NO. 4-00-0435

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

           Plaintiff-Appellee,

           v.

AARON L. TERRY,

           Defendant-Appellant.	)

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)	  Appeal from

  Circuit Court of 

  Champaign County

  No. 99CF2038

  Honorable

  John G. Townsend,

  Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

		In December 1999, the State charged defendant, Aaron L.

Terry, with the offense of unlawful possession of a stolen

vehicle, a Class 2 felony, in violation of section 4-103(a)(1) of

the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1), (b)

(West 1998)).  Defense counsel indicated defendant would rely on

the affirmative defense of insanity.  720 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 1998). 

In March 2000, following a stipulated bench trial, defendant was

found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and was sentenced to 24

months’ probation.

		On appeal, defendant’s only contention is that Public

Act 90-593 (Pub. Act 90-593, eff. June 19, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws

1307)) violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Consti

tution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)).  We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND		

		In December 1999, the State charged defendant with the

offense of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, a Class 2

felony, in violation of section 4-103(a)(1) of the Code.  625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1998).  The State alleged defendant, not entitled to possession of the vehicle, possessed a 1998 silver

Chevy Cavalier knowing it was stolen.  In February 2000, defense

counsel filed a motion for a fitness evaluation and to explore

the issue of insanity as a defense.  Thereafter, the trial court

entered an agreed order for a fitness evaluation to determine

whether defendant was fit to stand trial (725 ILCS 5/104-16 (West

1998)) and to determine if insanity was a defense.

		In March 2000, the trial court, taking into consider

ation defendant’s fitness evaluation by Dr. Lawrence Jeckel, a

psychiatrist, found defendant fit to stand trial.  Defendant

waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a stipulated bench

trial.  The evidence established defendant was found in posses

sion of the silver Chevy Cavalier owned by Rent-a-Wreck.  Defen

dant took the car without the owner’s permission.  Dr. Jeckel’s

report concluded defendant possessed the capacity to appreciate

the criminality of his conduct, but Dr. Jeckel did not believe

defendant could conform his conduct to the standards of the law

at the time of the alleged crime.

		The State argued defendant could not be found not guilty by reason of insanity due to the enactment of Public Act

90-593.  Public Act 90-593 reenacted various provisions of Public

Act 89-404 (Pub. Act 89-404, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws

4306)), one of which deleted language from section 6-2 of the

Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 1998)) that exoner

ated an accused who lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  Defendant correctly argued

that Public Act 89-404 had been found unconstitutional because it

violated the single subject clause.  Defendant further argued

that Public Act 90-593 likewise violated the single subject

clause.  Hence, defendant asserted he was not guilty by reason of

insanity under the language of section 6-2 as it existed before

Public Act 89-404 and Public Act 90-593.

		The trial court found defendant guilty of the offense of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle.  The court also

refused to find Public Act 90-593 unconstitutional.  Defendant

was sentenced to 24 months’ probation and ordered to obtain a

mental health evaluation.  This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

		Defendant argues his conviction must be reversed

because Public Act 90-593 violates the single subject clause of

the Illinois Constitution.  We disagree.  Defendant’s argument

concerning the constitutionality of Public Act 90-593 presents a

legal question, and thus, our review is de novo.  People v. Jones, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1189, 1190, 744 N.E.2d 344, 346 (2001).

		The single subject clause of article IV, section 8, of

the Illinois Constitution provides, in part:

			“Bills, except bills for appropriations

and for the codification, revision or rear

rangement of laws, shall be confined to one

subject.”  Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d).

		The Supreme Court of Illinois has applied the single subject clause recently in People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 427, 739 N.E.2d 433, 442 (2000), stating:

			“In determining whether a legislative

enactment was passed in violation of the

single subject clause, we construe the term

'subject' liberally in favor of the legisla

ture.  People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9 (1999).  The subject of a bill may be as

broad as the legislature chooses, provided

that the bill’s provisions have a natural and

logical connection.  Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515 (1997).  The General Assem

bly violates the single subject rule only

when it includes within one act provisions

that by no fair interpretation have any natu

ral and logical connection to a single sub

ject.  Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 354-55 (1999).”

