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TERRORIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA:

THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 4, 2014

Serial No. 113–121

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Gino Costa, Ph.D., president, Ciudad Nuestra (appearing via teleconference) .. 5

Ms. Celina B. Realuyo, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies, professor of practice of National Security Affairs, National Defense 

University ............................................................................................................. 13

Mr. Douglas Farah, senior associate, Americas Program, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies ................................................................................... 27

Mr. Michael Shifter, president, Inter-American Dialogue ................................... 59

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Gino Costa, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 7

Ms. Celina B. Realuyo: Prepared statement ......................................................... 16

Mr. Douglas Farah: Prepared statement ............................................................... 30

Mr. Michael Shifter: Prepared statement .............................................................. 61

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 76

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 77

(1)

TERRORIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA:

THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The committee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitation of the rules. 

Transnational criminal and terrorist groups in Latin America are 

a threat to the United States national security. Some of the main 

players on this battlefield are FARC in Colombia, and Shining Path 

in Peru, and even Hezbollah. The DEA has solid evidence showing 

stronger ties between FARC and Hezbollah. 

Hezbollah operative Ayman Joumaa smuggled over 90,000 tons 

of cocaine into America and laundered over $250 million for the 

cartels. Jamal Yousef, also a Hezbollah agent, agreed to provide 

military grade weapons to FARC in exchange for hundreds of kilograms of cocaine. 

Hezbollah and FARC maintain an operational alliance, much of 

which occurs under the protection of the Venezuelan regime. Other 

illicit Hezbollah activity occurs in the dangerous tri-border area. 

The activities of these groups include drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, and weapons shipments. 

In Peru, Shining Path is the main terrorist organization. Shining 

Path recruits children to participate in the drug activity, also forcing them to fight on the front lines. We have seen progress, however, in the fight against Shining Path. U.S. assistance was critical 

to kicking them out of an area called San Martin. Our assistance 

helped eradicate cocaine crops, give farmers alternative crops to 

plant, and take out leaders of Shining Path. 

This past August, two of the group’s top leaders were killed. I 

had the opportunity to go to San Martin last fall. I saw Peruvians 

working in the heat of the day pulling up one by one the cocaine 

crops. They were trying to make their country a safer place. 

I also visited a farm that stopping growing cocaine. The matriarch was a strong-willed woman whose husband was killed by drug 

violence. When this happened, she decided she had seen enough, 

2

and now she grows some of the best quality chocolate in the world. 

Ten years ago, even the Peruvian Government could not set foot in 

the region. Today Shining Path is nowhere to be found, and it is 

known as the San Martin Miracle. 

The war is not won. Up to 500 members of the Shining Path are 

holding on in a hard region known as VRAEM. More than 50 percent of all cocaine produced in Peru comes from this region. There 

are few roads that go in and out of the rugged terrain, but drug 

traffickers fly about six flights a day out of VRAEM into neighboring countries. 

President Humala has doubled down on the taking out of Shining Path. For the first time in its history, the Government of Peru 

is now spending its own money on drug eradication, and now President Humala is preparing to go into VRAEM and smoke these bandits out. 

Now is not the time, when we have the Shining Path on the run, 

for the United States to stop its help. We need to help Peru finish 

this job. In Colombia, the FARC is the main enemy. Thanks in part 

to over $100 million of U.S. assistance and training the FARC has 

never been weaker. FARC went from 20,000 members in 2004 to 

7,000 today, but FARC is still a serious threat. 

No longer able to execute large and high profile attacks, they are 

going back to their guerrilla warfare. They have increased small 

scale attacks on the military and government workers in the last 

2 years. They are getting more involved in the drug trade. Some 

say they are even morphing into their own criminal organization. 

The Colombian Government is negotiating with FARC as we 

speak. So far, the two sides have tentatively agreed on what political participation would look like in some of the rural development 

and land reform. 

Now the ball is in FARC’s court to see if the talks are going to 

progress. FARC has to decide if it is willing to give up its weapons 

and change their criminal behavior. It is not clear if these negotiations are going to work. Any deal is not necessarily a good deal. 

FARC senior leaders might enjoy a deal, but the foot soldiers won’t 

benefit much. If that happens, there is a chance that the lower 

ranks will fracture and form their own separate criminal or terrorist organizations, and the problem may only grow. 

We have seen progress in both Colombia and Peru, and I want 

to know from our witnesses what lessons we can learn from this 

progress and how we can help fight other terrorist organizations. 

It remains to be seen if this progress can be sustained. We have 

not yet achieved victory against these two groups, and I look forward to hearing what our witnesses think U.S. policy should be 

going forward to make sure we can finish the job. 

I will now turn over for his opening statement the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Judge, for holding these hearings. We 

will focus particularly on Colombia and Peru, which have struggled 

with insurgencies for decades. These conflicts have a long and complicated history. Additionally, the neighboring states and various 

non-state actors have used the region as a battleground and as a 

base to advance their interests. 

3

I want our witnesses to particularly focus on three things—the 

involvement of Hezbollah, the exportation of drugs, and human 

trafficking. 

The insurgent activity in Peru has been reduced in strength and 

territory from its peak in the 1980s and the 1990s. Current assessments of the insurgency known as Shining Path consist of only a 

few hundred armed members. At one point, this insurgency had at 

least 5,000 armed fighters. 

Shining Path operations have been mostly limited to the most remote rural areas, and Shining Path is a militant movement founded by a former university professor who is now in prison. Its goal 

was to destroy the Peruvian Government and replace it with a revolutionary peasant authority using Mao-style guerilla warfare. 

Engaging in massacres and assassinations, Shining Path posed a 

threat to the Peruvian Government and institutions at the height 

of its activity. The conflict led to 70,000 deaths, most of whom were 

civilians. Alberto Fujimori, then President, led a counterinsurgency 

campaign that improved national security, but according to many 

human rights groups came at the cost of many human rights violations. 

Shining Path began a minor resurgence in 2001. It currently has 

two competing factions constituting a low level threat in certain 

mountainous and hard-to-reach Andean regions. There was a split 

over whether or not to pursue a peace process, with one faction expressing interest in those negotiations. 

According to the State Department’s most recent country report 

on terrorism, Shining Path committed 87 acts of terrorism in 2012 

killing 1 civilian and 13 members of the military, 5 police officers, 

for a total of 19 people. 

Turning to Colombia, the State Department’s annual report—annual Country Reports on Terrorism in 2012, which was issued in 

May of last year, indicates that the majority of terrorist acts in 

Latin America were perpetrated by the FARC—one organization, 

the majority of terrorist acts on the entire continent, in fact the entire region. 

FARC is a group of mostly rural insurgents who, since the organization’s founding in 1964, have sought to overthrow the Colombian Government. FARC grew steadily over the decades and drew 

resources from drug trafficking, extortion, other illicit activities. 

The FARC portrays itself as a struggle against the Colombia systematic inequality. The FARC was declared to be a foreign terrorist 

organization by the United States in 1997, and in that same year 

so was the Shining Path of Peru. Both are still listed. 

It is believed that at its high point in the early 2000s FARC had 

approximately 16,000, even 20,000 troops. It is now down to about 

half that strength. Reports indicate that some 220,000 people have 

died in the course of Colombia’s conflict, and of course the vast majority of those were civilians. 

The war with FARC entered a very different phase over the 

course of the implementation of Plan Colombia. The United States 

appropriated over $9 billion this century to carry out that plan. I 

know our witnesses will assess for us the impact of that aid. 

Under Plan Colombia and its subsequent strategies, the country 

has made considerable progress in combatting drug trafficking and 

4

insurgent activities. However, here again we hear human rights 

groups citing elements with the Colombian military, working with 

right wing paramilitary forces, and abusing human rights. 

There have of course been tensions with Colombia’s neighbors, 

most especially Venezuela, but there also has been FARC operations in Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. And I look forward to learning more from our witnesses, and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the ranking member. Without objection, all of 

the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made part of the record, 

and I will ask that each witness keep their presentation to 5 minutes. 

I will introduce all four witnesses, and then we will hear from 

our first witness. Dr. Gino Costa is the head of the Ciudad 

Nuestra, an NGO specializing in citizen security and police reform. 

Prior to that he worked in the U.N. Center for Human Rights in 

Geneva and the U.N. Mission to Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. He served as executive secretary of the Ad Hoc Pardons 

Commission set up by the Peruvian Government in 1996 to review 

terrorism conviction and was Deputy Ombudsman for Human 

Rights from ’97 to 2000. 

Ms. Celina Realuyo—is that right? Close enough? Is professor of 

practice at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies at the National Defense University where she focuses on 

U.S. national security, illicit networks, transnational organized 

crime, counterterrorism, and threat finance issues in the Americas. 

She is a former U.S. diplomat, international banker with Goldman 

Sachs, and a U.S. foreign policy advisor under the Clinton and 

Bush administrations. 

Mr. Douglas Farah is the senior non-resident associate of the 

Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. Since January 2005, he has also been the president of the 

IBI Consultants. His focus is on the transnational criminal organizations, terrorism, and their effects on states and corruption with 

a focus on the Western Hemisphere. And he serves as consultant 

to several U.S. Government departments, agencies, combatant commands, and leading academic centers in the United States and 

overseas. 

Mr. Michael Shifter is the president of the Inter-American Dialogue. Since ’93, he has been adjunct professor of Latin American 

Politics at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Before 

joining the Dialogue, he directed the Latin American and Caribbean Program at the National Endowment for Democracy and the 

Ford Foundation Governance and Human Rights Program in the 

Andean region in Southern Cone. 

Dr. Costa will give his opening statement, and we will proceed 

directly to members’ questions from him. We will then end the 

video conference with him and hear from our remaining witnesses. 

Dr. Costa, thank you for joining us from Peru. Thank you also 

for waiting some time. And you may now give us your statement, 

and then we will go directly to questions from the panel, and then 

hear testimony from our other three witnesses. 

5

STATEMENT OF GINO COSTA, PH.D., PRESIDENT, CIUDAD 

NUESTRA (APPEARING VIA TELECONFERENCE) 

Mr. COSTA. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, and 

members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 

In 1992, 12 years after the beginning of the armed conflict, the 

most important leaders of the Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru 

Revolutionary Movement were captured by the police, and their 

military forces were almost completely dismantled. Since then, the 

leaders of both groups have been in prison and military actions 

have almost disappeared. 

This victory was the result of excellent police intelligence in 

urban areas and an alliance between the armed forces and rural 

peasants in the countryside. Holdovers from the Shining Path retreated to mountainous, inhospitable, and inaccessible areas located in the coca-growing regions of the VRAEM and the Upper 

Huallaga valleys, where they engaged in sporadic actions to obstruct efforts by the security forces to eradicate illicit crops and 

fight drug trafficking. 

In February 2012, 20 years later, Comrade Artemio, the Shining 

Path leader in the Huallaga Valley, was detained by the police. 

Thus, one of the two armed holdovers of the Shining Path was effectively dismantled. Artemio’s downfall was the result of a prolonged and successful intelligence effort, which involved the counternarcotics and counterterrorism police. 

Previously, police actions had led to the arrest or killing of 

Artemio’s most important supporters. Progress in security went 

hand in hand with the eradication of illicit coca, alternative development efforts, and a growing state presence. Although illicit crops 

remain, they are shrinking in number, and the Valley has turned 

into a peaceful region, a condition which has been described as the 

‘‘San Martin miracle.’’

Unlike the Huallaga Valley, the strategy against the Shining 

Path in the VRAEM was led by the military, and the role of the 

police was negligible until fairly recently. The strategy, implemented a decade ago, was basically defensive and consisted of the 

establishment of military bases for the purpose of containing the 

Shining Path’s expansion. 

Between 2008 and 2009, the armed forces went on the offensive 

in order to take control of the Shining Path headquarters in the 

Vizcatan region. After initially retreating, the Shining Path 

counterattacked by ambushing and killing dozens of soldiers and 

police agents, and even disrupting its air support, forcing the military to withdraw in defeat with not one Shining Path soldier detained or killed. 

Artemio’s capture made evident that the unsuccessful military 

strategy in the VRAEM had to be replaced by the successful police 

strategy carried out in the Huallaga Valley. It was not easy for the 

military to acknowledge that the police had to play the lead role 

in the counterterrorist effort. 

The decision was finally made by President Humala, who decided 

to integrate the intelligence activities of the counternarcotics police, 

the counterterrorist police and the Peruvian Navy, which together 

6

formed a special intelligence brigade under police leadership. This 

brigade, with the support of all the branches of the armed forces, 

made it possible to strike on an ad hoc basis. 

It was this new strategy that led to the killing of Comrade William in September 2012, and Comrades Alipio and Gabriel in August 2013, the three most important Shining Path military leaders 

and the number 5, 2, and 4 of its command structure, respectively. 

The Shining Path has been dealt a very hard blow, but it is still 

a long way from being defeated. Estimates of its strength in the 

VRAEM vary between 140 armed men and somewhere between 400 

and 500. It is essential to take advantage of its current weakness 

to capture and kill what is left of its leadership—Comrades Jose, 

Raul, and Olga—and dismantling its military apparatus. U.S. assistance, through DEA, has been instrumental in the progress thus 

far achieved and should be sustained to ensure the defeat of what 

is left of the Shining Path. 

The achievements of the last 2 years demonstrate the effectiveness of the new strategy, which could be helpful to confront terrorist groups elsewhere. This strategy consists of prioritizing police 

intelligence work, which should combine human intelligence with 

electronics, telephone and radio listeners. Good intelligence facilitates more precise police operations in the field to capture or hit 

the main leaders of the terrorist organizations. 

Military involvement in these command operations can be very 

helpful. It is crucial to ensure the legality of intelligence and operational actions, so that these cases may be prosecuted by the judicial system. An effort of this nature requires only a small number 

of participants, but highly professional ones, that generally come 

from various units and institutions. Thus, it is essential that their 

actions be properly coordinated and conducted at the highest possible level. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costa follows:]

7


86587a-1.eps

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing 

Landscape 

The Peruvian Case 

Gino Costa, Ph.D. 

President, Ciudad Nuestra 

Lima, Peru 

February 4,2014 
8


86587a-2.eps

In 1992, twelve years after the beginning of the armed conflic!' the main leaders of the 

Shining Path (SP) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (TARM) were captured 

by the police and their military forces were almost completely dismantled. Since then, the 

leaders of both groups have been in prison and military actions have almost disappeared. 

This victory was the result of excellent police intelligence in urban areas and an alliance 

between the armed forces and rural peasants in the countryside. Holdovers from the SP 

retreated to mountainous, inhospitable, and inaccessible areas located in the coca-growing 

regions of the VRAEM and the Upper Huallaga valleys, where they engaged in sporadic 

actions to obstruct efforts by the security forces to eradicate illicit crops and fight drug 

tralTic1..ing. 

In February 2012, Arlemia. the Shining Path leader in the Huallaga Valley, was detained 

by the police. Thus, one of the two armed holdovers of the SP was e1Tectively dismantled. 

Artemia's dovmfall ,vas the result of a prolonged and successful intelligence effort, ,vhich 

involved the countemarcotics (DIRANDRO) and counterterrorism (D1RCOTli) police. 

Previously, police actions had led to the arrest or killing of Anemia's most important 

supporters. Progress in security went hand in hand with the eradication of illicit coca, 

alternative development efforts, and a growing state presence. Although illicit crops 

remain, they are shrinking in number, and the Valley has turned into a peaceful region, a 

condition which has been described as the "San Martin Miracle". 

Unlike the Huallaga Valley. the strategy against the Shining Path in the VRAEM was led by 

the military and the role of the police was negligible until fairly recently. The strategy, 

implemented a decade ago, was basically defensive and consisted on the establishment of 

military bases for the purpose of containing SP's expansion. Between 2008 and 2009, the 

armed forces went on the olTensive in order to ta1..e control of the SP's headquarters in the 

Vizcatan region. After initially retreating, the Shining Path counter-attacked by ambushing 

and killing dozens of soldiers and police agents, and even disrupting its air support, forcing 

the militarv to withdraw in defeat with not one SP soldier detained or killed. 

Arremia's capture made evident that the unsuccessful military strategy had to be replaced 

by the successful police strategy. It ,vas not easy for the military to acknowledge that the 

police had to play the lead role in the counterterrorist elI or!. The decision was finally made 
9


86587a-3.eps

by President Humala, who decided to integrate the intelligence activities of the 

counternarcotics police, the counterterrorist police and the Peruvian Navy, which together 

f0ll11ed a special intelligence brigade, under police leadership. This brigade, vvith the 

support of all the branches of the armed forces, made it possible to strike on an ad hoc 

basis. It was this new strategy that led to the killing of William in September 2012 and 

Alipio and Gabriel in August 2013, the three most important SP military leaders and 

number five, two and four of SP's cOl11l11and structure, respectively. 

SP has been dealt a very hard blow, but is still a long way from being defeated. Estimates 

on its strength in the VRAEM vary between 140 anmed men and somewhere between 400 

and 500. It is essential to take advantage of its current weakness by capturing or killing 

what is left of its leadership (Jose, ROlli and Olga), and dismantling its military apparatus. 

U.S. assistance, through DEA has been instrumental in the progress thus far achieved and 

should be sustained to ensure the defeat of SP. 

The achievements of the last two years demonstrate the effectiveness of the nevv strategy 

against SP, which could be helpful to confront terrorist groups elsewhere. This strategy 

consists of prioritizing police intelligence vvork, which should combine human intelligence 

with electronics (telephone and radio listeners). Good intelligence facilitates more precise 

police operations in the field, to hit, wound, and eventually kill the main leaders of the 

terrorist organization. Military involvement in these conmland operations can be very 

helpful. It is crucial to ensure the legality of intelligence and operational actions, so that 

these cases may be prosecuted by the judicial system. An effort of this nature requires only 

a small number of participants, but highly professional ones, that generally corne from 

various units and institutions. Thus, it is essential that their actions be properly coordinated 

and conducted at the highest possible level. 
10

Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Costa. It is good to see you again. I will 

start with the questions. There are reports that the United States 

Government is looking at cutting some of the aid to Peru. What impact will this have on the fight against Shining Path? And, second, 

what impact will it have on drug eradication? 

Mr. COSTA. The U.S. Government has already been cutting down 

its cooperation to Peru. So the information that it might cut it further is not good news for the fights against what is left of Sendero 

and the fight against drug trafficking in Peru. So we do hope that 

an effort can be made to sustain the support provided by the U.S. 

Government to the Peruvian Government, especially to make sure 

that we can finish what is left of the Shining Path. 

I do think that the U.S. support is crucial. It has been crucial, 

and we need to continue with that support. 

Regarding the fight against drug trafficking and illicit crops, the 

Peruvian Government has been increasing its budget to finance 

what periods ago was exclusively an effort funded by U.S. resources. And we hope that in the coming years that national effort 

will increase to make sure that we can deal on our own with, you 

know, the need to confront drug trafficking in Peru. 

Still, we also need in this regard sustained support by the U.S. 

Government. But I want to stress the type of thing that, you know, 

the most important threat now is to deal with the violent expression of drug trafficking in Peru, and there is a need to get the job 

finished before retreating from Peru. 

Mr. POE. If you would be a little more specific on U.S.-Peruvian 

counterterrorism efforts and give us some detail as to what has 

been effective, what has been the most successful strategy between 

Peru and the United States on counterterrorism. 

Mr. COSTA. Chairman Poe, as I said in my statement, it has been 

crucial for the progress achieved regarding the Shining Path to ensure that quality of the intelligence work that has been carried out. 

And in this regard, the support of the U.S. has been very important 

in terms of training, in terms of providing equipment for electronic 

intelligence, and in terms of following and accompanying the efforts 

of the security forces in Peru. 

There have also been resources provided by the U.S. Government 

to recompense us to compensate for those that provide information 

that could lead to the detention of Shining Path leaders. So I think 

that that would be the most important aspects of U.S. cooperation 

with Peruvian security forces. 

Regarding the fight against the Shining Path, of course the drugs 

program in Peru, which is also very important, it has been instrumental for the success of the San Martin experience regarding the 

eradication of illicit crops and alternative development strategies. 

But as I said before, the Peruvian Government in the last 2 years 

has been investing of its own resources to be able to compensate 

for the reduction in the U.S. support in this regard. 

Mr. POE. Do you know of any evidence that Shining Path is 

working with FARC or other Mexican drug cartels? 

