoy full benefits of any soldier in the 

Iraqi army. 

I have been to Iraq twice since the new year. In meetings with 

Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders, I have pressed upon 

them the urgent necessity of mobilizing the population against 

ISIL. 

I have also discussed the situation directly with tribal and local 

leaders in Anbar Province. These coordinated efforts have begun to 

produce results. Fighting continues in Ramadi’s outskirts but local 

leaders report that the central city is increasingly secure with tribal fighters working in coordination with local leaders. 

8

The Iraqi army has remained outside, helping where necessary 

to secure populated areas. The situation in Fallujah is more serious 

with hardened ISIL fighters and former insurgents in control of the 

streets. One week ago, ISIL fighters captured a group of Iraqi soldiers, paraded them around the city flying al-Qaeda’s black flag 

and then executed them. 

Further complicating the situation, we assess that some tribes in 

and around Fallujah are supporting ISIL while others are fighting 

ISIL and many others remain on the fence. The hardened fighters 

inside the city are seeking to draw the army into a direct confrontation. 

Thus far, the army has not taken the bait, focusing its efforts on 

the outskirts and keeping tribal fighters in the lead. But make no 

mistake, the Government of Iraq, working in full coordination with 

local leaders and the local population, has a responsibility to secure 

Fallujah. 

Under the plan that is now being developed as explained to us 

by local and national leaders late last week, tribal fighters will lead 

this effort with the army in support when needed. 

The United States is prepared to offer advice, make recommendations and share lessons learned based on our deep experience in 

these areas. General Austin, in a visit to Baghdad last week, had 

a series of candid conversations with Iraqi officials and commanders about the importance of patience and planning. 

ISIL is also planning to consolidate control of Fallujah and move 

30 miles east of Baghdad. In a rare audio statement, on January 

21st ISIL’s leader directed his fighters ‘‘to be on the front lines 

against the Shi’a and march toward Baghdad.’’

Were there any doubt of potential risks for the United States, he 

added what he said was a direct message to the Americans: ‘‘Soon 

we will be in direct confrontation so watch for us for we are with 

you watching.’’ We take such threats seriously and through cooperation with this committee and the Congress we intend to help 

the Iraqis in their efforts to defeat ISIL over the long term. Here’s 

how. 

First, we are pressing the national leadership in the highest possible levels to develop a holistic security political economic strategy 

to isolate extremists from the population. This means supporting 

local tribal fighters, incorporating those fighters into the security 

services and committing to April elections to be held on time. 

Second, we are supporting the Iraqi security forces through accelerated foreign military sales, training and information sharing. The 

Iraqis have now equipped Caravan aircraft, for example, to fire 

Hellfire missiles thereby denying ISIL safe haven in the western 

desert. 

Such assistance is offered pursuant to a holistic strategy and 

we’ve made clear to the Iraqis that security operations, while a necessary condition for defeating ISIL, are not sufficient. 

Third, we are actively encouraging an aggressive economic component to mobilize the Sunni population against ISIL. In the 5 

weeks since ISIL entered Ramadi and Fallujah, the GOI has allocated over $35 million to Anbar Province in assistance and payments to fighters. 

9

Throughout, our message to all Iraqi leaders is firm. Despite 

your differences across a host of issues, you must find a way to 

work together when it comes to ISIL, an organization that threatens all Iraqis. 

This is particularly true for Prime Minister Maliki who, as the 

head of state, must take extra measures to reach out to Sunni leaders and draw critical mass of the local population into the fight. 

I want to thank you again for allowing me to address this most 

important topic. I look forward to working closely with you in the 

months ahead to protect U.S. interests in Iraq and throughout the 

region and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGurk follows:]

10


86588a-1.eps

Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Brett McGurk 

House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing: Iraq 

February 5, 2014 

Chaimlan Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and Members ofthe Conunittee, thank 

you for inviting me to discuss the situation in Iraq with a focus on al Qa'ida's 

primary offshoot in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 

Threat Posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 

I will begin with a brief overview of the security situation in 20 II and 2012, as it is 

important to tmderstanding the current environment. In both years, 2011 and 2012, 

Iraq remained a very violent country. By our counts, 4,400 Iraqis were killed each 

year, most in attacks by extremist groups led by al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). 

While this violence was persistent and targeted, it did not threaten the stability of 

the state, or a rekindled civil war. Indeed, based on studies of historical parallels -

civil wars and insurgencies -Iraq by 2012 had entered what is called a "low boil" 

stage of insurgency. A low boil insurgency retlects a level of violence that may 

not present a serious risk of state collapse, or rekindled broad scale reprisals, but 

rather a persistent tempo of attacks carried out by the hardened core of an 

insurgency - which, by historical examples, can take a decade to fizzle out. 

These two years, 2011 and 2012, also witnessed the escalating civil war in Syria, 

int1amed by regional rivalry and opportunism by terrorist groups. The Asad 

regime's unwillingness to engage with the opposition in meaningful political 

dialogue and violent suppression of peaceful protests led to open, armed contlict. 

As the fighting has dragged on, the conflict has attracted terrorist groups seeking to 

take advantage of the loss of state authority, including in eastem Syria, leading to 

the rise of terrorist groups near the Iraq border. 

The most organized and lethal of these groups - the al-Nusrah Front and ISILwere franchises ofAQI. They vary in their objectives: al-Nusrah has put greater 

priority on the toppling of Asad and working with other Syrian opposition groups, 

whereas ISIL has focused on a more regional agenda, with an aim to carve out an 

Islamic caliphate stretching from Baghdad to Lebanon. These dueling objectives 

have at times required direct mediation by Osama Bin Laden's former deputy, and 

now global head ofal-Qa'ida, Ayman al Zawahiri. The debate has been a central 
11


86588a-2.eps

tocus among global jihadist networks, and has given ISIL, in particular, a global 

platfonn to propagate its agenda and recmit adherents. 

Flush with resources, recruits, weapons, and training, TSTL slowly began to execute 

its strategy across the Syrian border in Iraq. Violence in Iraq ticked up towards the 

end of2012, but did not accelerate until early 2013. This included a marked rise in 

suicide bombers. The majority of these suicide bombers, we believe, are foreign 

tighters, recmited through extremist propaganda. Suicide bombers are a key data 

point we track, as they have a pemicious etlect on the stability ofIraq, and 

demonstrate a sophisticated global network that is able to recruit, train, and deploy 

human beings to commit suicide and mass murder. The suicide bombers are, in a 

twisted tum oflogic, ISIL's most precious resource. 

It was signiticant, therefore, that by early 2013, we began to see signs of ISIL 

shifting these resources from Syria to Traq. Tn 2012, Traq witnessed an average of 

5-10 suicide attacks per month. By the summer of20 13, it was averaging 30-40 

suicide attacks per month, and increasingly coordinated and etlective attacks. On 

March 14,2013, for example, five suicide bombers from ISIL attacked and took 

hostages in the Ministry of Justice in Baghdad, and controlled the building for 

several hours before detonating themselves. This was the first in a series of 

sophisticated military-style operations throughout 2013, with suicide bombers used 

to clear a path, followed by well-trained fighters to take and hold an objective. 

By the summer of 20 13, TSTL suicide bombers struck regularly, focused primarily 

on Shia civilian targets (playgrounds, funerals, markets), but also Sunni areas (to 

contest territory) and Kurdish areas (to spark ethnic contlict). In November 2013, 

Iraq witnessed 50 suicide attacks, compared with only three in November 2012. 

These attacks had a devastating effect on political discourse in the country, further 

fueling mistmst from political leaders to ordinary citizens, and making the tangible 

reton11S that Iraq needs to reconcile its society even harder to reach. 

Indeed, the violence may appear indiscriminate - but it is not. From what we are 

now seeing, TSTL attacks are calculated, coordinated, and part of a strategic 

campaign led by its Syria-based leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This campaign has 

the stated objective to cause the collapse ofthe Iraqi state and carve out a zone of 

goveming control in the westem regions ofIraq and eastem Syria (an area known 

as the "Jazeera"). To do this, they are now using three primary tactics: 

• First, attacking Shia civilians with an aim to re-ignite a civil war and cause 

ordinary people to look to militias, not the state, tor protection. Adherents to 

2 
12


86588a-3.eps

ISIL's extreme ideology believe Shia should be killed based on their sect 

alone, and the suicide bombers seek populated areas to murder as many 

innocent people as possible. These are the vast majority ofISIL attacks. 

• Second, contesting territory in Sunni areas to assert dominance over local 

Sunni officials and tribes. Targeted assassinations and attacks increased in 

these areas as ISIL focused its resources inside Iraq. In one 30-day period 

between September and October oflast year, for example, more than a 

dozen suicide bombers were used in assaults on three towns in Anbar 

province (Rawa, Rutbah, and Haditha). 

• Third, attacking the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) and disputed boundary 

areas in north em Iraq to stoke ethnic tensions and conflict. The thriving 

capital city ofthe lKR, Erbil, faced an attack in September similar to attacks 

seen in Baghdad earlier in the year: multiple suicide bombers followed by an 

infantry assault to temporarily control a govemment building. 

By the end of2013, suicide and vehicle-bome attacks initiated by ISIL retumed to 

levels not seen since the height of AQl's power (its earlier incamation) in 2007. 

Overall levels of violence, however, remain far below 2007 levels, demonstrating 

that reprisal attacks from Shia militias have been restrained, though the risks of 

such reprisals continue to rise as ISIL continues to attack Shia civilian areas. 

In summary, ISIL's strategy is sophisticated, patient, and focused. It will take a 

similar combination of sophistication, patience, and focus to combat it, and 1 will 

explain shortly what this strategy should look like, and how we intend to help the 

Iraqis increase the chances that they can arrest these 2013 trend-lines in 2014. 

Political Instability Enables ISIL Operations 

The above picture would not be complete without discussing the political situation 

in Iraq, and how it does - and does not - impact these violence trends. Over the 

course of2013, the security situation deteriorated against a backdrop of political 

instability and protests in Sunni areas ofthe country. These protests began after 

3 
13


86588a-4.eps

Iraqi forces detained a number of bodyguards to then-Minister of Finance Rafa alIssawi in late December 2012. Issawi later resigned from his post. I 

The guilt or innocence ofthe bodyguards and their detention soon became a side 

issue, as the protest demands grew to encompass a full catalog of decade-long 

grievances among Iraq's Sum1i conm1ill1ity. These grievances included appeals to 

end the process of de-Ba'athfication, which began in 2003, reform the criminal 

procedure code to ensure due process rights to detainees, and greater power sharing 

in national govemance decision-making and institutions 2 

From the very beginning, participants in these protests varied: some had legitimate 

political demands, such as those listed above; others rejected the entire post-2003 

political order and questioned the legitimacy of the state; while a small minority 

was openly militant and advocated violence against the central govemment. The 

latter two groups were often the most visible and vocal, which made it increasingly 

difficult (due to constituent pressure in some cases, excuses in others) to convince 

prominent Shia and Kurdish leaders to address demands from the first group. 

The toxic combination of unaddressed grievances and rising terrorist attacks 

created a pressure cooker with no safety valve, and ISLL took advantage. Its black 

flags began to appear at protest squares, particularly in FalIL0ah, further alienating 

the Shia population and fueling the charged sectarian environment. In April, Iraqi 

forces moved to clear one of the most militant protest squares, in the north-central 

town of Hawija. The operation appears to have begun peacefully, but shots were 

later exchanged, followed by a barrage, leaving nearly 50 people dead. 

After that incident, some Sum1i nationalist insurgent groups, including Jaysh Rijal 

al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN), openly vowed to attach Iraqi Security Forces 

(ISF) and declared a new oflensive against Baghdad. The JRTN is a militant 

1 Rafa al-Issawi has been a close partner of the United States, and we believe his official status 

and standing should be restored as soon as possible. I met with Issawi earlier this month and 

found him committed and dedicated to helping isolate and defeat ISIL in Anbar province. 

2 We fully support addressing these grievances, and have worked with all political blocs to 

develop a package of laws that answer legitimate demands through the political process. In 

April. the Iraqi cabinet approved this package of laws, including sweeping refonns to the deBa'athification process. The Iraqi parliament, however, has yet to take up a vote on this 

package. This is partially due to pressing matters in other areas (such as passing the law to 

govern April elections, which took months of debate) and partially due to lack of support among 

the Shi'a and Kurdish blocs. We continue to call on all political blocs to work together and 

finalize this important package of laws for an up-or-down vote. 

4 
14


86588a-5.eps

offshoot ofthe Iraqi Baath party, and together with AQI, designated under u.s. 

law as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Its resurgence added to the instability in 

Sunni areas, fueled mistrust in Shia areas, and facilitated the rise and entrenchment 

ofTSIL, particularly in border regions ofNinewa province. Today, ISIL and JRTN 

appear to be working together in some areas, but with vastly different agendas -

this partnership is likely to be short-lived. 

The danger at this moment is that these hardened cores of militancy, which must be 

isolated from the broader population and defeated, become fused with a sense of 

despondency and grievance in Sunni areas ofthe country. It is therefore critical 

and incumbent upon the Goverrunent of Iraq (GOl) to help mobilize the people in 

Sunni areas against ISIL and JRTN through a combination of aggressive political 

outreach and targeted intelligence-driven security operations. 

This responsibility for political outreach and inclusion rests on all Iraqi leaders, but 

most prominently on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He is under tremendous 

political pressure from the Shia population, which faces a near daily threat of car 

and suicide bombs; but it is incumbent upon the head of state to act in a manner 

that advances stability in all parts ofTraq. In all of our engagements with Maliki, 

accordingly, including a November meeting with the President, and reh'l.llar calls 

from the Vice President, we have continued to press the urgency of working with 

local Sunni leaders to draw the population into the fight against lSlL. 

The Current Situation: Fallujah and Ramadi 

On January 1, 2014, convoys of approximately 70-100 trucks with mounted heavy 

weapons and anti-aircraft guns, flying the black flag of al-Qa'ida, entered the 

central cities ofFallujah and Ramadi. They deployed to key objectives, destroyed 

most police stations, and secured vital crossways. The police in both cities nearly 

disintegrated. The Iraqi army, deployed in camps outside the cities, engaged some 

anned vehicles but generally chose not to get drawn into urban fighting. 

The domination of these central cities was a culmination of ISIL 's 2013 strategy to 

govern territory and establish 7th-century Islamic nile. Across the border in Syria, 

ISIL has governed the city ofRaqqa (with a population of220,000) for most ofthe 

past year. In Iraq, ISTL sees Ramadi and FallL0ah as their new Raqqa. In Fallujah, 

days after seizing central areas, lSlL declared the city part of an Islamic caliphate. 

