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82–962 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–56] 

UNDERSEA WARFARE CAPABILITIES 

AND CHALLENGES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, September 12, 2013, Undersea Warfare Capabilities and Challenges .................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, September 12, 2013 ............................................................................... 29 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 

UNDERSEA WARFARE CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Breckenridge, RADM Richard P., USN, Director, Undersea Warfare Division 

(N97), Department of Defense ............................................................................. 4 

Johnson, RADM David C., USN, Program Executive Officer for Submarines, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Breckenridge, RADM Richard P., joint with RADM David C. Johnson ....... 37 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 51 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 54 

(1) 

UNDERSEA WARFARE CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 12, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES. 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on our 

undersea warfare capabilities and challenges. 

Before we begin our discussion today on undersea warfare, I 

wanted to quickly discuss sequestration and the alternatives that 

are facing the Navy. It is apparent to me that the largest threat 

to the United States Navy is of our own making. Despite repeated 

attempts by the House of Representatives to rein in our Nation’s 

spending and properly resource the Department of Defense, the administration has instead offered an alternative plan that would 

raise our Nation’s taxes, creating a logjam that ensured sequestration continues to decimate our Nation’s defense. 

When budget cuts were compared with the Nation’s risk associated with our Syria interest, even Secretary Hagel agreed that dismantling of our military by budget cuts constitutes the greatest 

risk. 

If this administration remains supportive of the continued deterioration of the military because of sequestration, I look forward to 

the day when a new leadership in our country is established to 

overcome this shortsighted agenda. We need to ensure that strategy drives budget decisions, we need to provide a voice to our combatant commanders, and we need to ensure that every time we put 

our soldiers and sailors in harm’s way, we provide them with every 

tool and every resource to ensure that we retain a superior advantage over any competing interest. 

If sequestration is allowed to remain during the remaining tenure of this administration, I would urge the Department to adopt 

a strategy that retains our current force structure in a reduced 

operational status to allow the next administration the opportunity 

to reverse our military’s decline. 

A decision that reduces our Navy by three aircraft carriers will 

take 20 years to recover. This type of irreversible action by the administration will irreparably harm our Nation. A hold-and-wait 
2 

strategy is superior to any strategy that would reduce our force 

structure, as is being considered by the administration. 

As to this hearing, I continue to believe that the undersea warfare capabilities provided by our United States Navy provide a preeminent role in the—our control of the global commons. These capabilities provide the United States with a key asymmetric advantage over any potential aggressor. Even in a time of declining resources, it is crucial that our Nation continue to retain our strategic advantage in undersea warfare. 

At the heart of our current fleet is the Los Angeles-class attack 

submarine. To augment the Los Angeles class, this committee has 

been successful in the authorization of two Virginia-class submarines per year, and we authorized another two boats in the fiscal year 2014 NDAA. However, with the accelerating retirement of 

the Los Angeles-class submarine, our Nation will drop below the 

48-boat goal starting in 2025. 

I believe that our attack submarines are an essential element to 

any of our Nation’s high-end war plans and I remain committed to 

continuing the annual procurement of two Virginia-class submarines to retain our asymmetrical advantage. 

Our submarines force also provides a substantial strike capability with the land-attack Tomahawk cruise missile. Our Navy has 

four Ohio-class guided missile submarines that can each carry 154 

Tomahawk cruise missiles. Unfortunately, these four boats are 

scheduled to be retired. 

The Navy has proposed to replace this reduced strike capacity 

with the Virginia Payload Module [VPM]. I believe that the Virginia Payload Module could provide this additional capability to 

the fleet, and I will closely monitor the affordability of the Virginia 

Payload Module to ensure that the benefits outweigh the associated 

costs. 

Finally, the Ohio-class replacement program is expected to provide almost 70 percent of our Nation’s entire strategic arsenal. Our 

national security rests on our ability to deliver this boat on time 

and within budget. Unfortunately, the cost of these 12 boats will 

each average $6 billion and may crowd out other shipbuilding interests starting in the next 5 years. I believe it is imperative that 

the Department of Defense allocate the correct funding towards 

these strategic assets and ensure that our United States Navy does 

not disproportionately bear the burden. 

The fair share division of our Nation’s defense resources at the 

Pentagon needs to come to an end to ensure that our naval forces 

are properly resourced for our future challenges. 

Today we are truly honored to have as our witnesses the director 

of the Undersea Warfare Division, Rear Admiral Richard 

Breckenridge, and the program executive officer for submarines, 

Rear Admiral David Johnson. 

Gentlemen, we want to thank both of you for your service. You 

are the best our country has to give. We thank you both for being 

in the role that you are in, and we are looking forward to hearing 

your testimony today. 

I now want to recognize my friend, the ranking member from 

North Carolina, Mr. McIntyre, for any remarks that he might have. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we look at the Navy’s current and planned undersea warfare 

programs, we couldn’t have two better witnesses. So thank you to 

Admiral Johnson and Admiral Breckenridge for your service and 

for being here today. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, because 

we do know the Navy’s undersea capabilities are critical, critical 

issues facing the DOD [Department of Defense] and the Congress 

as a whole. I particularly want to thank Admiral Breckenridge, 

whom I have known since I first came to Congress, for his leadership and character, for his integrity and for your service. And 

thank you for being a continuing example of that from the time I 

knew you when you were studying for your first exam to be able 

to do nuclear engineering and to go on to submarines. And to have 

risen today to the responsibility and rank you have; you have been 

steadfast in that, and thank you for that great witness of character. 

As we look ahead to examining the Navy’s plans in this area, 

there is a lot of talk about China, about other countries having 

asymmetric advantages over the U.S., but we know in terms of 

submarines, the reverse is true, and you gentlemen know that better than anybody, which is, of course, why you are here today. 

We know that our submarines are clearly at the forefront and 

clearly have the most mobility to do what needs to be done quickly, 

accurately and responsibly. We know that that means we can’t take 

that advantage for granted, and it means that we can’t simply 

stand still, or I guess the better parallel is say we shouldn’t just 

simply stay anchored, we must get underway, and we must stay 

underway with the advancements in our submarine fleet and our 

underwater warfare capabilities. 

Another reason, of course, we want to talk with you gentlemen 

is we are concerned about the cost of the current submarine programs and how that is going to impact what we do now, but obviously what we do in the future. In the fiscal year 2013 budget 

alone, there is more than $5 billion in shipbuilding procurement accounts for the Virginia-class attack submarine program. That is 

supposed to continue for many years. There is also about $750 million in research and development for the Ohio-class replacement 

submarines, which I know we have had some conversations about, 

even though we are years away from actually starting construction. 

In both cases, in plain terms, that is a lot of money, but as things 

stand today, it looks like the Nation gets the most bang for its buck 

out of these investments. 

With falling budgets for sequestration, we are concerned about 

how the Navy will be able to keep these programs on track. It is 

not only a personal interest, a professional interest for you, I know 

as Navy officers, but it is an interest that I know you share in our 

national defense, in a concern on behalf of our Nation. 
4 

Finally, I want to mention the future of unmanned underwater 

vehicles. The progress in this area is raising some important questions. Will the Navy be able to expand its global undersea presence 

without the expense of building more and more large, very expensive manned submarines, or alternatively, will the Navy in the future do more to have a balance of some type, and if so, in what 

proportion of both manned and unmanned submarines working together to make our overall submarine fleet more effective. 

These are the type of questions we know that—we hear a lot of 

about unmanned aerial vehicles these days and that has captured 

the public’s imagination, but also have been the reality in our military. This is a new area, though, for many people, and as our citizens start asking questions, we would like to hear your answers as 

we look ahead to those unmanned submarines and other ways of 

having unmanned underwater vehicles and activities. 

We look forward to your testimony. Thank you for your service, 

and indeed we pray God’s blessings upon you and your families, because we know they make great sacrifices in the lengthy times that 

you have been away and will continue to be away as you serve our 

great Nation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, we thank you both. And as you know, 

as you look at this subcommittee, we are building a record so that 

we can use it for making the decisions that we need. It is probably 

one of the most bipartisan subcommittees that you will find in Congress. Mike is one of my closest friends in Congress. And Mr. 

Courtney is representing the northeast for us up here today. Mike 

and I are carrying the southern portion. And we have got Mr. Cook 

bringing up our western flank over there, so we are well represented in here. 

But, Admiral, we are going to turn it over to the two of you. And 

I think, Admiral Breckenridge, are you going to go first? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Then we will turn it over to you. Thank you for 

being here. 

STATEMENT OF RADM RICHARD P. BRECKENRIDGE, DIRECTOR, UNDERSEA WARFARE DIVISION (N97), DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

members, Rear Admiral Dave Johnson and I thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Seapower, as we 

represent the men and women of your Navy’s undersea forces. And 

in both your opening statements, again, the special relationship the 

Navy has enjoyed with Congress since the very beginning of our 

country is an underpinning of our greatness as a Nation. 

With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide a 

brief statement and a separate written statement for the record. 

By any objective measure, the United States has the finest undersea force in the world. We enjoy a distinct military advantage 

in the undersea domain unlike any other. When you consider land, 

the surface of the sea, air, even space and cyber, these domains are 

becoming more and more heavily contested between us and our adversaries, but in the undersea domain, we have a unique military 
5 

advantage, and that advantage has been the bedrock of our greatness as a Nation, a crown jewel, if you will, of our global strength 

and security. Strength, I might add, that is not used to add to our 

own national glory, but is instead given sacrificially as we stand by 

others who are severely oppressed, as they pursue the ideals of democracy and freedom. 

The outstanding reputation enjoyed by our submarine force is the 

result of sustained excellence by our shipbuilders, our maintainers, 

our shore staffs, our planners, and most of all by the men and 

women who operate our submarines day in and day out. This is demanding, highly technical work that requires the best people our 

Nation can produce, and we are very fortunate as a country to 

draw the members of this great team from all over the Nation. 

Our undersea forces have a unique role within the Navy, just as 

the Navy has a unique role within the joint force. Undersea forces 

leverage the concealment of the undersea to provide what no other 

part of the joint force can deliver, and that is persistent, undetected, assured access far forward and the ability to deliver unique 

military advantages. By leveraging stealthy concealment, our undersea forces can deploy forward without being provocative, penetrate an adversary’s defensive perimeter, and conduct undetected 

operations. These undetected operations might be precautionary 

ship movements, intelligence collection and surveillance missions, 

or special forces operations. 

Should it be necessary, our concealed undersea forces can exploit 

the element of surprise and attack at a time and place of our choosing. These attacks could include efforts specifically focused on helping ensure access into a denied area by our follow-on general purpose forces. Feedback from our operational commanders indicates 

that the demand for this capability is strong throughout the globe. 

In addition, looking into the future, the threat to our ships and 

aircraft from cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles and integrated air defense systems is growing. This will create more military demand for undersea forces. 

