2022 IL App (2d) 210524-U 

Nos. 2-21-0524 & 2-21-0525 cons. 

Order filed September 28, 2022

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) Nos. 21-CC-12, 21-CC-13 

) 

RAJ G. SHEKAR a/k/a Roger Shekar, ) Honorable 

) Daniel P. Guerin, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice McLaren concurred in the judgment.

Presiding Justice Brennan dissented.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s imposition of bond conditions, in combination with a prior 

administrative order preventing defendant from future filings without written 

approval of the presiding judge of the Du Page County Law Division, improperly 

enjoined him from filing pleadings in defense of his prosecution for indirect 

criminal contempt. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Roger Shekar, was charged with indirect criminal contempt for alleged 

violations of an administrative order prohibiting him from filing any new pleadings without 

express written approval of the presiding judge of the Du Page County Law Division. Following 

defendant’s arrest, the trial court imposed certain bond conditions in addition to the prohibitions 
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contained in the administrative order. Defendant subsequently attempted to file a pro se motion to 

substitute judge as of right pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) and a petition to transfer venue. 

Defendant’s attempts were denied, and he filed a notice of appeal leading to the matter before this 

court. We vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On February 26, 2021, the Du Page County trial court issued administrative order 21-8 that 

found defendant had “filed a complaint on December 30, 2019, case number 19-L-1445, with said 

complaint containing language that is patently offensive, harassing and not included for any proper 

purpose[.]” The administrative order further found that defendant’s had “filed a complaint on 

February 11, 2021, case number 21-L-184, with said complaint containing language that is patently 

offensive, harassing and not included for any proper purpose[.]” As a result, the administrative 

order found that “restraints must be imposed upon [defendant’s] ability to file any new civil cases 

or any other documents relating to any currently pending cases in [Du Page County].” It was 

ordered that defendant, on his own behalf or on the behalf of any other person or entity, be 

“prohibited and enjoined from filing any new complaints or any other documents relating to any 

currently pending cases in [Du Page County] without the express written approval of the Presiding 

Judge of the Law Division.” 

¶ 5 On May 20, 2021, the trial court entered an administrative order amending the February 

26, 2021, order. The amended administrative order found that defendant had “sent emails to 

employees of the Clerk of the Circuit Court that contain language that is patently offensive, 

harassing and not included for any proper purpose[.]” The amended order, in addition to the 

existing prohibitions of the February 26 order, “prohibited and enjoined [defendant] from sending 

emails to any employee or staff member of the Circuit Clerk’s Office.” Defendant was ordered to 
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“direct any email correspondence for the Circuit Clerk’s Office directly to the Clerk of the Circuit 

Court, Candace Adams[.]”

¶ 6 On August 5, 2021, a misdemeanor complaint for indirect criminal contempt of court in 

violation 720 ILCS 5/1-3 was filed against defendant under case number 21-CC-13. The complaint 

alleged that defendant 

“[K]nowingly and without authority directly emailed Circuit Court Clerk 

Employee, Sarah Rose, directly in violation with [the amended administrative order], using 

language that was patently offensive, harassing, not included for any proper purpose, and 

specifically directed at Sarah Rose. In this email, he also included her home address and 

stated he would include her home address in papers filed in the Cook County Circuit 

Clerk’s Office, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and 

against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Illinois.”

Also on August 5, 2021, an arrest warrant for defendant was issued by the trial court. 

¶ 7 On August 9, 2021, the trial court issued an order quashing the arrest warrant issued on 

case number 21-CC-13. However, the trial court then issued an arrest warrant for defendant on 

case number 21-CC-12 for three counts of indirect criminal contempt based on three separate 

emails sent by defendant in alleged violation of the amended administrative order. The new arrest 

warrant, issued by Judge Michael Reidy, specified that the amount of defendant’s bond would be 

set in court. Case number 21-CC-12 was then assigned to Judge Daniel Guerin. 

