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CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 19, 2013

Serial No. 113–118

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert P. Jackson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................ 4

The Most Reverend Nestor-De ́sire ́ Nongo-Aziagbia, Roman Catholic Bishop 

of Bossangoa, Central African Republic ............................................................. 20

Mr. Mike Jobbins, senior programme manager, Africa, Search for Common 

Ground .................................................................................................................. 28

Mr. Philippe Bolopion, United Nations director, Human Rights Watch ............. 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert P. Jackson: Prepared statement ....................................... 7

The Most Reverend Nestor-De ́sire ́ Nongo-Aziagbia: Prepared statement .......... 23

Mr. Mike Jobbins: Prepared statement ................................................................. 31

Mr. Philippe Bolopion: Prepared statement .......................................................... 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: The Central African Republic (CAR) fact sheet from the United States Commission 

on International Religious Freedom ................................................................... 68

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Letter 

to the Honorable John F. Kerry, Secretary of State ......................................... 73

(1)

CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and good morning to everyone. 

Today’s hearing is not being called an emergency hearing, but it 

could very well be, because since we first decided to hold a hearing 

to spotlight the human rights situation in the Central African Republic, the situation has deteriorated even further, so that today 

the country is on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe. 

Coups and dictatorships have characterized the Central African 

Republic since its independence in 1960, but the current crisis is 

far more dangerous than what has come before. 

Consider this, in a country of approximately 5 million people, 

roughly 1.1 million citizens face serious food insecurity. Some 

460,000 CAR nationals are displaced, including 64,000 who have 

fled to neighboring countries as refugees and nearly 400,000 who 

are internally displaced. 

This is because there has been a complete breakdown of law and 

order in the country following the ouster of President Francois 

Bozize in March of this year. After riding to power on the back of 

an insurrection known as Seleka, the current dictator, Michel 

Djotodia, has found it difficult to disengage. 

Seleka, originally a political alliance, has transformed itself into 

a militia of about 25,000 men, up to 90 percent of which come from 

Chad and Sudan, and, therefore, constitute in the eyes of many, a 

foreign invasion force. They do not speak the local language and 

are Muslim in a nation that is roughly 80 percent Christian. 

They have targeted churches for destruction and stirred up sectarian hatreds where none had existed previously. Indeed, the Sudanese contingent in particular are said to be members of the notorious Janjaweed, who have spread slavery and destruction into the 

Darfur region of Sudan and now are doing the same in the Central 

African Republic. 

And if that is not bad enough, elsewhere the Lord’s Resistance 

Army, or the LRA, under the psychotic leader Joseph Kony, is also 

2

loose in the Central African Republic. Both the LRA and Seleka are 

said to kidnap children to serve as soldiers, and UNICEF estimates 

that there are now as many as 3,500 child soldiers affiliated with 

armed groups in the country. 

Djotodia has formally disbanded Seleka, but Seleka continues to 

wreak destruction in the countryside, and they have seized mines 

and other resources in the country. Even in Bangui, the situation 

is chaotic. 

One of our witnesses, Mike Jobbins, has related how ‘‘there have 

been nearly a dozen successful or attempted carjackings of humanitarian vehicles over the past 2 weeks and at least three aid workers have lost their lives since the crisis began.’’

In response the victims have begun to form self-defense units referred to as anti-balaka or anti-machete gangs, which have begun 

to commit retaliatory outrages of their own. Rather than confront 

Seleka rebels who are responsible for starting the cycle of violence, 

they often target Muslim citizens who they deemed soft targets. 

Thus, the violence begets more violence. 

The situation is so bad that just this past week John Ging, the 

director of the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

warned, ‘‘We are very, very concerned that the seeds of a genocide 

are being sown.’’ All of this is happening in a state which, by any 

definition, is dysfunctional. 

In the words of the Prime Minister, who is the closest thing to 

a legitimate figure in the Government of the Central African Republic, and whom my staff and I met with this summer when he 

visited Washington, the Central African Republic is ‘‘anarchy, a 

non-state.’’ This descent into chaos has compounded the misery of 

the people of the Central African Republic, who have suffered 

greatly and lagged substantially in terms of development. Prior to 

this year, the Central African Republic ranked 180 of 186 countries 

per the U.N. Human Development Index. 

One area where the Central African Republic did lead bespeaks 

an irony. National Geographic ranks the Central African Republic 

as the nation least affected by light pollution. This, of course, is indicative of its low level of development, and the neglect and affirmative harm which generations of political leaders have subjected 

the country and its people. 

Amid this darkness, however, there are some bright spots. It is 

the leadership of the churches and the faith-based organizations, as 

well as traditional Muslim leaders, long resident in Central African 

Republic, who have sought to defuse communal tensions. These indigenous Muslim leaders who speak for peace need to be recognized 

and distinguished from foreign fighters from countries such as 

Sudan—the same Janjaweed, again, who harrowed Darfur—who 

kill and sow destruction in the name of jihad. 

We will have the opportunity to hear from one such courageous 

faith leader, Bishop Nongo. I had the privilege of hosting Bishop 

Nongo in my office when he came to visit Washington this past 

summer, and I was moved nearly to tears as he described the suffering of the people of his country. It is leaders such as Bishop 

Nongo who provide assistance to all, regardless of their affiliation, 

and who strive for peace, who provide the greatest hope for the 

Central African Republic. 

3

I would like to now turn to the ranking member and my friend, 

Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. As always, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue and today’s hearing. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Jackson and today’s other witnesses, 

thank you for coming before this committee and providing testimony, and I would like to officially welcome you. I believe this is 

your first time giving testimony before our committee. 

The crisis in the Central African Republic is deeply concerning, 

and I hope today’s proceedings will offer some clarity on what can 

be done by the Congress to ensure greater peace and stability in 

Central Africa and the Central African Republic. 

Today we turn our attention to another crisis, this time in the 

Central African Republic, at the very center of Africa. CAR is the 

size of Texas with a population equivalent to that of South Carolina. The irony of a country like the Central African Republic is 

that it is mineral-rich, diamonds, gold, and other deposits. Despite 

such natural wealth, that wealth does not extend to the people. CAR has a per capita GDP of $454, a literacy rate of just over 

50 percent, and the country’s life expectancy stands roughly at 50 

years. In comparison, the U.S. had the same rate over 100 years 

ago in the early part of the 20th century. 

The World Food Programme reports that more than 1⁄2 million 

people are currently at risk of hunger. A recent U.N. press release 

noted that in the CAR 1.6 million people are in dire need of assistance, including food, protection, health care, water, sanitation, and 

shelter. 

In October, before the U.N. Security Council, the Central African 

Republic’s Ambassador to the U.N. referred to his country as a 

failed state, and the U.N. Envoy to the CAR warned that the country runs the risk of descending into anarchy and chaos. Today’s 

hearing is about a country on the brink of collapse, a fragile state 

by all accounts. While debate may go on as to the Central African 

Republic’s failed state status, the fact that we are here discussing 

this situation requires all of us to find better strategies and better 

solutions. 

In early October, I had the opportunity to meet with the Central 

African Republic’s Prime Minister. He was unequivocal in seeking 

support for his nation. I hope that today’s hearing helps clarify the 

role the U.S. and other nations can play toward saving lives, renewing peace, and returning stability to the Central African Republic. 

I want to conclude by saying the African Union is advancing efforts to strengthen peacekeeping efforts. I am eager to hear what 

role the U.S. sees as these efforts move forward. I am also eager 

to hear the status of Seleka forces and what can be done to end 

Muslim Christian violence. 

I am keenly aware that the humanitarian crisis has the potential 

to worsen. If the Republic continues its downward spiral, what impact will all of this have on U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly as we deal with the AQIM, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and 

other rogue groups? 

Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

4

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Bass for holding today’s hearing on this very important issue. The 

relationship between the United States and Africa has been, and 

continues to be, a priority in U.S. foreign policy. The Central African Republic has had serious obstacles to achieving democracy and 

stability, and like many of my colleagues I am increasingly concerned about the impact of such instability and insecurity on the 

region. 

Along with strategic considerations, we also must contemplate 

the humanitarian conditions within the Central African Republic. 

The United States has a duty to honor the founding principles of 

our country and to encourage opportunity, prosperity, and the 

hopes of an upward social mobility. With such rampant food insecurity and internal displacement in the Central African Republic, the 

workforce cannot truly flourish and citizens will not be able to 

achieve an adequate standard of living. 

There are several questions that must be addressed today regarding the issues that the Central African Republic continues to 

face, especially its economic and regional stability, and the history 

of U.S. assistance in addressing these concerns. 

I thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Jackson for being here today 

and look forward to his testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

I would like to now introduce our first distinguished witness, the 

Ambassador Robert Jackson, who is currently the Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs. Ambassador Jackson previously served as our Ambassador to Cameroon and as the 

Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d’Affaires at U.S. Embassies 

in Morocco and Senegal, and has also worked in Burundi, 

Zimbabwe, Portugal, and Canada. 

Within the State Department, he has worked in commercial and 

consular sections and has done officer training. He also did oversight work in the Office for the Promotion of Democracy and 

Human Rights after 9/11. 

Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT P. JACKSON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador JACKSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member Bass, and Congressman Cicilline. This is an opportunity for the State Department to offer its views on this very 

important subject. 

Seleka, a loose coalition of four rebel groups under the command 

of the Michel Djotodia, began their violent trek from northeastern 

Central African Republic (CAR) toward the capital city of Bangui 

in late 2012. The overthrow of then-President Francois Bozize on 

March 24 by Seleka forces only exacerbated the crisis. I had been 

following that crisis from neighboring Cameroon. And after Bozize 

fled the country, we saw Djotodia declare himself President, suspend the constitution, and dissolve the National Assembly, thus 

leading the country into greater turmoil. 

5

We are deeply concerned by the extreme levels of lawlessness 

and violence that continue to plague the country. The United 

States publicly condemned the Seleka rebellion from the very beginning. Furthermore, the United States Government suspended, 

as a matter of policy, direct assistance to the Central African Republic central government, but allowed for special funding 

carveouts that permit NGO-sponsored programs operating in the 

country focused on humanitarian assistance, civilian protection, 

health, and antitrafficking in persons activities, all of which focus 

on vulnerable populations susceptible to violence and instability. 

The conflict in the CAR has internally displaced nearly 400,000 

people and forced approximately 68,000 new refugees into the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, and Chad. In Fiscal Year 2013, the U.S. Government provided more than $24 million in humanitarian assistance to CAR in 

support of programs providing food and non-food items, health 

services, access to clean water, and more. 

The State Department also provided $6.2 million to UNHCR and 

UNICEF to respond to the needs of new refugees in these neighboring countries. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, establishing civilian protection in Bangui and the countryside is a prerequisite for 

a more substantial international presence in assisting the CAR to 

address the ongoing crisis. In order to help restore peace and assure civilian protection throughout the country, we strongly supported the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2121, 

which expressed the Council’s support of the African Union-led 

international support mission in the Central African Republic 

known as MISCA. 

We believe that MISCA is the best mechanism for quickly addressing the ongoing violence in the CAR, facilitating the provision 

of humanitarian assistance, and establishing the environment necessary for an eventual political transition to take place. 

The Department of State now is in the process of notifying the 

Congress of our intention to provide logistical support, non-lethal 

equipment, training, and planning assistance to MISCA. We are 

also urging countries in the region, as well as the broader international community, to assist in facilitating its rapid implementation. 

We are concerned that the violence between the largely Muslim 

Seleka rebels and the self-defense militias that have formed in majority Christian communities in reaction to Seleka’s abuses is now 

taking on an increasingly religious cast. For example, fighting in 

Bossangoa and Bangassou, between Seleka and local defense militias in September and October sets the stage for what could in a 

worst-case scenario lead to atrocities on an even larger scale than 

we have witnessed to date. 

On November 8, as part of our continued commitment to working 

with the international community to find an immediate solution 

aimed at ending the violence and creating stability in the CAR, the 

State Department’s senior advisor for CAR traveled to Bangui for 

the first time to participate in the third meeting of the International Contact Group. 

6

This frank and honest discussion resulted in the Bangui Declaration, which calls for the international community to strengthen the 

AU-led MISCA military mission and to lend support for the CAR’s 

transitional road map. While in Bangui, the United States led the 

discussion calling on President Djotodia to reverse his plan to enlist former Seleka rebels into the CAR military. 

We strongly oppose the trend of past authoritarian leaders in 

CAR using the military as an instrument of personal power instead 

of national defense. We have utilized this and other diplomatic engagements, including lengthy discussions with the Government of 

France in Paris last week, as a means to urge regional and international partners to provide troops, additional funding, and other 

support necessary for MISCA to deploy quickly into CAR. 

We also use these opportunities to press our international partners to join us in looking for ways to bolster the legitimate portions 

of the transitional government, including Prime Minister Tiangaye, 

so that governance can begin to be restored to the country and we 

can begin focusing on holding elections by February 2015, as called 

for in the political agreements that brought an end to the fighting 

earlier this year. 

We hope, through these engagements, that we will have an increased commitment by the international community to be more 

engaged on the serious issues facing the CAR. 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, Congressman, let me 

assure you that we remain substantively engaged and will continue 

to address the ongoing crisis in the CAR. There is no doubt that 

the international community must act quickly. We are committed 

to working with our international partners to bring about peace 

and security for the people of the Central African Republic. 

We also look forward to keeping you and the committee informed 

of our efforts in this regard. I would be glad to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

7


85638a-1.eps

Testimony of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Jackson 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on African Affairs, Global Health, Human Rights and 

I nternational Organizations 

November 19, 2013 

Thank you very much Chainnan Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and 

Members ofthe Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify before you today on 

this most important subject. We are deeply concerned about the continuing 

insecurity, hLUnanitarian crisis and hlUllan rights violations across the Central 

African Republic (CAR). We are working closely with our European allies, the 

United Nations, and the African Union to press for stability, the respect of human 

rights and the restoration of democratic governance in CAR. 

The crisis in the Central African Republic began in December 2012 when 

Seleka forces, a loose coalition of four rebel groups, under the command of Michel 

Djotodia, began their violent trek from the northeast region of the country toward 

the capital city of Bangui, which I had been following from neighboring 

Cameroon. After rejecting the power-sharing arrangement that had been brokered 

in January in Libreville, Gabon, by the Economic Community of Central African 

States (ECCAS), Seleka rebels were able to take the capital Bangui, by force on 

March 24. President Bozize fled the country, and Djotodia declared himself 

president, suspended the constitution, and dissolved the national assembly. After 

significant pressure from the region, Djotodia chose to abide by the ECCASbrokered arrangement with opposition leaders. This agreement and a second 

ECCAS summit in April led to a new power-sharing arrangement, the drafting of 

an interim constitution, and the swearing-in ofDjotodia as interim President ofthe 

Transition in August. In accord with agreements brokered by ECCAS, Djotodia 

also promised to hold elections by February 2015. 
8


85638a-2.eps

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Djotodia has never had strong command and control of his own Seleka 

torces and has been unable to sustain them in the field with salaries and stipends. 

With the collapse ofthe former national anned forces, the Central African An11ed 

Forces (F ACA), and the absence of any other meaningful govenunent authority 

outside of the capital, relatively autonomous Seleka commanders - including 

Chadian and Sudanese militia leaders with groups ofloyal fighters under them --

have become criminal enterprises preying on local populations. Seleka's targeted 

violence - including murders, rapes, robberies, looting and burning of villages has 

created inter-religious tensions in a country that had previously enjoyed excellent 

Christian-Muslim relations. These Seleka abuses, in tum, have given rise to 

primarily Christian self-defense groups that have sought to kill both Seleka fighters 

and CAR Muslims, creating a dangerous dynamic of inter-religious hatred and 

tension that risks spiraling out of control. For example, fighting in Bossangoa and 

Bangassou between Seleka and local defense militias in September and October 

2013, although primarily an anti-Seleka backlash, has the potential to lead to largescale atrocities. 

The United States, along with others in the intemational cOllli11Unity, have 

publicly condemned Seleka's overthrow of the government from the very 

beginning. In early April, as a matter of policy, the United States government 

decided to suspend direct assistance to the CAR central government, but allowed 

support for programs operated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These 

programs provide tor humanitarian assistance throughout accessible areas in CAR, 

and combat trafficking in persons, and civilian protection in support ofthe cOlmterLord's Resistance Anny campaign. 

So far, the conflict in the CAR has internally displaced nearly 400,000 

people and torced approximately 68,000 new refugees into the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic ofthe Congo, Cameroon, and Chad. 

This has brought the total number of CAR refugees in neighboring cOlmtries to 

over 220,000. During Seleka's advance on Bangui, hospitals, schools, and 

warehouses were looted and entire villages destroyed. Today, Intemally Displaced 

Persons (IDPs) have little to no access to clean water, schools, or health services. 

The ongoing conflict and displacement raises particular concern for the protection 

of civilian populations. Food security is a growing concem as many farmers 

missed the planting season due to the violence. U.S. govemment partners continue 
9


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-3-

to try to reach these populations with life-saving assistance, but are constrained by 

lawlessness and banditry. In Fiscal Year 2013, the u.s. goverm11ent provided 

more than $24 million in humanitarian assistance in CAR to support programs 

providing food and non-food items, health services, access to clean water, and 

more. The UN Humanitarian Air Service, supported by USAlD and the State 

Department, continues to provide access to affected populations that are otherwise 

inaccessible. On September 25, the State Department announced an additional 

$6.2 million contribution to respond to the needs of new refugees in neighboring 

countries. 

We continue to calion all anned groups in this conflict - primarily the 

Seleka and an increasing number of self·defense groups -- to refrain from violence, 

including attacks against innocent women and children. Establishing civilian 

protection in Bangui and the countryside is a prerequisite to a more substantial 

international presence in addressing the ongoing hLUnanitarian, hLUnan rights, and 

political crisis. Tn order to help restore peace and ensure civilian protection 

throughout the country, we strongly supported the adoption on October 10 of UN 

Security Council resolution 2121, which expressed the Council's support ofthe 

African Union-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic 

(MISCA). 

We believe MISCA is the best mechanism for quickly addressing the 

ongoing violence in the CAR. Establishing a secure enviromnent is necessary for 

the provision ofhtunanitarian assistance and for an eventual political transition to 

take place. To help MISCA deploy in as rapid and effective a manner as possible, 

the Department of State has identified and is now in the process of notifYing 

Congress of our intention to provide logistical, non-lethal equipment, training, and 

plam1ing assistance to MISCA. We are closely coordinating with our international 

partners who are supporting MISCA. We continue to urge cOlmtries in the region, 

as well as the broader international conuntmity, to assist in facilitating the 

mission's rapid deployment. 

While we continue to receive credible reports ofhtunan rights abuses against 

civilians, we know that these reports, alarming as they are, are almost certainly not 

comprehensive. The lack of access to significant parts ofthe country is deeply 

concerning. We continue to receive reports from credible international human 
10


85638a-4.eps

-4-

rights NGOs that humanitarian workers in the CAR assisting victims of the crisis 

have been physically harassed, intimidated, beaten, and killed by Seleka rebels. 

Individuals suspected of conunitting these crimes are unlikely to face justice while 

insecurity and instability reign. It is important that all reports of human rights 

violations be investigated and violators be brought to justice. Therefore, we have 

supported the UN Security Council decision to reinforce the mandate ofthe UN 

Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BTNUCA) in 

order to monitor and report on the human rights situation. 

We support the Council's decision for BTNUCA, as part of its mandate to 

investigate human rights abuses, to report to the UN Security Council regularly on 

individuals or groups who are responsible for serious human rights abuses. 