Against this backdrop of increasing undersea force value and 

continued strong demand, we must consider the trends in undersea 

force structure. The Navy has worked hard to stabilize overall 

naval forces near or slightly above the current level; however, within this stabilized Navy, there is a submarine force that will decline 

by more than 25 percent over the next 15 years. This decline is not 

the result of some recent decision, as you mentioned. It is the gradual consequence of a long list of choices made over many years. 

The total submarine force will drop from 73 submarines to 52 

ships, a cut of about 30 percent. The vertical strike payload volume 

of the undersea force, as our SSGNs [guided missile submarines] 

retire and we reach the bottom of this trough area with our SSNs 

[attack submarines], will drop by over 60 percent. The forward 

presence of our submarines around the globe will decline by over 

40 percent. This is the program of record. This is with the two per 

year Virginia construction rate, of which we received great support 

from Congress. 

So facing a long-term trend of increasing undersea importance 

and decreasing undersea forces capacity, the Navy has developed 

an integrated approach to provide as much undersea capability as 
6 

possible, yet within realistic constraints. This integrated approach 

does not solve all of the shortfalls faced by the Navy, but it makes 

significant progress with limited resources. I would like to discuss 

the top four priorities of this integrated undersea future strategy. 

First and foremost, it is mandatory that we sustain our survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent with about the same level of atsea presence as today. The Ohio class represents the best lessons 

learned from the SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] that preceded it, and the Ohio replacement will likewise benefit from the 

Ohio class. Although we have delayed this program for over 20 

years, it is now time to make the necessary investments to support 

procurement of the first Ohio replacement in 2021. There is no allowance for any further delay. 

Second, to prevent the attack submarine reduction from getting 

any worse than the 29 percent currently programmed, it is essential that we protect the Virginia-class SSN procurement plan and 

hold the line at two SSNs per year. 

Number three, to cost-effectively compensate for the retirement 

of the four SSGNs and the reduction in our SSN force below the 

required minimum level of 48 ships, we need to invest in the Virginia Payload Module. In addition to partially compensating for the 

lost strike volume, the Virginia Payload Module will distribute this 

volume over more hauls, providing greater security and military 

utility. This module will provide valuable payload flexibility in the 

future that will otherwise be unobtainable. 

And lastly, it is essential that we restart torpedo production to 

fill empty torpedo stows, create the required reserves and reestablish a capable producer of these highly specialized weapons. 

Taken together, this integrated program will provide us with the 

platforms, the payload volume and the capable payloads to address 

emerging future needs. 

The United States is fortunate to have the best undersea force 

in the world. At the same time, we have the greater burden of responsibility of any Nation in the world, with scores of countries 

looking to us for nuclear security and defense in a world that is increasingly uncertain and combative. Our undersea forces are up to 

the task today and will continue to be up to the task in the future 

provided they are supported with the right resources. Thank you, 

sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral Breckenridge. 

Admiral Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF RADM DAVID C. JOHNSON, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR SUBMARINES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. 

I would like to thank the Seapower Subcommittee for inviting me 

here today to talk to you about the Navy’s undersea warfare programs. My role as program executive officer for submarines is to 

provide the Navy with the platforms, the weapons, and the sensors 

required to ensure the United States maintains its unquestioned 
7 

dominance in the undersea domain, done so both affordably and on 

time. 

This past Saturday, we commissioned the tenth Virginia-class 

submarine, the USS Minnesota, SSN 783, which delivered 11 

months early to her contract delivery date and closed out the second, or Block II, contract. 

Of the 10 Virginias now in the fleet, we have delivered 7 early, 

including all of the 6 Block II submarines. 

When looked at in terms of relevance to the warfighter, these 

submarines, from Virginia to Minnesota, gave the fleet over 4 years 

of additional Virginia-class submarine use because of the early delivery, and the fleet has used these ships, deploying them to frontline missions at on-station rates that meet or exceed the Los Angeles-class submarines they are replacing. That kind of performance 

is a testament to the strong Navy industry team that is one of the 

strongest in all of the Department of Defense. 

Not being satisfied with our past successes, we continue to reduce delivery spans, and deliver ever more capable ships. Two days 

ago, the 11th Virginia-class ship, the future USS North Dakota, 

SSN 784, rolled out of the construction facility at General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut, and into dry dock in preparation for float-off this Sunday. North Dakota is the first of the 

Block III ships, the ships we modified for cost reduction and designed and built with large payload tubes in the bow. 

North Dakota is tracking to a January of 2014 delivery, and if 

that holds, she will be 7 months early and break the 60-month barrier on the lead ship of a new contract. That is truly phenomenal 

performance. 

Now, over the course of the Virginia-class program, each ship delivered more complete and more ready for tasking. One measure I 

use is how each ship is graded by the Navy’s independent assessor, 

that is the Board of Inspection and Survey, or INSURV for short. 

The Huntington Ingalls Industry Newport News delivered ship, 

Minnesota, received the highest score yet from INSURV and continued a trend also seen on her predecessor, the Electric Boat delivered ship, USS Mississippi. 

Beyond new construction performance, the program is focused on 

maximizing the operational availability. We executed a number of 

modifications to the design in the Block IV Virginias, the 10 ships 

we are in negotiations with General Dynamics Electric Boat and 

Huntington Ingalls Industry Newport News today. That will add 

one deployment to each boat and reduce to three the number of 

major shipyard availabilities over the ship’s 33-year life. 

We intend to continue our collective work to lower cost, both construction and in service, and deliver these capable Virginia-class 

submarines affordably. 

As Admiral Breckenridge mentioned, we have the initial research 

and development funds to design a payload module to accommodate 

up to 28 Tomahawk cruise missiles and future payloads. The Virginia Payload Module will utilize the modularity and the flexibility 

inherent in the Virginia-class base design and reconstitute the 

SSGN’s payload volume in a cost-effective manner. The Virginiaclass program, with its industrial partners, has proven its ability 

to incorporate new design concepts without disrupting a successful 
8 

production program. I am confident that we will be in a position 

to execute the Virginia Payload Module affordably in the fiscal year 

2019 Block V contract. 

The experience and knowledge gained from the successful Ohio- class ballistic missile and Virginia-class fast attack submarines are 

being used to design the Ohio replacement ships. Since the program’s initial acquisition milestone, we have focused on delivering 

a ship with the right capability at the lowest possible cost. The program is a model for Secretary Kendall’s better buying power approach to defense acquisition, incorporating from the start key tenets, such as affordability targets and innovative contracting. 

The R&D [research and development] contract with Electric Boat 

contains discrete incentives for reaching significant, specific nonrecurring engineering construction and operating support costs. 

This is the first time in a shipbuilding research and development 

contract we have tied substantive incentive fees to cost reduction 

across the entire life cycle. This is but one example of how the Ohio 

replacement program is reducing its costs. 

And finally I would like to mention our torpedo work. It has been 

17 years since the last Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo was built. Restarting that production line is, as Admiral Breckenridge said, a 

top submarine force priority. We have demonstrated our ability to 

reduce costs and improve capability in this world’s best torpedo, 

using hardware upgrades with software improvements to the front 

end electronic kits. We are developing our acquisition strategy to 

leverage our current industrial base and develop the industrial 

base elements to restart the build of the entire weapon using the 

proven Mark 48 advanced capability heavyweight torpedo design. 

The restart effort is critical to replenishing our torpedo inventory, 

and like the Navy’s other undersea programs, will be done 

affordably. 

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and Admiral 

Breckenridge can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral Johnson. 

And, Admiral Breckenridge, you had mentioned a couple of 

alarming statistics in terms of our subs reducing from 73 to 52. 

And can you give us that timeframe again. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. That timeframe 

is between now and 2030. 

Mr. FORBES. And that would be exclusive of sequestration. Isn’t 

that correct? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. FORBES. So if you add sequestration onto that, those numbers become even more staggering. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Exacerbated further, yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. The other thing that I would love for you to address, 

if you would, is as you see the reductions that we are recognizing 

with reducing our subs to 73 to 52 by 2030, our presence in subs 

dropping 40 percent, I think your statistics, can you give us a little 

snapshot of what you see happening with some of our peer competitors, and specifically with Russia and China, in terms of what they 

might be doing to compete with some of our capabilities? 
9 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. The first thing I would like to 

emphasize is the Chief of Naval Operations understands the undersea asymmetric advantage very well, and one of his top priorities 

is making sure that we never forfeit this advantage that we have 

in the undersea domain. So even in the face of the budgetary pressures of things like sequestration, the Navy is committed to providing as much stable funding as we can to continue the success 

story that Admiral Johnson mentioned with our shipbuilding industry partners to keep, you know, rolling with the Virginia class 

and Ohio replacement. So we are going to do our best within naval 

service to hold the line and make sure that we don’t—— 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral, I don’t think any one of us on the 

committee question you doing your best. We just want to make 

sure we are doing our best. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And I am afraid we are not. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. But let us know, what do you see with our peer 

competitors? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. And that is a great question. 

And Congressman McIntyre alluded to it in his remarks, is our adversaries are not standing still, and so even though we have an advantage and we have a lead, we can’t sit on our lead. So we have 

to continue to move, or we do have the potential within 20 years 

of losing this crown jewel, this advantage that we have in the undersea domain. 

So if I could, I would like to address three countries to just talk 

about how other nations use the undersea domain, and the first 

one I would like to address is Iran. So if you look at Iran, they, 

like many other countries, use the undersea domain from a purely 

maritime, sea denial, local region type of influence, much like we 

did in World War II in the Pacific. We used it as an asymmetric 

advantage, but it was for a maritime purpose, to hold that risk, 

predominantly in surface warships. So Iran has a submarine force. 

It is a disruptive force, a challenging force, and one that we deal 

with with regard to our ability to project stabilizing influence 

around the globe, but—so there is a maritime geographic use of undersea domain. 

I would like to contrast that with Russia. So Russia and the 

United States use the undersea domain in a much, much larger 

level. It is a global strategic, you know, lever of power. It is more 

than just a region; it is the ability to control the seas, it is the ability to do land attack from covert positions. It has a much larger 

utility than just a maritime sea control, sea denial perspective 

alone. And the Russians have always maintained a very capable 

submarine force. 

I mentioned that we have an advantage. You know, they are a 

close second with regard to their capability and with regard to 

their shipbuilding industry and the capabilities they are putting 

into their new classes of submarines. 

The Russians today have a two-line production in their major 

submarine shipbuilding. They are recapitalizing their SSBN force. 

As their SSBN force is retiring, they have the new Borei class. The 

lead ship is the Dolgorukiy. The first three ships are seaworthy in 
10 

end testing, and they intend to recapitalize with at least a class of 

eight. There has been talk of a higher number of SSBNs within 

their force, but that machine is running. Those—very good quality 

ballistic missile submarines are being produced in Russia. 

Their second line is an SSGN, and so I think they have watched 

us closely with our SSGNs. They see the value of large payload volume, the ability to take a large amount of strike capability to the 

undersea, and so they are building the Severodvinsk SSGN class. 

It has not four large-diameter tubes like we envision within the 

midsection of the Virginia Payload Module, but their midsection is 

an eight-pack. It is two abreast by four. So they see the importance 

of the concealment of the undersea to bring potency with that. 