Mr. COSTA. No. We don’t have any—I don’t have any information 

regarding relations between what is left of the Shining Path and 

Hezbollah or the FARC, or even the Mexican or Colombia cartels 

11

themselves. There is no doubt that the Shining Path is related to 

the drug traffic. 

The most important source for the funding of its activities comes 

from drug trafficking and mainly from the support and protection 

that it provides drug trafficking in the VRAEM. But I don’t have 

information as to direct relations between the Shining Path and 

the Mexican and the Colombian cartels. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Costa. 

Now the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for his questions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

The Shining Path is split into two organizations, one with the 

initials SL.FRAEM, the other SL.UHV. Would you think either one 

of these will reach a peace accommodation with the Peruvian Government? 

Mr. COSTA. Actually, the two—I mentioned that after the defeat 

of the Shining Path, the strategic defeat of the Shining Path in the 

early ’90s, there were two armed holdovers, one in the Huallaga 

Valley and one in the VRAEM. The holdover in the Huallaga Valley, headed by Artemio, wanted a peace accord with the government, and Artemio followed the line, the political direction, of 

Abimael Guzman imprisoned for life in the Peruvian naval base. 

But Artemio was detained, as I said in my statement, 2 years 

ago. And after his detention the whole military apparatus led by 

Artemio collapsed and was dismantled. So actually today we only 

have one Shining Path group, which is one left in the VRAEM. 

They have no relation with the leadership of Abimael Guzman and 

Artemio. They believe that Guzman has betrayed the Peruvian 

Revolution, and they follow a different line. 

So in military terms, all we have left today is one Shining Path 

group concentrated in the VRAEM that has no relation with historical leadership of the Shining Path. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you for that update. President Fujimori 

was convicted not only of corruption but also of stated crimes 

against humanity and human rights abuses. How does the human 

rights behavior of the current Peruvian Government compare to 

those who practice under President Fujimori? 

Mr. COSTA. I do believe that we have learned the lesson. Currently, there are no serious allegations of human rights abuses 

against the security forces in the context of the fight against the 

Shining Path in the VRAEM, or previously the Shining Path in the 

Huallaga Valley, nor any serious allegations regarding the conduction of our anti-drug policy in those two valleys and a number of 

other valleys where the coca leaf is produced. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Obviously, the Shining Path is a much less dangerous organization than it was in its heyday. Peru is a mid-income 

country. Why can’t the Peruvian Government deal with this and 

other issues of national security and drug interdiction without help 

from the United States taxpayer? 

Mr. COSTA. We are certainly dealing with the problem, but we 

certainly benefit a lot from U.S. assistance. We are well aware of, 

you know, the budgetary and fiscal problems you are facing in the 

United States. And as I said before, we have been making a very 

important effort to compensate for the reduction in U.S. cooperaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:26 Mar 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\020414\86587 SHIRL
12

tion regarding the fight against drugs and the fight against Shining Path. 

As I said before, I think it would be very important to ensure 

that U.S. cooperation can be sustained at least until we finish what 

is left of the Shining Path, and that is what I would hope. I think 

it is also, as Chairman Poe said at the beginning of his presentation, that this is also in the interest of—the international interest 

of the U.S. Government. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. We will now hear questions from the gentleman from 

Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, sir, thank you for being here. I am actually—I fly an RC26, 

which is an intelligence surveillance reconnaissance airplane, and 

I believe Peru actually has the same asset. You talked a lot about 

the use of intelligence in terms of finishing off these groups or in 

terms of taking the fight to them anywhere else that this replicates. 

Where does Peru stand right now in terms of having enough of 

those assets without U.S. help? And, you know, where do they need 

to be in order to be able to effectively take—to finish this fight and 

take it to the bad guys? 

Mr. COSTA. We do have the wherewithal to deal with the problem, but part of that wherewithal is being provided by the U.S. 

Government. So, as I said before, that is one of the reasons why 

I do believe that it would be helpful to continue receiving U.S. assistance, especially regarding intelligence, electronic intelligence. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. Also, so now to kind of tie this to the issue 

we deal with in the Middle East and in other places, what is the 

risk right now? What do you see the risk of—if we let up on this 

fight in Peru, what do you see the future as? Are they going to 

stay, you know, 500 people? Do you see the risk of this expanding 

yet again? 

And on top of that, I want you to talk about the difference between what drives this group, Shining Path, and what drives, for 

instance, al-Qaeda? Al-Qaeda, which is a jihadist group driven by 

religion versus kind of a political ideology. Could you talk about the 

difference in the risk associated with that issue? 

Mr. COSTA. Yes. If we would be having this conversation 2 years 

ago, we would certainly be much more concerned, because that 

strategy to deal with Sendero was failing until we managed to 

strike Artemio in the Huallaga, and then implement the new strategy to deal with the Shining Path in the VRAEM. And now we expect to be able to conclude the job if we insist in applying this new 

strategy. 

But 2 years ago the feeling was that we were losing this battle, 

that the Shining Path—especially in the VRAEM was growing, its 

area of influence was increasing, and its military presence was 

threatening the transportation of natural gas from the Camisea region in Cusco to the coast and mainly to the capital in Lima. That 

natural gas accounts for around 40 percent of the energy we consume in the country. 

That threat is still there. We know that part of the funding of 

Sendero comes from extortion to the gas companies that are reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:26 Mar 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\020414\86587 SHIRL
13

sponsible for the transportation of the natural gas from Cusco to 

Lima. So that is the kind of threat, and what concerns us the most 

with Sendero, the possibility of Sendero recovering the lost territory it had in the early ’90s, threatening the supply of natural gas, 

40 percent of the energy we consume in the country. 

But we are aware that it is more a local than an international 

threat in this moment. As I said before, we don’t have information 

that it has contacts with international terrorist groups. This discussion within Peru where Sendero is today, the military expression 

of drug trafficking in Peru, or if it is still a political group, I do believe that it is still a political group, although its interests with 

drug trafficking and illegal logging and extortion to gas companies 

have—makes this group also an organization involved in common 

crime. 

But I think there are great differences between the Shining Path 

and al-Qaeda and these sort of movements in the Middle East. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. And I will just conclude by saying I 

think it is important when you have a group like this on their 

heels, this is where we tend to sometimes make the decision to let 

up, because we are not eager to have a fight over—and I think this 

is when it is important to double down pressure and extinguish existing terrorist groups. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Five minutes for the gentleman 

from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton. 

[No response.] 

All right. He yields back his time. 

Mr. Costa, I want to—Dr. Costa, I want to thank you for joining 

us today by video conference. We appreciate your testimony and 

your answers to all of the questions. And I also want to thank the 

U.S. Embassy for helping to set this up. So thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. We will now turn to the witnesses at the—present in 

the hearing room. Thank you for waiting. Ms. Realuyo, you have 

5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CELINA B. REALUYO, WILLIAM J. PERRY 

CENTER FOR HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES, PROFESSOR 

OF PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NATIONAL 

DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Ms. REALUYO. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today before you to testify on the convergence of illicit networks in Latin America. 

I am a professor of practice at the William J. Perry Center for 

Hemispheric Defense Studies, but the views expressed today are 

my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Perry Center, the National Defense University, or the Defense Department. 

Globalization has transformed our lives positively with the free 

flow of goods, services, information, and technology. However, at 

the same time, globalization has empowered illicit networks, including terrorists, criminals, and proliferators that undermine our 

prosperity and security. 

14

Terrorists have political objectives while criminals seek to maximize profits. What we are witnessing today is a disturbing convergence of terrorism and crime from the mountains of Afghanistan to 

the jungles of Latin America that threatens the rule of law, governments, the economy, and society. 

In contrast to indigenous terrorist groups like the FARC in Colombia and the Shining Path, Hezbollah, the Shia Muslim political 

group in Lebanon, designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization, operates inside and outside of Lebanon. It relies on significant support from Iran and the Lebanese Shiite diaspora community around the world. 

As you know, before the tragic attacks of September 11 perpetrated by al-Qaeda, Hezbollah was the terrorist group responsible for the most U.S. casualties from terrorist attacks since its 

founding in 1982. More recently, Hezbollah has been in the headlines for actively supporting and fighting alongside President 

Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria. 

Hezbollah and its global facilitators represent an emerging terror-crime nexus through its networks in the Middle East, Africa, 

and the Western Hemisphere. Since the 1990s, Hezbollah has enjoyed ideological and financial support from the Lebanese community in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, a region known for arms, drugs, counterfeit, and human trafficking. 

Three more recent cases illustrates Hezbollah’s increasing reliance on facilitators engaged in criminal activities beyond the triborder of South America. In 2008, Operation Titan, a 2-year joint 

U.S.-Colombian investigation, dismantled an international cocaine 

smuggling and money laundering ring that allegedly directed part 

of its profits to Hezbollah. 

Among the 138 suspects arrested was Lebanese kingpin Chekry 

Harb, accused of being a world-class money launderer. According to 

Colombian officials, he laundered millions of dollars each year from 

Panama to Hong Kong and paid some 12 percent of his profits to 

Hezbollah. 

In a separate case, Ayman Joumaa, a Lebanese-Colombian national and critical facilitator for Hezbollah, was indicted in absentia 

in November 2011 for distributing 85,000 kilograms of cocaine from 

Colombia through Central America to the Los Zetas cartel in Mexico. He is also accused of laundering $850 million of drug money 

from Mexico, Europe, and West Africa, to Colombia and Venezuela. 

Joumaa allegedly charged between 8 to 14 percent for laundering 

the funds and directed some of his profits to Hezbollah. This partnership between a prominent Hezbollah facilitator and Los Zetas, 

Mexico’s most violent cartel, is a disturbing development illustrating the convergence of terrorism and crime. 

The most recent case of Hezbollah’s global facilitators involved 

the now-defunct Lebanese Canadian Bank, Lebanon’s eighth largest bank with assets worth over $5 billion. According to the DEA, 

this bank and some Lebanese exchange houses wired at least $329 

million from 2007 to 2011 to the United States to finance a sophisticated illicit trade and money laundering scheme. 

This network moved drugs from South America to Europe and 

the Middle East, and purchased used cars in the U.S. to be shipped 

and sold in West Africa. Cash from the car sales, as well as from 

15

the drug trafficking, were funneled to Lebanon through Hezbollahcontrolled money laundering channels. 

On June 23, 2013, Lebanese Canadian Bank agreed to pay here 

in the United States a settlement of $102 million. It is just a fraction of the amount of money allegedly laundered by this institution. 

In the age of globalization, the convergence of terror crime networks is capitalizing on global resources, supply chains, markets, 

and facilitators. The Operation Titan, Ayman Joumaa, Lebanese 

Canadian Bank cases illustrate how Hezbollah relies on criminal 

activities and support from overseas among the Lebanese diaspora 

in Latin America. 

Drug trafficking, money laundering, and illicit trade in Latin 

America that fund Hezbollah are impacting U.S. consumers, financial institutions, and markets. While according to the State Department, Hezbollah may not be currently plotting terrorist acts in the 

United States or Latin America, we must remain vigilant and prepare for potential threats. 

The 2011 White House Strategies to Combat Terrorism and 

Transnational Organized Crime seek to channel the appropriate 

USG resources to address these threats. To confront the convergence of illicit networks, we need to promote more effective interagency and international cooperation to better understand, analyze, 

and counter these illicit networks. 

Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Realuyo follows:]

16


86587b-1.eps

Statement of 

Celina B. Realnyo* 

Professor of Practice 

William J. Peny Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 

On 

Hezbollah's Global Facilitators in Latin America 

At a Hearing Entitled 

"Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing Landscape" 

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

U. S. House of Representatives 

February 4,2014 

* The views expressed in this testimony are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, or 

the Department of Defense. 
17


86587b-2.eps

Thank you Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Shennan, and members of the subcommittee 

for the opportunity to appear before this committee today to testify on terrorist groups in Latin 

America and discuss the emerging threat posed to U.S. national security by the convergence of 

illicit networks in the region. Through globalization, the free flow of goods, services, capital, 

ideas, and technology has positively transformed our lives in an increasingly interconnected 

world; simultaneously, these same drivers have allowed terrorists, criminals, proliferators, and 

the illicit networks in which they operate, to empower themselves at the expense of the 

prosperity, security, and integrity of the global community. These illicit actors actively seek out 

governance gaps, socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and character weaknesses as openings to 

conduct their nefarious activities and expand their power and influence throughout the world. No 

community, country, or region is immune. This includes Latin America that is no stranger to 

terrorism and crime. More recently though, we are witnessing a notable and disturbing 

convergence of these phenomena that is destabilizing the region and threatening U.S. interests at 

horne and abroad. After briefly examining indigenous terrorist movements in Colombia and Peru 

that illustrate the terror-crime nexus, I will focus on Hezbollah's global facilitators who are 

securing financing and support from Latin America and beyond. 

While illicit activities have been with us since ancient times, what is novel today is the 

pervasive, prolitic, and converging nature of illicit networks around the world. Terrorists have 

political objectives and criminals are focused on profits, but the convergence of terrorism and 

crime is a lethal combination. These networks threaten the rule oflaw, government institutions, 

the economy, and society. In the words of former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral 

James Stavridis, "just as legitimate governments and businesses have embraced the advances of 

globalization, so too have illicit traffickers harnessed the benefits of globalization to press 

forward their illicit activities."! Criminal activities such as drug, arms, contraband, and human 

tratlicking have experienced measurable increases in their velocity, scale, and associated 

violence as a result of globalization, and terrorist groups are getting into the act. The United 

States represents an attractive operating environment for these illicit actors given our open 

markets, continued drug demand, and financial system. The U.S. National Strategy for 

1 James G. Stavridis. Partnership jar the ~.J.merjcas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.,)'. ,Southern Command. 

(Washington, DC: Natiormi Defense University Press, 2010), p. 84 

2 
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Counterterrorism and Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime issued in 2011 by the 

White House directly recognize and address the convergence of these transnational threats. 

FARC in Colombia 

When we think about terrorism in Latin America, the FARC (or Revolutionary Anned 

Forces of Colombia) in Colombia comes to mind as the oldest and most fonnidable insurgency 

in the region. The F ARC is a Marxist-Leninist rebel group that has been challenging the 

Colombian government and seeking regime change since the 1960s. In the 1990s, the FARC that 

had provided security services for the powerful Cali, Medellin, and Norte del Valle drug cartels 

succeeded the cartels once they were defeated and dismantled by Colombian and U.S. 

counternarcotics operations. The FARC not only filled the power vacuum in Colombia's illicit 

economy but also filled its own coffers with the proceeds from the lucrative cocaine trade. 

Experts estimate that FARC takes in between $500 million and $600 million annually from the 

illegal drug trade. The group also profits from kidnappings, extortion schemes, and an unofficial 

"tax" that it levies in the countryside for "protection" and social services 2 The FARC's wealth 

has allowed it to equip, train, ann, and support its guerrillas and wage a prolonged and 

aggressive insurgency in Colombia. The case of the FARC, at times described as a narcoinsurgency or narco-terrorism, is one of the best examples of the terror-crime nexus in Latin 

America. Presently, the Colombian government under President Santos and the FARC are 

engaged in a peace process that may bring an end to this 50-year old insurgency. 

Shining Path in Peru 

Peru, like its neighbor Colombia, has faced its own insurgency from the Maoist-inspired 

Sendero Luminoso (or Shining Path). Shining Path was founded in the late 1960s as a small 

communist revolutionary group, led by philosophy professor Abimael Guzman. The group 

sought to overthrow the Peruvian government and political institutions and replace them with a 

communist revolutionary command. The Shining Path's "people's war" was quite active in the 

2 COlmcil on Foreign Relations. "F ARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-Wing Guerrillas Backgrounde,," August 19, 2009. 

hup:/h\ \\ \'V. cfr.o rg/cok:mb ia/fmc-e In-colomb las-len -\y jng -guerrillas/p92 7 2 

3 
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1980s and early 1990s but lost much of its momentum when its leader Guzman was captured and 

incarcerated in 1992.' 

In recent years, Shining Path has reemerged along with the Peruvian cocaine trade and is 

considered a key threat to Pem's national security. Due to Colombia's successful 

counterinsurgency and counternarcotics strategies isolating the F ARC and reducing cocaine 

production in Colombia creating the so-called "'balloon effect," Pem is tilling the void as a key 

drug production and trafficking concern. According to the State Department 2013 International 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Peru remained the world's top potential producer of cocaine 

for the second consecutive year The majority of cocaine produced in Peru is transported to 

South American countries for domestic consumption or to the grm'iing markets in Europe, East 

Asia, Mexico and the Caribbean. Shining Path operates in the Apurimac-Ene-Mantaro River 

Valley (VRAEM) and relics on cocaine production and trafficking as well as extortion for 

funding. The group is responsible for killing or wounding scores of police and military personnel 

engaged in counternarcotics operations. 4 Shining Path represents yet another example of the 

convergence of terror-crime networks in Latin America. 

Hezbollah and its Global Facilitators 

In contrast to indigenous terror groups like the F ARC and Shining Path, Hezbollah, the 

Shiite Muslim political group in Lebanon, designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the 

United States, relies on support from Iran and the Lebanese Shiite diaspom community overseas. 

Hezbollah and its global activities represent the emerging terror-crime nexus through its 

networks in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. As you know, before the tragic 

September II, 2001 attacks perpetrated by AI Qaida, Hezbollah was the terrorist group 

responsible for the most US casualties from terrorist attacks since its founding in 1982. More 

recently, Hezbollah has been in the headlines for actively supporting and fighting alongside 

President Bashar AI-Assad's regime in Syria. 

3 COlUleil on Foreign Relations, "Shining Path, Tupae Amaro (pem, leftists) Backgrounde,," August 27,2009. 

u.S. State Department 2013 Intemational Narcotics Control Strategy Report 

hUp:/r\\, \" \'\'. stale. go\,/j/illJJ rls!nrcmV2\) 11/\'011/2 O-W51, him 

4 
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86587b-5.eps

The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish 

Cultural Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina attributed to Hezbol1ah and Iran focused attention on 

Hezbollah's support networks in Latin America. According to Argentine special prosecutor 

Alberto Nisman, Hezbollah began its infiltration of Latin America in the mid-1980s, with its first 

major stronghold in the Tri-Border Area, a relatively lawless region along the frontiers of 

Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. From this base in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, Hezbollah set up 

illicit enterprises to fund its operations in the Middle East and elsewhere; the organization's 

endeavors included money laundering, counterfeiting, piracy and drug trafficking.; A 2004 study 

for the Naval War College detennined that Hezbollah's operations in the Tri-Border Area 

generated about $10 million annually, while a 2009 Rand Corporation report said Hezbollah 

netted around $20 million a year. Paraguayan authorities recognize the threat of Hezbollah and 

its facilitators operating in the Tri-Border Area, but admit that they lack the intelligence and law 

enforcement capabilities to effectively counter the threat. (, Hezbollah 's overseas operations 

extend beyond Latin Amelica. lts most recent attack was the July 18,2012 suicide bombing of a 

bus transporting Israeli tourists at the airport in Burgas, Bulgaria that killed five Israelis and the 

Bulgarian driver, and injured 32. 7 The incident in Bulgaria prompted the European Union to 

designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in July 2013 and demonstrates the group's global 

reach. 

The State Department designated Hezbollah a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 

1997 and believes that the group operates terrorist cells in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin 

America. In 2010, the Obama Administration described Hezbollah as "the most technically 

capable terrorist group in the world." According to a 2013 State Department fact sheet, 

Hezbollah's terrorist acti vity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s with Iranian 

sponsorship. Western diplomats and political analysts in Beirut estimated that Hezbollah 

~ Arthur Brice. "Iran. Hezbollah mine Latin America for revenue. recruits. analysts say:- CNN. June 3. 2013. 

http://\\ '-'Ii" ,Cll1LCOIU!':2()13!06/03h"orld/amcricasiiraJl-latin-HlllcricaI 

Li Author's intervie,Ys with Paruguayan Natiol1nl Police and Centml Bank Financial Intelligence Unit officinls in 

Asuncion. Paraguay_ November 8, 2013 

) Nicholas Kulish and Eric Schmitt. "Hezbollah Is Blamed [or Attack on Israeli Tourists in Bulgaria, 19. 2012 . 

