ARIZONA BORDER 

SURVEILLANCE 

TECHNOLOGY PLAN

Additional Actions 

Needed to Strengthen 

Management and 

Assess Effectiveness

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2014

GAO-14-368

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-368, a report to 

congressional requesters

March 2014

ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE 

TECHNOLOGY PLAN

Additional Ac tions Needed to S trengthen 

Management and As s es s E ffec tivenes s

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s (CBP) schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) reflect some, but not all, best 

practices. Scheduling best practices are summarized into four characteristics of 

reliable schedules—comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled

(i.e., schedules are periodically updated and progress is monitored). GAO 

assessed CBP’s schedules as of March 2013 for the three highest-cost programs 

that represent 97 percent of the Plan’s estimated cost. GAO found that 

schedules for two of the programs at least partially met each characteristic (i.e., 

satisfied about half of the criterion), and the schedule for the other program at 

least minimally met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the 

criterion), as shown in the table below. For example, the schedule for one of the 

Plan’s programs partially met the characteristic of being credible in that CBP had 

performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis was not 

based on any connection between risks and specific activities. For another 

program, the schedule minimally met the characteristic of being controlled in that 

it did not have valid baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP 

could track progress.

Summary of GAO’s Schedule Assessments for the Three Highest-Cost Programs 

under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan 

Schedule 

characteristic Program 1 Program 2 Program 3

Comprehensive Partially met Partially met Partially met

Well constructed Substantially met Partially met Partially met

Credible Partially met Partially met Minimally met

Controlled Partially met Partially met Minimally met

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

Note: Not met—CBP provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. Minimally met—CBP 

provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met—CBP provided evidence 

that satisfies about half of the criterion. Substantially met—CBP provided evidence that satisfies a 

large portion of the criterion. Met—CBP provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion.

Further, CBP has not developed an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan in 

accordance with best practices. Rather, CBP has used the separate schedules 

for each program to manage implementation of the Plan, as CBP officials stated 

that the Plan contains individual acquisition programs rather than integrated 

programs. However, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP 

with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona 

border with Mexico, and resources are shared among the programs. According 

to scheduling best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule is a critical 

management tool for complex systems that involve a number of different 

projects, such as the Plan, to allow managers to monitor all work activities, how 

long activities will take, and how the activities are related to one another. 

Developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could 

help provide CBP a comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP better 

understand how schedule changes in each individual program could affect 

Why GAO Did This Study

In recent years, nearly half of all 

annual apprehensions of illegal 

entrants along the southwest border 

have occurred along the Arizona 

border. Under the Secure Border 

Initiative Network (SBInet), CBP 

deployed surveillance systems along 

53 of the 387 miles of the Arizona 

border with Mexico. After DHS 

canceled further SBInet procurements, 

CBP developed the Plan, which 

includes a mix of radars, sensors, and 

cameras to help provide security for 

the remainder of Arizona’s border. 

GAO was asked to review the status of 

DHS’s efforts to implement the Plan. 

This report addresses the extent to 

which CBP (1) developed schedules 

and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the 

Plan in accordance with best practices, 

(2) followed aspects of DHS’s 

acquisition management guidance in 

managing the Plan’s programs, and (3) 

identified mission benefits and 

developed performance metrics for 

surveillance technologies to be 

deployed under the Plan. GAO 

reviewed schedule, cost, and 

acquisition documents and analyzed 

fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 

data on apprehensions and seizures.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CBP, among 

other things, apply scheduling best 

practices, develop an integrated 

schedule, verify Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates, revise the IFT test plan, and 

require tracking of asset assist data. 

DHS concurred with four of six GAO 

recommendations. It did not concur 

with the need for an integrated 

schedule or a revised IFT test plan. As 

discussed in this report, GAO 

continues to believe in the need for a 

schedule and a revised test plan. 

View GAO-14-368. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777

or gamblerr@gao.gov
Highlights of GAO-14-368 (Continued)

United States Government Accountability Office

implementation of the overall Plan. 

Moreover, cost-estimating best practices are summarized into four characteristics—well documented, comprehensive, 

accurate, and credible. GAO’s analysis of CBP’s estimate for the Plan and estimates completed at the time of GAO’s 

review for the two highest-cost programs showed that these estimates at least partially met three of these characteristics: 

well documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with 

independent cost estimates in accordance with best practices. Ensuring that scheduling best practices are applied to the 

three programs’ schedules and verifying Life-cycle Cost Estimates with independent estimates could help better ensure 

the reliability of the schedules and estimates.

CBP did not fully follow key aspects of DHS’s acquisition management guidance for the Plan’s three highest-cost 

programs. For example, CBP plans to conduct limited testing of the highest-cost program—the Integrated Fixed Tower 

(IFT: towers with cameras and radars)—to determine its mission contributions, but not its effectiveness and suitability for 

the various environmental conditions, such as weather, in which it will be deployed. This testing, as outlined in CBP’s test 

plan, is not consistent with DHS’s guidance, which states that testing should occur to determine effectiveness and 

suitability in the environmental conditions in which a system will be used. Revising the test plan to more fully test the 

program in the conditions in which it will be used could help provide CBP with more complete information on how the 

towers will operate once they are fully deployed. 

CBP has identified mission benefits for technologies under the Plan, but has not yet developed performance metrics. CBP 

has identified such mission benefits as improved situational awareness and agent safety. Further, a DHS database 

enables CBP to collect data on asset assists, defined as instances in which a technology, such as a camera, or other 

asset, such as a canine team, contributed to an apprehension or seizure, that in combination with other relevant 

performance metrics or indicators, could be used to better determine the contributions of CBP’s surveillance technologies 

and inform resource allocation decisions. However, CBP is not capturing complete data on asset assists, as Border Patrol 

agents are not required to record and track such data. For example, from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013, Border 

Patrol did not record whether an asset assist contributed to an apprehension event for 69 percent of such events in the 

Tucson sector. Requiring the reporting and tracking of asset assist data could help CBP determine the extent to which its 

surveillance technologies are contributing to CBP’s border security efforts.

This is a public version of a For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in February 2014. 

Information DHS deemed as For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive has been redacted.
Page i GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Letter 1

Background 7

CBP’s Program Schedules and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates Reflect 

Some but Not All Best Practices 13

CBP Followed Some Aspects of DHS Acquisition Guidance, but 

Did Not Fully Complete Documents for Acquisition Decisions 

Consistent with the Guidance 27

CBP Has Taken Some Steps to Assess Performance and Identify 

Mission Benefits, but Does Not Capture Complete Data on the 

Contributions of Its Surveillance Technologies 36

Conclusions 49

Recommendations for Executive Action 50

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 50

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 58

Appendix II Photographs of Technologies in the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan 66

Appendix III Our Schedule Assessment Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile Surveillance 

Capability Programs 73

Appendix IV Summary Statistics on the Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the Tucson and Yuma Sectors 

from Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 85

Appendix V Mission Benefits Identified by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of Its 

Surveillance Technologies 94

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 96

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 100

Tables

Table 1: Description of the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan’s Seven Technology Programs 8

Table 2: Summary of the Status of the Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology Plan’s Seven Technology 

Programs 11

Table 3: Summary of Our Schedule Assessments for the 

Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance

System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability 

(MSC) Programs 16

Table 4: Quantities to Be Procured and Deployed for the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan’s Programs and 

Their Estimated Cost as of June 2013 23

Table 5: Comparison of When Key Acquisition Documents Were 

Required to Be Approved and When They Were 

Approved for the Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT), Remote 

Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability (MSC) Programs, as of November 

2013 30

Table 6: Reporting of Asset Assists for Apprehension and Seizure 

Events Occurring across the Tucson Sector within the 

Range of Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) and 

Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) Towers, from 

Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 45

Table 7: Our Assessments of the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), 

Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability (MSC) Program Schedules, as of 

March 2013 75

Table 8: Numbers of Apprehension Events and Apprehensions, 

and Percentages with Unreported Asset Assists, 

Technology Asset Assists, and Other Asset Assists in the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors, Fiscal Year 2010 through 

June 2013 87

Table 9: Numbers of Seizure Events and Seizures, and 

Percentages with Unreported Asset Assists, Technology 

Asset Assists, and Other Asset Assists in the Tucson and 

Yuma Sectors, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 88
Page iii GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 10: Mission Benefits Identified by the U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) of the Technologies Deployed or 

Planned for Deployment under the Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology Plan 94

Figures

Figure 1: Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Acquisition 

Life-cycle Framework and Acquisition Decision Events 

(ADE) 9

Figure 2: Comparison of Original Baseline Schedule and March 

2013 Schedule for Each Technology Program in the 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan 14

Figure 3: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the 

Tucson Sector for Apprehensions Events, Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013 41

Figure 4: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Yuma 

Sector for Apprehensions Events, Fiscal Year 2010 

through June 2013 42

Figure 5: Percentage of Apprehension Events Occurring within the 

Detection Ranges of Remote Video Surveillance Systems 

(RVSS) and Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) 

across the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 

2013 44

Figure 6: Integrated Fixed Tower Concept (Secure Border 

Initiative Network Tower) 66

Figure 7: Remote Video Surveillance System 67

Figure 8: Mobile Surveillance Capability 68

Figure 9: Mobile Video Surveillance System 69

Figure 10: Agent Portable Surveillance System 70

Figure 11: Thermal Imaging System (RECON III) 71

Figure 12: Unattended Ground Sensor 72

Figure 13: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the 

Tucson Sector for Apprehensions Events and 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 89

Figure 14: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Yuma 

Sector for Apprehension Events and Apprehensions, 

Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 90

Figure 15: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the 

Tucson Sector for Seizure Events and Seizures, Fiscal 

Year 2010 through June 2013 92
Page iv GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 16: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Yuma 

Sector for Seizure Events and Seizures, Fiscal Year 2010 

through June 2013 93

Abbreviations

AAR After Action Report

ADE Acquisition Decision Event

APSS Agent Portable Surveillance System

ATEC U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command

BSFIT Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and 

Technology

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CPIC Capital Planning and Investment Control

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

EID Enforcement Integrated Database

IFT Integrated Fixed Towers

IS Imaging Sensors

MSC Mobile Surveillance Capability

MVSS Mobile Video Surveillance System

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OTIA Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition 

PIR SBInet Block 1 Post-Implementation Review

RVSS Remote Video Surveillance System

SBI Secure Border Initiative 

SBInet Secure Border Initiative Network

TID Thermal Imaging Devices

UGS Unattended Ground Sensors

UGS/IS Unattended Ground Sensors/Imaging Sensors

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Page 1 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 3, 2014

Congressional Requesters

In recent years, nearly half of all annual apprehensions of illegal entrants 

along the southwest border with Mexico have occurred along the Arizona 

border, according to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data. A top 

priority for DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is 

preventing, detecting, and apprehending illegal entrants. In November 

2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a 

multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and 

reducing illegal immigration. CBP intended for the SBI Network (SBInet) 

to include technologies such as fixed sensor towers, a common operating 

picture, and tactical infrastructure to create a “virtual fence” along the 

southwest border to enhance CBP’s capability to detect, identify, classify, 

track, and respond to illegal breaches at and between land ports of entry.1

At a cost of about $1 billion, in 2010, CBP deployed SBInet systems, 

referred to as Block 1 systems, along the 53 miles of Arizona’s 387-mile 

border with Mexico that represent one of the highest-risk areas for illegal 

entry attempts.2 However, in January 2011, in response to internal and 

external assessments that identified concerns regarding the performance, 

cost, and schedule for implementing the systems, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of 

SBInet systems.3

 1

The SBInet fixed sensor towers were intended to transmit radar and camera information 

into a common operating picture at workstations manned at all times by U.S. Border Patrol 

agents. The SBInet Common Operating Picture was intended to provide uniform data 

through a command center environment to Border Patrol agents in the field and all DHS 

agencies, and to be interoperable with the equipment of DHS external stakeholders, such 

as local law enforcement. Tactical infrastructure includes pedestrian and vehicle fences, 

roads, and lighting. Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide for the 

arrival at, or departure from, the United States.

2

These systems were specifically deployed to the Tucson and Ajo stations within the 

Tucson sector of Arizona, and Border Patrol began using SBInet at the Tucson station in 

February 2010 and at the Ajo station in August 2010.

3

See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed 

Investment in Key Technology Program, GAO-10-340 (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010), 

and Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key 

Technology Investment, GAO-08-1086 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). 
Page 2 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

After the cancellation of SBInet in January 2011, CBP developed the 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), which includes a 

mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide security for the 

remainder of the Arizona border. Under the Plan, CBP identified seven 

programs to be implemented ranging in estimated costs from $3 million to 

about $961 million. The three highest-cost programs under the Plan are 

the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System 

(RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC), accounting for 97 

percent of the Plan’s estimated cost.4 In November 2011, we reported on 

CBP’s development of, and estimated life-cycle costs for implementing,

the Plan.5 Specifically, we reported that CBP needed more information for 

the Plan and its costs before proceeding with implementation, and we 

recommended that CBP (1) ensure the underlying analyses of the Plan 

were documented in accordance with DHS guidance and internal control 

standards, (2) determine the mission benefits to be derived from the 

implementation of the Plan and develop and apply key attributes for 

metrics to assess program implementation, (3) conduct a postimplementation review and operational assessment of SBInet, and (4) 

update the cost estimate for the Plan using best practices.6

Further, in September 2012, we reported on acquisition management at

DHS.

DHS 

concurred with these recommendations and has actions under way to 

address some of them, which we discuss later in this report.

7

 4

The IFT consists of towers with, among other things, ground surveillance radars and 

surveillance cameras mounted on fixed (that is, stationary) towers. The RVSS includes 

multiple color and infrared cameras mounted on monopoles, lattice towers, and buildings 

and differs from the IFT, among other things, in that the RVSS does not include radars. 

The MSC is a stand-alone, truck-mounted suite of radar and cameras that provides a 

display within the cab of the truck. 

Specifically, we found that DHS acquisition policy reflects many 

5

GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011). A Life-cycle 

Cost Estimate provides an exhaustive and structured accounting of all resources and 

associated cost elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular 

program.

6

Measures and key attributes are generally defined as part of the business case in order 

to explain how they contribute to the mission’s benefits. See Office of Management and 

Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 7, Section 300, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, 

and Management of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 

July 2010). 

7

GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to 

Help Meet Mission Needs, GAO-12-833 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2012).
Page 3 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

key management practices that could help mitigate risks and increase 

chances for successful outcomes; however, most of DHS’s major 

acquisition programs continued to cost more than expected, took longer 

to deploy than planned, or delivered less capability than promised. These 

challenges in DHS’s acquisition management, as well as in the 

department’s other management functions, such as financial and human 

capital management, have contributed to our designation of DHS’s 

management functions as a high-risk area.8

You asked us to review the status of DHS’s efforts to develop and 

implement the Plan. This report addresses the following questions: To 

what extent has CBP (1) developed schedules and Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates for the Plan in accordance with best practices, (2) followed key 

aspects of DHS’s acquisition management framework in managing the 

Plan’s three highest-cost programs, and (3) assessed the performance of 

technologies deployed under SBInet and identified mission benefits and 

developed performance metrics for surveillance technologies to be 

deployed under the Plan?

