alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 7

Expressing the sense of the Congress that any Federal agency that utilizes

the Draize rabbit eye irritancy test should develop and validate alternative ophthalmic testing procedures that do not require the use of

animal test subjects.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. JACOBS submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred

to the Committee on Commerce

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that any Federal agency that utilizes the Draize rabbit eye irritancy test should

develop and validate alternative ophthalmic testing procedures that do not require the use of animal test subjects.

Whereas the Draize rabbit eye irritancy test has long been

used by various Federal agencies for predicting human

opththalmic response to pesticides and toxic chemicals,

household cleaning solvents, some medicinal products,

and other hazardous substances;

Whereas the Draize test causes significant pain to the albino

rabbit which is used in each irritancy test; and

Whereas the reliability of the Draize test has been called into

question: Now, therefore, be it
2

HCON 7 IH

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the

3 Department of Health and Human Services, the

4 Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental

5 Protection Agency, and any other department, agency, or

6 instrumentality of the United States that utilizes the

7 Draize rabbit eye irritancy test, should develop and vali8 date alternative ophthalmic testing procedures that do not

9 require the use of animal test subjects.

Æ
_____________

No. 96-2717MN

_____________

John Kittel; Karen Kittel, *

*

Appellants, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

Dayton Hudson Corporation, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

_____________

Submitted: February 13, 1997

 Filed: March 5, 1997

_____________

Before McMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

John Kittel and Karen Kittel appeal the district court's grant of

summary judgment in favor of Dayton Hudson Corporation. The district court

granted summary judgment because John Kittel did not meet his employer's

requirement that he be at work on the day the benefits were scheduled to

commence or any time afterwards, the enrollment forms he signed clearly

stated the terms of the benefits, and his Family Medical Leave Act claim

failed because he did not work for his employer for twelve months. Having

considered the record and the parties' briefs, we are satisfied the

district court's judgment was correct and further discussion is not

warranted. We affirm for the reasons stated in the district court's

opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
October 1, 2014

US Department ofTransportation Docket Operations, M-30 West Building ground floor, Room W12-140 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, D.C. 20590 

### Department of Homeland Security 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W

.



## ..**Washington~** 

## D.C. 20229

RE: 8496B Docket**FAA~2004-18662** Permit Aircraft under Title 14, Code ofFederal Regulations Part 45.29 (h), 45.29 

### (f), 45.29 (b), 45.29 (a), 45.27 (a), 45.25, US Customs and Border Protection.

FAA Docket Operations:
I'm writing to ask for your assistance in extending the exemption of8496B Docket FAA-2004 Permit Aircraft under Title 14, Code ofFederal Regulations Part45.29 (h), 45.29 

### (f), 45.29 (b), 45.29 (a), 45.27 (a), 45.25, US Customs and BorderProtection dated February 25, 2011, and terminating on February 23, 2015. We would like this exemption to stay in effect for the new stamping requirement, and for new aircraft that are being delivered for replacement ofthe aging fleet. Please call Paul McDaniel at (202) 325-0296 ifyou have any further questions regarding this request. I thank you in advance for your assistance in resolving this matter as soon as possible. Sincerely,

# ~**\l:i4P~f 't~**  J);evin Boissonneault Program ManagerDate: 9/11/2014 Exemption No: 84968 from 14 CFR (FAR Section)- Part: 45.29 (h); 45.29 (f); 45.29 (b); 45.29 (a); 45.27 (a); 45.25 will expire on 2/28/2015. If appropriate, please submit your request to extend this exemption (including the docket number FAA-2004-18662) within 30 days of the date of this notice. Otherwise, the FAA may not be able O"lGi·i2652:2091 

## 0**2059~** to process your request for extension before the expiration date. You may either submit your request electronically through the internet using the Docket Management System web site at: http://Regulations.gov/ or mail your request to: U.S. Department of Transportation Docket Operations, M-30 West Building ground floor, Room W12-140 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE**Washi~gton,** DC 20590 Submission to other locations may delay processing. 

## us

Kevin Boissonneault Program Manager Department ofHomeland Security 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D 