This message, however, is not popular in Anbar - and has bred tierce resistance. 

In Ramadi, in the hours atler ISIL arrived in force, tribal leaders organized and 

asked for funding and amlS from the central government to retake their streets and 

5 
15


86588a-6.eps

protect their population. The GOI responded with $17 million to support urgent 

humanitarian assistance and reconstmction of areas damaged in fighting. It also 

began sending small and medium weapons to tribal tighters, with assurance that 

these fighters would be given full benefits ofthe state, as if they were soldiers. 

I was in Iraq in early January as this effort got underway. In meetings with Maliki 

and other key leaders, I pressed the urgent message that without a broad base of 

support from the population in Ramadi, it would be impossible to root out the 

hundreds ofISIL tighters who had taken up positions in strategic areas. I also 

discussed the situation with fornler leaders ofthe Anbar awakening, such as Sheikh 

Abu Risha, and local officials in Ramadi, including Governor Ahmed Khalaf, who 

were focused on organizing tribal tighters to oust ISIL from populated areas. 

Over the tirst two weeks ofJanuary, these local and tribal leaders made requests to 

the central government for additional resources, weapons, and a common strategy 

to reclaim the streets from ISIL and other militant groups. The GOI dispatched the 

acting Defense Minister, SadOlll Dulaimi, to fulfill these requests and finalize a 

military and political plan. (Dulaimi is from Anbar and a member of one of its 

largest tribes. He has been in Ramadi nearly full-time since this crisis began.) 

These coordinated efforts have begun to produce results. Fighting continues in the 

outskirts of Ramadi, but the central city is increasingly secure with a critical mass 

oftribes having pledged to tight ISIL to ensure that they cannot return. This quick 

albeit fragile turnaround in Ramadi, with serious and regular coordination between 

local and national leaders, may provide a model for how we can best ensure that 

2014 is a year in which the tide begins to turn once again against ISIL inside Iraq. 

The F allujah situation is far more serious, as hllldreds of ISIL tighters have joined 

ranks with fornler insurgent groups to consolidate control ofthe imler city, and 

contest areas in small towns nearby. The Iraqi army is now working to establish a 

cordon from the outskirts ofthe city, in coordination with local tribes, but they face 

well-trained snipers armed with 50-caliber ritles. On January 26, approximately a 

dozen Iraqi soldiers were captured near Fallujah. Some were later paraded around 

the city in the back of a pickup truck tlying the al-Qa'ida tlag. The next day, ISIL 

posted a video showing their gmesome execution, daring the army to enter the city. 

The army, thus far, has not taken the bait. It remains on the city's outskirts, 

working to execute a strategy similar to what proved effective in Ramadi. There 

had been reports ofanny units randomly shelling Fallluah's neighborhoods, but 

6 
16


86588a-7.eps

Iraqi conuuanders have denied this (blaming ISIL), and tribal figures have since 

confirmed that military operations are being coordinated with local actors. 

At this moment, Fallujah is the scene of a tense standoff. Some tribes are ready 

and preparing to fight ISIL, others are working with ISIL (and forming "tribal 

councils" with declared intention to fight the anny), and more are on the fence, 

waiting to see which side is likely to prevail in the end. Local leaders in Anbar, in 

coordination with the GOI, are working to recruit more tribes to enter, clear, and 

hold Fallujah, while ensuring civilians and families can leave the city. 

This standoff will not last forever. The GOI has the responsibility to help local 

leaders secure the city and oust the militants now in control. Under the plan that is 

being developed by the GOl in coordination with local leaders, the army will seek 

to control outlying areas and cordon the city; tribal fighters will then seek to take 

the lead in securing populated areas, with military support when needed. We know 

from experience how difficult this will be, and U.S. military officers from the 

Office of Security Cooperation are in regular touch with their Iraqi cOlmterparts to 

share lessons learned, offer advice, and make reconm1endations. 

ISIL has also made its intentions clear: move from a new base of operations in 

Fallujah to Baghdad - a distance of under 30 miles. Its leader, Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, had this to say in a rare audio statement issued on January 21: 

"As for ISIS in Iraq: Be in the frontlines against the Shia, and march toward 

Baghdad and the South, keep the Shia busy in their own areas. Know that the 

entire Sunni population and the brothers in Syria are watching you." 

Were there any doubt, moreover, of the threat Baghdadi and his network -now 

with approximately 2,000 fighters in Iraq - presents to the United States and our 

interests in the region, his statement said this in its concluding paragraph: 

"Our last message is to the Americans. Soon we will be in direct confrontation, 

and the sons ofTslam have prepared for such a day. So watch, for we are with 

you, watching." 

Developing a Long-Term Iraqi Strategy: Political, Economic, Security 

Drawing on our own lessons learned, we are also encouraging the GOI to develop 

and execute a holistic strategy to isolate and defeat ISIL over the long-term. This 

strategy fuses political, security, and economic components with an immediate 

focus on incorporating tribal fighters to protect the population in towns and 

7 
17


86588a-8.eps

villages throughout the provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, and Sal all Din. These tribal 

fighters would work in coordination with local officials, local police, and the army 

when needed, to deny space and sanctuary for an organized ISIL presence. 

Such a strategy is extremely difficult to develop and execute in a dynamic tribal 

environment like Anbar province. But in recent weeks, we have seen a new level 

of commitment from the GOI to mobilize the local population against lSI L. Over 

the course ofJanuary, the GOI cabinet has allocated resources to ensure local 

people taking up arms against extremist groups enjoy full state benefits in the event 

they are killed or wounded. Importantly, the GOI has committed to incorporating 

these fighters into the security stmctures of the state once fighting concludes. 

Regarding economic support, in January alone, the GOI allocated $18 million for 

rebuilding projects in Fallujah and Ramadi; $17 million for direct humanitarian 

assistance; and $3.4 million for direct payments to tribal fighters. As noted above, 

Sadoun Dulaimi has remained in Ramadi to oversee allocation of these resources. 

Our team in Baghdad is in direct and regular contact with all relevant actors, and 

urging them to ensure resources reach intended recipients as soon as possible. 

In my own visits to Baghdad last month, including one just last week, I fOlmd the 

national leadership increasingly attuned to the necessity of enlisting popular 

support as a necessary condition for defeating ISIL. I also detected, for the first 

time, acknowledgement that GOI missteps over the course of 20 13 may have made 

the situation worse, and that this coming year must be different in temlS of strategy 

and execution. As the GOI spokesman told the Washington Post last week: 

"We are supplying [the tribes] with more weapons and whatever they need. They 

will be treated like any troop in the Iraqi anny. They will have salaries and pensions 

and any right a troop in the Iraqi army has." 

This statement articulates precisely what must be done, and fairly reflects my own 

hard conversations with local and national leaders over this past month. 

Finally, at the national political level, we are focused on ensuring that the political 

process remains on track, most importantly with national elections on April 30th. 

More than forty coalitions have registered to compete in these elections, which will 

choose a parliament to form a new government to serve through 2018. 

One carmot overstate the importance ofthese elections, and we have made clear to 

all Iraqi leaders that they must happen on time, with oversight by the Independent 

8 
18


86588a-9.eps

High Electoral Conunission (IHEC) and the United Nations Mission in Iraq 

(UNAMI). The work by IHEC and UNAMI, thus far, has been heroic, and we will 

continue to support their missions between now and Election Day. 

Security Measures (and focused U.S. Support) 

Political and economic initiatives are necessary for defeating a network like ISIL. 

But they are not sufficient. From our own experience, we know that while success 

is impossible without mobilizing the population, such popular mobilization will not 

last absent focused and persistent security operations. The tribes will fight, but 

they must be confident that they are going to win and be recognized when the 

fighting is over - not left to the mercy ofTSTL reprisals. For this to happen, TSTL 

networks must be constantly pressured, and their safe havens destroyed. 

Consistent with ISIL's rise last sunuuer, a series of an ned camps - staging areas 

and training grOlmds - were spotted in westem Iraq. The existence of these camps 

demonstrated a shortfall in the capacity of the ISF. Even where camps could be 

located, through persistent TSF reconnaissance platfonl1S, such as manned King Air 

platfonns, the ISF lacked the ability to target effectively, thereby providing ISIL 

safe haven just miles from populated areas. 

Iraq's lack of armored helicopters was a glaring example. Iraqi pilots, over the 

course 01'2013, often flew thin-skinned helicopters towards ISIL camps defended 

by PKC machine guns and anti-aircraft platfonns. The result was helicopters shot 

up and crews (many of whom we had trained) sutlering grievous wOlmds. This 

situation was not sustainable, and the GOI requested our urgent assistance. 

I want to thank this Conunittee, in particular, for working so closely with us over 

the past six months to approve the Apache helicopter lease and sale through our 

Foreign Military Sales program. While this is not an immediate remedy to the 

current problem, they will provide the ISF with the most etlective platform 

possible for denying ISIL a safe haven in the remote westem deserts ofIraq. They 

will also ensure that we can provide effective oversight on the end use of attack 

helicopter systems, as well as influencing planning and operations. 

Similarly, the Iraqis have recently proven effective at deploying Hellfire missiles 

against remote ISIL targets from a Caravan aircraft. The ISF have equipped 

Caravans to launch Hellfire strikes, but the overall supply of Hellfire missiles was 

not adequate to tackle the threat and number of targets they had located and 

surveyed. Again, thanks to close coordination with this Committee, this situation 

has begml to change. We delivered 75 Hellfire missiles in December, and have 

9 
19


86588a-10.eps

notitled Congress ofa potential sale of up to 500 more. Our objective is to ensure 

that ISIL can never again gain safe haven in western Iraq. 

Consistent with this strategy, we will deliver 10 Scan Eagle surveillance UA Vs this 

spring, and 48 Raven UAVs later this year, all of which, when used in combination 

with other platfonns, can provide regular surveillance ofthe Jazeera region and the 

Iraq-Syria border. As Director of National Intelligence Clapper noted in recent 

testimony before the Senate Select C011l11littee on Intelligence, the "greater two 

way tlow of Sunni extremists between Syria and Iraq" has a direct bearing on 

ISIL's ability to conduct high-profile attacks in Iraq. To be successful, thus, a 

long-term strategy must focus on security and surveillance in these areas. 

Finally, we have increased bilateral and regional training opportunities for Iraqi 

counterterrorism (CT) lmits, and expedited deliveries of key CT -related equipment 

for Iraq's most elite and disciplined units. U.S. trainers with the Embassy's Office 

of Security Cooperation are also conducting non-operational training with these 

high-end Iraqi operators, and Iraq and Jordan have discussed the possibility of 

advanced training for Iraqi forces in Jordan. We fully support this initiative. 

All ofthis assistance comes in the context ofthe holistic strategy discussed above, 

short of which, long-term stability will not be possible. This was a point General 

Austin pressed home with Prime Minister Maliki and other key leaders in a visit to 

Baghdad last week: security, economics, and politics, must be fused together. 

*** 

Before concluding, I would like to say a brief word to our men and women who 

served so bravely in these areas ofIraq. I cannot imagine what it must have been 

like to see al-Qa'ida raise its flag once again in the cities ofFalllliah and Ramadi. 

was sickened by the spectacle. But I want to ensure everyone who served, and this 

Conm1ittee, that we will do everything possible to help the Iraqis take back their 

streets. The situation in Ramadi is slowly improving, and we will support the 

Iraqis - and the tribes of Anbar province - to secure the city of Fallujah. 

Conclusion 

Vital U.S. interests are at stake in Iraq. While my testimony today has focused on 

the threat from ISIL, the issues of oil, regional stability, and Iranian infl uence, are 

also central to our policy during this pivotal new year. I look forward to working 

closely with this Committee to ensure that we are doing all we can to protect and 

10 
20


86588a-11.eps

advance u.s. interests month-to-month. Thank you again for the opportunity to 

address these complex issues today. 1 look forward to answering your questions. 

11 
21

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. McGurk. 

The first question I was going to ask you related to something 

that happened last summer. There were militant camps and training grounds spotted in western Iraq. 

So we could see this brewing, and yesterday we heard the CIA 

Director note before Congress that there are camps inside of both 

Iraq and Syria that are, in his words, used by al-Qaeda to develop 

capabilities that are applicable both in theater as well as beyond. 

So you noted that the Iraqi Government could spot these camps 

but did not have the ability to target effectively, leaving safe havens just miles from populated areas, in your words. 

If these al-Qaeda camps present a direct threat to our interests 

and the Iraqis can’t deal with it, then why weren’t we doing more 

against these camps? 

You know, how would this gap that the Iraqi capabilities obviously can’t meet be closed? How could you effectively move on this? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me kind of walk through the last 4 or 5 months. Really, late 

last summer the Iraqis spotted some of these camps and they tried 

to target them. They flew Bell 104 helicopters out—47 helicopters 

out there. 

The helicopters were shot up by PKC machine guns. They tried 

to send the army out there. The army was IED’d on the roads, 

which are heavily booby trapped. So it was pretty clear that despite 

a very strong Iraqi security force capability they were not able to 

target camps in these remote areas and their special forces also 

could not operate effectively in those areas. 

And that is when we began to accelerate some of our foreign 

military assistance programs and also information sharing to get a 

better intelligence picture. So two notable developments over recent 

months. 

First, the Iraqis have become very effective with the Hellfire missile strikes through their Caravan aircrafts and we are helping 

them in the find, fix and finish mission in which they’re undertaking, and second, we believe, as we’ve had many discussions with 

this committee—many good discussions—that Apache helicopter 

platforms are really a critical platform for denying safe haven in 

these areas over the long term, and I want to thank this committee 

for helping us with that sale, which was recently approved. 

But this won’t be immediate. It won’t be until later this year that 

the first leased helicopters get into the country and are operational. 

But that is really a long-term solution to this problem. 

Chairman ROYCE. The other question I was going to ask you was 

in your testimony you called suicide bombers a key data point we 

track and noted that these suicide bombers operating in Iraq are 

in fact foreign fighters that have come in. 

Where are these foreign fighters coming from? We’ve seen reports that close to a 1,000 have come from Europe, some from the 

U.S. I was going to ask you how do you assess the threat to U.S. 

personnel, not only that threat to personnel and our interests in 

the region but also here in the United States. 

Mr. MCGURK. Mr. Chairman, the foreign fighters in Syria are 

coming from all over the world. This is a problem we faced in the 

years 2006 to 2008 when foreign fighters were coming into Syria 

22

and also making their way into Iraq through what was then the 

al-Qaeda in Iraq network. 

They’re coming mainly from the region. But we do assess from 

our best intelligence assessments that the suicide bombers are foreign fighters. Right now, they do not pose a direct threat to us or 

our personnel but they pose a direct threat to the stability of Iraq. 

The suicide bombers, and again, about five to 10 a month over 

2011 and 2012, now about 30 to 40 a month, it has a pernicious 

effect on the political discourse in the country. 

Car bombs—the Iraqis have been able to protect against car 

bombs. You don’t see mass casualty car bomb attacks like you used 

to see. There are still a lot of car bombs but casualties are lower. 

It’s the suicide bombers that are able to get into funerals, 

mosques, populated areas and cause mass casualties, which has 

just a devastating effect on the country. So it’s a very serious, serious problem and a regional problem. 

Chairman ROYCE. And the last question I’ll ask in my remaining 

moments, you were just in Baghdad meeting with Iraqi officials 

and you state that you detected for the first time acknowledgment 

that Government of Iraq missteps may have made the problem 

worse, and as I noted in my statement this is not the feeling that 

Ranking Member Engel and I received when we raised this issue 

with the President of Iraq in our meeting. So that was a few 

months ago. 

I am somewhat encouraged by this but how encouraged should 

we be? Because our concern has long been that this lack of reconciliation is compounding the problem seriously. 

Mr. MCGURK. I have found, frankly, Mr. Chairman, an attitude 

among the Iraqis that was similar to the tactics that we used in 

the early part of the war, that the security problem was simply a 

security problem and not a problem that was fused with politics 

and economics, and we had a series of conversations over the 

course of last year as the ISIL attacks increased in which Iraqis 

saw this mainly as a security problem. 

All I can say is that I’ve been there twice this month since the 

entry of ISIL into Fallujah and Ramadi and I have heard from 

across the board from the Prime Minister on down that unless you 

enlist local Sunnis in those areas you will never defeat and isolate 

ISIL. 

And we have seen that now manifested in a commitment. The 

Iraqi cabinet has passed a number of resolutions saying tribal 

fighters will be given full benefits of the state and, most significantly, Prime Minister Maliki has made a commitment that tribal 

fighters who oust ISIL from these areas will be incorporated into 

the formal security services of the state—the police and the army. 

That did not happen with the Awakening fighters that we 

worked with in 2006 to 2008. So that is a very significant commitment. We now need to stay on the Iraqis to make sure they follow 

through. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We’ll go to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGurk, let me ask you about al-Qaeda in Iraq. It’s been reported that al-Zawahiri, the head of al-Qaeda, has disowned the IsVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:41 Mar 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\020514\86588 SHIRL
23

lamic State of Iraq and Syria. So if that’s true, what does that 

mean for al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq? 

What are the repercussions for ISIS operating without the alQaeda umbrella and how will this affect the rebel infighting in 

Syria now that al-Nusra has the blessing of al-Qaeda? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, ISIL and al-Nusra were both kind of—came 

out of al-Qaeda in Iraq. ISIL basically is al-Qaeda in Iraq. Its leader was the al-Qaeda in Iraq leader since 2010. 

Nusra was a bit of an offshoot and is focused more on Syria. As 

you said, there’s now this message, which seems from Zawahiri, 

saying that ISIL is no longer affiliated with al-Qaeda central. 

I would defer to my intelligence colleagues on the long-term effects but what we have found is that ISIL has such a media presence, such a propaganda presence and is able to self-sustain itself 

by controlling facilities in eastern Syria including oil facilities and 

also through extortion rackets in cities in western Iraq that it’ll be 

able to maintain its cycle of operations. 

In terms of those who are recruited and come in to ISIL, it’s really—their message, and it goes all the way back to Zarqawi 10 years 

ago, is just very perniciously sectarian, that Shi’a Muslims in particular simply don’t have a right to live and they should be killed, 

and those who believe that tend to gravitate toward ISIL. 

Nusra is more of a al-Qaeda central-like message and also including a threat to us. But I think—despite this new statement 

we’ve seen I think ISIL is going to maintain its pace of operations 

and continue to be a very serious threat. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

I’d like to ask you some questions about Iraq and Iran and the 

relationship. When I look back at the war in Iraq, what really 

breaks my heart is that we lost so many Americans, so much 

American blood, and now it’s almost as if we didn’t do anything. 

Nothing we did was positive. It’s all been eroded, and it really 

just breaks my heart for people who lost loved ones there. 

We’re the ones responsible, in my opinion, for making Iran the 

hegemonic power in the region because Iran and Iraq for years 

fought wars, checked each other and once we blew up—not that 

Saddam Hussein was worth anything but once we blew up the minority Sunni regime in Iraq and it seems to me it was only obvious 

that the Shi’as in Iraq would gravitate to the Shi’as in Iran, and 

the sad thing is that Iran has more influence, in my opinion, in 

Iraq now than we have. 

So there are reports, and Chairman Royce and I raised this with 

Mr. Maliki when he was in Washington, that Iraq is allowing Iran 

overflights as Iran seeks to arm Hezbollah. Hezbollah, obviously, is 

now fighting the war in Syria on Assad’s side. It’s helping 

Hezbollah expand its presence in Syria, defending the Assad regime. 

So can you characterize that relationship that Prime Minister 

Maliki and other senior Iraqi officials have with Iran and how 

would you describe Iraq’s commitments to the U.S. on the overflight issue? Does Maliki understand how this destabilizes the region? 

24

Mr. MCGURK. Iraq’s relationship with Iran is multifaceted. We 

have found repeatedly over the years that Iraq acts primarily in its 

own interests. 

We found very few instances in which we’ve seen Iraq acting at 

the behest of Iran in which it did not see it acting in its own interests. You can look at that in terms of Iraq’s overall oil production. 

You can look at it in terms of Iraq ratifying the additional protocol. 

You can look at it in terms of Iraq supporting the Geneva 1 communique, a number of steps in which we know the Iranians were 

pressing the Iraqis not to do things and the Iraqis did them. The 

issue of overflights is something where the Iraqis have not done 

enough. We have seen the number of flights come down. 

We continue to press this issue. Inspections go up. Inspections go 

down. It’s very frustrating. It’s often very difficult for us to get a 

precise intelligence picture of specific flights and what’s on a flight. 

We know that material, we believe, is coming on civilian aircraft. 

So it’s just—it’s a problem that we focus on all the time. It’s the 

one area where I can say Iraq is simply not doing enough. 

Mr. ENGEL. I just—thank you. I just want to make one final comment and that it’s—it was my opinion when the chairman and I 

met with Mr. Maliki that he was a good listener but I didn’t think 

he provided too much in terms of answers to the questions we had, 

one of which was overflights. 

I think that he just came to listen but, really, didn’t come to put 

his head together with us and help solve the problem. 

Mr. MCGURK. I have found, Congressmen, that the—since the 

Prime Minister’s trip that your meeting with him, other meetings 

he had here on the Hill, he spent about 2 hours with President 

Obama in the Oval Office, he got a very direct message on a number of issues and we have seen some fairly significant changes from 

that visit. 

So I want to thank you for the meeting you had with him. I think 

you made an influence. On some of the issues which I know were 

discussed with Camp Liberty we’ve seen some changes, and particularly in the need for a holistic strategy to defeat ISIL and enlisting the Sunnis into the fight at the local level we have seen 

some fairly dramatic and significant changes from that visit. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome once again, sir. The Iraqi Jewish archives—you have 

been engaged in discussions with the Iraqis on this issue and your 

staff has spoken to—with representatives of the Iraqi Jewish Diaspora and the Jewish community as a whole. 

But could you give us an update on progress of these discussions? 

Have there been alternative plans proposed? On the issue of the Twalls at Camp Liberty, why have there been only 235 out of 17,500 

T-walls put up and why have we only seen an addition of 43 since 

our November subcommittee hearing? Can you please commit that 

you will put extra effort in saving lives there? 

And then thirdly, as far as al-Qaeda’s resurgence, a large part 

of this is due to the failure in the Iraqi Government and Iraqi leadVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:41 Mar 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\020514\86588 SHIRL
25

ership since we left the country. There are national elections 

planned in Iraq in April. 

We were successful after the surge in getting the Iraqi Government to participate in a more inclusive power sharing government 

that kind of mollified the Sunnis of Iraq and left al-Qaeda 

marginalized. Then after we left the Iraqis took another step backward. 

Now it was the Sunnis who were marginalized, drawing many of 

them toward al-Qaeda. What steps are we taking to ensure that 

the Sunnis are participating in these elections and that Iraq can 

return to that sort of power sharing government we saw in the 

post-surge Iraq? 

And continuing with the Shi’a-Sunni issue we’ve seen over the 

last few days that the Iraqi military has been bombarding Fallujah, 

which was taken over by al-Qaeda late last year, presumably preparing the way for a ground assault. 

However, the Shi’a-dominated Maliki government cannot successfully take Fallujah on its own without the help of the Sunni tribal 

leaders in the region. Can you describe the current—our relationship between the Maliki government and these tribal leaders and 

do you think Maliki will be able to gain their support, given 

Maliki’s crackdown on Sunnis in Iraq for these past few years? 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you. 

Let me take the topics in order. On the Jewish archives, as you 

know this is a very sensitive topic. I’ve been working directly with 

the Iraqis on this. I was just in Iraq and raised it with those officials who are charged with the file. We are engaged in sensitive negotiations with the Iraqis. 

In the coming weeks, the director of Iraq’s National Library and 

Archives will be coming to the United States and, again, I hope to 

report progress on this. But we’re engaged and it’s a sensitive negotiation but I will keep you fully informed of those talks. 

On Camp Liberty, on specifically on the issue T-walls, I have, 

again, made a number of trips to Iraq and every time I go from 

Maliki on down I raise the issue of T-walls. We got T-walls moving 

back into the camp earlier this month. They stopped. 

I raised it again last Thursday with the Iraqi national security 

advisor. I understand this morning T-walls are moving into the 

camp again. I visited the survivors and residents at Camp Liberty 

earlier this month. I told them I promised I would do everything 

I could. 

I also urged them to do everything they could and that meant 

showing up at these camp management meetings where plans are 

made to move the T-walls into the camp. This is an issue I’m going 

to continue to stay on top of. 

On the issue of elections and Sunni participation, as I said in my 

testimony we are focused to holding elections on April 30th. This 

will be the third full term election for a 4-year government, first 

one December 2005 and then 2010 and then this year. 

As you may know, the head of the main Sunni coalition, Osama 

al-Nujaifi, was in the United States 2 weeks ago. He had meetings 

with the President and the Vice President. He met the Secretary 

of State at his home. 

26

So we are very focused on making sure that the elections happen, 

that they produce a genuine and credible result and that they allow 

a government to reform that reflects the make-up of Iraqi society 

with all represented. 

In Fallujah, as I described in my testimony the plan is to have 

the tribes out in front but with the army in support because this 

is—they face—ISIL is an army. They have heavy weapons. They 

have 50-caliber sniper rifles. They are very well trained and very 

well fortified. 

So we have to have the Sunnis, tribal local people out in front 

but they will require security support. And General Austin was in 

Iraq last week for direct talks with Iraqi military commanders. We 

are advising the commanders as best we can, building on the lessons that we learned in these areas for tactical and strategic patience, for planning and to make sure that civilian casualties are 

minimized. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

I know how hard you have been working, and to paraphrase Ambassador Crocker everything about Iraq is hard all the time. So 

please keep making progress. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Sherman of California. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There was bipartisan support for leaving a residual force in Iraq. That required a status of forces agreement with 

the Maliki government, and the status of forces agreement would 

have had to have included immunity for our soldiers so that they 

would not be subject to Iraqi courts. 

We ask our soldiers, Marines, airmen, et cetera, to take many 

risks. One of them we don’t ask them to take is the idea that their 

actions would be held up to judgment in a court in Iraq or a court 

in Afghanistan, for that matter. 

We didn’t get a status of forces agreement. One theory is the administration blew the negotiations. The other view is the Maliki 

government was in place when this administration got there. 

Maliki didn’t have to give immunity to our troops and chose not to. 

We’ve seen that these immunity agreements are difficult for a 

host country to provide. Karzai isn’t providing them and there are 

several elements of Iranian history going back 70 or 80 years 

where the Shah was held up to great ridicule for providing such 

immunity agreements. 

Did we fail to get a status of forces agreement because we blew 

the negotiations or, given the political reality starting with Maliki, 

was there simply no way to get the immunity? 

Mr. MCGURK. First, keying on the history is really important 

here. The history of immunity agreements, particularly in this region, is really what colors the entire debate. 

The negotiation in 2007 and 2008 took almost 18 months, and 

while we got those two agreements passed, the security agreement 

which allowed our forces to stay for 3 more years with immunities 

and a permanent strategic framework agreement they barely 

passed. 

They passed on the last possible day and almost by the skin of 

their teeth, and I was working on that issue with Ambassador 

Crocker for almost 18 months. 

27

Mr. SHERMAN. This is passing the Iraqi Parliament? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes, the Iraqi Parliament. Our legal requirements 

in 2011 were that another follow-on agreement would have to go 

through the Iraqi Parliament. 

It was the assessment of the Iraqi political leaders and also of 

our leadership that it was unlikely to pass and therefore the decision was made that our troops leave by the end of 2011. 

But we still have a permanent strategic framework agreement. 

That agreement has passed the Iraqi Parliament. It was ratified in 

2008 and it provides us a strong basis for providing security assistance to the Iraqis. 

It does not provide us a basis for having boots on the ground and 

a training presence. But we do train Iraqi special forces under our 

Office of Security Cooperation through the Embassy and we’re also 

in discussions with regional partners for having a training presence. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I want to move on to another question. 

Has there been discussion of the U.S. Air Force or other air 

force—naval air forces bombing these al-Qaeda camps rather than 

us providing huge amounts of weaponry to Maliki so that he can 

try to do it himself? And has there been discussion of U.S. Air 

Force’s preventing overflights by the Iranians since the Iraqis say 

they can’t control their own airspace? 

Mr. MCGURK. No, there’s not been discussion of a direct U.S. role 

in controlling Iraqi airspace or in targeting the camps. We’re very 

focused on increasing the Iraqi capacity to be able to target camps 

and they’ve proven effective in recent months. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would point out that if only we were bombing 

al-Qaeda camps before—the years before 9/11 we may have had a 

very different history. 

We see the residents of Camp Ashraf, 52 of them killed last September—in December, another four killed. The Secretary of State 

has appointed a special advisor on MEK resettlement. 

What is the status of protecting these folks while they’re there 

and insisting that Iraq meet its legal obligations to do so and of 

finding homes outside the region for some of the residents? 