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 

provided to you. DHS deemed some of the information in the prior report 

as For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must be 

protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive 

information on our analysis of Border Patrol data on apprehension and 

seizure events relative to various surveillance technologies. Although the 

information in this report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same 

questions as the sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology used for 

both reports is the same.

 8

Every 2 years, we call attention to agencies and program areas that are high risk 

because of their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most 

in need of transformation. In 2003, we designated implementing and transforming DHS as 

high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management 

challenges—into one department. In February 2013, we narrowed the scope of this highrisk area to focus on strengthening DHS management functions, as we reported that DHS 

had made considerable progress in transforming its original component agencies into a 

single cabinet-level department and positioning itself to achieve its full potential. We 

found, though, that continued progress was needed in order to mitigate the risks that 

management weaknesses pose to mission accomplishment and the efficient and effective 

use of the department’s resources. See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283

(Washington, D.C.: February 2013).
Page 4 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

To address the first question, we analyzed DHS and CBP documents, 

including program schedules and cost estimates, and interviewed DHS 

and CBP officials responsible for developing and overseeing schedules 

and cost estimates. Specifically, we obtained program schedules as of 

March 2013, which were current at the time of our review, for the three 

highest-cost programs—IFT, RVSS, and MSC—and compared the 

schedules with best practices for developing schedules outlined in an 

exposure draft of GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide.

9 We also 

interviewed cognizant officials in CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation 

and Acquisition (OTIA) and program offices. By assessing the schedules 

against best practices, we identified schedule challenges that CBP was 

experiencing in testing, procuring, deploying, and operating technologies 

under the Plan, and interviewed CBP officials to determine reasons for 

the schedule challenges and steps that CBP had taken or was taking to 

address them. For Life-cycle Cost Estimates, we analyzed the Plan’s 

June 2013 estimate, the IFT program’s January 2012 estimate, and the 

RVSS program’s March 2012 estimate, which were the current estimates 

at the time of our review, and compared them against best practices for 

cost estimating.10

 9

GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Program Schedules, 

We also analyzed DHS and CBP documents and 

interviewed officials regarding their efforts to implement our prior 

recommendations to update the August 2010 Life-cycle Cost Estimate for 

the Plan in accordance with best practices. To assess the reliability of 

cost estimate data, we reviewed relevant program documentation, such 

GAO-12-120G (exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 2012). We developed this guide 

through a compilation of best practices that federal cost-estimating organizations and 

industry use. This guide presents guiding principles for auditors in evaluating the 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of government programs. We used the best 

practices in this guide to assess the schedules for the Plan and its three highest-cost 

programs because, as the guide states, a schedule is used to help manage government 

acquisition programs, and thus this guide is applicable to the Plan and its acquisition 

programs. 

10To compare the cost estimates, we used leading government and industry practices as 

discussed in GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 

Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: 

March 2009), and Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide

Supplement to Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11, Part 7: Preparation, 

Submission, and Execution of the Budget (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the 

President, June 2006). Specifically, the methodology outlined in the Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide is a compilation of best practices that federal cost-estimating 

organizations and industry use to develop and maintain reliable cost estimates throughout 

the life of an acquisition program. We did not analyze a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the 

MSC because CBP had not completed it as of December 2013. 
Page 5 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

as cost estimation spreadsheets, as available, to substantiate evidence 

obtained from interviews with knowledgeable agency officials. We found 

the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.

To address the second question, we analyzed DHS and CBP documents, 

including DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and its 

associated DHS Instruction Manual 102-01-001, program briefing slides, 

budget documents, Acquisition Decision Memorandums, schedules, and 

program risk sheets.11

To address the third question, we analyzed performance assessment 

documentation and metrics used by CBP to determine the effectiveness 

of technologies deployed under SBInet and interviewed CBP officials 

responsible for performance measurement activities. Specifically, we 

analyzed the results of CBP’s January 2013 post implementation review 

of the effectiveness of SBInet technologies in achieving their intended 

results. We also analyzed CBP and DHS documents, such as plans to 

address the post-implementation review, and interviewed officials to 

assess corrective actions taken to improve SBInet performance issues. 

We analyzed CBP data on apprehensions, seizures, and asset assists 

from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 to determine the extent to which 

We focused on the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs 

for more in-depth analyses because they are the Plan’s three highest-cost 

programs and represent 97 percent of the estimated cost of the Plan. 

Specifically, to assess the acquisition strategy for the Plan, we focused on 

the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs and analyzed their respective 

acquisition plans and discussed the acquisition approaches with CBP 

officials. To assess system requirements and capabilities for the IFT, 

RVSS, and MSC programs, we analyzed requirements and capabilities 

documents and worked with CBP officials to identify any changes since 

the documents were initially approved and whether any requirements or 

capabilities had been traded off because of cost, schedule, or other 

purposes. To assess the extent to which CBP followed DHS acquisition 

guidance, we selected aspects of Acquisition Management Directive 102-

01 that were relevant to where these programs were in the acquisition 

process during fiscal year 2013. Specifically, we determined whether 

acquisition documents had been approved by the time required, that is,

by the applicable Acquisition Decision Events.

 11DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, Jan. 20, 2010, and DHS Instruction 

Manual 102-01-001, Acquisition Management/Instruction Guidebook, Oct. 1, 2011.
Page 6 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

the data could be used to measure the contributions of SBInet

technologies in enhancing border security.12 We selected this time frame 

because fiscal year 2010 was the first fiscal year for which data on asset 

assists were available following Border Patrol’s deployment of its SBInet

technologies, and the collection of data on Geographic Information 

Systems coordinates for apprehensions and seizures was required.

13 To 

assess the reliability of these data, we discussed data quality control 

procedures with CBP officials. We determined that these data are 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We compared CBP’s 

tracking and recording of data on asset assists for apprehensions and 

seizures against criteria outlined in Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government.

14

 12As discussed in more detail later in this report, in general, an asset assist is what 

happens when a technological asset, such as an SBInet surveillance tower, or a 

nontechnological asset, such as a canine team, contributes to apprehensions or seizures. 

For the purposes of this report, apprehensions data include individuals arrested and 

identified as deportable aliens, consistent with Border Patrol’s definition. Apprehension 

and seizure data for fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 were obtained from relevant DHS 

databases. See appendix I for additional information on our scope and methodology.

In addition, we visited the Tucson sector in 

Arizona to observe Border Patrol agents operating technologies and 

discuss agents’ experiences in using these technologies. We selected the 

Tucson sector to visit because of the presence of surveillance 

technologies, such as SBInet and RVSS towers, in that sector and 

because the Tucson sector includes locations for which additional 

technology deployments, such as IFTs, are planned. While the 

information we obtained from our visit cannot be generalized to all Border 

Patrol sectors, it provided us with insights about the use of the deployed 

surveillance technologies. Furthermore, we interviewed CBP officials and 

analyzed documents to determine the progress CBP and DHS had made 

in implementing our prior recommendations to develop mission benefits to 

be derived from technologies in the Plan and metrics to measure the 

extent to which border security is expected to improve by using these 

technologies. For more information on our scope and methodology, see 

appendix I.

13Data on asset assists attributed to SBInet surveillance towers were available for 8 

months of fiscal year 2010. Border Patrol began requiring the collection of longitude and 

latitude coordinates for all apprehensions and seizures in May 2009 and thus fiscal year 

2010 was the first full year for which these data were available.

14GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
Page 7 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

We conducted this performance audit from September 2012 to March

2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Border Patrol has reported that its primary mission is to prevent terrorists 

and weapons of terrorism from entering the United States and also to 

detect, interdict, and apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter or 

smuggle any person or contraband across the nation’s borders. 

Geographic responsibility for the southwest border is divided among nine 

Border Patrol sectors, two of which are in Arizona—Tucson and Yuma. 

Each sector has a varying number of stations, with agents responsible for 

patrolling within defined geographic areas.15

CBP’s OTIA was created to help ensure CBP’s technology efforts are 

properly focused on the mission and are well integrated, and to 

strengthen CBP’s expertise and effectiveness in program management 

and acquisition. OTIA’s mission is to conduct and facilitate effective 

identification, acquisition, and life-cycle support of products and services 

while driving innovation to improve CBP’s performance in securing U.S. 

Border Patrol collects and 

analyzes various data on its enforcement efforts and the number and 

types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the 

land ports of entry. These data include apprehensions and seizures of 

drugs and other contraband. The Border Patrol collects and maintains 

data on apprehensions and seizures in DHS’s Enforcement Integrated 

Database (EID). This database also includes an asset assists field in 

which agents can specify whether an asset, such as SBInet surveillance 

towers, contributed to apprehensions or seizures.

 15Border Patrol, within CBP, has primary responsibility for securing the national borders 

between U.S. land ports of entry. The Tucson sector is made up of eight stations located 

within Arizona: Ajo, Casa Grande, Douglas, Naco, Nogales, Sonoita, Tucson, and Wilcox. 

The Yuma sector is made up of three stations located within Arizona, California, and 

Nevada, including Blythe, Wellton, and Yuma stations.

Background

Border Patrol and OTIA 

Roles and Responsibilities
Page 8 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

borders and facilitating lawful movement of goods and people. OTIA 

manages the implementation of the Plan and is acquiring seven 

technology programs in the Plan for use by Border Patrol in Arizona. The 

goal of the Plan is to achieve situational awareness along the Arizona 

border where the Plan’s technologies are deployed. For fiscal year 2013, 

OTIA budgeted $297 million in development and deployment funds for the 

Plan’s seven technology programs. Table 1 describes the Plan’s 

programs, and appendix II provides a photograph of each technology 

program.

Table 1: Description of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan’s Seven Technology Programs 

Technology program Description

Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) New towers to consist of surveillance equipment (for example, ground surveillance radars and 

surveillance cameras) mounted on fixed, that is, stationary towers, and power generation and 

communication equipment to support the towers. The sensors and command and control 

equipment are to be capable of displaying information received from surveillance towers on a 

common operating picture.

Remote Video Surveillance 

System (RVSS)

a

A legacy (that is, existing) system including multiple color and infrared cameras as well as 

microwave antennas for communications mounted on 30- to 90-foot monopoles, lattice towers, and 

buildings. The images are transmitted, monitored, and recorded at a central location. This system 

is deployed to monitor large areas of the international border or critical transit routes. In addition to 

acquiring new RVSS units that will include upgraded surveillance technologies, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) officials stated that the agency intends to replace obsolete surveillance 

technologies on legacy systems with upgraded technologies. 

Mobile Surveillance Capability 

(MSC)

A stand-alone, truck-mounted suite of radar and cameras that provides a display within the cab of 

the truck. An operator can use the information displayed to identify activity and advise responding 

Border Patrol agents.

Mobile Video Surveillance 

System (MVSS)

Also referred to as a Scope Truck, the system includes a telescoping mast or lift system that 

elevates a camera containing day and night capabilities with target illuminators and range finders. 

The operator interface display and control subsystem are operated within the cab of the vehicle.

Agent Portable Surveillance 

System (APSS)

b

A portable, ground-sensing radar and surveillance system that can be deployed and operated by 

Border Patrol agents where truck-mounted systems are unable to be deployed.

Thermal Imaging Devices (TID) Devices that use a camera and corresponding remote viewing kits to enable Border Patrol agents 

to see clearly up to 5 miles in areas that are dimly lit or in total darkness.

Unattended Ground Sensors 

(UGS) and Imaging Sensors (IS)

Sensors placed in the ground to detect, track, identify, and differentiate among humans, animals, 

and vehicles.

Source: GAO analysis of CBP information.

a

The Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) Common Operating Picture was intended to provide 

uniform data through a command center environment to Border Patrol agents in the field and all DHS 

agencies, and to be interoperable with DHS external stakeholders, such as local law enforcement.

b

Among other things, the MVSS differs from the MSC because the MVSS does not include radar, 

while the MSC does include radar.
Page 9 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

The overall policy and structure for acquisition management outlined in 

DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and its associated 

Instruction Manual 102-01-001 includes an Acquisition Life-cycle 

Framework to plan and execute the department’s acquisition programs. 

According to the directive, DHS adopted the Acquisition Life-cycle 

Framework to ensure consistent and efficient acquisition management, 

support, review, and approval throughout the department. As shown in 

figure 1, DHS’s Acquisition Life-cycle Framework includes four acquisition 

phases through which DHS develops, deploys, and operates new 

capabilities.

Figure 1: Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Acquisition Life-cycle Framework and Acquisition Decision Events (ADE)

During the first three phases, the DHS component pursuing the 

acquisition is required to produce key documents to justify, plan, and 

execute the acquisition. These phases each culminate in an Acquisition 

Decision Event where the Acquisition Review Board—a board of senior 

DHS officials—determines whether a proposed acquisition has met the 

DHS’s Acquisition LifeCycle Framework
Page 10 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

requirements of the relevant acquisition framework phase and should 

proceed.16 The Acquisition Review Board is chaired by the Acquisition 

Decision Authority—the official responsible for ensuring compliance with 

Acquisition Management Directive 102-01. DHS classifies acquisitions 

into three levels that determine whether the Acquisition Decision Authority 

can be a Component Acquisition Executive or should be DHS’s Deputy 

Secretary or Under Secretary for Management.17 Under the Plan, the IFT 

program is a Level 2 acquisition, which is overseen by the department, 

and the DHS Under Secretary for Management serves as the Acquisition 

Decision Authority. The other six programs in the Plan are Level 3 

acquisitions, which are overseen by CBP’s Acquisition Review Board, and 

the Acquisition Decision Authority is a CBP official who serves as both the 

Assistant Commissioner for OTIA and Component Acquisition Executive.

As of January 2014, CBP has awarded contracts for four of the Plan’s 

seven programs and has initiated or completed deployment of technology 

to Arizona for three of the four programs under contract, as shown in 

table 2.18

 16DHS components represented on the Acquisition Review Board include the Office of 

Policy, the Science and Technology Directorate, the Office of General Counsel, and the 

Procurement Office, among others.

17Level 1 is for programs with estimated life-cycle costs of $1 billion or more. Level 2 is for 

programs with estimated life-cycle costs from $300 million to less than $1 billion. Level 3 is 

for programs with estimated life-cycle costs of less than $300 million. Within DHS 

components, the Component Acquisition Executives are responsible for establishing 

acquisition processes and overseeing the execution of their respective portfolios.

18Subsequent to the issuance of our prior sensitive report, CBP awarded a contract for the 

IFT program on February 26, 2014.

Status of the Plan’s Seven 

Programs
Page 11 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 2: Summary of the Status of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan’s Seven Technology Programs

Program

Under 

contract

Deployment

Started Completed

Integrated Fixed 

Towers (IFT)

a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials reported that 

CBP expects to award an IFT contract by March 2014. As of June 

2013, vendors in the competitive range—that is, vendors whose 

bids CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) 

considers to be the most competitive for the contract award—

completed demonstrations of their proposed systems for CBP. 