They can be threatening at a strategic level. And, again, we are 

mindful of that and we are prepared to be able to counter that. 

In the middle sits China. And China is sort of a hybrid between 

the Iranian example I gave you and the Russian example I gave 

you. So China right now is predominantly a maritime, regional undersea force, certainly a larger region, with more of our allies and 

partners that are sort of within their bubble, but they predominantly use their undersea forces to threaten the presence of our 

surface ships, to be able to shoulder off on the positive stabilizing 

influence of our naval forces in an anti-surface warfare dimension. 

But China is growing towards more of a global strategic undersea 

force. They have the Jin SSBN class, their own ballistic missile 

submarine class, and a JL2 missile that they are developing. That 

will put them into the stage of using the undersea for more than 

just maritime regional control. And they also are in development 

of a nuclear SSGN, a large vertical launch capacity submarine. 

So there are three pictures for you, sir, of the advances that our 

potential adversaries are making and that we have to be mindful 

of to make sure that we as a Nation preserve this unique advantage that we have in the undersea domain. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you see the Chinese numbers increasing dramatically? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. That is a great question. I 

failed to mention that, is the challenge that I see with China is 

more of a capacity issue than necessarily a capability issue in the 

near term. I think the capability, the quality of their submarines 

will improve as we march forward a couple of decades, but right 

now there is a capacity challenge that is unique to what the Chinese navy has. 

Mr. FORBES. Help us with the Virginia Payload Module. I know 

that Admiral Johnson was at the nursery when the Virginia class 

was born and has lived with it most of your career that you have 

got, and you have been a part of that, too, Admiral. Can you give 

us for the subcommittee and for our record exactly what the Virginia Payload Module is, what it’s designed to do? And specifically 

there has been a little debate about the timing of the requirements 

and where we are on that. And if you could delineate that for us. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. So let’s 

pick for example Operation Odyssey Dawn against Libya. When 

our country decided to make an attack to neutralize the defense 

shield around Libya, we did that predominantly with Tomahawk 

cruise missile strike, the bulk of which came from undersea forces. 
11 

We had three submarines that were involved in that operation, one 

SSGN, USS Florida, and two fast attack straight stick Virginia- class submarines. 

So let’s hypothetically say that you have a target requirement 

where you need to strike 120 targets, which is a reasonable, modest 

level for this type of operation. One SSGN carries 105 Tomahawk 

cruise missiles, so it alone carries the bulk of that service requirement. You add another 12-shooting Los Angeles-class submarine, 

you are up to 117. Still doesn’t make the whole 120, but pretty 

close just for those two submarines. 

So as the SSGNs go away, that is going to have a very significant 

impact for our ability to quickly mobilize a strike force, an arsenal 

ship of that capacity. 

You know, to put it in perspective, without an SSGN and without 

the Virginia Payload Module, we will require 10 attack submarines 

to be able to service 120 targets. And I am here to tell you that 

it is highly unexecutable for us to mobilize and surge 10 attack 

submarines into a domain with the agility that we were able to 

muster forces for Operation Odyssey Dawn. So that is problematic 

for us. 

What the Virginia Payload Module does is it puts four large-diameter tubes in the center of the Virginia class that can carry 

seven Tomahawk cruise missiles each. So in addition to the 2 largediameter tubes forward that Admiral Johnson mentioned with 

Block III that carry 6 Tomahawks each, we go from a 12-shooter 

SSN to a 40-shooter Tomahawk strike SSN. 

So 3 Virginia class with the VPM could service 120 target package. So just from a capacity perspective, VPM is a very cost-effective way to recapitalize it. 

You know, as you well know, we don’t have the ability as a Nation to recapitalize our SSBNs, maintain two per year Virginia, 

and develop a new SSGN replacement class. So this integrated solution is a way to distribute that firepower over a larger force in 

a very cost effective way. At less than 20 percent the cost of a Virginia, I can more than triple its payload volume. 

But I don’t want to restrict this discussion to just land-attack 

strike, although, again, that is a very asymmetric, unique advantage for our country, but there are many other things that we can 

do with a large capacity, large open ocean interface. And Congressman McIntyre mentioned UUVs [unmanned underwater vehicles] 

and supplementing our thin manned submarine force with surrogates that are unmanned. And I will have the ability to get those 

UUVs into theater in those vertical payload tubes and deploy them 

and have a network or constellation of UUVs to supplement our 

manned platforms. 

So this payload volume is strategically important for us and I 

think is a low risk, cost-effective improvement to the Virginia class. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral, just one more thing and then one 

question, but, Mr. Johnson, I am hoping Mr. McIntyre will ask 

some more about the U class [unmanned underwater vehicles], but 

tell us about the requirements and where we are on those. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. So when the Nation made the 

decision to go from an 18-SSBN to a 14-SSBN force, we had the 

first four Ohios coming into the window to be refueled, so we had 
12 

this decision as a country, do we just decommission them at the 

halfway point of their life or do we convert them to be able to do 

more—something different, more from the undersea for the country. And with great support from Congress and great wisdom, the 

country went ahead and converted those four SSBNs to this new 

SSGN platform. 

That was a tremendous military benefit for us. There wasn’t a 

specific written requirement for that at that time, but we have 

come to grow to depend heavily on that requirement. So in both the 

Central Command and the Pacific Command, a good portion of the 

Tomahawk strike requirement required day to day in theater of 

those combatant commanders is delivered by our SSGN force, so it 

has become a requirement for our military that is in high demand 

by the COCOMs [combatant commands]. 

What we as a Navy have done to codify this requirement is we 

have developed the Capabilities Development Document [CDD]; it 

is a joint staff process to formalize military requirements. That has 

been approved by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], has undergone initial joint staff review, and is on its path to JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] approval later this year. 

So on our side, we felt it important to show Congress that we 

have a certified official military requirement for this payload volume, and the CDD that is in process of final approval will be that 

pedigree of why this is as important to this country. So I expect 

to have that formal requirement by the end of this calendar year. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

And, Admiral Johnson, tell us what we are doing so that we can 

afford this very important module. What do you see us doing to 

make sure that we are maintaining the affordability? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Great question, Mr. Chairman. So 

the first, as Admiral Breckenridge noted, we are working on the requirements, getting those right up front. As you said, I was in the 

early stage of the Virginia design. I watched us work hard with the 

operators and the acquisition force to get the requirements right 

back in the early 1990s, and we have essentially not changed our 

operational requirements document for Virginia in 20 years. And 

I think that is a first order effector on why that program has executed in such a cost-effective manner. 

For Virginia Payload Module, we are doing the same thing. We 

are working hard to get the requirement set, and as Admiral 

Breckenridge noted, we are about done with that process through 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

Second is to execute a carefully planned, designed program 

where we would achieve an 80 percent design completed construction start so that we can build the Virginia Payload Modules costeffectively, and is really one reason why we can’t continue to sustain cuts to the Virginia Payload Module research and development 

funding, because we need to be going on that program by 2014, 

early 2014 so I can build and install that ship and the 19 ships. 

The third is, is to make sure that we keep the technical risk to 

as low as possible. The payload tubes that will be in the Virginia 

Payload Module, two of them are about to be floated off on Sunday. 

Essentially they are the same as what is in the bow of the North 
13 

Dakota today. That lowers our technical risk by basically integrating instead of having to develop something new. 

And fourth, keep affordability on equal footing with our technical 

requirements. Go forward through our design and do these cost capability trades, keep pushing on it so that we do effectively insert 

a Virginia Payload Module. That thinking has already driven almost 40 percent out of the cost of our initial estimate for the Virginia Payload Module. I anticipate that will continue as we go 

through the design. 

Mr. FORBES. Congressman McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you gentlemen, again, for your insight. 

Admiral Breckenridge, at an estimated $6 billion apiece, the 12 

Ohio-class replacement submarines, we realize, won’t leave much 

room in the budget for other critical undersea priorities. If hard 

choices have to be made, can you help us understand will the Ohioclass replacements still be such a clear priority one that the Navy 

would prioritize them over having a full complement of attack 

subs? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. Thank you. Our ballistic missile submarines are the bedrock underlying our national nuclear 

deterrent. Americans are asked to invest in replacing this force 

only once every other generation. The last time Congress started 

procurement of a new class of ballistic missile submarines was during the Nixon administration. The next time will be in 2021 as we 

start to build the Ohio replacement class, almost 48 years later. 

Recapitalizing this force is a solemn duty we have to the nuclear 

security of future Americans as well as allies. And I want to emphasize with regard to the Ohio replacement program, we are designing it in close partnership with the U.K. [United Kingdom], as 

they have to replace their Vanguard class. 

So the common missile compartment and the D–5 strategic weapons systems will be common between both of our countries, and 

both of our nations are committed to making sure that we provide 

this capability on time. 

Because ballistic missile submarines are infrequently procured, 

they are not part of the Navy’s stable shipbuilding plan. Because 

this is episodic, it is an infrequent but critical responsibility for our 

country. It is not built into the rest of our shipbuilding plan. 

In order to maximize the stability and cost efficiency of the existing ship programs and to avoid reducing the size of an already 

stressed Navy, the funding of existing programs should not be disrupted. So often we hear the debate of, well, you can either afford 

your general purpose force Navy, or we are going to have to go 

ahead and do this ballistic missile force investment, and we pit two 

equally important strategic instruments of power against each 

other, which is just, you know, an inappropriate friction. 

So as Mr. Chairman mentioned, to best accomplish this, Congress must look at a way to provide an annual supplement to the 

Navy during the very small margin of time that we recapitalize the 

submarine. So we will build these 12 ballistic missile submarines, 

two less than what we currently use to provide strategic deterrence, in a 15-year period, and these SSBNs will serve for a 42- 
14 

year life. So the return on investment is sort of amortized over four 

decades as we go ahead and recapitalize our SSBN force. And so for a supplement amount of about $4 billion per year, and 

to make that clear to the rest of the shipbuilding industry, we can 

provide the stability we need to do both, to build the right Navy 

forces, general purpose forces, as well as recapitalize our SSBN 

force. 

Now, that is a $60 billion total, and we have mentioned that that 

is a lot of money. And, again, we are doing everything in our 

power, and believe me, we are working on affordability as one of 

our top priorities, higher than even some of the military capabilities of this replacement SSBN. But $60 billion in the grand scheme 

of the Department of Defense budget represents less than 1 percent. So what we are looking at is do we have the will as a Nation 

to be able to identify less than 1 percent of the budget, to go ahead 

and commit it to this 15-year recapitalization commitment without 

having an adverse impact on the rest of our general shipbuilding 

force. 

Just to try to give some examples to make this more germane, let’s say we only are able to identify a $30 billion supplement, or 

$2 billion a year over the 15-year period. If the Navy has to absorb 

that other $30 billion, we would be required to cut from our other 

general purpose forces four attack submarines; four large surface 

combatants, DDGs [guided missile destroyers]; and another eight 

combatants. So the Navy with only half of that supplement would 

have to compromise and build 16 less ships for the inventory. And 

those numbers double without any supplement to this important 

national strategic priority. 