Mr. MCGURK. Let me make a couple points. When I was here in 

November, I explained that there is a cell, we believe, trained by 

Iran and it is dedicated to attacking the MEK at Camp Liberty. 

We had cells trained by Iran dedicated to attacking us when we 

had a military presence in Iraq. We did everything we could to root 

those cells out and it was very difficult. We were never able to do 

so. 

So the only place that these people will be safe is outside of Iraq 

and that’s why we are focused, as you said. Jonathan Weiner has 

been appointed to work this issue full time as a senior advisor for 

MEK resettlement to find a safe secure relocation for the residents 

of Camp Liberty. 

But while they’re at Camp Liberty, the governor of Iraq has an 

obligation to do everything it can to keep them safe and that 

means T-walls and that means protection and that is something we 

raise constantly to make sure that they are getting as much protection as possible. 

28

You also mentioned some other notable developments and there’s 

finally some real international tension to this urgent humanitarian 

crisis. First, there is a U.N.-created resettlement fund. 

We have notified Congress for $1 million to put into that resettlement fund. When I was in Iraq last week on Tuesday, the Iraqi 

cabinet authorized $500,000 to be allocated to that resettlement 

fund. 

The United Nations has also appointed Jane Holl Lute full time 

basis to focus on MEK resettlement. So we are getting some 

progress and I look forward to working with you and the committee 

and the Congress to try to move this forward in the coming weeks. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary 

McGurk, thank you for your service and thank you for being here 

today. Just a few questions. 

You mentioned that on January 1st and reminded us 70 to 100 

trucks entered Fallujah and Ramadi. Was that a tactical surprise 

on the part of the ISIL or did we have intelligence that suggested 

they were mustering and that they were about to move or did the 

Iraqis have that intelligence, and if we did what was done with 

that? 

Secondly, you talked about how the suicide bombers in a turn of 

twisted logic has become the most precious resource and, ominously, you point out that in November 2012 there were three suicide bombings and that has gone up to 50. 

What is the glide scope on that? Is that continually expanding 

as—do we expect it to be 100 by November of next year or has that 

ebbed? If you could speak to that issue. 

Third, you point out that ISIS has set their sights on Baghdad 

in the south. You quote Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on January 21st. 

How seriously is that threat to Baghdad? 

Fourth, if you could, you point out the ISIL execution of Iraqi soldiers, that the Maliki soldiers did not take the bait—the army. But 

is that something that’s ongoing? Are they executing police? Are 

they holding prisoners in center city Fallujah or the central part 

of it, I should say, of Fallujah? 

And then when it comes to the issue of Christians, the USCIRF 

report—the Commission of Religious Freedom points out that the 

Iraqi Government continues to tolerate systematic, ongoing and 

egregious religious freedom violations and that is against a number 

of the smaller sects, many of them going back 2,000 years including 

the Chaldo-Assyrians. 

What is happening? What kind of pressure are we trying to put 

on that government to get them to mitigate and hopefully completely end their repression of Christians in Iraq? 

And finally, you talked about the low boil type of insurgency that 

this represents. Are we looking at the possibility of another Syria 

in Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Congressman. Let me try to address 

these issues, first, in terms of the entry into Fallujah and Ramadi. 

We started to see, as the Iraqis started to hit some of the encampments, kind of moving around of the ISIL forces and trying 

to relocate. Their entre en masse on New Year’s Day was a surprise. 

29

Again, I think it was a tactical mistake on ISIL’s part. This isn’t 

going to turn overnight but there has been a response. As I described in my testimony, in Ramadi the response developed fairly 

rapidly to actually expel them from the streets. In Fallujah, it’s 

going to be far harder. 

But one thing that—the Sunnis in Anbar Province they may not 

like the government. They may not even trust the army. But they 

really don’t like these foreign jihadist fighters. 

So we’re trying to kind of gather common cause against them. In 

terms of the suicide bombers, the average now is about 30 to 40 

a week. I don’t think this will be an exponential rise. I’m hoping 

that the—kind of 50 might be, you know, a cap. 

We saw this problem and phenomenon in the past and what we 

did in 2006 and 2008 was a very concerted regional wide effort—

how do you get these people with a one-way ticket—then they’re 

flying into Damascus—military-age males with a one-way to Damascus off the airplanes, and we were fairly effective actually at 

draining the flow, and one thing that drained the flow was increasing security in western Iraq. So we’re going to try to recreate that 

strategy throughout the region. 

ISIL’s strategy to attack the south—they are trying to attack the 

south. I would not be surprised if they’re on the same play book 

from 2006. You may remember that after the election in December 

2005 it was in late February that al-Qaeda in Iraq then attacked 

the Samarra mosque, which really kind of led to the sectarian violence which you saw for the next 2 years. 

I think they are going to try to attack very high profile targets 

in the south, particularly religiously symbolic targets. I hope and 

I don’t think they will be successful. I think the Iraqis have those 

areas pretty well protected. But it’s definitely part of their strategy. 

In terms of Fallujah, yes, we do believe that Iraqi soldiers are 

being held in Fallujah and, as I said, these extremists are fighters. 

They’re trying to goad the army into a direct urban confrontation. 

So far, despite some rhetoric you might see about storming 

Fallujah, that is not the strategy that is underway. But the government does have responsibility working with the local people to secure Fallujah and I think there will be—there will be fighting, particularly in the outskirts and then later in the central city. 

But we’re going to try to make sure it is as contained as possible. 

And on Christians, a very good question. We’re very focused on the 

plight of Christians in Iraq but also throughout the region. 

When Prime Minister Maliki was here he acknowledged in his 

public remarks the importance of taking care of the Christian community. In October, he met with Patriarch Sako, the head of the 

Chaldean Church. 

When I am in Iraq I try to meet with Christian leaders. I met 

with Archbishop Warda in Erbil a couple months ago and tried to 

focus on some of their land disputes they’re having there. The Iraqi 

cabinet recently passed a resolution to talk about carving out a 

Christian province to allow them some autonomy and security. 

Again, this is something that we continue to develop. I’m going 

to be meeting with an Iraqi Christian leader tomorrow in my office. 

So we’re very focused on it but it’s an extremely, extremely difficult 

30

issue. Christians are threatened by these extremists as are Sunnis 

and everybody—Sunni, Shi’a, everybody. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Sires of New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being 

here. 

You know, the ties between Iraq and Iran seems to be getting 

closer. They signed a defense—have a defense treaty that supposedly they put together. 

I am concerned that maybe the safety of people at Camp Liberty 

the Iraqis are not making the effort that they really need to secure 

these people. If I’m making an arms contract with—a treaty with 

Iran, why would I be so intent on the safety of these people? 

Just in December they keep firing rockets into this—into this 

camp. So how sure are you that they’re making the best possible 

effort to bring security to this camp? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, the issue remains extremely, extremely difficult. There was a rocket attack in the camp earlier this 

month and I would just remind you there was a rocket attack at 

Camp Cropper, which is right near Camp Liberty which used to 

house our soldiers, and we took casualties as late as summer of 

2011, and that’s when we had about 70,000 troops in the country 

trying to stop this kind of activity. 

It’s very difficult to deter and to root out a well-trained team 

with rockets and that is why we’re trying to move as much protection into the camp as possible. That’s why I went to the camp myself—to see it, to meet with the residents and to try to assess the 

security and protection. It remains a very difficult issue. 

I’ll be honest. The MEK doesn’t like the Iraqi Government. The 

Iraqi Government doesn’t like the MEK, and it’s a very dynamic 

issue and all we got to do is stay on the MEK to do everything they 

can to cooperate, to move the residents to a safe and secure location and stay on the government. 

Every time I meet with the leaders of the government I mention 

this issue. Despite all the other issues they’re dealing with, I mention it every single time and as I said, I just received a report this 

morning that T-walls are moving back into the camp and we’re 

going to make sure that they continue to move back in the camp 

tomorrow, the next day and the day after. 

Mr. SIRES. How concerned are you about the treaty between Iraq 

and Iran, this defense treaty, the arms going into Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. The Iraqis have been pretty careful to draw a line 

in terms of security cooperation with Iran and so far they’ve kept 

that line fairly firm. So I’ve seen reports like that but I would not 

take it too seriously. 

Iraq has made—the Iraqis have made clear they want a longterm institutional relationship with the United States and they 

want the United States to be the backbone of their military, and 

that’s why they want platforms like an Apache helicopter system. 

When we sell a country an Apache helicopter we’re not just giving them an attack helicopter. We’re actually—we’re buying a 30-

year relationship in terms of training pilots, logistics, maintenance 

and that’s why we feel it’s so important. 

31

The F–16 program is the same. We want Iraq to have a longterm institutional relationship military to military with the United 

States. In General Austin’s visit to Iraq last week he, of course, 

knows the Iraqi commanders. They’ve led together in the streets 

and the fields of Baghdad and the outskirts and all throughout 

Iraq and they have very deep, deep relationships. 

And I was in those meetings and you cannot get a deeper relationship than people who have fought side by side, and that is 

something that we are going to continue to develop. You know, 

Maliki is the Prime Minister now. He might be the Prime Minister 

after the coming elections. He might not be. 

What we’re focused on is building an institutional relationship 

with the Iraqi Government and the institutions—the military, the 

Parliament, something that’s going to last for many, many years. 

Mr. SIRES. And the sale of Russian arms to Iraq, are you concerned about that at all—$4 billion, whatever it was? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. I don’t want Iraqis buying Russian hardware 

and, you know, but I have to be honest. Given the security situation there’s a lot of strategic competitors in Baghdad showing up, 

knocking on the same doors we’re knocking on and saying hey, 

we’re here to sell you an attack helicopter, just write a check. 

We have a system through our foreign military sales system, 

which is a good system, it makes sure that the stuff arrives with 

a long-term institutional relationship, as I discussed. But it’s slow 

and cumbersome. 

Earlier this month, I was in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other 

countries and there was a lot of, you know, complaints about our 

foreign military sales system is too slow. We hear the same thing 

from the Iraqis. 

But I want Iraq to buy U.S. equipment because that buys a longterm strategic relationship. So yes, you know, it’s unfortunate that 

they bought the MI–35s from the Russians but on the other hand, 

you know, they kept telling us they were going to do it if we 

couldn’t get them the Apaches fast enough. 

Mr. SIRES. And there’s no consideration to giving them drones, 

right? Selling drones to the Iraqis? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, we are selling them unmanned UAVs. Not 

armed drones but we’re selling them——

Mr. SIRES. I meant armed. 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. No, armed drones is not under consideration. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

We now turn to Mr. Rohrabacher for his questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and we’re all impressed with your knowledge level you’re able to do this and from 

your memory and we’re impressed by that. I’m impressed by that. 

But that doesn’t mean that I agree with your assessment. 

Let me just say that the idea that—we’re talking about Camp 

Ashraf. It seems that fundamentally you’re suggesting that our approach to try to stop the massacre—the ongoing massacre of the 

people at Camp Liberty that we basically have to go to the Maliki 

government and ask them and the problem is they’re not providing 

enough security. 

32

The Maliki government is responsible for these deaths. I don’t 

understand. The military, the Iraqi military, invaded Camp Ashraf 

and murdered people. These are the people under Maliki’s command did that. 

They recently went into—the 50 that were so left at Camp 

Ashraf, tied their hands behind their back and shot them in the 

back of the head and it was Maliki’s own military we know who 

did that. 

We know that the Camp Ashraf and these people were attacked 

numerous times by the Iraqi military. This isn’t whether Maliki 

and his people are not protecting the MEK. This is a crime against 

humanity. These are unarmed refugees in which Maliki’s own 

troops are murdering. 

We’re not talking about, you know, rockets that we don’t know 

where they come from. We’re talking about actual—by the way, I 

would suggest that they probably know about those rockets as well. 

Maliki—let’s make it very clear. As far as I’m concerned and as 

far as many people in Washington are concerned, Maliki is an accomplice to the murders that are going on, and as an accomplice 

we should not be treating him, begging him, to have a residual 

force of U.S. troops in order to help his regime. 

I don’t understand why the United States feels like—we feel compelled to be part of all of this. Why do we feel compelled that we 

have to go in and be in the middle of a fight between people who 

are murdering each other? Thirty to 40 suicide bombers a month? 

Thousands of people are losing their lives to this insanity. 

Why should the United States, tell me—this is my question—

why does the United States feel that we need to become part of this 

insanity and does that not instead turn both of the parties against 

us? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, the suicide bomber phenomenon, it 

is complete insanity. I agree with you. 

When you look at Iraq and you look at the region and you define 

our interests, and I don’t go with any leader and beg for anything 

but we protect and advance U.S. interests as we define them, and 

in Iraq, whether you like it or not, oil, al-Qaeda, Iran, vital U.S. 

interests are at stake in Iraq. So we need to do what we can without putting U.S. personnel——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Why shouldn’t we let them kill each other? 

Let them kill each other. I’m sorry. If it means that we’re going to 

spend our treasure and more of our blood—we’ve already spent 

thousands of lives of American soldiers. 

We’ve done enough, and I’m so happy that you now can report 

to us that your negotiations to provide a residual American military force in Iraq was not successful because I’m very happy that 

we don’t have a bunch of American troops in the middle of that 

mess. 

And if we’re not even—we are not even capable of letting Maliki 

know that we’re holding him responsible for the murders in his 

own ranks, for the people—for the military that he commands to 

go into Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty and murder unarmed refugees. 

This is a no-win situation for us. Both sides seem to be evil—

both sides or all the sides. One last question. I’ve got 30 seconds. 

33

Who is financing? You talked about 100 trucks and all of this 

equipment costs money. Bullets even cost money. AK–47s cost 

money. Rockets cost money. Who is paying for all of that, the mayhem on both sides of this fight? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, I defer to my intelligence colleagues 

for the specific funding. But we believe it’s the whole source of 

funding but private funding from throughout the region funding 

the global jihadist movement which is now really based in Syria 

and the region. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is that the Saudis? 

Mr. MCGURK. Again, I would have to defer to my intelligence colleagues for that sort of information. But a lot of it is private—you 

know, private funding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Private funds. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. McGurk, while you’re on the subject—

while we’re on the subject, did you want to share any details in 

terms of the attack on Camp Ashraf and, in your judgment, who 

you believe was involved in that, since that was the question at 

hand? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the last time I was here I discussed what we know. We 

believe it was a militia. We believe the militia was trained by Iran 

and that’s really the primary responsibility, and we have—since 

that very horrific attack we worked to get the survivors out of 

Camp Ashraf, which is about, you know, 40 miles from the Iranian 

border, and onto Camp Liberty. 