Furthermore, we also strongly support the UN Human Rights COlmcil's decision in 

September to establish an Independent Expert to monitor the human rights 

situation. The State Department along with USAlD is examining potential 

assistance for monitoring, atrocity prevention and/or transitional justice. 

Furthermore, we believe the international commlmity must continue to 

demand that the transitional CAR government end any and all support to the 

Seleka rebels; exclude rebels responsible for human rights abuses from the 

reconstituted military, gendarmerie, and police; and abide by the agreements that 

established the transitional government, including abiding by the electoral timeline 

of February 2015 and the ban on members of the transitional government 

contending for office. The United States also co-sponsored a September 2013 

resolution with African nations in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) that 

called for adherence to the electoral timeline. The Department of State will seek 

opportm1ities to express support for this timeline both bilaterally and multilaterally, 

i111derstanding that security needs to be restored throughout the country and the 

new constitution needs to be completed in order for elections to be feasible. 

We also continue to work to address the crisis in CAR with our regional and 

international partners through the International Contact Group(ICG) for CAR. On 

November 8, as part of our continued commitment to working with the 

international community to find an immediate solution aimed at ending the 

violence and creating stability in the CAR, the State Department Senior Advisor 

tor CAR traveled to Bangui tor the first time to participate in the third meeting of 
11


85638a-5.eps

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the rCG. The African Union chaired the third Contact Group meeting in Bangui, 

with more than 40 countries represented, including many regional states and a 

handful of non-African countries. The Contact Group released the Bangui 

Declaration, which calls for the intemational community to strengthen the AU-led 

MlSCA military mission and support the CAR political transition roadmap. It also 

expresses alam1 over the current humanitarian crisis and calls for robust 

intemational donor support. During the meeting, Republic of the Congo President 

Sassou, who has led ECCAS' etforts to respond to the crisis in CAR and restore 

stability, stated his strong opposition to delaying national elections beyond 2015 

and voiced his support that transitional govemment officials not be allowed to 

stand for elections. 

The United States led the discussion calling for President Djotodia to reverse 

his plan to integrate 3,500 fonner Seleka rebels into the CAR security forces and 

another 1,500 additional Seleka rebels to be recruited as law enforcement officers 

and park rangers. We emphasized that Djotodia's plan to include large numbers of 

ID1vetted and fID1ctionally illiterate Seleka fighters was a clear violation of United 

Nations Security COlllcil Resolution 2121, which calls for a professional, 

balanced, and representative (by ethnic group, region, and religion) national 

military force. We strongly oppose the trend of authoritarian leaders in the CAR 

using the military as an instrument of personal power instead of an instrument of 

national defense for all citizens. 

While in Bangui, the State Department's senior advisor on CAR made it a 

priority to meet with local and international civil society representatives, in 

addition to senior government officials. One local NGO, for example, reported 

that ten women per day came to their Bangui offices from April to August to report 

being raped; since September, five women per day report being raped. 

Undoubtedly, the number of rapes since Seleka started its advance is much higher 

as stigmatization causes the majority of rapes to go lmreported. This violence also 

continues with total impunity since not one accused rapist has yet to be brought to 

trial. 

We have also received reports from local civil society representatives of 

secret detention centers run in Bangui by the so-called "Extraordinary Committee 

tor the Defense of Democratic Gains." According to our contacts, torture is being 
12


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carried out at the Roux military camp and another location in Bangui, according to 

at least 15 victims oftorture who have spoken to human rights groups in Bangui. 

It was also obvious that fear and tension still pervades the capital as 

Bangui's streets at night were largely devoid of citizens. Djotodia's announcement 

in September that he had dissolved the Seleka force was nothing more than a 

smoke screen as Seleka fighters continue to carry weapons and deny the use of 

arms to "legitimate" law enforcement authorities whose efforts are needed to end 

the lawlessness in the CAR. 

We are deeply concemed that Djotodia does not intend to abide by his 

commitment to hold elections by February 2015, but will instead continue to take 

other measures to delay them and further consolidate his hold on power. His 

nomination on October 8 of Seleka fighters to take command of 10 of 12 military 

regions ofthe country, was a worrying indication of his real intentions. The 

commitment ofDjotodia to even the notion of a lmifled republic in the CAR is also 

in doubt. On multiple occasions in recent weeks, Djotodia has told foreign 

interlocutors that if pushed too hard he might lead the north in seceding from the 

CAR. 

We will continue our diplomatic etlorts to coordinate with our partners and 

to highlight our own commitment to helping address the issues facing the CAR. 

As our immediate priority, we will continue to work assertively with the French 

and other members of the intemational community to bolster efforts to establish 

security in the CAR. We will continue to utilize these and other engagements, 

including constructive consultations with the govenunent of France in Paris last 

week, as a means to urge regional and intemational partners to provide troops, 

additional fLmding, and other support necessary for MlSCA to deploy quickly into 

CAR. We also use these opportunities to press our intemational partners to join us 

in looking for ways to bolster responsible stakeholders in the transitional 

govemment, including Prime Minister Tiangaye, so that govemance can begin to 

be restored to the country and we can begin focusing on holding elections by 

February 2015. We hope these engagements will result in increased commitment 

by the intemational community to be more engaged on issues facing the CAR. 
13


85638a-7.eps

-7-

Finally, let me also note that we remain concerned about the continued 

activity ofthe Lord's Resistance Anny (LRA) in southeastern CAR. This year, the 

LRA has continued to commit attacks against civilians across the Mbomou, HautMbomou and Haut-Koto prefectures ofthe CAR. According to the UN otIke for 

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), from January to September 

20 13, presumed LRA fighters committed 21 attacks, resulting in 33 deaths and 128 

abductions in the CAR. According to UNOCHA, an estimated 21,000 Central 

Africans remain internally-displaced and over 6,000 are living as refugees as a 

result ofthe LRA threat. The United States continues to support efforts by the 

regional forces of the AU Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) to end the LRA threat 

and bring its top commanders to justice. AU-RTF operations have resumed in the 

CAR, but remain limited by the insecure environment. With the support of U. S. 

military advisors, we believe the AU-RTF continues to make progress to degrade 

the LRA's capabilities and promote defections from the LRA's ranks. 

Chairnlan Smith and Members ofthe Committee, let me assure you that we 

remain substantively engaged and will continue to address the ongoing crisis in the 

CAR. There is no doubt that the international conu11lmity must act quickly. A 

wide range of U.S. departments and agencies are working to bring to bear all of the 

appropriate policy tools at our disposal, and we are committed to working with our 

international partners to bring about peace and security for the people of CAR. We 

also look forward to keeping you and the Committee infornled regarding our 

efforts in this regard. I would be glad to answer any questions you may have. 
14

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for your testimony. And, without objection, your full statement will be made a 

part of the record. Can you clarify whether U.S. troops are operating inside the Central African Republic as has been reported? 

Are they helping to support efforts against the Lord’s Resistance 

Army? What is their role? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, we do 

have U.S. troops in the Central African Republic acting as advisors, 

and their only mission is to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army and 

to support the AU, primarily Ugandan mission, to counter the 

Lord’s Resistance Army and encourage defections and, of course, 

find Joseph Kony. 

Mr. SMITH. You stated in your testimony, orally as well as on 

page 5 of your written testimony, that the U.S. has led discussions 

calling for President Djotodia to reverse his plan to integrate 3,500 

former Seleka rebels into CAR security forces and another 1,500. 

What has been the outcome of those interventions? And could you, 

for the committee, elaborate on the composition of Seleka? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, allow me to begin with the 

latter part of your question. We believe that Seleka originally numbered around 4,000 people. It has grown over the months since the 

rebellion began to about 20,000. While we have no exact count, 

there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that perhaps three-quarters 

of that 20,000 originate in Chad or Sudan. 

As for the integration of those Seleka forces into the police and 

the Army, we have made it very clear that we cannot support 

President Djotodia’s efforts to do that. The Bangui Declaration and 

efforts by our partners in the International Contact Group we hope 

will lead him to rethink that entire approach. 

There is no question that the CAR needs an effective Army and 

an effective police force, but it needs to be representative of all the 

people and of all religious groups in the country. 

Mr. SMITH. With regards to MISCA, you point out that you believe that MISCA is the best mechanism for quickly addressing the 

ongoing violence in the CAR. MISCA is, what, about 2,500 troops? 

How robust are their rules of engagement? One of my biggest 

takeaways from multiple trips to Africa, and elsewhere, including 

the former Yugoslavia during the worst days of the bombings and 

the killings in Sarajevo, was a lack of a mandate to truly be peacemakers rather than to be garrisoned. 

I saw the same thing in the DR Congo on trips years ago, and 

my first trip to Darfur saw the same thing as well—rules of engagement that were far less robust. What are their rules of engagement? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is worth 

nothing that the U.N. mission is actually called a peace-building 

mission, precisely because we need rules of engagement that are 

very clear that permit peace to be restored. This is not a peacekeeping mission, unfortunately. We hope eventually it will transition to a peacekeeping mission under AU’s auspices. 

But the key is that right now the 2,500 troops from the Economic 

Community of Central African States that are on the ground, plus 

another 1,500 we expect from those countries as well as Burundi 

and potentially other AU members, will be able to restore peace, 

15

and they are currently engaged in fighting and cleanup operations 

and any operation necessary to restore peace. So they have robust 

rules of engagement, and we think appropriate rules of engagement 

for the situation. 

Mr. SMITH. Are there any funding or resource issues, you know, 

lack of materiel, money, to buy bullets for MISCA, for example, and 

weapons. Are there deficiencies there? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, we plan to request the 

Congress’ approval to provide about $40 million for MISCA’s operations. 

Mr. SMITH. When will that be? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Within the next few weeks. We are actively working on using several different pots of money in order to 

have sufficient funds for this worthy mission. The assistance that 

we would provide would be non-lethal and would be complemented 

by assistance from France and the European Union in particular, 

that would include military supplies to ensure that MISCA can fulfill its peacebuilding mission. 

Mr. SMITH. Are there any inhibitions with regards to training 

that need to be overcome vis-a`-vis the Leahy amendment? I mean, 

I strongly support the Leahy amendment, but as we have recently 

seen, at least I have seen recently in Nigeria, there are capacities 

and capabilities that are not being used because the Leahy amendment, out of an abundance of caution, people are less likely to want 

to train and vet individual soldiers who then could be deployed who 

have a human rights mindset. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of any impediments to deploying the soldiers that we plan to train and see 

in MISCA. That said, we will of course comply with the Leahy vetting requirements to ensure that human rights abusers are not 

part of the mission. Given the makeup of Seleka and the whole history of this rebellion and the gross human rights violations that 

have taken place in CAR, adding people with a poor human rights 

record would only aggravate the situation. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you, if I could, on Friday, November 1, 

United Nations Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. 

Adama Dieng, asserted that violence in the country may already 

constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Civilians face 

imminent threats of atrocities, and he would not rule out the possibility of genocide. Has this risen to the point of genocide? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we are in 

a genocidal situation. We are in a pre-genocidal situation, as the 

U.N. Envoy and other experts have said. And that is why we think 

it is so important to move ahead with assuring that MISCA is in 

place next month, so that we can stop the descent into worse and 

worse violence, and particularly into communal violence. 

Mr. SMITH. Is the administration making any plans for a justice 

mechanism, the likes of which we saw in Sierra Leone, with a tribunal or some way to significantly hold perpetrators of violence to 

account? 

Ambassador JACKSON. We have begun to discuss with the U.N. 

and partners the possibility of sanctions. We do not currently have 

enough information to apply sanctions to any individuals. We are 

16

in an information-gathering mode at this time, but it is something 

that is under consideration. 

Mr. SMITH. Finally, just let me ask you, as you know, Bishop 

Nongo is here to provide testimony, among others, in our second 

panel. The church is playing—and, again, having just been in Jos, 

Nigeria, different country, but situations that may parallel at least 

what is going on here, and that’s the Boko Haram and its killing 

spree that they have unleashed, one of the biggest takeaways that 

I have had time and again and had it most recently with Nigeria 

was just how effective, how proactive, and how comprehensive the 

work is that the churches provide, and that they do reach out in 

a very significant way to the Muslims. 

I mean, the highest ranking Islam Muslim cleric in Jos couldn’t 

have been closer to the Catholic Bishop in Jos working together to 

try to mitigate the violence. And Bishop Nongo will speak shortly 

about the efforts the church is making to try to provide safe haven 

shelter, humanitarian assistance, but also to try to bridge the gap 

between those who commit violence and to put as much of a tourniquet on this terrible blood-letting. 

What is your view of the church’s role? And how would you characterize the Catholic Church and the other churches’ role in CAR? 

Ambassador JACKSON. The church and other religious leaders 

have played a fundamental role in attempting to address this cycle 

of violence. The Archbishop of Bangui, a prominent Protestant pastor, and one of the leading imams from Bangui, have been working 

very actively and very effectively together to sensitive their 

congregants to the dangers of intercommunal violence. And I believe that the Bishop will certainly amplify on that, but we view 

their role as pivotal and potentially of great relevance in resolving 

the tensions that have developed over the last year. 

Mr. SMITH. And are we backing that up with financial support 

to them, especially as it relates to the work that they do on behalf 

of victims? Again, another takeaway, as I met with the Bishop in 

Jos, I was shocked and disappointed that under PEPFAR he had 

received money for AIDS orphans, and as we were talking about 

the Boko Haram and the violence and all the things that he was 

doing, he said he was bewildered as to why his funding had been 

shut off for these AIDS orphans. 

When I got back to the Embassy, I learned to my shock that only 

9 percent of our money, health money and PEPFAR money, was 

going to faith-based organizations on a continent where faith-based 

is the go-to entity. And I am wondering if we are assisting tangibly 

the Bishop and the others, the Protestants, the other faith-based 

organizations in their humanitarian endeavors. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to get 

back to you on that. Of the $25 million that we provided in humanitarian assistance last fiscal year, I do not know how much went 

to faith-based organizations. 

Mr. SMITH. Could you get back specifically with that? And I 

would hope—and I don’t know if it parallels in CAR, but I would 

hope—I mean, I was disappointed and asked them to try to do a 

better job certainly in Nigeria, because the story from the Bishop 

in Jos was frightening. He goes, ‘‘What do I do with these hundreds 

of children?’’ And, again, these are AIDS orphans who all of a sudVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:24 Mar 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\131119\85638 SHIRL
17

den he is told, ‘‘Oops, your program has been terminated.’’ Please 

take that back. 

Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I wanted to know if you could speak a little more about humanitarian assistance that we are providing, to what scale it is specifically, and then also if it is being able to reach the west where the 

attacks on civilians have been particularly harsh. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Congresswoman, I don’t have a good sense 

of the geographical distribution of the assistance. I can tell you 

that we have provided some assistance in the west and northwest. 

We are attempting to reach the most affected populations around 

the country. We have provided food, we have provided access to 

clean water, we have provided other vital supplies. But to get into 

the details I would need to get back to you. 

Ms. BASS. No problem. And you mentioned that soon you were 

going to be coming for $40 million for MISCA, and I am assuming 

that is money that State already had and you wanted redistributed. Are you going to be asking for additional resources for humanitarian efforts as well? 

Ambassador JACKSON. We are looking at all of the Central African Republic’s needs. At this time, we are focused first and foremost on supplying MISCA with the resources that it needs. We will 

continue to provide humanitarian assistance from existing programs, and we are looking at how we can support the U.N mission 

and its efforts to assure that we have the best possible elections by 

February 2015. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. And please follow up with me about the humanitarian assistance, in particular if there are additional resources 

that are needed, because I would like to be supportive of that. 

And I wondered also if you would talk about some of the regional 

dynamics, because I think you said that three-quarters—well, actually, before getting to that, you talked about the Seleka forces increasing from either 2,000 or 3,000 to 20,000. And so I wanted to 

know if you would say a little more about that, the reason why 

their ranks have swelled so much. I am imagining it is for economic reasons that people have joined in, but maybe it is not. 

Maybe it is ideological or religious. 

But I also think you said that three-quarters are from Chad. So, 

one, why the troops have, you know, swelled; and then, two, the 

regional dynamics of them being from Chad. 

Ambassador JACKSON. We believe that three-quarters of Seleka 

are from Chad and Sudan. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, okay. 

Ambassador JACKSON. The two countries. I can’t give you a 

breakdown. I don’t think there has been any kind of census. But, 

indeed, our assessment is that the motivation has been primarily 

economic. Seleka has consistently pillaged and sent goods that 

have been pillaged out of the country primarily to Chad and Sudan, 

and that is part of our basis for concluding that those are the national origins of many of the fighters. 

But the rebellion grew in size precisely because people saw economic opportunity, be it illicit in this case, and they profited from 

it and continue to profit from it. Seleka continues to have access 

18

to customs revenues and other revenues that should rightfully be 

supporting the national government and the people of the Central 

African Republic. 

Ms. BASS. So what does that say, that the majority of folks are 

not even from the Central African Republic, in terms of the support 

for Seleka within the country? 

Ambassador JACKSON. I am not certain that we can say very 

much except that these people are mercenaries. There are a lot of 

questions about how Seleka was financed at its origins, and, unfortunately, we have yet to establish good facts to support various rumors that we have heard. 

Ms. BASS. Can you speak to some of the rumors? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Some of the rumors are that there were 

financiers from Chad and Sudan. But, again, those are unfounded. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Or unproven, I should say. 

Ms. BASS. So then, on a governmental level, perhaps you could 

talk about the regional powers. I understand the rogue elements, 

but, you know, are you saying that it is the Government of Chad? 

What about Uganda, Republic of Congo, et etcetera? 

Ambassador JACKSON. The regional countries have actually 

played a very constructive role. President Deby Itno of Chad has 

been very active working with President Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo, in attempting to broker peace deals along the 

way, starting with the Libreville Accords, and then meeting with 

the African Union in August, and then President Sassou-Nguesso 

chaired the most recent contact group meeting in Bangui. 

So the regional leaders have been very positive. Gabon, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea have also contributed peacekeepers 

to the overall force. And I must say, the police from the Republic 

of the Congo have performed exceptionally well according to many 

reports. And so we appreciate their involvement, and that gives us 

hope that this force can be effective if it is expanded through 

MISCA. 

Ms. BASS. Do you think we could assist if we appointed a special 

envoy? Especially, you know, in the question that Chairman Smith 

asked about if you thought this was genocide or pre-genocide, if we 

appointed a special envoy, would that be helpful in terms of preventing it from going in that direction toward genocide? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Congresswoman, at this time, we do not 

think it would be helpful. We have a senior advisor, as well as a 

desk officer, for Central African Republic. That senior advisor is a 

person who speaks fluent French, who has participated in the contract group meetings, has had access to very senior officials from 

the government by telephone on a regular basis, is in daily contact 

with the locally engaged staff who continue to function at our Embassy in Bangui, and we think he is doing a very good job. 

So at this juncture, we think the staffing is appropriate for the 

situation. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Let me just conclude, Mr. Ambassador, 

with a few final questions, and perhaps Ms. Bass might have another question or two. In his testimony, the Bishop makes I think 

a very important point in suggesting that the peacekeepers ought 

19

to be put under the United Nations auspices and matriculate to a 

U.N. Chapter VII mandate, and that troops then could be obviously 

garnered from other states, probably mostly African states. What 

is your view on that? 

You mentioned $40 million. That is a sizable sum. But, again, if 

they don’t have the mandate, if they don’t have the kind of rules 

of engagement that will lead to a disarming of the perpetrators of 

violence, it could be an ill-fated peacekeeping force. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, that is a great question 

and one that we have given a lot of thought to. At this time, we 

do not support the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, because we think it would take many months to put in place, and we 

believe that MISCA would provide the immediate security that 

CAR needs first and foremost. 

