Filed 5/19/22 Sweetflower Pasadena v. City of Pasadena CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

SWEETFLOWER PASADENA LLC

,

P laintiff and Resp ondent

,

v.

C ITY OF PASADENA

, Defendant

,

INTEGRAL ASSOCIATES DENA, LLC

, Real Party i n Interest and Appellant

. B 30 8897

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCP01456 )

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff

, Judge. Affirmed.
Carlson & Nicholas and Richard A

. McDonald for Real Party in Interest and Appellant

. No appearance for Defendant.2 Nossaman, Artin N. Shaverdian, Gabriela S. Pérez, Gregory W. Sanders and John J. F lynn III for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______ ____ __ ______ SweetFlower Pasadena, LLC filed a verified petition for
writ of mandate and complaint seeking to compel the City of
Pasadena to set aside a conditional use permit the City had granted to SweetFlower’s competitor, Integral Associates Dena,
LLC

, and to obtain a judicial declaration that Integral was ineligible for the permits required to open and operate a cannabis retail store in the City. Integral, named in SweetFlower ’s petiti on /complaint as real party in interest, filed a special motion

to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16

. 1 The trial court denied Integral’s motion, concluding none of
SweetFlower ’s claims arose from protected speech or petitioning

act ivity. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. SweetFlower’s Petition and Complaint According to SweetFlower ’s petition /complaint , in June
201 8 City voters approved two initiative measures to legalize and regulate commercial cannabis businesses within City boundaries. ( S ee Pas. Mun. Code, §§ 5. 28 .010 et seq.
, 5.78 .010 et seq., 8.11.010 et seq., 17.50.066

. ) The approved ordinances authorized the operation of up to six retail cannabis businesses within City
limits ; included zoning rest rictions that required the businesses to be at least 1,000 feet from any other cannabis retailer or cultivation site and 600 feet from specified “sensitive uses,” such

1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated

.3

as any school, park or childcare center ; and limited cannabis
retailer s to one per c ity c ouncil district . The initiative measures authorized the City ’s m anager or his or her designee to promulgate the rules and procedures governing the application

process for the necessary City permits

. 2

a. SweetFlower’s application for a use permit
A fter a detailed vetting process, the City selected
SweetFlower as one of six eligible candidates to apply for a conditional use permit to operate a cannabis retail store. Because zoning restrictions and other limitations in the initiative

measures meant t hat fewer than six cannabis retailers c o uld operate simultaneously in the City

, the City adopted a first

- in

line selection procedure for the six candidates to apply for a
conditional use permit . Under those rules, permit applications would be processed in the order received, with the first complete d application for a permit to operate in a specified council district
able to “lock in ” the available spot for that district. Any changes to a submitted application would void the previous a pplication, sending the applicant to the back of the line.
SweetFlower was the first candidate to submit its conditional use permit application on June 12, 2019

. On June 27, 2019 the City notified SweetFlower its application was incomplete and would not be processed because the location map
SweetFlower included had not been prepared by a licensed

surveyor , as required by City rules. On June 27, 2019
SweetFlower sub mitted a second application, this time including

2 Some of the City’s cannabis

- related ordinances were amended in November 2021

. Those amendments , the subject of ongoing litigation between Integral and the City in the Los Angeles Superior C ourt, are not at issue in this appeal.4

a certification that its location map had been reviewed by a licensed surveyor. The City rejected the second application

, explaining “reviewed by ” a licensed surveyor was not the same as “prepared by ” a licensed surveyor

. When SweetFlower submitted its third application on July 3, 2019, the Cit y refused to process it
because the City had already approved Integral’s application for
the same district.

b. SweetFlower ’s petition / complaint
SweetFlower filed this lawsuit for a writ of mandate pursuant to sections 1085 and/or 1094.5 to compel the City to set

aside Integral’s conditional use permit

. 3 SweetFlower alleged the City had arbitrarily enforced its own rules by interpreting the requirement of a location map “prepared by a licensed surveyor” liberally f

o r Integral and more st rictly f o r SweetFlower

. SweetFlower also alleged City rules required any cannabis operator that engaged in nonpublic communications with the City during the vetting process be disqualified from eligibility for a conditional use permit; Integral’s managing agents privately