The last comment I would make is, and I agree with Chairman 

Forbes, is that I do think it is important for the country to look 

at this as a requirement above the Navy. It is a strategic level requirement and we ought to give it the gravity of attention and 

focus and insulation from the pressures of sequestration. 

That said, the control of those resources must remain resident 

within the Navy with the control of our acquisition community. We 

know how to build submarines, we know how to oversee the building of submarines. Electric Boat, Huntington Ingalls, best submarine shipbuilders in the world. We need to be able to make sure 

that if we come up with a creative, you know, strategic account for 

this, that it is still the Navy and the shipbuilding team that has 

the control and authority over those monies as we do this recapitalization to make it as affordable as possible. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Now, I appreciate the thoroughness and the explanation, and I agree with your analysis, and ideally would like 

to be able to look at it in a way with the supplements and from 

this more strategic DOD perspective, since, as you know, in the 

outset of my opening comments, the submarine force is clearly, as 

you have said, the crown jewel, and as I was saying in my opening 

comments is unmatched worldwide, and we know you are at the 

forefront. 

With regard to the priorities, when you talked about we would 

have 16 less ships, so in other words, I guess, more precisely, what 

I am asking if we unfortunately are put in that situation of making 

priorities, you feel like it is so important that we have to go ahead 
15 

absolutely with the Ohio-class replacement submarines, and in the 

unfortunate situation it is, is it is going to make the loss of other 

ships if those priorities have to be shifted around. Is that correct? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir, that is exactly correct. And the 

CNO has stated his number one priority as the Chief of Naval Operations is our strategic deterrent, our nuclear strategic deterrent. 

That will trump all other vitally important requirements within 

our Navy. But if there is only one thing that we do with our shipbuilding account, we are committed to sustaining a two-ocean national strategic deterrent that protects our homeland from nuclear 

attack, from other major war aggression, and also acts as an extended deterrent for our allies. 

Part of the reason we have been able to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons around the globe is the great responsibility the 

United States has to assure our allies that we will also provide deterrent effectiveness for them so that they don’t have to pursue 

their own nuclear weapons. If we don’t build these 12 SSBNs on 

this timeline, and again, it to me is mind-staggering how much risk 

as a Nation that we have taken with regard to this recapitalization 

timing decision. Even last year in the Budget Control Act, we decided to delay this program by 2 years, such that we are going to 

go down to a minimum level of 10 SSBNs during the transition between Ohio’s timing out at 42 years and the Ohio replacement coming on as a new class. That is just an astronomical challenge for 

us to be able to maintain our vibrant and credible two-ocean deterrent to deter bad behavior from powerful adversaries. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. That is the kind of summary that I 

think is well stated and succinct, and that that message, I hope 

and encourage you all to get that bullet point kind of message so 

that our fellow colleagues can understand that clearly, that this is 

what will happen, you know, one, two, three, this is what our priorities are. And the way you have stated the CNO’s priority and how 

what you gentlemen do fit into that is essential. 

I have one other quick question, Mr. Chairman. I mentioned in 

the opening remarks, and I don’t want this to go by, because I 

think it is a question. The large number of unmanned underwater 

vehicles, will that allow the Navy to—I mean, could a large number 

of unmanned underwater vehicles allow the Navy to expand global 

undersea presence in a way that would make it more cost-effective 

and that possibly could avoid building some of the larger, more expensive manned submarines, or in light of what you have just 

clearly explained about their importance, is there a way in which 

manned and unmanned submarines could work together to make 

the fleet more effective obviously from a defense standpoint, but 

also from a cost-effective standpoint, and how does that fit in as 

we do look ahead from the cost side as well as the effectiveness 

side? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. The manned platform provides 

the country incredible influence and access from the undersea domain. And as I work on the integrated undersea future strategy, 

the platforms remain paramount in importance. You know, we 

mentioned this minimum number from force structure analysis of 

a 48 red line that we are going to go below for over a decade as 
16 

we bottom out to 42, based on decisions made in the 1990s. That 

minimum red line doesn’t really represent the COCOM demand. 

To keep 10 attack submarines forward deployed across the globe 

in the hotspots and the places that they are operating today requires a force of about 50 attack submarines. The COCOM demand 

for what our undersea forces provide is about double that requirement. So each year as we go to each of the COCOMs and say, what 

do you need from an undersea presence perspective for intelligence, 

surveillance, reconnaissance, for Tomahawk inventory in theater, 

for the other unique capabilities that submarines provide, the combatant commanders typically request greater than double the 10 

SSNs that we are able to provide. 

So there is always going to be a high demand for platforms, of 

which we are not going to—you know, we are going to have to, you 

know, make tough decisions and not be able to support that. 

So with regard to UUVs being a solution to reducing our force 

structure, I don’t see that as a likely utility of unmanned undersea 

vehicles. 

That said, is we have some untapped potential in the undersea 

domain and the advantage that we have in the undersea domain 

that we can leverage even greater than our manned platforms. And 

I think a strategy of using unmanned vehicles, of using seabed infrastructure with energy coms and power—I am sorry, sensors will 

be vitally important to maintain our advantage in the undersea domain. 

So we are beginning as a Navy to do exactly as you have recommended, and that is, how do I get even more bang for the buck 

in that domain given the very tight limits, even with the mobility 

we have with our nuclear fleet, that one ship can only be in one 

place at one time. So what can I do to even leverage greater influence, and it is going to come down to these large displacement 

UUVs. And we are beginning to, you know, build momentum, to 

have those to supplement. 

Now, what will they do? What they will do is the missions that 

are dull, dangerous, dirty or deceptive that the SSNs can’t do. So 

what we will do is we will be able to free up those manned assets 

to go do our Nation’s bidding at that appropriate level while these 

UUV surrogates are able to take care of sort of the run-of-the-mill 

missions where I don’t have to commit a manned platform to do it. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral Breckenridge, before we go to our 

next member, I just want to clarify the answer you gave to Congressman McIntyre. As I understand, you were saying right now to 

have 10 forward deployed attack submarines, we would need 50 in 

the fleet. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. I am sorry, sir. I was a bit unclear 

there. 

Mr. FORBES. Maybe I misstated it. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. A force of 50 total submarines 

in the Navy, we are able to keep 10 attack submarines forward deployed 365 days of the year. 

Mr. FORBES. I got you. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. So that is sort of the ratio in peacetime. 
17 

Mr. FORBES. And our combatant commanders need, I believe you 

said, to meet their requirements, 20—— 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. That is right. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Forward deployed. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Would that math equate to needing 100. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Just wanted to make sure—— 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. We have that clarified. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. That is right. 

Mr. FORBES. The distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. 

Cook, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Admirals, 

thank you. 

This is kind of ironic. You got an infantry officer from the Marine 

Corps that is going to ask some questions. So I do have to make 

a comment, and that is, many years ago when I was a captain— 

that was about 1775—captain in the Marine Corps, I had the honor 

to meet Admiral Rickover, and I have to tell you, I talked—was in 

a mess line, ironically enough, and one of the most brilliant individuals in the world, but I have to say, one of the most intimidating, and I don’t get intimidated easily, but of course, you guys 

went through the Academy and screened through the program, and 

you probably know that better than I do, but I think you talk about 

somebody a long time ago that realized how important submarines 

were, and what he did for the Navy, for the country and everything 

else. 

My fear is that a lot that has happened in the past, the importance of what you do, and I went to the War College and I tried, 

you know, to understand—and I am one of your big supporters, because it is a force multiplier in so many different ways, and I think 

you explained that tremendously. 

I am afraid that it is becoming the silent service in terms of the 

slice of the pie, you know, that DOD has when all those things that 

you outlined so eloquently, you know, the public just doesn’t understand it. And it is almost like it is not glamorous. And you mentioned it yourself about some of the other things, and the remotely 

pioneered—powered vehicles, and I can go on and on and on all the 

different things. 

So I would hope that we can kind of change that, because I think 

you are going to have some tough times in the budget battles coming up, and a lot of it is going to be on public perception so that— 

the people in this room, I think, are big supporters of it, but this 

isn’t going to be enough, and we have got to change that. 

The big question I have is, very quickly, about the intel that the 

Russians and the Chinese have stolen, quite frankly, from the 

United States. I am worried about this leakage, if you will. They 

have got the money, they have got the will to replicate what we 

have in your service. And do you have any comments on that, because after what happened with the recent scandal, it just frightens me to death that this is going to continue to happen. And you 

have indicated that they are going to do something about that. 
18 

They have the money, the will and power to do that, and they are 

going to pass us in terms of overall technology. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. A few comments before I answer your question. So Dave and I are classmates from the proud 

class of 1982 at the Naval Academy. We were the last class to 

interview with Admiral Rickover. 

Mr. COOK. Was it fun? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. We will save that for another hearing. 

Mr. FORBES. It should be a classified hearing, probably. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. But Admiral Rickover still lives in our 

nuclear force today. And I am very proud to say that. What he 

brought into the culture of our nuclear-trained force provides incredible return for the greatness of our Navy in leadership, in discipline. The Rickover method is—I am proud to say that I passed 

interview with Admiral Rickover. 

The second thing that you mentioned is, I agree with you, I think 

we are victims of our covert nature. And there is not enough of 

America who understands or appreciates the brand that is attack 

submarines, especially our ballistic missile force. You know, these 

sentinels have gone for over 50 years on continuous strategic deterrent patrols in two oceans, over 4,070-day patrols, safeguarding 

and protecting the United States of America. And I would tell you 

that there is probably less than 1 percent of the American citizens 

that even knows what role that they can play, that they can sleep 

well at night. 

So we have to do a better job in getting that word out. And I 

thank Chairman Forbes for this opportunity. I view this as so important, to be able to get over here and lift a little bit of the veil 

and discuss the paramount importance of our undersea forces. 

That said, there is a lot of things that are supersecret that must 

remain so by nature of what we do and we will push that as far 

as we can of that line. But we are more than happy to come over 

and give you highly classified briefings of some of the recent take 

around the globe of what our submarine force is doing. 

And what was the specific question? 

Mr. COOK. The intel. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. 

So safeguarding our national secrets, particularly from industry. 

You know, so the Walker-Whitworth espionage case that compromised a lot of the lead that we had with stealth in the undersea 

domain. And that is the coin of the realm. You know, he who is 

more silent has the advantage over another. That was compromised through spy craft. Nowadays with that spy craft spreading to cyberexploitation and other ways that adversaries can get information and leapfrog America’s ability on the cheap is an imposing threat to us, and we take that very seriously. 

So part of our hard work within DOD is to put up those firewalls 

even tighter, also with industry to make sure that we have the 

right standards there to safeguard and protect that information 

from being stolen. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. And having that infantryman on your side is a pretty good asset to have. Our good friend, Mr. Courtney, has little in-
19 

terest in submarines, but we are hoping he will have a few questions to ask for the next 5 minutes. So Joe? 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, when we talk 

about the submarine gap, which you have done an outstanding job, 

I think it is important really also for the record to remember that 

it was this subcommittee that in the spring of 2007, actually led 

the way in terms of an increase in submarine funding. Over the objection of the prior administration, $588 million which, again, kickstarted the two-sub-a-year production which, again, the North Dakota is ahead of schedule, under budget because of the quantity, 

economic quantity savings. It was an incredibly important moment 

in terms of addressing that submarine gap. 

But last night, I was walking around the Capitol with the moonlight, thinking about, obviously, the anniversary of 9/11. And I was 

walking by Jack Murtha’s maple tree which was planted there. 

And he, along with Gene Taylor and Roscoe Bartlett and others, 

were part of the group that, again, led the way to make sure that 

happened. And it is a reminder that we all can make a difference 

here, and this subcommittee can make a difference in terms of 

making sure that the important issues that you have raised here 

today aren’t going to get lost. 

And the good news is, is that the Navy’s request, which came 

over with the administration’s budget, the House defense authorization bill and the House defense spending bill all basically provide for two subs a year and full funding for design work. And we 

have got to work on the Senate a little bit with the Virginia payload. But there really actually is quite extraordinary consensus in 

terms of the fact that we need to protect this. And hopefully the 

bipartisan budget negotiations that are going to start today are 

going to get us to a point where we can, again, avoid all the negative consequences that you have described here today. 

One of the issues, again, which my friend Mr. McIntyre raised 

was obviously that bulge in the shipbuilding account that we are 

looking at. Again, it is important to start talking about a national 

security funding mechanism, a la the missile defense, as a way of 

trying to solve that problem. That is probably a little bit off in 

terms of a decision point for Congress. The one thing that we can 

control today is obviously trying to keep the costs down by making 

sure that the defense, the design, and engineering budget requests 

for Ohio replacement is protected. And the one thing I am concerned about, if a CR [continuing resolution] mechanism—and let’s 

set aside sequester for a moment—even if we do a straight CR 

without sequester, using last year’s budget levels, again, that 

leaves a shortfall in terms of making sure that we are going to get 

that investment in the design work. And I was wondering, Admiral 

Johnson, if you could talk about that. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you, Congressman Courtney. 

So under a continuing resolution, because of our starting point 

in fiscal year 2013, which is about half of what the budget request 

is for fiscal year 2014, a CR is particularly harmful to the program. 

Because it is research and development, the Department has the 

latitude, if it chooses, to alleviate some of the issue of that by actually putting in research and development funding to keep the program on its up-ramp. 
20 

As Admiral Breckenridge noted, in 2012, that was our time to increase the designers and buying material and increasing our prototyping work to support a 2019 lead ship. That has been indexed to 

the right 2 years. So now it is 2014. 2014 is the year that we need 

to significantly upscope our work so that we are ready for a 2021 

build. Continuing resolutions and sequesters hamper my ability to 

plan and execute the program required to tell Admiral Breckenridge that I will have a submarine ready on patrol in 2031. The 

time scale really does lay out that long. 

So I think from a standpoint of where I sit, a CR, though it is 

harmful if it is not mitigated by the Department, a sequester is another issue because that is an outright cut against the line, and 

that will, in fact, delay me. 

As Rick said, ‘‘insulate’’ is a good word; but we do have to take 

a step back and look at how should we continue to fund this program? Do we continue the levels that we have put into the budget 

to support us to have the research and development prototyping 

and the design products disclosed to keep the shipbuilding done 

predictably? 

We have a very challenging shipbuilding schedule on this ship. 

We are going to build it in 84 months. It took Virginia 86 months. 

That ship is about the third the size of Ohio replacement. Now why 

would we think we could do that? The reason is we have the experience of Virginias. At that time, we will have at least contracted 

for over 30 Virginias by the time Ohio replacement ship one is 

under contract. 

So that alone, along with what we know now and how we are designing the ship, we think we can be ready to build an 84-month 

ship. But you back up 2021, 2028 is when I have to have the ship 

built for a 2031 deployment. That means I have to sustain the research and development and the design work now so that I am 

ready in 2021. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney, we thank you for your service and all 

of your hard work. 

Admiral, as I understand what you have just responded to Mr. 

Courtney, that delays that we are putting into effect today will impact your ability to even deliver in 2031, that far out; is that a correct assessment? 

Admiral JOHNSON. That is correct. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Runyan, is 

recognized for comments. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Johnson, you kind of touched on it with Mr. Courtney’s 

answer. I had an opportunity to go down to Huntington—I think 

it was a little over a year ago—and asked them the question. As 

we get here—and God help us that we are not in this budgetary 

climate 20, 30 years from now. But as we move down the road, 

when does the Navy start to put the crunch on the shipbuilders to 

say, you are going to build these in less and less time, as we try 

to anticipate our adversaries’ steps forward and actually make that 

time longer? So just in your thought processes, in the acquisition 

realm on that. 
21 

Admiral JOHNSON. That is a great question, Congressman, in 

that we are doing that today. We are today in the Navy Yard sitting across from our Huntington Ingalls and Electric Boat partners 

with my folks and the NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command] 

folks to negotiate the next 10 ships, the 19th through the 28th 

ship. If you look at where we were in Virginia, it took 86 months 

to build that ship. The ship we just commissioned, the Minnesota, 

was delivered in 63 months. So we have actually taken almost 2 

full years out of the build stroke. We are approaching a point 

where we can’t, on that level magnitude, reduce the build span. 

Maybe we will get to the mid 50s if, in fact, we continue to work 

this. We certainly are challenging the shipbuilders along those 

lines because time is money in the shipbuilding programs. And if 

we can get these ships out quicker, it gets those to Admiral 

Breckenridge and Admiral Connor so they are able to be used. As 

I said, we have already returned 40 years of additional utility because of this thinking. But it also lowers the cost of these ships. 

Mr. RUNYAN. I appreciate that. Because I think sometimes—I 

know we experience on the HASC [House Armed Services] committee—sometimes I don’t think the DOD thinks far enough in the 

future to really acquire the savings and the planning. I mean, obviously you have said a lot of what we are doing hasn’t changed in 

20 years, especially in the submarine venue. And that has some 

cost savings to it in the long run and being able to plan for that 

stuff over the long haul. I have nothing else, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both 

our witnesses for being here today. I appreciate your testimony, especially as we navigate the complex and challenging issues that we 

are facing right now. 

Like Mr. Courtney, I have a slight interest in submarines. So I 

want to turn to that right now. As I am sure you are aware, the 

CNO Admiral Greenert stated on September 5 that shipbuilding 

will drop in fiscal 2014 and, specifically, that he envisioned the loss 

of a Littoral Combat Ship and afloat forward staging base and advanced procurement for a Virginia-class submarine and a carrier 

overhaul. 

Can you elaborate on what the CNO is referring to? In particular, with respect to subs, would this be a fiscal year 2015 or fiscal year 2016 boat? And how would this affect the proposed Block 

buy? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you, Congressman. As we look at the 

sequestration continuing forward, that will impact my ability to obviously fully fund not only the full funding for the ships in those 

years but the advanced procurement. If you look at 2013, 2013 took 

out $492 million out of the Virginia program specifically. Split between those ships and 2013 and the advanced procurement for the 

2014 and 2015 ships. That same effect happens in fiscal year 2014. 

If it happens at the levels we estimate, which is around 14 percent, 

that is almost $750 million out of the Virginia accounts in fiscal 

year 2014. And the way the Department handled it in fiscal year 

2013 is, we have cost to complete bills that have now moved for-
22 

ward. This committee was—we appreciate the add of $492 million 

showing up in the 2014 budget for overcoming the sequester in 

2013. That type of behavior has to continue in 2014 and on. If we 

eventually can procure 100 percent of a ship when, in fact, have 

only been paid for 86 percent of a ship under the sequester. I can’t 

give you the specifics on what the CNO was talking about relative 

to which ships. Is it a fiscal year 2015 or 2016 ship? But it will, 

over time, potentially impact that Block IV 10-ship procurement, 

fiscal year 2014 to 2018, those ships. Our tack right now though 

is to try to preserve that 10-ship buy but then have the Department fund cost to complete builds for the cuts that we have taken 

in the intervening years. 

It will be more challenging to sign off on a 10-ship multiyear 

when, in fact, the budget doesn’t reflect full funding for all 10 ships 

going forward. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. So let me turn also then to Ohio replacement. As I am sure you are well aware, the Navy ship over budget 

clearly comes under significant future strain, as the Ohio replacement program comes online. And to quote your Department’s 30- 

year shipbuilding plan, the cost of the Ohio replacement SSBN is 

significant relative to the annual ship procurement resources available to the Navy in any given year. At the same time, the Department will have to address the block retirement of ships procured 

in large numbers during the 1980s which are reaching the end of 

their service lives. And the confluence of these events prevents the 

Department of the Navy from being able to shift resources within 

the shipbuilding account to accommodate the costs of the Ohio replacement SSBN. 

The plan further states that if the Navy has to take these costs 

out of hide, the effects on the Navy’s battle force will be such that 

the fleet will not be as sufficient to implement the defense strategic 

guidance. 

So with that, can you inform the subcommittee as to the current 

progress of efforts to fund the Ohio replacement program as part 

of our deterrent and the national strategic imperative outside the 

Navy shipbuilding budget akin to a military sealift or ballistic missile defense? And alternatively, is there talk of a supplement to the 

Navy shipbuilding budget because of the strategic comparative 

resident in ORP [Ohio replacement program]? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Thank you, sir. 

Just a little back step in history to talk about the two other 

times that we have had to, as a Nation, build the strategic deterrent. So in the 1960s, we built 41 SSBNs. They were called ‘‘The 

41 for Freedom.’’ We did that in a 7-year period which, again, is 

just an incredible—only in America could you go ahead and put out 

41 ballistic missile submarines in a 7-year period. There was an 

impact to other shipbuilding accounts at that time. But the priority 

was such for national survival that we had to go ahead and make 

that an imperative and a priority. There was a supplement to the 

Navy’s top line at that time when we fielded the class, but it did 

cast quite a shadow over the rest of the shipbuilding in the 1960s. 

We recapitalized those 41 for Freedom with 18 Ohio-class SSBNs 

in the 1980s. It was the Reagan years. There was a major naval 

build-up. And underneath the umbrella of that build-up, we were 
23 

able to afford, as a Nation, the recapitalization of building 18 

SSBNs. Again, a very great success story from a shipbuilding industry perspective. The maturity, the stability. You know, Electric 

Boat, as they punched those out, did it at a great bargain for the 

country to have that capability. Still around today. A 30-year designed submarine that has been extended half again to a 42-year 

total service life is just sort of mind-staggering. 

We are at that point right now where there is no more delay, 

there is no more room to absorb risk in schedule where we have 

to recapitalize the strategic deterrent force. The Navy recognizes 

that without a supplement, this is going to have a devastating impact on our other general purpose forces ship and supports and is 

working with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and with 

Congress to identify the funds necessary, which I mentioned earlier 

represent less than 1 percent of the DOD budget for a 15-year period to go ahead and provide relief and fund this separately above 

and beyond our traditional norms for our ship control budget. 