During the demonstrations, each vendor was required to provide 

assurance or demonstrate that its proposed system is ready and 

deployable and will not require additional engineering development. 

CBP had completed its evaluations of the demonstrations as of 

September 2013. Also, as of August 2013, CBP had acquired and 

completed approach and access roads for three deployment areas 

in Arizona where IFTs are to be located.

In April 2013, because of threats shifting away from the Tucson 

sector in Arizona to the Rio Grande Valley sector in Texas, Border 

Patrol requested that OTIA reduce the quantity of IFT units to be 

procured and deployed to Arizona from 50 to 38. OTIA officials 

stated that they are considering the request and no actions had 

been taken as of November 2013.

Remote Video 

Surveillance System 

(RVSS)

X On July 26, 2013, CBP awarded a contract to procure 73 units to 

be deployed to Arizona starting in the second quarter of fiscal year 

2014. As of August 2013, CBP had constructed 5 new RVSS 

towers so that surveillance technologies can be installed on them. 

According to CBP officials, as of November 2013, modifications to 

a command and control facility where the surveillance systems are 

monitored were completed for the towers in the Nogales station’s 

area of responsibility, 6 new RVSS towers were constructed, and 

11 existing RVSS towers were repaired to be ready for new 

surveillance technology.

Mobile Surveillance 

Capability (MSC)

X X CBP awarded contracts in December 2010 to two contractors. As 

of August 2013, one of the contractors had delivered all 33 units it 

was under contract to provide. However, CBP rejected 13 of the 33 

units in July 2013 because cracks were identified where the 

surveillance technology was welded to the truck carrying the 

technology. According to CBP officials, the welding problem was 

resolved in September 2013, and CBP accepted the 13 units 

previously rejected and deployed them.

The other contractor produced and deployed 2 units to Arizona that 

did not meet performance requirements in the operational 

environment during multiple tests. According to CBP officials, CBP 

terminated this contract in July 2013 and plans to use de-obligated 

funds from this contract to procure 16 additional units from the 

other contractor during the first quarter of fiscal year 2014.
Page 12 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Program

Under 

contract

Deployment

Started Completed

Mobile Video 

Surveillance System 

(MVSS)

CBP officials stated that CBP expects to award a contract for the 

system by July 2014. In December 2012, CBP directed that the 4 

units to be procured under the Plan be deployed in Texas instead 

of Arizona because of shifting threat patterns. OTIA officials stated 

that they have not removed the program from the Plan because the 

system will be needed in Arizona in the future.

Agent Portable 

Surveillance System 

(APSS)

X X In 2012, CBP procured 15 APSS units under an existing 

Department of Defense (DOD) contract because that system was 

the only option that had an integrated radar and thermal imaging 

solution. OTIA considered use of these 15 units to be a technology 

demonstration project under the Plan, and considers this initial 

project/program to be completed. However, after using these units, 

Border Patrol determined that the units did not meet its

requirements. Border Patrol continues to operate the APSS units 

until a new APSS program can be established. OTIA plans to 

establish a new APSS program and is developing a mission needs 

statement and a preliminary concept of operations, which OTIA 

expects to complete by October 2014. 

Thermal Imaging 

Devices (TID)

X X CBP awarded a contract for the system in August 2011 and all 22 

units to be procured under the Plan were deployed to Arizona by 

October 2011.

Unattended Ground 

Sensors (UGS) and 

Imaging Sensors 

(IS)

X

(for UGS)b

In June 2013, CBP procured additional units of UGS with the same 

capability as UGS currently deployed in Arizona. As part of the 

Plan, CBP had intended to procure and deploy UGS with IS 

technology (an advanced capability) in Arizona. However, during 

demonstration and analysis of the UGS with IS technology, there 

were problems because of saturated radio frequencies, limited 

bandwidth, and system integration. Consequently, in March 2013, 

CBP approved the procurement of additional units of the UGS with 

existing current capabilities to replace old and failing units in 

Arizona, while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

CBP work to resolve frequency allocation and infrastructure 

supportability issues in order to meet the UGS with IS technology 

operational requirements. OTIA officials expect the problems to be 

resolved by March 2015.

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

a

Subsequent to the issuance of our prior sensitive report, CBP awarded a contract for the IFT 

program on February 26, 2014.

b

According to OTIA officials, CBP is procuring UGS units with existing current capabilities; CBP is not 

procuring UGS with IS technology. Once CBP resolves the frequency allocation and infrastructure 

supportability issues, according to CBP officials, it will award the contract for the UGS with IS 

technology as originally planned.
Page 13 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

OTIA has developed a schedule for each of the Plan’s seven programs, 

and four programs will not meet their originally planned completion dates. 

OTIA established schedules for each program, serving as the original 

program plans with the required sequence of events, resource 

assignments, and dates for deliverables.19 However, as of March 2013,

five of the Plan’s programs—IFT, RVSS, MSC, APSS, and UGS/IS—have 

experienced delays relative to their baseline schedules, as shown in 

figure 2.20

 19The baseline schedule is to represent the original configuration of the program plan and 

to signify the consensus of all stakeholders regarding the required sequence of events, 

resource assignments, and acceptable dates for key deliverables. The current schedule is 

to represent the actual plan to date. The current schedule is to be compared with the 

baseline schedule to track variances from the program plan. 

20The APSS program, which was considered a demonstration project under the Plan, was 

completed on time, but it experienced a delay relative to its baseline schedule because 

the start date was delayed. Units to be procured under the MVSS program have been 

redirected to Texas, and OTIA plans to award a contract for the program in July 2014. The 

TID program did not experience any schedule delays and was completed by CBP’s 

originally planned target date.

CBP’s Program 

Schedules and LifeCycle Cost Estimates 

Reflect Some but Not 

All Best Practices

CBP’s Program Schedules 

Have Experienced Delays 

and the Three HighestCost Programs Meet 

Some but Not All 

Scheduling Best Practices

The Majority of the Plan’s 

Programs Experienced Some 

Delays, and Schedules for the 

IFT, RVSS, and MSC 

Programs Are Not Fully 

Reliable
Page 14 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 2: Comparison of Original Baseline Schedule and March 2013 Schedule for Each Technology Program in the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan

OTIA officials attributed program delays to various factors, including 

higher than expected numbers of proposals from vendors for some of the 

programs, system performance problems, and limited resources. In 

particular, OTIA officials stated that they initiated acquisitions for a 

number of the Plan’s programs around the same time, but OTIA did not 

have a sufficient number of acquisition staff with sufficient experience and 

skills to review contract proposals or manage the programs, a fact that 
Page 15 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

contributed to program delays.21

According to best practices, in acquisition programs, agencies may make 

modifications to program schedules to reflect changes to programs; CBP

has consistently updated each program’s schedule in response to 

program delays. However, we assessed OTIA’s schedules as of March 

2013 for the three highest-cost technology programs—IFT, RVSS, and 

MSC—and found that these program schedules addressed some, but not 

all, best practices for scheduling. The Schedule Assessment Guide

identifies 10 best practices associated with effective scheduling, which 

are summarized into four characteristics of a reliable schedule—

comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled.

For example, OTIA officials stated that 

for both the IFT and RVSS programs, the source selection process to 

decide which vendor would be awarded the contract was extended 

because of a higher than expected number of proposals received from 

vendors and a limited acquisition workforce to review and process the 

proposals, including not having a dedicated contracting officer for each of 

the programs. In addition, for the MSC program, OTIA officials attributed 

delays to problems both vendors who were awarded contracts 

experienced with their systems, as previously discussed. OTIA took 

various actions in response to these delays, such as extending the 

scheduled contract award date for the IFT and RVSS programs and 

extending scheduled activities for the MSC program from July 2014 to 

September 2015.

22 Table 3 

summarizes our assessment of the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules. 

Appendix III provides more detailed information on the description of each 

best practice and on the results of our assessment.

 21A senior OTIA official stated that in prior years, OTIA had about half of the workforce 

needed to manage the Plan’s technology programs and that there was a shortage in 

contracting staff. The official stated that OTIA staff has gained experience and skills more 

recently.

22GAO-12-120G.
Page 16 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 3: Summary of Our Schedule Assessments for the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System 

(RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) Programs

IFT RVSS MSC

Schedule

characteristic Best practice Overall assessment

Comprehensive • Captures all activities, as defined in the work breakdown 

structure, which defines in detail the work for both the 

government and its contractors necessary to accomplish a 

program’s objectives.

• Reflects what resources (for example, labor, materials, and 

overhead) are needed to do the work, whether all required 

resources will be available when needed, and whether any 

funding or time constraints exist.

• Establishes the duration of all activities and has specific start 

and end dates.

Partially

met

Partially

met

Partially

met

Well 

constructed

• Sequences all activities—that is, all activities are sequenced 

in the order that they are to be implemented with the most 

straightforward logic possible.

• Establishes a valid critical path, which represents the chain 

of dependent activities with the longest total duration. A valid 

critical path is necessary to examine the effects of any 

activity slipping along this path.

• Identifies the total float time—the amount of time by which 

an activity can slip before the delay affects the program’s 

estimated finish date—so that a schedule’s flexibility can be 

determined. 

Substantially

met

Partially

met

Partially

met

Credible • Verifies that schedule is (1) horizontally traceable—that is, it 

reflects the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated 

products or outcomes and (2) vertically traceable—that is 

that activities in varying levels of the schedule map to one 

another and key dates presented to management in periodic 

briefings are in sync with the schedule.

• Conducts a schedule risk analysis to predict a level of 

confidence in meeting the program’s completion date.a

Partially

met

Partially

met

Minimally

met

Controlled • Updates periodically using actual progress and logic to 

realistically forecast dates for program activities.

• Maintains a baseline schedule to measure, monitor, and 

report the program’s progress. 

Partially

met

Partially

met

Minimally

met

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition data.

Notes: Not met—OTIA provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. Minimally met—OTIA 

provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met—OTIA provided 

evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. Substantially met—OTIA provided evidence that 

satisfies a large portion of the criterion. Met—OTIA provided complete evidence that satisfies the 

entire criterion. We developed this rating scale in consultation with cost-estimating experts who 

helped develop the Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.

a

A schedule risk analysis is performed to calculate the amount of contingency time that is needed to 

complete the program on time.
Page 17 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

According to our overall analysis, OTIA at least partially met the four 

characteristics of reliable schedules for the IFT and RVSS schedules and 

partially or minimally met the four characteristics for the MSC schedule. 

For example:

• Comprehensive: OTIA’s schedule for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC 

programs partially met best practices in terms of being 

comprehensive. For example, our analysis found that all three 

program schedules reflected the work that needed to be 

accomplished for the schedules, and each schedule had duration 

estimates that at least substantially met best practices. The IFT 

schedule contained a clear start and a finish milestone, and the RVSS 

schedule contained at least a clear start milestone. However, the 

schedules for these programs did not meet other best practices in 

terms of being comprehensive. For example, the MSC schedule did 

not contain fields that map activities to a program work breakdown 

structure; and the schedules for the IFT and RVSS programs did not 

fully map all schedule activities to each program’s work breakdown 

structure in accordance with best practices.23 Moreover, the IFT and 

RVSS schedules did not include the level of detail expected to provide 

oversight of ongoing construction work, as activities associated with 

the construction work were reflected in the schedules as milestones, 

limiting OTIA’s ability to monitor the progress of these efforts. 

Specifically, these activities were reflected in the schedules as a 

milestone that was a point in time, rather than a range of time, as 

called for by best practices. In addition, resources were not assigned 

to some activities in all three schedules. According to best practices, a 

schedule without resources implies an unlimited number of resources 

and their unlimited availability. Best practices note that assigning 

resources to activities across programs can help prevent any future 

overallocation of resources.

• Well constructed: OTIA’s schedule for the IFT program substantially 

met the characteristic of being well constructed; the schedules for 

RVSS and the MSC programs partially met this characteristic. For 

example, our analysis found the IFT program schedule had few 

missing or incorrect logic links and the critical path—the chain of 

dependent activities with the longest total duration—was found to be a 

 23The program’s work breakdown structure defines, in detail, the work necessary to 

accomplish a program’s objectives, including activities the owner and contractors are to 

perform.
Page 18 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

straightforward, continuous path of activities that depicted the effort 

driving the key milestones. Our analysis of the RVSS and MSC 

program schedules found that these schedules had no missing or 

incorrect logic links. However, we could not verify a reliable critical 

path that was continuous from the status date to contract award for 

these schedules. In addition, our analysis shows that each of the 

three programs’ schedules exhibited unreasonable amounts of total 

float—that is, the amount of time by which an activity can slip before 

the delay affects the program’s estimated finish date appeared to be 

overestimating true schedule flexibility. For example, 25 percent of the 

activities in the IFT schedule appeared to be able to slip at least 10 

working months before affecting the final milestone of the program.

• Credible: OTIA’s schedules for the IFT and RVSS programs partially 

met the characteristic of being credible; the MSC program schedule 

minimally met this characteristic. For example, our analysis found that 

the IFT and RVSS schedules responded when significant delays were 

introduced into the planned activities in the schedules; that is, when 

we tested the robustness of the schedules by extending activity 

durations, forecasted dates recalculated appropriately. However, the 

MSC schedule responded to schedule delays in some instances but 

not in others, and some forecasted dates did not recalculate to 

account for changes we made in the duration of activities when testing 

the MSC schedule. Additionally, OTIA performed a risk analysis for 

the IFT and RVSS programs; however, the IFT and RVSS analyses 

did not include the risks most likely to delay the project or how much 

contingency reserve (that is, time held in reserve for potential delays) 

was needed for each schedule. For the MSC schedule, OTIA did not 

conduct a schedule risk analysis because, according to program 

officials, OTIA did not have a tool for conducting schedule risk 

assessment at the time the MSC schedule was developed. According 

to best practices, without this analysis, the program office may not 

sufficiently understand the level of confidence in meeting the 

program’s completion date and identify any potential reserves for 

contingencies.24

 24Specifically, best practices state that if a full and complete schedule risk analysis is not 

conducted, program managers may not be able to determine the likelihood of the 

program’s completion date, how much schedule risk contingency is needed to provide an 

acceptable level of certainty for completion by a specific date, risks most likely to delay the 

program, how much contingency reserve each risk requires, and paths or activities most 

likely to delay the program.
Page 19 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

• Controlled: OTIA’s schedules for the IFT and the RVSS programs 

partially met the characteristic of being controlled; the MSC program 

schedule minimally met this characteristic. For example, our analyses 

determined all three schedules were well maintained, updated 

periodically by a trained scheduler, and contained no out-of-sequence 

activities. We also found that the IFT and the RVSS schedules 

contained no date anomalies, but the MSC schedule did have 

anomalies. For example, the MSC schedule contained 13 activities in 

the past with no actual start or finish dates. Further, our analysis 

showed that none of the schedules had valid baseline dates for 

activities or milestones by which management could track current 

performance. The IFT baseline schedule was originally approved in 

July 2011, and the baseline for the RVSS was approved in September 

2012; however, both of these programs have been delayed. 