3 In addition to this lawsuit, SweetFlower filed at least three other petitions for writ s of mandate involving the City’s cannabis

related conditional use permit decisions . (See Super. Ct. L.A. County n o. 20STCP00 038 [ challenging the City’s denial of SweetFlower ’s own conditional use permit application ]; Super. Ct. L.A. County n o. 20STCP01048 [ challenging the City’s approval of a conditional use permit for Harvest of Pasadena LLC , a SweetFlower competitor ]; Super. Ct. L.A. County n o. 20STCP03212 [challenging the City’s rejection of SweetFlower ’s request that Integral’s conditional use permit be set aside based on a material change of control at Integral].)5

contacted members of the City’s selection committee during the vetting process; and the City failed to disqualify Integral.
In a separate cause of action for declaratory relief

, SweetFlower alleged the City had misapprehended the initiative

measures , which required the City to deny a conditional use permi t for cannabis retail to any applicant who “has been denied a permit or state license to engage in commercial cannabis activity, or has had a permit or state license to engage in commercial cannabis activity suspended and not reinstated, or
revoked

, by any city, county, city and county, or any other state cannabis licensing authority.” ( Pas. Mun. Code, § 5.78.100
, par. A .) According to SweetFlower , t he City interpreted that language to apply to jurisdictions with in California

. SweetFlower alleged, and so ught a judicial declaration that

, “any other state cannabis licensing authority ” included those in other states and, when so interpreted, made Integral ineligible for a conditional use permit

. In its prayer for relief SweetFlower sought (1) a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City to set aside its grant of a conditional use permit to Integral; (2) an injunction prohibiting Integral from taking any further action in reliance on the invalid conditional use permit and prohibiti ng the City from taking any action to process applications by Integral for additional permits based on the noncompliant conditional use permit ; (3) a judicial declaration that Integral is ineligible to apply for additional permits based on a noncompliant c onditional use permit; and (4) a judicial declaration that the City’s business license application , as interpreted by the City, violate d the initiative
ordinances.6 2. Integral’s Special Motion To Strike Integral filed a special motion to strike the petitio n/complaint under section 425.16

. Integral argued each
claim was based on oral or written statements made in
connection with Integral’s application for a conditional use permit or the City’s protected activity in reviewing and processing Integral’s application within the meaning of
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and ( e)(2)

. In support of this argument Integral cited paragraphs in the petition/complaint quoting statements by the City’s planning director

, members of the zoning board and c ity c ouncil members , all of which were made during official proceedings addressing SweetFlower ’s application and the City’s interpretation and application of the

licensed surveyor requirement

. 4 Integral also cited
SweetFlower ’s allegations that Integral had secret ly
communicat ed with the City during the applicant screening

process , a rules violation that required the City to disqualify it
from consideration for a c onditional use permit and the
S weetFlower ’s prayer for relief barring Integral from submitting further permit applications premised on an invalid conditional use permit. Integral also argued SweetFlower could not demonstrate any of its claims had merit.

4 SweetFlower alleged t h e City’s p la nning director struggled to explain to SweetFlower in a zoning board meeting what “prepared by a licensed surveyor” meant ; t he chair of the zoning board questioned during that meeting whether other applications by SweetFlower ’s competitors were incomplete under this standard ; and members of the c ity c ouncil cautioned during SweetFlower ’s administrative appeal that the same “strict standards” should apply to all applications, not just SweetFlower ’s.7 I n its opposition to Integral’s special motion to strike,
SweetFlower argued its claims arose from the City’s failure to disqualify Integral and the City’s wrongful approval of Integral’s conditional use permit

— acts of governance

— and characterized
the quoted statements by City officials and Integral’s private contacts with the City as providing context for its claims.
The trial court denied Integral’s special motion to strike

, ruling the causes of action arose from the City’s acts of governance, not the City’s protected speech or petitioning activity

. Because Integral failed to carry its threshold burden to
demonstrate the claims arose from protected speech or petition activity

, the court denied Integral’s special motion to strike
without addressing whether SweetFlower c ould demonstrate its
claims had minimal merit

. Integral filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying its special motion to strike

. DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law and Standard of Review Section 425.16, commonly known as the anti

- SLAPP
statute, makes available a special motion to strike certain
meritless claims early in the litigation: “A cause of action against

a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of a person’s right to free speec h under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike

, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019)
6 Cal.5th 610, 619

- 620 [“[a] court may strike a cause of action only if the cause of action (1) arises from an act in furtherance of8

the right of petiti on or free speech ‘in connection with a public issue,’ and (2) the plaintiff has not established ‘a probability’ of prevailing on the claim”].)
Pursuant to s ection 425.16, subdivision (e), an “‘ act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free spe ech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by l aw, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest

, or (4) any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection wi th a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
I n ruling on a motion under section 425.16, the trial court engages in a two

- step process. “First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establis hing a probability of success.” ( Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 ( Baral ) ; accord, Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 ( Bonni ); Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 ( Park ) .) If the moving party fails to demonstrate that any of the challenged claims for relief arise from protected activity (the first step) , the court9

properly denies the motion to strike without addressing the probability of success ( the second step) . ( City of Cotati v.
Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 80

- 81; Verceles v. Los Angeles
United School Dist. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 776, 784.)
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity
underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” ( Park

, supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062

- 1063 ; accord, Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at

p. 1009. ) Thus, “[t]he defendant ’ s first

- step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti

- SLAPP statute. A ‘cl aim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’” ( Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc . (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 871, 884 ( Wilson ); see Bonni , at p. 1009 [“[t]he defendant ’ s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity”]; Park , at p. 1060 [same].) A motion pursuant to section 425.16 need not challenge an entire cause of action as pleaded in the complaint. ( Bonni

, supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Baral

, supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 382 .) Rather, “courts should analyze each claim for relief

— each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action

— to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.” ( Bonni , at

p. 1010; accord, Baral , at p. 395 ; Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 802, 815 ; see Park, supra,
2 Cal. 5th at p. 1063 [in determining whether a claim a rises from protected activity, “courts should consider the elements of the10

challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability ”].) 5 We review do novo an order granting or denying a speci al motion to strike under section 425.16. ( Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884; Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)

2. The Court Properly Concluded SweetFlower ’s Claims Did Not Arise From Protected Speech or Petitioning Activity
SweetFlower ’s petition for writ of mandate alleged the City

v iolated its own rules when it (1 ) approved Integral’s conditional use permit application despite a deficient location map and (2) failed to disqualify Integral from the applicant pool after Integral made priva te overtures to the City. SweetFlower ’s claim for declaratory relief (apart from its request for a judicial declaration concerning the meaning of certain language in the

5 In its written ruling denying Integral’s special motion to strike, the court stated, “[T]he true basis for liability and the gravamen of the petition” is the City’s acts of governance. Although the court used the term “gravamen,” the court’s ruling

as a w hole, including the language immediately preceding the word “gravamen,” reflects a proper focus on the basis for the City’s liability in accordance with Baral , and not on the “gist or essence” of SweetFlower ’s petition/complaint. (Cf. See Bonni,

supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012 [“[W]e do not suggest that every court that has continued to label its approach a gravamen test even after Baral has erred. Some courts have invoked the term not in the way [defendant] suggests

— to determine the essence or gist of a so

- called mixed cause of action

— but instead to determine whether particular acts alleged within the cause of action supply the elements of a claim [citation] or instead are incidental background” ]

. )11

ordinance) was essentially the same. Integral contends each of
these claims ar o se fr om protected speech and petitioning activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1)
and /or (e)(2).

a. SweetFlower’s claim the City wrongfully approved Integral’s conditional use permit Integral contends statements by City officials and employees discussing the l icensed

- surveyor requirement in official meetings are protected as an act in furtherance of a petition and speech activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1)

, and form the basis for most of SweetFlower ’s
claims

. While Integral is certainly correct that the statements by City officials during official City hearings fit within the definition of protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), i t is the City’s alleged arbitrary application of its rules in granting Integral’s application and denying SweetFlower ’s, not the City’s

statements themselves, that is the wrong alleged in
SweetFlower ’s petition/complaint

. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063

- 1064.)
We addressed a nearly identical issue in Shahba zian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 823 ( Shahbazian )

. Like SweetFlower , the plaintiffs in Shahbazian alleged the City of Rancho Palos Verdes (RPV) had “ ‘ acted arbitrarily and engaged in illegal selecti ve enforcement by refusing to strictly enforce and follow its own ordinances with respect to the Hessers while having previously and at the same time strictly enforced such ordinances as to the Shahbazians

. ’ ” ( Id. at p. 828.) RPV moved to strike the complaint under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) , contending that claim arose out
of statements by public officials in connection with a matter12

under consideration by RPV. The trial court denied the motion,
and we affirmed. W e expl ained the Shahbazians ’ allegations “ar [o] se from [ RPV] ’s decisions to grant the Hessers a permit for their wall (allegedly a violation of local laws) and to deny the Shahbazians a permit for their deck . [Citation.] While [RPV] ’s decisions followed public hearings at which members of the city
council and [public] employees undoubtedly exercised their free speech rights, the Shahbazians’ causes of action do not arise from (or even allude to) that speech