# Rn**~**
Any request for extension must meet the 1 requirements of 14 CFR part 11. If you have already**cJ~**

# ~~~~e:~~d**e~~~~~~~.iop~:~~~~~n~~=~~!~litJa~~\~HWi**\\\\\1\i \ 1\\\ 1\\\

### i\\\\\\\\\1

# (e.........,-'-"'...,
§ 48.4191-1 Imposition and rate of tax. ( a ) *Imposition of tax.* Under section 4191(a), tax is imposed on the sale of any taxable medical device by the manufacturer, producer, or importer of the device. For the definition of the term *taxable medical device,* see § 48.4191-2.
( b ) *Rate of tax.* Tax is imposed on the sale of a taxable medical device at the rate of 2.3 percent of the price for which the device is sold. For the definition of the term *price,* see section 4216 and §§ 48.4216(a)-1 through 48.4216(e)-3.
( c ) *Liability for tax.* The manufacturer, producer, or importer making the sale of a taxable medical device is liable for the tax imposed by section 4191(a). For rules relating to the determination of who the manufacturer, producer, or importer is for purposes of section 4191, see § 48.0-2(a)(4). For the definition of the term *sale,* see § 48.0-2(a)(5). For rules relating to the lease of an article by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, see section 4217 and § 48.4217-1 through § 48.4217-2. For rules relating to the use of an article by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, see section 4218 and § 48.4218-1 through § 48.4218-5.
( d ) *Procedural rules.* For the procedural rules relating to section 4191, see part 40 of this chapter.
( e ) *Tax-free sales for further manufacture or export.* For rules relating to tax-free sales of taxable medical devices for further manufacture or export, see section 4221 and § 48.4221-1 through § 48.4221-3.
( f ) *Payments made on or after January 1, 2013, pursuant to lease, installment sale, or sale on credit contracts.* For rules relating to the taxability of payments made on or after January 1, 2013, pursuant to a lease, installment sale, or sale on credit contract entered into on or after March 30, 2010, see § 48.4216(c)-1(e)(1). For rules relating to the taxability of payments made on or after January 1, 2013, pursuant to a lease, installment sale, or sale on credit contract entered into before March 30, 2010, see § 48.4216(c)-1(e)(2).
( g ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section applies to sales of taxable medical devices on and after January 1, 2013.
[T.D. 9604, 77 FR 72934, Dec. 7, 2012]
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Grant Leon TURNER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-4047.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted June 13, 2002.

Decided June 21, 2002.

Benjamin D. Porter, Morrow, Alexander, Tash, Kurtz & Porter, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Robert A. J. Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

*702Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Grant Leon Turner appeals his convictions and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and retaliating against a witness, victim or informant. On appeal, he argues that (1) the district court erred in publishing to the jury a transcript of a recording admitted into evidence and (2) the district court violated *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), by sentencing him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994) even though the issue of his prior convictions was not submitted to the jury. We affirm.

Whether to allow the use of transcripts to aid in the presentation of tape-recorded evidence is within the district court’s sound discretion. *United States v. Collazo,*732 F.2d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir.1984). Here, the transcript was properly authenticated, and the district court appropriately instructed the jury that the transcript was not evidence, that the list of speakers in the transcript was not proof as to the identity of the speakers, and that any inconsistencies between the transcript and the recording should be resolved in favor of the recording. As such, we find no abuse of discretion. *Id.*(noting that cautionary instructions “cured any prejudice that might have resulted from discrepancies between tape and transcript”); *United States v. Clark,*986 F.2d 65, 69 (4th Cir.1993) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of a recording even though defense counsel did not stipulate to its accuracy).

Next, we have recently held that prior convictions that qualify the defendant for an armed career criminal sentence need not be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. *United States v. Sterling,*283 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir.2002) (holding that *Apprendi*did not affect enhanced sentence under § 924(e)). We decline Turner’s invitation to reconsider *Sterling.*

Accordingly, we affirm Turner’s convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Daniel C. Oakes et al., Respondents, v Rajnikant Patel, M.D., et al., Defendants. HealthNow New York, Inc., Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 455]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John P Lane, J.), entered June 8, 2004. The order denied the motion of HealthNow New York, Inc. for permission to intervene in the action to assert an equitable subrogation claim against defendants.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the motion is granted.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this negligence and medical malpractice action seeking damages for injuries sustained by Daniel C. Oakes (plaintiff). Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of HealthNow New York, Inc. (Health-Now), plaintiffs health insurer, for permission to intervene in the action. In denying the motion, the court determined that *1024HealthNow’s motion was premature. That was error. Health-Now’s equitable subrogation rights accrued upon payment of the medical expenses under the policy *(see Teichman v Community Hosp. of W. Suffolk,*87 NY2d 514, 521 [1996]). Upon such payment, HealthNow was entitled to commence a direct action against defendants to recover those medical payments *(see id.*at 521-522) or, contrary to the court’s determination, HealthNow instead was entitled to move for permission to intervene in plaintiffs’ action. With respect to the merits of HealthNow’s motion, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion. HealthNow established that its claim and that of plaintiffs share common questions of law and fact *(see*CPLR 1013; *Kaczmarski v Suddaby,*9 AD3d 847, 848 [2004], *lv dismissed*3 NY3d 738 [2004]), and HealthNow further established “that its intervention would not unduly delay [plaintiffs’] action or unduly prejudice the rights of plaintiffs” *(Kaczmarski,*9 AD3d at 848; *see*CPLR 1013; *Omiatek v Marine Midland Bank, N.A.,*9 AD3d 831, 832 [2004], *lv dismissed*3 NY3d 738 [2004]). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Martoche, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
[Cite as State v. Nimocks , 2015-Ohio-394.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-14-1115 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201401139

v. Timothy Nimocks DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: January 30, 2015

* * * * * Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Tim A. Dugan, for appellant.