Rebaselining resets the estimated schedule that is used to determine 

how the program will be held accountable.25 Once a program is 

rebaselined, OTIA officials stated that the office plans to report on the 

performance of the program based on the revised schedule. However, 

none of the schedules we assessed contained valid baseline dates 

that could be used to track on-time, delayed, or accelerated effort. For 

example, a baseline schedule was not established for the MSC 

program and both the IFT and RVSS schedules were missing some 

baseline dates for activities and milestones. In addition, according to 

our analyses, none of the three schedules were supported by a 

schedule baseline document, which is a single document that defines 

the organization of a schedule, describes the logic of the network, 

describes the basic approach to managing resources, and provides a 

basis for all parameters used to calculate dates. OTIA officials stated 

that the Acquisition Program Baseline for both the IFT and RVSS 

serves as the baseline schedule document, which defines the cost, 

schedule, and performance baselines; however, the Acquisition 

Program Baseline and related guidance present an overview of OTIA 

schedule policy rather than assumptions specific to individual program 

schedules.26

 25According to our assessment guide, while rebaselining can be beneficial for quickly 

identifying new variances, reporting a program’s performance based on a rebaselined cost 

or schedule can also skew or conceal the program’s real cost and schedule performance 

or overall timeline.

26An Acquisition Program Baseline document explains the overall approach to the project 

and establishes a program’s baseline cost, schedule, and performance parameters.
Page 20 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

OTIA officials stated that they believe the schedules for the IFT, RVSS, 

and MSC programs are generally reliable, but also stated that these 

schedules may not fully meet all best practices. OTIA officials stated that 

they plan to rebaseline the IFT and RVSS program schedules after 

contract award and the MSC program schedule after contract 

negotiations. Rebaselining these schedules would help OTIA better 

address some of the best practices, such as to help ensure a more full 

and consistent allocation of resources, to address gaps in the critical path 

to program completion, and to address schedule risk assessments. 

However, OTIA’s plans to rebaseline the schedules would not position 

OTIA to meet all best practices, which are designed to ensure reliable 

schedules. According to best practices, to be considered reliable, a 

schedule must substantially or fully meet all four schedule characteristics.

As our analysis indicates, OTIA does not have the information it needs in 

the schedules to effectively use them in managing and overseeing the 

IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs. While OTIA’s plans to rebaseline the 

schedules are positive steps, ensuring that all schedule best practices are 

applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules when updating them could 

help OTIA better ensure the reliability of the three programs’ schedules 

and could help better position OTIA to identify and address any potential 

further delays in the programs’ commitment dates.

OTIA has not developed an Integrated Master Schedule for scheduling, 

executing, and tracking the work to implement the Plan and its seven 

programs. Rather, OTIA has used the separate schedules for each 

individual program (or “project”) to manage implementation of the Plan. 

The use of an Integrated Master Schedule is a well-established practice 

in program and project management and is a necessary tool for 

coordination of independently managed projects that have 

dependencies—including resource dependencies—on one another.27

 27

According to schedule best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule 

shows the effect of delayed or accelerated government activities on 

contractor activities, as well as the opposite effect for multiple programs. 

In addition, an Integrated Master Schedule that allows managers to 

monitor all work activities, how long the activities will take, and how the 

GAO-12-120G and GAO-09-3SP. We recognize that different organizations may use the 

term “Integrated Master Schedule” differently; for example, an Integrated Master Schedule 

is often used to refer solely to the prime contractor schedule. We use “integrated” to refer 

to the schedule’s incorporation of all activities—contractor and government—necessary to 

complete a program. 

OTIA Does Not Have an 

Integrated Master Schedule for 

the Plan
Page 21 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

activities are related to one another is a critical management tool for 

complex systems that involve the incorporation of a number of different 

projects, such as the Plan.28

OTIA officials stated that an Integrated Master Schedule for the 

overarching Plan is not needed because the Plan contains individual 

acquisition programs as opposed to a plan consisting of seven integrated 

programs. However, collectively, these programs are intended to provide 

Border Patrol with a combination of surveillance capabilities to assist in 

achieving situational awareness along the Arizona border with Mexico, as 

referenced in CBP’s planning documents.29

Moreover, while the programs themselves may be independent of one 

another, the Plan’s resources are being shared among the programs. 

OTIA officials stated that when schedules were developed for the Plan’s 

programs, they assumed that personnel would be dedicated to work on 

individual programs and not be shared between programs. However, as 

OTIA has initiated and continued work on the Plan’s programs, it has 

shared resources such as personnel among the programs, contributing, in 

part, to delays experienced by the programs. For example, with regard to 

the IFT program, OTIA officials stated that a contracting officer had to be 

shared with another program. Further, OTIA officials told us that because 

of resource constraints associated with initiation of the Plan, development 

of two acquisition documents—an Acquisition Program Baseline and Lifecycle Cost Estimate—for the MSC program were deferred because the 

IFT and RVSS programs were deemed higher priorities. In addition, for 

the IFT and RVSS programs, planning and deployment activities were 

delayed because of resource-constrained environments and the lack of 

As a document that integrates 

the planned work, the resources necessary to accomplish that work, and 

the associated budget, an Integrated Master Schedule provides 

information and oversight regarding the schedule. According to best 

practices, an Integrated Master Schedule also helps agencies monitor 

progress against overall completion dates. However, OTIA has not 

established a target completion date for an Integrated Master Schedule 

for the overall Plan.

 28GAO-12-120G and GAO-09-3SP.

29Department of Homeland Security, Multi-Year Investment and Management Plan for 

Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) for Fiscal Years 2014-

2017 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2013).
Page 22 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

dedicated contracting officers to plan and execute the programs’ source 

selection and environmental activities. Developing and maintaining an 

Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could allow OTIA insight into 

current or programmed allocation of resources for all programs as 

opposed to attempting to resolve any resource constraints for each 

program individually. Because OTIA does not have an Integrated Master 

Schedule for the Plan, it is not well positioned to understand how 

schedule changes in each individual program could affect implementation 

of the overall Plan. An Integrated Master Schedule could also help 

provide CBP a comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP to reliably 

commit to when the Plan will be fully implemented, as well as help CBP to 

better predict whether estimated completion dates are realistic to manage 

programs’ performance.

OTIA has developed a rough order of magnitude estimate for the Plan 

and individual Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs 

that meet some but not all best practices for such estimates.30 Best 

practices for cost estimating and Office of Management and Budget 

guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are important for 

program approval and continued receipt of annual funding.31 DHS policy 

similarly provides that Life-cycle Cost Estimates are essential to an 

effective budget process and form the basis for annual budget decisions. 

Reliable Life-cycle Cost Estimates reflect four characteristics—they are 

(1) well documented, (2) comprehensive, (3) accurate, and (4) credible—

which encompass 12 best practices.32 For example, a best practice for a 

credible cost estimate is independently verifying a program’s Life-cycle 

Cost Estimate with an independent cost estimate and reconciling any 

differences.33

 30CBP officials stated that they are developing a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the MSC’s 

operations and maintenance costs, which is expected to be completed in early 2014. 

31GAO-09-3SP, and Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide V 2.0 

Supplement to Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11, Part 7: Preparation, 

Submission, and Execution of the Budget (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

32GAO-09-3SP.

33 An independent cost estimate provides an independent view of expected program costs 

that tests the program office’s estimate for reasonableness. Independent cost estimates 

frequently use different methods and are less burdened with organizational bias, helping 

to provide decision makers with insight into a program’s potential costs.

OTIA Does Not Have LifeCycle Cost Estimates for 

the Plan or Its Two 

Highest-Cost Programs 

That Fully Meet Best 

Practices
Page 23 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

In August 2010, OTIA developed a rough order of magnitude cost 

estimate for the Plan—a high-level estimate without much detail—which 

was about $1.54 billion, including approximately $750 million in 

acquisition costs and approximately $800 million in operations and 

maintenance costs. In June 2013, OTIA revised this cost estimate for the 

Plan, estimating the cost at $1.39 billion, including about $480 million in 

acquisition costs and about $910 million in operations and maintenance 

costs.34 According to OTIA officials, some of the differences in costs 

between the August 2010 and June 2013 estimates are attributable to 

using more current information for the June 2013 estimate.35

Table 4: Quantities to Be Procured and Deployed for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan’s Programs and Their 

Estimated Cost as of June 2013 

Table 4 

provides the June 2013 estimated cost and number of units to be 

procured and deployed for each of the Plan’s seven programs.

Program

Number of units to

be procured and deployed 

Estimated cost in June 2013

(in millions of then-year dollars)

Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) 52 $960.8 a

Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 18 new systems and technology 

upgrades to 47 existing systems

287.5 b

Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 48 107.2 c

Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 15 11.6

Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 4 12.6 d

Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 22 7.3 e

Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) and Imaging Sensors (IS) 545 UGS and 140 IS 3.0

Total

f

891 $1,390.0

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data.

a

The cost estimate is based on 52 units, but CBP subsequently reduced the number of units to 50, 

and according to officials, CBP is considering reducing the quantity to 38 because of threats shifting 

from Arizona to Texas.

b

In November 2013, CBP officials told us that CBP had awarded a contract for 73 units on July 26, 

2013, but the agency did not provide a revised cost estimate for the additional units.

c

 34The August 2010 and June 2013 cost estimates are in then-year dollars, which reflect 

the cost at the time of the procurement. 

The 48 units to be procured and deployed exclude 1 unit that CBP received for consideration. 

Twelve of the 48 units are to be procured under the Plan with annually appropriated funds; the other 

36 units are to be procured with American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds. According to CBP 

35Because OTIA did not have cost estimate data readily available for some of the Plan’s 

programs for the August 2010 cost estimate, we could not describe all of the reasons for 

differences between the August 2010 and June 2013 cost estimates.
Page 24 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

officials, all units will be initially deployed in Tucson, Arizona, and 36 units were to be deployed as of 

March 2013.

d

Because of a change in threat, these units are to be deployed in Texas instead of Arizona as 

originally planned.

e

Border Patrol procured an additional 34 units with American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds.

f

According to OTIA officials, the UGS estimated cost is for existing technology, not the UGS with IS 

technology as planned, because of problems developing the new IS technology.

In November 2011, we reported on the results of our analysis of the 

Plan’s August 2010 estimate.36 Specifically, we found that the August 

2010 estimate substantially met best practices in terms of being 

comprehensive and accurate, and partially met best practices in terms of 

being well documented. For example, we reported that, in terms of being 

comprehensive, the estimate included documented technical data. In 

terms of accuracy, we reported that the cost estimate was continually 

updated and refined as more information became known. However, we 

also found that the August 2010 estimate minimally met best practices for 

being credible. For example, CBP officials had not conducted a sensitivity 

analysis and a cost-risk and uncertainty analysis to determine a level of 

confidence in the estimate, nor did CBP compare it with an independent 

estimate. At that time, OTIA officials stated that CBP’s approach was to 

develop and report an initial rough order of magnitude cost estimate for 

the programs in the Plan, not necessarily a Life-cycle Cost Estimate that 

met all best practices. In our November 2011 report, we recommended 

that CBP update its August 2010 cost estimate for the Plan using best 

practices, so that the estimate would be comprehensive, accurate, well

documented, and credible.37

In November 2012, OTIA officials told us that CBP no longer intends to 

develop a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the Plan that meets all best 

practices. OTIA officials also stated that they used a risk-based approach 

to improve cost-estimating certainty and confidence by focusing on the 

Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs, which 

compose 90 percent of the Plan’s estimated cost. According to the 

CBP concurred with the recommendation.

 36GAO-12-22. To compare the cost estimates, we used leading government and industry 

practices as discussed in GAO-09-3SP and OMB Circular A-11, Part 7. 

37Specifically, we recommended that CBP (1) fully document data used in the cost model; 

(2) conduct a sensitivity analysis and risk and uncertainty analysis to determine a level of 

confidence in the estimate, so that contingency funding can be established relative to 

quantified risk; and (3) independently verify the new Life-cycle Cost Estimate with an 

independent cost estimate and reconcile any differences.
Page 25 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

officials, developing a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the Plan that followed 

all best practices at this point in the acquisition cycle would not contribute 

much cost management benefit because a number of programs are under 

contract and units were being deployed to the field. However, as we 

recommended in November 2011, we continue to believe that a Life-cycle 

Cost Estimate for the Plan, developed using best practices, is needed to 

ensure that the estimate is comprehensive, accurate, well documented, 

and credible to help the agency and Congress fully understand the 

impacts of the Plan’s various programs. Moreover, CBP’s June 2013 

revised cost estimate for the Plan does not address the concerns we 

identified in November 2011 with CBP’s original cost estimate. For 

example, the IFT and RVSS programs compose 90 percent of the Plan’s 

cost in the June 2013 Life-cycle Cost Estimate; however, OTIA has not 

independently verified its Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS 

programs with independent cost estimates and reconciled any differences 

with each program’s respective Life-cycle Cost Estimate, consistent with 

best practices.38

After CBP developed the initial cost estimate for the Plan in August 2010, 

CBP developed separate Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS 

programs in January and March 2012, respectively. The estimates for the 

IFT and RVSS programs met some but not all best practices for cost 

estimates. Specifically, our analysis shows that, in developing these 

estimates, CBP partially documented the data used in the cost model for 

the IFT’s Life-cycle Cost Estimate and fully documented the cost model 

for the RVSS’s Life-cycle Cost Estimate. CBP also conducted a sensitivity 

analysis and risk and uncertainty analysis to determine the level of 

confidence in both Life-cycle Cost Estimates so that contingency funding 

could be established relative to quantified risk. However, our analysis 

showed that CBP did not independently verify its draft Life-cycle Cost 

Furthermore, the remainder of the June 2013 Life-cycle 

Cost Estimate is not fully documented. The costs for programs other than 

the IFT and RVSS are provided as a summary program cost without a 

detailed description provided. In contrast, the IFT and RVSS Life-cycle 

Cost Estimates provided backup documentation, including labor hours 

and methodology.

 38According to OTIA officials, they submitted the IFT Life-cycle Cost Estimate to DHS’s 

Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management in January 2013 and the estimate 

was assessed in preparation for the Acquisition Decision Event decision. However, an 

assessment is not equivalent to verifying the IFT estimate with an independent cost 

estimate.
Page 26 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost 

estimates and reconcile any differences with each program’s respective 

Life-cycle Cost Estimate, consistent with best practices.