. ” ( Id. at p. 835 .) 6

In co ntrast to the complaint in Shahbazian, SweetFlower ’s petition/complaint expressly identifies, and at times quotes directly, statements by City agents and officials made at various government hearings

. However, none of those statements by the City official s or employees comprise s the wrong s alleged

— the decision to grant Integral a conditional use permit and to deny
the same to SweetFlower

. SweetFlower ’s claim the City failed to hold Integral to the same strict standard as SweetFlower exists independently of any of those statements. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068 [“The dean’s alleged comments may supply
evidence of [discriminatory] animus, but that does not convert
th e statements themselves into the basis for liability. As the trial court correctly observed, Park’s complaint is ‘based on the act of denying plaintiff tenure based on national origin. Plaintiff could have omitted allegations regarding communicative acts . . . and
still state the same claims ’ ”]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of
Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 596 [communications from

6 Integral’s failure to address Shahbazian in both its opening brief and reply papers is troubling

, especially considering SweetFlower ’s significant reliance on the case in its opposition

papers.13

the city “that led to and that followed” the alleged breach

— the city ’ s refusal to issue a license

— were “merely incid ental to the asserted claims” against the city for breach, interference, and unfair business practices] ; cf. Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 622 [in claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, mayor and city officials’ statements are “themselves the ‘w rong[s] complained of’ ”].) Graffiti Protective Coatings

, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211 ( Graffiti Protective ) , cited with approval in Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p age 1065, and discussed at length by this court in Shahbazian

, supra , 17 Cal.App.5th at

p ages 833 to 834
, reached a similar conclusion. In Graffiti
Protective the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate asserting the City of Pico Rivera violated its own rules by awarding a contract to the plaintiff’s competitor without requiring the competitor to undergo a competitive bidding

process. The City of Pico Rivera filed a special motion to strike
the petition, and the trial court granted the m otion . In reversing the trial court’s order

, the Graffiti Protective court explained the complaint did not arise from the City of Pico Rivera’s protected activity despite multiple statements by city employees quoted in the petition : The statements by gov ernment officials “ assist in telling the story

, ” the court explained, but the claims are based
not on those statements but on “state and municipal laws requiring the C ity [ of Pico Rivera ] to award certain contracts through competitive bidding

. ” ( Graffiti Protective, at p p

. 1215,
1224 ; cf. City of Montebello v. Vasquez ( 2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 425 [distinguishing between complaints against a public entity for “acts of governance ” preceding or following statements by government officials, which would not be subject to a special14

motion to strike, and a complaint against the officials based on
their statements themselves

, which could be ] .) Integral’s reliance on Sugarman v. Brown (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 152 ( Sugarman ) is misplaced. In Sugarman a bank’s former board president and chief executive officer sued the bank’s lead auditor, among others, contending the auditor’s fraudulent misrepresentations attached to the bank’s 10

- K annual report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commiss ion (SEC) had induced him to hold onto his bank securities. ( Id. at p. 170.) The auditor filed a special motion to strike, asserting statements made in a report filed with the SEC were protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), as a

statement ma de in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a government body. The trial court agreed and granted the motion after also finding the plaintiff had not carried his merits burden. Division Eight of this court affirmed the trial
court’s o rder, finding, as to the first step of the two

- step anti

SLAPP analysis, the representations in the audit report were protected activity, and that the plaintiff’s claim for fraud arose from that protected activity. (See Sugarman, at p. 173 [“[h]ere,
the a udit report in the 10

- K filing clearly ‘forms the basis for’ plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claims and ‘“gives rise to [the auditor’s] asserted liability”’”].) Integral’s characterization of its location map and application to the City for a permit as protected speech and petitioning activity misses the point. Its location map, like the bank’s 10

- K filing with the SEC in Sugarman , may well be speech or petitioning activity, but that is only part of the first

step inquiry. The speech or petitioning act ivity must also be the wrong alleged. Here, the City’s failure to apply its licensed

-15

surveyor rule equally to all applicants is the basis for the City’s liability, not Integral’s submission of its map or any statement
contained in it.

b. The City’s failure t o disqualify Integral from the applicant pool Tacitly acknowledging the City’s decision to approve Integral’s application for a conditional use permit is not protected activity subject to a special motion to strike, Integral argues SweetFlower ’s petition / complaint goes “well beyond attacking the decision to approve” Integral’s permit application. SweetFlower ’s petition/complaint also includes a claim the City violated its rules when it failed to disqualify Integral from eligibility after Integral private l y contacted City employees on multiple occasions during the screening process. Its private contacts concerning its application , Integral contends, is protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2)