.. Vel/' rork Times, 

5 
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recei ved up to $200 million a year from lran. 8 Due to increased pressures on Iran from the strict 

economic sanctions imposed by the West for its nuclear ambitions, it is believed that Iranian 

funding of Hezbollah has diminished and has forced Hezbollah to rely more on fundraising from 

the Lebanese diaspora and from facilitators engaged in criminal activities such as drug 

trafficking, counterfeit goods, and money laundering. 

Three cases of Hezbollah's reliance on global facilitators engaged in drug tratlicking and 

money laundering illustrate the convergence of terrorism and crime that threatens security and 

prosperity around the world. The following cases that involve Latin America will be discussed 

below: Operation Titan in 2008, the 2011 designation and indictment of Lebanese-Colombian 

drug kingpin Ayman Joumaa, and collapse of Lebanese Canadian Bank in 2012. 

Hezbollah Support from Cocaine Trafficking 

Operation Titan was a j oint endeavor by US. and Colombian investigators that in 

October 2008 dismantled an international cocaine smuggling and money laundering ring that 

allegedly directed part of its profits to finance Hezbollah. The two-year investigation resulted in 

more than 130 arrests and the seizure of $23 million by Colombian and US. agents 9 Among 

those arrested was Lebanese kingpin, Chekry Harb in Bogota, Colombia, who used the alias 

"Taliban" and acted as the hub of a disturbing alliance between South American cocaine 

trafllckers and Middle Eastern militants, according to Colombian investigators 10 Harb was 

accused of being a "world-class money launderer" whose ring laundered hundreds of millions of 

dollars each year, from Panama to Hong Kong, while paying some 12% of profits to Hezbollah, 

according to Gladys Sanchez, lead investigator for the special prosecutor's otlice in Bogota. She 

cited "this [case 1 as an example of how narco-tratlicking is a theme of interest to all criminal 

organizations, the F ARC, the paramilitaries, and terrorists" 11 Harb was charged with drugrelated crimes in a sealed indictment tiled in Miami in July 2008, but terrorism-related charges 

8 ScoU Wilsoll "Lebanese Wmy of a Rising Hezbollah: Fears of Militia's Broader Ambitions Reiglrite Debate Over 

Its Populist Agenda:' Washington Post, December 20,200-1-, In:m:/!wlY\Y.'iY3Shingtonpostcom/p.-pdYIvarticlesiA.J233G-200-t.Dec19 2.hunl 

9 Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella. "Drug probe finds Hezbollah link: Officials say they\e broken up Colombian 

ring that helped fund the militant grouP." [ ... 1 Times. October 22. 200g, 

http://:Jrticles.13times.com/2008!octJ22/\vorldlfg-cocainering22 

10 ibid. 

11 Matthew Leyitt. "South of the Border, a Threat from Hezbollah," Journal ojInternationai Security Ajjairs. 

Spring 2013, hi tP:i /1,",' '\' \'> . \\ ashlngtontIlSLHutc. oIg/no Ii cv -anal" E.1S!'"ie'\\ lsouth-0f-lhe-border-a-lhrem -frout-heL.bollah 

6 
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86587b-7.eps

were not filed. The suspects allegedly worked with a Colombian cartel and a paramilitary group 

to smuggle cocaine to the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. 

Colombian authorities explained that the case originally began as a money laundering 

investigation, but as agents "followed the money trail," they discovered the links between Harb 

and Hezbollah operatives. 12 Investigators employed 370 wiretaps and monitored 700,000 

conversations. Harb logged extensive travel to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt and was in phone 

contact with Hezbollah fib'llres, according to Colombian officials. 13 Operation Titan's revelations 

illustrate how Hezbollah receives support from members of the Lebanese diaspora community in 

Colombia to finance its activities; in the case of Chekry Harb, it was through the laundering of 

proceeds from cocaine trafficking. 

Ayman Joumaa - A Critical Global Facilitator for Hezbollah 

Ayman Joumaa is another key facilitator who is a dual Lebanese-Colombian national 

with ties not only to Hezbollah but the Mexican drug cartels. On November 23,2011 a federal 

grand jury indicted Ayman Joumaa, a.k.a "Junior," Lebanese drug kingpin, with alleged 

connections Hezbollah, for distributing tens of thousands of kilograms of cocaine from Colombia 

through Central America to Los Zetas in Mexico and for laundering millions of dollars worth of 

drug money from Mexico, Europe and West Africa to Colombia and Venezuela. 14 According to 

the Justice Department and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Joumaa and his associates 

allegedly shipped an estimated 85,000 kilograms of cocaine into the United States and laundered 

more than $850 million in drug money coming out of Mexico trom the Los Zetas cartel through 

various front companies and the now defunct Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB). Joumaa was 

allegedly charging fees between 8 percent and 14 percent for laundering the funds. During the 

12 Author"s intervie\vs ,vith Colombian Attomey General-s Terrorist Finance and Asset FOlfeiture Unit in Bogota, 

Colombia. September 17, 2013. 

l' Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella. "Dmg probe finds Hezbollah link: Officials say they've broken up Colombian 

ring tlmt helped fund the militant group." L·l1'imes. October 22, 200S, 

ln1ll;LIllrticles,lmi1l1~s.comj]J2.Q8ioGla2/\vorlM~ninering2~ 

14 The United States Attorney's Office - Eastern District of Virginia. "U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese Drng Kingpin 

Vlith Laundering Dnlg Proceeds For T\.1c:xican And Colombian Drug Cartels," Press Release, December 13, 2011, 

hUlJ://\\ \\'\'v.i!lli1icc,gov/u&ao/\ m:/Ilc'\"s/2Ul], ] 2/201J 12 t3jomt:l .. 13iIT,blml 

7 
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86587b-8.eps

course of the conspiracy, he typically picked up between $2 and $4 million at a time in Mexico 

City.1S 

According to the 2011 indictment, J oumaa's coordination of money laundering activities 

occurred in the United States, Lebanon, Benin, Panama, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of 

Congo and elsewhere. Regarding this case, U. S Attorney Neil MacBride said, "money fuels the 

drug trade, and Mr. Joumaa is alleged to be at the center of it all, working with those producing 

the vast majority of the world's cocaine to get their drugs safely into the hands of Mexican 

cartels, and then moving hundreds of millions in proceeds all around the world so the money 

can't be traced back to them in Colombia.,,16 Although indicted and designated a drug kingpin, 

Ayman Joumaa remains at large as a key global facilitator for Hezbollah. 

Lebanese Canadian Bank - Hezbollah's Bank of Choice 

As mentioned above, Ayman Joumaa moved and laundered money derived from 

narcotics trafi'icking through the now defunct Lebanese Canadian Bank among other tlnancial 

institutions. This bank and a series of Lebanese exchange houses served as conduits for money 

laundering and the iunding of Hezbollah through a sophisticated used car sales scheme through 

the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East. On February 10,2011, the Treasury Department 

identitled the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) together with its subsidiaries as a tlnancial 

institution "of primary money laundering concern" under Section 311 of the USA P ATRlOT Act 

for the bank's role in facilitating the money laundering activities of an international narcotics 

trafficking and money laundering network. This network moved illegal drugs from South 

America to Europe and the Middle East via West Africa and laundered hundreds of millions of 

dollars monthly through accounts held at LCB, as well as through trade-based money laundering, 

involving consumer goods throughout the world, including through used car dealerships in the 

United States. Treasury had reason to believe that LCB managers were complicit in the 

15 Jason Ryml "Lebanese Drug Lord Charged in US: Links lo Zelas and Hezbollah," ABC News, December 13, 

2011, http://<ibcne\vs.go.comiblog~Jpolitics!20IlI12!lcballcse-dmg-lord-charged-in-us-links-to-zet.ls-alld -hezbollahl 

16 [hid. 

8 
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network's money laundering activities. This action also exposes Hezbollah's links to LCB and 

the international narcotics trafficking and money laundering network. 17 

According to US authorities, from January 2007 to early 2011, at least $329 million was 

transferred by wire from Lebanese Canadian Bank and other financial institutions to the US to 

purchase used cars that were then shipped to West Africa. Cash from the sale of the cars, along 

with the proceeds of narcotics tratlicking, were tunneled to Lebanon through Hezbollahcontrolled money laundering channels. LCB played a key role in these money-laundering 

channels and conducted business with a number of Hezbollah-related entities. 18 Prior to being 

identified by FinCEN as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern in the 311 

Action, Lebanese Canadian Bank was Lebanon's eighth-largest bank, headquartered in Beirut, 

with approximately 35 branches throughout Lebanon, and total assets worth more than $5 billion 

as of 2009. Reflecting on this case, DEA Administrator Leonhart stated: "DEA and its partners 

have exposed the Lebanese Canadian Bank as a major money laundering source for Hezbollah. 

The connection between drug tramckers and terror networks is evident. By attacking the 

financial networks of those who wish to harm innocent Americans, DEA is strengthening 

national security making our citizens safer." 19 The complex investigation of Lebanese Canadian 

Bank and illicit networks was a great example of US. interagency cooperation among the 

Treasury and Justice Departments as well as law enforcement agencies like the DEA. 

On June 23,2013, the Beirut-based Lebanese Canadian Bank agreed to pay $102 million 

to settle the case, a fraction of the amount of money allegedly laundered by the institution on 

behalf of illicit actors. US. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara said, 

"the settlement shows that banks laundering money for terrorists and narco-tratlickers will face 

consequences for their actions, wherever they may be located. This type of money laundering 

l' Department of Treasury Press Release. 'Treasury Identifies Lebanese Canadian BanI\. Sal as a "Priumry Money 

Laundering COllCent" February 10.2011. ltU12:I!l\ "}~)~tJlS:;J~JJly.g9\jjJfQS_~:,9~!1Lf;JiP:c~~~-=-c~l~1}5~~12qg~s!lg]n:"}-,-,1S1r~ 

18 FBI NY Field Office Press Release. "Civil Suit Seeks More Than $480 Million from Entities That Facilitatcd 

Hizballah-Relatcd Money Laundcring Schcme:' December 15, 2011, bttp:iiwwwJbi.govinewyorlill>.!Sssreleasl;;..s/2011lclyil-suit-seeks-.i[!ore-thml--t80:mimoll-from-clitiJies-t]t!n-f~gJttill.~illzballah-Jrlated-m.Q.rrn.:. 

FBI NY Field OlIice Press Release, "Civil Suit Seeks More Tlmn $480 Million from Entities Tlk1t Facilitated 

Ld'UH"WHb Scheme," December 2011. 

bundering-scheme 

9 
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network fuels the operations of both terrorists and drug traffickers, and we will continue to use 

every resource at our disposal to sever the connection between terrorists, narco-traffickers, and 

those who fund their lethal agenda." DEA Administrator Michele M. Leonhart also commented, 

"Regardless of how or where, DEA will relentlessly pursue global drug criminals and their huge 

profits, in particular those associated with terror networks such as Hezbollah. This settlement is 

significant and addresses the role the Lebanese Canadian Bank played in facilitating illicit 

money movement from the United States to West Africa to Hezbollah-controlled money 

laundering channels. Drug trafficking profits and terror financing often grow and flow together. 

One of DEA's highest priorities will always be to promote U.S. and global security by disrupting 

these narco-terror schemes and protecting the systems they abuse.,,2o The Lebanese Canadian 

Bank case provided important insight into how Hezbollah's financiers leverage global supply 

chains and international financial institutions to realize their criminal activities around the world. 

Implications of the Convergence of Terrorism and Crime 

In the age of globalization, we are witnessing an emerging threat, the convergence of 

terror-crime networks that capitalize on global resources, supply chains, markets, and facilitators. 

Threats from illicit networks, including terrorists, criminals, and proliferators are nothing new, 

but the drivers of globalization have magnified the scope, pace, and impact of their activities that 

endanger national security and prosperity across the world. While indigenous terrorist groups 

like the F ARC in Colombia and Shining Path in Peru focus on national objectives, Hezbollah is a 

foreign terrorist organization that does not limit its operations and logistical support to Lebanon 

and the Middle East. Hezbollah directly targets U.S. interests and those of our allies, like Israel. 

The organization has been responsible for several terrorist attacks and plots beyond the Middle 

East, including the Burgas, Bulgaria bombing in 2012. 

The State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism indicated that there were no known 

operational cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere in 2012, although 

ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and 

ideological support to those terrorist groups. It also stated the Tri -Border area of Argentina, 

". U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Press Release, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Atmounces $102 

MilliOl:l sme~lilue~l~lle;nJl~O~[~C~i\~'il~F~O~r;[e~il~ur~e~At:;ld~M;o~ne~Y~;rlhl:2C~I~ai~nfllS~A~g~a~ill~slRL~e;bar'leSe Calk1dianBank," June 25, 2013, 11 

10 
26


86587b-11.eps

Brazil, and Paraguay continued to be an important regional nexus of anns, narcotics, and human 

smuggling, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering - all potential funding sources 

for terrorist organizations21 The cases of Operation Titan, the indictment of Ayman Joumaa, and 

dismantling of Lebanese Canadian Bank demonstrate how Hezbollah relies on overseas support 

from facilitators among the Shiite Lebanese diaspora community in Latin America. The drug 

trafficking, money laundering, and illicit trade in Latin America that fund Hezbollah are 

impacting U. S. consumers, financial institutions, and markets. The cases above illustrate the 

complexity and sophistication of these illicit networks tied to terrorism. Hezbollab may not be 

conducting or plotting terrorist operations in the U.S. and Latin America, but we must remain 

vigilant and be prepared for potential threats. The 2011 White House strategies to combat 

terrorism and transnational organized crime recognize these emerging threats and seek to channel 

the appropriate resources to address them. To confront the convergence of illicit networks, we 

need to promote more effective interagency and international cooperation, such as joint task 

forces and vetted units, to better understand, analyze, and devise specific measures to impact 

these illicit networks. 

Thank you for your time and attention. 

:1 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, hHV//w\\ w.state,gO\/i/ctirls!crV21J12l2099g.+.l\lm 

11 
27

Mr. POE. The chair recognizes Mr.—is it Farrah or Farah? 

Mr. Farah. Five minutes. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

AMERICAS PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you, sir. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Sherman, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity here to talk about the FARC and lessons learned for the 

United States. I should clarify that I am speaking on behalf of myself and not any institution. 

I believe the U.S. Government—the U.S.-Colombia partnership is 

one of the most successful in recent times. I have had the privilege 

of working in Colombia since 1989 and have seen the nation teeter 

on the edge of the abyss in the 1990s to emerge as a regional model 

of democracy and economic development. 

The FARC, despite the ongoing peace talks with the government 

of President Juan Manuel Santos in Cuba, remain engaged in 

criminal enterprises and terrorist activities that stretch from Colombia to Argentina and northward to Central America and Mexico. Recent cases by the DEA show the direct and growing criminal 

and drug ties between the FARC and Hezbollah. 

As I detail in my testimony, the FARC, since at least 1999, has 

established a relationship with the Government of Iran designated 

by the United States Government as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

The FARC was designated in 1997 following the kidnapping and 

executions of seven American missionaries. The European Union 

followed suit in 2005. 

Under the protection of the Governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, 

Nicaragua, and Bolivia, as well as powerful friends elsewhere, the 

FARC maintains a robust international infrastructure that produces thousands of kilos of cocaine and launders hundreds of millions of dollars. It has emerged as a prototype hybrid criminal/terrorist insurgency. 

It is not for me as a non-Colombian to judge the wisdom of holding peace talks, but what I can say is that the FARC is a central 

part of the revolutionary project of bringing together armed groups 

and terrorist organizations under the umbrella of the Bolivian Revolution with the aid and support of Iran. 

The glue that binds these groups is a shared vision of creating 

a new world order in which the United States, Europe, and Israel 

are enemies to be destroyed. Their common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare explicitly endorses the use of weapons of mass destruction against their perceived enemies. 

Over the past 15 years, Colombia has undergone a profound 

transformation. This is testament to Colombia’s own innovative 

and courageous policies and the sustained bipartisan U.S. support 

that span three administrations and has led to a partnership that 

is unique in Latin America. 

During the 3-year peace negotiations that ended in February 

2002 in Colombia, the FARC significantly expanded its outreach to 

other terrorist groups to increase its technical capabilities and establish relationships that endure to this day. 

28

Among the visitors to the FARC territory during the talks were 

the Iranian Government officials, ostensibly to build a refrigerated 

meat storage facility. The plant was never built, but it provided the 

FARC leadership with direct contact with Iranian officials, a relationship that endures today through the Venezuelan Government. 

ETA terrorists and other groups trained the FARC, and by 2003 

the FARC was using techniques from these organizations in attacks that took hundreds of civilian lives. In my written testimony, 

I detail the support based on documents captured by Colombian security forces when they killed Raul Reyes in 2008. Of these groups, 

as well as Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, Daniel Ortega, and Salvador Sanchez Ceren, the leading candidate for President of El Salvador, and his fellow FMLN leader, Jose Luis Merino. 

The FARC’s Central American Network is among the most important in the current discussion because it is still active. Nicaraguan President Ortega offers refuge and financial aid to the 

FARC, and the Reyes documents show that when Reyes was killed 

Merino and El Salvador was brokering a deal that included the 

sale of grenade launchers, 50-caliber machine guns, sophisticated 

explosives, and possibly surface-to-air missiles. 

Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, William Walker, a 

friend of Merino, recently wrote an op-ed in The New York Times 

defending the FMLN and dismissing its ties to the FARC, which 

he called a leftist movement rather than a terrorist organization. 

The right of the FMLN to participate in the electoral process is not 

in discussion as Ambassador Walker mistakenly argues. But defending its leaders who supply weapons to a terrorist organization 

is shocking for a former U.S. Envoy. 

There is significant evidence showing the FARC’s operational alliance with Hezbollah and Hezbollah’s allies based in Venezuela 

under the protection of the Maduro government. The evidence is 

compelling that both the FARC and Hezbollah are now engaged in 

a series of business relationships that involve the cocaine and 

weapons trades. 

Despite the support, the FARC did not win. The Colombian people ultimately wanted to save their country. It was this will, welded to the political will of successive U.S. administrations, to support them that is perhaps our greatest lesson to be drawn. The 

U.S.-Colombia Strategic Partnership must continue for the foreseeable future, even if peace talks are successful. 

With or without a peace agreement, the Colombian Government 

will require not only ongoing military and police support but support in other areas of their vast undertaking of reestablishing a 

positive state presence in huge areas of the country where the government has been absent for generations. Failure to adequately address the continuing challenges could put at risk many of the hardwon gains achieved by the Colombians. 

There are several key lessons one can draw from Colombia that 

are applicable in other theaters. First is that there has to be a significant level of trust in a successful partnership or there will be 

conflicts, as we see in Afghanistan today. In Colombia, the trust led 

the United States to support some of the Colombian Government’s 

riskiest operations, including a hostage rescue, that it would be almost impossible to image with any other ally. 

29

Second is that hybrid groups like the FARC, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and many others thrive in the seams of the world’s illicit trade pipelines. The money from cocaine that the FARC has 

garnered has ensured that it has endured far longer than it would 

have as a simple insurgent group. 

All of these new groups are dangerous and far more difficult to 

attack than terrorist groups of the past, given their enormous access to financial resources. None of these groups operate in a vacuum. Governments like those of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and 

Ecuador create a permissive operational environment in which the 

FARC, Hezbollah, Iranian officials, ETA, and others can safety 

meet, exchange lessons learned, and work to build alliances. 

This is not to say there is one giant alliance of all these groups 

aimed at the United States. Rather, it is a deliberately created environment where these groups can trade expertise and make temporary alliances of mutual convenience, none of which will be of 

benefit to the United States. This is the danger of the FARC, and 

that danger is unlikely to diminish even with a successful peace 

process in El Salvador—in Colombia, I am sorry. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]

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86587c-1.eps

Testimony of Douglas Farah 

President, IEI Consultants LLC 

Senior Non-Resident Associate, Americas Program, CSIS 

Before the House Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade 

"Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing Landscape" 

February 4,2014 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building 
31


86587c-2.eps

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman and members ofthe committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify here today on the FARC , the peace talks in Colombia, 

lessons learned for countering other terrorist organizations and the possible U.S. 

role going forward. I believe there are important lessons and that the U.S.-Colombia 

partnership is one of the most successful models we have seen in recent decades, in 

large part because of the sustained political will and commitment to resources over 

a long period of time by both countries. 

