UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4428

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HAKIM ABDULAH RASHID, a/k/a Rodney Buchanan,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:10-cr-00941-RBH-1)

Submitted: July 22, 2013 Decided: August 26, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joshua S. Kendrick, KENDRICK & LEONARD, P.C., Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States 

Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States 

Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Hakim Abdulah Rashid appeals from his sentence of 262 

month’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to conspiracy to 

distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and a quantity of 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Rashid argues 

that the district court erred in several respects when 

determining his sentence. We disagree and affirm.

First, Rashid argues that the district court erred in 

determining drug quantity and in imposing enhancements for 

possession of a firearm and a leadership role in the offense. 

Rashid contends that the evidence supporting the district 

court’s findings of fact did not bear the requisite indicia of 

reliability because the evidence was comprised primarily of 

hearsay statements from cooperating witnesses, each of whom 

Rashid claims had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of his 

criminal conduct. We conclude, however, that Rashid’s blanket 

assertion fails to show an abuse of discretion or clear error. 

See United States v. Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(when assessing a challenge to the district court’s application 

of the Guidelines, factual findings are reviewed for clear 

error); United States v. Rhynes, 206 F.3d 349, 383 (4th Cir. 

1999) (district court’s determination that evidence is reliable 

enough to be relied on at sentencing is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion).
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A district court must find facts relevant to 

sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence and may accomplish 

this task by referencing a wide variety of informational 

sources. Perez, 609 F.3d at 614; see United States v. Tucker, 

404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (during sentencing, “a judge may 

appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 

unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, 

or the source from which it may come”). The sentencing court’s

inquiry is not subject to the rules of evidence and, instead, is 

constrained only by the Guidelines and due process, which both 

require that evidence considered at sentencing exhibit a 

“sufficient indicia of reliability to support its accuracy.” 

United States v. Nichols, 438 F.3d 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006); 

see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3, cmt. (2010).

In applying this standard, we have authorized district 

courts to consider uncorroborated hearsay when making factual 

findings at sentencing, so long as the hearsay evidence is 

appropriately reliable. See, e.g., Perez, 609 F.3d at 618 n.4. 

Although such evidence must go beyond wholly unsupported 

allegations, the evidence must only bear “some minimal indicia 

of reliability” to satisfy due process. Rhynes, 206 F.3d at

383. Accordingly, contrary to Rashid’s suggestion, the mere 

fact that information originated from an individual who may have 

had a motive to lie or embellish the truth does not 
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automatically render that information uniquely suspect or 

otherwise incompetent for sentencing purposes. United States v. 

Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (defendants have an 

“affirmative duty to make a showing that the information in the 

presentence report is unreliable, and articulate the reasons why 

the facts contained therein are untrue or inaccurate.”).

During Rashid’s sentencing hearing, the district court 

appropriately ensured that the information on which the court

ultimately relied was sufficiently dependable and accurate. 

Rashid has produced no authority suggesting that it was error 

for the district court to accomplish this task through the 

testimony of a law enforcement officer who was extensively 

involved in investigating Rashid and his coconspirators. See

United States v. Pratt, 553 F.3d 1165, 1170-71 (8th Cir. 2009)

(at sentencing, district court did not err in relying on hearsay 

statements of defendant’s coconspirators as related through law 

enforcement officer where such statements were generally 

consistent with each other and other evidence). Rashid offered

no evidence to contradict the information contained in his

presentence report or otherwise support his contention that the 

information was unreliable. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

district court’s reliability determinations and findings of fact 

when sentencing Rashid are not tainted by an abuse of discretion 

or error, clear or otherwise.
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Nor do we find error in the district court’s refusal 

to grant Rashid a reduction in offense level for acceptance of 

responsibility. As the district court explained, Rashid’s 

extensive objections to the presentence report amounted to a 

denial of a majority of the conduct Rashid admitted in 

connection with his guilty plea. Accordingly, Rashid’s claim 

that the district court penalized him for making good-faith 

objections to his presentence report rings hollow. See United 

States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452, 463 (4th Cir. 2011). 

Because we also find that Rashid’s below Guidelines 

sentence is substantively reasonable, we affirm Rashid’s 

sentence. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 

2012). We deny Rashid’s pro se motions to supplement his 

counsel’s reply brief and for the preparation of a transcript at 

the Government’s expense. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED