alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TONY ASBERRY,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

PHELPS,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 13-16899

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01494-MCEKJN

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 18, 2014** 

Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Tony Asberry appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his

right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with his

prison housing assignments. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

FILED

DEC 04 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo, FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (1991), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Asberry

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant

intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race. See Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (a § 1983 equal protection

claim requires showing that the defendant “acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class”); see

also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th

Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth

non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)

(per curiam).

Defendant’s unopposed motion to supplement the record, filed on June 9,

2014, is granted.

AFFIRMED.

2 13-16899
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-7181

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

GENE ELLIS WILLIAMS, a/k/a Glenn,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert D. Potter, Senior

District Judge. (CR-86-40-P, CA-95-116-3-P)

Submitted: December 14, 1995 Decided: January 11, 1996

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gene Ellis Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas J. Ashcraft, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) motion. We have reviewed the record and the

district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United States v.

Williams, Nos. CR-86-40-P; CA-95-116-3-P (W.D.N.C. June 21, 1995).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                             478
<SECURITIES>                                    42,732
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  43,210
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           39,900
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,310
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    43,210
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                80,612
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (41,848)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (41,848)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (41,848)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (6.59)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (6.59)


</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of St. Thomas Malankara Orthodox Church, Inc., Long Island, Respondent, v Board of Appeals, Town of Hempstead, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 801]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Appeals, Town of Hempstead, dated February 20, 2003, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner’s application to waive certain off-street parking requirements, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Martin, J.), entered May 10, 2004, which granted the petition, annulled the determination, and directed the Board of Appeals, Town of Hempstead, to grant the application.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that “while religious institutions are not exempt from local zoning laws, greater flexibility is required in evaluating an application for a religious use than an application for another use and every effort to accommodate the religious use must be made” *(Matter of Genesis Assembly of God v Davies,*208 AD2d 627, 628 [1994]; *see Cornell Univ. v Bagnardi,*68 NY2d 583 [1986]; *Matter of Westchester Reform Temple v Brown,*
      *66722 NY2d 488 [1968]; *Matter of Rosenfeld v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Ramapo,*6 AD3d 450 [2004]; *Matter of Young Israel of N. Woodmere v Town of Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals,*221 AD2d 646 [1995]; *Matter of Harrison Orthodox Minyan v Town Bd. of Harrison,*159 AD2d 572 [1990]). A local zoning board is required to “suggest measures to accommodate the proposed religious use while mitigating the adverse effects on the surrounding community to the greatest extent possible” *(Matter of Genesis Assembly of God v Davies, supra*at 628; *see McGann v Incorporated Vil. of Old Westbury,*256 AD2d 556 [1998]; *Matter of Islamic Socy. of Westchester & Rockland v Foley,*96 AD2d 536 [1983]). Here, the record reflects that the Board of Appeals, Town of Hempstead (hereinafter the Board) made no effort to suggest such measures. Accordingly, the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and was properly annulled *(see Matter of Genesis Assembly of God v Davies, supra; Matter of Harrison Orthodox Minyan v Town Bd. of Harrison, supra).*Schmidt, J.P., Adams, Luciano and Covello, JJ., concur.
```

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 24 (Thursday, February 5, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 6435]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: C1-2015-01205]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 25

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0142; Amdt. No. 25-141]
RIN 2120-AK12

Harmonization of Airworthiness Standards--Gust and Maneuver Load 
Requirements; Correction

Correction

    In FAA rule document 2015-01205 appearing on pages 4761-4762 in the 
issue of Thursday, January 29, 2015, make the following corrections:
    1. On page 4762 in the first column, the second paragraph should 
read as follows:
    This document corrects three errors in the Greek letters and 
subscripts contained in various equations in the regulatory text. In 
one case, the ``U'' in the equation is changed from subscript to 
regular, uppercase text. In another case, instead of ``PL = 
PL-1g U[sigma]AA'', the equation 
should be ``PL = PL-1gU[sigma]AA''. 
In two cases, the three Greek letters ``[rho][egr][phgr]'' after sigma 
``[sigma]'' in the subscript of ``U'' are changed to ``ref''. In these 
cases, ``U[sigma][rho][egr][phiv]'' should be 
``U[sigma]ref''.
    2. On page 4762 in the first column, the third, fourth and fifth 
paragraphs following the Corrections heading should read as follows:
    2. On page 73467, second column, line 11, the equation 
``PL = PL-1g U[sigma]AA'' 
is corrected to read ``PL = PL-1g  
U[sigma]AA''.
    3. On page 73467, second column, fifth line from the bottom, the 
equation ``U[sigma] = U[sigma][rho][egr][phiv]Fg'' is 
corrected to read ``U[sigma] = U[sigma]ref Fg''.
    4. On page 73467, second column, third line from the bottom, the 
text ``U[sigma][rho][egr][phiv]'' is corrected to read 
``U[sigma]ref''.

[FR Doc. C1-2015-01205 Filed 2-4-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1505-01-D
```
###### Editorial Note on Part 301

#### Editorial Note:

In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations.

References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

#### § 301.6039-1 Information returns and statements required in connection with certain options.

For provisions relating to information returns and statements required in connection with certain options, see §§ 1.6039-1 and 1.6039-2 of this chapter (Income Tax Regulations).

[T.D. 7275, 38 FR 11346, May 7, 1973]
2001 Incemtive Compensation Plan


    ..

    EXHIBIT
      10.21A

    


    AMENDMENT
      TO THE FIRST OAK BROOK BANCSHARES, INC.

    2001
      INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN

    


    


    Paragraph
      6(a) shall be amended to include the following at the end
      thereof:

    


        “Notwithstanding
      anything herein to the contrary, effective January 1, 2005, the determination
      of
      Fair Market Value shall comply with Section 409A. “Section 409A” means Code
      Section 409A and any regulations and guidance of general applicability issued
      thereunder.”

    


    Paragraph
      9 shall be amended to include the following at the end thereof.

    


        “No
      Option
      may be amended, modified, extended or renewed after December 31, 2004 in a
      manner that would subject the Option to Section 409A, unless such Option is
      intended to be subject to Section 409A and such amendment, modification,
      extension or renewal is made in accordance with Section 409A.”

    


    


    The
      foregoing amendments were adopted on February 22, 2007 but effective as of
      January 1, 2005 unless Section 409A (as defined above) requires an earlier
      or
      later effective date, in which case such earlier or later date shall be the
      effective date.
[Cite as Groves v. Mallory, 125 Ohio St.3d 160, 2010-Ohio-1805.] 

GROVES, APPELLANT, v. MALLORY, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as Groves v. Mallory, 125 Ohio St.3d 160, 2010-Ohio-1805.] 

Appeal from dismissal of a petition for a writ of mandamus — Timely appeal not 

filed — Judgment affirmed. 

(No. 2009-2256 — Submitted April 20, 2010 — Decided April 28, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-090777. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We dismiss the appeal of appellant, Larry Groves, because 

although he challenges the court of appeals’ September 2009 judgment dismissing 

his petition for a writ of mandamus, he did not file a timely appeal from that 

judgment. S.Ct.Prac.R. 2.2(A)(1)(a) (“To perfect an appeal from a court of 

appeals to the Supreme Court * * *, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal in 

the Supreme Court within forty-five days from the entry of the judgment being 

appealed”); State ex rel. Martin v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 124 Ohio St.3d 63, 

2009-Ohio-6164, 918 N.E.2d 1005, ¶ 1. Neither the court of appeals’ November 

2009 entry striking Groves’s initial notice of appeal, which was erroneously filed 

by him in the court of appeals instead of this court, nor the court of appeals’ 

November 2009 entry denying his motion for reconsideration of its dismissal of 

the mandamus petition extended his time to appeal the court of appeals’ 

September 2009 judgment dismissing his mandamus petition. Id. 

Appeal dismissed. 

 PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 

decision in this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

__________________ 

 Larry Groves, pro se. 

 Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Phillip R. 

Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

__________________
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1007

To amend title 23, United States Code, to permit a maximum speed limit

of 65 miles per hour on any highway within a State’s jurisdiction located

outside an urbanized area, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 21, 1995

Mr. ROBERTS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL

To amend title 23, United States Code, to permit a maximum speed limit of 65 miles per hour on any highway

within a State’s jurisdiction located outside an urbanized

area, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. MAXIMUM SPEED LIMITS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The first sentence of section

5 154(a) of title 23, United States Code, is amended by

6 striking ‘‘The Secretary’’ and all that follows through ‘‘,

7 or (4)’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘The Secretary shall

8 not approve any project under section 106 in any State
2

•HR 1007 IH

1 which has (1) a maximum speed limit on any highway

2 within its jurisdiction located inside an urbanized area of

3 50,000 population or more in excess of 55 miles per hour,

4 (2) a maximum speed limit on any highway within its ju5 risdiction located outside an urbanized area of 50,000 pop6 ulation or more in excess of 65 miles per hour, or (3)’’.

7 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The third sentence

8 of section 154(a) of such title is amended by striking

9 ‘‘Clause (4)’’ and inserting ‘‘Clause (3)’’.

Æ
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1000

To designate certain lands in Alaska as wilderness.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 21, 1995

Mr. VENTO (for himself, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BECERRA, Mr. BEILENSON, Mr.

BERMAN, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. CARDIN, Mr.

CLAY, Mr. COLEMAN, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DEFAZIO, Ms. DELAURO, Mr.

DELLUMS, Mr. DEUTSCH, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. EVANS, Mr.

FARR, Ms. FURSE, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. GUTIERREZ,

Mr. HINCHEY, Mr. HOLDEN, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida,

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island, Mr.

KILDEE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. MATSUI, Mr.

MINGE, Mrs. MINK of Hawaii, Mr. MORAN, Mrs. MORELLA, Mr.

NADLER, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. OLVER, Mr.

PASTOR, Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. RAMSTAD, Mr.

REED, Ms. RIVERS, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. SABO, Mr. SANDERS, Mrs.

SCHROEDER, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SERRANO, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. SKAGGS,

Ms. SLAUGHTER, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. STARK, Mr. TORRES, Ms.