So we are focusing on the African-led operation. We believe that 

it can establish the security that we are seeking and put in place 

the conditions for elections. And the U.N. peacekeeping proposal 

may be something we want to look at down the road, but at this 

time we do not think it is a viable option. 

Mr. SMITH. With all respect, could it be looked at simultaneously 

as MISCA is itself being beefed up? I mean, a transition can be 

done on a parallel tract, and that would bring more players into 

it in terms of financial resources. I mean, I don’t see what the 

downside would be, especially since we have had a mandate problem. On my first trip to Darfur, I met with a major name, Ajumbo, 

who told me while he was there, he said, this is after being with 

him a day and a half, he goes, ‘‘I was in Sarajevo during 

UNPROFOR, and I have the same mandate here. We walk around 

giving the appearance of protection, but it is a facade.’’ And he was 

very, very upset about that. And of course the rules of engagement 

for the Darfurian peacekeeping were significantly ratcheted up over 

time. 

But initially it was awful, and beyond awful because it gave a 

false sense of protection to the people. And that is exactly what 

happened with UNPROFOR, particularly with Srebrenica and all 

of the other atrocities when peacekeepers were deployed and facilitated, perhaps unwittingly, the violence. 

And so I am just wondering, you know, what the downside would 

be of a simultaneous tract to try to get a Chapter VII mandate. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I will take that under advisement and confer with my colleagues at the Department. We 

still believe that right now MISCA is our best option. 

Mr. SMITH. One final question. The Bishop also points out that 

he is organizing care for over 35,000 people. And I would hope—

and if you could be in touch with us, you know, either right after 

this hearing or within a few days, as to how well our resources are 

supporting through Caritas or Catholic Relief Services, efforts. And 

that goes for other NGOs as well, but he has specific numbers of 

people in his compound that are receiving protection, and, you 

know, they are in great need. 

I mean, that is, frankly, the genesis of this hearing, the meeting 

that we had with the Bishop several months ago, and it has only 

gotten worse. And so I do hope you will see how we can beef up 

20

that humanitarian assistance to these NGOs and to these churchbased groups. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, we will definitely look at 

that and respond to you as quickly as possible. 

Mr. SMITH. I really appreciate that. Thank you so very much, Mr. 

Ambassador, and I really appreciate it. Look forward to working 

with you again going forward. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I would like to now welcome our second panel to the witness 

table, beginning with Bishop Nestor Nongo from the Bossangoa Diocese. He has been the Bishop there since 2012. This year, he is 

also the Vice President of the Central African Catholic Bishops’ 

Conference. He is a member of the Missionaries of Africa Society 

and was on mission in Nigeria from 1998 to 2004. 

He then filled numerous duties in the Diocese of Strasbourg in 

France, including chaplain to the Africa Missions College, to the 

Boy Scouts, and to a state hospital. He was also responsible for the 

Africa Missions Chapel and pastor to the Terrance de Mission Parish from 2004 to 2012. 

We will then hear from Mr. Mike Jobbins. Who is a senior program manager for the Africa Region at Search for Common 

Ground’s Washington headquarters. He supports the design, development, and management of SFCG’s conflict prevention programs 

in Africa, and has led the startup of its work in the Central African 

Republic. 

Mr. Jobbins has 10 years’ experience working on violent conflicts 

in Francophone Africa. Most recently, he was based in the DRC 

and Burundi, working with Search for Common Ground’s violence 

prevention, security, and sector reform, and refugee reintegration 

programs. Mike previously worked at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Africa Program. 

We will then hear from Mr. Philippe Bolopion from Human 

Rights Watch. He joined Human Rights Watch as U.N. director in 

August 2010. Prior to that, he spent 5 years working with the 

French daily Le Monde as the U.N. correspondent. There he covered a wide range of U.N. issues and traveled to such places as 

Darfur, eastern DRC, Sri Lanka, Gaza, and Haiti. 

He has also worked as a journalist covering the United Nations 

for France 24 and Radio France International. Prior to working in 

New York, he was based in Pristina where he reported on the end 

of the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and 2000, so he has a great deal of 

experience. 

Bishop, if you could proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE MOST REVEREND NESTOR-DE ́ SIRE ́

NONGO-AZIAGBIA, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF 

BOSSANGOA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. I am Nestor-Desire Nongo-Aziagbia, 

Bishop from the Diocese of Bossangoa in the Central African Republic, and the Vice President of the Central African Catholic 

Bishops’ Conference. 

21

I want to thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member 

Bass, for the opportunity to testify today. I ask that my written 

testimony be entered into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. And I would ask all of 

you, don’t be as concise as sometimes the rules of this and other 

committees would suggest. We really want to hear what you have 

to say, so please take whatever time you need. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. My diocese and its people are at the 

epicenter of an unprecedented crisis that began last March. More 

than 35,000 people have taken shelter in my diocesan compound in 

horrible conditions to escape the deadly violence. About 440,000 

people are displaced in CAR, and no one knows how many people 

have died. 

We believe that about 25,000 people, Seleka and militiamen, are 

responsible for this violence. Around 90 percent of them have been 

recruited from Chad and Sudan, and most are Muslims. They do 

not speak nor understand our local languages. 

The victims are overwhelmingly Christian. In response to the attacks, a small but growing number of Christian Central African 

self-help militia are attacking Muslims. The entire population is 

living in fear, and the country is now in a state of complete insecurity. 

I come to urge you to provide immediate assistance to end the 

violence. The United States, working with France, the U.N., and 

the African Union should fund an increase of MISCA troops to secure the entire country the size of Texas, and equip the force to disarm and demobilize the mercenaries and to return them to their 

home countries and then integrate the Central African citizens 

back into our society. 

This force should be put under a U.N. Chapter VII mandate to 

ensure impartiality and legitimacy, to use force as a last result, to 

save innocent civilian lives. We are grateful for the $40 million 

under discussion by the administration for this purpose. 

Second, the United States and its partners should fund humanitarian assistance to allow Central Africans to return to their villages and to rebuild their lives. Catholic Relief Services is working 

effectively with the church and will be a natural partner in these 

efforts. We are thankful for the $24 million committed for this purpose. It is a good start, but more is needed. 

Third, the United States and its partners should fund the transition process through a legitimate democratically elected government. We need an independent electoral commission to conduct 

free and fair elections. Assistance should also be extended to civil 

society and faith-based groups, so they can protect the civil rights 

and ensure government leaders serve the common good. 

At this difficult time, the church is the only national institution 

that is still operating and serving the needs of the victims of violence and destruction. 

In ending, I would like to emphasize two important points about 

the nature of this conflict. First, the March 2013 overthrow of the 

government was about gaining access to political power. Seleka attacks on Christian communities have created a growing sectarian 

conflict in CAR that never before existed. That will make the conflict more intractable. 

22

Second, our rich natural resources are funding the current militias and could attract other armed groups, criminal networks, or 

even terrorist groups looking for a safe place to operate, new recruits, and a source of financing for their operations. This is a formula for persistent regional instability that must be avoided. 

We urge the United States to rally the international community 

in our time of need. This is clearly a moment when you can be a 

modern-day good Samaritan to the Central African people who 

have fallen prey to perpetrators of violence and destruction. We 

hope and pray that the United States will rise to this call and help 

us rebuild a new free and democratic Central African Republic. 

Thank you for your kind attention. I welcome any questions you 

might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nongo-Aziagbia follows:]

23


85638b-1.eps

DIOCESE DE BOSSANGOA 

B.P.1728 BANGUI 

Ripub/ique Centrafricaine 

Courriel: nestorsma12lilgmail.com 

Tel: (+236)7092 1204 

(+236) 72 53 33 10 

(+236) 75 40 0180 

(+236) 77 44 11 39 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY 

BY MOST REVEREND NESTOR-DESIRE NONGO AZIAGBJA 

HEARING ON THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

Submitted to the 

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

NOVEMBER 19,2013 

T am Most Reverend Nestor-Desire NONGO AZlAGBIA, bishop from the 

Diocese of Bossangoa, in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Vice President of the 

Central African Catholic Bishops' Conference. I want to thank you, Chairman Smith 

and, Ranking Member Bass, for the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee. I 

ask that this written testimony be entered into the record. 

I am a religious leader and a pastor to my diocese of about 623,000 people, 

360,000 of whom are Catholic. Since early 2013, my diocese and its people have been at 

the epicenter of an unprecedented crisis. As I speak, more than 35,000 people have taken 

shelter in my diocesan compound living in horrible conditions to escape the deadly 

violence occurring just outside our walls. Zen it, a Catholic news service reports that 

about 2,000 homes have been destroyed in my diocese alone. Some estimate that about 

440,000 people are displaced acroSs the country, and no one knows how many people 

have died. The road south to the capital Bangui, over 200 miles away is deserted. 

Villagers have fled to escape the attacks, mass killings, rape, and plundering perpetrated 

by the roaming groups of Seleka militia. Fighting, the mass displacement and economic 

collapse have disrupted the agricultural planting and harvesting season. The World Food 

Program estimates that over 1 million people, almost one out of four Central Africans, 

face serious food insecurity. Seleka groups have also taken control over gold and 

diamond mines, the primary source of foreign exchange revenue. 

The Central African Republic (CAR) is a country of 4.5 million people in the 

center of the African Continent. In March, CAR experienced a coup d'etat led by Michel 

Djotodia. For its entire 63 year post-colonial history, CAR has been ruled by a series of 

1 
24


85638b-2.eps

military coup leaders and negligent autocratic politicians who have plundered the country 

of its rich natural resources and neglected the needs of their people. As a result, CAR 

ranks near the bottom of United Nations Human Development Index (180 out of 186 

countries). Life expectancy is 49 years. Adults have a mean average of only 3.5 years of 

education. 

This current political crisis is, however, very different and more threatening to the 

country, its people and the surrounding region than past political upheavals. Before 

taking power, the current Interim President Djotodia led an alliance of four political 

parties, called Seleka (Alliance in the Sango language). For years Seleka opposed the 

rule of former President Francois Bozize. As a result of years of poor governance, 

corruption, a failed election, pol itical deadlock and a series of broken peace deals, Seleka 

strengthened its rebel group forces from about 5,000 rebels to 25,000 when Michel 

Djotodia recruited large numbers of mercenary forces from Darfur, Sudan and southern 

Chad and took control of the country. At present, we believe the Chadian and Sudanese 

forces in Seleka make up 90% of the Seleka militia. These foreign mercenaries, who put 

President Djotodia in power, now run rampant across the country, attacking villages, 

stealing property and livestock, raping, abducting and killing many people and recruiting 

child soldiers. Although President Djotodia has formally dissolved Seleka in an attempt 

to end the violence, he has no formal army to enforce peace and security. 

The four main groups of the Seleka militia have established control over different 

regions of CAR, setting up a de facta foreign occupation. Most of the Seleka forces do 

not speak the local language, come from different ethnic backgrounds, and are Muslim. 

They occupy a country that is 85% Christian and 12% Muslim. Traditionally, Christians 

and Muslims in CAR have enjoyed good relations. Seleka's violent attacks have targeted 

Christian homes, schools and places of worship while sparing local Muslim communities 

and mosques, often only a short distance away. Christian communities have now begun 

to set up self-defense militia to fight back. Sadly, there are reports that they are attacking 

Muslim communities in retribution. Thus, although the violent conflict started out as a 

response to poor governance and exclusion, and a battle over access to political and 

economic power, it has now taken on an additional and dangerous Muslim-Christian 

sectarian character that the country has never experienced. 

The Central African Muslim and Christian communities are being divided by 

another particular aspect of this conflict. Seleka militia often raid villages to steal cattle, 

livestock and other property. Seleka militia men then pass the livestock to Central 

African Muslim herders to take care of because like them, herding is part of their shared 

culture. IneVitably, Christians see local Muslims herding the cattle that Seleka stole from 

them. This has led some Christians to believe the Central African Muslim community is 

in league with the Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries and is benefiting from Christian 

losses. This conflict and the grievances it is creating could create internal MusIimChristian conflict that will persist even if the foreign mercenaries eventually return to 

their countries of origin. 

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Another important factor in this contlict is the presence of gold and diamonds in 

CAR. Seleka militia groups are already in control of gold and diamond mining areas. 

There are regular reports of attacks on mining communities in order to take control over 

mining operations. The potential revenue from this illegal mining will strengthen Seleka 

forces embed them more firmly in the country and create in CAR a 'contlict minerals' 

crisis similar to the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

The total absence of the rule of law and the presence of vast natural resource 

wealth could attract other outside militia groups, criminal networks, or even terrorist 

groups looking for a safe place to operate, new recruits and a source of financing for their 

operations. This is a formula fOf persistent regional instability by fueling militia activities 

in neighboring countries. This must be avoided at all cost. 

For years before the coup d'etat in March 2013, northern and northwest CAR 

have been havens for Chadian rebels and armed groups from Darfur in Sudan. In the last 

few years, the infamous Lord's Resistance Army has taken refuge in the Southeast of the 

country to find refuge from Ugandan army forces supported by American troops. They 

have also pillaged villages, killed innocent civilians and forcefully abducted children into 

their ranks. 

In this situation of chaos, the Catholic Church stands as virtually the only national 

institution that still functions. In my diocese alone we run 54 schools and seven social 

welfare centers. T and my staff are organizing care fur over 35,000 people. Archbishop 

Dieudonne NZAPALAINGA of Bangui, the capital of CAR, has united with the 

President of the Central African Islamic Community and the President of the Evangelical 

Churches in a religious platform to call on the President and Seleka leaders to end the 

violence. They are also urging national Muslim and Christian leaders, and their 

communities, to refrain from violence and counter attacks. 

The Church Caritas institutions have mobilized assistance from international 

organizations like Caritas Internationalis and Catholic Relief Services to feed the 

displaced. We are also helping people to restart their farms by providing seeds and tools. 

Lastly, the diocese of Bangassou in the LRA area and CRS are helping villages to 

develop safety and security plans to provide early warning of LRA movements and help 

people avoid attacks. 

In September I traveled to New York with a delegation of Central African civil 

society leaders to meet UN officials and country missions to the UN to raise awareness of 

the crisis and to plead for assistance. I and the delegation also came to Washington where 

the National Endowment fur Democracy, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and 

CRS staff organized meetings with Congressional leaders, the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom and the State Department, 

In October, Archbishop NZAPALAINGA from the Archdiocese of Bangui 

traveled to Geneva to address the United Nations Human Rights Council to raise 

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awareness of the crisis and to stimulate a mobilization of donor countries to help us bring 

peace to our country. 

I have returned to the United States now to urge you, the United States 

Government to provide immediate assistance. First, the CAR urgently needs 

international support to end the violence. The United States working with France, the UN 

and the African Union should fund an increase of MlSCA troops to secure the entire 

country (the size of Texas) and equip the force to compel Seleka forces to disarm, 

demobilize and reintegrate into society, or to return to their home countries. This force 

should be put under a UN Chapter VIf mandate to ensure impartiality and the ability to 

stop violence and save innocent civilian lives. 

The UN mandate and operational control is important for two reasons. First it is 

the need to prevent regional country forces in MISCA from pursuing their national 

interests over the interests of the CAR people. A large portion of the MlSCA troops are 

from Chad. Chadian government troops protected former President Bozize while he was 

in power. The Chadian's withdrawal permitted Seleka forces to take control over the 

entire country. In addition, the largest portion of the Seleka forces are also Chadian. 

It is our hope that the UN will be able to select MlSCA troops from neutral 

African countries outside of our immediate region and also monitor all troops' operations 

to ensure impartiality. The second reason for a UN mandate is the hope that the UN will 

instill greater discipline and effectiveness. 

My second request is that the United States and its partners should fund 

humanitarian assistance such as food, household goods, health care and agricultural 

inputs to allow Central Africans to return to their villages and rebuild their lives. A 

second phase of assistance would help people to rebuild their homes, promote societal 

reconciliation programs and help the government to re-establish essential social services 

like schools and health clinics. The Church has a close and effective partnership with 

Catholic Relief Services on the ground and we urge you to fund projects that take full 

advantage of the benefits of this productive partnership. 

Third, the United States and its partners should fund the transition process to a 

legitimate, democratically elected government. We need an independent electoral 

commission to prepare the electoral voter rolls, establish the polling stations and then 

organize effective monitoring programs to ensure that the electoral campaign, the election 

day process and the vote counting are done in a free and fair way. 

We will need many years of sustained assistance to rebuild government 

administrative, judicial and social services and professional, well-trained military and 

police forces under the full authority of civilian leaders. We request the International 

Criminal Court to investigate the most serious cases of human rights abuses. 

We urge you in a particular way to extend ample assistance to civil society and 

faith-based groups so they can protect the peoples' civil rights and ensure government 

leaders serve the common good. At this difficult time, the Church is the only national 

institution that is still operating and serving the needs of the victims of violence and 

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destruction. It is also the ~nly institution big and trusted enough to unite religious leaders 

to speak truth to the interim government and hopefully be a positive influence on its 

policies and actions. 

In closing, we urge the United States to rally the international community in our 

moment of need. This is clearly a moment when you can be a modem day Good 

Samaritan to the Central African people who have fallen prey to perpetrators of violence 

and destruction. Central Africans look up to the United States as the leader of the 

community of nations. You are a country and a people who many years ago fought to 

establish your freedom from a foreign power. You endured a brutal civil war and reunited 

as one nation to rise to the world power that you are. 

We hope and pray that the United States will rise to this call 

new, free and democratic Central African Republic. 

Bislmtl~ 3'6ss:ang,~a and 

Vice President of the Central African Catholic Bishops' Conference 

5 
28

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, Bishop Nongo. 

Mr. Jobbins. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MIKE JOBBINS, SENIOR PROGRAMME 

MANAGER, AFRICA, SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND 

Mr. JOBBINS. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 

Bass, and members of the committee. I would like to also start by 

thanking Bishop Nongo for the fantastic work that his diocese is 

doing in Bossangoa, as well as for Mr. Bolopion for the work that 

Human Rights Watch is doing in documenting the deteriorating situation in the Central African Republic. 

I also ask that my written testimony be entered into the record. 

I work for Search for Common Ground, which is one of the largest conflict transformation organizations in the world, and we have 

been working in Central African Republic since the end of last 

year, working with Catholic Relief Services to prevent violence 

using media, using community actions in the southeast, and increasingly around the rest of the country as we see the crisis that 

we have all noted begin coming out of control. 

My testimony is informed by our work on the ground, but the 

opinions and the analysis are my own. 

I would like to share with you three things that we consider critical to understanding the situation in CAR today. The first is looking at the dynamics of the violence, and the second is looking at 

the trend lines, and the third considering why we think this is a 

critical time and opportunity to realistically change the course of 

action and change the course of the tragic river that we are seeing. 

The first is on the dynamics of violence. The crimes that have 

been committed by the Seleka forces are well-documented. Human 

Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and a great number of very 

courageous Central African media groups, Central African civil society groups, have documented these amply. 

They have documented rapes, killings, arbitrary executions, reprisals against the previous regime, and hundreds and most likely 

thousands of deaths through those atrocities, both in March and 

then more recently as we see an uptick in fighting with anti-balaka 

groups that you mentioned in your opening statement. 

The important thing that we are seeing with Seleka is that even 

though they disbanded in September, they still retain de facto control over much of the country. And, in that regard, the command 

and control structures have broken down and they are much harder to control and to engage with than in the past. 

It is a group without any clear ideology, any clear platform, or 

anything that unites them except a sense of opportunism, a sense 

of marginalization, and a shared faith. Many of them are of the 

Muslim faith. 

The second part of the violence that we see is that there has 

been a breakdown of law and order that has created a vacuum. So 

the LRA, of course, continues to operate. It has been facilitated because many of the operations were suspended during the uncertainty of the transition period, and then we also see poachers coming down from Sudan, and we see a number of upticks in armed 

bandits. We have all sorts, and not just Seleka, but new forms of 

banditry and lawlessness. 

29

And, third, that was alluded to by Bishop Nongo and is certainly 

troubling is the rising uptick in intercommunity violence. The antibalaka militias are springing up around the country, and we have 

seen segregation of nearly every community. Every village, every 

city, has been dividing into ethnic neighborhoods, into religiously 

divided neighborhoods. 

As a result, with this armament process, with this segregation, 

with this fear, we see a tinder box in the local political dynamics 

where any incident can create a spillover. And so not only have we 

seen violence in the northwest, which has always been a hot bed 

of opposition to the Seleka movement, but we have also seen incidents in Obo, incidents in Zemio, where farmer and pastoralist tensions have boiled over into intercommunal violence. 

The trend lines in all of this are scary. The ingredients for tragedy at a much larger level are there. We saw for the first time in 

mid-October heavy weapons used by both anti-balaka and Seleka 

forces, including mortars and ground-to-ground missiles. We see increasing armament around the country and increasing segregation, 

as well as an economy that is devastated, a population that is desperate, and a political transition that doesn’t seem to be advancing 

very clearly. 

This is the same sorts of things that we have seen create frustration and create tragedies in Syria, in the DRC, and elsewhere, and 

we see those same dynamics at play of segregation, fear, and weaponry. 

But yet the situation isn’t hopeless. We have heard a lot about 

the upcoming deployment of MISCA, which is certainly a promising—could be a very promising development if there is sufficient 

U.S. logistical, financial, and planning support. At the same time, 

we are also hoping to see security before MISCA gets deployed to 

secure humanitarian access in the corridors of Bangui. 

You alluded to a comment I made in my statement that there 

have been dozens of attacks on humanitarian vehicles. Those are 

continuing to increase. And as we lose humanitarian space, it not 

only affects us but it also affects the entire community that are 

being served by the humanitarian access. 

On the second point on humanitarian response, it is important 

to underline the operational capacities there—Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, IRC, IMC. Many of the major humanitarian actors are there and have the operational capacity to respond, yet 

funding is short. The U.N.’s combined appeal only garnered 42 percent of the amount that they requested, and there is a need to 

ramp up assistance as well as the capacity to do so. There is not 

yet the funding, as far as we know. 

The third point on how to accomplish this process, as you referenced earlier, is a good one and that is the role that the religious 

community and community-based groups can play. There is a risk 

that before any peacekeepers come the situation will be already out 

of control, be too far past the pale, yet there are community leaders 

who are there now, there are church leaders, there is media, there 

are youth groups, there are thousands, hundreds of thousands of 

Central Africans who are deeply upset with what they see going on. 

And groups like the church and others can mobilize a response 

to that in a way that can happen before the peacekeepers and preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:24 Mar 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\131119\85638 SHIRL
30

vent some of these dynamics of segregation and violence from coming to fruition. 

And, finally, certainly the transition process is a critical one. We 

heard from the colleagues from the State Department about the accompaniment of that process, and that is something that we would 

like to see continue, particularly with a higher level of engagement 

from the United States, more consistent political engagement. 

Certainly, the nomination or the naming of a special advisor is 

helpful, but at the same time making sure that there is an Embassy that reopens in Bangui as soon as it is feasible from a safety 

perspective, in the meantime maintaining contact with the transitional authorities, with the civil society, is critical, as these decisions are being sorted out, because without a clear political future, 

without understanding what is going to happen to the Seleka 

forces, if there is going to be demobilization, what will happen with 

the electoral process, it is very unclear what the future of the political leadership is in the country and impossible to find an exit to 

the crisis in that context. 

So those are the four points that we consider priority actions for 

U.S. engagement, and I am open to your questions. And thank you 

again for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jobbins follows:]

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Written Testimony 

by Mike Iobbins 

Submitted to the 

House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizations 

NOVEMBER 19TH 2013 

Members of Congress, Ladies and Gentlemen: 

Chairman Smith, Representative Bass, and Members of the Committee, I would like to begin by 

thanking you for convening this timely and important meeting, and for the chance to update you 

on the increasingly worrying crisis in the Central African Republic. 

I would also like to recognize the extraordinary work that my co-panelists, the distinguished 

Reverend Nongo-Aziagbia and Mr. Bolopion, and their organizations are doing to raise 

awareness of the severity of the crisis, and respond to the urgent needs within the CAR. 

My name is Mike Iobbins, I work on violence prevention with Search for Common Ground. My 

testimony is informed by our on-the-ground programs in the Central Mrican Republic, but the 

views expressed are my own. 

I will begin by speaking briet1 y on the current state of the crisis in the CAR, some of the risks of 

a further deterioration of conditions there, and then conclude by considering some practical steps 

to help improve the situation. 

THe: ClmRENI SlATE (If' CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUHLIC 

The politico-military crisis, which the Central Mrican Republic has experienced since late 2012, 

has taken a new tum. Fighting between the former regime and the Seleka rebellion profoundly 

weakened an already-fragile state. 

Prior to the crisis, the Central African Republic ranked 1801h out of 187 countries in the world on 

the UN's Human Development index. The central government had little control outside of 

Bangui, and was led by an increasingly-narrow group of political elites, including the wife and 

children of then-President Francois Bozize, who had himself come to power in a coup in 2003. 

A series oflong-running rebel movements operated in the north of the country prior to the recent 

coup, and with porous borders, the Central African Republic became home to foreign armed 

groups, including the Chadian rebel leader Baba Lade, the Lord's Resistance Army, and heavily 

armed Sudanese poachers. 

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Seleka's arrival in Bangui in March 2013 ushered in a new era of insecurity and chaos. UN 

Secretary General Ban Ki Moon observed in May that "the country is plunging into a state of 

general anarchy marked by a complete breakdown of law and order," an observation that has 

sadly continued to play out over the past eight months. The instability displaced more than 

400,000 people, claimed countless lives, and risks to deteriorate further. In the present context, 

we can see three forms of violence against ci vilians. 

TIIRTIE PATTERNS Of VIOLENCE 

1, Abuses by semi-organized armed groups, notably the (ex) Seleka forces. The Seleka 

movement, officially disbanded since September, still retains de facto control in much of the 

country. Abuses committed by Seleka fighters have been well documented by Human Rights 

Watch, Amnesty International, and national human rights groups, and include arbitrary killings, 

looting, pillaging, and rape on a large scale. 

There had always been little internal cohesion within the Seleka movement. Seleka came into 

being as a coalition of fighters from long-running and historically-opposed rebel groups and 

remained fractious, with troops loyal to individual commanders with only a loose hierarchy. 

There is no coherent agenda, ideology, or political platform behind the Seleka movement, aside 

from - at most - a general sense that the north of the country has been historically neglected. 

Apart from being predominantly Muslim, and being driven by opportunism, there is little else 

that fighters within the Seleka movement have in common with one another. 

Over the course of the rebellion, the numbers of Seleka fighters dramatically increased as its 

success attracted recruits. It is widely cited that the movement began with 5 000 fighters at the 

end of 2012 and are now thought to number more than 20 000. While it is impossible to know 

the exact proportions, local media, civil society, and human rights groups have observed that a 

large proportion of Seleka commanders and fighters come from Chad and Sudan. There are also 

credible reports of the recruitment of children into the movement, and lJNTCEF currently 

estimates that there are now as many as 3 500 child soldiers affiliated with armed groups in the 

CAR. 

The rapid increase in poorly-disciplined fighters, the lack of coherent objectives or community 

support, and the absence of a clear command-and-control structure, particularly since being 

officially disbanded, has meant that the majority of ex-Seleka fighters have drifted into looting, 

pillaging, and attempting to continue to reap the spoils of war. This is dangerous for two reasons. 

First, the lack of internal control makes it difficult for political leadership to reign in the 

remnants of the movement. In recent days there have been reports of violence between different 

groups of Seleka fighters, creating the risk of new waves ofviolence. 

Second, the lack of support structures has led some groups of ex-Seleka to try to rally local 

Muslim civilians to their "cause," and to try to position themselves as protectors of the interests 

of the Muslim community in places like Yaloke and Bangassou where ex-Seleka sought to make 

common cause with local Muslims when they felt under threat, or in apparent alliances with 

Peulh herdsmen that cross the region. It is possible that as Seleka forces divide and come under 

threat, this trend of increasingly seeking alliances based on identity-lines at the local level may 

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85638c-3.eps

increase. There are persistent rumors - though no confirmation - of attempts by SeTeka groups to 

form alliances with groups from North Africa and the Middle East. 

2. Banditry, criminality, score settling, and other opportunistic activity. Alongside the 

banditry and abuses committed by ex-Seleka elements, the breakdown of law and order created 

an opportunity for other forms of violence. This includes catjackings, highway robberies, and 

other kinds of criminality, which has further exacerbated insecurity for ordinary citizens. The 

turmoil that has persisted in the CAR since last December has created a vacuum, in which other 

criminal groups have operated. This includes the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has 

operated in the southeastern CAR for years. The Ugandan Army's operations against the LRA 

were impeded during the crisis, although they have since resumed. In addition to the LRA, in 

recent days we have seen several movements of heavily armed wildlife poachers moving 

southwards from Sudan. 

3. Inter-communal violence. As a result of the lawlessness and fears of inter-communal strife, 

many cities, including Bangui, have become increasingly segregated along ethnic and religious 

lines as people settle in neighborhoods shared with their family members and identity group in 

order to better ensure their security. Self-defense militias, known as ami-BaTaka, have emerged 

in many parts of the country and clashed with ex-Seleka elements. 

These groups have actively attacked ex-Seleka fighters, and in many cases have also explicitly 

targeted Muslim communities perceived be allies of ex-Seleka forces. The targeting of innocent 

civilians and the practice of "collective punishment" has created the dynamic of attacks and 

reprisals between communities. The documentation of atrocities committed against civilians, 

which began primarily in the northwest has increased tensions throughout the country. 

The presence of local defense groups to protect a neighborhood or village has existed to various 

degrees in the past, but we have seen a dramatic proliferation of such groups the couutry iu 

recent months. Attacks by anti-Balaka groups have often triggered "collective punishment" 

reprisals by ex-Seleka forces, particularly targeting young men based on their perceived ethnicity 

or neighborhood. Anti-Balaka groups at the moment do not appear to be organized beyond their 

immediate surroundings, although a few have proclaimed loyalty and to, and identified with, the 

former regime. 

In addition, while many such groups have been armed with traditional weapons, including 

hunting rifles and machetes, there have been a few cases of more heavy weapons being used, 

including a clash at Gbombolo in mid-October that saw artillery use and which left six dead. 

Later that month, a weapons cache believed to belong to anti-Balaka groups was discovered in 

Bangui including mortar shells, ground-to-ground missiles and Kalashnikov ammunition. 

As word of violence spreads throughout the country, it has the result of further increasing 

tensions, fears, and rumors, creating the risk of a self-perpetuating cycle. For example, in the far 

southeast prefecture of Haut Mbomou, which has seen relatively little presence of Seleka forces, 

information about attacks elsewhere in the country have led both Muslim and Christian 

communities to segregate, arm themselves, and view each other with suspicion. As a result, longrunning conflicts between predominantly Muslim herders and predominantly Christian farmers 

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have boiled over into serious violence in several places. In the climate of fear, mistrust, and 

armament, any small incident risks quickly escalating. 

This amalgamation of factors places civilians at imminent risk of atrocity crimes. On Friday 

November 1, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. Adama Dieng, 

asserted that violence in the country may already constitute crimes against humanity and war 

crimes, civilians face imminent threat of atrocities, and he would not rule out the possibility of 

genocide. On November 13th, John Ging, director of the UN Office for Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs warned, "We are very, very concerned that the seeds of a genocide are 

being sown." 

HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES 

The humanitarian consequences have been devastating. The United Nations estimates that 

half of 4.6 million Central Africans are in need of urgent assistance. Nearly 400,000 people have 

fled their homes, many living in the bush and forests out of fear of being attacked in their 

villages. The current period, from September to November is harvesting season in much of the 

country, but people are unable to harvest out of fear of attack. As a result, about 1.1 million 

people are facing food shortages. The school year should have started last month, but seven out 

of ten children were unable to return. There are critical shortages in nearly every sector: food, 

health, shelter, water and sanitation, and education. 

Insecurity in Bangui has led to increased pressure on aid workers. There have been nearly a 

dozen successful or attempted catjackings of humanitarian vehicles over the past two weeks and 

at least three aid workers have lost their lives since the crisis began. The situation is troubling, 

and appears to be degrading. Yet, there is substantial humanitarian capacity in the CAR to 

respond to the crisis. There are about 28 international NGOs operating in the country, including 

Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, IMC, MSF, IRC and others, as well as UN Agencies like 

lJNICEF and WFP, and the ICRC. While these groups are largely able to secure operational 

access to provide assistance, there are chronic funding shortfalls and only 42% of the UN's 

Consolidated Appeal has been met. 

TIlE RISK 01' FURTIlER DETERIORATION 

The humanitarian crisis in the Central Atrican Republic, and its human cost, is troubling. Even 

more troubling is recognition that we are seeing the ingredients necessary for an even greater 

tragedy. We see many of the same features emerging in this situation that we have seen in the 

DRC, Syria, Nigeria and other regions that have seen protracted violence on a large scale. These 

include: 

I. The emergence of a multiplicity of militias closely aligned with ethnic and religious identity 

groups. As both Anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka groups seek to rally support, there is a risk of 

further polarization along ethnic and religious lines; 

2. The proliferation of weapons in the country, including trom looted government arsenals, but 

likely also through the international weapons trade. This is accompanied by illicit trafficking 

in diamonds, cattle, poaching and other transnational criminal activities that have longexisted in the CAR; 

3. Increasing popular perception of a sectarian divide, driven by recent experiences of violence; 

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4. The breakdown of economic and social life, which has exacerbated suffering for ordinary 

citizens, and driven a sense of frustration and desperation in both rural and urban areas; 

5. An unclear political transition process, and an uncertain "endgame" for the transitional 

leadership and ex-Seleka fighters, should the transition succeed. 

RESPONDING TO THE CURRENT CRISIS 

There is a manifest need - and a critical opportunity - for the international community, national 

and international civil society, and local actors to take urgent action to prevent violence, provide 

lifesaving assistance, and support a path towards a stable transition to civilian rule. While the 

current situation is troubling, it is not hopeless. 

There are promising local initiatives to resolve tensions within the CAR, including a series of 

interfaith meetings and several examples of ex-Seleka commanders being transferred or moved 

as a result of abuses. Humanitarian organizations on the ground have the capacity to respond, 

and discussions on a MISCA peacekeeping force appear to be slowly advancing. 

There is a realistic chance for a coordinated, strategic, and urgent response by the international 

community - including the United States - to begin stabilizing the country before the situation 

deteriorates further. The current moment in CAR represents a key opportunity to head ofl'the 

worst case scenario, along the principle that "a stitch in time saves nine." To identify what this 

might look like, we, Search for Common Ground, convened a group of civil society and religious 

leaders in Bangui in October, and consulted an array of international and local actors on how 

best to respond to the crisis. We identify four immediate needs: 

1. Improving Security. The multiplicity of militia groups, particularly Seleka elements have 

overwhelmed the capacity of FOMAC peacekeepers and the remains of the former armed forces 

and the Gendarmerie. There is therefore an urgent need for the deployment of the muchanticipated MlSCA peacekeeping mission which is sufficiently resourced, with the adequate 

numbers of troops and mobility, and with a suitable mandate to protect civilians. U.S. logistical, 

financial and planning support to this mission will be critical to ensure its success. At the same 

time, there is urgent need for a limited interim force aimed at securing the rapidly-closing 

humanitarian space and securing the major arteries in Bangui, in order to facilitate the circulation 

of goods, people, and humanitarian materiel. 

Additionally, there is a need for continued strong international engagement to protect civilians, 

documenting, denouncing and dissuading abuses committed by the different anned groups. This 

is a role that can be played by a reinforced BINUCA ofllce if rapidl y deployed and resourced, 

under the existing Security Council Resolution. The US can be support these efforts through 

high-visibility public statements recognizing the gravity of the situation, through its interactions 

with the Transitional Government, and through its engagement with regional and international 

partners. 

2. Community-Based Violence Prevention. While the rapid deployment of peacekeeping 

forces are a priority, the current situation risks seriously deteriorating before MISCAs 

deployment. Even if the challenges posed by armed groups are addressed, the proliferation of 

weapons and mistrust within communities will create long-running issues if they are not dealt 

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with. There is a need and opportunity for the US to support existing initiatives by civil society, 

media, the religious community and other local actors to stem the tide of fear and polarization. 

We have seen media, civil society and religious leaders successfully mobilize their communities 

to de-escalate tensions and reject violence in many areas during the height of the 2009-2010 war 

in Cote d'lvoire and even in some parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The rise of fear 

and mistrust is not irreversible; the capacity and the potential to change course is present in the 

Central African Republic as well. 

3. Humanitarian response. There is tremendous humanitarian need. Reliable information is 

difficult, but it is believed that more than half of the entire population requires urgent assistance 

and nearly every kind of emergency assistance, including health, protection, and food security is 

necessary. As 1 noted before, the human and operational capacity exists in country to begin 

meeting these needs, but there are significant funding shortfalls in order to respond. 

4. Transition Planning. Finally, key questions contentious questions remain unresolved, 

including elections and the political future of the transitional leadership, the potential 

demobilization of Seleka combatants, reconciliation, economic recovery, restoration of the state, 

and potential transitional justice mechanisms. While these are significant issues requiring longterm sustained effort, they are also intrinsically linked to the interests of actors perpetrating the 

current wave of violence. 

Many of these issues were agreed in the Libreville and Ndjamena political roadmap, but will 

require significant political accompaniment to put into practice. The US. could support this by 

re-establishing a diplomatic presence in Bangui as soon as feasible or through the option of 

temporary accreditation in a neighboring country, and increasing contacts with the transitional 

authorities at all levels, as well as with civil society and other groups. 

This is a critical moment for the US. government to engage proactively and decisively to protect 

civilians and prevent current threats from evolving into large-scale atrocities in the Central 

African Republic. While there are indeed a multitude and complexity of challenges facing the 

US. today, failing to act in CAR today will make it harder and more costly in both lives and 

dollars for the United States to act tomorrow. 

Search for Common Ground Page 6 
37

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your time, for your wonderful work on the ground, and for these very specific recommendations. Thank you so much. 

I would like to now recognize Mr. Bolopion. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PHILIPPE BOLOPION, UNITED NATIONS 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Mr. BOLOPION. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very much, Ranking Member Bass. And I would ask that my statement be entered for the record as well. 

I work for Human Rights Watch, which is a human rights organization. Three weeks ago I arrived in Bangui. I was carrying piles 

of our latest report there. It is a brutal read. It is a report that details abuses committed by the Seleka fighters between March and 

June of this year. For many months now, they have killed scores 

of civilians, women, children. They have pillaged, burned entire villages, looted as well, and they did this with complete impunity. 