Later this month the CSIS Americas Program will release a new report, "Colombia: 

Peace and Stability in the Post-Conflict Era," which I co-authored. Much of the 

current research for this testimony was drawn from working on that report. 

I have had the privilege of being involved in Colombia since 1989. I was first sent by 

the Washington Post to cover an airliner blown up by the Medellfn cartel. Over the 

past quarter of a century I have lived in Colombia a number of years and visited 

there regularly, first as a journalist and in recent years as a researcher and a 

consultant. I have seen the nation teeter on the edge of the abyss in the 1990s, when 

U.S. officials spoke of the possibility of a FARC victory and Colombia becoming a 

"narco state" to the present time, when Colombia is a regional model of democracy 

and economic development. 

Yet the FARC, despite engaging in ongoing peace talks with the government of 

President Juan Manuel Santos, remains at the center of a multitude of criminal 

enterprises and terrorist activities that stretch from Colombia south to Argentina, 

and northward to Central America and into direct ties to the Mexican drug cartels, 

primarily the Sinaloa organization. It is involved in the massive laundering of drug 

money, and recent cases by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have 

shown the direct and growing criminal drug ties ofthe FARC and Hezbollah. 

As I will discuss below, the FARC, since at least 1999, has established a direct 

relationship with the government of Iran, a government that is routinely designated 

by the U.S. government as a state sponsor ofterrorism. The FARC was designated a 

terrorist entity in 1997, following the kidnapping and executions of seven American 

missionaries. The European Union followed suit in 2005. 

Under the protection ofthe governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua and 

Bolivia - as well as powerful friends in El Salvador and Panama -- the FARC 

maintains a robust international infrastructure that is producing and moving 

thousands of kilos of cocaine and laundering hundreds of millions of dollars. It has 

emerged as a pioneer hybrid criminal-terrorist insurgency, using drug money to 

sustain an ideological movement. Over time the ideology has faded and the F ARC 

has become much more of a business enterprise, helping to enrich its leadership and 

the leadership of the regional governments it supports. 

2 
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86587c-3.eps

The current peace talks between the Santos government and the FARC, underway 

for 14 months in Havana, Cuba, have yielded more results than past dialogues, in 

large part because the FARC is in a significantly weakened state. 

It is not for me, as a non-Colombian, to judge the wisdom of holding such talks. So 

far the two sides have reached a general agreement on two ofthe six items on the 

agenda -land reform, which remains one ofthe greatest challenges to the country's 

stability; and the potential participation of the FARC in nation's political life if an 

agreement is reached. The third topic currently under discussion, which has led to 

the most strain, revolves around severing the FARe's long-standing relationship to 

the cocaine trade, the issue thattouches atthe heart ofthe FARe's economic power. 

What I can say, after watching multiple peace processes in Central America and 

West Africa, that almost every armed group that has negotiated an end to a conflict 

have maintained clandestine armed structures and logistical pipelines that almost 

immediately morph into criminal enterprises. This was true of the Sandinistas and 

the Contras in Nicaragua; the FMLN and far right groups in El Salvador; the RUF in 

Sierra Leone; and the paramilitary structure of Charles Taylor in Liberia. One would 

have to extremely naive to believe that the FARC, which as existed for almost 50 

years as a subversive, clandestine organization already deeply involved in criminal 

enterprises, will not do exactly the same thing. This will present an enormous 

danger to Colombia, its neighbors and the United States. 

And there is the tremendously important question of exactly whom the General 

Secretariat of the FARC represents in the negotiations in Havana. The Colombian 

military estimates that the Secretariat, badly hurt by the loss of key leaders and 

spending most of their time outside the theaters of combat, now exercises real 

command and control authority over only 15 of the FARC 67 combat fronts.1 

Although the control appears to extend to the groups most involved in the drug 

trade, this means that several thousand combatants now operate largely 

independently ofthe high command. 

As many members of the paramilitary United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 

groups did a decade ago, many FARC combatants are simply forming their own mini 

criminal groups and no longer feel any loyalty to their military structure. This will 

likely strengthen the emerging criminal groups, known as BACRIM in Colombia, as 

the AUC desertions did. There are multiple cases of former AUC and the FARC, once 

mortal enemies, engaging in the cocaine trade together. 

The FARC has been consistently underestimated as a transnational organization that 

has significant and long-standing ties to multiple international terrorist and criminal 

groups. Understanding those ties are important to drawing lessons from the long 

road Colombia has traveled. 

The FARC is a regional and trans-regional organization. The significant support -

logistically, financially, ideologically - the group receives from nations and non-state 

allies in the hemisphere that aid and abet its criminal and terrorist alliances is 

1 Author interview with senior Colombian officials, September 2013. 

3 
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86587c-4.eps

significant and dangerous. The FARC is a central part ofthe revolutionary project of 

bringing together armed groups and terrorist organizations under the umbrella of 

the Bolivarian Revolution, with the aid and support of Iran. This is now a deeply 

criminalized political project with the express and overt intention of hurting the 

United States.2 

What should worry us, as I have documented and written about extensively, is that 

the glue that binds these groups is a shared vision of creating a new world order, in 

which the United States, Europe and Israel are the enemies to be destroyed. Their 

common doctrine is one of asymmetrical warfare that explicitly endorses the use of 

weapons of mass destruction against the perceived enemies.3 This doctrine remains 

a statement of intention, not a statement of capabilities. Yet a review of Iran's 

growing presence in the region, the FARe's growing relationship with Hezbollah and 

other terrorist groups and the ability ofthese groups to deal extensively with 

Mexican drug cartels, make that statement of intention a dangerous possibility. 

Current Stability 

Over the past 15 years Colombia has undergone a remarkable and profound 

positive transformation, particularly regarding its internal security. The stability, 

strength of its democratic institutions, and booming economy are proof of a decade 

of policies that have pulled Colombia back from the brink of collapse. 

For the first time in its history, the state has a presence in each ofthe nation's 1,102 

municipalities. Although pockets of the country remain under the influence of a 

variety of non-state armed actors, by almost every measure today Colombia is a 

more safe and stable country. This is also a testament to the greatly increased 

professionalization and training of the Colombian police and military, and to the 

sustained bipartisan U.S. policy that spanned three administrations and has led to a 

successful partnership that is unique in Latin America. 

A few data points stand out. The land used for the cultivation of coca, the raw 

material for cocaine, has been cut in half, from a high of99,000 hectares (251,400 

acres) in 1999 to 48,000 hectares (122,000 acres).4 Rather than producing 90 

percent of the world's cocaine, Colombia now produces less than 60 percent.s 

2 For a more complete view of the aims, goals and strategy of the Bolivarian Revolution and its 

project to create 21 ,t Century Socialism, see: Douglas Farah, Transnational Organized Crime, 

Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority 

(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2012), 

3 Ibid. The doctrine of asymmetrical warfare and the use ofWMD is outlined in many writing used by 

the Bolivarian Revolution, and has been adopted as official military doctrine in Venezuela. 

4 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), "Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2012," June 2013, 

4 
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86587c-5.eps

Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants have dropped from 70.2 in 2002 to 30 in 2012. 

The most significant drops occurred in the cities of Bogota and Medellfn.6 

As the conflict has moved into a different phase against more diffuse and less 

structured set of actors, U.S. aid has been steadily dropping. Although Colombia is 

still one of the top recipients of U.S. aid in the world, the downward trend-from 

$441.5 million in 2009 to $279.5 million in 2013 and a projected $257.6 million in 

20147-is likely irreversible. 

Even at its peak during the Uribe administration-$611 million in 2004-U.S. aid 

never accounted for more than 26 percent of Colombia's national security budget. 

The rest has come from Colombian resources generated by higher taxes, mostly 

levied on businesses and the wealthy, to pay for the Colombian part of the budget.s 

The percentage of U.S. support had dropped to 4 percent by 2012 and is projected to 

be 3 percent in 2014, while the overall Colombian defense budget continues to 

increase slightly through the same period.9 This is a testament of the Colombian 

people's willingness to undergo significant economic sacrifice to fund the conflict on 

their own. 

Yet in a country that has been in an almost continual state of internal conflict for 

more than 50 years and where undisputed state authority has been absent for 

centuries, the gains remain fragile and reversible. Government officials recognize 

that citizen security and a positive state presence are essential to any path toward 

durable peace and economic growth.IO 

Colombia's internal violence is complex and historic, defying easy analysis or 

solutions. Even as the state security apparatus becomes more efficient, more 

effective, and more respectful of human rights, the drivers of insecurity, as they have 

over the past five decades, continue to mutate into new and lethal forms. 

the 

Caribbean," a joint project of Center for International Policy, Washington Office on Latin America, and 

the Latin America Working U~~dJC~~~~~;~~;;t,~1l.Lill!CiJ~llilr;c. B Author interviews with U.S. 

9 Data provided to the author by the Colombian Ministry of Defense. 

10 The concept of '"positive state presence" draws on the work of Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: 

Sovereignty. international Relations and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

1990). Jackson defines negative sovereignty as freedom from outside interference. the ability of a 

sovereign state to act independently. both in its external relations and internally. toward its people. 

Positive sovereignty is the acquisition and enjoyment of capacities, not merely immunities. In 

Jackson's definition. it presupposes '"capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters." 

(29). The absence of either type of sovereignty can lead to the collapse or absence of state control. 

See also Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas. "Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces." in 

Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. ed. Anne L. 

Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford. CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 

5 
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86587c-6.eps

A Brief Historv ofthe FARe: The Early Days 

The FARC is currently a shell of what it was in late 1990s, when it controlled more 

than 40 percent ofthe national territory and had some 20,000 combatants. It is 

worth briefly reviewing the history ofthe hemisphere's oldest armed insurgency 

and its metamorphosis from a motely band of Marxist guerrillas wandering the 

jungles of Colombia into a prototype hybrid terrorist-criminal organization that was 

once on the verge oftaking power. Current estimates place FARC combat strength at 

about 7,200, seldom operating units of more than 10 people and largely unable to 

hold territory. 

The FARC grew out ofthe Liberal Party militias that fought against the Conservative 

Party in Colombia in the bloody period of the late 1940s and 1950s known as "La 

Violencia." The negotiated end to the fighting between the two main political parties 

brought an unprecedented period of political stability to the capital, but several of 

the militia groups in more remote regions remained active and in control of 

autonomous regions. In 1964 the FARC, formed in one ofthose regions, was 

officially formed with an ideology that was a combination of Soviet Marxism and 

nationalism. 11 

Over time, the FARC and various other insurgent groups grew in different parts of 

Colombia. These included the Chinese-backed Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito 

Popular de Liberaci6n-EPL), the Cuban-back National Liberation Army (Ejercito de 

Liberaci6n Nacional-ELN) and the M-19 nationalist movement. The EPL and M-19 

movements negotiated peace settlements with the government in the early 1990s, 

while the ELN remains a fighting force but has lost most of its military strength and 

political following. 

The FARC continued to grow throughout most of its life, reaching a peak of about 

18,000 combatants in the 2002 period. Unlike most rebel groups, the original 

founders of the group, until recently, lived long lives and retained significant 

influence over the group. They leaders were, until recently, more likely to die of old 

age in the hills than in combat. Jacobo Arenas, the founder of the FARC, died of old 

age in hills at the age of Colombia in August 1990. His successor and long-time 

second-in-command, Manuel Marulanda (AKA "Sure-shot") died of a heart attack on 

March 26, 2008. 12 Alfonso Cano, who succeeded Marulanda, was killed by the 

Colombian military on November 4,2011. 13 

11 For a brief history of the FARC's development, see: 

12 Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Manuel Marulanda: Commander of the FARC guerrilla army during four 

decades Colombian state:' The May 26,2008, 

accessed 

13 BBC News, "Top FARC rebel leader Alfonso Cano killed in Colombia," November 5, 2011, accessed 

at: hj;l,[£LcJYl=J:illJ:S..Q:JlJiLm:2Y3/sY.'lruH:i!JJ:l4.15.5. 

6 
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86587c-7.eps

The survival ofthe FARC has been possible in part because the FARC is not as 

dependent as many other non-state armed groups on external sources of financing, 

most of which evaporated with the end ofthe Cold War. Instead, the group 

established a strong nexus with criminal activity, including drug trafficking. 

kidnapping and extortion, allowing it to finance itself following the collapse of the 

Soviet Union and its Marxist bloc. 

It was also possible in part because the Colombian government exerted relatively 

little effort to fight the FARC for more than three decades. While active, the group 

was largely viewed as a nuisance but not a threat to the state and actual efforts to 

confront the FARC militarily were relatively rare. Finally, the state support of 

Colombia's neighbors Venezuela and Ecuador over much ofthe past decade has 

given the FARC a significant rearguard area for rest, relaxation, resupply and 

financial activities. 

Beginning in the late 1970s and growing in the 1980s, the FARC began to implement 

what it considered to be legitimate "taxes" on landowners and illicit activities in 

areas where the group exercised considerable political power. One favorite way of 

collecting taxes was to kidnap the landowners and hold them for ransom. 

This, in turn, led to the formation of paramilitary groups paid for by the large 

landholders to protect their property and themselves from the FARC and other 

guerrilla organizations. Over time the paramilitary units, often under the protection 

of the military, grew into formidable fighting forces and cocaine trafficking structure, 

and has been deemed by human rights groups to be responsible for the majority of 

the human rights abuses committed against civilians in Colombia. 

The upsurge in the paramilitary violence coincided with a prolonged negotiation 

period in the 1980s between the government and the FARC, which led to significant 

hopes that the FARC could be brought into the political process as a legal party. As a 

result ofthe negotiations the FARC formed a political party called the Patriotic 

Union (Union Patriotica-UP) and joined the political process while maintaining its 

armed wing.11 

Despite the UP's legal status the paramilitary forces viewed the organization as a 

front for the FARC and the drug traffickers viewed the UP as a threat to its activities. 

As a result, the narco-paramilitary forces carried out a series of massacres against 

thousands of UP candidates and leaders, including the assassination of its two most 

promising presidential candidates. 

As the peace process unraveled, the FARC entered a new phase of working with 

drug traffickers, protecting coca fields and laboratories and collecting "gramaje" or 

taxes on the products moving through their territory. With the influx of cash, the 

FARC was able to expand its recruiting, buy new weapons become a much more 

structured, effective military force. This coincided with the killing or extradition of 

the leaders of the major drug trafficking organizations in Colombia, leaving the 

7 
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86587c-8.eps

once-mighty cartels fractured, less unified and less able to control who entered the 

trade. 

From Insurgency to Narco-Terrorism and the Edge of Victory 

Gradually the FARC moved from an ideological force that protected drug trafficking 

operations to a more structured criminal enterprise that relied more and more on 

its own drug trafficking structures, kidnappings and extortion to finance its 

existence. 

As the FARC began to take control of cocaine laboratories, landing strips and 

international trade in a more active, direct manner, its financial situation improved 

markedly, and the insurgency used the money to purchase new weapons, recruit 

more combatants (whom they were able to pay more than a Colombian army 

soldier), and rapidly consolidate control over many swaths of rural Colombia. 

Eventually they were able to cut of the main highways among the nation's major 

cities. 

In a change oftactics, the FARC began targeting Americans for kidnappings, 

particularly evangelical Christian groups that lived and worked in isolated areas. In 

1993 the FARC kidnapped three members ofthe New Tribes Mission, and in 1994 

kidnapped two more, as well as member ofWycliffe Bible Translators. All six were 

killed while in captivity. These targeted attacks, coupled with increasing evidence 

that the FARC had emerged as a serious drug trafficking organization,led President 

Clinton to place the FARC on the State Department list of terrorist organizations in 

October 1997.15 The European Union would eventually follow suit, listing the FARC 

as a terrorist entity in 2005.16 

As the internal security situation of Colombia collapsed, the United States, deeply 

involved in counter-narcotics efforts, grew increasingly alarmed. By the mid 1990s 

Colombia was one of the most violent nations in the world, despite having 

eliminated the infamous Medellin and Cali cartels. The FARC, right-wing 

paramilitary "self-defense" groups, and drug-trafficking organizations controlled 

more than half the national territory. Colombia was the world's largest producer of 

cocaine, as well as coca leaves, the raw material for cocaine. 

The situation sank to its lowest point in the late 1996 when President Ernesto 

Samper's U.S. visa was publicly revoked for Samper's alleged ties to the Cali cartelY 

15hll~L~~lDY~~~m,~m~~~U~Ia.lli~U~cQ.u~m~J~Q1.~IT~2~nm 

16 Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision of Dec. 21. 2005, accessed at: 

17 Art Pine and Steven Ambrus, "U.S. Revokes Colombian President's Visa. Citing Ties to Drug 

Traffickers," [uly 12,1996. accessed at: JJ.U_f)J!1U:l;k.l!2i.,_l.ij.Ul.ll\~.'£llm,m~2Q.:.oZ: 

8 
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86587c-9.eps

The chairman ofthe Colombian military's Joint Chiefs of Staff met the same fate, and 

the military was in complete disarray. 

At the same time the army suffered a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of 

the FARC, whose newly armed and trained units, controlling enormous amounts of 

territory, defeated the military in more than a dozen major encounters in a row. 

A 1998 assessment by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (D1A) found that the 

FARC and its allies in drug trafficking would be able to defeat the government within 

five years, converting Colombia into a "narco-state." The commander ofthe U.S. 

Southern Command at the time testified in Congress, "The primary vulnerability of 

the Colombian armed forces is their inability to see threats, followed closely by their 

lack of competence in assessing and engaging them."18 

When President Andres Pastrana agreed in 1999 to peace talks with the FARC and 

granted them a territory the size of Switzerland as a demilitarized zone, the 

Colombian government was at its weakest point. In addition to the military defeats, 

the economy was sinking. Poverty rates had risen dramatically, unemployment was 

growing. and the economy sank by more than 4 percent in 1999. 

The FARC, with some 18,000 combatants and flush with sophisticated new weapons 

and equipment purchased with money from its burgeoning drug trade, was at its 

strongest point militarily since it was founded in 1964. 

During the three-year negotiations, which ended in February 2002, the FARC 

significantly strengthened itself and its ties to cocaine trafficking while dragging the 

talks on with endless and constantly shifting demands. 

It also moved to aggressively expand its outreach to other terrorist groups and 

insurgencies to increase its technical capabilities and establish relationships that 

endure to this day. In many cases the representatives were invited to spend 

significant amounts of time in the FARC-controlled peace zone. 

Among the more unusual visitors to the FARC territory were a group of Iranian 

government officials, ostensibly sent to finance a $12 million halal beef 

slaughterhouse and refrigerated meat storage facility. The project was unusual, to 

say the least, given the remoteness of the region, the lack of transportation for the 

meat and general lack of economic rationale for the investment.19 The plant was 

never built but it provided the FARC leadership with several months of unmonitored 

time with the Iranian officials, a relationship that endures to the present time. 

Two other terrorist groups that spent a significant amount of time training FARC 

cadres in a variety of explosives techniques, intelligence methods and kidnapping 

skills: Basque ETA terrorist and a splinter group ofthe Irish Republican Army. Their 

involvement came to light with the arrest of three members of the organizations in 

1B Douglas Farah, "Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War; U.S. Study Finds Army Inept, !II-Equipped," 

Washington Post, April 10, 19')8,)illu;1IQ!l1lI!1hii.h'illJ;lllilli~1bITJJlYlil:mill:1j:yx!2.:lL!l5i1lJ.W1l1. 

lY Karl Penhaul, "Iranians in SideshowtColomhia Peace Process," Reuters News Service, December 

28,1999. 

9 
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2001. By 2003 the FARC was using techniques from both organizations to set off car 

bombs and other explosives that took hundreds of lives. 20 

Other experts from closer to home also joined the FARC in the jungle safe zone. 

Among the visitors were Daniel Ortega, the Sandinista leader and current president 

of Nicaragua; Salvador Sanchez Ceren, the leading candidate for president of El 

Salvador and leader of the most hardline Marxist faction of the FMLN in El Salvador; 

and Jose Luis Merino, AKA Ramiro Vasquez, a Communist Party leader in El Salvador 

who later supplied large shipments of sophisticated weapons to the FARC and 

reportedly taught them urban kidnapping techniques. 

Turning the Tide 

But the military, given a reprieve, also used the time to reorganize, train, and 

dramatically improve it capabilities. 21 

It became increasingly evident the FARC was using the ceasefire with the 

government during the peace talks to expand its cocaine trafficking networks as 

well as acquire new weapons. But other factors were changing the nature ofthe 

political and drug-related violence in Colombia that would ultimately set the FARC 

back on its heels. 