. Even a ssuming Integral’s private inquiries to the City during the initial screening process const ituted statements made
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a government body (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)), that conduct is not the basis for the City’s alleged liability. SweetFlower alleged the City had a duty under its rules to disqualify any applicant that privately contacted the City during the screening process

. It is the City’s acts (or omissions) of governance, its failure to disqualify Integral, not Integral’s private inquiries

, that underl ie
SweetFlower ’s claim against the City. ( See generally Park

, supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1060, 1063 ; Graffiti Protective

, supra , 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224 .)16 c. SweetFlower ’s request for relief Relying on dicta in Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1062 ( Rudisill )

, a case decided by Division Two of this court, Integral argues SweetFlower’s request for an injunction barring Integral from using an invalid conditional use

perm it to obtain further permits is a direct attack on Integral’s petitioning activity that subjects that “claim” to a special motion
to strike. In Rudisill petitioners sought a writ of mandate directed to the City of Los Angeles and the California Coastal
Co mmission, challenging various permit decisions and naming several real property developers as real parties in interests. The developers filed a special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16. The superior court denied the motion, ruling the petition for writ of mandate was directed to government decisionmaking, not the protected activity of the developers in seeking the permits. The superior court also sanctioned the developers for filing a frivolous anti

- SLAPP motion, concluding any reasonable

atto rney would have recognized that the writ petition concerned government decisionmaking, not the protected activities of the developers. ( Id. at p. 1069.) In their appeal from the sanctions order (the developers did not appeal the order denying their anti

- SLAPP motion), the developers argued their special motion to strike was not frivolous because they reasonably believed, based on some of the allegations in the petition relating to their piecemeal methods to obtain approvals, the mandamus action had asserted a claim against them for their protected conduct. The Rudisill court held the motion was not frivolous, the only issue before it. In dicta supporting the superior court’s ruling denying the special motion to strike, the Rudisill court also observed, in the language17

Integral emphasizes, that the petitions for writ of mandate did not seek an order directly affecting the developers’ participation in the go vernment process “such as, for example, an order precluding [the developers] from submitting any further permits[].” ( Rudisill, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 10 75 .) Integral argues that, by seeking an injunction barring Integral from obtaining additional p ermits based on an invalid conditional use permit, SweetFlower has alleged the very claim
the Rudisill court suggested would be subject to a special motion to strike. Integral reads too much into language that simply recognizes claims of wrongdoing direct ed to blocking petitioning activity could be subject to a special motion to strike. Here, SweetFlower’s request for an injunction, even if directed to Integral, 7 is not based on Integral’s alleged liability. (See Bonni

, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012 [whe n considering whether a claim arises from protected speech or petitioning activity within the meaning of section 425.16, the focus is on the “‘“ acts on which liability is based ”’”].) The request for a remedy alone, unsupported by a claim for liability, ma y well be subject to some other challenge, 8 but it does not create a claim where there is not one, let alone subject the remedy to a special motion to strike. (See Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1187 [anti

- SLAPP motion is pro perly directed to a cause of

7 SweetFlower has now clarified its request for an injunction is directed to the City only, not to Integral.

8 Sweet F lower’s request for injunctive relief, to the extent it

encompasses Integral’s activities without any concomitant allegations of Integral’s liability, is certainly questionable and may well be an appropriate target of a traditional motion to

s trike by Integral

.18

action, not the relief sought; “ ‘[i]njunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action’”]; Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007)

154 Cal.App.4th 154, 162 [same].) 9 In sum, Integral did not carry its threshold burden to
demonstr ate SweetFlower ’s claims arose from protected activity under section 425.16. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the special motion to strike.
DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying Integral’s special motion to
strike is affirmed. SweetFlower is to recover its costs on appeal

.

PERLUSS, P. J.
We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J

.

9 Although Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, supra

, 179 Cal.App.4th 1177, and this division’s opinion in Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC

, supra , 1 54 Cal.App.4th 154, were decided before Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376, the distinction in those case s between the wrong alleged and the remedy sought remains valid post

- Baral : It is the claim, not the remedy, to which an anti

SLAPP motion is properly directed. (See Baral, at p. 395 [anti

SLAPP motion is properly directed to “allegations of protected

ac tivity that are asserted as grounds for relief”; “ [ t ] he targeted claim must amount to a ‘cause of action’ in the sense that it is alleged to justify a remedy’”], italics omitted.)