So arriving in Bangui, I knew that the situation was very bad, 

and yet I was not fully prepared for what I found on the ground 

there. We quickly made our way to Bossangoa, where the Bishop 

is from, which is in the northern part of the country. And as soon 

as we arrived there, we saw the Seleka. They are in control; they 

rule the town. And we saw what they looked like. To be very clear, 

it is a bunch of very young men wearing random uniforms, 

flipflops, carrying old weapons, but they are the law in town. 

We went to the church, which has now become the center of a 

makeshift displaced people camp. I have seen my share of camps 

in my career. I can tell you this is one of the most horrible I have 

seen. It stinks of human waste. There is smoke everywhere, sick 

people, children. It is a very, very bad camp. 

And the real tragedy is that many of the people I met in this 

camp live just nearby, some only a few hundred yards from the 

church. They were not displaced by a natural catastrophe; they 

were just displaced by fear, because whenever they tried to leave 

the camp and work in their fields, for example, they get shot at by 

the Seleka fighters who control the town. 

As a matter of fact, in front of the church, I met a young woman 

roughly my age, Florence Namngafo. She was carrying an infant 

child there who had a really nasty wound on his arm and he was 

injured by the same Seleka bullet that killed his father close to 

their field and for absolutely no reason. And this woman only survived because she played dead for several hours while her kid was 

screaming in pain, unable to assist him. 

Now, if you walk a bit away from the church in Bossangoa, you 

quickly meet the Muslim communities. You have about 4,000 people. They live around what used to be the school, what used to be 

the court building, in very poor conditions as well. And these people were not displaced by the Seleka; they were displaced by antibalaka violence. And, as you have heard, the anti-balaka are these 

militias of mostly Christians. 

They are supposed to be about self-defense, but the story we 

were told by Muslim residents there are very different. It appears 

that in many instances these anti-balaka use the same brutal tacVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:24 Mar 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\131119\85638 SHIRL
38

tics as the Seleka and target civilian Muslims for the only reason 

that they are Muslims. 

So, for example, I talked to a few men there who told me that 

their village was attacked only months ago by anti-balaka. At 5 

o’clock a.m. in the morning, they come in the village where you 

have also a few Christian people. They go to all the Muslim houses, 

take everybody out, and started saying things like, ‘‘You are Muslims. You are Seleka. We are going to kill you. We are going to kill 

all the Muslims.’’

They proceeded to separate what they call the men, which really 

are the boys at 10 years old and up, from the women and the other 

kids. They slit the throat of a young man, 27 years old. The other 

men panicked, started to run in every direction. The Seleka men, 

who were mostly men in civilians with machetes, but a few guys 

in uniforms with AK–47s as well, they started shooting at them 

and they killed four more people, including a 13-year-old boy. 

The other men made it out to the bush, many of which I talked 

to. And when they came back at night to see what had happened, 

the women and the kids were gone. They could figure out from the 

footsteps in the sand that they had left with the anti-balaka, but 

they don’t know what happened to them. They think they are probably dead. 

The village was burned to the ground. All their cattle, which is 

their livelihood, was killed. Only the heads of the cows were laying 

on the ground. 

In the same camp, I talked to another man, an older Muslim 

man. His name was Massadou Bichefou, and he had two wives, 11 

kids and grandkids, and the same thing happened to him in early 

September. Anti-balaka came in. He was able to escape and hide 

in the grass, but he saw the anti-balaka come in, take each and 

every of his 11 kids and grandkids, to anti-balaka men with a knife 

who slit the throat of each and every of them one by one. 

So, you know, what we heard when we were there was a bit new 

to us, the sort of new sectarian religious undertone to the violence. 

We did not hear that when we were in the country between March 

and June. And it is extremely worrying in a country like the CAR 

where people have lived well for many years. And it is not a country that was about religion to begin with, but people with guns on 

both sides seem to be using religious tensions to justify the crimes 

they are committing against defenseless civilians on both sides. 

So what this could do to the whole country, of course, is extremely worrying. It is hard to predict. And to get a better sense 

of it, we ventured a bit outside of Bossangoa. We went to a small 

town called Zere, and the Bishop I am sure is familiar with this 

place. There was no one on the road. We drove for 2 hours without 

meeting anyone. The few women we saw alongside the road were 

so scared when they saw us—because they thought we were the 

Seleka because we had a 4x4—that they were running into the 

bush, dropping all their belongings, everything they had. One of 

them even dropped a baby on the side of the road. It took us half 

an hour to find the mother to take the baby back. 

When we arrived in Zere, it is a very eerie feeling. It is a ghost 

town. The church has been burned. The mosque has been deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:24 Mar 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\131119\85638 SHIRL
39

stroyed. We counted 300 burned houses there, including all of the 

Muslim houses. It is completely devastated. 

And we spent a bit of time there and eventually some men came 

out of the bush. They were carrying spears and machetes, old guns, 

knives. They told us they were not anti-balaka, and they described 

the Seleka violence. When we asked them about the burned Muslim houses, they said they did not know what happened. And they 

told us about the kind of lives they live now. They live in the bush, 

three kilometers out in the bush. The kids are dying of malaria. 

The women are giving birth under trees, and they are getting absolutely no aid whatsoever. People in Bossangoa have a bit of aid; 

these people do not. 

So to conclude now, you know, what could the U.S. Government 

do to prevent the country from spiraling further into chaos? First, 

I think the U.S. should support the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission. I think it would be a mistake to put all your eggs 

in the MISCA basket, in the African force basket. I saw them on 

the ground. There are too few of them. They are ill-equipped and 

not very professional. They provide private security for money in 

Bangui, in Bossangoa. They get pushed around by the Seleka. They 

sell beer and bottled water. Put simply, I think they are not up to 

the task. 

Now, they are the only game in town for now, and it is true that 

the U.N. peacekeeping mission will take some time to deploy. But 

I think, Mr. Chairman, you were right to say that preparations for 

that could start right now with no real downside to this. 

And I believe that in places like Zere or Bossangoa a few blue 

helmets, a few professional peacekeepers, would provide enough security that people would go back to their homes, rebuild, cultivate 

their fields, and restart their lives. 

Second point, the humanitarian aid, I believe the U.S. could provide much more. The needs are staggering, and the people, especially living in the bush, are getting absolutely nothing and dying 

of diseases that could be easily treated. 

A third point, I think the U.S. could start sanctioning some of 

the people who are committing the worst abuses there, including 

Seleka leaders. Some of them are starting to get real access to a 

natural resource, to money, and they would care. And the U.S. 

should push the U.N. to do exactly the same thing. 

Right now, there is complete impunity for these crimes. Sanctions would not be the perfect solution, but at least it would signal 

that there is a cost for these abuses. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and of course I am 

happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolopion follows:]

40


85638d-1.eps

HRW.org 

Testimony ot Philippe Bolopion 

United Nations Director, Human Rights Watch 

Crisis in the Central African Republic 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, 

Global Human Rights, and International Organizations 

November 19, 2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am so pleased 

that this subcommittee is turning its attention to the Central African Republic - a country that often 

gets little attention but is at a point of crisis that demands urgent and immediate engagement by 

the international community - and the United States. 

I came back from the Central African Republic, a landlocked and deeply impoverished country in 

central Africa, less than two weeks ago. I spent a week in the country on a mission for Human Rights 

Watch, an international human rights organization. 

I arrived in the capital, Bangui, carrying piles of our latest report. It is 79 pages long, and a brutal 

read. It covers the period from March to June of this year and details the killing of scores of civilians, 

including women and children, by members of the Seleka rebels, now in power. It also documents 

the destruction of entire villages. 

As bad as I knew the situation was, it did not prepare me for what we found on the ground. 

We spent several days in Bossangoa, a town of40,000 inhabitants, 300 kilometers north of Bangui. 

At the entrance to the town, we found a checkpoint manned by young former Seleka fighters. They 

were wearing flip-flops, random uniforms, and were carrying old weapons - all trademarks ofthe 

now nominally disbanded force. 

Yet they rule the town, or what is left of it. Close to 40,000 people are living around the church in 

one of the worst ad-hoc displaced persons camps I have seen. It reeks of human waste and is filled 
41


85638d-2.eps

with bitter smoke and dust. Only a handful of non-governmental organizations and UN agencies 

provide help. 

Many of these people have houses still standing, only a few hundred yards away. They were not 

displaced by a natural catastrophe, but by fear. They told us that whenever they venture out of the 

camp, Seleka fighters shoot at them. 

Resident after resident told me of losing loved ones to Seleka bullets in their fields or houses. I met 

Florence Namngafo, a woman roughly my age, carrying a baby with a nasty wound. Her husband 

was killed by the same Seleka bullet that almost took her baby's arm. She survived by playing dead 

for hours, unable to assist her infant, who was screaming in pain. 

A few hundred yards away, around 4,000 displaced Muslims residents are living in the long-sinceclosed school and court building. They fled attacks not by the Seleka, which is predominantly 

Muslim, but by mostly Christian armed groups commonly referred to as "anti-balaka," which means 

anti-machete. These local groups were activated in reaction to months of ruthless Seleka abuses. 

While these mostly Christian armed groups define their purpose as self-defense against Seleka 

abuses, they have themselves often espoused radical anti-Muslim rhetoric and carried out deadly 

attacks against Muslim civilians. Such attacks have sometimes been carried out in coordination with 

better-armed former army elements that remain loyal to former President Fran<;ois Bozize and seek 

his return to power. 

According to the stories I heard, the anti-balaka groups can be as cruel and abusive as the enemy 

they purport to defend themselves against. 

Massadou Bichefou, an older man with a damaged eye, told me how anti-balaka fighters came to 

his house at 5 a.m. on a day in early September. He is from a Peuhl community, Muslim nomadic 

cattle herders. Some of the fighters were dressed in civilian clothing with primitive weapons, he 

said, while others were in uniform, carrying AK47 rifles. He was able to escape in the dense bush 

but says he saw the aggressors bring each and everyone of his 11 children and grandchildren to a 

man with a knife, who slit their throats, one by one. The youngest was 8 months old. His two wives 

met the same fate. He held his tears as he spelled the name and age of every lost one. Some of the 

attackers, he said, were former neighbors. 

Other Peuhl people described how their village was attacked a month ago, also at 5 a.m., by a 

similar group of anti-balaka who arrived announcing that they wanted to "exterminate all the 

Muslims." They separated the men and older boys from the women and the other children. Seydou 

Hiroyi, who survived, told me that he saw anti-balaka men slit the throat of his 27-year-old brother. 
42


85638d-3.eps

When he and the other men fled in panic, the militiamen opened fire, killing three more people, 

including a 13-year-old boy. 

Seydou and a few other men came back at night. All they found were footprints suggesting the 

women and children had left with the anti-balaka. He is convinced they are all dead. The houses had 

been looted and burned, and the cattle killed, with only the heads of the animals left on the ground. 

Many people we talked to described the conflict in sectarian terms, with Muslims attacking 

Christians, and Christians attacking Muslims. This was something we had never heard before during 

research trips to the Central African Republic. It is particularly worrying in a country where both 

communities have always lived well together, and where the crisis had little to do with religion to 

begin with. But for months, even though they didn't always spare Muslim communities, Seleka 

fighters, who are in overwhelming numbers Muslims, targeted Christian communities with 

particular viciousness, often looting and destroying churches. This did not go over well with the 

large Christian majority in the country. Today, those carrying the guns on both sides and committing 

abuses on defenseless civilians seem eager to exploit religious tensions to their advantage. Though 

they rarely face off, they attack each other's perceived communities with abandon. 

What this could do to the Central African Republic is extremely worrying, but hard to predict. To get 

an idea, we ventured out of the relative safety of Bossangoa to a village called Zere, down the road 

to the east. During the few hours we drove on a dirt road, we never saw another vehicle, nor a 

Seleka fighter. Yet all the villages along the road are deserted. And the few women we encountered 

on the way ran into the bush in fear for their lives at the sound of our vehicle, dropping all their 

belongings on the road. 

Zere is now an eerie ghost town. The cycle of Seleka attacks on Christians, anti-balaka attacks 

against Muslims, followed by Seleka reprisals, have left the town in ruins. The church was charred, 

the Mosque destroyed and the chief of the Muslim neighborhood killed. We counted 300 burned 

houses. The school and health center have been completely looted. We talked to a few men who 

eventually came out of the bush carrying spears, machetes and knives. They live with their families 

a few kilometers back in the jungle. They told us of their children dying of Malaria and their wives 

giving birth under trees. No one is helping these people, mainly because of the lack of security and 

the difficulty reaching them. They told us about the Seleka attacks but claimed to be unaware of 

what had happened to their Muslim neighbors. 

Back in Bangui, I met with the country's interim president, and former Seleka leader, Michel 

Djotodia. He received me not in the Presidential palace, but in a military camp on a hill in Bangui, in 

a blacked-out office with omnipresent security cameras. He was open and claimed that he was 

trying to bring some abusive ex-Seleka commanders under control. But he also tried to downplay 

the abuses Seleka forces have been responsible for, and at times seemed out of touch with the 
43


85638d-4.eps

dangers facing his country. 

I also met with the security minister, Pastor Josue Binoua, formerly loyal to Bozize, the ousted 

president. He told me that he only had 110 weapons for the 4,500 gendarmes and 1,400 policemen 

under his command. 

I sat down with one ofthe former Seleka strongmen, and now head of intelligence, Noureddine 

Adam, who has been accused by Reporters Without Borders, a press freedom organization, of 

threatening journalists. He too downplayed the abuses described in many harrowing details in our 

report. 

I was left with the impression that no one is really at the helm, and that the country could easily 

spin out of control. 

The religious leaders I met at the national level seemed to be the only ones struggling to keep the 

country together. The archbishop of Bangui, Dieudonne Nzapalainga, and Imam Omar Kobine 

Layama are both fully aware of the danger created by sectarian tensions. Both work together to 

condemn, at great risk to their safety, the abuses committed against civilians of all sides. But they 

do not control the men with the guns. 

So what could be done to prevent the country from spiraling into chaos, with untold numbers of 

lives claimed in the process? 

For now, the international community has placed all its chips on an ill-equipped and ill-trained 

African peacekeeping mission of 2,500 troops called MICOPAX, initially deployed as a sub-regional 

force by the Economic Community of Central African States. On December 19, it is supposed to 

transfer its authority to MISCA, an African Union-led force relying on many of the same countries to 

supply troops, with a planned strength of 3,652. 

Without these peacekeepers, the country would probably be in complete anarchy. Only their 

presence brought back a measure of security in Bangui, or, for example, in the displaced camps of 

Bossangoa. 

But they are not up to the task. In Bangui they rarely patrol the streets and supplement their 

income by providing private security to businesses and rich individuals. In Bossangoa they sell beer 

and get pushed around by the Seleka whenever they try to venture outside ofthe town. 

We believe that they should be urgently reinforced by a UN peacekeeping mission of the type that 

has been successfully deployed in Ivory Coast or Liberia. A few thousand professional and wellequipped blue helmets could deploy throughout the country, in places like Bossangoa or Zere. With 
44


85638d-5.eps

a strong mandate to protect civilians, they would keep the armed men in check, and provide 

enough security that people could leave the camps and the bush and come back to their villages. 

They could start rebuilding their houses, cultivating their fields, tend to their cattle, and learn to live 

together again. 

The UN is ready to undertake a peacekeeping mission, with a strong human rights monitoring 

section, and the US could use its seat in the Security Council to help make it happen. There would 

be a cost to the US, but it's a worthy investment. The human rights situation is dire, and yet it could 

get much worse, engulfing the entire region and creating a failed state many armed groups will be 

eager to exploit. A UN peacekeeping mission could help protect civilians and avert the worst, while 

it is still possible. 

In the interim, there are three things the US should do while it actively works to secure a UN 

peacekeeping force. 

First, the US should do more to support the current AU force on the ground - both diplomatically 

and technically - to ensure it is, at a minimum, regularly patrolling the streets and where possible, 

providing some measure of protection for civilians who have nowhere else to turn. Although the US 

has been a vocal supporter of the need for greater civilian protection in the Central African 

Republic, it has not allocated any funds for peacekeeping. 

Second, the US could expand its humanitarian assistance in the Central African Republic. In late 

September, the US provided $11.5 million for refugees who fled to neighboring countries, while in 

response to the dramatically deteriorating humanitarian situation a total of roughly $17 million has 

been allocated for those suffering at the ha nds of Seleka and a nti-Balaka forces, includ ing $8.2 

million in emergency programs and $8.8 million in food assistance in FY 2013. According to the UN, 

half of the population needs help. Although this is one of the worst situations in the world, it's also 

grossly underfunded. 

Finally, the US could sanction those most responsible for human rights abuses, including Seleka 

leaders, with visa bans and asset freezes. It may be unlikely that these individua Is actually have 

assets in the United States or intend to travel here but such a step would nonetheless make an 

important contribution toward accountability. The US could also work with other members of the 

UN Security Council to push for similar global UN sanctions against these individuals, to help raise 

the cost of abuses and seek to interrupt the cycle of violence. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I'm happy to answer your questions. 
45

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bolopion, thank you very much for your recommendations, your work on the ground as well. 

Because I know she does have to leave, I would like to yield to 

my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, for questions. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Following up from each of your comments, I wanted to know, 

since each of you have been there recently, do you see U.S. assistance on the ground? Do you see evidence of it? And what type of 

assistance do you see? And maybe each of you could comment briefly to that. 

Mr. BOLOPION. Maybe I will go first. No, I did not see any U.S. 

assistance, though I was not engaged in delivery of any humanitarian aid, so I wouldn’t take this as a probing sign. 

Mr. JOBBINS. From our end, we are supported by USAID and 

Catholic Relief——

Ms. BASS. You receive funding from——

Mr. JOBBINS. We are supported to respond to the needs of communities in the southeast of the country, which is not this area 

that has been most affected as of yet. We understand that there 

are discussions about additional U.S. assistance to a number of actors in the country, but I don’t know the status of those beyond the 

current programs that we have had since before this current crisis. 

Ms. BASS. Have you had assistance to go into other areas? Do 

you have the capacity to do that? 

Mr. JOBBINS. Yes, we do. And many of the humanitarian organizations on the ground do have the capacity to respond to almost 

every one of these needs. There are health actors, there are food 

security actors, there are peace and conflict resolution organizations. So there is the capacity to respond. It is, at the moment, of 

mobilizing resources and ensuring a modicum of security to begin 

operating. 

Ms. BASS. Bishop? 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. The American Embassy in the Central 

African Republic has closed down long time ago. I would say there 

is no American presence as such in the Central African Republic, 

and the American Government made a statement calling all its citizens to come back to the States or not to travel to the Central African Republic. 

But so far as I know, there is Catholic Relief Services, which is 

present in the Central African Republic working in Bangui, in the 

eastern part of the Central African Republic in the region where 

the LRA are operating. 

In the crisis we are living in Bossangoa since the 8th of September, the first humanitarian assistance we received it was 

through CRS. 

Thank you. 

Ms. BASS. So I want to ask you, in general, the panel, a question—if you can provide options and suggestions for ways in which 

the U.S. Government could best support civil society in the Republic. But then I am not exactly sure to what extent civil society is 

functioning, so maybe you could respond to both accounts. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. To the best of my knowledge, the best 

way of helping the civil society in the Central African Republic, it 

will be through American organizations such as CRS. They have a 

46

foot on the ground. They know the reality. They can help efficiently, monitoring any funds coming from the American Government. 

Mr. JOBBINS. To our perspective, there is certainly a role for civil 

society and for all sorts of actors in responding to the crisis, not 

just the formal civil society human rights groups that have been involved in documenting the abuses and in lobbying against them, 

but also church leaders, media organizations. 