Beginning in 1999, the Clinton administration launched Plan Colombia, a multi-year, 

multi-billion dollar program to tackle drug-related issues in the region. For the first 

time, significant amounts of aid could be given directly to the Colombian military, 

whose human rights record was widely recognized as being abysmal, to fight the 

FARe. The years of carefully trying to segregate counter-drug aid, largely given to 

the National Police, from small amounts of counterinsurgency aid, given the military, 

were over. 

This evolution would dramatically alter the intertwined conflicts in Colombia. Plan 

Colombia has increasingly allowed the military to push the FARC to more remote 

areas and carry out more sophisticated attacks against the rebel group.22 

With the election of Alvaro Uribe in 2002, Colombia's military turnaround began in 

earnest. Under Uribe's program of "Democratic Security," raw recruits were 

replaced over time with a highly trained NCO corps; intelligence operations were 

20 Tim Padgett, "The N ext Terror Nexus? Colombia fears the IRA and ETA may be using the country 

as a base for weapons testing and training," Time Magazine International, February 24, 2003. 

21 For an excellent overview of this process} see previous CSIS reports un Colombia, particularly 

Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani, and Phillip McLean, Buckfrum the Brink: EVu/lluting Prugress in 

Colombia, 1999-2007 (Washington, DC: CSIS, November 2007), 

22 The counter-drug and counter-insurgency aid figures come from the Center for International 

and its studies of Plan Colombia, accessed here: 

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revamped and enhanced, and significant new Colombia resources were committed 

to the conflict. 

Uribe also underscored the important link between democracy and security, stating 

consistently that the overarching goal was to "reinforce and guarantee the rule of 

law in all our national territory." As the government raised taxes and showed results, 

the businesses and citizens in urban areas became more supportive of the 

government. 

Although Uribe would come under significant and justified criticism from human 

rights groups for illicitly spying on journalists and political enemies and tolerating 

human rights abuses in the military,23 he is widely credited with developing the first 

comprehensive plan-including programs encompassing judicial, infrastructure 

rehabilitation, education, and medical programs to reestablish government 

authority in areas where non-state actors had held sway for generations. 

Focusing on rapidly accelerating military operations against the FARC and the 

group's drug-trafficking infrastructure, Uribe and his military leadership designed a 

strategy that pushed the guerrillas out of the economically vital middle section of 

the country and away from cities and importanttransportation routes. 

It also aimed to do away with their leadership by focusing significant resources on 

High Value Targets. From 2008-2012, for the first time in the conflict, senior FARC 

commanders were located and eliminated. This was particularly effective in 

targeting those leaders with direct ties to drug trafficking and massive human rights 

abuses, as was the case of Jorge Briceno, AKA Mono Jojoy, the commander ofthe 

FARC's Eastern Bloc, killed in 2010 in an aerial bombardment. 

Part of the urgency of confronting the FARC was the fact that presidents Hugo 

Chavez of Venezuela and Rafael Correa of Ecuador were giving significant logistical, 

financial, and political support to the FARC, allowing FARC to expand its 

international networks and increase its resources. 

Perhaps no action has played as significant role in changing the tide of the conflict in 

Colombia as the March 1, 2008 killing of Raul Reyes, the FARC's second most 

important commander and chief international liaison. Reyes, whose real name was 

Luis Edgar Devia Silva, and 25 others were killed in an aerial bombardment by the 

Colombian military on a FARC camp just across the Ecuadoran border. Included in 

the dead were five Mexican citizens and one Ecuadorian citizen living in the camp.24 

The camp, with electricity and hard structures, was in Ecuadorian territory and had 

existed for some time. The Ecuadoran forces had refused to move on it, despite pleas 

from the Colombian government to shut down the base. 

~:~ For a comprehensive look at the positive and negative aspects of the Uribe government, see June S. 

Beittel, "Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest," Congressional Research 

Service, November 28, 2012,illJt.!lw!..L:i!'2LIUillh!J.lJ:1:i.l;uL=J.n~LRl~~fu!Jl[. 

21h~~h'~Y~;'~j;~~Wl:4~~d;w~rt~~nlJ~llil~~m 

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In the immediate aftermath ofthe attacks, Colombian commandos entered the camp 

and retrieved documents and computers, including hundreds of gigabytes of data 

from the personal computer of Reyes containing communications with other 

members ofthe FARC 7-person general secretariat, Venezuelan president Chavez, 

senior Ecuadorian officials, and an outline ofthe political and economic strategy of 

the FARC. It is the most significant seizure of primary source documents from the 

FARC in recent decades, and the first time a member of the FARC general secretariat 

had been killed in combat in more than 40 years of war. 

While setting off a diplomatic row, the attack also accomplished two significant 

things: it captured years' worth of internal FARC communications that greatly 

enhanced the operational understanding of the group, and it killed a senior FARC 

commander, the first member of the guerrillas' general secretariat to be killed in 

combat in 44 years of war. Reyes's death was followed by the killing of other highvalue FARC targets, as well as a stream of desertions of many mid-level and upperlevel commanders, sending the FARC into a downward military and financial spiral 

from which has never recovered.25 

Two days later Reyes' death a second member of the FARC general secretariat was 

killed, this time by his own bodyguards, and data from his personal computers was 

also recovered. The assassination of Ivan Rios (aka Manuel Munoz Ortiz) at the 

hands of his own security detail was widely viewed as a sign of deep internal stress 

within the FARe. The assassins cut of Rios' hand and presented it, along with the 

computer data, to a Colombian military unit. 26 

The Colombian raid into Ecuadorian territory sparked an international incident that 

led Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua to break diplomatic relations with Colombia 

for several days, before the Organization of American States helped broker a detente. 

On national television, Chavez said: "We pay tribute to a true revolutionary, who 

was Raul Reyes," and called him a "good revolutionary."27 

The documents show several alarming developments that have gone largely 

undetected by U.S. and Colombian intelligence services prior to the attack. 

The first is that the long-cordial relationship between the FARC and Chavez had 

grown from one of friendship to one of allies and business partners, a relationship 

that endures in the Maduro government. It is clear that that FARC received a large 

sum of money from Chavez in 2007, although it is unclear if the money is a loan or a 

25 For a more complete look at the role of Ecuador and the FARC, see Douglas Farah and Glenn 

Simpson,Ecuador at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerrillas and the Citizens Revolution [Alexandria, VA: 

International Assessment and Strategy Center, January 2010), 

http://Wi:\;vv.\tr3.it~!&;y[.cIltel.nt;i /r1ocLihl20 1 01214 EL'uadnd7INi\L.pdf'. For a study of Venezuela's 

role with the FARC, see Douglas Farah, Trunsnutiunul Orgunized Crime, Terrorism, und Criminulized 

States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority [Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, August 2012), 

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gift. There are several references to "300" as an amount the FARC receives, and 

Colombian authorities have stated unequivocally that the number refers to $300 

million given by Chavez to the FARC. It is also clear that the FARC has Venezuelan 

government protection for its massive movement of cocaine to Central America and 

West Africa. 

The second insight gleaned was the FARe's extraordinary reach into regional 

politics, particularly in Ecuador, where the President Correa, whose presidential 

campaign received hundreds of thousands of dollars directly from the FARC, was 

willing to change senior military commanders along the border (the area where 

Reyes was killed) in order to curry favor with the insurgents. The role of Bolivia's 

President Evo Morales in supporting the FARC also stands out.2U 

The third is the FARe's apparent willingness to engage in trafficking of material 

(uranium) that could be used for a low-grade nuclear bomb. The type and grade of 

uranium in question indicate the FARC had been the victim ofa scam or was 

planning on perpetrating a scam on an unsuspecting third party. 

A fourth major point is the FARe's overt discussion of its involvement in drug 

trafficking and the need to move cocaine and money associated with the trade they 

have long claimed to not be involved in. 

The fifth is that the FARC has engaged in a deliberate campaign to hide its 

involvement in some of the worst atrocities, including the assassination of members 

of congress in 2006. 29 

In the wake of the death of Reyes and Rios by violent means and Marulanda to 

natural causes in a 30-day span left the FARC reeling, and more blows were to come. 

On July 15, 2008, the army carried out a dramatic rescue operation that freed 15 of 

the FARe's highest value hostages. These included former presidential candidate 

Ingrid Betancourt and three American contractors.30 

The holding of the hostages had been of great political and psychological value to 

the rebels. Not only did it prove the group could capture and hold senior political 

figures and U.S. citizens, the negotiations for the freedom ofthese hostages had 

given the FARC new opportunities to establish contacts with a host of governments, 

and a pretext for maintaining a political infrastructure in Venezuela. 

28 The details and documentation of these relationships see: Douglas Farah, "Into the Abyss: Bolivia 

Under Evo Morales and the MAS," International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009: and Farah 

and Simpson, op cit. 

29 The author worked with U.S. and Colombian officials to analyze the captured Reyes documents, 

which have now been made public. For more details on the issues raised here see Farah and Farah 

and Simpson, op cit. The main cache of Reyes documents were compiled into a single document, "The 

FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and Secret Archives of 'Raul Reyes,'" A Strategic Dossier, 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 201lo 

30 Chris Kraul, "15 Hostages Freed as FARC is Fooled in Cunning Operation," Los Angeles Times, July 

3, 2008, a ccessed a t: hH.rt:JLw.\2','CJi!Hl]:l[:e,.<:llJJ1/:rrf.l""".LlJJ:!riS!ll12~QLj di.12L,!dJj!LL,!:I~.Jl'.L"l]!¥':.:I:: 

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This growing network, under the pretext of negotiating a "humanitarian accord" 

that would lead to a prisoner exchange between the Colombian government and the 

F ARC, allowed the F ARC to build a significant, new international network, both in 

Latin America and elsewhere. 

The Central American Network 

The FARe's Central American network, unveiled in the Reyes documents, is among 

the most important in the current discussion because it is still active. 

One of the FARC staunchest supporters for more than 20 years has been Nicaraguan 

president Daniel Ortega. The alliance was first formed in the 1970s, when Ortega led 

the Sandinista revolution that succeeded in taking power in Nicaragua in 1979. 

Throughout his first presidency (1979-1990) Ortega was at the center of the 

revolutionary movements active throughout Latin America, in part because 

Nicaragua was the one state besides Cuba in the hemisphere where a violent, 

Marxist revolution triumphed. As a result, Ortega maintained close ties with 

revolutionary regimes and movements across the globe, including the FARC, when 

he was re-elected president in 2006. 

Of interest in the current discussion are the ties with the FARC, Libya, the Red 

Brigades, and the FMLN in EI Salvador. When Ortega suffered an unexpected 

electoral defeat in 1990, among his last acts in office was to grant citizenship to 990 

foreign nationals, including dozens of wanted Spanish ETA terrorists and Italian Red 

Brigade terrorists.31 

There is also compelling evidence that, in addition to the formal, cordial ties the 

Sandinista government maintained with the revolutionary government of Iran and 

the regime of Mom mar Gadhafi in Libya, it also maintained ties with radical nonstate Islamist groups. This included issuing passports for a suspect arrested in New 

York in connection with the Feb. 26, 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. 

When U.S. authorities arrested lbraham Elgabrowny in Brooklyn in early March 

1993, U.S. authorities found five Nicaraguan passports, five Nicaraguan birth 

certificates and two driver's licenses. The passports contain photographs of El 

31 Among the more comprehensive articles on Ortega's ties to foreign terrorist groups see: Tracy 

Wilkinson, "Nicaragua Pulls Up Red Carpet: Leftists, Idealists and Fugitives Flocked to Sandinista-led 

Nation in the 1980s," Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1994, p. A01; Douglas Farah, "Managua Blast Rips 

Lid Off Secret Salvadoran Rebel Cache," The Washington Post, July 14,1993, p. AOl. Among the 

terrorist granted citizenship was Alessio Casimirri, who ran a popular Italian restaurant, Magica 

Roma, in Managua, despite being tied to the 1978 murder ofItalian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. 

Several mem bers of the Spanish ETA organization were deported, but most of those granted 

citizenship remain there. 

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86587c-15.eps

Sayyid Nosair, his wife and children. Nosair is in prison in New York, convicted of a 

weapons charge after being acquitted of the 1990 murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane.32 

This is relevant because Ortega has never broken the ties to the various groups, 

including the FARe. In 1998 Ortega, then the leader ofthe opposition in Nicaragua 

awarded the Augusto Sandino medal, his party's highest honor, to Manuel 

Marulanda (aka Tirofijo or Sure Shot), the FARe's supreme commander. In 2000 

Ortega attended an international convention in Libya, organized by Gaddafi for 

"political parties, revolutionary movements, liberation movements and progressive 

forces."33 

This meeting was significant because senior leaders ofthe FARC were also in 

attendance. The timing is important because it was at a time when the FARC was 

seriously beginning to look to purchase surface-to-air missiles in order to have more 

32 Farah, op cit. The documents were discovered after an explosion ripped apart an underground 

bunker holding not only thousands of weapons, but also hundreds of Nicaraguan passport and 

identification cards for Marxist groups around the hemisphere, from the MIR in Chile to the Tupac 

Amaro group in Peru. The garage belonged to a wanted Basque terrorist, who disappeared after the 

explosion. 

33 Jose de Cordoba, "Ortega's Old Friendships are Liabilities as Election Nears," The Wall Street 

Journal, Oct. 19, 2001. 

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effective defenses against the U.S.-supplied helicopters that were beginning to arrive 

in Colombia for the police and military as part of Plan Colombia. 34 

A Sept. 4, 2000 e-mail from Reyes' computer, addressed to Gadhafi and signed by 

Reyes, offered a bold alliance and laid out the strategy: 

Comrade Colonel Muammar GaddaJi, Great Leader of the World Mathaba, 

receive our revolutionary and Solivarian greeting. We want to express our 

gratitude for the invitation that you gave us to visit your country and the 

hospitality you showed our delegation during the recent Summit of Heads of 

State, Governments, Parties and Organizations of the World Mathaba. We want 

to let you know that the FARC continues its struggle for the conquest of 

political power to govern Colombia ... As a member of the (FARC) high 

command I have been asked by the commander in chief to requestfrom 

you a loan of 100 million dollar, repayable in five years. Our strategic 

objectives and circumstances of our war oblige us to seek weapons with 

greater range to resist our enemy's advances. One of our primary needs 

is the purchase of surface-to-air missiles to repel and shoot down the 

combat aircraft. Our strategy is to take power through the revolutionary 

armed struggle. (emphasis added)3s 

Apparently Gaddafi was not immediately responsive to the request, and so the FARC 

tried to follow up on the request, this time through Daniel Ortega. In a Feb. 22, 2003 

note "From the Mountains of Colombia," that was hand-delivered to Ortega, Reyes 

requested help: 

Dear compafiero Daniel, this is to send you my warm and effusive revolutionary 

greeting, and that of commander Manuel Marulanda. We also are writing to 

see if you have any information on the request we made to our Libyan 

comrades, which was made in writing in the name of the secretariat of the 

FARe, and which I signed. The Libyans said they would answer us, but we have 

not yet received any information. .. While we were in Libya they explained to us 

that the political responsibility for carrying out Libya's policies in the region 

were in the hands of Daniel Ortega. For that reason, we are approaching you, in 

hopes of obtaining an answer. 

I also want to reaffirm to you that the primary priority of the FARe, in order to 

achieve greater success in its military operations against enemy troops, in 

order to take political power in Colombia, is acquiring anti-aircraft 

31 Plan Colombia is a multi· billion dollar program through which the United States has funded the 

expansion, retraining and arming of the Colombian national police and military. Begun in 1999" at 

the end of the Clinton administration, it has continued with hipartisan Congressional support, 

through the Bush years. 

35 Letter to Gadhafi, in possession of Author. It can also be seen here: Octavio Enriquez, "Ortega, 

Puente Entre Gaddati y las FARC," La Prensa, June 27, 2008. 

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capabilities, in order to counteract the efficiency of the Colombian and u.s. 

aircraft against our troops.36 

It is not clear what the result of the discussions were, but relations between the 

FARC remained cordial. According to documents obtained by La Prensa, Nicaragua's 

most important newspaper, the key envoy between Ortega and the FARC is Luis 

Cabrera, the Nicaraguan ambassador in Cuba. Cabrera is a nationalized Argentine 

who has maintained a long friendship with Ortega, dating back to the Sandinista 

revolution. 

Citing other documents from Reyes' computer, the newspaper said FARC leaders 

had met numerous times with Cabrera, who promised the rebels any help within 

Nicaragua's ability. He even offered to let the FARC establish a link on the Sandinista 

website in order to make it easier for people to get in touch with the organization. 

Reyes wrote to the FARC representatives in Havana not to forget to "visit the 

Nicaraguan ambassador with great frequency. Take him documents and express our 

appreciation for the stimulating statements of comandante Ortega."37 

The Reyes documents also show that the FARC maintained significant contacts with 

members of another former ally in El Salvador. A key player in supplying weapons 

to the FARC appears to be Jose Luis Merino, a senior figure in the Communist Party, 

one of the five parties that made up the FMLN in El Salvador during that nation's 11-

year civil war. During that time, the FMLN was also closely aligned with the 

Sandinistas, led by Ortega, in Nicaragua. Merino used the alias "Ramiro Vasquez" 

during the conflicts, and is still known by his nom de guerre, as are many former 

rebels who adopted other identities during the war. 

The FMLN formally demobilized in 1991 and became a legal political party, and its 

candidate, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, another long-time friend of the FARC and former 

senior rebel commander, is the favorite to win this year's presidential election. 

36 Letter to Daniel Ortega} in possession of the Author. It can also be seen here: Octavia Enriquez} 

"Ortega, Puente Entre Gaddafi y las FARe," La Prensa, June 27, 2008. 