According to OTIA officials, the IFT program’s Life-cycle Cost Estimate 

will be updated after the contract is awarded, the cost model for the 

updated Life-cycle Cost Estimate will be fully documented in accordance 

with best practices for cost estimating, and DHS’s Office of Program 

Accountability and Risk Management is expected to review the updated 

IFT Life-cycle Cost Estimate. Also, OTIA officials stated that they expect 

to update the RVSS Life-cycle Cost Estimate and receive approval for it in 

February 2014. However, OTIA is uncertain as to whether the updated 

IFT and RVSS Life-cycle Cost Estimates will be verified with independent 

cost estimates and any differences reconciled with the respective updated 

Life-cycle Cost Estimates. Specifically, OTIA officials stated that the IFT 

contract award will drive changes to the scope, schedule, and cost/budget 

baseline for the IFT program; CBP plans to update the Life-cycle Cost 

Estimate with programming and cost assumptions; and CBP plans to 

provide the updated cost estimate to the department as part of a revised 

submission of the Acquisition Program Baseline document. For the RVSS 

program, OTIA officials stated that the contract award resulted in changes 

that required updates to and reconciliation between the Cost Estimating 

Baseline Document and the Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the program’s 

scope, schedule, and cost/budget baseline. CBP intends to update the 

RVSS program’s Life-cycle Cost Estimate with programming and cost 

assumptions during the second quarter of fiscal year 2014 and provide 

the updated cost estimate to DHS for review. However, according to OTIA 

officials, as of November 2013, the agency had not yet determined 

whether to independently verify or validate the IFT and RVSS Life-cycle 

Cost Estimates. As CBP no longer intends to develop a Life-cycle Cost 

Estimate for the entire Plan, when updating the IFT and RVSS Life-cycle 

Cost Estimates, independently verifying the cost estimates and 

reconciling any differences, in accordance with cost-estimating best 

practices, could help better ensure the reliability of each estimate.
Page 27 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Consistent with DHS acquisition guidance, CBP tailored the DHS 

Acquisition Life-cycle Framework for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs, 

primarily because the agency’s strategy for the three programs includes 

acquiring nondevelopmental technologies, preferably commercial-off-theshelf systems, as opposed to developing technologies. As a result, rather 

than entering the DHS acquisition framework at Acquisition Decision 

Event 1, when a system includes technology development, the IFT 

program entered at combined Acquisition Decision Events 2B/3, and the 

RVSS and MSC programs entered at Acquisition Decision Event 2B.39

In pursuing its strategy to acquire nondevelopmental systems for the 

Plan’s three highest-cost programs, OTIA identified requirements and 

capabilities for each program, consistent with DHS acquisition guidance. 

Specifically, OTIA identified requirements for the IFT and RVSS programs 

that were approved in 2012, and capabilities for the MSC program that 

were developed in 2009. As part of the strategy to acquire commercialoff-the-shelf systems, CBP traded off, that is, reduced, some 

requirements for the RVSS and expects to trade off some requirements 

for the IFT for cost-effectiveness or schedule reasons. For example, with 

regard to the RVSS, OTIA traded off two requirements because, 

according to OTIA officials, they were not offered with the selected RVSS, 

 39The RVSS program is expected to reach Acquisition Decision Event 3 in May 2014 and 

will be based on the completion of a system acceptance test at the Nogales area of 

responsibility. For the MSC program, according to OTIA officials, the CBP Component 

Acquisition Executive chaired a series of decision briefs on the program and, after 

determining that the spirit and intent of DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 

were being met, approved the MSC program for Acquisition Decision Event 2B. The MSC 

program was approved for Acquisition Decision Event 3 in September 2012. 

CBP Followed Some 

Aspects of DHS 

Acquisition Guidance, 

but Did Not Fully 

Complete Documents 

for Acquisition 

Decisions Consistent 

with the Guidance

CBP Followed Some 

Aspects of DHS 

Acquisition Guidance to 

Acquire Commercial-Offthe-Shelf Products
Page 28 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

which presented the best value to the government while providing as 

many requirements as possible.40 According to DHS Acquisition 

Management Directive 102-01 guidance, as part of the acquisition 

process, a program office may make trade-offs among performance, lifecycle cost, schedule, and risk. For example, the guidance states that a 

small reduction in performance that does not impair the mission might 

result in a large cost reduction.

For the Plan’s three highest-cost programs, DHS and CBP did not 

consistently approve key acquisition documents before or at the 

Acquisition Decision Events, in accordance with DHS’s acquisition 

guidance. An important aspect of an Acquisition Decision Event is the 

review and approval of key acquisition documents critical to establishing 

the need for a program, its operational requirements, an acquisition 

baseline, and test and support plans, according to DHS guidance. DHS 

Acquisition Management Directive 102-01—and the associated DHS 

Instruction Manual 102-01-001 and appendixes—requires program offices 

to develop documents demonstrating critical knowledge that would help 

leaders make better-informed investment decisions when managing 

individual programs. The DHS guidance provides information for 

preparing acquisition documents, which require department- or 

component-level approval before a program moves to the next acquisition 

phase. In a September 2012 report, we found that while DHS had initiated 

efforts to validate required acquisition documents in a timely manner at 

major milestones, DHS leadership had authorized and continued to invest 

in major acquisition programs even though the vast majority of those 

programs lacked foundational documents demonstrating the knowledge 

needed to help manage risks and measure performance.41

 40DHS deemed specific details about the requirements that OTIA traded off as sensitive; 

therefore, we did not include them in this report.

We concluded 

in September 2012 that this limited DHS’s ability to proactively identify 

and address the challenges facing individual programs. We 

recommended, among other things, that DHS ensure all major acquisition 

programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy by obtaining 

department-level approval for key acquisition documents before 

approving their movement through the acquisition life cycle. DHS 

concurred and since the time of our September 2012 report has approved 

41GAO-12-833.

DHS and CBP Did Not 

Consistently Approve Key 

Acquisition Documents in 

Accordance with 

Departmental Guidance
Page 29 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

additional acquisition documents. However, DHS has not yet 

demonstrated progress in obtaining department-level approval for most of 

its major acquisition programs’ key acquisition documents.

On the basis of our analysis for IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs under the 

Plan, the DHS Acquisition Decision Authority approved the IFT program 

and the CBP Acquisition Decision Authority approved the RVSS and MSC 

programs to proceed to subsequent phases in the Acquisition Life-cycle 

Framework without approving all six required acquisition documents for 

each program. We also found that one document for the IFT program, five 

documents for the RVSS program, and two documents for the MSC 

program were subsequently approved after the programs received 

authority to proceed to the next phase. Table 5 provides a comparison of 

when key acquisition documents were required to be approved and when 

they were approved for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs.
Page 30 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 5: Comparison of When Key Acquisition Documents Were Required to Be Approved and When They Were Approved for 

the Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 

Programs, as of November 2013

Document

IFT RVSS MSC

Date 

required

Date

approved

Date 

required

Date 

approved

Date 

required

Date 

approved

Acquisition Plan—provides a top-level 

plan for the overall acquisition 

approach.

for Acquisition 

Decision 

Event 2B/3 on

3/15/12

3/13/12 for Acquisition 

Decision

Event 2B on 

11/3/11

2/24/12 for Acquisition 

Decision

Event 2B on 

7/22/10 and 

Acquisition 

Decision

Event 3 on 

9/27/12

4/20/10

Acquisition Program Baseline—

establishes a program’s critical 

baseline cost, schedule, and 

performance parameters.

3/15/12 9/6/12 Not yet 

approved

Integrated Logistics Support Plan—

defines the strategy to ensure 

supportability and sustainment of a 

future capability.

d

3/15/12 10/9/12 5/17/13

Life-cycle Cost Estimate—provides 

an exhaustive and structured 

accounting of all resources and 

associated cost elements required to 

develop, produce, deploy, and sustain 

a particular program.

Not yet 

approveda Not yet approvedc Not yet approved

Operational Requirements 

Document—provides a number of 

performance parameters that a 

program must meet to provide useful 

capability to the operator.

e

3/15/12 4/20/12 12/29/09

Test and Evaluation Master Plan—

documents the overarching test and 

evaluation approach for the 

acquisition program and describes 

developmental and operational test 

and evaluation needed to determine a 

system’s technical performance, 

operational effectiveness and 

suitability, and limitations.

f

11/27/13b 5/8/12 8/30/11

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) information.

g

Notes: Shaded documents were not approved when required.

a

CBP has a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the IFT dated January 6, 2012, but it has not been approved 

by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); CBP officials stated that they plan to update the IFT 

Life-cycle Cost Estimate after the IFT contract is awarded.

b

Although the IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan was originally approved on March 15, 2012, the 

approval was rescinded on June 11, 2012. CBP updated the IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan 

and the DHS Director of Operational Test and Evaluation approved it on November 27, 2013.

c

CBP has a draft Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the RVSS dated March 8, 2012, which CBP officials 

stated is expected to be completed and approved in the second quarter of fiscal year 2014.

d

According to CBP officials, an Acquisition Program Baseline for the MSC is to be approved by the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2014.
Page 31 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

e

CBP officials stated that they are developing a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the MSC’s operations 

and maintenance costs, which was expected to be completed by December 2013.

f

CBP did not approve an Operational Requirements Document for the MSC; rather, CBP approved a 

capabilities matrix.

g

The MSC Test and Evaluation Master Plan was approved later than required for Acquisition Decision 

Event 2B and in time for Acquisition Decision Event 3.

We discuss the status of key acquisition documents for the three highestcost programs below.

IFT program. Our analyses found that the DHS Acquisition Decision 

Authority approved four of the six documents required at Acquisition 

Decision Event 2B/3—the Acquisition Plan, Acquisition Program Baseline, 

Integrated Logistics Support Plan, and Operational Requirements 

Document—but did not approve two others—the Life-cycle Cost Estimate 

and Test and Evaluation Master Plan. At the time of the Acquisition 

Decision Event, CBP had a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the IFT, but the 

cost estimate had not yet been approved by DHS. According to OTIA 

officials, the Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the IFT was discussed at the 

Acquisition Decision Event 3 meeting and approved by the DHS Under 

Secretary for Management and DHS’s Office of Program Accountability 

and Risk Management. However, CBP did not provide documentation 

showing that the estimate was approved by DHS.

The DHS Director of Operational Test and Evaluation approved the 

revised IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan on November 27, 2013, over 

18 months after it was required to be approved.42

 42The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation administers the DHS test and 

evaluation policy and process for DHS acquisitions, supports the Acquisition Review 

Board by providing independent test and evaluation progress and status on acquisitions 

reviewed by the board, approves the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, and provides the 

status of any operational testing.

DHS and CBP officials 

attributed the delay in approving the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, in 

part, to discussions within CBP about the type and level of testing to be 

conducted on the IFTs. Specifically, CBP officials stated that a June 2012 

version of the draft Test and Evaluation Master Plan did not include 

robust operational test and evaluation because of the IFT program’s 

strategy to acquire a nondevelopmental system (sometimes referred to as 

a commercial-off-the-shelf system). As a result, Border Patrol requested 

that rigorous, disciplined testing be included in the Test and Evaluation 
Page 32 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Master Plan to obtain familiarization with, and confidence in, the system 

and establish baseline performance information.

According to DHS’s acquisition guidance, the Test and Evaluation Master 

Plan is important because it describes the strategy for conducting 

developmental and operational testing to evaluate a system’s technical 

performance, including its operational effectiveness and suitability. 

However, the IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan approved by DHS in 

November 2013 does not describe testing to evaluate the operational 

effectiveness and suitability of the system. Rather, the Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan describes CBP’s plans to conduct a limited user 

test of the IFT. According to the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the 

limited user test will be designed to determine the IFT’s mission 

contribution. According to OTIA and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, 

this testing is planned to occur during 30 days in environmental conditions 

present at one site—the Nogales station. CBP plans to conduct limited 

user testing for the IFT under the same process that is typically performed 

in any operational test and evaluation, according to the Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan.

The November 2013 IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan notes that, 

because the IFT acquisition strategy is to acquire nondevelopmental IFT 

systems from the marketplace, a limited user test will provide Border 

Patrol with the information it needs to determine the mission contributions 

from the IFTs, and thus CBP does not plan to conduct more robust 

testing. However, this approach is not consistent with DHS’s acquisition 

guidance, which states that even for commercial-off-the-shelf systems, 

operational test and evaluation should occur in the environmental 

conditions in which a system will be used before a full production decision 

for the system is made and the system is subsequently deployed. This 

guidance also states that for commercial-off-the-shelf systems, 

operational tests should be conducted to ensure that the systems satisfy 

user-defined requirements. In addition, DHS guidance states that the 

primary purpose of test and evaluation is to provide timely and accurate 

information to managers, decision makers, and other stakeholders to 

support research, development, and acquisition, in a manner that reduces 

programmatic financial, schedule, and performance risk.43

 43DHS Test and Evaluation Directive 026-06. May 22, 2009. 
Page 33 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to conduct testing to 

determine the IFT’s operational effectiveness and suitability with the 

benefits to be gained from such testing. However, revising the Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan to include more robust testing to determine 

operational effectiveness and suitability that more fully accounts for the 

various environmental conditions under which the IFTs will operate could 

better position CBP to evaluate IFT capabilities before moving to full 

production for the systems, help provide CBP with information on the 

extent to which the towers satisfy the Border Patrol’s user requirements, 

and help reduce potential program risks. In particular, although the limited 

user test should help provide CBP with information on the IFTs’ mission 

contribution and how Border Patrol can use the system in its operations, 

the limited user test does not position CBP to obtain information on how 

the IFTs may perform under the various environmental conditions the 

system could face once deployed. For example, in November 2013, the 

DHS Director of Test and Evaluation stated that testing the IFT at only 

one location during a clear, warm day without much wind would not 

produce representative results for days when it would be, for example, 

rainy, windy, freezing, or snowy, or when there was lightning. Likewise, 

he said testing in one location, such as Nogales, would not necessarily 

produce the same results as testing in Tucson because of the different 

terrains for the two locations. Conducting limited user testing in one area 

in Arizona—the Nogales station—for 30 days could limit the information 

available to CBP on how the IFT may perform in other conditions and 

locations along the Arizona border with Mexico. As of November 2013, 

CBP intends to deploy IFTs to 50 locations in southern Arizona, which 

can include different terrain and differences in climate throughout the 

year.

Although the IFT program is not the same as SBInet, according to the 

Plan, the IFTs are to be deployed to locations with similar environmental 

and terrain conditions as SBInet towers, and IFT and SBInet systems 

may have similar types of technologies, such as cameras and radar. CBP 

previously encountered testing issues with SBInet. For example, in a 

January 2010 report, we found that while DHS’s approach to SBInet

testing appropriately consisted of a series of progressively expansive 

developmental and operational events, the test plans and procedures for 
Page 34 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

some test events were not defined in accordance with guidance.44 In 

January 2010, we concluded that effective testing was integral to 

successfully acquiring and deploying a large-scale, complex system, like 

SBInet. We further concluded that to do less unnecessarily increased the 

risk of problems going undetected until late in the system’s life cycle, such 

as when it was being accepted for use. In addition, in a November 2011 

report, we found that the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command 

(ATEC) operationally tested SBInet at Tucson and that testing revealed 

challenges regarding the effectiveness and suitability of the technology 

for border surveillance.45

RVSS program. The CBP Acquisition Decision Authority approved the 

program at Acquisition Decision Event 2B; however, the official had not 

approved any of the six required documents as required by DHS 

acquisition guidance at the time of that event. According to OTIA officials, 

the Acquisition Decision Authority approved the program for this 

Acquisition Decision Event because all of the necessary programmatic 

information was sufficiently developed and coordinated to support this 

decision. However, the Acquisition Decision Authority did not approve five 

of the documents until months after this event, and a sixth document, a 

Among other things, this testing found that the 

rugged, restrictive terrain and weather conditions prevalent where SBInet 

is deployed affected the performance of the system’s radar, which 

affected success in detecting, identifying, and classifying items of interest. 