We have seen the work that the bishops have been doing with 

the imams in a number of cities to reduce tensions and begin establishing relationships, and to break down some of those rumors and 

fears. At the same time, there is a need to take that work to scale. 

There are only so many people you can have in a meeting room 

as you sort of talk through these issues. And so what happens is 

the events in Bossangoa, for example, when people hear of that 

elsewhere in the country that creates fear throughout the entire 

country because of the events that are happening there. And the 

good work that is being done isn’t necessarily getting out. 

So when people turn on their radios, they listen to the Radio 

Centrafrique, they listen to the atrocities that are being committed, 

they listen to news or rumors and fear that spread, but there isn’t 

any opportunity for people to carve out another solution. And so 

media can play a key role in promoting that, in both managing rumors and also promoting moderate voices, promoting non-violent 

voices, recognizing that everyone, every Central African, is deeply 

upset by what they are seeing happen to their country. 

But there is this choice that young people have to make. Do you 

join—you know, if you are young and afraid of your own personal 

safety, do you choose to align yourself with an anti-balaka group, 

or align yourself with a different kind of armed group? Or do you 

choose to engage with the people who you are fearing from, so that 

you are developing a way to protect yourself as a community? 

And ultimately that is the choice that everyone has to make, and 

yet it is not something that is being discussed, or it is not something that is being actively supported. And so there is a huge opportunity to support religious groups, but to support human rights 

groups, youth organizations, media organizations, to start having 

that conversation and supporting the people who are making that 

choice, to protect and look out for their community in a way that 

doesn’t necessarily lead the country further down the road to chaos. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. And people need a third alternative, obviously. 

And I know you are talking about international organizations, and 

maybe you are talking about domestic organizations, because I was 

in terms of, what is the capacity on the ground of domestic organizations. And maybe you could follow with both questions. 

Mr. BOLOPION. Yeah. You know, I would say the number one 

issue right now is security. If you are a human rights activist, even 

in Bangui today, if you are a journalist you ought to fear for your 

life. And so that climate makes it very difficult for anyone to operate freely in the country. 

And journalists recently have been interrogated by Noureddine 

Adam, who is the head of intelligence in the country. I spoke with 

the highest-ranking imam in the country, Imam Kobine. He told 

47

me that only a few weeks ago he received death threats from a 

high-ranking person in the government with the rank of minister. 

So as long as you have this kind of climate, and as long as you 

have men with guns doing whatever they please in Bangui and in 

the rest of the country, it will be very hard to allow civil society 

to really flourish. 

Ms. BASS. And when you were describing the religious violence, 

you were describing it on both sides, I believe, Christians to Muslims, Muslims to Christians? 

Mr. BOLOPION. Absolutely. I think the tragedy right now is that 

you have in the country two armed groups, the Seleka who are in 

power, the anti-balaka, mostly Christian militias, and they almost 

never fight each other, or it is very rare. What they do is attack 

civilians, defenseless civilians, with brutality from communities 

they believe are associated with their enemies. 

So the Seleka will attack the Christian population of a village. 

The anti-balaka will retaliate against the Muslim population of the 

same village. The Seleka will come back to punish the Christian 

population for this attack. So both groups, as far as we can tell, are 

using the same brutal and bloody tactics. 

Ms. BASS. And I believe that the three of you had a difference 

in terms of whether or not the U.S. should appoint a special advisor, special envoy. I wanted to know if you could respond to that, 

and then I just have one more question after that, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. BOLOPION. Maybe I will go first, then. It is not a recommendation we have made so far, but I believe any measure that 

would elevate this issue in U.S. foreign policy and bring it higher 

level attention would be beneficial. The Central African Republic 

for a long time has suffered from being ignored. Most people would 

not be able to place it on a map. 

So anything that can start changing that, given the urgency of 

the situation on the ground, would be positive, I believe. 

Mr. JOBBINS. From our end, we do work closely with the special 

advisor, who was here earlier, who is in the State Department. Our 

view from the ground would be as soon as possible to reopen the 

Embassy and to have a full diplomatic presence, to engage in these 

very sensitive questions and to monitor, of course, the assistance 

that hopefully will be provided. 

But at the same time, what we are also asking is for increased 

visibility, increased public statements, increased awareness from 

within Central African Republic, that this is an issue that the U.S. 

is looking—is watching, is caring about. We have seen several 

cases where international lobbying, international concerns, about 

crimes being committed, about the responsibility of certain Seleka 

commanders for committing crimes, has yielded real change on the 

ground in terms of, you know, people being rescinded from various 

posts because of international support, international recognition. 

And so the more that the U.S. publicly engages, it can only have 

positive results for the people in the Central African Republic. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. I don’t believe personally that the 

American Government could make much difference or much change 

in the situation on the ground in the Central African Republic from 

48

Washington. We need to get people on the ground to live the experience the Central African people are going through. 

Also, a delegation from the U.N. security visited Bossangoa. They 

came by plane, spent 6 hours within the city of Bossangoa. Prior 

to their visit, means were taken for their safety, for their protection. Troops were sent in from Bangui, while the people living in 

Bossangoa, they don’t have such security. 

I made that clear to the U.N. assistant in matter of security. If 

you want to have a feel of what the people are living, experiencing, 

don’t stay within the city of Bossangoa. Get out of that city at a 

radius of 25 kilometers. Things will be different from your own perspective. 

So from this office, from our office in Washington, we will be 

talking, but we won’t be feeling what the people are living in the 

Central African Republic. 

Thank you. 

Ms. BASS. And my last question to you, Bishop, the Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary—that is a mouthful—mentioned that 

there was the potential for elections in 2015. And based on everything that we have heard today, how on earth could elections be 

held in 2015? I mean, do you see parties formed? Are there candidates that are trying to garner support? What is your thoughts 

on whether or not the nation would be ready for national elections 

in 2015? 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. I would say it is possible that elections 

might be fairly conducted in 2015, if all the conditions for security 

are guaranteed into the country by sending in MISCA troops or 

whichever troops, but with specific mandate to bring in peace. 

I would like just to give you a testimony from the call I had with 

my vicar general early this morning. At exactly 3:29 a.m., I called 

my vicar general just to have the latest news from Bossangoa. The 

news he gave me was really threatening, because the city of 

Bossangoa, as for now, has been surrounded by the Seleka elements, the increased number in that city. 

So you can’t travel outside of Bossangoa. Bossangoa is, I will say, 

a big open prison. So on one direction the Seleka killed five—they 

came across a group of five young men, killed three, dropped their 

bodies into a river. Two managed to escape and then run to the 

Catholic Church for their lives. On the other direction, they came 

across the anti-balaka militia groups. They fought, there are lots 

of human loss, of death. 

As they returned back to Bossangoa, they surrounded the Catholic mission with the over 35,000 people displaced there, threatening 

to shoot at them. So this night the people in the Catholic Church 

compound didn’t sleep. That was the message I received. 

I called the Minister of Security and Internal Affairs, asking him 

to react, and the response he gave me was a pathetic answer because his life is threatened. He has been accused of plotting against 

Djotodia and his regime, because he is telling him the truth. And 

those surrounding Djotodia don’t want the change. That is where 

we are coming to. They came. They want to stick to the power, and 

they will use all means at their disposal to stick themselves into 

power. 

49

Mr. SMITH. Bishop Nongo, let me ask you, so right now, as you 

testify, the people that you are trying to protect are under siege, 

surrounded by people with weapons. What does MISCA do? Do 

they in any way deploy? What is the response? How many people 

are surrounding the compound? 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. Presently, MISCA is not in existence 

because the decision will be taken hopefully in December. We have 

presently the MICOPAX operating in the Central African Republic, 

but MICOPAX is helpless. 

There are, from my perspective, observers of all the abuses committed on the population, against the population. They are there to 

see that you are killed in a proper way, and then maybe take the 

news abroad. 

We have a group of about 60 or 80 MICOPAX elements based in 

Bossangoa to protect over 35,000 people displaced at the Catholic 

Church. There is an average of 12 or 15 men posted there. There 

are three who are posted at the school where the Muslim displaced 

people are. It is not enough. We want the deployment of a U.N. 

force in that country to better protect the population. 

Mr. SMITH. I know, Mr. Jobbins, you in your testimony talked 

about that prior to MISCA’s deployment—and of course I understand that they are not deployed—that there is a heightened 

sense—I mean, a dangerous situation seems to be even more dangerous, if that is possible, because they are not there, and yet the 

bad guys know that they are coming. 

Would all of you agree that a U.N. force, blue helmets, with a 

Chapter VII mandate, is required in this situation? Otherwise, we 

might see a false hope and expectation that MISCA can bring 

about protection. I mean, those were the Bishop’s comments to my 

staff and I when we met several months ago. 

You know, if we haven’t learned that lesson yet, that you have 

got to have the right force, or else there is a dooming to failure. 

As a matter of fact, I was struck in your testimony, Bishop Nongo, 

when you pointed out that there is a de facto occupation occurring 

in the CAR, a foreign occupation at that. People from the outside 

actually have pretty much invaded your country, and I don’t think 

that is as appreciated as it ought to be. 

So if you could speak, if you all would, to—I mean, I am thinking 

that what this subcommittee will do, at least I will and I am sure 

I will be joined by other members, would be to write to the administration along the lines of the questions that I suggested to the 

Ambassador earlier, that there is nothing to preclude simultaneously working to get this, you know, under U.N. auspices and 

also with a much more serious mandate. And certainly Chapter VII 

mandates are the best. 

Mr. BOLOPION. If I may comment on that, Mr. Chairman. I mean, 

I think there is no question that right now the African troops are 

the only game in town. They are the only ones on the ground, and 

if they were not there the situation would probably be much worse. 

Now, is that enough to face the challenges the country is facing? 

Absolutely not. The Bishop described the numbers of troops in 

Bossangoa. I saw them. I have seen peacekeepers in other countries. They patrol. They have armored vehicles. They have a sort 

50

of aggressive stance, and they are ready to confront anyone who is 

antagonizing civilians. 

This is not the case in Bossangoa. At one point when we were 

leaving the cities for these day trips to see villages around, there 

was a crew of foreign journalists that wanted to come with us with 

an escort from the FOMAC, the African peacekeeping mission 

there. And we didn’t have any escort. We were allowed to go 

through the Seleka checkpoints. The BBC were authorized, but the 

FOMAC patrol was stopped by the Seleka, and they just went back 

to their base. 

So they are not ready to confront the bad guys there. And so 

what to do about it? I think they need to be supported right now, 

and I think the $40 million that could be put to that are probably 

a great thing. 

But you need to start running right now for a U.N. peacekeeping 

mission. Yesterday, the U.N. gave to Security Council members 

very good detailed reports giving options for how the international 

community could help with the situation. And the options ranged 

to very minimal support to MISCA all the way to a full-blown U.N. 

peacekeeping mission of the type that you have in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, in Liberia, in Ivory Coast, for example. 

These will be blue helmets. They would be certainly not the perfect 

solution, but they would be much more professional than what we 

have right now. 

They would have more vehicles, communications, command. They 

would have a civilian component of the mission that could work on 

justice, elections, security, things like that. So the U.N. is ready to 

do it. There is a good report on the table, and I think the U.S. 

should consider it in a very positive light. 

Another offer that the U.N. Secretary-General made is to say, 

‘‘Look, it is a very urgent situation. Things could go really bad. You 

could give us the authorization to redeploy U.N. peacekeepers from 

neighboring countries to intervene in the country if it comes to 

that.’’ I think it is also something that should be looked at very 

carefully. 

Mr. SMITH. Excellent point. Before we go to Mr. Jobbins, you 

know, one of the biggest takeaways from Srebrenica—and I have 

been there for reinterment of some 800 bodies when about 8,000 

Muslims were slaughtered in the course of about a week—was that 

the peacekeepers, they were all about force protection, not civilian 

protection, and we have seen that replicated time and time again. 

And, as you pointed out in that conversation about how the 

peacekeepers were turned away and went back to their barracks, 

I mean, if that doesn’t underscore and illustrate, you know, a deficiency, I don’t know what does. So thank you for that. 

Mr. Jobbins. 

Mr. JOBBINS. From our end, we don’t have any particular insight 

into whether a U.N. or African Union peacekeeping force is the 

most effective. But our position in evaluating the different plans, 

and certainly the ones that were put forward by the U.N. Secretary-General yesterday, the questions that we have to ask ourselves is, the speed of deployment, how can we get the most troops 

on the ground fast with the mandate that they require? 

51

Those, as far as we are concerned, are the only criteria. And 

which international administrative body it falls under is less important than the speed, the numbers, and the mandate that they 

have, and the degree of mobility. 

What is important to understand is that we have a very tragic 

situation in Bossangoa. We have dozens of other cities where there 

are almost as tense situations, and so the peacekeeping force needs 

to have the mandate and the troop strength to be able to cover a 

very large space the size of Texas that is sparsely populated and 

where, because of the climate of fear, conflict and tensions can 

erupt relatively quickly in a number of different places. And so mobility and geographical coverage is important. 

Mr. SMITH. Are the troops contemplated under MISCA adequate? 

Mr. JOBBINS. The troops contemplated under MISCA, I believe 

under the latest, it is 3,600 who are authorized, and they are looking at potentially going up to 9,000. In terms of the numbers, I am 

not a military planner, but they certainly need quite a lot. 

And the only other component that we would add that hasn’t 

been mentioned yet by my co-panelists, but I hope they would 

agree with us is also the support to BINUCA, which is the political 

arm, which was also recognized in Security Council Resolution 

2121, and the need for sustained U.N. political engagement on 

human rights issues, but also if we want to see elections, we want 

to see these things, there needs to already be an international political accompaniment as well as the security accompaniment. 

Mr. SMITH. Bishop. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. Mr. Mueller, in his report, after the 

visit he made to the Central African Republic, made that statement, that the 3,600 men from the MISCA is far below what is 

needed on the ground. So there is a need to increase that number 

to 9,000 to 10,000 men, I would say. And the composition of the 

Council members should be also looked into. 

From the perspective of the Central African people, the contribution of Chad, as stated in the crisis in the Central African Republic, has not been clear because Chad has been in a way 

instrumentalizing the crisis in the Central African Republic for its 

personal benefit. 

On the economic side, in the northern part of the Central African 

Republic, Chad has drilled its oil. They have two wells. One of the 

two wells is on the Central African Republic soil. So you do understand that the continuous crisis in the Central African Republic, 

the insecurity, will help Chad to continue exploiting our natural resources without anybody looking at it. 

We have this long troubled relationship with Chad as far as cattle herders and farmers are concerned. Chad is desert country. 

They need grass for their cattle. And according to international 

law, there is a tract made for the cattle herders, but they are not 

respecting this tract. They take their cattle into farmer’s field, destroying the crops and everything. That has been, for the past 

years, source of tension between farmers from the Central African 

Republic and cattle herders from Chad. 

So those cattle herders come with rifles, guns. They shoot at the 

farmers, burn down their houses, and the creation of the antibalaka groups, it is not just a new event, because the anti-balaka 

52

groups did form since the ’90s to fight the armed marauders, and 

then they are then fighting these cattle herders coming from Chad, 

destroying their crops, their villages, their houses. 

Now they are fighting to protect what they call their right. So 

we need to look into that. The international community maybe 

should help the Central African Republic to sort things out with 

Chad. 

Mr. SMITH. Bishop, thank you. I will put my remaining questions 

on temporary hold, because we have the privilege of being joined 

by the chairman of the full committee, Congressman or Chairman 

Ed Royce. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chairman. 

One of the concerns that many of us had with respect to the activities of the Janjaweed when they were participating in ethnic 

cleansing, which they still are, in Sudan, was the spillover effect 

that that would have in the region. And what we have seen are the 

same tactics of the Janjaweed. Indeed, probably 85 percent, 90 percent of this force, is not indigenous to Central African Republic. It 

is coming in from Sudan. It is coming in from Chad. 

And these foreign fighters have learned a particular method of 

operation. And what we see them doing in towns across the Central 

African Republic is committing the same types of looting, of rapes, 

of torture as well here. By the way, and their focus on going after 

the Catholic Church, which at this point is probably the only real 

institution functioning in the country, and functioning on the 

standpoint of not just the school systems that they deal with but 

also in terms of the social welfare network, in targeting a country 

which is 85 percent Christian and 12 percent Muslim, the other 

danger here is that they are going to ignite, as you are discussing, 

the sectarian conflict. 

And just as this has expanded, you are going to have a continued 

arithmetic increase in the struggles between Christians—animus—

Muslims, because, as the Bishop has explained, one of the consequences of this is if you are taking cattle that you have herded 

and you are turning it over later to a local Muslim cattle herder, 

then the tensions are going to be expanded to the ethnic tensions 

within that local community. 

And the real danger here is that this is a country the size of 

Texas that is engulfed now. But we are seeing this MO, you know, 

deployed across North Africa. And the reason we are supportive of 

action being taken is in order to try to arrest this, we met with 

Samantha Power, our new Ambassador to the U.N., had a meeting 

with her and the committee last week, and this was the foremost 

issue she wanted to talk about, which is indicative of how destructive this is going to be in terms of the African continent. 

I think the other aspect of this I would like to ask you about, and 

I will just expand this into our ongoing effort after 17 years, or 

whatever it has been, we finally had a pretty good operation going 

against Joseph Kony under legislation that we wrote. And that 

focus was on running Kony down, and he was in the southeast area 

of the Central African Republic. And all of that seemingly has been 

put on hold as we deal with the bigger disaster, allowing him, theoretically, to regroup, you know, to resupply. 

53

Again, it has been problematic in the past that the Sudanese 

Government has supplied him. I don’t know that they would continue to do that. But their tolerance of the activities of the 

Janjaweed, and their encouragement of it, has helped put us in this 

crisis today. So just some observations on those two points, if you 

would, and thank our panelists again. 

And, Chairman, I thank you and Karen Bass for your engagement in this. And, by the way, Mr. Marino has been very involved 

as well, and I really think it is going to take members’ engagement 

here in order to push up, you know, the focus on the Central African Republic and on the need to get the support there, both in 

terms of what we do for relief but also in terms of MISCA’s efforts. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. JOBBINS. Thank you, Chairman Royce, and thank you for all 

of the work that the entire committee has been doing to bring attention to this issue. On the first question of the influx of this 

movement and of Seleka inflaming wider religious tensions, it is 

certainly a trend that we have seen and one that we are very fearful will continue to increase. 

The pattern in several places, including in Bangassou and 

Yaloke, we have seen that when Seleka units or Seleka groups felt 

under attack that they sought to actively rally the local Muslim 

community to their cause. Many of these communities are ethnic 

pulled, many of them are not, from the same backgrounds of the 

Seleka forces. 

But we see them trying to forge these alliances or trying to establish a local support base, because many of them come from far 

afield, they are looking to establish roots in the country and reaching out and involving Muslim communities to do so, which is triggering the back and forth reprisal attacks that we have heard of 

and that Bishop Nongo illustrated so well. 

So that is a worrying trend. It is one that may continue as the 

movement continues to fracture. We have seen fighting now between Seleka groups. And as this sort of mixed group tries to devise, and continues to try and set down roots, we see risks of further attempts to mobilize civilians. 

On the question of the fight against the LRA and Joseph Kony, 

it is true that up until this most recent violence that there had 

been a lot of significant progress in reducing the operational space 

and encouraging defections, and that was set back by this instability. It seems as though efforts are ramping up again, but it is 

true that there was a moment of pause in which the LRA was able 

to regroup. 