Camp Liberty is not safe but it’s safer. We have the U.N. in the 

camp every day monitoring the camp and, again, when I go to try 

to go to the camp and meet with the survivors and the residents 

there. So we’re doing——

Chairman ROYCE. And you’re making efforts right now to relocate the survivors? 

Mr. MCGURK. Absolutely. Yes. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We’re going to go now to Mr. Gerry 

Connolly from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. 

McGurk. 

Couple of questions first. The authorization for the use of military force, the administration has indicated it would not oppose the 

repeal of that. Is the issue the timing with respect to, say, pending 

elections in Iraq? Might it disrupt things you’re doing in Iraq if we 

were to do that now? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, I don’t think there’s much focus on 

that in Iraq so I don’t think it would make much of a difference——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. 

Mr. MCGURK [continuing]. In terms of from the Iraqi perspective. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That’s good to know. Okay. 

Elections in April still on schedule? 

Mr. MCGURK. We—our team at the Embassy is talking every day 

to the United Nations assistant mission in Iraq and the Iraqi High 

Electoral Commission, which are planning elections, and the information I have received most recently is that elections do remain on 

track. 

34

We have tens of thousands of displaced families from Anbar 

Province. We have been assured by those planning the elections 

that displaced people will still be able to vote and the vote will 

count as if they were in their home province. 

So we are still confident the election will be held on April 30th 

and our consistent position and very firm position is that those 

elections have to be held on April 30th. There should not be a 

delay. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What a novel thought, allowing people to vote remotely—a thought here for the United States. 

But Fallujah—help us understand what happened. I mean, the 

United States has been involved now for 12 years. Billions and billions of dollars—we’ve reconstituted the Iraqi military. We have 

trained, you know, law enforcement forces. 

We spent our military’s blood and treasure to gain a foothold, to 

gain Fallujah, and, you know, al-Qaeda’s success or organization 

manages to occupy it. And if I understood your testimony correctly, 

we’re now once again relying on tribal support to essentially dislodge the occupying forces in Fallujah. 

How in the world—isn’t that an indictment of the investments 

we’ve made in the Iraqi military and its inability to hold its own 

territory secure? 

Mr. MCGURK. The Iraqi military would have the numbers and 

the equipment to go into Fallujah tomorrow and clean out the 

streets. We believe that were they to do an assault like that that 

it would actually exacerbate the problem. So——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I guess—excuse me 1 second, Mr. McGurk. 

I don’t mean—but before you get there, but how did it happen 

in the first place? How is it that the Iraqi Government was not able 

to secure something as symbolically important if not really important as Fallujah? 

Mr. MCGURK. As I tried to explain in my testimony, there was 

a series of events throughout 2013 including a protest movement 

which kind of added to the political instability in the region, and 

in Fallujah in particular it is an area, as we know, any outsiders 

coming into Fallujah are resisted and that includes the Iraqi army, 

it included us and it includes, we hope now, these al-Qaeda extremists. 

You know, all I can say is we are where we are right now and 

we’re helping the Iraqis develop a plan—they’re developing a plan, 

one that will lead—I say tribal fighters. What we really mean is 

that the local people, local population who know the streets, who 

are able to actually identify the foreign elements and push them 

out. 

But right now in Fallujah, it’s a mix of al-Qaeda, former insurgent groups and former Ba’athist networks who are in control of 

the streets there. It has always been a very difficult place and so 

it’s just a very difficult territory to operate in. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The tribal support we’re relying on or cooperating with what is their attitude toward the Maliki government? I 

mean, because doesn’t some of that support and cooperation, isn’t 

some of that a function of how they view the central government? 

35

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. Certainly, there’s tremendous mistrust in the 

area of Fallujah toward the central government. There’s no question about that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And does that impede our ability to try to dislodge the occupation forces in Fallujah? 

Mr. MCGURK. It does. It makes it—it makes it harder. As I said, 

some tribes are actually working with the extremists. Some are 

now working to oust them and many others are on the fence, and 

that’s why it’s incumbent upon the central government through resources and through dialogue and communication to mobilize the 

population against them. 

And when we worked with the Awakening we did three things. 

We trusted them, we funded them but also significantly we protected them. They thought they were going to win. 

Sheikh Abdul Sattar, who was the head of the Awakening in the 

early days, we parked two M–1 tanks in front of his villa and he 

was still killed by a suicide bomber. 

So, you know, this is a very tough area and these are tough folks. 

But the tribal leaders need to know that they’re going to be supported and they believe they’re going to win, and that’s why 

Maliki’s commitment most recently to give tribal fighters all the 

benefits of an Iraqi soldier and to incorporate those fighters into 

the security structures of the state, meaning they’ll have a livelihood going forward to protect their people, is a very significant 

commitment. 

It’s one that’s never been made before and we now need to make 

sure that we hold the government to it and follow through. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Judge Ted Poe from Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to talk about what you probably thought I would talk 

about today is the MEK. The last time you were here and you testified before my subcommittee and the chairwoman, Ileana RosLehtinen’s, subcommittee I made the statement that there would 

probably be more attacks on Camp Liberty and, unfortunately, I 

was correct. Camp Liberty was attacked again—four people killed, 

seven injured. One young man lost both of his legs. 

Since 2009, there have been seven attacks on Camp Liberty or 

Camp Ashraf. During that time, 19 times members of the State Department have testified. Most of those or many of those were about 

Camp Liberty in addition to other things. 

In all those attacks, to my knowledge as of today, not one person 

has been captured or charged with any of those killings—not one, 

and they’re still on the loose. 

As I alluded to in my testimony, I personally believe that the 

Maliki government is in cahoots with the Iranian Government to 

let Camp Liberty, Camp Ashraf be subject to attacks. These last attacks, from my understanding, were rockets came in that were 

three meters long, 40 of them. 

It seems impossible to me that a rogue Iranian militia could 

sneak those by anybody and then fire them over a period of time 

and cause this chaos and murder, and I bring this up for several 

reasons. 

36

One, it hadn’t been resolved. But this has become very personal 

to people who live in my district. I represent people who are Iranian-Americans. They know these people that are being killed. 

They are family. They are friends. And they come and they visit 

and they tell us it’s happened again, Judge Poe, with tears in their 

eyes. 

So it’s become personal. Many of those people are sitting behind 

you and they come up here wanting help. That’s all they want. The 

United States has, you know, said that we promised to help them. 

We’ve just—we no longer recognize them as a foreign terrorist organization. They just want their loved ones safe, safe first from the 

constant attacks by the—well, I believe the Iraqi and the Iranians 

working together, but long term they want to leave. They want to 

be in a safe country. 

Now, when you visited, and I commend you for going to visit the 

camp, did you see these—what looked like graves but they are really—what these are used for the people at Camp Liberty are in such 

fear of their lives they no longer stay in these trailer houses here. 

They have dug themselves what looks like a grave to hide in 

when the attacks come from the rockets and they dig these and 

they put sandbags around them and then they’re ready for the next 

attack. 

They jump in these things. Some of them sleep in these things 

at night, even in the rain, to try to be safe—literally digging their 

own graves. 

This is—it seems to me this is a fairly tragic situation when people live like this in fear of where they are, whether it’s the Iraqis, 

whether it’s the Iranians or both. Were you able—did you see any 

of this when you were there, these—what they use as now foxholes 

to hide in from the rockets? 

Mr. MCGURK. I didn’t see that particular lane but I saw some of 

the bunkers in the—at the camp. 

Mr. POE. Well, I’m sure you’ll see it on your next visit. But, now, 

this is what they have resorted to for their own safety. I think that 

is an international human rights concern. It should be. 

The T-walls—you mentioned T-walls are coming. My understanding they hadn’t gotten any T-walls today. Seventeen thousand 

of them were removed in a short period of time. Now they’re wanting to put them back in slowly. It’s a safety hazard. 

They just want these T-walls to be safe. They ought to move 

them in now. The other concern that I wanted to mention is the 

resettlement issue. They want to leave Iraq. We want them to 

leave. The Iraqis want them to leave. 

The Iranians want them to—I’m not so sure what the Iranians 

want. But the West constantly says because the United States has 

not taken any of these people we’re not going to take them either. 

When the U.S. starts leading by example rather than just talking 

about removing these people then maybe we’ll take them as well. 

Why haven’t these folks been sent to other countries? Why 

haven’t we taken some of them or all of them? That’s my first question. And the second question is when you visited with the survivors of the Ashraf Camp attack, did they tell you who they believed was responsible for attacking them and killing their families 

and their friends? Those are the two questions I have. 

37

Mr. MCGURK. Let me, first, say in terms of accountability, a 

Shi’a militia leader who took responsibility for the attacks openly 

and was on Iraqi television giving interviews, taking responsibility 

for attacking the camp. We thought it was ridiculous that this guy 

was walking the streets inciting people to attack the camp. 

He was arrested by Iraqi security forces and is detained and is 

being investigated. So that is something that happened in the last 

month. I agree with you that this is an international human rights 

concern. 

That is why, as I mentioned in my response earlier, I find it encouraging that there is now United Nations focus with the resettlement fund, a full time person at the United Nations to focus on 

this issue. 

And as you also correctly point out, very few countries around 

the world, despite the international human rights concern, have 

agreed to take the residents into their territory—Albania, Germany, a total of about 350. So we still have almost 2,900 people 

at the camp. 

This is an international human rights concern and it has to be 

treated with the utmost urgency. As you know, we are considering 

options to relocate and integrate camp residents in the United 

States, in close coordination with the White House Department of 

Homeland Security and other relevant agencies, and any eligible 

residents would have to be fully vetted, of course, under our standards by the Department of Homeland Security. That is something 

that we are actively, actively, actively considering, I can assure 

you. 

But we also, and I would encourage those who care about the 

residents as do we to lobby other capitals around the world, given 

that this is an international human rights concern, to take residents into their territory because so long as they are in Iraq they 

will not be safe. 

And you’re right, four residents of the camp lost their lives, tragically, this month. Nine hundred Iraqis also lost their lives this 

month. 

Iraq is a very violent place and particularly the residents at 

Camp Liberty will not be safe until they leave and that is why we 

have a full time person working on it. 

We encourage the U.N. and they have now appointed a full time 

person to work on the problem and we have a U.N. resettlement 

fund to encourage other countries to take the residents in, and 

until they’re out of Iraq they won’t be safe. 

Chairman ROYCE. And now we go to Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGurk, thanks for being here. Thanks for your thoughtful 

testimony. 

Last year, we wrote a letter to the Prime Minister about the 

flight—the overflights of Iranian aircraft. There are reports that 

the number of overflights from Iran has increased, that these are 

flights that Iran sends to arm Hezbollah to expand their influence 

in Syria to defend the Assad regime even as it slaughters—continues to slaughter its own people. 

38

How do you characterize Prime Minister Maliki’s relationship 

with Iran? 

Mr. MCGURK. Let me say a couple words about Iran’s nefarious 

role in Iraq. 

Just like al-Qaeda has exploited the grievances of the Sunni community, Iran is exploiting the fears and apprehensions of the Shi’a 

community as they are attacked by these al-Qaeda extremists. 

So it’s a vicious cycle that Iran very much takes advantage of in 

their most extreme elements of that regime and the Quds Force. 

Maliki, and we discuss this with him all the time, you know, 

tries to balance all these many pressures that come at Baghdad 

from the region and from internal debates. 

He is under great pressure from his constituency, particularly 

among the Shi’a who continue to get attacked by these extremist 

groups. But so far we have seen the Iraqi Government resist the 

Iranian efforts to have a direct security role in Iraq. 

Iran still, we believe, controls certain militia groups in Iraq, although their activities are not nearly to the level that they were 

4 or 5 years ago. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So they’ve resisted Iran’s efforts to play a more significant role in Iraq but they’ve resisted the efforts of many of us 

here to convince them to play a more significant role in stopping 

these overflights. Why don’t they do it? 

Mr. MCGURK. Again, the overflights are something that—all I 

can say is we continue to raise the overflight issue. We believe 

some of this material, a lot of it, is coming on civilian flights. 

We do have certain agreements with the Iraqis, which we look 

forward to testing as soon as we have intelligence we’re able to 

share with them in terms of actually catching a flight in the act. 

But we’ve not been able to test that yet. So——

Mr. DEUTCH. I’m sorry. Say that again. You’ve—explain that. 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, we have agreements with Iraq. It’s very hard 

to get a precise intelligence picture in terms of what’s coming on 

a flight and when. It’s just very difficult. 

But when we do—and we’ve worked with countries around the 

region in similar circumstances—when we do we hope to be able 

to work with the Iraqis to be able to make sure that we’re able to 

stop or deter that flight. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. Here’s what I’m—here’s what I’m trying to 

get at. It is difficult to identify what’s on the planes. I understand 

that. 

Much of the frustration that I have on this issue is frustration 

generally with what’s happening in Syria and the ongoing assertion 

by so many that it’s hard. 

So much about Syria is hard, and it’s difficult even as there are 

now more than 130,000 Syrians who have been slaughtered. So this 

is one very small area where it is difficult. 

Yet, do you believe that the Maliki government, that the Prime 

Minister discounts the suggestion that there are planes flying from 

Iran full of weapons that are flying over Iraq with those weapons 

to be delivered to Hezbollah, used to prop up Assad’s regime and 

to kill the Syrian people? 

Mr. MCGURK. Do I believe he believes that and knows it’s actually happening? 

39

Mr. DEUTCH. Mm-hmm. Right. 

Mr. MCGURK. I think we’ve given him enough information to provide a reasonable assurance. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Then when do we start—how do we test these? You 

said we need to start testing some of this. When are we going to 

start testing? How do we do that? 

How do we—this is—again, this is one very discrete and this—

I’m just bringing in everything else that goes into Syria at the moment, which this committee had focused on extensively and will 

continue to focus on extensively. 

But with this one very discrete area, one very discrete point—

that is, weapons from Iran to Hezbollah that fly over Iraq—it’s one 

very discrete area where perhaps we can have some—play some 

greater role in making it even slightly more difficult for Hezbollah 

to help Assad as he murders his own people, slightly more difficult 

if our ally in Iraq plays a more constructive role. 

So how do we test that? How do we get—how do we make that 

happen? 

Mr. MCGURK. First, I would be happy to come discuss in a different setting specifically some of the issues related to this topic. 

But I can just put you in the picture. When we have these conversations with Iraqi officials and leaders, as soon as you mention 

Syria what they talk about in Syria is the threat that is coming 

from Syria into Iraq and it’s a very real threat, and that is, like, 

their primary threat perception coming from Syria. 

We explain that the reason the terrorist groups are entrenching 

in Syria is partially due to Assad who, as the Secretary said, is a 

terror magnet, and so long as the Assad regime is able to be 

strengthened this vicious cycle is going to go on. The Iraqis have 

signed up to Geneva 1 communique. 

They’ve done some things consistent with our efforts to try to put 

pressure on Assad, and on the overflight issue all I can say I’ve 

been in Iraq twice this month and has raised this issue specifically 

to get inspections increased again, and the next time I’m here I 

hope to report some progress. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Mr. McGurk. Yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Deutch. We go now to Mr. George Holding 

of North Carolina. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGurk, I appreciate your level of knowledge and facility 

with the facts and your ability to communicate them. 

In numerous answers you detailed the support that Iran is giving 

to militias in Iraq and to al-Qaeda-related and successor al-Qaeda 

groups in Iraq who are propagating this violence and undoing, I 

think, a lot of the good work that we were able to do in Iraq. 

In addition to that, where the Maliki government may be able to 

disavow it and say that, you know, we’re not supportive of what 

Iran is doing in Iraq on that level, there are other areas which are 

in contravention of the sanctions that we’ve placed on Iran such as 

in the energy area—the energy sector. 

You know, it’s come to light that in the Basra Province, you 

know, Iran and Iraq are negotiating the building of a pipeline to 

supply gas into two new power plants there, this all in contravention, you know, of the sanctions. 

40

Are we putting Iraq on notice that this is in contravention to the 

sanctions and detrimental to what we perceive as our interest? 

Mr. MCGURK. A very good question and this is also an ongoing 

topic of conversation. They share a 3,000-kilometer border so there 

is trade. There’s cultural ties. It’s impossible to stop everything. 

The Iraqis have been very conscious of trying to enforce—make 

sure that they are working consistent with our sanctions. In fact, 

they have not paid Iran for arrears that they’re owed for certain 

electricity payments because they believe that it might be 

sanctionable even though the banks in which they would pay are 

not sanctionable banks. 

So the Iraqis have tried to even go an extra mile in terms of a 

sanctionable—making sure that they are staying and keeping with 

our——

Mr. HOLDING. And with regard to financial institutions, I mean, 

there’s a great deal of evidence that, you know, the nature of the 

relationship between Iraqi financial institutions and Iranian financial institutions goes way beyond what would be permitted, you 

know, under the sanctions. 

Mr. MCGURK. I have to—maybe I could follow up with you specifically on this because it’s a very detailed topic. But Iraqi banks 

have cut off many transactions with Iranian banks simply due to 

reputational risk. 

Iraq has also increased its oil output while Iran has asked them 

not to do that because we’ve taken 1 million barrels of Iranian oil 

off the market. 

So, again, this is constant. But the pipeline you mentioned is 

concerning. If that pipeline goes forward that could indeed fall 

afoul of our sanctions. 

Mr. HOLDING. You know, considering the extreme, you know, detriment to our interests from this Iranian support of militant groups 

in Iraq, is there any part of the nuclear deal that the administration is currently negotiating that would address these issues to, 

you know, put it as a condition? You know, Iran you’ve got to stop 

doing this. 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, the nuclear negotiation is focused 

solely on the nuclear proliferation issues but that does not mean 

that we are not also focused on——

Mr. HOLDING. So we’re not using any leverage or any of our capital in lifting the sanctions for the nuclear enrichment part of it to 

try to solve some of the other problems we’re having in Iraq with 

Iran? 

Mr. MCGURK. Given the existential threat that a nuclear-armed 

Iran would pose to our interests in the region, we focused the nuclear negotiations specifically on the nuclear issue to try to get at 

that. 

Mr. HOLDING. As far as Iranian support of Hezbollah which, as 

you say, pointed out that you’ve given Maliki clear, clear evidence 

of, you know, what’s going on as far as the overflights go and the 

supply of Hezbollah with Iranian weapons, is there any part in the 

nuclear negotiations that we’re doing now with Iran which would 

address Iranian support of Hezbollah fighters in Syria? 

41

Mr. MCGURK. Again, the nuclear negotiations are focussed on the 

nuclear proliferation issues specifically but that does not mean we 

don’t deal with the other issues on parallel and separate tracks. 

Mr. HOLDING. But, again, we’re not using any of the leverage 

that we have in the nuclear negotiations to try to address the situation we have with Hezbollah and Syria? 

Mr. MCGURK. We’re not discussing those through the nuclear 

channel, no. 

Mr. HOLDING. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. KINZINGER. The gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes 

Mr. Cicilline for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

McGurk, for being here and for your insightful testimony this 

morning. 

As you can imagine, events in Iraq are particularly difficult to 

hear about in light of the heroic sacrifice of American heroes and 

the billions and billions of dollars of taxpayer money expended in 

this region of the world and you acknowledge that in your written 

testimony, and I thank you for that. 

I’d ask you to first speak a little bit to the difference of events 

in Ramadi and Fallujah. It seems as if the turnaround in Ramadi 

was quick and fairly effective and, obviously, that is not the case 

in Fallujah. 

Would you speak a little bit about why that is, the extent of the 

coordination between the tribal fighters and the Iraqi Government 

and resource allocations between these two cities and any other 

factors which are contributing to either different outcomes or different strategies? 

Mr. MCGURK. I think Fallujah has always just been the most 

hardened—the most hardened part of the insurgency when we 

were fighting it and it’s just—it’s a different environment. 

If you look at the protest movement over 2013, the protests in 

Ramadi remained generally of a moderate tone focussed on the legitimate grievances of the community. The protests in Fallujah, 

which also took place every Friday, were far more militant, far 

more extremist. 

So it’s just a different environment, just like many, you know, 

cities in different countries have different cultures and different attitudes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And if I could just follow up on Congressman 

Deutch’s question, I think you said that most of the foreign fighters 

were Syrian. Is that right? 

Mr. MCGURK. No, foreign fighters who come in to Syria. So from 

the greater region and global jihadist-minded people who come in 

to Syria to fight jihad and are——

Mr. CICILLINE. Are then coming into Iraq. 

Mr. MCGURK [continuing]. Put into a suicide bomb track. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And so would you speak a little more about what 

the relationship is between the Maliki government and President 

Maliki in particular and President Assad? And so do they understand that by allowing these flyovers and potentially strengthening 

or prolonging the Assad regime they actually are undermining 

42

their ability to take back their own country from these same extremists. 

I mean, do they make that connection? What is the relationship 

between the Maliki administration—Maliki regime and the Assad 

regime? 

Mr. MCGURK. Maliki and the top leaders of the Iraqi Government, there’s no love lost with Bashar al-Assad. If you look at 

2009, Maliki was calling for Assad to be brought to a criminal court 

at the time based upon some bombings which happened in August 

2009 that the Iraqi Government blamed on the Syrian regime. 

Again, they’ve signed on to the Geneve communique which prefaces 

that there will be a transition without Bashar al-Assad. 

I’ll be perfectly candid. When we explained to them that Bashar 

al-Assad remaining in power is a magnet for jihadis and terrorists 

who are coming into Iraq that is a train of logic that many Iraqi 

officials don’t agree with, frankly. They believe that if Assad left 

that the regime would collapse and make the problem worse. 

So this is a constant—you know, just seeing the same picture we 

do they don’t see it but we believe very strongly, as the Secretary 

has said a number of times, and the President that Bashar alAssad in power is a magnet for these foreign fighters coming into 

Syria to fight a jihad. 

And until he is removed from power, we’re going to continue to 

be in this very vicious cycle which is going to have pernicious effects on all of Syria’s neighbors—Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, in particular. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But, I mean, what other tools do we have at our 

disposal to persuade the Maliki government that that is the case? 

Because otherwise we’re going to be left in a position where they’re 

going to continue to implicitly or explicitly support the Assad regime in the context of flyovers or other efforts. 

Mr. MCGURK. I think—you know, I just have to be really candid. 

I think over the next—particularly heading up to the election, 

Iraqis are going to be increasingly focused inward on their internal 

issues and internal politics and our hope is that after those elections with a new government up we will work with that government to really get at this problem. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And which leads to my final question. That is, is 

it clear to President Maliki and to the Iraqi leaders in general that 

the responsibility to defend their country is their responsibility and 

that their expectation should not be that the United States is going 

to fulfill that responsibility, that they have to—after a very long 

commitment from this country they have to take this responsibility 

of defending their country and doing the hard work of bringing stability and peace to their own country? 

Mr. MCGURK. Absolutely, and when General Austin was in Iraq 

last week, and I was in those meetings with him and Iraqi leaders, 

they all stressed four or five points. 

First, they want all of our support to be under the strategic 

framework agreement, which is a permanent foundation. That 

means institutional, military to military. They want training support and we’re talking about doing some training in Jordan or in 

the region. 

43

They want intelligence support and they want to let us know 

when they feel that they need weapons or systems that we can help 

them supply. So that is what they want, and they also want advice 

and recommendations for how to actually plan effectively. They do 

not want us to be in the lead in this fight. It’s their fight. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Gentleman from Rhode Island yields back. 

Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. McGurk, thank you for coming in. We really appreciate it. 

I appreciate your service to your country and dealing with these 

very tough issues. 

I’m, obviously, not very happy with what’s happening in Iraq and 

I’ve been very clear that I thought the withdrawal from Iraq was 

one of the biggest mistakes, I think, historically that’ll be shown 

that the United States has made in modern foreign policy. 

So I’m going to express a lot of concern with that. It’s not necessarily directed at you but it is directed at the decision by the administration. 

I’m a Air Force pilot and I served in Iraq a number of times and 

I remember specifically going there in 2008 and still, you know, 

watching the environment and seeing people hunker down, in essence, as there was still a threat of terrorism but they were starting to emerge. 

And I then I remember going in 2009 and seeing an Iraq that 

had completely turned around and actually as, you know, somebody 

there thinking hey, you know, we’re serving a purpose here—we’ve 

brought freedom to people, kids are out playing soccer. 

Even though most of our operations in some cases were directed 

against Iranian assets Iran is now—is known to be responsible for 

directly or indirectly the death of about half of the Americans in 

Iraq, including EFPs. And by the way, I might want to mention 

that we are now negotiating with Iran in terms of giving them 

their ability to enrich uranium. 

I’ll tell you another concern I had is I remember I was actually 

getting ready to fly a mission into Afghanistan back a few years 

ago when I heard the Senate majority leader from the other side 

of this building say that the war in Iraq was lost, and he still has 

his powerful position but he very quickly said that the war in Iraq 

is lost and it’s time to withdraw all the troops. 

And then President Bush made what I think is a very brave decision to not only not withdraw but to actually surge more troops 

and then we saw a great deal of success. 

I think the reason it’s important to revisit these decisions is not 

beating a dead horse but it’s the fact that we’re getting ready to 

face the same kind of decision in Afghanistan. 

Are we a country tired of war and we’re going to pull out and 

have to deal with this shameful thing that we’ve seen in Fallujah, 

the equivalent of that in Afghanistan now, or are we going to learn 

lessons from the past? And I think it’s very important to learn 

those lessons. 

I’ve got a question—a couple of quick questions. There used to 

be a policy in this country that anywhere al-Qaeda exists they 

should know that there’s no safe haven. I think President Bush 

44

talked about that there’s no safe haven for terrorists anywhere in 

the country. 

We see in Iraq right now they in essence appear to be somewhat 

safe. Hopefully, the Iraqi Government can push against them. We 

see the same type of situation in Syria and I’m for intervention in 

Syria. I want to be very clear about that. 

Has this—does this—is this a change in the administration from 

the Bush policy of no safe haven anywhere in the world and now 

we accept safe havens in Iraq because we just lost the political will 

to do anything or is it still kind of the Bush policy of no safe haven 

for al-Qaeda? 

Mr. MCGURK. First, Congressman, thank you for your service 

and I think particularly now everybody who served in Iraq and has 

experience there it’s really time for us to have a constant ongoing 

dialogue because we can all bring our experience and relationships 

to bear at this very important moment. 

Again, I can just speak to Iraq and in working with the Iraqis 

in terms of intelligence support and Hellfires and, as I mentioned 

in my testimony, we are confident that Iraq will deny al-Qaeda safe 

havens in western Iraq. 

One of the reasons we believe we saw the convoys moving into 

Fallujah and Ramadi is because the Iraqis started hitting their 

camps and safe havens in the remote regions of western Iraq. 

So I am confident, particularly as the Hellfire missiles and they 

develop even more sophisticated ability to deploy them and also 

with the Apache helicopters and with the other things we’re able 

to do with our Iraqi partners, that al-Qaeda will not have safe havens to plan and plot in those areas and that’s one reason, though, 

they’re moving into urban areas because it’s harder to root them 

out of those areas. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, and I’d like to say too I have called 

for and believe that the United States should help the Iraqi Government in a limited way using air power—American air power to 

take out these safe havens because this Congress, this House, has 

passed a use of force agreement that says attack, basically, alQaeda and so I think we have the authority and we have the responsibility to do that. 

Let me ask you one more brief question. Israel foiled and dismantled what the Israeli officials describe as an advanced al-Qaeda 

plot within their borders. 

There’s kind of this far war grand strategy with al-Qaeda and a 

near war grand strategy. The near war is co-opting, for instance, 

Iraq—you know, all those places. 

The far war would be a threat to the U.S. homeland. Do you believe that the situation we’re seeing in—and that it’s the goal of 

AQI to be part of a far war strategy, a.k.a. an attack on the American homeland eventually? 

Mr. MCGURK. Again, my file is Iraq so I’m focused on Iraq. I 

would just——

Mr. KINZINGER. But, obviously, Iraq has huge implications for 

the homeland? 

Mr. MCGURK. Again, I think al-Qaeda is a real threat. If they’re 

able to entrench in the heart of the Arab world it’ll threaten our 

interests throughout—vital U.S. interests throughout the region. 

45

Mr. KINZINGER. All right. Thank you. And, again, thank you for 

your service to your country. I appreciate that. 

Chair now recognizes Mr. Vargas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Appreciate it. 

You know, I think for most Americans trying to keep score at 

home it’s becoming very difficult to understand the situation. 

I think a lot of the nations there become somewhat confused and 

complex. I mean, Iraq, Iran, Syria—it’s all kind of running together 

and the issue of the Sunni-Shi’a discord and what’s happening 

there. 

But what is very, very clear, I think, is the terrible price that 

Americans have paid. As you know very well and, again, thank you 

for your service, I mean, the amount of sons and daughters that 

didn’t come home alive, the number of parents—mothers and fathers that didn’t come home alive and those that did that brought 

the demons home with them that will haunt them and their families for the rest of their lives, I mean, we’ve paid a terrible price. 

And so, I mean, today I heard even from some on the other side 

they were saying, you know, to hell with it. Let them kill themselves. You know, let them just fight it out—what should we be 

doing there. I don’t hold that same feeling. 

