NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

LARRY GOLDEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

APPLE INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

AT&T INC., BIG O DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP RAM, 

FCA US LLC, FAIRWAY FORD LINCOLN OF 

GREENVILLE, FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, 

LLC, GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, KEVIN 

WHITAKER CHEVROLET, LG ELECTRONICS USA 

INC, MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC., PANASONIC 

CORPORATION, QUALCOMM, INC., SAMSUNG 

ELECTRONICS USA, SPRINT CORPORATION, TMOBILE USA, INC., VERIZON CORPORATE 

SERVICES GROUP,

Defendants

______________________

2020-1508

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of South Carolina in No. 6:19-cv-02557-DCC, 

Judge Donald C. Coggins Jr.

______________________

Case: 20-1508 Document: 16 Page: 1 Filed: 09/03/2020
2 GOLDEN v. APPLE INC.

Decided: September 3, 2020

______________________

LARRY GOLDEN, Greenville, SC, pro se. 

 JOHN FRANKLIN MORROW, JR., Womble Bond Dickinson 

(US) LLP, Winston-Salem, NC, for defendant-appellee. 

Also represented by ANA FRIEDMAN. 

 ______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LINN and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Larry Golden, pro se plaintiff-appellant, sued fifteen 

defendants in the District Court for the District of South 

Carolina, alleging patent infringement by the defendants’ 

development and manufacturing of communicating, monitoring, detecting, and controlling (“CMDC”) devices. Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald issued an Order notifying 

Golden that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal for frivolousness. After Golden amended his complaint, 

the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal without 

prejudice and without service of process because the case 

was duplicative of parallel proceedings Golden brought 

against the government in the Court of Federal Claims. 

Golden objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, arguing that the present action was not duplicative but was instead a separate action against nongovernmental entities for patent infringement. The district court reviewed the record and adopted the Magistrate 

Judge’s recommendation. Golden appeals. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

The district court concluded that because the present 

case and the earlier case against the government involved 

the same patents, that was enough to find the action duplicative. Golden argues on appeal that what the district 

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GOLDEN v. APPLE INC. 3

court failed to appreciate is that while the earlier action 

asserted unfair acts by the government, the present action 

allegedly involves the infringing acts of third parties unrelated to any activities of the government. Even if Golden 

is correct, however, in asserting that the present action is 

not duplicative and therefore should not have been dismissed on that ground, we “may affirm a judgment of a district court on any ground the law and the record will 

support so long as that ground would not expand the relief

granted.” Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. TorPharm, Inc., 153 F.3d 

1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Indeed, we may dismiss a case 

for lack of jurisdiction where the complaint is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” First Data Corp. v. Inselberg, 

870 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Arbaugh v. 

Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006)).

Allegations of direct infringement are subject to the 

pleading standards established by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662 (2009). Under this standard, a court must dismiss 

a complaint if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570. This “facial plausibility” standard requires “more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. 

Rather, it requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up 

to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.”). Although courts do 

not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, a plaintiff must allege “‘enough 

fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 

reveal’ that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. 

Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Case: 20-1508 Document: 16 Page: 3 Filed: 09/03/2020
4 GOLDEN v. APPLE INC.

Golden’s amended complaint here, like his initial complaint, even if not duplicative of the earlier filed action 

against the government, “contains only conclusory formulaic recitations of the elements of patent infringement as to 

each defendant.” Magistrate Judge Initial Order at 5,

Golden v. Apple Inc., No. 6:19-cv-02557 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 

2019), ECF No. 12. Count I of Golden’s Amended Complaint, for example, merely states that “at least one of the 

defendants named in this complaint has infringed at least 

independent claim 4 & 5 of the ’287 patent,” Complaint at 

¶ 156, Golden v. Apple Inc., No. 6:19-cv-02557 (D.S.C. Oct. 

15, 2019), ECF No. 16-1, followed by generalized statements of infringement by each defendant, id. at ¶¶ 157–

204, and similar broad infringement allegations for each of 

Golden’s other patents, id. at ¶¶ 205–384. The complaint 

itself offers only vague generalities and block quotes of 

statutes, cases and treatises, but nowhere points us to any 

nonfrivolous allegations of infringement of any claim by 

any actual product made, used, or sold by any defendant.

The complaint also references “claim charts” for each 

defendant and each patent. E.g., id., ECF No. 16-14. These 

claim charts present a dizzying array of disorganized assertions over several hundred pages, disingenuously using 

the words of the claims to generally describe cryptically 

identified structures. Although Golden appeals pro se and 

is therefore entitled to a certain leeway in interpreting his 

complaint, we agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion 

that “the plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations fail to 

state a claim for relief.” Magistrate Judge Initial Order at 

5.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal without prejudice and without service of process, not on 

the basis of duplicity, but on the ground of frivolousness.

AFFIRMED

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GOLDEN v. APPLE INC. 5

COSTS

No costs.

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