And we are quite afraid that as the dry season sets in, there is 

going to be increasing trade between the remote areas that are historically targeted. And so as traders move back and forth between 

these cities that haven’t been resupplied, first because of the fighting and then because of the rainy season, as people have to start 

getting food, have to start getting supplies out to these remote 

areas, those are new targets and new opportunities for the LRA 

and other armed groups to prey upon. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. I, again, thank the panelists, and 

I yield back. I know Mr. Marino has been waiting, and I also want 

to thank him for allowing me to go out of sequence. 

54

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. One of the wonders of this committee, really of Congress, is that there are so many people of extraordinary talent. 

Well, Mr. Marino used to be the U.S. Attorney in Pennsylvania, so 

has a wealth of law enforcement knowledge, and was a very effective U.S. Attorney. He is a member of our subcommittee, and I 

yield to him such time as he may consume. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome, and I apologize for being a little late. I am 

doing the traditional marathon here today, because of three committees simultaneously having hearings. 

But I have a constituent in my district, in the 10th District of 

Pennsylvania. It is the north-central northeast. Actually, it is the 

largest district in the state. I have 15 of the 67 countries. So it is 

a very large geographical area. 

And Jon Cassel has been working in the Central African Republic for a number of years with the Christian Broadcasting Network. 

And Jon has—he has an ambivalence concerning Chad, fighters 

from Chad going into the Central African Republic and choosing 

sides. 

What is the U.S. doing to address Chad’s role in the Central African Republic? And on top of that, what is the international community doing as well? So, Mr. Bolopion? 

Mr. BOLOPION. Thank you, sir. We hear a lot of things, too, about 

the involvement of Chad in what is happening in the Central African Republic. We have not done extensive research on that. We do 

not know who is pulling the strings and who is playing what games 

exactly in the country. Frankly, it is very hard to follow because 

at times alliances are made very quickly, as fast as they are being 

rescinded, so it is a very complex situation. 

I would say that Chad will soon join the U.N. Security Council. 

Starting on January 1, they will sit around the table there with the 

U.S., and they will have a major say in decisions the U.N. Security 

Council will take about the situation in the Central African Republic, including for the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, 

if it comes to that. 

So I think your question is extremely relevant, and I believe that 

the presence of Chad around the table will provide the U.S. Government with ample opportunities to ask tough questions to the 

Chadian diplomats there. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MARINO. I am going to shift gears here a little bit, and then 

if you gentlemen would like to respond to any of the questions 

when I get through these. I only have 5 minutes. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

It has been brought to my attention—and I would like to know 

if you can verify this for me, any one of you could verify this for 

me—the USAID has been reluctant to work with religious-based 

organizations throughout the world, which is especially harmful in 

the Central African Republic. 

As the chairman keenly alluded to, the Catholic Church is probably one of the last humanitarian organizations still functioning in 

the Central African Republic. Is that the case? Are any of you finding out that USAID is reluctant to work with the Catholic Church? 

55

Bishop, this sounds like this is right in your area. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. I don’t really know the policy governing 

the way the American Government is working, and then disbursing 

its help or assistance, humanitarian assistance, to which organizations, I can’t really see, because I haven’t been working with the 

American Government, neither benefitting from any assistance 

from them. 

But the only thing I know is when the crisis really broke up in 

Bossangoa, the first emergency assistance we received it was 

through CRS, which is a faith-based organization, an American 

faith-based organization. Where do they get their money? I guess 

from the American Government. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. I want to make——

Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield on that? 

Mr. MARINO. Yes, please. 

Mr. SMITH. In part, but in large part, very often it is raised 

through other sources as well. So I did ask the Ambassador when 

he testified, Ambassador Jackson, if he could give us a full accounting as to how much money has been let to faith-based organizations. And I pointed out my deep disappointment, having just returned from Nigeria, when I discovered, really to my shock, that 

despite having ample capability and capacity the church was largely overlooked, and just 9 percent of our PEPFAR money and health 

dollars were going to faith-based organizations. And I am talking 

about mostly indigenous, on-the-ground infrastructure and capacity 

that was being overlooked. 

Mr. MARINO. And thank you for bringing that point up, because 

Jon, my constituent who spends a lot of time there, you know, 

brought this to my attention. And we need to do more work, Chairman, to see that funds are, how can we say it, fairly disbursed, because the Catholic organization and my mother—I hope she is listening, because I am a Roman Catholic, and my mother wanted me 

to be a priest, and it just didn’t work out that way. So she would 

be proud of me right now, I am hoping. But we will work hard in 

that direction. 

Either Mr. Jobbins or Mr. Bolopion, do you have an opinion on 

that that you would like to make? 

Mr. JOBBINS. What I can say, we work—we are not a faith-based 

organization, but we work very closely with Catholic Relief Services 

in the southeast of the Central African Republic, and that is supported by USAID. In terms of how much they are supporting in the 

rest of the country, I am not sure, but what I can certainly say is 

echo the sentiments that you have said and that the religious leaders do have a huge capacity to respond to the crisis, both religious 

media, religious clerics, and other sort of faith-linked organizations, 

both on the Christian as well as on the Muslim side, to respond to 

the crisis in the CAR. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. 

Mr. BOLOPION. We have no expertise in this question. 

Mr. MARINO. What do we do, then? What more can we do, aside 

from funding? How do we get the best bang for our buck? And what 

changes, if either—any one of you gentlemen could instantly make 

a change, where would it be, the change, and how would you do 

it? So if you each would respond to that, please. 

56

Mr. BOLOPION. If I may, it may be on how to get the best bang 

for the buck. I am convinced that that would be by supporting a 

U.N. peacekeeping mission. I am convinced that in a place like 

Bossangoa, a few well-equipped, well-trained professional U.N. 

peacekeepers would go a long way. 

We are not in a country where you are facing a real military 

threat. I described the Seleka men in Bossangoa. They go around 

in flipflops. The anti-balaka are often people carrying knives and 

spears. So you are not confronting on either side well-organized, 

well-equipped military groups. A few U.N. peacekeepers in 

Bossangoa and you could have 40,000 people go back to their 

houses, go back to their fields, the humanitarian crisis would be 

averted. 

So I think it is the most cost-effective way for the U.S. to invest 

in this crisis. 

Mr. JOBBINS. From our end, I think the two things to guarantee 

bang for the buck, the first is that a stitch in time saves nine, and 

that we are seeing—the failure to act today is going to lead to a 

much worse situation tomorrow, both in terms of funding and in 

terms of lives lost. 

We are at a point where there are, in Bossangoa and other 

places, have already been tragedies, but in much of the country 

there have been tensions, there have been signs of danger, signs 

of tragedy, that haven’t happened yet. And so now is an opportunity to respond quickly to keep that from coming into place. 

And the second, of course, is to build on the capacity that is in 

place, there are humanitarian organizations. There is 28 national/

international aid agencies who are working there. There are 

churches; there are networks in place. They can be mobilized quickly. And so there is an opportunity to respond fairly effectively and 

quickly. 

And then, in terms of the question of the one thing that would 

change, we would say that alongside the support to an international peacekeeping mission is to support community non-violence actions, supporting churches, supporting media, supporting 

things that can begin shifting this tide, using the capacities and 

the initiatives and the energies that already exist among hundreds 

of organizations across the Central African Republic. 

Mr. MARINO. Bishop, please. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. I will just make three small points. 

First, peace—building peace; second, humanitarian assistance; and, 

third, security by supporting MISCA. 

Mr. MARINO. Are there individuals—or I am seeing that there 

are individuals, but maybe you have a different twist on this, gentlemen, that need to be arrested and criminally prosecuted? 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. Well, from experience, and then coming 

across people on the ground, I will say we may produce a list of 

people who have been involved in the human atrocities and others. 

But human rights organizations have done a good job on that. I 

think they might help us. 

Mr. BOLOPION. Thank you, Bishop. Yes, absolutely, and large 

numbers. The type of crimes that have been committed in the country since March are simply horrendous. Scores of people have been 

killed. 

57

I described the way armed groups have slit the throats of children, so there should be a lot of people right now who should be 

prosecuted for these crimes, all the way up the chain, if that chain 

can be reconstituted. It is not happening for a very simple reason; 

it is that the men in power, which in some cases condone the 

abuses, are also controlling now the justice system, which is completely broken down. 

So the only way you will bring back some measure of accountability could be through the International Criminal Court, which is 

closely observing the situation in the country and could decide at 

some point to start investigations. There could be, through the 

U.N. Security Council, for example, the creation of a Commission 

of Inquiry, which could start documenting these abuses and start 

looking at how we can hold these people accountable. 

And as I said earlier, one thing the U.S. Government can do 

right now is when they have sufficient information, and the information is out there against some of these individuals who are responsible for these crimes, to sanction them and ask the U.N. to 

do the very same thing. 

If some of these people in power right now cannot travel abroad 

anymore, cannot have bank accounts in other countries, cannot engage in business, for example, profiting from the natural resources 

they have access to right now, that will be a game-changer for 

them. So I think it is a very simple, very little cost measure that 

the U.S. could take that would really help. 

Mr. MARINO. And if the chairman would just allow me one other 

question. I know that the United Nations has the wherewithal, it 

has the money, it has the people there that could do just exactly 

what you described, but do you think the U.N. actually has the desire to do this in Central African Republic? 

Mr. BOLOPION. If we talk about the U.N. Secretary-General, the 

answer is yes. The U.N. Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, gave a 

report to the U.N. Security Council yesterday. This was the result 

of a mission that was on the ground for 2 weeks. The Bishop described talking to some members of the mission. I did as well. They 

were there to evaluate what the best options were. 

When you read their report, I believe it is pretty clear that they 

think the best option would be a U.N. peacekeeping mission that 

would take over the African Union peacekeeping mission as quickly 

as possible. They know how to do this. They have done it in many 

countries. It is not always a perfect solution. We all have in mind 

very well-known failures of blue helmets in the past. 

But personally, coming back from the country, having seen on 

the ground what the African Union mission looks like, I have very 

little confidence that they will be able to face the challenges ahead, 

including the possibility of further mass atrocities in the country. 

So are they ready to do it? Yes, they are. All they need is a green 

light from the U.N. Security Council, and the U.S. could make that 

happen tomorrow. 

Mr. MARINO. Thanks. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. I will say everybody knows exactly 

what to do. A lot of reports have been produced about it. But up 

to now, I don’t know why but no action is being taken. I think it 

is time you stop talking and then you start acting. 

58

Mr. MARINO. I agree. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Thank 

you for your service. 

And, Chairman, thank you for allowing me the extra time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. And, Mr. Marino, I would ask for your 

help on this as well. You know, it is my understanding that the 

Catholic Relief Services’ work in northeast CAR is completely and 

totally privately funded, only the work in the southeast with regards to the LRA is not, and then it is only in part supported by 

USAID. 

And one of the things we asked Ambassador Jackson earlier, I 

asked him, I think we need to do a better job in getting the money 

where its utilization can immediately be felt by people who are suffering hunger and medical needs. 

I mean, Bishop Nongo, you are caring for 35,00 people. How are 

you doing it? I am sure the camps would be much nicer if you had 

the capability and the wherewithal, and USAID has that. And so 

part of the reason for this hearing as well was to try to say, ‘‘Get 

the money to those individual groups that can really have an impact on the ground.’’ And certainly the faith community has that 

capacity, and it is not being utilized. 

Mr. Jobbins, would you want to——

Mr. JOBBINS. Just to send that spirit that there is a whole number of groups that can use money and can use it well to both respond to the emerging humanitarian needs, and also to prevent 

this cycle of violence, because there are people who are unhappy, 

there are people who can do things about it. It is about making 

sure that they have a voice and have an opportunity to start mobilizing alternatives to this kind of violence that we are seeing. 

Mr. SMITH. In your statement, Mr. Jobbins, your final bottom 

line was this is a critical moment for the U.S. Government to engage proactively and decisively to protect civilians and prevent current threats from evolving into large scale atrocities in Central African Republic. Are we? I mean, are we really seizing the moment, 

or is it still something that awaits action? 

Mr. JOBBINS. We have been very pleased to see the attention that 

is beginning to be paid to this situation. It is something, of course, 

we wished that there had been more attention earlier, but we are 

very pleased through efforts like this hearing, through some of the 

meetings that are going on at State and USAID to begin bringing 

a response. But the speed that is needed is something that we can’t 

underestimate. It is something that we need to move. The situation 

gets worse every single day, and we need to move quickly. 

Mr. SMITH. You said, Mr. Jobbins, in your testimony there are 

persistent rumors, though no confirmation, of attempts by Seleka 

groups to form alliances with groups from North Africa and the 

Middle East. Could you elaborate that? Are we talking about alQaeda, Boko Haram, al Shabaab? Of course, that is, in Somalia. 

And where does Seleka get its arms from? Have any of those arms 

been traced to Libya and the fall of Ghadafi? 

Mr. JOBBINS. From my end, I can say what I said in my testimony, which is that there are persistent rumors. There are rumors 

of all sorts, including the rumors of weapons from Libya and other 

places abroad. What I need to emphasize is, of course, they are rumors, but they are widespread and it has been since the beginning 

59

of Seleka that there have been these kinds of rumors. And every 

group that you have named has been rumored to be attached to 

Seleka one way or another. 

What we can say is that as Seleka’s internal coherency weakens, 

as we see them feeling under military threat, and reaching out and 

mobilizing local, trying to mobilize local divisions to build a support 

base in-country, it is fair to imagine that they are trying to use this 

narrative of religious conflict, or that they would have this opportunity to use this narrative of religious conflict to mobilize support 

outside of the country as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Bishop. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. I would like to add to this answer. The 

borders with Chad and Sudan are a porous border. Anybody can 

come in and out of the country as he or she wishes, when it wishes, 

and there is no control. From some information, there are arms 

manufacturers in Sudan, AK arms in Sudan, and then people easily get arms in that area. 

So it is possible that these militias, either from Chad or either 

from Sudan, get their arms from Sudan into the Central African 

Republic. The fact is, the Central African Army didn’t fight the 

Seleka. They kept on running. As running, most of the arms are 

located to them for the protection of the civilians. They left it behind, and then the Seleka, as they moved, they picked whatever 

was left behind by the Army. 

And we have some arms bought by the oustered President, kept 

in his own village of Benzambe, in various places in Bangui. Those 

arms were not used, and then the Seleka easily got access to those 

arms. That is what they are using. 

Mr. BOLOPION. And I would just say we don’t have any conclusive evidence on the issues you mention. I would say, as the U.S. 

weighs its options in the region, that many of the groups you mention are often attracted to countries that are lawless, and where 

they can operate freely, and the Central African Republic is definitely becoming one of these countries. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bolopion, you made I think a very constructive 

recommendation that we single out individuals and make it harder 

for them to travel, to, you know, isolate them. I would note parenthetically in 2004 I authored the Belarus Democracy Act, which, 

among its many other provisions, created a visa ban on 

Lukashenko and many of his henchmen. 

And to our pleasant surprise, my pleasant surprise, the Europeans followed suit, and we pretty much have the same list of people who commit human rights atrocities who then can’t travel to 

Europe or to the United States. 

With regards to CAR, have our Government or the Europeans’ or 

anyone done anything yet along these lines? Would it be hard to 

compile a list of individuals that should be so sanctioned? And it 

wouldn’t just be visa bans. It would be, you know, trying to do, in 

a parallel way, what we do with foreign terrorist organizations. We 

go after their sources of funding, make it harder for them to do 

business, if you will. Your thoughts on that? 

Mr. BOLOPION. Mr. Chairman, I think it is really something to 

look into in more detail. I don’t believe any of these individuals 

have been put under sanction in any country right now. These 

60

sanctions are most effective when they are taken at the level of the 

U.N. Security Council, because certainly these individuals not only 

cannot travel or have bank accounts in the U.S., but they cannot 

travel or have bank accounts in any other countries. 

And so some of the Seleka leaders have family or businesses in 

Chad, in Sudan, in Gulf countries, in places like that. So they have 

interests in foreign places. The reason why, talking to diplomats, 

I believe these type of sanctions have not been adopted yet is the 

lack of information that governments regret when it comes to the 

situation. 

I believe that there is a lot of information out there now. We certainly have allowed—many of the individuals committing crimes 

are not even hiding very well. So if there is the political will to go 

after them, I think it can easily be done, and I believe that to be 

effective it should be done at the U.S. level, as well as the U.N. 

level. And the U.S. mission in New York can show leadership on 

this issue if it decides to. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Jobbins. 

Mr. JOBBINS. I think the only thing that I would add to that—

I think that is something we all agree with—is also just to recognize the dissuasive power, not just of accountability but of communicating about accountability and making sure—just the notion 

that there is an attention to the commission of war crimes and 

other kinds of mechanisms, has a positive effect in dissuading future events. 

And we have seen individual Seleka commanders be transferred 

because of outrage at some of the crimes that they have committed, 

and so we—you know, some messaging that accompanies that is 

something that would be very welcome. 

Mr. SMITH. You know, because the NSA is probably reading my 

emails and yours, it does seem to be a matter of prioritization and 

taking that initiative to do it. We will follow up on that, and I 

thank you for that recommendation. 

You know, you also made a recommendation that the ICC look 

into what is going on in the CAR. I recently chaired a hearing and 

wrote an op-ed for The Washington Post on Syria and the fact, in 

my opinion, that a regional or ad hoc tribunal might be far superior 

because of the focus, the buy-in from the local individuals. 

And we had David Crane, the Chief Prosecutor for the Special 

Court for Sierra Leone, testify, and he is part of an accountability 

project vis-a`-vis Syria right now, gathering information about 

atrocities, who, what, where, why—we know the why—and when. 

And, you know, the hope is that something like that can be set up. 

Parenthetically, my concern with the ICC has been, and it certainly has a role to play, but they have had 18 indictments and one 

conviction, somebody from the DR Congo, who has been convicted 

and they are looking at three individuals with Boko Haram right 

now. 

So your thoughts perhaps on a justice mechanism that might be 

different in the ICC. You know, they could do it, but I think they 

will go for one or two people, if that, and leave out the dozens that 

might also be, you know, held to account for their atrocities. 

Mr. BOLOPION. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This was not exactly 

a recommendation. The ICC has already declared that they were 

61

actively looking into the situation, so they are aware of it. We believe that they will be the appropriate place to judge people who 

are most responsible for the horrendous crimes that have been created there. 

Now, you are exactly right that this will not be enough. They will 

not go after the lower-level commanders on the ground who are involved in some of these crimes. The types of mechanisms that we 

will require will have to be part of the discussion, and, frankly, 

could be part of what a U.N. peacekeeping mission would look like. 

We have to keep in mind that whenever a U.N. peacekeeping 

mission deploys in the country it doesn’t come with just military; 

it comes with a lot of civilians who are doing exactly this type of 

work and are trained to help people rebuild the justice system, try 

to make sure that minimum standards are in place. When people 

are arrested and charged, they can look into truth and reconciliation commissions, alongside this type of thing. 

So we are just at the very beginning, but these are important 

questions that will need to be addressed. 

Mr. SMITH. Bishop. Thank you. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. In the advocacy mission, that the Central African civil society made to U.N. in the month of September, 

here in Washington in the month of September, one of the points 

we stressed, it was to fight against impunity. There are what my 

colleague used to say—the big fish can be looked after by the international penal court, and then they have to set up at the national 

level the judicial systems, which might take into consideration all 

those who have committed any abuses of any kind. 

The BINUCA has received a political mandate with particular regard to justice, impunity, abuses. I hope they will get the necessary 

funding and the adequate personnel to look into this matter. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Jobbins, you mentioned on point three of your 

four points, humanitarian response. There is a tremendous humanitarian need, and you point out that, as I noted before, the human 

and operational capacity exists in-country to begin meeting those 

needs, but there are significant funding shortfalls in order to respond. 