I think that, you know, the price that we paid has to mean something and the sacrifice that these people made, our brothers, our 

sisters and our country and the price that they paid has to mean 

something at the end of the day and we should do as much as we 

can. 

I mean, I personally am very concerned about the Christian community. You know, the Christian community has been slaughtered. 

I mean, the Christians that we saw killed on Christmas—you 

know, very unified attacks against Christians, 37 murdered. The 

Chaldean community before the war was about 1 million Chaldean 

Christians. 

Now, I think, there’s less than half, maybe even a third of that. 

We’re very thankful in San Diego that many Chaldeans have been 

able to come to San Diego and a great community that’s forming 

there and continues to form. 

But I’d like to hear from you what we can do and what we should 

do and what we’re not doing to help not only the Christian community but especially the Christian community but other communities 

as well. I mean, what else should we be doing? 

Mr. MCGURK. Congressman, thank you. 

I’ve visited the Chaldean community in Michigan and I would 

welcome the opportunity to come to your district also to visit the 

community there. 

Mr. VARGAS. You’re invited, then. Love to have you. 

Mr. MCGURK. And these extremist groups, as I mentioned, are 

threatening Christians, Muslims, everybody in the region. It is a 

phenomenon throughout the region that is a regional problem, and 

one thing we’re trying to do is work with the Christian leaders in 

Iraq to make sure that they have the resources they need from the 

central government and also the Kurdish regional government and 

making sure that their areas are as secure as possible. 

46

In Iraq, the Chaldeans and other Christian minority groups are 

located in the Nineveh Plains. There is an al-Qaeda extremist presence south of there. 

We are working to try to make sure that local people, Christians 

in that community, have the resources to protect themselves and 

to police their own communities and we’ve made some progress in 

that area over the last 6 months. 

In the north in Erbil and the Kurdish region, when I was in Iraq 

a few months ago and I met, as I mentioned earlier, with Archbishop Warda—the head of the community there—and linked him 

up with the Prime Minister of the Kurdish region to talk about 

schools for the community and making sure that they’re getting the 

resources they need from the Kurdish regional government. 

So what we can do as a neutral player in Iraq with relationships 

between everybody, because we’ve been there for 10 years and 

we’re seen as a neutral player—one of the very few—is try to make 

sure that the connections are made between the governments—provincial, regional and national—so that the Christian and minority 

communities have the resources they need to protect themselves 

but also for schools and for children and everything else. 

Mr. VARGAS. Now, I do have to say, though, I’ve heard from 

many that the central government—they claim that the central 

government is not doing much at all to help the Christians. In fact, 

just the opposite—that they leave them exposed, that their churches are exposed, that the schools are exposed. 

I mean, could you comment on that, that they haven’t been doing 

enough and not nearly enough to protect the Christian community 

and especially the churches? 

Mr. MCGURK. Since a series of church bombings, if I recall correctly in 2009 or 2010, the Iraqis have really buttressed the protection of Christian sites in Iraq. But as you mentioned, there are still 

attacks on these sites. 

Mr. VARGAS. The Christmas attacks, I believe, killed 37 Christians. 

Mr. MCGURK. That’s right, and I have found the Prime Minister, 

when you discuss this issue with him, fairly emotional about it, 

wanting to protect Christians, just like everyone else in his country 

and looking for ways to do that. 

But it’s something that, again, we’re going to have to keep focusing on. But I think the more communication the better from the 

Christian community—Iraqi Christian community here in the U.S. 

who have deep ties back into Iraq and with us. 

There’s a lot that, if your constituencies tell you something 

they’re seeing and you can let us know we can—we can work those 

problems. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. 

I yield back. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

Chair recognizes Mr. Yoho for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGurk, thank you for your testimony. I feel like you’ve 

been sitting there a long time. You might need to get up and 

stretch. But I appreciate your endurance. 

47

What are our military assets in Iraq and are they purely advisory and, if so, how many? Can you divulge that or——

Mr. MCGURK. We have, under our Embassy—under the chief of 

mission and Ambassador Beecroft, the Office of Security Cooperation which works very closely with the Iraqi military. 

The numbers ebb and flow but it’s about 100 personnel and they 

do everything from advising to running the FMS programs to making sure that that is running efficiently, and a very small contingent of half a dozen or so of our special operators who train some 

of the higher end special operators as a training component. That’s 

all done under the Embassy chief of mission and the Office of Security Cooperation. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. So we have a very small footprint as far 

as——

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. Americans there. What can be learned 

from how we left Iraq and applied to the draw down in Afghanistan 

so we don’t make the same mistakes or repeat what we’ve done 

there so that we’ve got the benefit of the effort we put in there, you 

know, that both sides benefit from this? 

What do you see that we need to do different? If you could 

write—rewrite a post draw down of troops in Iraq, especially with 

the announcement which I think was wrong, of the end date announced, what would you do differently so that we don’t repeat 

that in Afghanistan? 

Mr. MCGURK. I think, Congressman, you’ll have to forgive me. I 

think I’m—when I’m out of government I might look back and work 

with historians on the history or also make comparisons to Afghanistan. But right now, I’m focused on the situation at hand and trying to protect our interests as we face right now. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Let me switch over to a different topic. 

I’ve talked to many veterans that have fought both in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and we’ve talked to members of the Iraqi Government, 

and what they have said is that we have come to a stalemate between the Iraqi military or the Iraqi men and our military and a 

stand-off. In the meantime, countries like China, Japan, South 

Korea are going in there, building infrastructures and trading. 

Would it not benefit us to put more effort into that so that we 

do have economic trade and that way we can help them build an 

economy where they own more of trying to solve this problem? 

I know they’re—I know they’re working hard on it but if we can 

help build that infrastructure and work with developing trade. 

Mr. MCGURK. I agree with you 100 percent, and while the focus 

of this hearing has been the al-Qaeda threat and the rising extremist threat our policy, as I discussed last time, is really multifaceted 

and one of them is developing economic ties and economic relationships. 

We do advocacy for U.S. companies. We are proud that Boeing 

has signed a major contract with Iraqi Airways to be the backbone 

of the—of Iraqi Airways. 

We’re proud that Hill International Company, a U.S. company, 

has contracted with the provincial government of Basra to lead the 

effort there to try to modernize Basra in a very long-term 5- to 10-

48

year project. I can go through a number of companies—General 

Electric and others who are doing very well in Iraq. 

But I agree with you, we need to get the private sector involved 

and invested in Iraq and there are a lot of opportunities, particularly in parts of the country that are very secure. 

Mr. YOHO. That’s where I’d like to, you know, help focus our foreign policy and that’s why I was asking you if you could rewrite 

that. 

With Fallujah, do you think the Iraqi Government can control 

Fallujah and defeat the ISIL? Do you feel like they can go in there, 

they have the willpower or the assets to do that? 

Mr. MCGURK. As I said in my testimony, I think without the support of the local population it’ll be extremely difficult. That’s a lesson that we learned in Iraq. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. What about with—you were talking about 

the backbone—U.S. is the backbone of the Iraqi military. Were you 

meaning with our military assets? 

Mr. MCGURK. With equipment and training the Iraqis consistently look to us to be their primary supplier and primary supporter. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. And then Chairman Royce was asking about 

where the foreign fighters were coming from and I know a lot of 

them are coming from Europe. Is there any estimate how many are 

coming from the U.S. that go into Syria, then go over to Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. I don’t have those numbers. I’d have to get—I’d 

have to go to the intelligence community and get back to you with 

those numbers. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. 

We go now to Mr. Collins of Georgia—Doug Collins of Georgia. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity and thanks for answering a multitude of questions. 

I want to turn back a little bit that was asked earlier about the 

elections and, really, from serving in Iraq and back in ’08, as my 

colleague has as well, the understanding of the relationship between the Sunni and Shi’a is something that is—I think there’s a 

huge mistrust that goes back generations. There’s a multitude of 

issues there, and it looks like the current government has done 

very little to really relate with that or work on that relationship. 

Experts in Iraq have talked about al-Qaeda in Iraq, Islamic State 

of Iraq some and increasingly building the alliances with Sunni 

tribal leaders, and has adjusted its message in 2013 to try and win 

more Sunni political support. How would that translate into the 

next round of Iraq elections? 

Can we see—really see a move from Shi’a to Sunni and what 

does that mean for the region, and then answer that and then I 

want to talk about Iran’s possible influence there as well. And I 

want to—just speak to the elections at this point. 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you. First, Congressman, thank you for 

your service and it’s a very important question—an insightful question. 

This election coming up is going to be pivotal and also extremely 

interesting. The first national election in December 2005 there 

49

were really three main lists people could vote for. There was a 

Shi’a bloc, a Sunni bloc and a Kurdish bloc. 

The 2010 elections there was a little bit more choice, really—two 

Shi’a blocs, the Sunni parties were under one main list also with 

some Shi’as, kind of a cross sectarian list, and then the Kurds. 

This election everything is really fractured so you have about 

four Shi’a lists, you have three Sunni lists and even the Kurds are 

running on four different lists. So what’s going to happen out of 

those results are going to be a number of different permutations in 

terms of forming governments and forming coalitions. 

So the hope is that this election will give rise to the more possibility of cross sectarian kind of issue-based politics emerging. As 

difficult as that is going to be, if you look at the candidate list and 

the coalitions there is that possibility there. 

But as I mentioned earlier, what al-Qaeda does very effectively 

is targets the fault line which has existed for 1,400 years, targeting 

symbolic areas and trying to increase fear in particularly the Shi’a 

population, which just rises the sectarian debate and discourse in 

the country. 

So on the positive side, you have an election that’s shaping up 

with a number of different choices, kind of number of different lists 

which will allow for cross sectarian coalitions. On the negative side, 

you have extremists who are trying to incite and inflame the sectarian dimensions in the country. 

Mr. COLLINS. And I think that’s sort of what we’re heading in 

here and looking at, especially with the Iran influence in Iraq, the 

Shi’a population, and Iran’s influence in one is what we’re seeing 

there. 

There’s also the reports that, you know, I’ve read and others with 

dealing with the rest of the Arab world—Sunni Arab world—having to deal with this dynamic of Iran and Iraq and what’s going 

on there. 

Do you see or is there a sense that there is more push in the 

Shi’a with the Iran influence there and especially with everything 

else we’ve talked about here? Not encouraging discourse maybe is 

the best way to put it. 

Mr. MCGURK. Yeah. We’ve seen—if I could say, you know, 2011 

and 2012, and I described in my written testimony this kind of low 

boil stage of insurgency, Shi’a militias and the most maligned Iranian influence were unable to really gain much traction because 

the violence was at this low boil. 

As the al-Qaeda attacks went up this year, we’ve seen an increase in Shi’a militia activity, which has also given an inroad to 

the most nefarious Iranian activities. 

So this is something that we continue to have to work with Iraqi 

not only political leaders but civil society leaders and everybody to 

try to isolate those most extreme groups. 

Mr. COLLINS. And I appreciate it because I think and, really, 

what we look at and it’s been mentioned, you know, several times 

here is we look at the world of Iraq right now and the issues of 

Fallujah and the Anbar region and then the price that we paid in 

those areas that are continuing. 

We’ve got to maintain pressure on this administration in Iraq, 

whether it would be the protection of those that are at Camp LibVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:41 Mar 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\020514\86588 SHIRL
50

erty to Ashraf, the other things. This is not something that this 

congressman is going to let go. 

We got to continue this process. We owe that, in a large sense, 

to what happened there. So I think, really, in these elections that’s 

the concern that I would express to Maliki is you’ve got to do the 

process of working to sustain your own country without the division and I think that’s what we’re expecting. 

When we see stuff like what happened at Fallujah, when we see 

this action it tells me that maybe we’re spending too much time 

doing other things and not doing the things that will keep that 

country, you know, on a path toward a sustainable future. 

So I appreciate, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Collins. 

We go now to Mr. Weber—Randy Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

Mr. McGurk, you were last here in November. There’s something—I think it’s been 78 days as we count and with Iran fostering all of the unrest over in Iraq there’s been 312 executions. If 

you divide that out it’s one every 6 hours. It is four a day, 120 a 

month, hence, the 312 in 78 days. 

It’s been 78 days since you were here. We have a regime in Iran 

that is built on sending terror throughout its own citizenry and, of 

course, exporting it into Iraq. How many more executions do you 

think is acceptable before we take the Iranian regime to task over 

their executing their own citizens? 

Mr. MCGURK. I can address that from the Iran standpoint. 

Again, the human rights situation in Iran is quite despicable. 

We have seen President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Sharif 

talk about wanting to make inroads and improve the human rights 

situation but, quite frankly, we have yet to see them make inroads 

in that area. 

Mr. WEBER. So really, I mean, we need to be—we need to really 

be focused on this, even in our negotiations with or, I should say, 

the administration’s negotiations over relaxing the sanctions because they don’t—you know, we’re getting played for fools, quite 

frankly. 

I want to—I know that you’re here to testify about al-Qaeda in 

Iraq so I have a question for you. The residents of Camp Liberty—

are they as dangerous as al-Qaeda? 

Mr. MCGURK. No. No, certainly not. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And yet and we promised them that, did we 

not, that we would protect them and that we would take care of 

them back during the conflict when they were repatriated, so to 

speak, to the camp? 

Mr. MCGURK. There were agreements between our kind of military commanders at the time when we moved into Iraq at Camp 

Ashraf. 

Mr. WEBER. Right, and you’re aware of how many of them have 

paid a terrific price with their lives to live there under the agreement that we made? 

Mr. MCGURK. I am, sir. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And you’re aware that they’re basically having to live in graves now—we’re not getting T-walls, the protection 

installed that they used—we had? I mean, it’s just unbelievable the 

51

paper thin walls that they’re living in and the attacks that are 

coming from outside. You’re aware of that? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes, sir. And as I said, I was at the camp this 

month and talked to the residents about what it’s like to live in a 

trailer when colleagues of yours are being killed by rockets in trailers. It’s something that many of us can recall quite clearly. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, good news and bad news. The good news is 

most of them, as I understand it now, are not living in trailers. The 

bad news is they’ve had to dig out a 3-foot wide by 6-foot grave, 

basically, and live in it to avoid the rocket attacks. 

How long should—how long does that have to go on? Should we 

not be pressing for, A, to get them out of the country and, at best, 

while we’re working diligently on that should we not be getting 

them protection? How much longer do you estimate that going on? 

Mr. MCGURK. As I said earlier, we need to do everything we can 

to get them—to get them out of the country. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, you were here 78 days ago. Has their situation 

improved? 