¶ 8 On August 11, 2021, defendant was arrested and brought before Judge Guerin for a bond 

hearing. At the hearing, the State indicated it would proceed on the three-count complaint for 

indirect criminal contempt (21-CC-12) and would seek a sentence of up to 180 days in jail. 

Defendant was not represented by an attorney at the bond hearing. The trial court advised 
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defendant of his rights but informed defendant that he would have no right to a jury trial as the 

State was seeking only 180 days of jail time for the three counts of indirect criminal contempt. 

Defendant’s request to be released on his own recognizance was denied by the trial court. A public 

defender was appointed for only the purpose of assisting defendant with the remainder of the bond 

hearing. A $5000 bond (with ten percent to apply, $500) was ordered. As a condition of bond, the 

trial court issued a “no contact order to include direct and indirect contact, including and through 

email, social media or a third party” with “any employee [of the] Du Page County Clerk’s Office 

until further order of court.” 

¶ 9 Later, on August 11, 2021, defendant was again called before Judge Guerin following his 

wife’s attempt to post the requisite $500 to secure his release. The attempt had failed due to an 

error with the bond being entered on case 21-CC-13. The State indicated that it wished for the trial 

court to enter a recognizance bond on case 21-CC-13 and further indicated that it would dismiss 

21-CC-13 on August 13, 2021. The State then requested the trial court enter the conditional bond 

order on case 21-CC-12. The trial court entered amended orders in each case number. Defendant’s 

appointed public defender was discharged from the matter following the bond hearing, returning 

his status to pro se. The trial court advised defendant that he should appear on August 13, 2021, to 

raise his arguments concerning the underlying charges against him, but defendant asked for 30 

days to obtain counsel. The matter was continued to September 28, 2021, and defendant was 

admonished in open court that the conditions of bond requiring no contact with the clerk’s office 

would remain in effect. Defendant indicated that he understood the conditions of the trial court’s 

admonishment and he was released on bond after posting $500 on case number 21-CC-12. 

¶ 10 On August 16, 2021, defendant attempted to file a motion for substitution of judge as of 

right pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114-5, as well as a petition to transfer of venue to Cook County. 
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Defendant submitted the motion to substitute judge at 8:56 a.m. on August 16, 2021. At 10:05 a.m. 

on August 16, an email was sent to defendant indicating that all filings had to be submitted to the 

presiding judge of the Law Division, Judge Robert Kleeman, per administrative order 21-8, dated 

July 6, 2021.1 

¶ 11 On September 3, 2021, defendant filed a “motion seeking leave to file notice of appeal 

before Robert Kleeman.” The motion recounted defendant’s inability to file his motion for 

substitution of judge and petition to transfer venue. The September 3 motion additionally contained 

a three-page “Notice of Appeal as of Right Pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1); and Pursuant to Rule 304.” 

Defendant’s notice of appeal sought to challenge the bond condition that prevented his contact 

with the circuit clerk as it prevented his ability to file documents in his own defense to the charges 

of indirect criminal contempt. On September 8, 2021, the circuit clerk of Du Page County filestamped the notice of appeal in both cases 21-CC-12 and 21-CC-13 as the case numbers giving 

rise to this appeal. 

¶ 12 Defendant appeared pro se before Judge Guerin on September 28, 2021, whereupon he 

informed the court that he had not yet obtained counsel. The State informed the trial court of 

defendant’s pending appeal. The trial court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender 

to represent defendant, and the case was continued pending the resolution of this appeal. 

¶ 13 Defendant then timely filed this appeal. 

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

1 The record presented to this court does not contain an amended administrative order dated 

July 6, 2021. Defendant asserted through affidavit that he was unaware of any such order.
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¶ 15 Before analyzing the issues raised by defendant in this appeal, we must first address the 

State’s renewed objection to this court’s jurisdiction. The State renewed its objection to

defendant’s contention that jurisdiction lies in Rule 604(c) as he did not perfect his appeal by first 

filing a written motion for relief in the trial court, and on appeal filed a formal brief instead of a 

motion for review. See IL. S. Ct. R. 604(c)(1), (2) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 16 Defendant’s appellate counsel filed its opening brief to this court on January 28, 2022. 

