alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 18 (Thursday, January 29, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 5205]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-1931]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 6490]


Notice of Meeting

    Title: Shipping Coordinating Committee; Notice of Meeting.
The Shipping Coordinating Committee (SHC) will conduct an open meeting 
at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, February 18, 2009, in Room 6103 of the 
United States Coast Guard Headquarters building, 2100 Second Street, 
SW., Washington, DC 20593. The primary purpose of the meeting is to 
prepare for the 13th session of the Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and 
Gases (BLG 13) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to be 
held March 2-6, 2009 at the IMO's London Headquarters. The primary 
matters to be considered at BLG 13 include:

--Evaluation of safety and pollution hazards of chemicals and 
preparation of consequential amendments;
--Application of the requirements for the carriage of bio-fuels and 
bio-fuel blends;
--Development of guidelines and other documents for uniform 
implementation of the 2004 International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention);
--Development of provisions for gas-fuelled ships;
--Casualty analysis;
--Consideration of International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS) unified interpretations;
--Development of international measures for minimizing the transfer of 
invasive aquatic species through bio-fouling of ships;
--Review of the Recommendation for material safety data sheets for 
MARPOL Annex I cargoes and marine fuel oils;
--Revision of the International Code for the Construction and Equipment 
of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code);
--Safety requirements for natural gas hydrate pellet carriers;
--Review of relevant non-mandatory instruments as a consequence of the 
amended MARPOL Annex VI and the NO<INF>X</INF> Technical Code; and
--Amendments to MARPOL Annex I on the use and carriage of heavy grade 
oil on ships in the Antarctic area.

    Members of the public may attend the meeting up to the seating 
capacity of the room. Interested persons may seek information by 
writing: Mr. T. J. Felleisen, U.S. Coast Guard (CG-5223), Room 1210, 
2100 Second Street, SW., Washington, DC 20593-0001 or by calling (202) 
372-1424.

    Dated: January 21, 2009.
Mark Skolnicki,
Executive Secretary, Shipping Coordinating Committee, Department of 
State.
[FR Doc. E9-1931 Filed 1-28-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-07-P
#### Christina Corso, Appellant, v John Halama, Respondent.

[805 NYS2d 602]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff wife appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Adams, J.), dated March 28, 2005, as denied those branches of her motion which were for an award of maintenance pendente lite and for reimbursement for out-of-pocket healthcare costs, and granted that branch of the defendant husband’s cross motion which was to enjoin her from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of marital and separate assets, except as required to meet ordinary and necessary living expenses.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the facts and as a matter of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion which was for an award of maintenance pendente lite and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion to the extent of directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 per week in pendente lite maintenance; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the plaintiff.

Generally, the appropriate remedy for any perceived inequity in a pendente lite award is a prompt trial *(see McDermott v McDermott,*4 AD3d 457 [2004]). However, under the circumstances of this case, given the plaintiffs serious health situation, which requires frequent hospitalization, as well as the facts that the defendant, a professional baseball player, earned almost $1,000,000 in the year 2003, and that the plaintiffs income situation is questionable, we conclude that the plaintiff should have been awarded pendente lite maintenance in the sum of $1,000 per week *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]).

“A court is authorized to issue pendente lite injunctive relief in a matrimonial action upon a showing by the movant that the party to be restrained is attempting or threatening to dispose of marital assets so as to adversely affect the movant’s ultimate rights in equitable distribution” *(Balkin v Balkin,*8 AD3d 416, 417 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see*Domestic Relations Law § 234). Here, the plaintiff admitted that at or *427about the time she commenced this action, she transferred funds from certain joint accounts of the parties to an account in her sole name, and claimed that the latter account was her separate property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to enjoin the plaintiff from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of marital and separate assets, except as required to meet ordinary and necessary living expenses.

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Adams, Spolzino and Fisher, JJ., concur.
IA

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 50

To designate the visitors center at the Channel Islands National Park,

California, as the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino Visitors Center’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 11, 1995

Mr. GALLEGLY (for himself, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. WOLF, Mr. DORNAN, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. COX of California, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska,

Mr. BEILENSON, Mr. HERGER, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. MCKEON, Mr.