Revising the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to more fully test the IFT in 

the various environmental conditions in which it will be used to determine 

operational effectiveness and suitability before IFTs move to full 

production, in accordance with DHS acquisition guidance, could help 

provide CBP with more complete information on how the IFTs will operate 

under a variety of conditions before beginning full production. It could also 

help better position CBP to understand how the IFTs will meet Border 

Patrol’s operational requirements for the towers in contributing to Border 

Patrol’s border security mission. Without conducting operational testing in 

accordance with DHS guidance, the IFT program may be at risk of not 

meeting Border Patrol operational needs.

 44GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance 

Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, GAO-10-158 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 29, 2010).

45GAO-12-22. ATEC was the operational test agency for the SBInet Block 1 deployment 

at Tucson.
Page 35 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Life-cycle Cost Estimate, was in draft form in November 2013—2 years 

after its required approval date. According to OTIA officials, the RVSS 

Life-cycle Cost Estimate is expected to be completed and approved in the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2014 and provided to DHS for review.

MSC program. The CBP Acquisition Decision Authority approved two of 

the required six documents by Acquisition Decision Event 2B—the 

Acquisition Plan and Operational Requirements Document. However, the 

Integrated Logistics Support Plan was not approved until about 21 

months after Acquisition Decision Event 2B. Also, the Acquisition 

Program Baseline was not expected to be approved until the second 

quarter of fiscal year 2014, more than 3 years after it was required to be 

approved for Acquisition Decision Event 2B and at least 16 months after it 

was required to be approved for Acquisition Decision Event 3. 

Furthermore, a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the MSC’s operations and 

maintenance costs was expected to be completed in late 2013, more than 

3 years after it was required to be approved for Acquisition Decision 

Event 2B.
Page 36 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Since we last reported on CBP’s efforts to assess the performance of its 

SBInet surveillance systems in November 2011, CBP has taken steps to 

assess the performance of these technologies.46 In November 2011, we 

found that CBP had not conducted a post-implementation review and 

developed a plan to address SBInet operational test outcomes. 

Specifically, we found that CBP had not addressed the findings of ATEC’s 

March 2011 operational test results for the SBInet system at Tucson, 

which revealed challenges regarding the effectiveness and suitability of 

the technology for border surveillance and made nine recommendations 

to address performance issues.47

 46

At that time, CBP officials stated that 

the agency did not conduct a post-implementation review or develop a 

plan to address the ATEC test results because the Secretary of 

Homeland Security canceled SBInet in January 2011. In November 2011, 

we recommended that CBP, in accordance with DHS guidance, conduct a 

post-implementation review and operational assessment of its SBInet

system, and assess costs and benefits of taking action on the results of 

GAO-12-22. 

47As the operational test agency for the SBInet Block 1 deployment at Tucson, ATEC was 

to provide an independent evaluation of the system’s operational effectiveness and 

suitability. ATEC issued its final evaluation report in March 2011. U.S. Army Test and 

Evaluation Command, Operational Test Agency Evaluation Report for the Secure Border 

Initiative Network (SBInet) Block 1.0 (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Mar. 29, 

2011).

CBP Has Taken 

Some Steps to 

Assess Performance 

and Identify Mission 

Benefits, but Does 

Not Capture 

Complete Data on the 

Contributions of Its 

Surveillance 

Technologies

CBP Has Taken Steps to 

Assess the Performance 

of SBInet Technologies
Page 37 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

ATEC’s operational test.48

In response to our November 2011 recommendation, OTIA tasked the 

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory with conducting an 

independent post-implementation review of its SBInet Block 1 system. In 

January 2013, CBP released the results of the SBInet Block 1 Post 

Implementation Review (PIR), an assessment of the performance of its 

two SBInet surveillance system locations at Tucson and Ajo.

In making this recommendation, we concluded 

that conducting such a review, and weighing the costs and benefits of 

taking action on recommendations resulting from ATEC’s test of the 

SBInet system, could inform CBP’s decisions about future deployments of 

similar technologies, such as the IFTs.

49 The PIR 

concluded that CBP’s SBInet surveillance system has enhanced overall 

situational awareness within system viewsheds, improved agent safety, 

and been operationally available and effective with costs consistent with 

those anticipated for the system.50

The PIR also made five recommendations for CBP to improve future 

operational assessments of its SBInet surveillance system and to plan for 

new acquisition sensor deployments, such as for CBP to conduct a more 

detailed assessment of the impacts of Block 1 systems and develop more 

For instance, the PIR concluded that 

the system broadened the agents’ situational awareness beyond the 

tactical, agent-on-the-ground sphere of awareness, and increased their 

ability to monitor incursions.

 48DHS guidance requires program managers to conduct a post-implementation review to 

evaluate the impact of an investment’s deployment on customers, the mission and 

program, and technical or mission capabilities. Chief Information Officer, Department of 

Homeland Security, Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) Guide, Version 4.0 

(Washington, D.C.: May 2007). 

49CBP and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Secure Border 

Initiative Network (SBInet) Block 1 Post Implementation Review, Version 1.1, AOD-12-

0916, (Laurel, Maryland: Jan. 29, 2013). 

50A viewshed refers to the region viewable from a fixed location, as constrained by line-ofsight blockage, such as terrain obstructions. 
Page 38 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

on-the-job agent training.51

In addition, the PIR concluded that as of January 2013, six of the nine 

recommendations outlined in ATEC’s operational test have either been 

addressed or are in the process of being addressed. The ATEC 

recommendations that remain to be addressed include, for example, 

addressing software reliability, improving sustainability cost, and reducing 

maintenance issues. OTIA officials stated that the agency plans to take 

According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, 

as of May 2013, CBP is in the process of documenting and reviewing 

each recommendation outlined in the PIR, and intends to document its 

plans to address those recommendations that OTIA and the Office of 

Border Patrol determine need corrective action. However, these officials 

stated that some of the findings and recommendations outlined in the PIR 

will not be explicitly addressed or applied to future deployment efforts. For 

instance, according to officials, because the technologies planned for 

deployment under the Plan are commercial-off-the-shelf products, the PIR 

finding about recording the documentation of environmental factors, such 

as weather and terrain, that impede the system performance will not 

apply to the technologies to be deployed under the Plan, as those 

technologies include requirements on documentation of environmental 

factors. Border Patrol officials further stated that the contractor and 

Border Patrol will have a process to enable them to determine where the 

best deployment locations, given the variable terrain, will be for the 

technologies to be deployed under the Plan. Moreover, Border Patrol 

officials stated that Tucson sector officials have been assigned 

responsibility to determine the extent to which corrective actions are 

needed to address each recommendation outlined in the PIR because 

these sector officials have a better understanding of the environment in 

which the SBInet system is operating. According to OTIA officials, the 

agency plans to conduct annual operational assessments of its SBInet 

system. As additional surveillance technologies are deployed, we will 

continue to monitor Border Patrol’s efforts to address issues identified by 

the PIR as part of our recommendation follow-up process.

 51The recommendations outlined in the PIR include the (1) conduction of a more detailed 

assessment of the impact of deployment of Block 1 system on threat tactics and illegal 

incursion traffic, (2) systematic recording of system downtime in operations logs, (3) 

continued observation by OTIA and Border Patrol of Tucson performance and possibly 

implementation of another trial common operating picture team at Ajo, (4) development of 

a more formalized on-the-job agent training program, and (5) development of an electronic 

Operator Watch Log that would allow agents to provide a record for system performance 

assessment. 
Page 39 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

actions to address the remaining three recommendations by, for example, 

pursuing alternative technical solutions to extend the life-cycle of the 

SBInet system and improving sustainability costs by reducing the 

contractor’s responsibility for field maintenance and other functions by 

transitioning to government support in 2014.

CBP is not capturing complete asset assist data on the contributions of its 

surveillance technologies to apprehensions and seizures, and these data 

are not being consistently recorded by Border Patrol agents and across 

locations. Although CBP has a field within the EID for maintaining data on 

whether technological assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and 

nontechnological assets, such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to 

the apprehension of illegal entrants, and seizure of drugs and other 

contraband, according to CBP officials, Border Patrol agents are not 

required to record these data. This limits CBP’s ability to collect, track, 

and analyze available data on asset assists to help monitor the 

contribution of surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system, to 

Border Patrol apprehensions and seizures and inform resource allocation 

decisions.

Our analysis of EID asset assist data for apprehensions and seizures in 

the Tucson and Yuma sectors from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 

shows that information on asset assists was generally not recorded for all 

apprehension and seizure events.52

 52For the purposes of our analysis, we define an “apprehension or seizure event” as the 

occasion on which Border Patrol agents make an apprehension of an illegal entrant or a 

seizure of drugs or other contraband. The event is recorded in the EID and a date and 

unique identifying number are assigned. An event can involve the apprehension of one or 

multiple illegal entrants or types of items, and each individual illegal entrant apprehended 

or type of item seized in the event is associated with the assigned unique identifying 

number. Our analysis of apprehension events includes instances in which an event has at 

least one deportable individual.

For instance, for the 166,976 

apprehension events reported by the Border Patrol across the Tucson 

sector during fiscal year 2010 through June 2013, an asset assist was not 

recorded for 115,517 (or about 69 percent) of these apprehension events. 

In the Yuma sector, of the 8,237 apprehension events reported by Border 

Patrol agents during the specified time period, an asset assist was not 

recorded for 7,150 (or about 87 percent) of these apprehension events. 

Similarly, data on seizure events reported across the Tucson and Yuma 

sectors show that for some seizure events, asset assists were not 

CBP Is Not Capturing 

Complete Data on the 

Contributions of Its 

Surveillance Technologies
Page 40 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

reported from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 (about 32 percent and 

about 67 percent, respectively). According to Border Patrol officials, in the 

absence of requirements for Border Patrol agents to record data on asset 

assists, differences in the reporting of these data at the station level are 

likely attributable to the emphasis placed on the recording of these data 

by supervisory agents. Appendix IV contains summary statistics on the 

extent to which data on asset assists are recorded for apprehensions and 

seizures across the Tucson and Yuma sectors from fiscal year 2010 

through June 2013.

Since data on asset assists are not required to be reported, it is unclear 

whether the data were not reported because an asset was not a 

contributing factor in the apprehension or seizure or whether an asset 

was a contributing factor but was not recorded by agents. As a result, 

CBP is not positioned to determine the contribution of surveillance 

technologies in the apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs 

and other contraband during the specified time frame.53

 53For the purposes of this report, surveillance technologies are technological assets 

identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field for which Border Patrol 

continues to make significant investments and are included as part of the Plan. Thus, 

surveillance assets that may be selected from the asset assist field’s drop-down menu 

include Cameras, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Scope Trucks, and Unattended Ground 

Sensors. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, agents identifying “Cameras”

are most likely attributing the asset assist to either SBInet towers or RVSSs.

As shown in 

figures 3 and 4, while the recording of asset assists increased from fiscal 

year 2010 through June 2013 from about 18 percent to about 47 percent 

in the Tucson sector and from about 8 percent to about 21 percent in the 

Yuma sector, for more than one-half of the apprehension event records 

for the Tucson sector and four-fifths for the Yuma sector, asset assists 

were not reported for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2013.
Page 41 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 3: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Tucson Sector for 

Apprehensions Events, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. For the purposes of this analysis, we 

identify asset assists involving technology, as those Border Patrol technological assets identified 

within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field for which Border Patrol continues to make 

significant investments and are included as part of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. 

Thus, technology assets that may be selected from the asset assists field’s drop-down menu include 

Cameras, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Scope Trucks, and Unattended Ground Sensors. According 

to Border Patrol headquarters officials, agents identifying “Cameras” are most likely attributing the 

asset assist to either SBInet or Remote Video Surveillance Systems towers. Because agents may 

identify assists from more than one type of asset within the asset assists data field, assists from 

technological assets could be the result of technology assets alone or some combination of other 

asset assists.
Page 42 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 4: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Yuma Sector for 

Apprehensions Events, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 

Note: For the purposes of this analysis, we identify asset assists involving technology, as those 

Border Patrol technological assets identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field for 

which Border Patrol continues to make significant investments and are included as part of the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan. Thus, technology assets that may be selected from the asset 

assists field’s drop-down menu include Cameras, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Scope Trucks, and 

Unattended Ground Sensors. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, agents identifying 

“Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to either SBInet or Remote Video Surveillance 

Systems towers. Because agents may identify assists from more than one type of asset within the 

asset assists data field, assists from technological assets could be the result of technology assets 

alone or some combination of other asset assists.

Border Patrol officials did not specify why the agency does not require the 

recording and tracking of data on asset assists. However, Border Patrol 

officials stated that agents are encouraged to select the appropriate asset 

assist code when assets contributed to an apprehension or seizure. 

Border Patrol officials also stated that although they do not regularly track 

and analyze data on asset assists, including those from surveillance 

technologies, these data are tracked and analyzed on an ad hoc basis to 

help determine Border Patrol’s resource allocation and operational needs, 

and more specifically, what resources are available at the strategic level 

to help mitigate the threat of illegal entrants, drugs, and other contraband. 

Moreover, an Associate Chief at Border Patrol told us that while data on 
Page 43 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

asset assists are not systematically recorded and tracked, Border Patrol 

recognizes the benefits of assessments of asset assists data, including 

those from surveillance technologies, such as the SBInet system, as 

these data in combination with other data, such as numbers of 

apprehensions and seizures, are used on a limited basis to help the 

agency make adjustments to its acquisition plans prior to deploying 

resources, thereby enabling the agency to make more informed 

deployment decisions. Border Patrol also uses these other data, such as 

numbers of apprehensions and seizures, to help inform assessment of its 

efforts to secure the border. Border Patrol officials cautioned that while 

asset assists data are the only available data directly linking 

apprehensions and seizures to the agency’s surveillance technologies, 

these data do not enable direct attributions of the SBInet system’s 

contribution to border security strategic goals because of several factors, 

such as changes in the flows of illegal entrants across sectors or in 

economic conditions in the United States and Mexico. Moreover, the 

officials said that surveillance technologies such as SBInet and RVSS 

towers enable the detection of apprehensions and seizures and 

accordingly, it is the agents who identify and track the illegal activity and 

ultimately apprehend illegal entrants and seize contraband.

Despite the absence of complete data on the contribution of CBP’s 

surveillance technologies to apprehensions and seizures, our analysis of 

Border Patrol’s data on the location of apprehensions and seizures 

provides some insights into where Border Patrol apprehensions and 

seizures occurred in relation to the locations of its two highest-cost 

surveillance technologies—SBInet towers and RVSS.54 For example, our 

analysis of apprehensions events data, as determined by Geographic 

Information System data entered by Border Patrol agents when recording 

apprehensions and seizures, shows that across the Tucson sector from 

fiscal year 2010 through June 2013, of the 166,976 apprehension events,

71,397 (or about 43 percent) occurred within the camera and radar range 

of SBInet and RVSS towers.55

 54For the purposes of this report, the ranges of the SBInet and RVSS towers are “buffer 

ranges” that, according to Border Patrol headquarters officials, do not account for 

obstructions due to terrain, land features, and vegetation. 