Appellate counsel asserted that jurisdiction lies in this court pursuant to Article VI, Section 6, of 

the Illinois Constitution, as well as Supreme Court Rules 603, 604(c), and 606. On March 10, 

2022, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that 

defendant failed to perfect his appeal as required by Rule 604(c)(1). Defendant’s counsel filed an 

objection to the State’s motion arguing that the amended administrative order, in combination with 

the bond order forbidding defendant from any contact with the circuit clerk, made it impossible 

for him to file a motion in the trial court as required by Rule 604(c). However, defendant argued, 

his appellate brief, coupled with the record on appeal, contained all information that a verified 

motion for review under Rule 604(c)(2) would require. This court denied the State’s motion to 

dismiss.

¶ 17 As discussed above, the bond conditions defendant is challenging in this appeal forbid him 

from filing any pleadings, including those related to his defense in the prosecution of indirect 

criminal contempt. Had he attempted to file a Rule 604(c) motion in the trial court, he would have 

been prevented from doing so, and potentially found to be in violation of the ordered bond 

conditions. 

¶ 18 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(c)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides in pertinent part:
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“Before conviction a defendant may appeal to the Appellate Court from an order 

*** denying *** bail or the conditions thereof. As a prerequisite to appeal the defendant 

shall first present to the trial court a written motion for the relief to be sought on appeal. 

The motion shall be verified by the defendant and shall state the following:

(i) the defendant's financial condition;

(ii) his *** residence addresses and employment history for the past 10 years;

(iii) his *** occupation and the name and address of his *** employer, if he *** is 

employed, or his *** school, if he *** is in school;

(iv) his *** family situation; and

(v) any prior criminal record and any other relevant facts.”

At the August 11, 2021, bond hearing, defendant’s appointed counsel informed the trial court that 

defendant 

“[D]oes live in Streamwood with his family, his wife and two kids, ages 18 and 20. 

His wife is a teacher by trade but unemployed during the pandemic. [Defendant] has also 

been unemployed and existing on unemployment insurance throughout the course of the 

pandemic. He is an engineer by training.

His family is in debt. He doesn’t have much in his bank account that he would be 

able to post for bond. He thought it was about $25. He does have a car that is [an] older 

model but is paid off so he would be [able] to get back and forth to court. I am unaware of 

any history of failure to appear in court, so I don’t believe that would be an issue.” 

Paragraph 12 of defendant’s motion to substitute judge as of right states that he “has no history of 

any kind of a crime.” The conditions of defendant’s bond made any attempt to file a motion under 
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Rule 604(c) in the trial court an act of futility. However, the information required by Rule 604(c) 

was presented and known to the trial court. 

¶ 19 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(c)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides in pertinent part:

 “The appeal may be taken at any time before conviction by filing a verified motion 

for review in the Appellate Court. The motion for review shall be accompanied by a 

verified copy of the motion or answer filed in the trial court and shall state the following:

(i) the court that entered the order;

(ii) the date of the order;

(iii) the crime or crimes charged;

(iv) the amount and condition of bail;

(v) the arguments supporting the motion; and

(vi) the relief sought.

No brief shall be filed. The motion shall be served upon the opposing party. The State may 

promptly file an answer.” 

¶ 20 The most significant characteristic of Rule 604(c) “is the manner in which the record of 

what transpired in the court below arrives in this court.” People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 

191253, ¶ 3. In a Rule 604(c) appeal, a reviewing court “must rely upon the limited materials listed 

in the rule and provided by counsel, along with an uncertified transcript of the hearing on the 

defendant's motion to set his bail. The rule does not otherwise address what, if any, materials from 

the court below a party may provide or this court may consider.” Id. 