ROHRABACHER, Mr. MOORHEAD, and Mr. DOOLITTLE) introduced the

following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Resources

JOINT RESOLUTION

To designate the visitors center at the Channel Islands National Park, California, as the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino

Visitors Center’’.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

4 The visitors center at the Channel Islands National

5 Park, California, is designated as the ‘‘Robert J. Lago6 marsino Visitors Center’’.
2

HJ 50 IH

1 SEC. 2. LEGAL REFERENCES.

2 Any reference in any law, regulation, document,

3 record, map, or other paper of the United States to the

4 visitors center referred to in section 1 is deemed to be

5 a reference to the ‘‘Robert J. Lagomarsino Visitors

6 Center’’.

Æ
#### In the Matter of Alfred T. Renauto, Appellant, v Board of Directors of Valimar Homeowners Association, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[806 NYS2d 656]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Directors of Valimar Homeowners Association, Inc., dated October 1, 2003, which confirmed a determination of the Architectural Review Board of Valimar Homeowners Association, Inc., dated August 21, 2002, denying the petitioner’s request for permission to install a hand railing on the exterior of his home and directing him to remove the existing hand railing, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Smith, J.), entered June 30, 2004, which denied the petition, dismissed the proceeding, and directed the petitioner to remove the hand railing.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The declaration of Valimar Homeowners Association, Inc., to which the petitioner’s property is subject, provides for the appointment, by the association’s board of directors, of an architectural review board (hereinafter the ARB) “to act on requests from Homeowners to modify or improve their Homes or Home Sites.” At issue in this proceeding is the denial by the ARB, as confirmed by the Board of Directors of Valimar Homeowners Association, Inc. (hereinafter the Board), of the petitioner’s request for permission to install a hand railing on the exterior of his home. The determination of the ARB, as confirmed by the Board, is subject to review under the business judgment rule *(see Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v Evan,*12 AD3d 563 [2004]), pursuant to which the determination must be sustained if it was authorized, and was taken in good faith and in furtherance of the legitimate interests of the homeowners association *(see Matter of Levandusky v One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp.,*75 NY2d 530 [1990]; *LoRusso v Brookside Homeowner’s Assn., Inc.,*17 AD3d 323, 324-325 [2005]; *Gillman v Pebble Cove Home Owners Assn.,*154 AD2d 508, 509 [1989]; *Schoninger v Yardarm Beach Homeowners’ Assn.,*134 AD2d 1, 10 [1987]). Since the determination at issue satisfied these standards, the petition was properly dismissed. Prudenti, P.J., S. Miller, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur. *[See*5 Mise 3d 247 (2004).]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7342

JON DREUITT,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ABDUL JAMALUDEEN, Medical Doctor; BETH HOLCOMB, Registered

Nurse, Medical Department Supervisor,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief

District Judge. (3:06-cv-00061-JRS)

Submitted: April 28, 2008 Decided: August 7, 2008

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jon Dreuitt, Appellant Pro Se. John David McChesney, Elizabeth

Martin Muldowney, RAWLS & MCNELIS, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Jon Dreuitt appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm

for the reasons stated by the district court. Dreuitt v.

Jamaludeen, No. 3:06-cv-00061-JRS (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2007). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.6905-1 Discharge of executor from personal liability for decedent's income and gift taxes. ( a ) *Discharge of liability.* With respect to decedents dying after December 31, 1970, the executor of a decedent's estate may make written application to the applicable internal revenue officer with whom the estate tax return is required to be filed, as provided in § 20.6091-1 of this chapter, for a determination of the income or gift taxes imposed upon the decedent by subtitle A or by chapter 12 of the Code, and for a discharge of personal liability therefrom. If no estate tax return is required to be filed, then such application should be filed where the decedent's final income tax return is required to be filed. The application must be filed after the return with respect to such income or gift taxes is filed. Within 9 months (1 year with respect to the estate of a decedent dying before January 1, 1974) after receipt of the application, the executor shall be notified of the amount of the income or gift tax and, upon payment thereof, he will be discharged from personal liability for any deficiency in income or gift tax thereafter found to be due. If no such notification is received, the executor is discharged at the end of such 9 months (1 year with respect to the estate of a decedent dying before January 1, 1974) period from personal liability for any deficiency thereafter found to be due. The discharge of the executor under this section from personal liability applies only to him in his personal capacity and to his personal assets. The discharge is not applicable to his liability as executor to the extent of the assets of the estate in his possession or control. Further, the discharge does not operate as a release of any part of the property from the lien provided under section 6321 or the special lien provided under subsection (a) or (b) of section 6324.
( b ) *Definition of “executor”.* For purposes of this section, the term “executor” means the executor or administrator of the decedent appointed, qualified, and acting within the United States.
( c ) *Cross reference.* For provisions concerning the discharge of the executor from personal liability for estate taxes imposed by chapter 11 of the Code, see section 2204 and the regulations thereunder.
[T.D. 7238, 37 FR 28742, Dec. 29, 1972]
Exhibit
10.97