So we are at the point where we need to really make this decision. The stability of our other industrial bases count on us at this 

time, as Admiral Johnson pointed out the schedule as we march towards construction in 2021, is it is time to develop this plan. It is 

time for, as Congressman Courtney mentioned, you know, the courage that we have in Congress at moments like this in our Nation’s 

history with pivotal decisions regarding shipbuilding that we go 

ahead and do the right thing by the wholeness of the Navy as well 

as recapitalizing this vital strategic imperative. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. FORBES. As we talk about those pivotal times and, as Mr. 

Courtney said, need to do that, one of the things that helps us is 

information. And in our markup that we sent to the Senate, we requested the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] to give us an accurate depiction of where we will be with shipbuilding based on the 

numbers that we can project. He has said he is willing to do that. 

This is not a question for you, but a request. If you could, perhaps, ask the CNO and the Department, it would help us. Because 

we talk about a 30-year shipbuilding plan, we actually talk about 

it as if it is going to happen. And it has been a little more than 

fantasy world in the past. But it would be great for us to be able 

to show other Members and the public. This is our 30-year shipbuilding plan. Here are the numbers we can realistically expect 

based on the last 30 years. And there is a $4 billion shortfall annually there. But then, what is going to happen with sequestration 

if that carries through? Because I think if we showed those pictures, it is a frightening scenario for most individuals. It is my 

pleasure now to recognize the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, my good friend from Virginia, Rob Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Johnson, Admiral Breckenridge, thank you so much for 

joining us. Thanks so much for your service to our Nation. It 

means a lot, especially in these challenging times, to have your 

leadership there. 

Admiral Breckenridge, I want to begin with you. Give me your 

vision about how the Ohio-class replacement program is going to 
24 

play out. And the reason I ask that is putting it in a context of 

where we are now, with a tremendously successful program with 

the Virginia class where we have a teaming agreement with Electric Boat and HII [Huntington Ingalls Industries], is that—what I 

think is a very efficient model, is that a good, cost-effective way to 

look at how we pursue the Ohio-class replacement program? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. I will take the first swing and then I 

will turn it over to the expert, sir. 

Good morning. Great to see you. Thanks again for hosting that 

breakfast yesterday. I really appreciated the opportunity to participate in that. 

Sir, for a moment like this in our Nation’s history, we are going 

to depend and rely on the best engineers, the best ship pipefitters, 

the best—you know, across our submarine industrial base to make 

sure that we don’t miss a beat and that we deliver this national 

imperative. So this is going to require a whole team effort. You 

know, both Electric Boat and expertise from Huntington Ingalls are 

going to need to be brought to bear with this challenge, make no 

mistake about it. 

Now you mentioned a great point. And I have talked a lot sort 

of in hyperbolic terms about the risk and the compounded risk we 

have taken. I am optimistic, as a submariner and as the director 

of undersea warfare, that we have this incredible juggernaut that 

is our submarine shipbuilding industrial base that is just humming 

in all cylinders with the Virginia class. And we are going to be able 

to leverage that to be able to pull off a pretty daunting challenge 

with the recapitalization of the SSBN force. So I am very optimistic 

that we have the talent in America. We have the capacity in America. We are going to have to ramp up, as Admiral Johnson mentioned, to address that challenge. But as far as the procurement 

strategy, which I think is at the base of your question, I will turn 

it over to the acquisition specialist to discuss that with you. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. Thank 

you for that question. We have not yet determined how we will procure the build of the Ohio replacement. It is still a little bit to the 

right in our construct of thinking. Virginia, obviously, a success 

story under a teamed arrangement. Whether Ohio replacement follows on that or actually does more of a prime sub relationship, yet 

to be determined. But I think it is fair that as we acquire, I ask 

that we use the investments we have put into the submarine industrial base to the maximum extent possible. We built, as Admiral 

Breckenridge said, significant capacity, capability, and competence 

in our submarine industrial base both at Groton, in Rhode Island, 

as well as at Huntington Ingalls in Newport News. And our intent 

is to leverage that to the max extent possible for Ohio replacement. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Well, thank you. And I think your comments reflect how important the talent is with both of those great 

shipbuilders. And as you know, that industrial base is an important part of it, too. So to seamlessly go into that next generation 

of ballistic missile submarine is an important element, I think, in 

the decisions you all have to make. 

Let me ask this: You have talked a lot about the attack class of 

submarines. Putting it in perspective, [we’ve] talked a little bit 

about sequestration. Let me ask you this: In another envelope of 
25 

having to make decisions, we are now at a pretty significant rate 

of retirement of the Los Angeles class. So you take that and coupling what potentially the effects are of sequestration. Give us your 

perspective about what both of those events colliding might mean 

for our attack-class submarine fleet. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

As I mentioned, beginning in 2025, we are going to dip below the 

red line, the minimum agreed by all parties, break glass if you 

cross this line, minimum force structure. We are going to be below 

that line for a period of greater than a decade. The minimum right 

now, with our current program of record of two per year Virginia 

construction is 42 submarines in approximately 2030. 

The depth of the trough is not as significant to me as the width 

of the trough. So whatever I can do to soften that. And so our integrated strategy looks at that. There are three things I would like 

to talk about to mitigate the risk that, one, the Navy is below 48 

SSNs. Number one is, as I build Virginia class down at the 60- 

month point or less and get those to the fleet quicker, that will 

have an effect on that trough. That will give me more assets available during that time period. So any efficiencies that we can make 

regarding the delivery schedule is a win. 

The current Los Angeles class, we are carefully monitoring each 

hull. How much life is in their core, you know, what are their other 

system health looking like to see if we can maybe get a year or two 

extension on the Los Angeles classes. Again, I don’t like to talk 

about that as part of the plan because if we suddenly have an intense period where I am surging submarines, I am going to eat 

that margin. And so I sort of keep it as an ace in the hole. 

The last thing that we are looking at—and, you know, again, it 

is a combination of forward deployed assets. We are looking at 

going from three attack submarines to four in Guam. We are looking at extending deployments during that time period from a nominal 6-month deployment force to a 7-month deployment force. 

So there are a few other things that we can do to soften the blow 

of being below the minimum force structure. But the critical things 

that we must do is, as you mentioned, not decommission any submarines before their time. If there are some cost efficiencies that 

we might see there in a sequestration-like myopic view of saving 

money, or disrupting the two per year Virginia. And those are two 

very important parts of the strategy to take care of that SSN shortfall. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

And I would like to just make sure I have given each of you any 

additional time you need to wrap up anything that we have left out 

that you think is important to have on the record. Any clarifications that you would like to make. And Admiral Breckenridge, 

since you started off, I will let you go. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you 

very much for this opportunity to come this morning to showcase 

one of the things that is vibrant and healthy and is a powerful part 

of our national security strategy, and that is our influence within 

the undersea domain. We have talked a lot about some dire things 

ahead as we look at risks coming up. But I want to emphasize on 
26 

a positive note as we wrap up today that the men and women that 

man our Nation’s undersea craft—our SSBNs, SSGNs, and SSNs— 

are just incredible warfighters. Most recently we have opened the 

hatches to women onboard submarines, you know, on our SSGNs 

and SSBNs. These officers are performing in an incredibly exemplary fashion. 

We are fortunate, as a Nation, that our sons and daughters that 

we are able to recruit and bring into this very specialized field are 

as talented and gifted as they are. So your submarine force is out 

there doing great work, very important things vital to security, and 

undergirding that is this industrial base. A history lesson, as we 

sort of shut down the submarine industrial base post-Cold War, we 

went for a period of 8 years where we only built two submarines. 

That is a quarter of a submarine a year. Those were dark times 

for our Nation. 

The fact that we have come through that and we now have this 

vibrant shipbuilding industrial base is, we sort of cheated death. 

And we are very fortunate that that is as healthy and moving in 

all the right positive directions. And we need to preserve and protect that with every instrument of resources that we have as a 

Nation. 

So I know that we are in tough fiscal times in this country and 

we have to look at hard decisions. But we are doing everything 

within our power to try to come up with an integrated strategy to 

make sure that we don’t lose our grip on this advantage that we 

have in the undersea domain. 

So, sir, I thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with 

you this morning. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Johnson. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. And again, I will echo Admiral 

Breckenridge in thanking you for the opportunity to talk about the 

submarine force. It is a pretty good day when we get to sit up here 

and talk about the programs and the progress that we are making. 

I do think it is very important, as you have noted, that we sustain 

the drumbeat we have established with Virginia. It was a little bit 

of a climb to get in the 2011 budget. As Congressman Courtney 

noted, we got to two a year through a good bit of the actions this 

subcommittee took to get us in a position to be at two a year. We 

are there, and we are now seeing the benefits of it. Ships are being 

delivered not only earlier, but we are also turning them over to Admiral Connor and the fleet forces earlier. 

One of our metrics is the time it takes to take a ship from a delivery and get it into the fleet readiness training program. It took 

30 months for Virginia. On North Dakota, it will be less than 12. 

So not only are we building them faster, but they are ready to go 

to the fleet full up, get ready for a mission and deploy and do the 

Nation’s bidding. So I think that is very important that we do not 

disrupt this drumbeat. And that drumbeat isn’t just at HII or Electric Boat, but it is also in the 4,000 suppliers across the 50 States. 

It is very important as we grow this competitive industrial base 

that we sustain the continuity of the Virginia program. 

We also have to think, I think, a bit innovatively about Ohio replacement. As we get into the build of that and sustaining at least 

a two-a-year build rate to the vendor base means that we might 
27 

have to think about multi-yearing across both a Virginia-class and 

an Ohio-class SSBN so that the vendor base still sees two ship sets 

of something coming out every year. That will help us to keep the 

continuity and the cost down as we go into the build for Ohio replacement and not disrupt the pricing that I think you expect me 

to deliver on those ships. 

I can tell you that we are leading the charge in affordability. We 

are at the forefront of implementing Secretary Kendall’s efforts. 

And every day my program offices—from the guys who do Virginias 

to Ohio replacements to torpedoes to combat systems—they think 

about it every day. And we hold ourselves accountable because in 

the end, we are short if we cost growth end results and less capability are delivered to the fleet. 

So my job is to deliver products affordably that the fleet can use. 

And it is not just talk. We have objective quality evidence, some 

of which I have talked about here today. So I, again, thank you 

very much for the opportunity to talk. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, once again, we want to thank both of you. You 

are very complimentary of the valuable assets we have in the 

United States Navy. This subcommittee recognizes both of you as 

two of those valuable assets. So thank you for giving us your time 

and expertise. 

With that, if there are no additional questions, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 

(51) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Per the House-passed FY14 NDAA Report directive ‘‘Submarine Propeller Repair and Overhaul’’ (SPRO) the committee is concerned with the FY14 

SPRO budget and FYDP proposal. The Navy has stated that ‘‘funding requirements 

for propeller repair and overhauls are estimated based on historical and current 

year expenditures.’’ In the Navy’s August 27, 2012, response to HASC RFIs regarding SPRO, the Navy detailed historical SPRO funding levels between FY08–FY12. 