¶ 21 This court was made aware that the present appeal concerned the conditions of a bond order 

when we granted defendant’s motion for an extension of time to file his opening brief. Upon the 

filing of that brief, this court and the State were made aware of all information required in a verified 
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motion for review under Rule 604(c)(2). Based on the unique nature of defendant’s bond 

conditions that reduced the motion requirements of Rule 604(c) in the trial court to an act of futility, 

we hold that this court has jurisdiction under Rule 604(c), and this court further continues to deny 

the State’s request to dismiss this appeal on jurisdictional grounds. 

¶ 22 The dissent cites to People v. Albitar, 374 Ill. App. 3d 718 (2007), to support the notion 

that defendant’s failure to present to the trial court a written motion for the relief sought in this 

appeal was a “prerequisite” to this court’s jurisdiction. However, the procedural posture of Albitar

is distinguishable from the case-at-bar. 

¶ 23 In Albitar, the defendant in the underlying case had been arrested, charged, and convicted 

of unlawful use of a weapon. Albitar, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 720. Subsequently, the defendant was 

charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and 

conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping. Id. The trial court set bail for the defendant, 10% of 

which was paid by his brother as surety on the defendant’s behalf. Sometime later, the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service deported the defendant due to his conviction for unlawful use of a 

weapon. Id. As a result, he failed to appear for subsequent proceedings related to the most-recent 

slew of criminal charges, and the trial court issued a “no bail” arrest warrant for the defendant. Id. 

¶ 24 The trial court ultimately entered a bond forfeiture before the defendant’s counsel filed a 

motion for entry of cash refund to surety. Id. The motion alleged that because of the defendant’s 

deportation, his brother and surety could not comply with the bond conditions. Id. The trial court 

denied the motion and the defendant appealed. Id. 

¶ 25 On appeal, the State sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 604(c), arguing 

that the defendant’s brother and surety failed to comply with the Rule because he “simply filed a 

brief” rather than “a verified motion for review.” Id. at 721. The Albitar court found jurisdiction 
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was warranted because the underlying bond forfeiture judgment “was civil rather than criminal in 

nature,” and, thus, not subject to the requirements of Rule 604(c). Id. at 722. Additionally, the

court reasoned that Rule 604(c) was inapplicable because the bond forfeiture judgment order did

not “set, modify, revoke, deny, or refuse to modify bail or a condition thereof.” Id. The Albitar

court held that the bond forfeiture judgment on appeal qualified as a final and appealable order 

over which it had appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 722-23. 

¶ 26 Returning to the present appeal, the trial court’s bond conditions imposed an 

unconstitutional conundrum on defendant not contemplated in Albitar or any other case dealing 

with the prerequisites to appellate jurisdiction contemplated by Rule 604(c). Defendant in the 

present case was actively defending against charges of indirect criminal contempt, a matter unlike 

the civil-in-nature bond forfeiture at issue in Alibtar. The trial court’s bond conditions put in place 

an unduly burdensome obstacle to defendant’s ability to appeal those conditions by prohibiting 

him from filing any documents without permission. Our appellate jurisdiction cannot be hindered 

by such an unconstitutional order, especially when the record presented for review fully apprised 

this court of the nature of the issues presented. 

¶ 27 Assuming arguendo that the dissent's interpretation is reasonable, we must interpret the 

rule in such a way as to preserve its constitutionality. We have interpreted the rule to provide the 

necessary procedural due process to appeal unreasonable conditions for bail in a criminal 

proceeding. The majority’s position on jurisdiction preserves defendant’s right to procedural due 

process in a criminal proceeding, a right that the judiciary cannot abridge.