TRADEMARK
LICENSE EXTENSION AGREEMENT


This Extension Agreement
dated as of April 10, 2006 is by and between Hallmark Licensing, Inc. (“Hallmark
Licensing”) and Crown Media United States, LLC (“Crown US”).


WHEREAS, Crown US and
Hallmark Licensing have previously entered into that certain Amended and
Restated Trademark License Agreement between the parties dated as of March 17,
2001 as extended on November 30, 2002, as of August 28, 2003, as of August 1,
2004, and as of August 1, 2005 (the “License Agreement”); and


WHEREAS, the parties
desire to further extend the term of the License Agreement;


NOW, THEREFORE, Crown US
and Hallmark Licensing hereby agree as follows:


The term of the License
Agreement shall be extended for an additional period terminating on September
1, 2007, subject to any earlier termination pursuant to the terms of the
License Agreement.


All other terms and
conditions of the License Agreement will remain unchanged and in full force and
effect.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
parties hereto have executed this Extension Agreement as of the date set forth
above.


 


	
  HALLMARK LICENSING, INC.

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By: 

  	
  /s/ Deanne Stedem

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Title: 

  	
  Vice President

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CROWN MEDIA UNITED STATES, LLC

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By: 

  	
  

  /s/ C. Stanford

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  



  
	
  Title: 

  	
  Vice President
#### Stanley MARON, Co-Trustee of the David & Susan Wilstein Insurance Trust of 1986; Ronald Resch, Co-Trustee of the David & Susan Wilstein Insurance Trust of 1986; Denise Wilstein, Co-Trustee of the David & Susan Wilstein Insurance Trust of 1986, Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Canadian Corporation; Paul Gallagher, an individual, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 01-55635.

D.C. No. CV-99-10082-AHM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 4, 2002.

Decided June 6, 2002.

Before O’SCANNLAIN, RYMER, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Stanley Maron and his co-plaintiffs (collectively, “Maron”) appeal the district court’s grant of Manufacturers Life Insur*865anee Company’s (“Manufacturers Life”) motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. We affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we will not recount it here.

I

The district court did not err in granting Manufacturers Life’s motion to dismiss Maron’s claim for declaratory relief. The parties agree that there was sufficient consideration to support the final settlement agreement as a whole, and there is a presumption under California law that a written instrument is presumptive evidence of consideration. Cal. Civ. Code § 1614. Plaintiffs claim is based on the addition of a provision in the final agreement that recited that the insurance policy at issue had no cash value. However, there were other differences between the initial handwritten agreement and the subsequent typed agreement between the parties, and the district court appropriately construed the two documents together. *Id.*§ 1642. The final agreement also contained an integration clause, under which the parties agreed to waive any claims they might have based on alleged oral alterations in the contract. Given this, the district court correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, the final settlement agreement — including the no cash value provision — was supported by sufficient consideration.

II

The district court also properly granted summary judgment to Manufacturers Life on Maron’s claim of fraudulent concealment. Given the evidence presented, the district court properly concluded that Manufacturers Life’s discussions about demutualizing were immaterial because the company had no power to demutualize at the time it entered into the Settlement Agreement. *See Nussbaum v. Weeks,*214 Cal.App.3d 1589, 263 Cal.Rptr. 360, 368 (Ct.App.1990) (holding that a party’s intention to change policy was not material unless the party possessed the actual authority to change policy.)

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?