However, the August 27th response also proposed a very concerning FYDP funding 

forecast and a ‘‘Repair Only’’ ongoing approach to maintaining submarine propellers. 

Without addressing a mix of both ongoing propeller repair and overhaul needs, I believe that medium to high risk to submarine operational readiness remains. Additionally, I believe that the SPRO U.S. industrial base capability is highly skilled but 

very fragile. Adequate funding and budget planning is crucial to retaining this strategic asset. 

Please provide an update to the following: 

1. Provide to-date and planned/expected FY13 total funding expenditures for 

SPRO and break out base budget funding, reprogrammed funding, and OCO funding. 

2. Provide the funding level requested within the FY14 base budget and OCO, and 

across the FYDP. 

3. Provide a breakdown of the type and quantity of both repaired and overhauled 

propellers currently in RFI status. 

4. As stated, I am concerned with the Navy’s ongoing proposed ‘‘Repair Only’’ approach to SPRO as outlined in the August 27th response. I ask that the Navy reevaluate this plan and report back to the committee with an approach, to include 

both FY14 and FYDP funding, that adequately addresses the ongoing mix of both 

propeller repair and overhaul needs. 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. 1. For the funding year FY13, the 

Navy allocated a total of $5.867M for SPRO consisting of $.418M base and $5.449M 

OCO funds. These funds have been provided to NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support 

to support for the repair work to be completed by the end of the fiscal year. 

2. SPRO funds contained in OMN FY14 and across the FYDP are shown in the 

table below. 

FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 

Base Budget (M) $2.274 $2.358 $2.439 $2.493 $2.601 $2.691 

OCO (M) $5.942 $6.055 

Total (SPRO) (M) $8.216 $8.413 $2.439 $2.493 $2.601 $2.691 

3. The Navy has a total of 19 propellers in RFI status at this time. Break down 

by type as shown in table below 

Type of Propeller Total Quantity of RFI Repaired Overhauled 

I3B 1 1 

I3M 6 6 

LAHII 7 7 

IPMP 1 1 

SEAWOLF rotor 0 0 

TRIDENT 4 1 3 
52 

Hull applicability by Propeller Type: 

I3B—Applicable to SSN 688–720 only. 

I3M—Applicable to SSN 688–765, 767–770. 

LAHII—Applicable to SSN 751–765, 767–770. 

IPMP—Applicable to SSN 766, 771–773. 

TRIDENT—Applicable to SSBN/SSGN 726 class. 

4. The Navy shares the concern of maintaining the critical US industrial base for 

propeller refurbishments. The large majority of future propeller overhauls will be 

limited to the SSBN/SSGN 726 Class due to two factors: 

a. The current RFI inventory and SSN 688 demand history can be adequately sustained by ‘‘Repair Only’’. This is the prudent approach in a budget constrained environment. 

b. The decommissioning rates of SNN 688 Class submarines over the next decade 

will further reduce the demand signal for repaired or overhauled propellers. 

In addition to SSBN/SSGN 726 Class propeller overhaul activity, the propeller refurbishment industrial base will be supported by the VA Class propulsor rotor repair. These rotors are replaced on a periodic scheduled basis and, coupled with unanticipated failures, will provide additional work to maintain the industrial base. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the impact of sequestration on the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the Virginia-class SSN program? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President’s Budget includes ten submarines in Block IV, two per year for FY 2014–FY 

2018. The Navy is currently negotiating the Block IV as a Multiyear Procurement 

(MYP) Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) contract and expects to sign it in early Calendar 

Year (CY) 2014 contingent on the passing of the FY 2014 Department of Defense 

Authorization appropriations bills. The full effects of sequestration in FY 2014 are 

not yet known. However, it is expected that the Navy will be able to fund the basic 

construction effort with Ship Construction, Navy funding for the FY 2014 submarines (SSN 792 and SSN 793), but will require additional funds to finish Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) procurements and testing. Additionally, sequestration will result in AP and EOQ reductions, thereby reducing the expected MYP 

savings. To maintain construction schedule, procurement of Long Lead Time Material (LLTM) occurs two years and one year prior to construction start, with two year 

AP used to fund the most critical long lead components. FY 2013 sequestration reduced the Program’s AP funding by $127M which was restored and is in execution. 

The Navy is evaluating the potential for sequestration reductions to the FY 2014 

AP and EOQ to minimize the overall impact to the program. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the Navy intend to fulfill its requirements given the future 

retirement of the SSGNs in light of purchasing shortfalls of future SSNs? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. Submarines are meeting combatant commander requirements today. The future challenge will be ensuring that forward presence around the globe and surge requirements can be met with a smaller 

submarine force. 

VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) is needed to both 1) mitigate strike capacity 

of the decommissioning SSGNs and 2) provide flexibility to expand the range of payloads for the submarine force in response to evolving mission needs. The VPM will 

be a new hull section containing four large-diameter, SSGN-like, aft of the sail that 

can carry up to seven TOMAHAWK cruise missiles each and will be able to readily 

accept new future payloads. These future payloads could include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and advanced weapons, as well as additional sensors and 

stealth enhancements to counter capable adversaries, maintaining our dominance in 

the undersea domain. To reconstitute the payload volume lost when the SSGNs retire in the early 2020s in the most economical manner, the Navy must design the 

VPM now for incorporation into the Block V VIRGINIA Class contract that is schedule for awarding in Fiscal Year 2018. 

Mr. FORBES. In light of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, will the Navy fulfill its requirements given the shortfall in the number of SSNs? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. Air-Sea Battle is an operational 

concept designed to integrate air, land, and naval forces required to address evolving threats. Undersea Forces with their unimpeded access forward will play an important role within an Air-Sea Battle Concept. 

Air-Sea Battle is not an operational plan or strategy for a specific region, adversary, or geopolitical situation. Instead, it reflects an understanding of the threat and 

provides a means to develop symmetric and asymmetric advantages to counter and 

shape A2/AD environments. Air-Sea Battle seeks to develop an integrated force with 

the necessary characteristics and capabilities to succeed in those environments. 
53 

As such, Air-Sea Battle doesn’t define required capacity of the submarine force. 

Instead, our force structure requirements are based on Navy’s force structure assessment (FSA) which is based principally on: a) meeting warfighting capability and 

response time requirements for Combatant Commander operational plans b) providing a sufficient rotation base to sustain global posture 

Navy’s January 2013 FSA specified an SSN requirement of 48. Today we exceed 

that requirement with 54 SSNs. Based on Navy’s PB14 shipbuilding plan we are 

projected to fall below this requirement from 2025–2034. 

Mr. FORBES. Will cost increases in the Ohio replacement program affect other ship 

building programs? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. Our ballistic missile submarines 

are the bedrock underlying our national nuclear deterrence. Because ballistic missile submarines are infrequently procured, they place added pressure on the Navy’s 

shipbuilding budget when they are recapitalized once every other generation. To 

that end, the Navy must ensure it controls the OHIO Replacement SSBN’s costs to 

ensure other shipbuilding efforts are not impacted and the Fleet has the right mix 

of ships. 

Cost control is of paramount importance to the OHIO Replacement program. The 

Navy is working with industry and other government activities to deliver the OHIO 

Replacement affordably while maintaining mission requirements. The OHIO Replacement Program will continue to be thoroughly reviewed and aggressively challenged to responsibly reduce engineering, construction, and operations and support 

costs. Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense established aggressive cost 

targets for both operating and support costs and average follow-on ship costs for 

ships 2–12 of the 12 ship class to control OHIO Replacement’s costs. The program 

is reviewed annually by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to ensure affordability progress continues. 

Mr. FORBES. Will the Navy suffer a capability shortfall given its plan to replace 

14 Ohio-class submarines with 12 vessels? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. No. 12 SSBNs with life-of-ship reactor plants (no refueling required) will satisfy the core requirement for a credible 

and effective two-ocean sea-based strategic deterrent for the 42-year life of the replacement class (well into the latter half of this century). Today 14 SSBNs are required to meet strategic deterrent requirements since two to three SSBNs are offservice for approximately three years during the mid-life refueling overhaul period. 

Mr. FORBES. What capabilities will the Navy lose if they decide to only acquire 

less than 12 boats? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. The Navy cannot meet 

STRATCOM’s two-ocean, sea-based strategic deterrent requirements with less than 

12 SSBNs in the replacement class. 

12 SSBNs provide the absolute minimum number of platforms to remain undetected (survivable) and within the reach of key military targets of nuclear powers 

that could threaten the U.S. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the Ohio replacement support strategic warhead requirements associated with the New Start treaty? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. Though the New START Treaty 

will have expired when the OHIO Replacement (OR) goes into service (treaty expires no later than 2026 and OR enters service in 2031), the OHIO Replacement 

program full satisfies STRATCOM requirements associated with the Treaty. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the Navy anticipate replacing the strike capability lost 

with the retirement of the SSGN fleet? How does Virginia Payload Module support 

this capability? What options exist in lieu of the Virginia Payload Module? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. After the SSGNs retire in the 

mid-2020s, the Navy will be unable to meet combatant commander requirements for 

undersea-based, land attack strike with VIRGINIA Class submarines as they are 

designed today. Combatant commander demand for submarine presence and missions will continue to rise while the force shrinks, requiring the undersea force to 

employ UUVs and other distributed off-board sensors to increase the coverage provided by the remaining SSNs. 

All of this equates to payload volume. The Navy investigated several options for 

meeting this payload volume and concluded that the modular VIRGINIA design provides the opportunity to cost effectively add that payload volume without significantly impacting mission performance without redesigning the whole ship. Waiting 

for the next design of SSN or for an ORP-based solution is not timely enough to 

fill the gap in payload left by retirement of the SSGNs while fiscal and strategic 

limitations do not allow for conversion of more SSBNs. 
54 

VPM will both mitigate strike capacity of the decommissioning SSGNs and provide flexibility to expand the range of payloads for the submarine force in response 

to evolving mission needs. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the status of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s approval of the Virginia Payload Module? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. The Joint Staff completed its review of the VIRGINIA Payload Module’s (VPM) preliminary Capabilities Development Document (CDD) in August 2013 prior to its going to the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council (JROC) for final validation and approval. JROC approval is expected before the end of the calendar year. 

Mr. FORBES. How will the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s approval materially impact the research and development and the associated fielding of the Virginia Payload Module? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC) approval of the VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) Capabilities Development Document (CDD) will support acquisition decisions as the program 

transitions into the engineering development phase. Once JROC approval is received, the Navy will begin detailed design efforts to fulfill the stated requirements 

as part of the VIRGINIA Class Block V contract scheduled for award in Fiscal Year 

2018. 