¶ 28 Before concluding our review of this court’s jurisdiction over the matter, we must address 

the dissent’s criticism of the majority’s assertion that requiring defendant to seek permission before 

filing a motion to substitute judge as of right would amount to an exercise in futility. The dissent 
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states that the record belies such a position because defendant could have “utilize[d] the email to 

file the substitution-of-judge motion, as explicitly directed” after attempting to electronically file

his timely motion in contravention of the administrative order 21-8 and the imposed bond 

conditions. Defendant could have done what the dissent suggests and await either approval or 

denial from the Presiding Judge of the Law Division. However, as our forthcoming analysis will 

illustrate, defendant could not be constitutionally prevented from filing documents in his own 

defense against the charges of indirect criminal contempt. Once the State elected to charge him 

with a criminal offense, the prohibitions of the administrative order and bond conditions could not 

act to prevent him from exercising his rights under the sixth amendment to the United States 

Constitution. Permission from the Presiding Judge of Du Page County’s Law Division cannot act 

as an obstacle to that right, “explicitly directed” or otherwise. 

¶ 29 We now move to defendant’s contentions in this appeal. Defendant contends that the bond 

conditions ordered by the trial court on August 11, 2021, in combination with amended 

administrative order 21-8, improperly enjoins him from filing pleadings in his defense to the 

prosecution for indirect criminal contempt. Defendant argues that the bond conditions extend 

beyond the amended administrative order and create an unconstitutional violation of his 

fundamental right to defend himself against a criminal charge. Defendant requests that this court 

modify the conditions of his bond to permit him to file pleadings in his defense, as he remains a 

pro se defendant. Additionally, defendant requests that this court direct the underlying case to be 

assigned to a different judge on remand to the trial court as his motion to substitute judge as of 

right was timely filed on August 16, 2021. Finally, he requests this court to order that case 21-CC13 be dismissed due to its one count being duplicative of one of the three counts charged in case 

21-CC-12. 
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¶ 30 A trial court’s judgment as to setting bond and conditions of bond is generally reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (3d) 190582, ¶ 8. However, a trial court 

must exercise its discretion within the bounds of the law. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 

(1999). Where a trial court’s exercise of discretion is frustrated by an erroneous rule of law, the 

reviewing court must require the exercise of discretion consistent with the law. Williams, 188 Ill. 

2d at 369. Further, where the question is one of law, the reviewing court determines it de novo. Id. 

Here, because the issue is whether the trial court’s ordered conditions of bond created an 

unconstitutional violation of defendant’s right to defend against a criminal charge, we apply de 

novo review. See People v. Patel, 2020 IL App (2d) 190532, ¶ 22.

¶ 31 It is well established that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 

a defendant in a criminal proceeding both the right to the assistance of counsel and the correlative 

right to proceed without counsel. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 235 (1996) (citing Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975)). The right of self-representation is “as basic and 

fundamental as [the] right to be represented by counsel.” Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 235 (quoting People 

v. Nelson, 47 Ill. 2d 570, 574 (1971)). 

¶ 32 An indirect criminal contempt proceeding is a separate and distinct proceeding from that 

which underlies the contempt charge. Windy City Limousine Company LLC v. Milazzo, 2018 IL 

App (1st) 162827, ¶ 46. A person charged with indirect criminal contempt is entitled to 

constitutional protections and procedural rights to that of a criminal defendant. Id. “The protections 

and rights include (1) being charged by a written petition, complaint, or information; (2) being 

informed of the nature of the charges; (3) personal service; (4) the ability to file an answer; (5) a 

public trial where he or she has the ability to present evidence, subpoena witnesses, and confront 

and cross-examine witnesses; (6) the privilege against self-incrimination; (7) the presumption of 
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innocence; and (8) the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Additionally, the 

defendant charged with indirect criminal contempt is entitled to a jury trial if the potential penalty 

could exceed six months’ imprisonment or a $500 fine. Id. 