VELA ́ZQUEZ, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. WILLIAMS, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. YATES,

and Mr. ZIMMER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Resources

A BILL

To designate certain lands in Alaska as wilderness.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 1000 IH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Morris K. Udall Wil3 derness Act of 1995’’.

4 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF WILDERNESS AREA.

5 In furtherance of the provisions of the Wilderness

6 Act, an area in Alaska comprising approximately

7 1,559,538 acres, as generally depicted on a map entitled

8 ‘‘Arctic National Wildlife Refuge—1002 Area Alternative

9 E—Wilderness Designation’’, dated October 28, 1991,

10 and available for inspection in the offices of the Secretary

11 of the Interior, is hereby designated as wilderness and,

12 therefore, as a component of the National Wilderness

13 Preservation System.

Æ
#### In the Matter of Robert Dettling, Respondent, v Dora Dettling, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 914]

In a child support proceed*465ing pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Dounias, J.), entered November 17, 2004, which denied her objections to an order of the same court (Raimondi, S.M.) dated September 14, 2004, denying her application, inter aha, to vacate an order of the same court (Goglas, H.E.) entered August 6, 2001, awarding child support to the petitioner father after an inquest.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court properly denied the mother’s objections to the order of the Support Magistrate. Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Covello, JJ., concur.
H. R. 1011

One Hundred Fourth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six

An Act

To extend the deadline under the Federal Power Act applicable to the construction

of a hydroelectric project in the State of Ohio.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE.

Notwithstanding the time limitations of section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 806) the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, upon the request of the licensee for FERC Project

No. 9423 (and after reasonable notice), is authorized, in accordance

with the good faith, due diligence, and public interest requirements

of such section 13 and the Commission’s procedures under such

section, to extend the time required for commencement of construction for the project for up to a maximum of 3 consecutive 2-

year periods. This section shall take effect for the project upon

the expiration of the extension (issued by the Commission under

such section 13) of the period required for commencement of

construction of such project.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
###### Editorial Note on Part 301

#### Editorial Note:

In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations.

References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

#### § 301.6501(j)-1 Investment credit carryback; taxable years ending after December 31, 1961.

With respect to taxable years ending after December 31, 1961, a deficiency attributable to the application to the taxpayer of an investment credit carryback may be assessed at any time before the expiration of the period within which a deficiency for the taxable year of the unused investment credit which results in such carryback may be assessed, or, with respect to any portion of an investment credit carryback from a taxable year attributable to a net operating loss or capital loss carryback from a subsequent taxable year, at any time before the expiration of the period within which a deficiency for such subsequent taxable year may be assessed. For purposes of this section a deficiency shall include a deficiency which may be assessed pursuant to the provisions of section 6213(b)(2), but only those arising with respect to applications for tentative carryback adjustments filed after November 2, 1966.

[T.D. 7301, 39 FR 975, Jan. 4, 1974]
EX-10.7



 





EXHIBIT
10.7




FERRO CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

SCHEDULE II




     The Company has entered into change in control agreements substantially identical with its
form of change in control agreement (Exhibit 10.6) with the following current executive officers:



Sallie B. Bailey

James C. Bays

Ann E. Killian

James F. Kirsch

Celeste B. Mastin

Michael J. Murry

Barry D. Russell

Peter T. Thomas




     The Company had entered into a change in control agreement with Thomas M. Gannon where the
agreement has since terminated.
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.6241-5 Extension to entities filing partnership returns. ( a ) *Entities filing a partnership return.* Except as described in paragraph (c) of this section, an entity that files a partnership return for any taxable year is subject to the provisions of subchapter C of chapter 63 of the Internal Revenue Code (subchapter C of chapter 63) with respect to such taxable year even if it is determined that the entity filing the partnership return was not a partnership for such taxable year. Accordingly, any partnership-related item (as defined in § 301.6241-1(a)(6)(ii)) and any person holding an interest in the entity, either directly or indirectly, at any time during that taxable year are subject to the provisions of subchapter C of chapter 63 for such taxable year.
( b ) *Partnership return filed but no entity found to exist.* Paragraph (a) of this section also applies where a partnership return is filed for a taxable year, but the IRS determines that no entity existed at all for such taxable year. For purposes of applying paragraph (a) of this section, the partnership return is treated as if it were filed by an entity.
( c ) *Exceptions.* Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to— ( 1 ) Any taxable year for which an election under section 6221(b) is in effect, treating the return as if it were filed by a partnership for the taxable year to which the election relates; and
( 2 ) Any taxable year for which a valid section 761(a) election is made (regarding election out of subchapter K of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code for certain unincorporated organizations).
( d ) *Applicability date* — ( 1 ) *In general.* Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, this section applies to partnership taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, and ending after August 12, 2018.
( 2 ) *Election under § 301.9100-22 in effect.* This section applies to any partnership taxable year beginning after November 2, 2015, and before January 1, 2018, for which a valid election under § 301.9100-22 is in effect.
[T.D. 9844, 84 FR 6571, Feb. 27, 2019]