* * * * * PIETRYKOWSKI, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Timothy Nimocks, appeals a May 13, 2014 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him on a conviction of attempt to commit forgery, a violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2913.31(A)(3) and (C)(1)(a), and a2. misdemeanor of the first degree. Appellant pled guilty to the offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to incarceration at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio for a period of six months. {¶ 2} Appellant asserts a single assignment of error on appeal: 1. The trial court’s sentence is contrary to law. {¶ 3} Citing this court’s decision in State v. Polus , 12 N.E.3d 1237, 2014-Ohio2321 (6th Dist.), appellant argues that a sentence of six months on a conviction for a first degree misdemeanor is contrary to law because the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence of 180 days permitted under R.C. 2929.24(A)(1). The state agrees. {¶ 4} Appellant requests this court to reverse the trial court judgment and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing. The state requests, in the interest of judicial economy and pursuant to authority granted in App.R. 12(B), that we reverse the trial court judgment and impose the correct sentence of 180 days. We conclude in the interest of judicial economy that it is unnecessary to remand the case for resentencing and follow the procedure recommended by the state. {¶ 5} We conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a six-month sentence instead of a 180-day sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the May 13, 2014 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas and modify the third paragraph of the judgment to read as follows: After having considered the Presentence Investigation Report and having afforded defendant and defense counsel their rights pursuant to Rule3. 32(A)(1), the Court orders that defendant be committed to the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio for a period of 180 days until released according

to law. {¶ 6} The costs of this appeal are assessed to the state pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment reversed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.

_______________________________ JUDGE Stephen A. Yarbrough, P.J.

_______________________________ James D. Jensen, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
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###### Editorial Note on Part 301

#### Editorial Note:

In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations.

References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

#### § 301.7458-1 Hearings.

Notice and opportunity to be heard upon any proceeding instituted before the Tax Court shall be given to the taxpayer and the Commissioner. If an opportunity to be heard upon the proceeding is given before a division of the Tax Court, neither the taxpayer nor the Commissioner shall be entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard before the Tax Court upon review, except upon a specific order of the chief judge.
§ 25.2523(g)-1 Special rule for charitable remainder trusts. ( a ) *In general.* ( 1 ) With respect to gifts made after December 31, 1981, subject to section 2523(i), if the donor's spouse is the only noncharitable beneficiary (other than the donor) of a charitable remainder annuity trust or charitable remainder unitrust described in section 664 (qualified charitable remainder trust), section 2523(b) does not apply to the interest in the trust transferred to the donee spouse. Thus, the value of the annuity or unitrust interest passing to the spouse qualifies for a marital deduction under section 2523(g) and the value of the remainder interest qualifies for a charitable deduction under section 2522.
( 2 ) A marital deduction for the value of the donee spouse's annuity or unitrust interest in a qualified charitable remainder trust to which section 2523(g) applies is allowable only under section 2523(g). Therefore, if an interest in property qualifies for a marital deduction under section 2523(g), no election may be made with respect to the property under section 2523(f).
( 3 ) The donee spouse's interest need not be an interest for life to qualify for a marital deduction under section 2523(g). However, for purposes of section 664, an annuity or unitrust interest payable to the spouse for a term of years cannot be payable for a term that exceeds 20 years or the trust does not qualify under section 2523(g).
( 4 ) A deduction is allowed under section 2523(g) even if the transfer to the donee spouse is conditioned on the donee spouse's payment of state death taxes, if any, attributable to the qualified charitable remainder trust.
( 5 ) For purposes of this section, the term *noncharitable beneficiary* means any beneficiary of the qualified charitable remainder trust other than an organization described in section 170(c).
( b ) *Charitable remainder trusts where the donee spouse and the donor are not the only noncharitable beneficiaries.* In the case of a charitable remainder trust where the donor and the donor's spouse are not the only noncharitable beneficiaries (for example, where the noncharitable interest is payable to the donor's spouse for life and then to another individual (other than the donor) for life), the qualification of the interest as qualified terminable interest property is determined solely under section 2523(f) and not under section 2523(g). Accordingly, if the transfer to the trust is made prior to October 24, 1992, the spousal annuity or unitrust interest may qualify under § 25.2523(f)-(1)(c)(3) as a qualifying income interest for life.
[T.D. 8522, 59 FR 9663, Mar. 1, 1994]