* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-60477

Summary Calendar

_____________________

EJIKE OKERE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(23246-95)

_________________________________________________________________

September 8, 1998

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

In this tax protester case, Ejike Okere, a native of Nigeria,

appeals the Tax Court’s finding of liability for income tax

deficiencies and negli gence additions in relation to tax years

1991, 1992, and 1993, and its imposition of a jeopardy levy with

regard to same. Okere raises a vast number of confused and

intertwined arguments, but they all boil down to the following two

complaints, neither of which has any arguable merit.-2-

First, Okere contends that the Tax Court erred in its finding

of tax def iciencies. We review a decision of Tax Court applying

the same standards used in reviewing a decision of the district

court. E state of McLendon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

, 135

F.3d 1 017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998). Findings of fact are accepted

unless clearly erroneous; legal conclusions are reconsidered de

novo. B allard v. United States

, 17 F.3d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1994).

In this case, Okere’s deficiencies were based on wage and capital

gain income that he purporte dly collected under other names and

social security numbers, as well as his taking of certain dependent

and head of household exemptions to which he was not entitled. Our

review of the record reveals ample evidence, including eyewitness

testimony, that Okere was indeed the person who received the income

at issue, and that he neither was a head-of-household nor was he

supporting the claimed dependents for tax purposes during the years

at issue. The Tax Court’s findings in this regard were not clearly

erroneous, and are therefore affirmed.

Second, Okere asserts that the Tax Court erred in allowing a

jeopardy assessment and levy pursuant to I.R.C. § 7429 and in

d enying him relief for various torts allegedly committed by the

Secret Service. The Commissioner requested a jeopardy levy shortly

after Okere filed his petition with the Tax Cour t, when it was

determined that he was “designing quickly to depart the United

States” and to “place [his] property beyond the reach of the

Government by removing it from the United States, by concealing it,-3-

by dissipating it, or by transferring it to others.” The alleged

torts occurred when the Secret Service arrested Okere outside the

Tax Court as part of another aspect of the g overnment’s

investigation. With respect to the jeopardy levy, it is sufficient

to note that, under I.R.C. § 7429(f), “[a]ny determination made by

a court under this section shall be final and conclusive and shall

not be reviewed by any other court.” Okere’s jeopardy assessment

and levy were imposed after a determination under § 74 29, so we

have n o jurisdiction to review that issue in this appeal. As to

the alleged tort claims, it is a fundamental principle of tax law

that “[t]he Tax Co urt is a court of limited jurisdiction,

possessing only such power to adju dicate controversies as is

conferred upon it by the Internal Revenue Cod e.” C ontinental

Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

, 551 F.2d 74, 79

(5th Cir. 1977); see also I.R.C. § 7442. Okere points us towards

no provision of the Code conferring jurisdiction for tort actions

against Secret Service agents, nor can we locate any. As such, the

Tax Court had no jurisdiction over these claims, and prop erly

declined to address them in the first instance.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Tax Court is

AFFI RMED, and Okere’s motion to stay collection is DENIED.

Furthermore, because this appeal was utterly frivolous, IT IS ALSO

ORDERED that Okere show cause within ten days time why reasonable

attorney’s fees and double costs should not be awarded to the-4-

Commissioner of Internal Revenue as da mages, pursuant to Fed. R.

App. P. 38.