¶ 33 Following the conclusion of the August 11, 2021, bond hearing, defendant was pro se and 

representing himself in a proceeding for indirect criminal contempt as his appointed counsel was 

only representing him for the limited purpose of that hearing. As a result, defendant was entitled 

all constitutional protections and procedural rights that any criminal defendant should expect, 

including the right to file a motion for substitution of judge as of right. 

¶ 34 Section 114-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: 

“Within 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant has been placed on the 

trial call of a judge the defendant may move the court in writing for a substitution of that 

judge on the ground that such judge is so prejudiced against him that he cannot receive a 

fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the cause 

but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the motion. The defendant may name 

only one judge as prejudiced, pursuant to this subsection; provided, however, that in a case 

in which the offense charged is a Class X felony or may be punished by death or life 

imprisonment, the defendant may name two judges as prejudiced.” 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) 

(West 2020).

A substitution of judge as a matter of right is available to a defendant in a criminal contempt 

proceeding. People v. Perez-Gonzalez, 2014 IL App (2d) 120946, ¶ 30. Thus, “[p]ursuant to the 

statute, a defendant must be granted an automatic substitution of judge if the defendant meets the 

following requirements: (1) the motion is made within 10 days after defendant's case is placed on 

the judge's trial call; (2) the motion names only one judge unless the defendant is charged with a 
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Class X felony, in which case he may name two judges; (3) the motion must be in writing; and (4) 

the motion must allege the trial judge is so prejudiced against the defendant that the defendant 

cannot receive a fair trial. In addition [the supreme] court has held that the motion must be made 

before the trial judge makes a substantive ruling in the case.” Bangaly Estate of Sissoko v. 

Baggiani, 2017 IL App (1st) 1524454, ¶ 53 (quoting People v. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d 481, 487-88 

(1999)). “If the motion is made within 10 days after the cause has been placed on the judge’s call, 

the named judge cannot proceed further and must transfer the case.” SKS & Associates, 2012 IL 

App (1st) 103504, ¶ 21. 

¶ 35 Defendant’s motion for substitution of judge was made within 10 days of Judge Guerin’s 

assignment to the underlying case. His motion contained all the information required to grant a 

substitution of judge. 

¶ 36 As defendant remains pro se as of this writing, the bond order’s condition prohibiting him 

from any contact with the Du Page County Circuit Clerk’s office creates an unconstitutional 

violation to his right to defend himself against prosecution for indirect criminal contempt. As such, 

we vacate the August 11, 2021, bond order and remand this matter to the trial court to modify 

defendant’s bond conditions in a manner consistent with this disposition. Further, as defendant’s 

attempt to file a motion to substitute judge as of right under section 114-5(a) of the Criminal Code 

should have been allowed, we order that Judge Guerin be substituted on remand. As to defendant’s 

request that this court order case 21-CC-13 to be dismissed, we decline to take any action as the 

State has the discretion not only to decide what charges to bring, but to decide whether charges 

should be dismissed. People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 339 (2009). 

¶ 37 II. CONCLUSION
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¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we vacate the August 11, 2021, bond order entered in the circuit

court of Du Page County and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this 

disposition. 

¶ 39 Vacated in part, and remanded. 

¶ 40 PRESIDING JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting:

¶ 41 I respectfully dissent on the basis that this appeal should be dismissed due to defendant’s 

noncompliance with Rule 604(c)(1).

¶ 42 Initially, I question whether we even have jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s appeal of 

his bail conditions given his noncompliance with Rule 604(c)(1). Other than specifically 

delineated exceptions set forth in our supreme court rules, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain 

appeals in criminal cases until the entry of a final judgment. Rule 604(c)(1) is the only rule which 

establishes a right to review interlocutory bail orders, and it sets forth specific procedures for 

invoking that right. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(c)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) (“appeal to the Appellate Court from 

an order setting, modifying, revoking, denying, or refusing to modify bail or the conditions 

thereof.”); Albitar, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 721. These procedures include the straightforward 

requirement that, “As a prerequisite to appeal the defendant shall first present to the trial court a 

written motion for the relief to be sought on appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(c)(1) 