L\_2022266DE.01002201.xml


| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 13.10.2022 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 266/22 |

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Berichtigung der Verordnung (EU) 2019/1009 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 5. Juni 2019 mit Vorschriften für die Bereitstellung von EU-Düngeprodukten auf dem Markt und zur Änderung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 1069/2009 und (EG) Nr. 1107/2009 sowie zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2003/2003

(
[Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 170 vom 25. Juni 2019](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOL_2019_170_R_TOC)
)

Seite 51, ANHANG I Produktfunktionskategorien, Teil II, PFC 1(C)(II)(b): Anorganisches Mehrnährstoff-Spurennährstoff-Düngemittel

Anstatt:

| | |
| --- | --- |
| „2. | Die Summe allerdeklarierten Nährstoffgehalte in einem anorganischen Mehrnährstoff-Spurennährstoff-Düngemittel muss mindestens folgende Werte betragen:“ |

muss es heißen:

| | |
| --- | --- |
| „2. | Die Summe aller deklarierten Spurennährstoffgehalte in einem anorganischen Mehrnährstoff-Spurennährstoff-Düngemittel muss mindestens folgende Werte betragen:“. |

---
IA

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 185

To designate the Village of Sunbury, Ohio, as ‘‘Flagville, U.S.A.’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 18, 1996

Mr. KASICH introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to

the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

JOINT RESOLUTION

To designate the Village of Sunbury, Ohio, as ‘‘Flagville,

U.S.A.’’.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the Village of Sunbury, Ohio, is designated as

4 ‘‘Flagville, U.S.A.’’, and the President is authorized and

5 requested to issue a proclamation calling on the people of

6 the Village of Sunbury, Ohio, to display the United States

7 flag on National holidays and regularly during the year.

Æ
#### Long Island Sports Dome et al., Respondents, v Chubb Custom Insurance Company, Appellant.

[807 NYS2d 594]

In an action to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Costello, J.), dated October 22, 2004, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant, Chubb Custom Insurance Company (hereinafter Chubb), failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based upon the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with *442provisions of the insurance policy requiring the insureds to file sworn proofs of loss, submit to examinations under oath, and produce documents. It is undisputed that Chubb did not send demands for compliance with those policy provisions to two of the plaintiffs who were named insureds. As such, the Supreme Court properly denied Chubb’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by those plaintiffs *(cf Gola Supermarket v Travelers Indem. Co.,*150 AD2d 159 [1989]).

Chubb does claim to have mailed demands for a sworn proof of loss together with blank forms, an examination under oath and production of certain documents to the first named insured, Long Island Sports Dome, by both certified mail, return receipt requested, and regular mail. The certified mailings were returned, marked “unclaimed.” Long Island Sports Dome acknowledges receiving a copy of the demand for an examination under oath and production of documents, but claims it was forwarded to it by its adjuster, who was copied on the letter. Chubb admits that it was contacted by the plaintiffs’ attorney and consented to adjournments of the examination under oath. In the absence of an assertion by Chubb that it ever denied the requests for adjournments of the examination under oath, we find that it has not been established that Long Island Sports Dome wilfully failed to comply with the policy’s provision requiring submission to such an examination and production of documents *(see Sappah v Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*105 AD2d 911 [1984]).

Concerning the alleged mailing, by regular mail, of the demand for a sworn proof of loss, which Long Island Sports Dome denies receiving, we reject Chubb’s argument that it is entitled to the presumption of receipt. “The absence of evidence from anyone claiming to have mailed the notice or pertaining to office practices creates questions of fact that cannot be decided on a summary judgment motion . . . The mere assertion that notice was mailed, supported by someone with no personal knowledge of the mailing, is insufficient to give rise to the presumption of receipt that attaches to notices duly addressed and mailed” *(Washington v St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,*200 AD2d 617, 618 [1994]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Luciano and Lifson, JJ., concur. *[See*5 Misc 3d 1028(A), 2004 NY Slip Op 51593(11) (2004).]
#### TEXAS GRAY PANTHERS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Appellants v. Tommy G. THOMPSON, Secretary of Health and Human Services and Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Appellees

No. 01-5134.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

May 17, 2002.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 2002.

Before SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This case was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and was briefed and argued by counsel. Appellants appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary assigning error both as to the substance of the judgment and as to the failure of the District Court to rule on a discovery motion under F.R. Civ. P. 56(f) pending at the time of the grant of the judgment. It appears from the record that the motion was made while the case was assigned to a district judge who unfortunately died during the pendency of the action. After the reassignment of the case, no ruling was entered on the motion until after the entry *543of summary judgment when it was dismissed as moot. While we do not intend to suggest a result, it does appear that appellants were entitled to a ruling on the discovery motion before the entry of judgment. We are therefore vacating the judgment entered in favor of the defendant appellee, and returning the case to the District Court for disposition of the Rule 56(f) motion, and such further proceedings as may then be necessary.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this judgment.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.