1 16-1133-cv (L) Leyse v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DA TABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 15 th day of February, two thousand seventeen. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges

.

---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- MARK LEYSE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee , v. Nos. 16-1133-cv 16-1425-cv LIFETIME ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES, LLC, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant

.

---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: TODD C. BANK, Esq., Kew Gardens, New York.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: STEPHE N M. RUMMAGE, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Seattle, Washington (Sharon L. Schneier, Eric J. Feder, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, New York, New York, on the brief ).2 Appeal from a judgment of the United St ates District Court for the Southern District of New York (Alvin K. Hellerstein, Judge ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERE D, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the April 12 , 2016 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff Mark Leyse appeals the denial of class certification and entry of judgment on his individual claim under the Telep hone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B), after defendant Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC (“Lifetime”) tendered complete relief. On cross-appeal, Lifetime challenges Leyse’s standing to bring his claim, as well as the district court’s denial of summary judgment. “We review de novo both a district court’s gran t of summary judgment and its determination of standing.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin. , 710 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2013). We review a district court’s denial of class certification for abuse of discretion, see Brecher v. Republic of Argentina , 806 F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2015), which we will identify only where the decision rests upon an error of law or fact or otherwise falls outside the “range of permissible decisions,” Myers v. Hertz Corp. , 624 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 2010). In ap plying these standards here, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and re cord of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 1. Standing Lifetime contends that Leyse cannot sh ow the injury in fact necessary for standing. See, e.g. , Strubel v. Comenity Bank , 842 F.3d 181, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing “injury in fact” as necessary element of Article III standing). To3 demonstrate injury in fact, a plaintiff must show the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized ” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); accord Strubel v. Comenity Bank , 842 F.3d at 188. Congress may by statute define and confer upon individuals a legally protected interest, but even in such cases, “a plaintiff only has standing to sue if she can alle ge concrete and particularized injury to that interest.” Strubel v. Comenity Bank , 842 F.3d at 188. We need not here decide whether the a lleged violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) would, by itself, be sufficient to establish injury in fact because the evidentiary record establishes that Lifetime left a prerecord ed voicemail message, to which Leyse later listened, on an answering device in the pl ace where Leyse resided and to which he had legitimate access. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA , 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148–49 (2013) (noting that standing at summary judgment stage is demonstrated by record evidence). Insofar as the TCPA protects consumers from certain telephonic contacts, we conclude that Leyse’s receipt of such an alleged cont act in the way describe d demonstrates more than a bare violation and satisfies the c oncrete-injury requirement for standing. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Et her (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig. , 725 F.3d 65, 105 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The injury-in-fact necessa ry for standing need not be large; an identifiable trifle will suffice.” (alterations and inte rnal quotation marks omitted)); see also Golan v. Veritas Entm’t, LLC , 788 F.3d 814, 819–21 (8th Cir. 20 15) (holding that receipt of two brief unsolicited robocalls as voicemail me ssages was sufficient to establish standing under TCPA); Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A. , 781 F.3d4 1245, 1252 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that in jury under similar TCPA provision may be shown by one-minute occupati on of fax machine). Accordingly, we affirm the distri ct court’s standing determination. 2. Class Certification Leyse argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying, on ascertainability grounds, his motion to certify a class composed of “all persons to whose residential telephone lines [Lifetime] or a th ird party acting on its behalf initiated” the challenged prerecorded message. Our prece dent identifies “ascertainability” as an “implied requirement” for class certific ation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Brecher v. Republic of Argentina , 806 F.3d at 24 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). “A class is ascertainable when defined by objective criteria that are administratively feasible and when identifying its members would not require a mini-hearing on the merits of each
case.” Id. at 24–25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Leyse proposed to identify class memb ers by soliciting individual affidavits certifying receipt of the prerecorded call accompanied by telephone bills showing subscription to New York City residential telephone servic e in August 2009. Leyse adduced no evidence th at this method empl oyed objective criteria, was administratively feasible, or permitted ready iden tification of members. The district court consequently concluded that, under Brecher , the proposed class was unas certainable because (1) no list of the called numbers existed, see Leyse v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs. , No. 13 CIV. 5794 AKH, 2015 WL 5837897, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015); (2 ) no such list was likely to
emerge, see id. ; and (3) (as further explained in the order denying reconsideration)5 proposed class members could not “realistically be expected to recall a brief phone call received six years ago or . . . to retain a ny concrete documentation” of such receipt, App’x 172–73. 1 Although a list of class member s will not always be necessary to render a class ascertainable, we identify no a buse of discretion in th is finding that Leyse had failed to show a sufficiently reliable me thod for identifying th e proposed class to avoid “mini-hearing[s] on th e merits of each case.” Brecher v. Republic of Argentina , 806 F.3d at 25 (internal qu otation marks omitted). Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc. , 302 F.R.D. 240 (N.D. Ill. 2014), upon which Leyse relies, is not to the contrary. There, plaintiff alrea dy possessed a list of telephone numbers associated with the defendan t in proposing to use affidavits and phone records to document each individual call rece ived and the telephone number of each caller. Id. at 248. No such list exists here. Moreover, Leyse proposes to supplement affidavits with records showing only subscription to residential telephone service, not the receipt of particular calls. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in denying certification based on the inability to ascertain the class. 3. Entry of Judgment Leyse contends that the district court e rred in entering judgment on his individual claim upon Lifetime’s depositing with the clerk of court the full amount of damages and costs recoverable by Leyse under the TCPA , even though Leyse had not accepted