Perhaps all three of you—and, Bishop, if you wouldn’t mind providing us as detailed as possible an assessment of what those needs 

are, with as close to a price tag as you can put together, so we can 

advocate for—this subcommittee certainly has jurisdiction, and I 

can tell you that both myself and the ranking member want to ensure that—and the rest of the committee that those needs are 

being met. 

I think it is appalling that 35,000 people that you take care of, 

and we are not helping—we are giving verbal support, but we are 

not giving tangible support. So in as precise a fashion as you can, 

to detail the needs, and the unmet need especially, so we can, as 

best we can, admonish and maybe even legislate, particularly 

through the appropriations process, sufficient funding to meet that 

need. 

So if you could make that available to us, all three of you, I 

would say it would be very, very helpful. 

Yes. 

62

Mr. BOLOPION. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say it is hard 

to put a price tag on it. I would say the new number one is for security. Humanitarian aid will not be delivered in the kind of villages we went to unless the roads are secured, for example. The 

civil society will not flourish. Many things will not happen as long 

as we have a few men with guns running entire areas. 

Now, this of course has a price, and a U.N. peacekeeping mission 

has a price. I believe it would be a good investment. The solution 

of supporting an African Union mission would be probably a bit 

less costly in the short term, but I believe that in the longer term, 

if the country descends into chaos, it will have been a mistake to 

make that decision based on cost only. 

On the humanitarian situation, all I can tell you is that according to the U.N. this is one of the worst humanitarian crises, and 

it is also one of the most underfunded. So the needs are huge, and 

governments are not contributing enough. 

Finally, the Bishop pointed to something very important. 

BINUCA, the U.N. office there where I went to in Bangui, they 

were given with Resolution 2121 a very strong mandate, including 

to do human rights monitoring, exactly the type of things we do, 

but we are not there all the time, we go to a new few places. 

The abuses that I described are horrendous, but we see only a 

very small window into what is really happening in the full country. The U.N. should have human rights monitors deployed 

throughout. They have a mandate to do that but not the resources 

yet. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. JOBBINS. From my end, I can—there are some numbers and 

some estimations that have been done by the U.N. Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that brought together the 

different NGOs who are working and can give a full scientific estimate. 

But from all of my conversations with our peers in the humanitarian community around town, our sense is that by far the medical supplies, food assistance, shelter, and support for IDPs, displaced people, are the three or four sorts of emergency life-saving 

assistance that are needed right away, and that there are many expert groups around town. And so I would defer to their assistance 

in compiling those numbers. I can send it along to you later. 

And alongside that, of course, on the humanitarian side is the 

need to prevent violence and prevent further violence and integrate 

that into all of the work that we do. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. The list might be long, very long, because presently most of the villages have been burned down. So the 

displaced people need to start new lives, build new houses, get furniture, the basic elements they need to start their lives. Their crops 

have been completely destroyed, so they have to start fresh. Where 

to get the crops, the seeds, that is another question. It will need 

some funding. 

On health care, on education, the administration has been completely destroyed, so if we want the country to start, we have to 

redeploy the administration to rebuild the country. So we will deploy the civil servants, the judiciary members, and all that. We 

63

have to look at the offices. In that regard, the government will need 

some financial help. 

The most important above all is the security, because you can’t 

do any of that without security, and we can work with CRS to get 

you details of assistance. We are already working on needs. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. And I look forward to working with all 

of you to get those detailed responses. 

Without objection, a fact sheet by the United States Commission 

on International Religious Freedom entitled ‘‘Increasing Sectarianism and Violence in the Central African Republic’’ will be 

made a part of the record. And a letter from Chairman Royce to 

Secretary of State John Kerry dated November 7 will also be made 

a part of the record. 

And I do have one final question, and that would be, you know, 

you point out, Bishop, that another important factor in this conflict 

is the presence of gold and diamonds, and the CAR Seleka militia 

groups are already in control of gold and diamond mining areas. 

And I am wondering, because that can be a source of unbelievably tremendous subsidization for these terrible activities, is the 

international community responding to that? Has another blood 

diamonds situation emerged? And how effective are any of us being 

in focusing on that? 

As we have done in the past, and there are mechanisms in place 

now, are they being utilized to ensure that none of those diamonds 

and none of that gold that is extracted by these killers, these terrorists, gets into New York, London, or anywhere else in the world? 

Mr. BOLOPION. If I may on that, Mr. Chairman, we have not 

done any research on the exploitation of natural resources in the 

country. I think it is a great thing to look at. 

Just a little anecdote from my trip there, I met with the security 

minister when I was in Bangui, Pastor Josue Binoua, who used to 

be a minister under the government of former President Bozize. He 

is in charge of the military and the police. He has 6,000 men under 

his control. By the way, only 110 weapons he told me. 

But while I was with him, he was receiving a lot of phone calls 

on his cell phones trying to manage different crises. One of them 

he explained to me was that some, what he called Chinese businessmen, had just been arrested by his men at the airport trying 

to smuggle, out of the country, large quantities of gold. 

And they were caught, arrested, and he was receiving phone calls 

from another minister from the Seleka, from the government, 

whom he did not name, but whom he said was threatening him, 

telling him, ‘‘You need to release these guys, they are working with 

me. If you don’t release them, you will find me on your way.’’ So 

I think that tells you a lot about these dynamics. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I ask you on that, is there any evidence, as we 

saw with Bashir in Khartoum, of Chinese complicity with the terrorists? 

Mr. BOLOPION. I have absolutely no basis to say that the Chinese 

Government——

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Is anybody looking, do you know? 

Mr. BOLOPION [continuing]. Would be involved in this in any 

way. 

64

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. To the best of my knowledge, I would 

say that the Chinese presence in the Central African Republic is 

not on side of any rebel groups. They are there for their own business. And what has brought them to the Central African Republic, 

it is the mineral resources the country is having. 

And just to give another anecdote like the first speaker has just 

given, it is at the airport, the police officer in charge came across 

someone who was probably carrying a huge amount of money in a 

European currency. It was far beyond what is allowed. And then 

he just made that clear to the passenger, he won’t allow him to go 

across with his police formality. 

That man picked his phone, talked to someone who happened to 

be the President. He passed on the phone to that police officer who 

refused to take it. A few minutes later on, the President presented 

himself at the airport, and then blaming that police officer who was 

just doing his job. 

So that is where we are standing. The politicians are using all 

the means just to enrich themselves at the expense of the country. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Is there anything else any of you would 

like to add before we conclude today’s hearing? 

Mr. BOLOPION. Just to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing 

this discussion. It is really heartening to hear this country being 

discussed in the U.S. Congress. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. JOBBINS. I would just add my voice as well to thank you all 

for your attention. 

Bishop NONGO-AZIAGBIA. Thank you for this opportunity. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you for your extraordinary leadership, the insights you provided us, and look forward to working with you going 

forward. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(65)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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85638n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations 

Christopher H, Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

November 19, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Atiica, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live 

on the Committee website at }v"wJorei"na!IillI§J:1J2l-~dill\J: 

DATE: 

TiME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, November 19, 2013 

1000 a.m 

Crisis in the Central African Republic 

Panell 

The Honorable Robert P Jackson 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of African Atfairs 

US. Department of State 

Panel IT 

The Most Reverend Nestor-Desire Nongo-Aziagbia 

Roman Catholic Bishop of Boss an goa, Central African Republic 

Me. Mike lobbins 

Senior PrOb'Tamme Manager, Africa 

Search for Common Ground 

Me. Philippe Bolopion 

United Nations Director 

Human Rights Watch 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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85638m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

M IN UTES OF SU ~COMM rrrEH ON A/ric-a, Glf1/H71 Heal,,/, G/oba/llll1/UIII Rlghl~J (IIulIlliemllliomrlOlgatlit.uliolls HEARING 

l)ay_~7:,-,l",le"''''-"d"aIL' __ I) ale N(}l'elllhel'19.2013 \{oom 2172 Ravburn Hon 

Starting Time 10·00 a m Ending Time, 12.~3.:i~ 

Recesses [0] ( __ to __ )( __ 10 ~ ( __ to __ ) L-to __ ) L-l0 __ )( __ to __ ) 

P"esiding Mem lIe,'(s) 

Rep. Chris SmUIr 

Check all ,,[llle/ollow/I1K Illal app(J': 

Opcn Session IZl Executive (closed) Session D Televised IZl 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

CJ'isls III the Cel/fml Aji"iclIIl Republic 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Record~t"ped) IZl 

Stenographic Recol'd [Z] 

Rep. Meadows, Rep. Marilla, Rep. Bass, Rep. Cicillille 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with (III • if the)' are nut melllbe,'s of filii commillee.) 

Rep. Ro)'ce 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached'i Yes [J No 0 

(If "no ", please lisl below and inc/ude lille. agel/c)', depar/mellf, 0/' orga/llzmion) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Lis/ any statements submiffedfor Ihe record.) 

Factsheet fi'Ollllhe US Commissioll Oil Illtemational Religious Freedom 

Lellerfi'olll Rep, Royce to Sec. 1(eJ'f), 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE 

0" 

TIME ADJOURNED 12,33 p.m. 
68

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


85638e-1.eps
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85638e-2.eps

National Assembly would be dissolved and replaced with newly elected representatives within 

12 months. 

Bozize failed to implement the Libreville Agreement, which led the S6leIm to once again take up 

arms. On March 24, 2013 the Seleka captured the capital Bangui and deposed Bozize. Djotodia 

proclaimed himself President and Minister of Defense; appointed opposition party leader Nicolas 

Tiangaye Prime Minister; suspended the Constitution; dissolved the National Assembly, the 

Constitutional Court and the Government of National Unity; and appointed a new government, 

composed of representatives from Sel6ka, opposition parties, civil society, and one Bozize ally. 

In response to these new developments, Chad organized two summits of African states and CAR 

leaders on April 3 and 18 culminating in the N'Djamena Declaration and the N'Djamena Summit 

Road Map. The new CAR transitional government was recognized, a new 18 month transitional 

period led by a National Transition Council was tasked to draft a new constitution and prepare 

for new elections, and a new constitutional court was agreed upon. Djotodia was formally sworn 

in as interim president on August 18, marking the beginning of the 18-month transition period. 

Current human rights situation in the Central African Republic 

The Sel6ka are responsible for a breakdown in the overall human rights and rule of law 

environment in the CAR. The transitional government remains very weak and is absent outside 

of Bangui, as are rule of law institutions such as the police or judiciary and government service 

providers. Seh~ka fighters freely roam the country. Former special representative of the UN 

Secretary-General to the CAR, Margaret Aderinsola Vogt, told the Security Council in May that 

the country had plunged into a "state of anarchy." 

There are continuous reports of killings, torture, arbitrary detention, gender-based violence, and 

enforced disappearances by the Sel6ka. Se1eka fighters also loot property and food from 

civilians, churches, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and UN agencies; 

recruit and use child soldiers; and engage in sexual violence. International charities report 

having to pay Seleka rebels to prevent being robbed. The human rights situation has worsened 

since June, following a breakdown in S61eka cohesion, and again since September with the 

formation of anti-Seleka militias. 

Since March, the four associated groups and other parties comprising the Seleka a have become 

increasingly disorganized, with the various factions and fighters increasingly difficult to control. 

Seleka members repeatedly have been involved in gross human rights abuses. The UN reports 

that Seleka leaders can access only areas controlled by men loyal to them, as different factions 

do not recognize leaders from other groups. While Djotodia signed a presidential decree in 

September disbanding the Seleka, the rebels continue to operate and commit gross human rights 

abuses. 

Current religious freedom violations 

The CAR is a majority Christian country. Eighty five percent of its citizens are identified as 

Lutheran, Catholic, Protestant, or Evangelical. The remaining 15 percent are Sunni Muslim. 

The Muslim population can be found in the Vakaga district, a poor and remote area in the northeast of CAR located at the borders with Chad and Sudan where Arabic is the primary language. 

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85638e-3.eps

According to recent State Department International Religious Freedom reports, prior to the 2012-

2013 rebellion and subsequent coup, Muslims faced consistent social discrimination and Muslim 

citizens were labelled "foreigners." Low-level bureaucrats impeded access to services like 

citizenship documentation. Muslim-owned shops frequently were vandalized and, in some cases, 

vigilantes subjected Muslims to harassment, beatings, and detention. There also were reports of 

isolated clashes between Muslim nomadic groups and Christian or non-Muslim farmers and 

between Muslim traders and others. 

In the CAR's current lawless environment, a number of identifiable religious freedom violations 

have occurred. The United Nations, International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 

International, Christian religious leaders, and humanitarian organizations all report that the 

Seh~ka attack priests, pastors, nuns, church buildings, and other Christian institutions. SeIeka 

soldiers are reported to have beaten Catholic priests Abbe Philippe Greballe and Abbe Alain 

Banganzi, and nuns are threatened with rape. The Brethren church in Bangui's Cite Jean XXlll 

quarter was shelled during a worship service on April 14, killing or seriously injuring a number 

of people, including children. The Catholic Church of Basse Kotto Prefecture and the Mobaye 

Catholic Church were looted and damaged in late January and early February 2013, respectively. 

On April 13-14, clashes along religious lines occurred between Seleka elements and the 

population of Ouango and Boy-Rabe in Bangui, killing and displacing large numbers of 

civilians. 

Additionally, during their advances toward Bangui in December 2012 and March 2013, the 

Seh~ka targeted predominantly Christian neighborhoods and businesses were targeted for 

destruction. Seleka fighters in different villages, such as Bambari, Bangui, Boali, and 

Markounda, looted churches but not mosques. In other villages, the Seleka protected Muslim 

residents while Christian residents were killed or raped and their properties were destroyed and 

looted. Amnesty International and Catholic leaders report that in some Seleka-controlled areas, 

non-Muslims are prohibited from selling foods not eaten by CAR Muslims, including pork, 

bushmeat and caterpillars. 

Concerns for the future 

The rise of the almost universally Muslim S61eka and CAR's first Muslim leader has increased 

fear and confusion among CAR's Christian population. Neighboring countries are also 

increasingly concerned about CAR's internal religious tensions and rising religious 

fundamentalism. The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights has warned that "The 

conflict in the Central African Republic should not remain forgotten for three main reasons: 

conflict will continue to impose suffering on large numbers of people, it will deepen the religious 

and ethnic divide, and it may destabilize the wider region." The International Crisis Group 

reports that in online forums, some CAR citizens and members of the diaspora have encouraged 

the population to take up arms and systematically retaliate against any and all Muslims. 

These fears are based on the facts that large percentages of Sel6ka soldiers are from Chad and 

Sudan; wounded Seleka soldiers have been flown by military aircraft to Sudan and Saudi Arabia 

for treatment; Se!eka leaders have visited Qatar; Djotodia has strengthened ties with Morocco 

and Sudan; and most importantly, a rumor that in the April 2012, Djotodia wrote to the 

Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) asking for monetary and material support, and in 

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85638e-4.eps

return, the SeleIca would implement Islamic law across the CAR and try to do likewise in Chad. 

Djotodia has since denied writing this letter and reatlinned that CAR will remain a secular state. 

In response to the S616ka attacks, a number of militias have formed to fight back. Known as the 

anti-balaka (Sango for anti-machete), these disparate groups can be characterized as local selfdefense militias who are Christian, pro-Christian militias, or militias made up of Christian 

Bozize supporters. The various anti-balaka militias, depending on the situation, attack the 

SeI6ka, individual Muslims, and/or Muslim villages. 

For example, on September 6, anti-balaka fighters killed or captured 20 S616ka fighters and 

targeted Muslim homes in Benzamb6. Three days later, on September 9, the anti-balaka attacked 

a Muslim neighborhood in Bouca, killing three people and burning 150 homes belonging to 

Muslims. In response, Sel6ka fighters that same day in Bouca killed 10 Christians and burned 

down 300 homes belonging to Christians. A Sel6ka commander also accused a humanitarian 

worker of assisting the anti-balaka and executed him. In early October, Sel6ka and anti-balaka 

clashes again broke out. On October 7, anti-balaka and S6h~ka engaged in battle in Gaga village, 

before the anti-balaka attacked Muslim civilians. Two days later, the S616ka retaliated in Gaga, 

targeting Christians. Doctors Without Borders reports that more than 100 people died in this 

fighting. Anti-balaka and Sele1<a attacks and counter-attacks also occurred on October 12 in 

Bomboro and on October 26 in Bouar, killing dozens. 

The increase of fighting between the Sel6ka and the anti-balaka falls along religious lines, and is 

so viewed by CAR's many citizens. French UN Ambassador Gerard Araud said on November 

I, "More and more you have inter-sectarian violence because the Sel6ka targeted the churches 

and the Christians, so now the Christians have created self-defense militias and they are 

retaliating against the Muslims." The BBC reports that displaced residents of the Bozize's 

hometown of Bossangoa have fled to their co-religionists and that the town is split in half into 

Muslim-Christian areas. Displaced Christian Bossangoa residents also reported to the BBC that 

they fear if they leave their refuge in the Christian Mission that the S61eka fighters will identify 

them as Christian and detain, beat, shoot or kill them. Muslim residents report carrying weapons 

with them at all times. Amnesty Tnternational and Doctors Without Borders report that on 

September 29, S6leka soldiers executed two Christians south of Bossangoa and on October 4, 

anti-Balaka separated eight Muslims from a group of travelers between Bangui and Bossangoa 

and shot them. 

U.S. government and the international community response 

The United Nations, AU, ECCAS, and France have led the international response to the crisis in 

the Central African Republic. The African Union plans to deploy a 3,600-member peacekeeping 

mission, the International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA), in the 

country. This force would incorporate ECCAS soldiers already on the ground, but will not be 

fully operational before 2014. The Security Council on October 10 adopted a resolution asking 

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to outline "detailed options for international support to 

MTSCA, including the possible option of a transformation of MTSCA into a United Nations 

peacekeeping operation, subject to appropriate conditions on the ground" In October, the 

Security Council approved a plan by the Secretary General to send 250 military personnel to 

Bangui plus 560 troops to be deployed outside the capital where there is a UN presence. France 

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plans to have a small force of 700 soldiers in Bangui by the end of the year, but only to secure 

the airport and its local interests. 

The U.S. government supports UN, AU, and ECCAS etTorts to bring stability to the CAR; 

condemns the ongoing gross human rights abuses and insecurity; calls for the transitional 

government to move toward elections in 2015 and adopt a new constitution to bring democracy 

to the country; and funds humanitarian assistance operations in and outside of CAR. The U.S. 

government condemned the Se16ka's seizure of power in March, followed by Djotodia's selfappointment as president, and his decisions to end the transitional governance structures 

implemented by the Libreville Agreement It primarily works with the Prime Minister. The U.S. 

government closed its Embassy in Bangui in December 2012 for security reasons and the 

Embassy remains closed. A Senior Advisor is in place, however, to address the crisis. 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS


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The Honorable John F. KClTY 

November 7, 2013 

Page 2 

I under,til1d thal the D.'>. Security Council has taken certain actions regarding the situation in 

CA.R. and that the State Department is giving consideration to providing support La the African 

Union-led International Support Missionlo the Central A[rican Republic (MISCA) 1 urge you to 

remain substantively engaged with these international ellorls, and to keep the Committee fully 

informed a& you evaluate options to provide bilateral and/or multilateral support to this mission. 

The appalling security and humanitarian conditions in C..A.R.. warrant substantive international 

engagement. With D.S. national security interests at stake, T look forward to working with you in 

developing concentrate stcp' to help address instahility in the Celltral lIJrican Republic. 

Charnnan