As shown in figure 5, the percentage of 

apprehension events occurring within the range of both SBInet and RVSS 

55CBP’s SBInet tower system is located in the Tucson sector, and accordingly, there are 

no apprehension events within the viewsheds of SBInet surveillance towers in the Yuma 

sector.
Page 44 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

surveillance technologies has changed little, if at all, over time. 

Apprehension events occurring within the radar and camera range of 

SBInet towers have remained relatively unchanged, while apprehension 

events occurring within the range of RVSS towers increased by about 1 

percent during our specified time frame.

Figure 5: Percentage of Apprehension Events Occurring within the Detection 

Ranges of Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) and Secure Border Initiative 

Network (SBInet) across the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 

Moreover, of those 115,517 apprehension events in the Tucson sector 

that do not have data on asset assists, 8,751 (or about 8 percent) 

occurred within the camera range, and 9,818 (or about 9 percent) 

occurred within the radar range of SBInet towers. Moreover, data on 

asset assists were not recorded in 35,147 (or about 30 percent) of 

apprehension events within the range of RVSS towers. Table 6 shows the 

reporting of asset assists for apprehension and seizure events occurring 

across the Tucson sector within the range of SBInet and RVSS towers 

during our specified time period.
Page 45 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 6: Reporting of Asset Assists for Apprehension and Seizure Events Occurring across the Tucson Sector within the 

Range of Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) and Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) Towers, from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Apprehension events

Total

Seizure events

Total

Asset assist 

recorded

Asset assist

not recorded

Asset assist 

recorded

Asset assist

not recorded

Number Percent Number Percent Number Number Percent Number Percent Number

Camera range 

of SBInet tower

Within 

range

2,677 5.2 8,751 7.6 11,428 957 6.9 518 8.1 1,475

Not in 

range

48,782 94.8 106,766 92.4 155,548 12,959 93.1 5,888 91.9 18,847

Radar range of 

SBInet tower

Within 

range

2,942 5.7 9,818 8.5 12,760 1,090 7.8 568 8.9 1,658

Not in 

range

48,517 94.3 105,699 91.5 154,216 12,826 92.2 5,838 91.1 18,664

Camera range 

of RVSS tower

Within 

range

23,490 45.7 35,147 30.4 58,637 2,501 18.0 1,110 17.3 3,611

Not in 

range

27,969 54.4 80,370 69.6 108,339 11,415 82.0 5,296 82.7 16,711

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data.

Border Patrol officials stated that while analyzing data on the 

contributions of Border Patrol’s surveillance technologies is a relevant

measure of the agency’s ability to meet its border security goals, 

conclusions regarding the contributions and impacts of its surveillance 

technologies on Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts cannot be formed 

solely on the basis of the proximity of apprehension or seizure events to 

the locations of its surveillance technologies. These officials stated that 

there are instances in which illegal entrants were detected by some 

combination of cameras or radar closer to the border; however, to gain a 

better tactical advantage, Border Patrol agents made the apprehensions 

farther from the border. As we reported in December 2012, Border Patrol 

officials stated that apprehensions occur in areas farther from the border 

because several factors preclude greater border presence, including 
Page 46 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

terrain that is inaccessible or creates a tactical disadvantage, the distance 

from Border Patrol stations to the border, and access to ranches and 

lands that are federally protected and environmentally sensitive.56

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for 

agencies to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of 

normal operations to help evaluate program effectiveness.57

 56GAO, Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security 

Status and Resource Needs, 

These 

standards also state that agencies should promptly and accurately record 

transactions to maintain their relevance and value for management 

decision making and that this information should be readily available for 

use by agency management and others so that they can carry out their 

duties with the goal of achieving all of their objectives, including making 

operating decisions and allocating resources. These standards further 

state that to be effective, agencies need to clearly document all 

transactions in a timely manner to ensure that they are making 

appropriately informed decisions. Moreover, the standards call for clear 

documentation of and procedures that are readily available for 

examination. In addition, these standards call for comparisons and 

assessments relating different sets of data to one another so that 

analyses of the relationships can be made and appropriate actions taken. 

Because DHS’s EID database already includes the asset assists data 

field and these data are used by Border Patrol on a limited basis to make 

decisions about resources, requiring agents to record and track asset 

assists data could help ensure that these data are complete and, if 

analyzed, could help better inform CBP’s resource allocation decisions. 

Moreover, we acknowledge that conclusions regarding the contributions 

of surveillance technologies based on location and proximity data alone 

may not be sufficient to examine the contribution of CBP’s surveillance 

technologies in achieving their strategic goals. However, analyzing data 

on apprehensions, seizures, and asset assists in combination with other 

relevant performance metrics or indicators as appropriate could provide 

more robust analysis of the contributions of surveillance technologies, 

and accordingly could better position CBP to be able determine the extent 

to which its technology investments have contributed to the agency’s 

border security efforts.

GAO-13-25 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2012).

57GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
Page 47 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

In response to our November 2011 recommendation regarding the 

identification of mission benefits and development of key attributes for 

performance metrics for the surveillance technologies to be deployed as 

part of the Plan, CBP has identified mission benefits expected from the 

implementation of the surveillance technologies to be acquired or 

deployed as part of the Plan, but has not fully developed key attributes for 

performance metrics for these technologies.58

In April 2013, CBP issued its Multi-Year Investment and Management 

Plan for Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology for 

Fiscal Years 2014-2017, which identifies specific mission benefits to be 

achieved by the deployment of each of the seven technologies under the 

Plan.

In November 2011, we 

reported that agency officials had not yet defined the mission benefits 

expected or quantified metrics to assess the contribution of the selected 

approaches in achieving their goal of situational awareness and detection 

of border activity using surveillance technology. We recommended that 

CBP determine the mission benefits to be derived from implementation of 

the Plan and develop and apply key attributes for metrics to assess 

program implementation. CBP concurred with our recommendation.

59

While CBP has defined mission benefits for the technology programs 

under the Plan, the agency has not yet developed key attributes for 

performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed as 

part of the Plan. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) guidance emphasize the need to ensure 

that information technology investments, such as IFT systems, produce 

According to CBP officials, the majority of these surveillance 

technologies will provide the mission benefits of improved situational 

awareness and agent safety. Furthermore, CBP officials stated that each 

of the seven technologies deployed or planned for deployment as part of 

the Plan will help enhance the ability of Border Patrol agents to detect, 

identify, deter, and respond to threats along the border. A summary of the 

mission benefits of each surveillance technology deployed or planned for 

deployment under the Plan is presented in appendix V.

 58GAO-12-22.

59Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Multi-Year 

Investment and Management Plan for Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and 

Technology for Fiscal Years 2014 -2017 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2013).

CBP Has Identified 

Mission Benefits for 

Surveillance Technologies 

under the Plan but Has 

Not Yet Developed 

Performance Metrics
Page 48 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

tangible, observable improvements in mission performance.60 In our April 

2013 update on the progress made by the agencies to address our 

findings on duplication and cost savings across the federal government, 

CBP officials stated that operations of its two SBInet surveillance systems 

identified examples of key attributes for metrics that can be useful in 

assessing the Plan’s implementation for technologies.61

In addition to these efforts, CBP officials stated that in response to our 

prior recommendations regarding the establishment of a performance 

goal or goals and associated performance metrics that define how border 

security is to be measured, Border Patrol, as of December 2013, was in 

the process of developing and implementing performance goals and 

measures to assess Border Patrol’s efforts to secure the border.

For example, 

according to CBP officials, to help measure whether illegal activity has 

decreased, examples of key attributes include decreases in the amount of 

arrests, complaints by ranchers and other citizens, and destruction of 

public and private lands and property. While the development of key 

attributes for metrics for the two SBInet surveillance systems is a positive 

step, as of April 2013, CBP has not yet identified attributes for metrics for 

all technologies to be acquired and deployed as part of the Plan.

62

 60Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 40 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11703; Office of Management and 

Budget, Circular No. A-130 Revised, Management of Federal Information Resources

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2000). According to Office of Management and Budget 

Circular A-11, Part 6, Section 200, performance measurement should include program 

accomplishments in terms of outputs (quantity of products or services provided) and 

outcomes (results of providing outputs in terms of effectively meeting intended agency 

mission objectives), as well as, indicators, statistics, or metrics used to gauge program 

performance. 

However, CBP officials stated that none of the current measures directly 

address the operational impact of technology. The officials further stated 

that the Tucson sector has submitted an issue paper that identifies 

potential data that can attribute a certain level of effectiveness to its 

SBInet system, but it is still under review by CBP. While these are 

positive steps, to fully address the intent of our recommendation, CBP 

would need to develop and apply key attributes for performance metrics 

for each of the technologies to be deployed under the Plan to assess its 

61GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 9, 2013).

62GAO-13-25.
Page 49 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

progress in implementing the Plan and determine when mission benefits 

have been fully realized.

CBP has established schedules for the Plan and the IFT, RVSS, and 

MSC programs that meet some but not all best practices for scheduling, 

hindering CBP’s ability to reliably commit to when it will deliver all of the 

Plan’s technologies to Arizona. Ensuring that all schedule best practices 

are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules when updating them 

could help OTIA better ensure the schedules’ reliability and could help 

better position OTIA to identify and address any potential further delays in 

the program’s milestone commitment dates. Further, developing and 

maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan, in accordance 

with best practices, could allow insight into current or programmed 

allocation of resources for the Plan and help CBP to reliably commit to 

when the Plan will be fully implemented. Also, CBP has developed Lifecycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs. Although OTIA 

officials stated that DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk 

Management conducted an assessment of the IFT Life-cycle Cost 

Estimate, an assessment is not equivalent to verifying the estimate with 

an independent cost estimate. When updating the Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs, verifying the estimates with 

independent cost estimates and reconciling any differences, consistent 

with best practices, could help to better ensure the credibility of CBP’s 

cost estimates for these programs.

DHS and CBP have approved some key acquisition documents as 

directed by DHS and CBP Acquisition Review Boards, but work remains 

to approve all key acquisition documents in accordance with DHS 

acquisition guidance. Specifically, revising the Test and Evaluation 

Master Plan to more fully test the IFTs in the various environmental 

conditions in which they will be used to determine operational 

effectiveness and suitability, in accordance with DHS acquisition 

guidance, could help provide CBP with more complete information on 

how the IFTs will operate under a variety of conditions before beginning 

full production.

Requiring the collection of data on the extent to which technology assets 

assisted in apprehensions and seizures could better position Border 

Patrol to assess the contribution of surveillance technologies to its 

enforcement efforts and its goals of achieving and maintaining operational 

control and situational awareness along the southwest border. 

Conducting analysis of such data, once collected, in combination with 

Conclusions
Page 50 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

other relevant performance metrics or indicators as appropriate, could 

help better position CBP to be able to determine the extent to which its 

technology investments have contributed to border security efforts.

To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of 

its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed 

technologies, and better inform CBP’s deployment decisions, we 

recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following six actions:

• When updating the schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs, 

ensure that scheduling best practices, as outlined in our schedule 

assessment guide, are applied to the three programs’ schedules.

• Develop and maintain an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan that 

is consistent with scheduling best practices.

• When updating Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS 

programs, verify the Life-cycle Cost Estimates with independent cost 

estimates and reconcile any differences.

• Revise the IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan to more fully test the 

IFT program, before beginning full production, in the various 

environmental conditions in which IFTs will be used to determine 

operational effectiveness and suitability, in accordance with DHS 

acquisition guidance.

• Require data on asset assists to be recorded and tracked within the 

Enforcement Integrated Database, which contains data on 

apprehensions and seizures.

Once data on asset assists are required to be recorded and tracked, 

analyze available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological 

assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or 

indicators, as appropriate, to determine the contribution of surveillance 

technologies to CBP’s border security efforts.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS 

provided written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced 

in full in appendix VI, and technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. DHS concurred with four of the recommendations in the 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 51 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

report. DHS did not concur with the other two recommendations in the 

report.

With regard to the first recommendation, that CBP ensure that scheduling 

best practices are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs’ 

schedules when they are updated, DHS concurred and stated that OTIA 

plans to ensure that scheduling best practices are applied as far as 

practical when updating the three programs’ schedules. DHS plans to 

update the programs’ schedules by July 2015.

With regard to the second recommendation, that CBP develop and 

maintain an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan, DHS did not concur 

with this recommendation. DHS stated that maintaining an Integrated 

Master Schedule for the Plan undermines the DHS-approved 

implementation strategy for the individual programs making up the Plan 

and that a key element of the Plan has been the disaggregation of 

technology procurements. According to DHS, the implementation of this 

recommendation would essentially create a large, aggregated program, 

similar to SBInet, and effectively create an aggregate “system of 

systems.” DHS stated that CBP believes its strategy of disaggregation 

has been effective and has reduced overall risk and cost. DHS also 

stated that each program within the Plan has its own schedule and that 

forcing linkages among the Plan’s programs into a single Integrated 

Master Schedule contradicts lessons learned and the approved 

implementation strategy for the Plan. 

We continue to believe that developing and maintaining an Integrated 

Master Schedule for the Plan, consistent with best practices for 

scheduling, is needed. As noted in the report, the use of an Integrated 

Master Schedule is a well-established practice in program and project 

management and is a necessary tool to coordinate independently 

managed projects that have dependencies—including resource 

dependencies—on one another. The programs under the Plan are 

intended to provide Border Patrol with a combination of surveillance 

capabilities to assist in achieving situational awareness along the Arizona 

border with Mexico; and while the programs themselves may be 

independent of one another, the Plan’s resources are being shared 

among the programs. Furthermore, this recommendation is not intended 

to imply that DHS needs to re-aggregate the Plan’s seven programs into 

a "system of systems" or change its procurement strategy in any form. 

Rather, the intent of our recommendation is for DHS to insert the 

individual schedules for each of the Plan’s programs into a single 

electronic Integrated Master Schedule file in order to identify any resource 
Page 52 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

allocation issues among the programs’ schedules. Developing and 

maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could allow OTIA 

insight into current or programmed allocation of resources for all 

programs as opposed to attempting to resolve any resource constraints 

for each program individually. 

In addition to helping identify resource constraints, an Integrated Master 

Schedule can be a useful tool for consolidating multiple projects or 

program files into a single master file, even if those projects or programs 

have no direct links among activities. For example, aggregating individual 

files into a master schedule is useful for reporting purposes, particularly if 

the projects or programs are under the purview of a single management 

organization or a single customer. In this case, the master schedule 

would allow for a concise view of all projects or programs for which the 

stakeholder is responsible or has an interest. A master schedule of this 

nature is often referred to as a consolidated schedule, although the terms 

“consolidated schedule” and “Integrated Master Schedule” are often 

synonymous. We continue to believe that developing and maintaining an 

Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could help provide CBP a 

comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP to reliably commit to when 

the Plan will be fully implemented and better predict whether estimated 

completion dates are realistic to manage programs’ performance, as 

noted in the report.