1 Leyse addressed ascertainability in his class-ce rtification reply brief to the district court and Brecher at length in his motion for reconsider ation. Thus, his argument on appeal that he was denied a suffi cient opportunity to show ascertainability under Brecher is meritless.6 Lifetime’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment in that amount. The argument is defeated by precedent. While an unaccepted Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 offer for complete relief does not moot a case—that is, it does not strip the di strict court of jurisdiction over the case—such an offer, if rejected , may nonetheless permit a court to enter a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. See Tanasi v. New All. Bank , 786 F.3d 195, 200–20 1 (2d Cir. 2015); Cabala v. Crowley , 736 F.3d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 2013). Leyse argues that Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez , 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016), abrogated these precedents. The argument fails because Campbell-Ewald Co. held only that “an unaccepted settlement o ffer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case,” and therefore a district court “retai n[s] jurisdiction” to adjudicate it. Id. at 672. In so holding, the Court expressly stated that its holding did not extend to cases in which a defendant “deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that
amount.” Id. Because that is the precise scenar io at issue here, we conclude that Campbell-Ewald Co. does not undermine the controlling effect of Tanasi and similar precedents permitting the entry of ju dgment under these circumstances. 2 We therefore

2 Leyse’s reliance upon Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 819 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2016), is also misplaced. Chen held that an individu al claim was not subject to entry of judgment even where “funds ha[d ] been deposited in an escrow acc ount, relief ha[d] been offered, but it ha[d] not been received,” id. at 1138, but only where th e offer of judgment was rejected prior to resolution of the plaintiff’s cl ass-certification mo tion. Assuming arguendo that this court would follow Chen , its reasoning is inapp licable here because Leyse’s class-certification motion was litigated and resolved before Lifetime’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 offer.7 affirm the district court’s entry of judgment on Leyse’s individual claim. 3 We have considered Leyse’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the April 12, 2016 judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLF E, Clerk of Court

3 In so doing, we assume without deciding th at, (1) as a customary user of the telephone and voicemail at issue, Le yse was a “called party,” see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B); and (2) that the TCPA’s statutory defin ition of “unsolicited advertisement,” see id. § 227(a)(5), encompasses the content of th e prerecorded telephone call at issue.