		Prior to the enactment of Public Act 89-404, section 6-

2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defined the defense of insanity as

follows:

			“(a) A person is not criminally respon

sible for conduct if at the time of such

conduct, as a result of mental disease or

mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity

either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”  (Emphasis added.)  720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1994).

The General Assembly amended the defense by deleting the empha

sized language through the enactment of Public Act 89-404.  Pub.

Act 89-404, §15, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws at 4307)

(amending 720 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 1994)).  Along with this amend

ment, Public Act 89-404 also addressed topics under the Counties

Code (55 ILCS 5/1-1001 through 7-1001 (West 1996)), the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-1-1 through 11-152-4 (West 1996)), the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 through 47-25 (West 1996)), the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 through 19 (West 1996)), the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100

through 603 (West 1996)), the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/100-1 through 126-1 (West 1996)), the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/1 through 14 (West 1996)), the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 through 8-6-1 (West 1996)), the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-101

through 21-104 (West 1996)), and the Hospital Lien Act (770 ILCS 35/0.01 through 5 (West 1996)).  See People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 10-11, 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (1999).  

		In Reedy, the Supreme Court of Illinois found Public Act 89-404 violated the single subject clause of the Illinois

Constitution.  Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 11, 708 N.E.2d at 1119.  The court noted Public Act 89-404 addressed “diverse subjects” such

as jurisdiction and duties of law enforcement officers, the insanity defense and a defendant’s burden of proof, drug asset

forfeiture proceedings, truth-in-sentencing law, and the require

ments for the perfection and satisfaction of hospital liens. 

Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 11-12, 708 N.E.2d at 1119.  While giving deference to the legislature, the court found matters pertaining

to the criminal justice system and to hospital liens were unre

lated, and thus, Public Act 89-404 violated the single subject

clause and was unconstitutional in its entirety.  Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12, 708 N.E.2d at 1119.

		Prior to the supreme court decision in Reedy, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 90-593 (Pub. Act 90-593, eff.

June 19, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws 1307)).  Public Act 90-593 reen

acted the criminal -related provisions of Public Act 89-404 minus

any amendments to the Hospital Lien Act found unrelated to

matters of the criminal justice system in Reedy.  The Act also contained the same revisions to the insanity defense statute

originally included in Public Act 89-404.  

		The Supreme Court of Illinois reaffirmed the

unconstitutionality of Public Act 89-404 in People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 156, 735 N.E.2d 533, 534 (2000).  The court noted

the General Assembly had passed Public Act 90-593 containing the

same insanity defense revisions originally included in Public Act

89-404.  Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 157, 735 N.E.2d at 534.  The court also indicated the “new legislation *** is not claimed to

suffer from the same single subject rule problems that rendered

Public Act 89-404 invalid, and we must presume it to be constitu tional.”  Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 157, 735 N.E.2d at 534.

		In the case sub judice, defendant argues Public Act 90- 593 must suffer the same constitutional fate as Public Act 89-404

because the single subject clause is violated by the inclusion of

unrelated subjects such as the insanity defense and drug asset forfeiture proceedings.  We disagree.  We point out the First

District in In re F.G., 318 Ill. App. 3d 709, 715, 743 N.E.2d 181, 185 (2000), stated “Public Act 90-593 did not violate the

single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution.  [citing] Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 157.”  In Ramsey, however, the validity of Public Act 90-593 was not before the supreme court but only presumed to be

constitutional.  Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 157, 735 N.E.2d at 534.  In the present case, defendant argues Public Act 90-593 is

unconstitutional, and thus, we must subject that Aact to the

limits of the single subject clause.

		Our supreme court has articulated a two-tiered analysis

to determine whether a public act violates the single subject

rule.  In People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 339, 763 N.E.2d 264, 268 (2001), the court stated the first tier involves a determ ination of “whether the act, on its face, involves a legitimate

single subject.”  The second tier discerns “whether the various

provisions within an act all relate to the proper subject at

issue.”  Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d at 339, 763 N.E.2d at 268.