37 Octavio Enriquez, "Contacto Esta en La Habana," La Prensa, June 28, 2008 viewed at: 

~~~~~~:;,~~ti~~~~~;~;;,~~~~~~~~~l~~t~~~~~~t;~Jn a, Nicaraguan painter, Lugo, 

helped a senior FARe official as Alherto Bermudez, ohtain Nicaraguan identity papers, 

something Luga admitted to doing, This is interesting because the incident was described in Reyes 

See: 

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The Communist Party is a small but influential group within the FMLN coalition 

because it controls the international resources, including those funds provided by 

Chavez for the current electoral campaign, now underway. Communist Party 

members, including Merino (who is currently serving as a Salvadoran delegate to 

the Central American Parliament), are widely suspected of retaining a clandestine, 

armed wing after the rest of the FMLN had officially demobilized. This armed wing 

is suspected of carrying out several high-profile kidnap pings in EI Salvador and 

elsewhere in Latin America.oR 

Merino, using his old alias "Ramiro Vasquez," had been an important logistics officer 

for the Communist Party during the Salvadoran war, and seems to have maintained 

significant contacts abroad in the weapons-buying world. 

According to Sept. 6, 2007 e-mail from Ivan Rios, a member of the FARC secretariat, 

to other secretariat members lays out the multiple negotiations under way for new 

FARC weapons, including the highly coveted surface-to-air missiles: 

38 For a more complete look at Merino and the role of the Communist party, both with the FARC and 

with criminal activities, see: Jose de Cordoba, "Chavez Ally May Have Aided Colombian Guerrillas: 

Emails Seem to Tie EI Salvador Figure to a Weapons Deal," The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 28, 2008, p. 

A9. 

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1) Yesterday I met two Australians who were brought here by Tino, thanks to 

the contact made by Ramiro (Salvador). We have been talking to them (the 

Australians) since last year. 

2) They offer very favorable prices for everything we need: rifles, PKM machine 

guns, Russian Dragunovs with scopes for snipers, multiple grenade launchers, 

different munitions ... RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), .50 machine guns, and 

the missiles. All are made in Russia and China. 

3) For transportation, they have a ship, with all its documents in order, and the 

cargo comes in containers. The crew is Pilipino and does not know the 

contents, with the exception of the captain and first mate. They only need a 

secure port to land at. 

4) They gave us a list of prices from last month, including transportation. They 

offer refurbished Chinese AKs (Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles-DF) that come 

as used, but in reality are new, and were not distributed to the Chinese army, 

which developed a new line of weapons, for $175. AK 101 and 102, completely 

new, for $350. Dragunovs, new with scopes, $1,200. RPG launchers for $3,000 y 

grenades for $80. They say they have a thermo baric grenade that destroys 

everything in closed spaces (like the bombs the gringos use against Alqaeda 

(sic) hideouts) for $800. Chinese missiles (which they say are the most up-todate at this time) with a 97 percent effective rate, $93,000, and 15,000 for the 

launchers. They say it is very easy to use, and they guarantee the training. If 

one of these missiles were identified inside Colombia it would cause them a lot 

of problems , but if, on the side they include old Russian SA-7 (shoulder-fired 

surface-to-air missiles-DF) it would serve to confuse, mislead or at least give 

the impression that the guerrillas have weapons of different types, no just 

Chinese. The ammunition for AKs is 21 cents a round, but if we buy more than 3 

million rounds, the price drops to 9 cents a unit. 

4) (sic) They promised to give us an exact price on other material. Two months 

ago they sent me a price list (very favorable, for example, a used .50 machine 

gun for $400, new for $3,000), but I didn't take the list to the meeting place. 

5) They do the purchasing without the need of a down payment, but when the 

merchandise is on the ship, they want 50 percent. When it is delivered they 

collect the other 50 percent. The money moves through a bank in the Pacific, in 

an independent country where they can move money without any questions 

being asked. Once the cargo is shipped it can take one month, or a month and a 

half to arrive in Venezuela. They said we could have a representative, it doesn't 

matter what nationality, on board the ship while it sails to it final destination. 

The memorandum goes on to describe the potential purchase of different types of 

radio equipment, and the protocol for future contact, which will only be done in 

face-to-face meetings. There is an agreement to meet again on Nov. 23, 2007, to 

review an up-to-date price list and to test some radios on the ground. Ivan finishes 

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by reiterating that the Australians "are friends of Ramiro," and can therefore be 

trusted.39 

On Nov. 12, 2007, Ivan sent another missive outlining developments on several 

fronts. He noted that Rodriguez Chacin, at the time minister of interior and one of 

Chavez's closest advisers, was involved in the transaction and added, "he has 

already suggested mechanism for receiving the Australians in Orinoco."40 This 

That mechanism was apparently put to use, because a subsequent e-mail from Nov. 

23, the day ofthe agreed-upon follow-up meeting Ivan wrote that "we are waiting 

for the Australians, in order to reach an agreement on the items mentioned before. 

El Cojo (the Cripple) is responsible for the first quota and the logistics."11 This seems 

to indicate that Australians were arriving via Venezuela, as El Cojo is the nickname 

of an unidentified senior Venezuelan official who, according to other documents, is 

close to Chavez with whom the FARC has developed "an excellent relationship that 

is constantly growing closer."42 The first quota seems to refer to the payment, and 

placing him in charge of logistics would be logical, as he is credited with 

coordinating other logistical efforts for the guerrillas. 

The Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana 

While the bilateral and individual relationships are of tremendous importance to 

the FARC, the group was also anxious to break out of it broader international 

isolation. The mechanism devised for this was the Coordinadora Continental 

Bolivariana (The Bolivarian Continental Coordinator-CCB). The concept was to build 

a broad-based Bolivarian movement across the continent that would appear to be a 

coalition of progressive forces, when in fact, it would be driven and controlled by 

the FARe. 

According to documents in the Reyes computer, the CCB was born in August 2003, 

and by December had an anthem, a flag, a newspaper called "Bolivarian Mail," 

letterhead stationary and a logo. "The CCB is work of the FARC, the Bolivarian 

Movement composed of the Jose Maria Cordoba and Caribbean blocs, a Dec. 7, 2003 

the internal document said. The document said "Comrade Alfonso," referring to 

Alfonso Cano, later the FARe's commander-in-chief, had been informed of each of 

the steps taken, and that the first executive meeting had been held "in one of our 

camps" to "layout the specific tasks and responsibilities for the activities that are 

currently underway. Among our tasks is the creation of a Bolivarian movement, the 

39 E-mail provided by Colombian authorities, in the possession of the author. 

40 E-mail provided hy Colomhian authorities, in the possession of the . 

41 E-mail provided by Colombian authorities, in the possession of the Author. 

12 Dec. 23, 2007, e-mail from Ivan to the FARC high command, in possession of the Author. 

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establishment of the CCB in each country, etc. This organization has already led 

protests in Ecuador and Panama."43 

The CCB soon established a significant presence across Latin America, attracting the 

sympathy of numerous leftist political organizations and NGOs, many committed to 

non-violence. According to a March 11,2005 report on the CCB's activities in 2004, 

there were already active groups in Mexico, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 

Venezuela, and Chile. International brigades from the Basque region of Spain, 

Italians, French and Danish were operational. Work was underway in Argentina, 

Guatemala and Brazil. The number of organizations that were being actively 

coordinated by the CCB was listed at 63, and there were "political relations" with 45 

groups and 25 institutions. The CCB database contained 500 e-mails.44 

The CCB leadership went out of its way to hide its FARC affiliation to all but the 

more select inner circle. "The CCB runs the whole gamut, from respectable groups to 

useful idiots to terrorist," said one Colombian official studying the CCB. "There is the 

public face ofthe CCB, which seems benign, but the inner workings are all FARC, 

allied with other terrorist organizations that, frankly, we thought had disappeared." 

This is borne out in numerous internal documents. In an April 1, 2006 letter from 

Reyes to "Aleyda," identified by Colombia authorities as Mariana L6pez de Ia Vega of 

the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionaria-MIR) 

of Chile, the FARC leader states "the CCB is part of movement of masses of the FARC, 

and as such receives all of our support. However, we are not deluded or confused, 

and understand that the CCB is broader than just our cells, as the CCB has a broad 

roof, which allows us, if we are politically agile, to reach other sectors of society and 

create more Communist militants."1s 

A Dec. 31, 2006 letter from Ivan Rios to Raul Reyes, (whom Rios address as "Dear 

Foreign Minister") says the FARC support group in Chile "ask for instructions 

relating to CCB. It seems they are waiting precise orders from you regarding the 

activity in Santiago."46 

Operation Titan Ayman Iouuma and Ties to Hezbollah 

There is now a significant body of evidence showing the FARC's operational alliance 

with Hezbollah and Hezbollah allies based in Venezuela under the protection ofthe 

Maduro government, to which relatively little attention has been paid. A clear 

example of the breadth of the emerging alliances among criminal and terrorist 

43 Documents provided by Colombian officials, in possession of the Author. 

11 March 11, 2005 e-mail from lvim Rios to Raul Reyes, provided by Colombia officials, in possession 

of the Author. 

45 April 1, 2006 e-mail from Raul Reyes to Aleyda. provided by Colombia officials. in possession of 

the Author. 

46 Jan. 3, 2007 e-mail to Ivan Rios, provided by Colombia officials, in possession of the Author. 

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groups was Operation Titan, executed by Colombian and U.S. officials in 2008. 

Colombian and U.S. officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a drug 

trafficking organization that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, West 

Africa, the United States, Europe and the Middle East. 

Colombian and U.S. officials say that one of the key money launderers in the 

structure, Chekry Harb, AKA "Taliban" acted as the central go-between among Latin 

American DTOs and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah. Among the 

groups participating together in Harb's operation in Colombia were members of the 

Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups and the FARe. 

This mixture of enemies and competitors working through a shared facilitator, or in 

loose alliance for mutual benefit, is a pattern that is becoming more common, and 

one that significantly complicates the ability of law enforcement and intelligence 

operatives to combat these groups.17 

While there has been little public acknowledgement ofthe Hezbollah ties to Latin 

American TOC groups, recent indictments based on DEA cases point to the growing 

overlap of the groups. In December 2011, U.S. officials charged Ayman joumaa, an 

accused Lebanese drug kingpin and Hezbollah financier, of smuggling tons of u.s.-

bound cocaine and laundering hundreds of millions of dollars with the Zetas cartel 

of Mexico, while operating in Panama, Colombia, the DRC and elsewhere. 

"Ayman joumaa is one oftop guys in the world at what he does: international drug 

trafficking and money laundering," a U.S. anti-drug official said. "He has interaction 

with Hezbollah. There's no indication that it's ideological. It's business."48 j oumaa 

was tied to broader case of massive money laundering case that led to the collapse 

ofthe Lebanese Canadian Bank, one of the primary financial institutions used by 

Hezbollah to finance its worldwide activities. 

Other cases include the july 6,2009 indictment ofJamal Yousefin the U.S. Southern 

District of New York alleges that the defendant, a former Syrian military officer 

arrested in Honduras, sought to sell weapons to the FARC -- weapons he claimed 

came from Hezbollah and were to be provided by a relative in Mexico.49 

Such a relationship between non-state and state actors provides numerous benefits 

to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC gains access to Venezuelan 

territory without fear of reprisals; it gains access to Venezuelan identification 

47 While much of Operation remains classified, there has been significant open source reporting, in 

part because the Colombian government announced the most important arrests. For the most 

complete look at the case see: Jo Becker, "Investigation into bank reveals links to major South 

American cartels," International Herald Tribune, December 15, 2011. See also: Chris Kraul and 

Sebastian Rotella, "Colombian Cocaine Ring Linked to Hezbollah," Los Angeles Times, Oct. 22, 2008; 

and "Por Lavar Activos de N arcos y Paramilitares, Capturados Integrantes de Organizacion 

internatcional," Fiscalia General de la Republica (Colombia), Oct. 21, 2008. 

48 Sebastian Rotella, "Government says Hezbollah Profits From U.S. Cocaine Market via Link to 

Mexican Cartel," ProPublica, December 11, 2011. 

49 United States District Court, Southern District of New York, The United States of America v Jamal 

Yousef, Indictment, July 6,2009. 

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documents; and, perhaps most importantly, access to routes for exporting cocaine to 

Europe and the United States -- while using the same routes to import quantities of 

sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the Chavez 

government offers state protection, and reaps rewards in the form of financial 

benefits for individuals as well as institutions, derived from the cocaine trade. 

Key Elements of Success 

Officials directly involved in current Colombian campaign against the FARC point to 

five general elements that have greatly weakened the F ARC and led to the 

government's current success. These elements simultaneously generated popular 

support for the government and diminished the long-held fear ofthe FARC, while 

reestablishing (or in some cases, establishing for the first time) government 

legitimacy in many parts of the country. 

While the United States initially tried to keep its counter-narcotics aid separate from 

counter-insurgency assistance to the military, and couched the rationale for the 

expanding aid package as a way to fight drug trafficking, the segregation was 

untenable. The Bush administration, along with a bipartisan majority in Congress, 

eventually allowed the lines to blur. so The current concept it that Plan Colombia 

rests on three legs: military, counter narcotics and social work. 

The five main elements that those interviewed agreed were instrumental in 

changing the course ofthe war are: 

• The emphasis by the military on seizing and controlling territory, specifically 

strategic corridors and roads, allowing civilian state structures to set up and 

begin to operate; 

• A complete restructuring ofthe military, complemented by decisive civilian 

leadership; enforced intelligence sharing among different branches ofthe 

military and national police; 

• The successful oftargeting of specific High Value Targets in the FARC 

leadership and the subsequent disruption ofthe FARe's command and 

control capabilities, extending to the drug trade. 

• The creation of culture that rewarded risk-taking both operationally and 

conceptually inside both the military and the police, leading to the innovative 

operations that were most harmful to the FARC; 

A sustained, bipartisan support for the program in the U.S. Congress, 

allowing the aid programs to flow over a sustained period of time. 

50 Karen DeYoung, "U.s. Eyes Shift in Colombia Policy: Greater Aid for War Against Leftist Guerrillas 

Sought," The Washington Post, Jan. 15, 2002. 

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While the first two elements are not unusual, the latter three are areas where other 

countries, particularly the United States, have struggled. As outlined in the 9/11 

Commission report and several other post mortems on the terrorist attacks on the 

United States, there has consistently been a culture of risk aversion in the 

intelligence community, compounded by an almost-total lack of sharing of 

intelligence both among intelligence agencies and between the intelligence 

community and law enforcement communities. Despite some progress in the 

immediate aftermath ofthe 9/11 attacks, the problems persist. 

While the use of resources to attack high value targets was often debated in the 

early days of implementing the strategy in Colombia, it has proved pivotal in 

degrading the FARC over time. Because the FARC is a highly vertical organization 

yet highly compartmentalized by fronts and blocs, the individual commanding the 

overall structure is important and hard to replace. 

As described above, the rapid loss of senior commanders, coupled with a host of 

defections and killing of mid-level and upper level commanders, caused the FARC to 

implode. Fearing all its communications were compromised, the leadership was 

forced to communicate by courier. Today many of the command and control 

problems of FARC, as well as their inability to recoup the terrain they have lost, is a 

result of this strategy. 

The sustained bipartisan support for the policy not only came from the United 

States, but in Colombia. This long-term partnering allowed key personal 

relationships to grow in trust, and institutionalized successful methods of sharing 

information, operating jointly and acquiring the necessary equipment. In my view 

one of the most important decisions made by the Colombian authorities was to a 

fighting force they could sustain alone, something that has allowed the military and 

police to function at a high level even as outside assistance shrinks. 

Finally, there is the issue of political will on both sides. It is a well-known adage in 

foreign policy that we cannot want success and reform more than those we are 

seeking to aid. In Colombia, the Colombian people, the elites, the military and the 

police, ultimately wanted to save their country from the FARC and other criminalterrorist enterprises. It was this will, welded to the political will ofthe successive 

U.S. administrations to help make that possible, that is perhaps the greatest lesson. 

Ongoing Security Challenges 

It is important to note that the war is not won and peace is not yet at hand. The 

constant ability of non-state armed actors to morph into new types of groups 

deriving income from different sources to fund their activities is perhaps the 

greatest security challenge facing Colombia today. 

This is particularly difficult because the state security forces are having to 

Simultaneously assume the costly and resource-intensive task of holding significant 

parts of the country where the central government is seeking to reestablish its 

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authority while continuing to clear new areas of the different armed groups largely 

operating in rugged jungle terrain. 

The security forces have been remarkably successful in significantly reducing the 

existential threats to the state (major cartels, the FARC, and the AUC). But they are 

now facing a more dispersed series of actors that continue to undermine state 

sovereignty and diminish the state's ability to regain the trust of its citizens and 

establish the rule of law. 

Even though the FARC has been reduced from its peak of more than 18,000 

combatants to about 7,000 today, they pose a significant local threat in areas where 

they operate, generally relying on small-unit ambushes and constant movement to 

avoid large-scale combat. The BACRIM groups number and other insurgent groups, 

all deeply involved in drug trafficking, total some 5,000 armed members. Across the 

country there are several thousand more armed criminal gangs are operating on a 

smaller scale, and with less military coherence, in a more localized manner. 

Reestablishing a state presence is particularly difficult in areas where the state has 

seldom had a presence at all, and where non-state groups have exercised 

sovereignty. In these areas the "culture of illegality" has thrived for generations, 

where the state is viewed as the illicit interloper and local political structure has 

virtually no ties to or response from the central government. In many cases, earlier 

human rights abuses of the military have left the local population hostile and wary 

of a renewed state presence. 

One example of the new challenges that emerge even as traditional ones subside is 

the illicit trade in coltan and gold, both valuable minerals whose exploitation carries 

far less risk than the cocaine trade. Yet the illicit mining spawns armed groups, 

drives civilians from their land, causes significant ecological damage, and is a 

constant local driver of violence. The FARC, along with multiple other criminal 

groups, often with ties to drug-trafficking organizations, are increasingly involved in 

illicit mineral extraction.51 

These new challenges mean that the security forces must be highly adaptable and 

reconfigured to meet more diverse challenges at a time when both U.S. and national 

resources are likely to diminish. It also means that the nation's security forces will 

have to learn to coordinate extremely closely with a host of civilian agencies and 

often cede the lead role to the civilians. This clash of cultures continues to pose 

significant challenges among different agencies involved in the consolidation 

process. 

In recognition ofthese new challenges the Santos government in 2012 launched 

Campaign Sword of Honor (Espada de Honor), with the goal oflaunching a 

simultaneous offensive in the remaining base areas of FARC and ELN in order to 

deliver a decisive strategic defeat and combat the BACRIM and its illicit networks. 

51 For an extensive report on the illicit coltan trade, see Ignacio Gomez, "Colombia's Black-Market 

Coltan Tied to Drug Trafficking. Paramilitaries." Center for Public March 4. 2012, 

25 
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The operation, including the formation of 12 new regional joint task forces and 

intelligence fusion centers, focuses on 15 of the FARe's 67 combat fronts that are 

most active and most involved in the cocaine trade, and aims to reduce the FARe's 

size by 50 percent over two years. The campaign focuses on the most critical fronts 

in terms of command and control, terrorist activity, and financing, aiming at 

bringing FARC to half of its structural capabilities.52 

In order to be able to bring legal charges-rather than lethal force-against the 

networks of civilian supports for the FARC and other violent groups, the task forces 

include judicial police and government prosecutors.53 After initially starting in 51 

municipalities, the operation has now grown to include 58 townships in the most 

vulnerable regions ofthe country.54 

The FARe's growing lack of command-and-control capabilities over most of its 

fronts has significant implications for both the future FARC and the government's 

efforts to defeat it on the battlefield. There is a strong possibility, already seen in 

some areas of FARC operation, that the group's combat fronts will simply drift off 

into criminal activity, while perhaps keeping some sort ofloose allegiance to and 

alliance with the FARC high command.55 

This is but one of multiple difficulties remaining in the area of national security. 

Given the complexity ofthe internal conflicts and the geographically diverse regions 

that they span, addressing them within a single security policy is not an easy task. 

Challenges Going Forward 

As the forthcoming CSIS report notes, a failure to adequately address the continuing 

challenges could risk many of the hard-won gains achieved by the Colombian 

security forces in recent years. To their credit, leaders of the security forces are 

highly aware of the changing nature of the internal conflict and the need to revise 

and revisit many past assumptions and operational strategies and tactics that, 

though successful in the past, may not be adequate in the coming years. 

The change from a force primarily focused on combating a structured insurgency 

with a centralized command and its overlapping cocaine-trafficking structures to a 

small-unit war with a wide variety of enemies is difficult on its own. 

52 For a more in-depth look at Operation Sword of Honor, see Colby Martin, "Colombia's New 

Count:erinslurg.en,ey IPlan " Stratfor, March 29, 2012, 

provided to author Colombian Ministry of Defense. 

54 Colombian vice minister of defense Jorge Bedoya, CSIS conference in Bogota, Colombia, June 17, 

2013. 

55 For a look at different scenarios for the FARes evolution during the current peace process, see 

Jeremy ~AcI)ermo'tt, "Possible Scenarios for the FARe's "JnSightCrime, May 20,2013, 

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One of the biggest concerns of Colombian defense officials is the sustainability of the 

current policy at a time of declining U.S. aid and a growing weariness in the 

Colombian population over the level oftaxation needed to sustain the effort. Not 

only do current levels need to be sustained, but many will have to significantly 

expanded as the state pushes to establish a presence farther and farther afield. 

There are also significant logistical costs and hardships associated with creating 

sufficient security in remote areas to enable the functioning of other state 

institutions, such as the judiciary, law enforcement, and road building, in those 

places. Compounding the problem is the need to hold territory where the civilian 