(eff. July 1, 2017). Noting that Rule 604(c)(1)’s jurisdictional grant is an exception to the rule 

otherwise conditioning jurisdiction on the entry of a final judgment, our sister court in Albitar

recognized in dicta that “this court does not have jurisdiction to review such an interlocutory order 

when a defendant fails to follow the procedural requirements included in Rule 604(c).” Albitar, 

374 Ill. App. 3d at 721. Here there is no question defendant did not file the prerequisite motion 

with the trial court seeking relief related to the August 11, 2021, bail condition, “No contact of any 
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kind with * * * ANY EMPLOYEE DUPAGE CO CLERK’S OFC until further order of court * * 

* NO CONTACT ORDER TO INCLUDE DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTACT, INCLUDING 

THROUGH EMAIL[.]” Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed.

¶ 43 Moreover, even if our jurisdiction is not contingent on the filing of the Rule 604(c)(1) 

prerequisite motion, the failure to file the motion in the trial court should nevertheless result in 

dismissal. See People v. Beaty, 351 Ill. App. 3d 717, 721 (2004) (dicta agreeing that bail orders 

were only reviewable under the limited and clearly defined procedures set forth in Rule 604(c)). 

The majority dispenses with Rule 604(c)(1)’s prerequisite that defendant “first present to the trial 

court a written motion for the relief to be sought on appeal,” suggesting that requiring defendant 

to do so would amount to an exercise in futility. This conclusion, however, is belied by the record. 

Administrative Order 21-08, In the Matter of Roger Shekar, (Administrative Order) prohibits 

defendant “from filing any new complaints or any other documents relating to any currently 

pending cases *** without the express written approval of the Presiding Judge of the Law 

Division.” It further orders that “[a]ll such requests shall be made via email to the Presiding Judge 

of the Law Division.” The record contains various emails sent to the presiding judge of the Law 

Division prior to the August 11, 2021, bail order, demonstrating that defendant was well aware of 

the administrative order directing him to file all pleadings in pending cases with the presiding 

judge of the Law Division. Moreover, when defendant electronically filed his timely motion to 

substitute judge with the circuit court clerk’s office on August 16, 2021, in contravention of both 

the Administrative Order and defendant’s bond conditions, he received an electronic response 

notice several hours later rejecting his electronic filing and directing him that “[p]ursuant to 

Administrative Order 21-08 ***[,] all filings must be submitted to the Presiding Judge of the Law 

Division.” The notice also included the presiding judge’s email address. 
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¶ 44 Defendant eschewed this direction, instead emailing the presiding judge of the Law 

Division twice that day to complain that it was unfair to apply the administrative order to his 

criminal case filings. What defendant did not do, however, was utilize the email to file the 

substitution-of-judge motion, as explicitly directed. Nor did he utilize the email to file a motion 

to reconsider his bail conditions as required by Rule 604(c)(1). Why defendant elected not to file 

the latter motion is unknown. What is known, however, is that the majority engages in speculation 

when it concludes that doing so would have been futile. Equally likely is that a motion to modify 

defendant’s bail conditions, properly filed pursuant to the Administrative Order, would have been 

considered by the trial court, potentially obviating the need for this interlocutory appeal—the 

whole point, one supposes, for requiring the prerequisite motion in the first place. To this end, it 

should be recalled that defendant initiated this very appeal by seeking leave to file his notice of 

appeal from the presiding judge of the Law Division, after which it was file-stamped by the circuit 

clerk of Du Page County. 

¶ 45 Given defendant’s continued pattern of harassing the circuit court clerk’s office personnel, 

it was entirely reasonable to place limitations on the manner in which he filed documents with the 

clerk’s office. As the State notes, “The right to defend against a criminal charge is not synonymous 

with unfettered access to the court system.” For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.