		Considering the first tier of our analysis, the

purported subject of Public Act 90-593, one involving the crimi

nal law, is a legitimate subject for single subject purposes.  See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 428-29, 739 N.E.2d at 443, quoting Pub. Act 89-8, eff. March 21, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 322, 322)

(“'[[An Act]] in relation to criminal and correctional matters

***,'” was a legitimate subject and not overbroad to pass single

subject scrutiny); People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 513, 722 N.E.2d 1102, 1110 (1999) (legislation amending several acts could

pass muster if related to the single subject of “crime”).  Thus,

the subject of Public Act 90-593, on its face, is permissible.

		As to the second tier of our analysis, it must be

determined whether the amendments in Public Act 90-593 relate to

the single subject of criminal law.  Defendant argued at trial,

and now on appeal, the amendments to the Drug Asset Forfeiture

Procedure Act are not related to criminal law, and the single

subject clause is thereby violated.  We disagree.

		Section 35 of Public Act 90-593 (Pub. Act 90-593, §35,

eff. June 19, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws at 1350-55)) amended section 9

of the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act.  (725 ILCS 150/9 (West

1998)).  That section refers to property seized under the crimi

nal provisions of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720

ILCS 570/100 through 603 (West 1998)) and the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 through 919 (West 1998)).  Section 9 autho rizes the State’s Attorney to initiate judicial forfeiture

proceedings by filing a complaint for forfeiture.  Further, a

“defendant convicted in any criminal proceeding is precluded from

later denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense

of which the defendant was convicted in any proceeding under this Act regardless of the pendency of an appeal from that convic

tion.”  725 ILCS 150/9(I) (West 1998).  The State’s Attorney may

also stay forfeiture proceedings during a criminal trial.  725

ILCS 150/9(J) (West 1998).

		A person subject to prosecution under the Cannabis

Control Act or the Illinois Controlled Substances Act may face

judicial forfeiture proceedings.  In fact, Public Act 90-593 also

dealt with the items subject to possible forfeiture under these

two criminal statutes.  Further, the purpose of the Drug Asset

Forfeiture Procedure Act is to deter drug abuse and drug traf

ficking in this state.  725 ILCS 150/2 (West 1998).  The provi

sions of this section clearly have a logical and natural connec

tion to the subject of the criminal justice system.  

		Defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrat

ing any of the provisions of Public Act 90-593 bear no natural

and logical connection to the single subject relating to the

criminal justice system.  Defendant argues Public Act 90-593

remains so similar to Public Act 89-404 that the supreme court’s

decision in Reedy requires us to conclude Public Act 90-593 also violates the single subject clause.  However, while the court

noted Public Act 89-404 dealt with diverse subjects, it focused

on two unrelated subjects: “matters relating to the criminal

justice system, and matters relating to hospital liens.”  Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12, 708 N.E.2d at 1119.  This court also found

Public Act 89-404 unconstitutional because of the section dealing

with hospital liens, but found the other nine sections concerned some aspect of the criminal justice system to “fall within the

designation of one 'subject.'”  People v. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182, 189, 691 N.E.2d 1174, 1179 (1998).  Here, Public Act 90-593

dropped the portion relating to hospital liens.  

		The single subject rule “prohibits the inclusion of

'"discordant provisions that by no fair intendment can be consid

ered as having any legitimate relation to each other."' [Cita

tions.]” Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (1997).  Such cannot be said of the provisions of Public Act

90-593 and their legitimate relation to the criminal justice

system.  As we must give deference to the legislature, we find

Public Act 90-593 cured the defects of Public Act 89-404 as

determined by Reedy and does not violate the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution.  As the amended insanity

provisions were in effect (June 19, 1998) when defendant commit

ted the offense in December 1999, along with Public Act 90-593

meeting the requirements of the single subject clause, defen

dant’s conviction must be upheld.

III. CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

		Affirmed.

		McCULLOUGH, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.