population for decades has either been overtly hostile to the state and sympathetic 

to non-state actors, or has often been the victim of significant human rights abuses 

by the state. 

Both factors make Herculean tasks of efforts to establish a positive state presence 

and a relatively secure environment and to sustaining the effort until the state 

presence can take root. Yet failure to meet any ofthese challenges could give nonstate armed actors enough space to prosper while failing to meet the expectations of 

an already-skeptical civilian population. Such disillusionment could lead to further 

support for non-state actors, reigniting the cycle of violence. 

Over the past decade Colombia has demonstrated the resolve to take many 

significant strides toward transforming the nation and eradicating the violence that 

has plagued it for generations. Many more strides remain to be taken. 

It is clear to me, as the CSIS report details, that the U.S.-Colombia strategic 

partnership must continue for the foreseeable future, even if the peace talks with 

the FARC were to prove successful. With or without a formal peace agreement, the 

Colombia government will require not only ongoing military and police support, but 

support in other central areas of their vast undertaking of reestablishing a positive 

state presence in huge areas of the country where the government has been absent 

for generations. 

The recent shifts in the nature of the conflict are largely a reflection of the success of 

the joint strategy of dismantling the major existential threats to the state. 

Maintaining the current positive trends will require a constant reevaluation ofthe 

national strategy and goals, as well as resource allocation. Both the Colombian 

government and its U.S. partners must allow the cooperation to be flexible and agile 

in dealing with the shifting security threats. 

Lessons Going Forward 

In observing the Colombian conflict for almost 25 years, it seems to me that there 

are several key lessons one can draw that would be applicable in other theaters. 

The first is that there has to be a significant level oftrust between the partner 

nations. The United States cannot want success more than the partner nation, or 

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there are significant conflicts, as we see in Afghanistan today and in the collapse of 

the Northern Triangle in Central America. 

This trust, in Colombia, led to a common vision. Colombians demonstrated an 

extraordinary degree of creativity, patience and willingness to assume risk in 

fighting their enemy with the United States supplying crucial technical assistance 

but little operational leadership. The trust led the United States to support some of 

the riskiest operations of the Colombians, including the hostage rescue, hat would 

be almost impossible to imagine with any other ally. 

A second lesson is that intelligence dominance matters. In a time of the massive 

intelligence thefts by Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning and others, the necessity 

and usefulness of intelligence dominance is being questioned. While it is imperative 

that privacy concerns and civil liberties be protected, there are few cases where the 

innovative, creative and pro-active use of human intelligence and signal intelligence 

can be traced so directly to an overwhelming change in a conflict. 

A third lesson is that intelligence reform matters. The Colombians were able to 

undertake massive intelligence reforms across institutions to improve their 

performance. Because of its massive civil liberties abuses and illegal spying on its 

own citizens - a cautionary tale in intelligence dominance - the equivalent of our 

FBI, the DAS, was abolished even as other reforms brought an unprecedented 

cooperation between the police and military. This willingness to make very difficult 

decisions for the good of the country in the face of significant institutional resistance 

is both rare and crucial. 

A fourth lesson is that hybrid groups like the FARC, the Taliban in Afghanistan and 

many others, thrive in the seams of the world's illicit trade pipelines. With money 

from cocaine the FARC has built a significant political infrastructure that has 

allowed it to flourish and endure far beyond what a less criminalized group would 

have. The FARC is a prototype ofthe coming hybrid terrorist-criminal insurgencies, 

some being fought under an ideological banner and some in the banners of theology. 

All are dangerous and far more difficult to attack than terrorist groups of past 

generations, given the access to enormous financial resources. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the lesson that none of these groups 

operate in a vacuum. Governments like those of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and 

Ecuador create the operational environment in which the FARC, Hezbollah, Iranian 

officials, ETA, Brazilian drug trafficking organizations and others can meet in safety, 

exchange lessons learned and build networks of convenience. 

This is not to say there is one giant conspiracy or alliance of all these groups. Rather, 

it is a deliberately created environment where these groups can mingle, socialize, 

trade expertise and make temporary alliances of mutual convenience. This is the 

danger of the FARC, and that danger is unlikely to diminish with a successful peace 

process in Colombia. The FARC will, I am certain, retain a financial and military 

infrastructure to continue to aid the Bolivarian project long after any agreement 

might be signed. 

28 
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Thank you. 

29 
59

Mr. POE. Mr. Shifter, you have 5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SHIFTER, PRESIDENT, INTERAMERICAN DIALOGUE 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Sherman, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate 

this opportunity today. 

Latin America’s landscape is indeed changing. On balance, the 

changes have been positive. The region has had sustained growth, 

lowered its levels of poverty and inequality, and is moving toward 

more democratic, pragmatic politics. 

On the negative side of the ledger, there is spreading criminality 

in many countries, often fueled by the drug trade and other illicit 

activities. The result is institutional weakness, corruption, and 

challenges to the rule of law. 

Colombia and Peru are among Washington’s closest South American allies. The U.S. has trade agreements with both countries and 

cooperates with them in a variety of key areas. Both countries have 

ample experience in battling insurgencies designated as terrorist 

groups by the State Department that have sought to topple democratically elected governments. 

Fortunately, both the Shining Path in Peru and the FARC in Colombia have been substantially weakened militarily. They are still 

capable of inflicting some damage, but they no longer pose an existential threat to either the Peruvian or Colombian states. 

The Shining Path, the Maoist movement that started in 1980, is 

perhaps one of the most ruthless insurgencies in Latin America. It 

stopped being a significant strategic threat when its leader, 

Abimael Guzman, was captured in September 1992. The success 

was the result of old-fashioned, painstaking police work and sound 

intelligence-gathering. This was a top-down group, and when the 

leader went, the rest crumbled. 

Today, the Shining Path, as we just heard, is operating mainly 

in VRAEM region in Peru. It is sustained by drug-related income. 

The Peruvians have applied intelligence techniques and other approaches that have been used successfully in Colombia with United 

States support to engage successful policy against the Shining Path 

in the VRAEM region. 

The U.S. provides currently about $55 million in counternarcotics 

aid to Colombia—I am sorry, to Peru. 2014 is a big year. There are 

ambitious targets to destroy crops and illegal airstrips in Peru. 

There is one risk, which is that eradicating—focusing on eradication of coca crops in Peru could possibly deprive peasant growers 

of their most viable source of income and heighten resentment 

against the Colombian military and the Colombia Government—

Peruvian military and the Peruvian Government. 

In the case of Colombia, the U.S. has provided far more substantial support, some $9 billion since Plan Colombia was approved by 

the U.S. Congress in July 2000. This has been complemented by 

support in intelligence-gathering and coordination. This is a positive story of international cooperation. 

At a time when the FARC and the Self Defense Forces of Colombia posed a threat in the late 1990s or early 2000s and everybody 

was talking about a failed state, there was a response by the 

60

United States and by the Colombian Government and by its society. 

The figures of success are dramatic—a reduction in homicides, a 

reduction in kidnappings, an expansion of the defense budget, and 

police presence now in all of the country’s municipalities. The sustained U.S. bipartisan support over a dozen years to Colombia, 

with the initial focus on security and increasingly on institutional 

support and alternative development, contributed to the turnaround. 

As the GAO report of 2008 indicated, there has been more 

progress on the security than on the drug issue, which remains a 

significant challenge for Colombia. The key to success was the commitment and will on the part of the Colombian Government and 

major sectors of its society to mobilize and turn around a deteriorating situation. 

Today, faced with a militarily and politically weakened FARC, 

the Colombian Government is pursuing a peace process. Colombians clearly support that process. It has moved a bit more slowly 

than many expected. Two of the five issues on the agenda have 

been covered, and President Santos now says he plans to conclude 

it this year. 

Thanks to the efforts of the Colombian Government, including 8 

years under the presidency of A ́ lvaro Uribe, the process has a better chance of succeeding than it did in the past. It will not be easy. 

There is no guarantee. The most difficult, vexing question, in my 

opinion, is how to deal with the FARC, who are guilty of serious 

human rights crimes. This is an issue that remains to be addressed. Most Colombians want the FARC to pay for their crimes. 

The U.S. should sustain its support to a key strategic ally in 

South America. If a peace accord is reached, assistance will be 

helpful in post-conflict scenarios. And if an agreement is not 

reached, then Colombia would continue to benefit from aid for its 

social and justice reform agenda. 

The U.S. is rightly supporting President Santos’ peace effort. 

There will be issues that will need to be addressed regarding U.S. 

counterdrug policy, but the goal should be to try to reach an agreement. That would be a big boost for Colombia, for the region, and 

for U.S. interests. 

At the same time, peace will not immediately come to pass. The 

FARC is likely to fragment and fracture. Other groups will look 

and take over the illicit activities that are now controlled and dominated by the FARC. 

If we look at the broader situation on Hezbollah, clearly there 

are a few cases when they sought to advance their cause in the region in Argentina in the early 1990s aimed against Jewish targets. 

There is information, reliable information, about ideological and 

financial support for these groups in the region, but no evidence 

that we know of of operational cells. There is a lot of speculation 

and a lot of allegations, but a high standard of credible proof is 

critical. 

Organized crime is a major concern in many countries of the region. Colombia, fortunately, is now using U.S. support to help train 

Central American police and others to deal with their problem. 

Mr. POE. If I could ask you to sum up your testimony, please. 

61

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you very much. The main emphasis of the 

U.S. should be to try to encourage development of democratic institutions, justice systems, and police forces. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]


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Shining Path: Collapse of an Insurgency 

Arguably the most signiticant day in modem Peruvian history was September 12, 1992. That 

was the day Peruvian police detained Abimael Guzman, the founder and undisputed leader of the 

Shining Path insurgency, which emerged in 1980 and wreaked havoc for a dozen years. Shining 

Path was perhaps the most virulent insurgency in Latin American history. Unlike in Central 

America or Colombia, there was never a possibility of government negotiations with the Shining 

Path. The Maoist-inspired movement, which reached approximately 5,000 members at its peak, 

regularly committed terrorist acts and was bent on overthrowing the old order and installing a 

new one. 

According to the respected Truth and Reconciliation Commission, some 69,000 Peruvians were 

killed during the period of internal war. 1 Shining Path was responsible for the vast bulk of those 

killings, most of which were of innocent civilians. The costs to the country were incalculable, 

reflected as well in both political and institutional deterioration and economic chaos. 

Guzman's arrest dealt a major blow to the top-heavy insurgency. The success can be attributed 

to painstaking, effective police and intelligence efforts by the Peruvian authorities. The Grupo 

Especial de Inteligencia (GEIN) and the Direcci6n Nacional Contra el Terrorismo (DIRCOTE) 

benefited from US support, particularly in intelligence gathering. The eventual focus on counterterrorism proved far more productive than strategies mainly focused on anti-narcotics operations. 

Though drug eradication and interdiction efforts were intended to target a principal source of the 

insurgency's resources, they also undermined the livelihood of Peruvian peasants, and made 

them fertile recruiting ground for Shining Path. 

In recent years, in the context of a severely debilitated and fractured insurgency, other Shining 

Path leaders have been captured by applying roughly the same approach that worked with 

Guzman (now serving a life prison sentence). The most significant was that ofFlorindo 

Eleuterio Flores Hala (Comrade Artemio), who led the Shining Path faction in the coca-rich 

Upper Huallaga Valley and was the last remaining link with the original high command, still 

loyal to Guzman. 

The second, far more problematic faction of Shining Path is located in the Apurimac, Ene and 

Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM) and is referred to as the "resurfaced" Shining Path. It is 

sustained chiefly by drug-related income. The VRAEM has become an established drug corridor 

and, close to Bolivia, serves as a production hub for coca destined for Brazilian markets. Yet 

experts say there are no more than 500 Shining Path fighters in the VRAEM, and estimates show 

that Shining Path's monthly drug income is between $50,000 and $100,000 in a region that holds 

1 http://cverdad.org.peliflllul/ 
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about a third of the country's coca crops. Tn 2012, Peru passed Colombia and is the world's 

leading cocaine producer2 

With US counter-narcotics support on the order of $55 million a year, the Peruvian government 

is dealing with the challenging situation in the VRAEM by intensifying anti-drug operations, 

with a focus on interdiction and eradication3 Its goal is to eradicate 30,000 hectares of coca 

crops in 2014, and to destroy illegal airstrips in the VRAEM. Although such a stratetlY could 

yield modest, short-term gains, the risk is that it might only end up bolstering social support for 

Shining Path in the poverty-stricken region. By depriving peasants of the most viable source of 

income they have, the approach could well heighten resentment among the local population 

toward the Peruvian military and government ofilcials more broadly. 

Finally, while Shining Path still nominally espouses a Maoist doctrine, its ideological 

underpinnings have all but disappeared. As noted, the capture of Comrade Artemio severed the 

last link with the group's original, more ideological leadership. Tellingly, Guzman has called the 

VRAEM faction functioning today a pack of "mercenaries" that has discarded Marxism, 

Leninism and Maoism 

F ARC: Is the End Near? 

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or the FARC is Latin America's oldest and 

largest insurgency. Created in the early 1960s and designated by the State Department as a 

terrorist group in 1997, the F ARC has evolved in significant ways over the past half century. It 

began as a markedly ideological insurgency that employed violence to promote redistributive 

social justice. But over recent decades, the F ARC has been more heavily involved in criminal 

activity and has derived its substantial income not only from the drug trade - which it previously 

opposed - but also from extortion and kidnapping. 

The FARe's strength reached its height in the late 1990s, when it operated in 40 to 60 percent of 

the country and had about 18,000 fighters that were organized in over 70 "fronts." About half of 

the F ARC's income came from drugs, a third from the extortion of oil companies and other large 

businesses, and kidnapping and cattle rustling making up the remainder 

Today, however, a much weakened FARC has roughly 8,000 to 9,000 fighters (some credible 

projections are somewhat higher) and operates in about 20 percent of the country. The police 

estimate that the F ARC currently controls 60 percent of the cocaine production. It is hard to 

know with confidence precisely how much revenue the F ARC generates. The estimates have 

varied widely. Government ofilcials claim the level of $2 to 3 billion dollars off drugs alone, 

while others put the tigure at just over $200 million dollars. According to Colombia's Attorney 

General, only 30 percent ofF ARC's income is held within the country. 

:z Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/news-releases-remarks/survey-showssignifi cant -d rop-i n-coca in e-prod uction-i n-col ambia 

3 Congressional Research Service, 2014. 
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Tn the past several years particularly there has been a growing trend of illegal mining in 

Colombia from which armed groups, primarily the F ARC, are profiting. Police believe such 

illicit, profitable activity is taking place in at least 150 municipalities, in 25 of the country's 32 

departments. As of several months ago, gold had become more profitable than cocaine in eight 

departments. The F ARC both extort miners as well as run their own operations. 

Though the F ARC remains involved in an array of criminal activities, the group has been 

militarily weakened and enjoys scant political support among Colombians. This weakening is 

chiet1y because the Colombian government and society, fearing the threat posed by the F ARC's 

steady expansion in the early 2000s, decided to give urgent priority to reversing the deteriorating 

security situation and focus on strengthening the capacity of the state. With a strengthened 

F ARC and ominous growth of paramilitary groups (the State Department designated the United 

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia a terrorist group on September 10, 2001), South America's 

oldest democracy had reached its limit and determined to turn things around. 

Colombian efforts were aided by substantial US support and cooperation. In 2000, the US 

Congress, in a bi-partisan measure, approved an anti-drug security package 01'$1.3 billion that, 

though under different categories, has essentially continued until today (the US provided $353 

million in 2013). To date, the US Congress has appropriated more than $9 billion under the 

broad rubric of Plan Colombia, the bulk of it going, at least in early years, to military and police 

support Over time there has been a shift of emphasis towards more development-oriented 

activities and institution-building efforts Covert assistance, which entails help with intelligence 

gathering and precision-guided munitions, has also been provided by the US, and was 

instrumental in a Colombian raid on a F ARC camp in Ecuadoran territory in 20084 

Although framing the cooperation in terms of fighting drugs was the only politically feasible way 

to gain sufficient support in the US Congress, it was clear that the principal objective of the 

sustained cooperation - and certainly what most mattered to Colombians - was to improve 

security conditions and deter the expansion of both the FARC and paramilitary forces. Both of 

them seriously threatened Colombia's democracy and rule of law. As a 2008 Government 

Accountability Report concluded, US assistance contributed importantly to meeting Colombia's 

security aims. 5 But the assistance was far less successful to meeting the main, stated goal that 

was the primary justification for the aid: drug reduction. Improvements in crop yields offset the 

eradication of coca, which led the GOA to conclude that cocaine production was in fact 15 

percent higher in 2006 than it was in 2000. And while cocaine production has now hit its lowest 

levels in a decade, the aid had no discernible impact on the price and availability of cocaine on 

the streets of American cities. 

US support played a key role in improving Colombia's security situation. Police presence, which 

had been lacking in many municipalities, was now in place throughout most of the country. If 

4 Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in-colombia/ 

5 Government Accountability Office, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71 
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one compares kidnappings and homicides in 2002 and 2012, the changes are dramatic. Nearly 

3000 Colombians were kidnapped in 2002, and just 305 in 2012. The homicide rate dropped 

from 70 per 100,000 in 2002 to 32 in 2012. Colombia's defense budget figures and 

corresponding numbers of military and police personnel similarly point to a far greater emphasis 

on security priorities. Better intelligence-gathering capabilities and state-building in the security 

area proved critical to the country's improved outlook. 

Thanks in large measure to the etfective security policies carried out under the two 

administrations of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010), the current Colombian president, Juan Manuel 

Santos (who served as Uribe's defense minister) is now embarked on a peace process with the 

F ARC aimed at ending the country's tragic and costly anned contlict If the balance of forces 

had not shifted so favorably for the country over the past decade, the peace etfort would have 

little chance of success. Negotiations are proceeding in Havana, and so far agreement has 

reportedly been reached on two of the five items on the agenda: agrarian issues and political 

participation of the FARe. The drug question is now being discussed. Though progress has been 

slow to date, President Santos said that he hopes to have a settlement by the end of 2014. 

The current effort to reach a peace accord with the F ARC has far better prospects than previous 

attempts to negotiate, mainly because the government is in a stronger position than it had been. 

The government has also learned from mistakes of previous administrations. Polls show that the 

Colombian people clearly want peace. The key question, however, remains what the final terms 

of the agreement will say about the complex, difficult key of justice forFARC members who are 

accused of serious crimes. Since president Santos has said he will submit the final accord to a 

popular consultation, the terms will need to be broadly acceptable to the Colombian public. 

For the United States, an agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC would 

be a major step forward and should be enthusiastically supported. There are, to be sure, a 

number of sensitive issues that will need to be worked out regarding extradition of drug 

traffickers and other aspects of the US's counter-narcotics support to Colombia. An agreement 

backed by the Colombian people that advances social peace and economic development would 

effectively contribute to dealing with the continuing drug problem and other illicit activities over 

the long run. 

Although such an accord would be a maj or boost for Colombia - and for the region - it is 

important to be realistic and expect that the country will continue to face serious security 

challenges. Peace will not immediately come to pass. It is reasonable to anticipate increased 

fragmentation and fracturing of the FARe. (According to InsightCrime, for over a decade the 

F ARC have not been able to maintain centralized training camps and new recruits have not 

undergone the same military training or political education as their predecessors6 ) It is likely, 

moreover, that in the context of a peace agreement, other criminal groups, including splinter 

£j I nsightCrim e, http://www . i nsightcrim e .org/fa rc -pea eel cau I d-co 10m b i a-fa rc -rebe Is-b rea k -apa rt 
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factions of the insurgency, will look to take over a number of illicit activities now dominated by 

the F ARC. Still, though continuing security problems related to the F ARC are probable, a peace 

agreement would doubtless be a positive development for a nation weary of war. 

The United States should be prepared to strongly assist Colombia in the post-connict scenario. 

To be sure, in light of fiscal constraints in the United States, it may be a stretch to refer seriously 

to a Plan Colombia 2.0. But Washington needs to do what is possible to make sure that its wise 

and productive investment in Colombia continues to yield positive results. A continued 

partnership between the US and Colombia is critical to assure sustainability of what has been one 

of Washington's most successful chapters in international cooperation. 

Transnational Organized Crime 

Beyond Peru and Colombia, the wider outlook in Latin America regarding possible terrorist or 

insurgent activities requires steady monitoring and vigilance. There have just been a few 

reported cases when international terrorist groups have sought to advance their causes within the 

region. Most notably, in the early 1990s, there were two bombings against Jewish targets in 

Buenos Aires, Argentina, that have been attributed to the Islamic Shiite group Hezbollah. 

Although Hezbollah-related groups and Al Qaeda receive some financial support from 

sympathizers in Latin American countries, there is no evidence, as the State Department recently 