Mr. MCGURK. Some more of them have been able to relocate to 

Albania, which—and we have to thank the Albanians for being 

very gracious for taking about 210 residents into Albania. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MCGURK. And we wish there were more countries willing to 

do the same. 

Mr. WEBER. I’m told your comments earlier—I was—I was late 

from another hearing—that you made comments that the T-walls 

are currently being installed. 

Mr. MCGURK. That was the information that I received this 

morning——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MCGURK [continuing]. That they would—the T-walls would 

begin moving in again today or tomorrow. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you be interested to know that we’ve had cell 

phone communication from the residents inside the camp and 

that’s not the case? 

Mr. MCGURK. All I can say, Congressman, my understanding 

was there was a decision made this morning to begin moving Twalls back into the camp. Whether or not that’s actually started or 

not, I don’t know. 

But I can assure you, based upon the information I’ve received 

that we will follow up and if in fact T-walls are not being moved 

into the camp that will be a very serious matter and I will follow 

up with you as soon as I receive the information. 

Mr. WEBER. How soon? 

Mr. MCGURK. I can follow up with you in the next 48 hours to 

make sure that T-walls are moving back into the camp. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And is there a third party verification? Because when the Iraqi Government—I’m sorry, they just—for me 

they don’t have a lot of credibility. It’s almost as if the residents 

of Camp Liberty are the enemy and not the victims that they are. 

Is there a third—I mean, surely you’re not saying that you’re 

going to call them and they’re going to say of course? 

Mr. MCGURK. No, no, no. We will—we will talk to our colleagues 

at the United Nations mission in Iraq and the deputy there, George 

52

Bustin, who is at the camp regularly and he will be able to verify 

with eyes on whether or not. 

Mr. WEBER. As we watch Iraq descend, I hope you make it an 

extreme priority to get them out. 

Mr. MCGURK. We will do so. Thank you. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Well, let me just begin by thanking Mr. McGurk for—not just for 

your time this morning but for your work on this issue. As you 

know—as you can tell, this committee is extremely concerned about 

the resurgence of al-Qaeda, the impact that’s going to have there 

in Iraq, the impact it’s going to have on the region and, of course, 

even here to us in the United States. 

So we thank you for that. We look forward to continuing to work 

with you on the concerns that we have in the House. There is one 

other issue that I meant to raise with you and that’s just turning 

for a moment to discuss the inclusion of the Kurdish Democratic 

Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the PATRIOT Act’s 

Tier 3 designation—terrorist designation. 

My understanding is that this has become a sort of catch-all designation that has inadvertently mislabeled the KDP and the PUK 

as terrorists even though they have been a stabilizing force in the 

region and consistently loyal to the United States for decades. 

As al-Qaeda and associated groups expand across the Middle 

East and beyond, it seems like a good time to take count of our remaining friends in the region and maybe take a look at this inappropriate designation and recognize that that’s harming our very 

important relationship with the Kurdish people. 

So would the administration be supportive of a legislative solution to this issue that would exclude these Kurdish groups from the 

Tier 3 designation? 

Mr. MCGURK. Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking that question 

and for allowing me to put our response on the record. 

As you said, the Kurdish people, the PUK, the KDP have been 

among our closest friends in the region going back decades. We 

think they should be removed from this list as soon as possible. We 

think it is an imperative. We understand that it requires a legislative fix. 

It is nothing that we can do by executive action alone and therefore we are 100 percent supportive of an immediate legislative fix 

to this problem and we look forward to working with you and the 

relevant committees in Congress to get that done. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. McGurk. We did have to 

get you on the record for that and the Senate is working on this 

with the House, and we very much appreciate once more your testimony here today. 

Thank you, Members. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(53)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

54

f


86588n.eps

FlJLL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

W ASHTNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

February 5, 2014 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

AtIairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House OfIice Building (and available live on 

the Committee website at http!!www.ForeignAffairs.house.f!ov) 

DAn:: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Wednesday, February 5, 2014 

10:00 a.m. 

AI-Qaeda's Resurgence in Iraq: A Threat to U.S. Interests 

Mr. Brett McGurk 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

U. S Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 
55


86588m-1.eps

COMMlTTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MI'IUTES OF FeLL COMI\IITTEE HEARING 

Day Wedne.,dav Date __ -----'0'!-'2"-10"'5"-1"'14"----__ Room __ ~2~1.,7 __ 2'__ __ 

Starting Time 10:07 a.m. Ending Time 12:10 R.m 

Recesses :_0_ (_' _10 __ ) ( __ 10 __ )( __ 10 __ ) (_ .. to ___ ) <-__ to ~ C-to ~ 

Presiding Member(,) 

Rep. t.."tlward R. Royce, ('hairman 

Rep. Ileuna Ro~-Lehtillen 

Rep. Adam K;n,,;ng(>J' 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session W Executive (closed) Session D Televised [Z] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recorded (laped)W 

Stenograpbic Record W 

Al-Qaeda's Resurgence in iraq: A Threat to U.S. interests 

CO:vtJl.llTTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See Attendance Sheet. 

NO"l-CO);IMITTEE MEMDERS PRESE"IT: 

None. 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same.s meeting notice attacbed? Y.sO NoD 

(1f "no", please list belm·v r.md include title, agenr.j', department, nr nrganizati(Jn.) 

STATE:vIENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Lisl any slulemenls ,ubmilled/or rhe record.) 

IFR - Rep. Poe 

QFR - Lowenthal 

TIME SCHEDCLED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURI'\ED 12:10 p.m. 

// L/ 

// / /~~j-"" ----:7"-/--=-"---<-/ ( e>.v4 / 

.J.ia:n Marter, Tlirector of Committee Operations 
56

f


86588m-2.eps

Present 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FilII Committee Hearing 

Member Present Member 

Edward R. Royce. CA X EliotL EngeL NY 

Christopher H Smith. NJ Eni F.H Faleomavaega. AS 

lleana Ros-Lehtinen. FL X Brad Sherman. CA 

Dana RohrabaeheL CA Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Steve Chabot. OH X Albia Sires, NJ 

Joe Wilson. SC X Gerald E. Connolly. VA 

Michael T. McCaul, TX X ll1eodore E. Deutch. FL 

Ted Poe. TX Brian Higgins. NY 

Matt Salmon. AZ Karen Bass. CA 

Tom Marino, PA Willianl Keating. MA 

Jeff Duncan. SC X David Cicilline, RI 

Adanl Kinzinger, IL Alan Grayson. FL 

Mo Brooks. AL X Juan Vargas, CA 

Tom Cotton, AR X Bradley S. Schneider, IL 

Paul Cook. CA X Joseph P. Kennedy III. MA 

George Holding, NC X Ami Bera. CA 

Randv K. Weber, Sr., TX Alan S. Lowenthal, CA 

Scott Perry, PA Grace Meng, NY 

Steve Stockman. TX X Lois Frankel. FL 

Ron DeSantis. FL Tulsi Gabbard. HI 

Doug Collins, GA X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Mark Meadows. NC 

Ted S. Yoho. FL 

Luke Messer, IN 
57

f


86588b.eps

Insert for the Record 

Submit/cd by the Honorable Ted Poe 
58


86588c-1.eps

Ouestion 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Alon Lowenthal 

To Mr. Brett McGurk 

Which senior advisors recommended against Maliki doing a full scale assault against ISIS in Fallujah. Why did 

they do it? Can we trust Maliki to do what is necessary? 

Answer: 

In recent weeks. Deputy Secretary Bums. Ambassador Beecroft. GEN Lloyd Austin. CENTCOM Commander 

and I have all met with Prime Minister Maliki, and our message has been consistent with that of some senior 

Iraqi officials to successfully expel ISIL from Fallujah will require the active support and participation of the 

local tribes. This also holds true in the overarching battle against extremism. Security operations can only have 

a sustained impact if fused with political initiatives and outreach to all of Iraq's political leaders and 

communities in order to address the complex challenges that remain in Iraq beyond the security realm 

Fallujah remains the scene of a tense standoff. Some tribes are ready and preparing to fight ISIL. others are 

working with ISIL (and fonning "tribal councils"' with the declared intention to fight the anny), and more are on 

the fence, waiting to see which side is likely to prevail in the end. Local leaders in Anbar, in coordination with 

the Government of Iraq (GO I), are working to recruit more tribes to enter, clear, and hold Fallujah, while 

simultaneously ensuring civilians and families can leave the city 

This standotfwill not last forever. The GOI has the responsibility to help local leaders secure the city and oust 

the militants now in control Under the plan that is being developed by the GOI in coordination with local 

leaders, the anny will seek to control outlying areas and cordon the city; tribal fighters will then seek to take the 

lead in securing populated areas, with military support when needed. We know from experience how difficult 

this will be, and U.S military officers from the Office of Security Cooperation are in regular touch with their 

Iraqi counterparts to share lessons learned, offer advice, and make recommendations. During his recent visit to 

Baghdad, CENTCOM Commanding General Austin acknowledged the need to drive ISIL from Fallujah, but 

urged Iraqi commanders to use "strategic patience" as they accomplish this mission 

Onestion 2: 

How many fighters have been recruited from the United States to fight for the al-Nusrah Front and ISIS? 

I am not able to provide numbers for you The State Department does not track the activities of U.S. citizens 

abroad Since U.S. citizens are not required to register their presence abroad, we do not maintain 

comprehensive lists of U.S citizens residing overseas. We would refer you to the FBI for details pertaining to 

this question 

I can tell you, however, that we remain extremely concerned by the growing presence of foreign extremists 

among the Syrian opposition, including as members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also 

fonnerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - ISIS) and the Nusra Front These foreign extremists 

have very little stake in a negotiated solution to the Syria crisis that brings an end to the tighting and the 

establishment of a government that represents the aspirations of the Syrian people. The Department of State has 
59


86588c-2.eps

engaged partners across Europe and the Middle East to urge steps to stem the flow of foreign extremists, 

including by enacting effective steps to enhance infonnation sharing, law enforcement and border control 

measures and counter-radicalization programs 

Question 3: 

With the rise of al-Qaeda both in Iraq and Syria what should be our role in Syria? Should we be more proactive 

in taking out Assad? 

The demand of the Syrian people for a new, democratic, open system of government for their nation will not be 

resolved on the battlefield. We finnly believe that the only solution to the crisis in Syria is political in nature 

This is why we have invested a significant amount of capital, as have our allies and partners, and the United 

Nations, in creating a process with the goal of reaching a political solution to include the establishment of a 

transitional governing body. We expect that transitional governing body, which would have full, executive 

authority, including over the security services, will make rooting out violent extremism in Syria one of its 

primary goal s 

Question 4: 

Explain the relationship between ISIS and senior AI Qaeda leadership 

The Nusrah Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also formerly known as the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria - ISIS) began as franchises of al-Qa'ida (AQ) The groups vary in their methods and 

priorities: al-Nusrah has put greater priority on the toppling of Asad and working with other Syrian opposition 

groups, whereas ISIL has focused on a more regional agenda, with an aim to carve out an Islamic caliphate 

stretching tram Baghdad to Lebanon The split has been a central focus among global violent extremist 

networks. We believe it happened because of [SIL' s unwillingness to follow Ayman al-Zawahiri' s orders that it 

allow for al-Nusrah Front's continued independence within Syria and only fight in Iraq. Zawahiri has publicly 

distanced the AQ leadership from ISIL's unpopular actions against Syria's Sunni population, and it now appears 

that ISIL is conducting operations in Syria and Iraq entirely independent of any counselor assistance from AQ 

core leadership 

Question 5: 

In recent days, the Obama Administration has announced that it is expediting the delivery of U.S defense 

articles to Iraq. If we are offering military assistance, how much are we pushing Maliki to make peace with the 

Sunnis within Iraq? Is it a condition of these sales that Maliki address the political sources of current violence? 

He has allowed AI Qaeda to have a foothold and has treated the Sunnis with indifference. 

We are working closely with Iraq to provide support for its fight against our mutual enemy, the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant (iSILl. We continue to urge the Government of Iraq to fuse political and security efforts to 

address the immediate security situation while establishing a strategy to address long-standing Sunni 

grievances. 
60

Æ


86588c-3.eps

Security assistance is a key tool for building and shaping Iraq's defense capabilities and integrating Iraqi 

security forces into the region. Withholding security assistance during this volatile period would deal a serious 

blow to Iraqi efforts to defeat ISIL and weaken our strategic partnership with Iraq 

We continue to press the urgency of working with local Sunni leaders in the fight against ISLL in all of our 

engagements with Maliki, including meetings with the President in November and regular calls with the Vice 

President and during the recent visits of Parliament Speaker Osarna Nujaifi and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al 

Mutlaq, two prominent political leaders who represent Sunni majority areas of the country 

We have seen some progress Irom our efforts and are encouraged by the initial steps Maliki has tal<en to address 

legitimate grievances within the Sunni community and engage its members in the fight against ISIL High 

ranking Iraqi Anny officials have credited success in Ramadi to strong coordination between Iraqi Security 

Forces and local tribes - in addition to U.S. security assistance - and PM Maliki has agreed to incorporate tribes 

fighting AQIIISIL into Iraq's security forces. In a February 9 press release, Maliki reiterated his support for the 

tribes and committed to their integration with local forces, while calling for reconstruction and reforms in Anbar 

province, He also recognized the Anbar tribes' integral role in defending the city of Ramadi against terrorist 

groups. In another push towards inclusion, PM Maliki recently pledged to hire these local tribe members as 

policemen in Anbar province. We are now actively encouraging all sides to follow through and engage in 

active dialogue with one another 

Regarding economic support, in January alone the GOT allocated $18 million for rebuilding projects in Fallujah 

and Ramadi; $17 million for direct humanitarian assistance; and $3.4 million for direct payments to tribal 

fighters. During Maliki's visit to Anbar province, the Iraqi government said it would increase these allocations 

further, and the cabinet on February 18 established a mechanism with national and local leaders to expedite the 

implementation and disbursement of funds to areas in need of assistance 

While recognizing the serious situation now confronting Iraq, we are encouraged by these efforts, and will 

continue emphasizing to Iraqi ofticials that the long-term strategy to defeat ISTL and achieving security and 

stability must include a political solution involving all of the people of Iraq 

Question 6: 

Will the Administration put forth a repeal of the AUMF? 

The President has stated his intention to engage Congress about the Authorization to Use Military Force 

(ALJMF) passed after the September 11, 2001, attacks to determine how we can continue to light terrorists 

without keeping America on a perpetual war-time footing. The Administration is prepared to engage Congress 

and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF's mandate 

With respect to the Authorization to Use Military Force against Iraq, the administration supports the repeal of 

the Iraq AUMF