In the past, Congress has withheld VPM funding based on the lack of a validated 

requirement. With JROC approval, Congress will be able to fully support the Navy’s 

VPM design effort. The JROC approval is anticipated early Fiscal Year 2014. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am deeply troubled by any potential impacts on the two-per-year 

procurement schedule for Virginia-class boats that we so badly need. The economies 

and efficiencies that the men and women in Virginia, Connecticut, and Rhode Island 

have worked so hard to make possible would be seriously impacted by any change 

to the programmed schedule, with potentially serious long-term consequences to this 

model procurement program. 

Can you elaborate on the funding for the second FY14 boat and the FY15 boats? 

What is the current funding plan in our various future options—a CR, sequestration 

or no sequestration, et cetera? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. VIRGINIA Class Submarine— 

Funding for the second Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 (14–2, SSN 793) and the FY15 (15– 

1, SSN 794 and 15–2, SSN 795) boats: The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2014 

(PB14) contains the required funding for the four submarines in both Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2014 and FY 2015. To maintain construction schedule, procurement of Long 

Lead Time Material (LLTM) occurs two years and one year prior to construction 

start, with two year Advance Procurement (AP) used to fund the most critical long 

lead components. In FY 2012, the VIRGINIA Program LLTM contract was awarded 

for the 1st FY 2014 hull (SSN 792). In FY 2013, the LLTM contract was modified 

to complete LLTM funding for the 1st FY 2014 hull, as well as fund LLTM for the 

2nd FY 2014 hull (SSN 793), and for two FY 2015 hulls (SSNs 794 and 795). 

VIRGINIA Class Submarine Sequestration budget impacts: The FY 2014 President’s Budget includes ten submarines in Block IV, two per year for FY 2014–FY 

2018. The Navy is currently negotiating the Block IV as a Multiyear Procurement 

(MYP) Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) contract and expects to sign it in early Calendar 

Year (CY) 2014 contingent on the passing of an FY 2014 Department of Defense appropriations bill. The full effects of sequestration in FY 2014 are not yet known. 

However, it is expected that the Navy will be able to fund the basic construction 

effort with Ship Construction, Navy funding for the FY 2014 submarines (SSN 792 

and SSN 793), but will require additional funds to finish Government Furnished 

Equipment (GFE) procurements and testing. Additionally, sequestration will result 

in AP and EOQ reductions, thereby reducing the expected MYP savings. To maintain construction schedule, procurement of LLTM occurs two years and one year 

prior to construction start, with two year AP used to fund the most critical long lead 

components. FY 2013 sequestration reduced the Program’s AP funding by $127M 

which was restored and is in execution. The Navy is evaluating the potential for 

sequestration reductions to the FY 2014 AP and EOQ to minimize the overall impact to the program. 

VIRGINIA Class Submarine Continuing Resolution (CR) Impacts: The Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2014, prevents the Navy from entering into MYP contracts. If 

MYP authority language is provided in a follow on CR or appropriations bill, the 

Navy could execute an MYP contract. 
55 

The Navy must award the Block IV contract by January 31, 2014 in order to take 

advantage of AP/EOQ savings, award the FY 2014 ships, and not disrupt construction. By leveraging AP/EOQ, the Navy is able to produce VIRGINIA Class submarines in the most cost and schedule efficient manner possible. 

The Navy requires MYP contract authority and funding for the increased rate of 

spending as AP/EOQ amounts in FY 2014 are greater than FY 2013. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. While the Virginia program has been a model procurement story, 

there are clearly some other procurements in the Navy that have had more trouble. 

If the ORP program remains within the Navy shipbuilding budget, or even if it does 

not, how will the Navy seek to insulate the program from cost overruns in other 

shipbuilding lines? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. Submarines are meeting combatant commander requirements today. The future challenge will be ensuring that forward presence around the globe and surge requirements can be met with a smaller 

submarine force. 

VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) is needed to both 1) mitigate strike capacity 

of the decommissioning SSGNs and 2) provide flexibility to expand the range of payloads for the submarine force in response to evolving mission needs. The VPM will 

be a new hull section containing four large-diameter, SSGN-like, aft of the sail that 

can carry up to seven TOMAHAWK cruise missiles each and will be able to readily 

accept new future payloads. These future payloads could include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and advanced weapons, as well as additional sensors and 

stealth enhancements to counter capable adversaries, maintaining our dominance in 

the undersea domain. To reconstitute the payload volume lost when the SSGNs retire in the early 2020s in the most economical manner, the Navy must design the 

VPM now for incorporation into the Block V VIRGINIA Class contract that is schedule for awarding in Fiscal Year 2018. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you give us an update on the Virginia Payload Module and 

how the program is faring given sequestration, a potential CR, and other fiscal adversities? How much more bend is there in this program before we jeopardize the 

ability to include this capability in the Block 5 Virginias? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. Initial concept development for 

VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) is largely complete. The concept leverages existing technology, previous Navy experience with lengthening submarines, and the 

modular VIRGINIA Class design. Internal components required by VPM can be provided by existing systems. For example, VPM tubes have the same diameter (87′′) 

as the VIRGINIA Payload Tubes (VPT) located forward of the sail in Block III and 

beyond SSNs. This modification has minimal cost and technical risk in terms of development and procurement if funded to the President’s Budget. Delaying design 

and construction will make VPM more expensive and place at risk the opportunity 

to leverage the VIRGINIA Class Block V multi-year procurement contract. 

The Navy’s approved capability requirements document, which defines this undersea payload strike requirement for submarine launched vertical strike, has been 

submitted to the Joint Staff for final approval. The document is on track for validation by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 

2014. 

The Department of Defense and the Navy support VPM as the most viable nearterm option for this capability. The combination of sequestration and the possible 

CR will delay the VPM design effort, thus impacting the introduction of VPM in Fiscal Year 2019 with the start of Block V. If VPM development funding is zeroed in 

Fiscal Year 2014, as is recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee, it 

will not be ready for inclusion into the start of Block V VIRGINIA SSNs and will 

not deliver in time to help mitigate the dramatic reduction in undersea vertical 

launchers when the SSGNs begin to decommission in the early 2020s. Delaying the 

VPM effort will result in having insufficient strike volume to meet campaign requirements, an inability to enable early successful prosecution of adversary A2/AD 

networks, and will close off opportunities to significantly improve VIRGINIA Class 

performance and capabilities against advanced adversaries. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Stepping back a bit, can you remind me why these programs— 

VCS, VPM, ORP—are so important, given the intense A2/AD challenges we are likely to face in future contingencies? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. As anti-access/area-denial technologies have advanced and proliferated, submarines have grown in importance. 

Thanks to their stealth, they can operate where other naval forces cannot—inside 

the adversary’s A2/AD perimeter—performing peacetime missions and, in the event 

of hostilities, opening the door for the joint force with kinetic attacks. 

VIRGINIA Class attack submarines are deployed globally, meeting combatant 

commander requirements. They routinely have the highest operational availability 
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in the Submarine Force. The VIRGINIA Class as a platform will have to evolve to 

maintain the Navy’s edge and continue to carry out changing combatant commander 

requirements. After the guided missile submarines (SSGNs) retire in the mid-2020s, 

the Navy will be unable to meet combatant commander requirements for underseabased, land attack strike with VIRGINIA Class submarines as they are designed 

today. 

The VIRGINIA Class’ modular design provides the opportunity to cost effectively 

add that payload volume without significantly impacting mission performance and 

without redesigning the whole ship. The VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM), which 

will consist of four large-diameter payload tubes located in a new hull section aft 

of the sail, will mitigate loss of strike capacity as a result of the decommissioning 

SSGNs, allow for the employment of future payloads such as UUVs and advanced 

weapons, and serve to maintain our unquestioned dominance of the undersea domain by providing flexibility for incorporating additional sensors and stealth enhancements to counter capable adversaries. 

Finally, our OHIO ballistic missile submarines, which are the bedrock underlying 

our national defense, require recapitalization. For over 50 years the SSBN fleet has 

provided the most survivable leg of the nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent. The 

OHIO’s stealth, designed over 30 years ago, continues to allow it to operate undetected by adversaries. Based on the intelligence community’s projections, advances 

in stealth are required for the future. The OHIO Replacement fleet is being designed to operate against anticipated future threats to remain a credible and effective strategic deterrent through the 2080s. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) provide capable, relatively 

low cost alternatives to addressing certain mission sets while reducing operational 

risk, removing the warfighter from harm’s way, and potentially improving situational awareness. Can you provide this subcommittee with an update on UUV development programs, particularly the large-diameter UUVs? 

Admiral BRECKENRIDGE and Admiral JOHNSON. UUVs are a critical component of 

the future Navy Force and contribute to dominance in the undersea domain. UUV 

development efforts, mission areas, and vehicle systems include: 

Large Displacement UUV (LDUUV) will be a reconfigurable multi-mission UUV 

that can be launched from multiple platforms using modular payloads and energy 

sections. The program will leverage the Office of Naval Research’s Innovative Naval 

Prototype to develop advanced energy sources and autonomy for long duration missions. Acquisition Gate 2 was completed in August 2013 and the Capability Development Document (CDD) for Increment 1 is currently being drafted. Increment 1 mission capabilities will be Intelligence Preparation Of the Environment (IPOE) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Fleet Demonstration and Testing 

with prototypes will begin in FY16 with program Initial Operational Capability 

2022. 

Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance (PLUS) System provides effective, 

adaptive and persistent undersea surveillance of multiple quiet targets over large 

littoral areas. It is a multi-node network that consists of mobile UUVs with sensors, 

UUV gliders for communications, and a remote control station that can be placed 

anywhere in the world. In-water components can be launched and recovered from 

a variety of vessels. PLUS is a User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) that 

will be operational and deployed in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. Development Squadron 5 UUV Detachment and LCS Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package Detachment 1 have started operator and maintainer training in preparation for the deployment. 

Knifefish Surface Mine Countermeasure (SMCM) UUVs are designed to detect, 

classify, and identify bottom, buried, and volume mines in high clutter environments 

while conducting IPOE. They are deployable from LCS or crafts of opportunity. The 

program has completed Milestone B and critical design review. The program has an 

acquisition objective of 30 systems and initial operational units will be delivered to 

the Fleet in FY17. 

Mk18 Mod 2 is a lightweight Mine Counter Measure UUV that augments search 

capability for expeditionary response, amphibious operations, maritime homeland 

defense, and hydrographic survey operations. The MK18’s are being used in theater 

in an operational environment currently run by civilians/contractors. The program 

has a objective inventory of 8 systems (3 vehicles per system) will be reached in Fiscal Year 2017. Inventory of 4 systems will be realized by first quarter Fiscal Year 

2014. 

The Littoral Battlespace Sensing (LBS) Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (AUV) provides oceanographic, bathymetric, and hydrographic battlespace awareness including high resolution bathymetry and ocean bottom imagery in support of ASW and 
57 

Mine Warfare (MIW). The program is operational and objective inventory of 8 will 

be reached in Fiscal Year 2017. 

LBS Gliders provide Battlespace Awareness by gathering oceanographic data in 

support of ASW and MIW. Buoyancy driven gliders can operate for up to 180 days. 

The program is operational and objective inventory of 150 will be reached in Fiscal 

Year 2015. 

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