reported, that these groups have operational cells in the region. There has been much speculation 

about more extensive involvement of Iran-related groups in Venezuela and elsewhere, though 

there has been no credible proof of existent threats 7 

The expansion and evolution of organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean should be 

of considerable concern. Colombia's so-called "bandas criminales" (BACRIM), funded by a 

variety of revenue streams, is a phenomenon that will continue to be troubling, even if a peace 

agreement is reached. Tn addition, competition over micro trafficking networks of drugs is 

contributing to violence in much of the region, including countries that had previously not seen 

much violence like Ecuador and Argentina. 

The situations in parts of Mexico and especially Central America's northern triangle are 

particularly dire, with deleterious consequences for the rule oflaw. They renect weak 

governance structures and lack of effective state capacity. While such conditions need to be 

addressed primarily by national societies and governments, the United States - as the largest 

market for illicit drugs and a major sources of arms -- also bears some responsibility. It can and 

should be helpful in providing support, as needed, and working in close concert with Latin 

American and Caribbean partners to achieve greater social peace. 

7 Michael Shifter, http://www. thedialogue.org/uploads/testimony-houseforeignaffairs.docx 
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Policy Lessons and Guidelines 

Latin America's landscape is marked by great promise but also by a number of serious 

challenges. Fortunately, Peru's Shining Path insurgency no longer poses much of a threat 

(certainly nothing like it did two decades ago), and the F ARC seems to moving towards a 

possible peace accord with the Colombian government. In both countries, the weakening of 

these designated terrorist groups and the shift in the balance of forces can be attributed to the 

mobilization of societal groups and the efforts by national governments to buttress its capacity to 

protect its citizens by professionalizing its security forces. US assistance has contributed to the 

positive results in both cases, and especially with Colombia, where sustained and significant 

support to a close regional ally undoubtedly paid off. 

The fact that both Shining Path and the F ARC are less ideologically and politically motivated 

also suggests that what we are seeing in Peru and Colombia is not a continuation of the guerrilla 

warfare of the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Instead, these are two examples of the prevalence and 

persistence of transnational organized crime in Latin America. 

Moving forward, the focus of US policy should be on helping to build strong, effective and 

democratic institutions that offer the best fonnula for countering terrorist activities and organized 

crime. The Peruvian and Colombian cases clearly illustrate the potential efficacy of increased 

intelligence-sharing and coordination. 

The US should also engage in a search for policy alternatives to the current anti-drug approach, 

whose results have been mixed at best. Although the drug problem alone cannot account for the 

disturbing criminality in the region, it remains a critical dimension and piece of the overall 

puzzle that cannot be ignored. There is no easy solution, but the policy experimentation taking 

place in Uruguay and other Latin American countries, as well as some US states, should be 

closely watched. 

Whether the challenge is one of terrorist activities -- or organized crime in the drug trade, 

extortion, kidnapping or illegal mining -- there is no substitute for constructing capable states. 

This means having effective judicial systems and police forces that are committed to the rule of 

law and human rights. Latin America has had its share of missteps in dealing with such 

challenges, often with huge costs. But the region's successes also deserve notice, and point to 

the importance ofa long-tenn commitment to improving the performance of institutions 

equipped to tackle a rapidly changing security agenda. 
68

Mr. POE. Thank you. I will start with questions. Mr. Farah and 

Ms. Realuyo, I don’t know if any State Department officials are 

present for your testimony, but the State Department takes the position, insists that there is no real Hezbollah threat in Latin America, even though the Defense Department and the DEA have said 

otherwise. 

Do you know of why the State Department would take the position there is no Hezbollah? And both of you just talked about it. 

Ladies first. 

Ms. REALUYO. And having been a U.S. State Department official 

in the Counterterrorism Office, if you recall, after September 11 we 

actually added, as well as al-Qaeda and affiliates, we added 

Hezbollah to Hamas, as well as the FARC and Tamil Tigers to 

that. 

And, more importantly, I am sad that we don’t have a State Department colleague here with us to explain, but the bigger question 

is, perhaps we need to take a look at the mistakes we have committed in the past. We considered in the 1990s Osama Bin Laden 

as just merely a money man for al-Qaeda. 

What we have described I think between Doug’s and my testimony, and we actually work collaboratively together, is a lot of the 

fund-raising you can’t separate out when you look at terrorist organizations, because we consider the money as the oxygen for any activity, legal or illegal, and, more importantly, for these lethal operations. 

So I think that is actually why the different agencies look and 

define Hezbollah and its activities in the Western Hemisphere differently than perhaps a diplomatic stance. So as the State Department——

Mr. POE. Well, diplomatically, we are in denial. And the ones 

that do the hard work, the DEA and the Department of Defense, 

say, ‘‘Yeah, those folks are really down in Latin America.’’ You 

don’t know why they—I mean, you have been pretty diplomatic in 

your statement. You used to work for the State Department. 

Mr. Farah, are you going to weigh in on this issue? 

Mr. FARAH. I have had many discussions with senior State Department officials about this. Their view is that the intelligence 

community does not have compelling evidence of Hezbollah’s operational activities in the region. I think part of the issue is resources, and part of the issue is that there are overwhelming 

issues, both in Latin America and other parts of the world, that 

make it difficult to isolate this out and focus on it as I think they 

should, perhaps a little more aggressively. 

And I think that one of the things that is lost in this is that 

starting in 2008, the DEA particularly, but other agencies, built a 

series of what are now public cases in a judicial record that clearly 

shows this involvement in transnational organized activities and 

the—not the merging, the alliances between the FARC Hezbollah, 

Hezbollah and many other trafficking organizations in the region. 

And it has not been put together into a timeline that can show, 

unless you really study it, to put the pieces together and say, ‘‘Holy 

cow, it is really there.’’ We keep hearing it is not there, we don’t 

see the evidence, but it is there, it is just in many little pieces. 

69

And I think that that is one of the frustrations of people who 

deal with the issue on the ground and see it is that it is hard to 

get through the policy perception that it is not there. And why that 

is I honestly don’t know. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Realuyo, let me be—I want you to be specific. You 

said that Hezbollah works with the brutal drug cartel, the Zetas, 

operates out of Mexico. Be a little more specific about how they are 

partners in outlawry, if you will. 

Ms. REALUYO. So actually what is quite interesting is if you 

think about the Lebanese-Colombian community, those who support Hezbollah—and this is actually very important in terms of 

qualifying that it is a subset of the Lebanese diaspora community 

that supports Hezbollah and, more importantly, actively moves 

money and product for them, what they are doing is actually offering a service to cartels such as the Mexican Los Zetas cartel. 

What they were doing in the case of Ayman Joumaa, in the indictment that has been unsealed, is actually describe how they 

were helping to move cocaine toward the Mexican cartels and then 

also launder the money in the backflow. So there is a big question, 

when we take a look at these types of groups of illicit actors, which 

includes terrorists, proliferators, and, more importantly, criminals, 

a lot of them are actually offering and brokering services. 

They may not espouse the same kind of ideological fervor that 

other groups have, but what we are really disturbed by is the fact 

that they are finding a lot of these very specialized services to 

which Doug has actually written about these terror pipelines where 

you see this very unholy alliance between terrorist groups and 

criminal groups who in the end, have a win-win because they actually meet their long-term objectives in terms of that. And that is 

the one case that we have seen specifically documented through 

legal—kind of an actual indictment of Ayman Joumaa’s interaction 

with Los Zetas. 

Mr. POE. And then Hezbollah uses the money maybe for other 

Hezbollah activities somewhere else. 

Ms. REALUYO. And that is the part that is actually worrying us. 

As they step up operations in the Middle East, they need to finance 

and support their militants. 

Mr. POE. And, Mr. Farah, briefly explain in a little more detail 

the connection between Hezbollah and the FARC in Colombia. 

Mr. FARAH. I think if you look at Operation Titan, which then 

grew into—going forward into the Ayman Joumaa cases, they are 

all interconnected. You saw for the first time in 2008 Hezbollah 

operatives directly buying product from the FARC. That hadn’t 

been seen before. There were rumors of it. There were suspicions 

of it. 

But in large quantities, and where a significant amount of the 

profits—the FARC benefitted on the front end directly from selling 

the cocaine, and then the sale profits, large parts of them filtered 

back directly into Hezbollah. And that was well documented, again, 

an open source judicial case that the Colombians worked with the 

Americans on for 2 years. 

An Ayman Joumaa case grew out of that. Again, you had direct 

purchase from FARC, 48th Front on the Ecuadorian border, and 

others, where the money then moved—so the FARC benefits clearly 

70

on the front end. Hezbollah benefits from skimming off the percentages as was mentioned of the money that—it doesn’t all go to 

Hezbollah, but a significant amount of that revenue does. 

And then you have to look I think at the state sponsorship or the 

protection of the states like Venezuela that allow these groups to 

operate with impunity, which really cuts down on their operating 

costs. If you are not worried about getting caught, you can do a lot 

more things than you otherwise would do. And I think that is one 

of the primary issues. And where you see the FARC being very active with a heavy Iranian presence is in Bolivia, and I think you 

have to look at how state support mitigates the cost and the threat 

to these groups. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Ranking member Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. We are focused here on Colombia and 

Peru. If we were going to focus on a third or fourth country, what 

would it be? Where should we be concerned? 

Ms. REALUYO. Probably a region. It is actually Central America, 

because of the fact that, actually, if we think about the balloon effect, which we have talked about a lot in terms of this topic, as Colombia and Peru become much more effective in terms of countering and have real assets, and are actually growing economies, 

Central America, unfortunately, has become now the new 

ungoverned territory, if you want to call it that, for these cartels 

to move, not just drugs by the way; there are tons of other illicit 

products and activities. And, sadly, human trafficking has become 

now in the headlines, which I know it is a topic of interest to you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Farah. 

Mr. FARAH. I would add Argentina. I think if you look at the funnel of—the way the drug trafficking patterns have developed as the 

movement of cocaine downstream, you have Bolivia now producing 

HCL and large quantities. Peru—Brazil has cut off its borders, 

Chile has protected its borders, and you have one giant funnel 

going down to the one country, that, one, has a very high consumption rate; and, two, uncontrolled border traffic to West Africa and 

Europe, which is Argentina. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So from a drug perspective, Argentina. What 

about from the perspective of ideologically driven terrorist organizations? 

Mr. FARAH. I think you see both—I think you see the REA program between Argentina and Iran, which I think is one of the really troubling areas. I think in terms of where they are active and 

where they are raising money, Panama is where Hezbollah is probably——

Mr. SHERMAN. There are people in Panama who take money out 

of their own pocket and——

Mr. FARAH. No. This is where they take money from other people’s pockets and buy dual-use equipment and all kinds of weapons 

in a completely uncontrolled—and then the free trade zones particularly, I would say that where the money flows through, not 

where they are generating the revenue——

Mr. SHERMAN. So Panama is a place for Hezbollah to go on a 

shopping spree, not a place where they are going to——

71

Mr. FARAH. As well as Iran, yes, absolutely. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. Mr. Shifter? 

Mr. SHIFTER. I would say Central America, especially the northern triangle of Central America, Honduras and Guatemala, in 

terms of the drug trafficking. And in terms of ideological affinity, 

you know, I think you could find—I mean, Venezuela is still—is a 

problem that deserves a lot of attention as well. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now, Plan Colombia has cost us $9 billion. The request for the administration is $323 million, including almost half 

of that for economic support. Colombia is considerably better off 

economically than many countries that get little or no economic 

support from the United States. 

Colombia has been substantially successful. Why do we need to honor the President’s request for $323 million, particularly his request for $140 million of economic support? Mr. Shifter. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, I mean, I think Colombia, first of all, is assuming a larger responsibility than they had in the past, and I 

think that number requested has gone down from what it was a 

number years ago. I also think that, you know, the United States 

has made a huge investment in Colombia over a dozen years. This 

is a success story, and I think it is in our interest to do what we 

can to make sure——

Mr. SHERMAN. I see in foreign policy, everywhere we do something, that is where we have got to put more. Where we put our 

blood, we have to put more of our blood; where our money, more 

of our money. Iraq is the most important country in the Arab Middle East because Americans have died there. And everywhere we 

have made an effort we have a stake in continuing that effort. 

It is frustrating. I would like to see somebody come before us and 

say, ‘‘We have been so successful we don’t need any more money.’’ 

How large—I mean, the natural affinity for Hezbollah will come 

among some portion of the Lebanese Shiite community. How large 

a Lebanese Shiite community is there in several of the countries 

we have talked about? And what portion of that community has an 

ideological adherence to Hezbollah? 

Mr. FARAH. I think—if I might, I think that is not necessarily a 

correct—excuse me? It is on. My light is on. 

Mr. POE. They are all off. Mine is working. 

Mr. FARAH. Okay. I will talk loud. I think that there is a misconception that the primary issue is the Lebanese diaspora community or I think they are very important. I think more important to 

understand is this—is anybody else’s mic working? No? 

Okay. I think one needs to look at the broader issue of the—as 

I said before, the state protection that allows—it is not so much 

that you have people who are profoundly—who have a profound affinity for radical Islam or Hezbollah activities. 

It is that you have states in the region that are willing to allow 

those groups to operate with impunity in their national territory, 

issue them, as Venezuela has done, has Ecuador has done, as Panama has done, hundreds, if not thousands, of valid passports, so 

they are no longer tracked as Iranians, where they can move their 

money with impunity. 

One of the great black holes in the Iranian sanctions is the Venezuelan economy, the Panamanian economy, the Ecuadorian bankVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:26 Mar 31, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\020414\86587 SHIRL
72

ing sector. And so I think that if you look at what they are doing 

in Latin America, it is not so much the recruitment and this massive conversion effort, it is having a safe haven in which they can 

operate, get to know each other, cross-pollinate, and raise a lot of 

money with groups like the FARC and others, which is not to say 

that you should dismiss the Lebanese diaspora community, which 

provides some of the fixer opportunities, but in those states where 

they are protected many other types of things can happen that 

wouldn’t happen without that state protection. 

Mr. POE. And they get that protection because the governments 

want money or they just want to stick it to us? 

Mr. FARAH. I think if you read their literature and what they 

talk about and what they want, it is heavily anti-American, is part 

of the glue that goes to—that binds these groups together, as part 

of—they have developed a whole theology that equates liberation 

theology with Shia Islam. They have entire books now about the 

new theology that is possible. It is strange, but if you read——

Mr. SHERMAN. You are saying that books that equate liberation 

theology with Shiite Islam then motivate the Panamanian or Ecuadorian Governments to take action which otherwise wouldn’t be in 

their national interest? 

Mr. FARAH. I don’t think it motivates them. I think it is a justification for creating—as I say, I think that there is a common—

the commonality is the desire to inflict hurt on the United States, 

pain on the United States. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. 

You just touched on what I wanted to talk about. 

[Loud noise.] 

Are we all right? 

What I wanted to touch on here was the coming together of all 

of these organizations—FARC, Hezbollah, the Shining Path—it 

seems like they are on the run—coming together for that commonality, and that is against the United States, European powers, 

and to me that is the danger. 

And what we saw was FARC had been—there was good control 

put on them and their numbers went down, but yet what we are 

seeing seems like an increase in the techniques, the military capabilities of them, bombing and roadside bombs on the military and 

the police in Colombia. They seem to become more violent and 

more dangerous. 

And with this coming together with us as the targets, my questions are, is there any idea how much illicit traffic and trade, and 

what type of that, is coming through our southern borders? Not 

just our southern but our eastern and western shores, and maybe 

even our northern borders. So this organization of the TOCs. 

Mr. FARAH. I think that—in my research, I think that that is 

the—I don’t think we know how much, but I think that if you look 

at what crosses our border in terms of illicit products, they probably have a better delivery rate than FedEx or UPS. You know, if 

you put something in an illicit pipeline from Venezuela and want 

it to get across our border, it will get there. 

73

Mr. YOHO. Where do you see most of that coming through, the 

southern border or the coast? 

Mr. FARAH. The southern border. I think that they now have the 

capability to use submersibles now that can get all the way to California. I think one of the concerns in the security community is 

that they know that the submersibles exist. They can carry 10 tons 

of anything, and they can reach our coast without refueling now, 

and we can’t find them very easily. And I think that that is one 

of the great unknowns out there. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. So not just our southern border but our shorelines, east and west, is a national security interest that we should 

monitor these and secure them. Would you say that—we are in 

agreement there from a national security standpoint? 

Mr. FARAH. Sure. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Mr. FARAH. I think securing borders is——

Mr. YOHO. How about the other two members? Are you guys in 

agreement with that? 

Ms. REALUYO. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. It is a national security threat that we should address? 

Ms. REALUYO. Yes. Because if you think about the types of people 

and products that are actually penetrating the borders, that are 

marketed and pushed by these illicit networks, they are actually 

directly affecting American consumers. 

So we have this tragic case of this very famous actor who was 

found, we allegedly think, from a heroin overdose. And many people who work in this field are suspecting that the heroin probably 

originated from or was trafficked by Mexican cartels, because there 

have been reports now that consumption in the United States of cocaine is actually at its lowest levels ever, but that is not to say—

prescription drugs, methamphetamine, and heroin is actually on 

the rise. 

So since there is a market still here in the United States for 

these types of illicit drugs, we are creating a market, and obviously 

because of the financial incentive and to empower themselves these 

groups look for the governance gaps on our borders, maritime or 

land, in order to actually get the product and people here into their 

market. 

Mr. YOHO. And what we are seeing is the rise of heroin. I read 

a report the other day that said children under the age of 18 to 25, 

in the last 5 or 10 years 20 percent of them have tried heroin. And 

it is a rise because drugs like oxycontin have gotten so high that 

heroin is so cheap, and I think it is a very dangerous thing that 

we need to bring under control. 

The other thing is I know several people in the Coast Guard. The 

people are out there and they are running into these people, if not 

yet, they are going to, and these people are going to be well armed 

with military assets, and it is going to put our military and our 

Coast Guard at a high risk, and this is something that we need to 

bring under control. 

What other ways do you see that we can fight this war on the 

narco-terrorist organizations, other than a perpetual war on drugs 

74

or a war on terror, through maybe policy change or a paradigm 

shift in the United States of America? 

Ms. REALUYO. Well, here in the United States we have to start 

to raise awareness of the average citizen. I am from New York 

City. There was tons of campaigns and ads about human trafficking, which we had never seen, at a large major metropolis 

sporting event. 

Mr. YOHO. We are running those in our district, too. 

Ms. REALUYO. And you saw that as well. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. REALUYO. There was a huge takedown of the syndicates that 

were actually trafficking not just people but also counterfeit goods 

that could actually harm consumers. So there is a big push for 

awareness on the demand side. 

And then on the actual supply side and interdiction, we have actually seen—I think the cases of Peru and Colombia illustrate how 

good intelligence and good cooperation and coordination, tactically 

but also strategically, in terms of political will, can actually bear 

some kind of influence to constrain the operating environments of 

the——

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. I am out of time. I have to cut you off. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. POE. I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. 

It has been very informative, and thank you for the information 

that you have given us. 

This subcommittee hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(75)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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86587n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be 

held by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House 

Office Building (and available live via the Committee website at http)/vv"\?:::vv.FQlt~(fuLI£:house gQ}} 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SlJBJILCT: 

WITNESS: 

Tuesday, February 4, 2014 

2:00 p.m 

Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing Landscape 

Panel I 

Gino Costa, Ph.D 

President 

Ciudad Nuestra 

(Appear;ng via releconference) 

Panel 11 

Ms. Celina B Realuyo 

William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 

Professor of Practice of National Security Affairs 

National Defense University 

Mr Douglas Farah 

Senior Associate 

Americas Program 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Mr. Michael Shifter 

President 

Inter-American Dialogue 

By Direction of the Chairman 
77

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86587m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITlTlE ON 

D.y_--"I-"'II",es,,,(l=-av,---~D"te Fekl'l/(II'V 4, 2014 Room __ --'2""1c.e7e'-2_ 

Starting TIme 2"51' m EndiugTime 1:10 p.m. 

Recesses 

l'residiog Member(s) 

Charrl1J(m 1'01~ 

elieek 1111 oftllefollowinlt Ilwl apply: 

Open S""ion RJ Executivc (dosed) Session 0 Televised RJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

F:iectronioaUy Record"!!Jt.ped) RJ 

Sfenographic Record lZl 

Terroris'l Gml/ps ill La/ill America: The Changing Landscape 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESF,NT: 

Reps. Poe 8,'00k8, Yoho, Peny, Killzinge,', SIWI1IUIII, V{(I'gIlS, Schneider, Cotton 

HEARING 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark wilh (ill • iffhey are 1101 member" of full cOlllmillee.) 

HJ<:ARlNG WITNE8SRS: Same as nlectlllg noUce attached? Yes m No 0 . (If "uo H

, please /i..,/ below and include tille, agency, dcparlmellf, OJ' organizQtron.j 

STATI(MENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List mlysialeme"ts wbmittedf01'lhe recol'd.) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RRCONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 3:.'IOI'!lI' _