With regard to the third recommendation, that CBP verify the Life-cycle 

Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost 

estimates and reconcile any differences, DHS concurred, although its 

planned actions will not fully address the intent of the recommendation 

unless assumptions underlying the cost estimates change. DHS stated 

that while OTIA did not obtain a traditional independent cost estimate for 

the programs, the Life-cycle Cost Estimates were meant to be 

conservative in managing program risk and that the estimated life-cycle 

costs to date are less than originally projected. DHS further stated that at 

this point it does not believe that there is a benefit in expending funds to 

obtain independent cost estimates and that if the costs realized to date 

continue to hold, there may be no requirement or value added in 

conducting full-blown updates with independent cost estimates. DHS 

noted, though, that if this assumption changes, OTIA will complete 

updates and consider preparing independent cost estimates, as 

appropriate. We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to verify 

the Life-cycle Cost Estimates with the benefits to be gained from 

verification with independent cost estimates. However, as noted in this 

report, independently verifying the cost estimates is consistent with best 
Page 53 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

practices and could help provide CBP with more insights into program 

costs. An independent cost estimate provides an independent view of 

expected program costs that tests the program office’s estimate for 

reasonableness. Independent cost estimates frequently use different 

methods and are less burdened with organizational bias than a program 

office’s estimate, helping to provide decision makers with insight into a 

program’s potential costs. Thus, we continue to believe that 

independently verifying the Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and 

RVSS programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best 

practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the estimates. 

With regard to the fourth recommendation, that CBP revise the IFT Test 

and Evaluation Master Plan to more fully test the IFT program in the 

various environmental conditions in which IFTs will be used to determine 

operational effectiveness and suitability, DHS did not concur with the 

recommendation. Specifically, DHS stated that the Test and Evaluation 

Master Plan includes tailored testing and user assessments that will 

provide much, if not all, of the insight contemplated by the intent of the 

recommendation. According to DHS, the approved non-developmental 

item acquisition strategy for the IFT program was based on market 

surveys and observations during field use by other customers and the 

incorporation of system demonstrations conducted during source 

selection. DHS also stated that there is no requirement for expansive, 

formal operational test and evaluation and to re-write the Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan to incorporate operational testing undermines and 

removes the benefits of the non-developmental item strategy. Moreover, 

DHS stated that the user test currently outlined in the Test and Evaluation 

Master Plan will provide the operational user the information needed to 

validate system requirements and operational characteristics. DHS also 

noted that Acquisition Decision Event 3 has been approved for IFT 

production, and after the initial IFT system undergoes testing in 

accordance with the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the Office of 

Border Patrol will make the determination regarding operational readiness 

prior to deploying additional systems. 

We continue to believe that DHS should revise the Test and Evaluation 

Master Plan to more fully test the IFT program, before beginning full 

production, in the various environmental conditions in which the IFT will 

be used to determine operational effectiveness and suitability. DHS’s 

acquisition guidance states that the Test and Evaluation Master Plan is 

important because it describes the strategy for conducting developmental 

and operational testing to evaluate a system’s technical performance, 

including its operational effectiveness and suitability. The guidance states 
Page 54 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

that, even for commercial-off-the-shelf systems, such as the IFT program, 

operational test and evaluation should occur in the environmental 

conditions in which a system will be used before a full production decision 

for the system is made and the system is subsequently deployed. In 

addition, DHS guidance states that the primary purpose of test and 

evaluation is to provide timely and accurate information to managers, 

decision makers, and other stakeholders to support research, 

development, and acquisition in a manner that reduces programmatic 

financial, schedule, and performance risks. 

The current Test and Evaluation Master Plan describes CBP’s plans to 

conduct a limited user test of the IFT, which will be designed to determine 

the IFT’s mission contribution. However, determining mission contribution 

is not equivalent to determining operational effectiveness and suitability, 

which specifically identifies how effective and reliable a system is in 

meeting its operational requirements in its intended environment. DHS 

plans to conduct limited user testing during a 30-day period in 

environmental conditions present at one site—the Nogales station. 

However, as of November 2013, CBP intended to deploy IFTs to 50 

locations in southern Arizona, which can include different terrain and 

differences in climate throughout the year. As we noted in the report, 

conducting limited user testing in one area in Arizona for 30 days could 

limit the information available to CBP on how the IFTs may perform in 

other conditions and locations along the Arizona border. Therefore, CBPs 

approach to use limited user testing will not specifically identify how 

effective and reliable a system is in meeting its operational requirements 

in its intended environment. Moreover, while DHS has approved the IFT 

program for production at Acquisition Decision Event 3, testing for the 

IFTs has not yet begun. As noted in the report, revising the Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan to include more robust testing to determine 

operational effectiveness and suitability could better position CBP to 

evaluate IFT capabilities before moving to full production for the system, 

help provide CBP with information on the extent to which the towers 

satisfy the Border Patrol’s user requirements, and help reduce potential 

program risks. 

Furthermore, although the IFT program is not the same as SBInet, 

according to the Plan, the IFTs are to be deployed to locations with 

similar environmental and terrain conditions as SBInet towers, and IFT 

and SBInet systems may have similar types of technologies, such as 

cameras and radar. As noted in the report, we previously identified testing 

issues CBP encountered with SBInet, such as DHS’s test plans and 

procedures for some SBInet test events not being defined in accordance 
Page 55 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

with guidance and that operational tests of SBInet at Tucson revealed 

challenges regarding the effectiveness and suitability of the technology 

for border surveillance. Thus, we continue to believe that revising the Test 

and Evaluation Master Plan to more fully test the IFT in the various 

environmental conditions in which it will be used to determine operational 

effectiveness and suitability, before beginning full production, could help 

provide CBP with more complete information on how the IFTs will operate 

under a variety of conditions. Without conducting operational testing in 

accordance with DHS guidance, the IFT program may be at increased 

risk of not meeting Border Patrol operational needs. 

With regard to the fifth recommendation, that CBP require data on asset 

assists to be recorded and tracked within the Enforcement Integrated 

Database, DHS concurred and stated that Border Patrol is changing its 

data collection process to allow for improved reporting on asset assists 

for apprehensions and seizures and intends to make it mandatory to 

record whether an asset assisted in an apprehension or seizure. DHS 

plans to change its process by December 31, 2014. 

With regard to the sixth recommendation, that CBP analyze available 

data on apprehensions and seizures and technology assists to determine 

the contribution of surveillance technologies to its border security efforts, 

DHS concurred and stated that Border Patrol intends to create a plan of 

action with milestones to explore and develop a process to answer how 

different classes of technology, within a certain environment, contribute to 

Border Patrol’s mission. DHS stated that Border Patrol plans to develop 

an initial set of quantitative and qualitative technology-related measures 

by September 30, 2014, as an interim milestone; gather baseline data for 

the measures in fiscal year 2015 and begin to use these data to evaluate 

the contributions of specific technology assets by the end of that fiscal 

year; and by the end of fiscal year 2016, use measures associated with 

technology to assist in determining levels of situational awareness in 

different areas of the border. These planned actions, if implemented 

effectively, should address the intent of the recommendations.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 56 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix VII.

Rebecca Gambler

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Page 57 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

List of Congressional Requesters

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul

Chairman

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Candice S. Miller

Chairman

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Peter T. King

Chairman

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jeff Duncan

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Henry Cuellar

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 58 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Our objectives were to determine the extent to which U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) has (1) developed schedules and Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technologies Plan (the 

Plan) in accordance with best practices; (2) followed key aspects of the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) acquisition management 

framework in managing the Plan’s three highest cost programs; and (3) 

assessed the performance of technologies deployed under the Secure 

Border Initiative Network (SBInet), identified mission benefits, and 

developed performance metrics for surveillance technologies to be 

deployed under the Plan.

To determine the extent to which CBP has followed best practices in 

developing schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Plan’s three 

highest-cost programs—the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video 

Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability 

(MSC)—we obtained CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and 

Acquisition’s (OTIA) program schedules as of March 2013, which were 

current at the time of our review, for the these programs and compared 

them against best practices for developing schedules.1 Specifically, we 

assessed the extent to which the schedules for these three programs met 

each of the 10 best practices identified in the schedule assessment 

guide.2

 1

GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide Exposure Draft, 

We characterized whether the schedules met each of the 10 best 

practices based on the following scale:

GAO-12-120G (Washington, 

D.C.: May 2012). We developed this guidance through a compilation of best practices that 

federal cost-estimating organizations and industry use. This guide presents guiding 

principles for auditors in evaluating the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of 

government programs. We used the best practices in this guide to assess the schedules 

for the Plan and its three highest-cost programs because, as the guide states, a schedule 

is necessary for government acquisition programs and thus this guide is applicable to the 

Plan and its acquisition programs. 

2

We determined the overall assessment rating by assigning each individual rating a 

number: Not met = 1, minimally met = 2, partially met =3, substantially met = 4, and met = 

5. Then, we took the average of the individual assessment ratings to determine the overall 

rating for each of the four characteristics. The resulting average becomes the overall 

assessment as follows: Not met = 1.0 to 1.4, minimally met = 1.5 to 2.4, partially met = 2.5 

to 3.4, substantially met = 3.5 to 4.4, and met = 4.5 to 5.0. This rating scale was 

developed by GAO staff in consultation with some of the cost-estimating experts who 

helped develop the Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. See GAO Cost Estimating 

and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program 

Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 59 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

• Not met—the program provided no evidence that satisfies any of the 

criterion.

• Minimally met—the program provided evidence that satisfies a small 

portion of the criterion.

• Partially met—the program provided evidence that satisfies about half 

of the criterion.

• Substantially met—the program provided evidence that satisfies a 

large portion of the criterion.

• Met—the program provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion.

In conducting our analysis, we focused, for example, on whether the 

schedules reflect best practices for a reliable schedule, such as whether 

the schedules define the work necessary to accomplish a program’s 

objectives. More details on our assessment and methodology are 

presented in appendix III. By assessing the schedules against best 

practices, we also identified schedule challenges that CBP was 

experiencing in testing, procuring, deploying, and operating technologies 

in the Plan and interviewed CBP officials to determine the reasons for the 

schedule challenges and steps that CBP had taken or was taking to 

address them. In addition, we obtained and analyzed the August 2010 

and June 2013 Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Plan. We also analyzed 

the IFT and RVSS January 2012 and March 2012 Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates, respectively, which were current at the time of our review, and 

compared them against best practices for cost estimating.3 We analyzed 

DHS and CBP documents and interviewed officials regarding their efforts 

to implement our November 2011 recommendations to update the Lifecycle Cost Estimate for the Plan in accordance with best practices.4

 3

To compare the cost estimates, we used leading government and industry practices as 

discussed in 

To 

assess the reliability of cost estimate data that we used, we reviewed 

GAO-09-3SP and Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming 

Guide Supplement to Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11, Part 7: 

Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget (Washington, D.C.: Executive 

Office of the President, June 2006). Specifically, the methodology outlined in GAO-09-3SP

is a compilation of best practices that federal cost-estimating organizations and industry 

use to develop and maintain reliable cost estimates throughout the life of an acquisition 

program. We did not obtain and analyze a Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the MSC because 

CBP had not completed it during our audit engagement. A Life-cycle Cost Estimate 

provides an exhaustive and structured accounting of all resources and associated cost 

elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program.

4

GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011). 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 60 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

relevant program documentation, such as cost estimation spreadsheets, 

as available, to substantiate evidence obtained from interviews with 

knowledgeable agency officials. We found the data to be sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of our report.

To determine the extent to which CBP followed key aspects of DHS’s 

acquisition management framework in managing the Plan’s three highestcost programs, we analyzed DHS and CBP documents, including DHS 

Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and its associated DHS 

Instruction Manual 102-01-001, program briefing slides, budget 

documents, Acquisition Decision Memorandums, schedules, and program 

risk sheets.5

To determine the extent to which CBP has assessed the performance of 

technologies deployed under SBInet and developed performance metrics 

to assess the performance of surveillance technologies planned for 

deployment under the Plan, we analyzed performance assessment 

documentation and interviewed CBP officials responsible for performance 

measurement activities regarding the establishment of performance 

metrics used by CBP to determine the effectiveness and the contributions 

We focused on the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs for more 

in-depth analyses because they are the Plan’s three highest-cost 

programs and represent 97 percent of the estimated cost of the Plan. 

Specifically, to assess the acquisition strategy for the Plan, we focused on 

the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs and analyzed their acquisition plans 

and discussed the approaches with CBP officials. To assess system 

requirements and capabilities for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs, we 

obtained and analyzed requirements and capabilities documents and 

worked with CBP officials to identify any changes to requirements and 

capabilities since they were initially approved and whether any 

requirements or capabilities had been traded off for cost, schedule, or 

other purposes. To assess the extent to which CBP followed DHS 

acquisition guidance, we selected aspects of Acquisition Management 

Directive 102-01 that were relevant to where these programs were in the 

acquisition process during fiscal year 2013. Specifically, we determined 

whether acquisition documents had been approved by the time of the 

applicable Acquisition Decision Events as required by DHS acquisition 

guidance.

 5

DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, Jan. 20, 2010, and DHS Instruction 

Manual 102-01-001, Acquisition Management/Instruction Guidebook, Oct. 1, 2011.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 61 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

of its surveillance technologies toward the agency’s stated border security 

goals. With respect to CBP’s assessment of the performance of 

technologies deployed under SBInet, we analyzed the results of the 

January 2013 post implementation review, which was conducted by the 

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to determine the 

effectiveness of SBInet technologies in achieving their intended results.6

We reviewed our November 2011 report to determine the extent to which 

CBP’s post implementation review aligned with DHS guidance and the 

Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Capital Programming Guide, 

a supplement to OMB Circular A-11, which identifies a post

implementation review as a tool to evaluate an investment’s efficiency 

and effectiveness.7 We also analyzed CBP and DHS documents, such as 

CBP’s July 2013 SBInet Block 1 After Action Report, and interviewed 

officials to assess corrective actions taken to improve SBInet

performance issues.8 Specifically, we analyzed CBP documentation and 

interviewed agency officials within OTIA and the Office of Border Patrol to 

determine the progress the agency has made in addressing findings and 

recommendations outlined in CBP’s post implementation review and prior 

performance assessments, including the Army Test and Evaluation 

Command’s assessment of its SBInet technologies.9

 6

CBP and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Secure Border 

Initiative Network (SBInet) Block 1 Post Implementation Review, Version 1.1, AOD-12-

0916, (Laurel, Maryland: Jan. 29, 2013).

On the basis of 

interviews with agency officials regarding the methodology and 

implementation of the review, we found the review to be sufficiently 

reliable for our report.

7

GAO-12-22; Chief Information Officer, Department of Homeland Security, Capital 

Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) Guide, Version 4.0 (Washington, D.C.: May 

2007); and Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide V 2.0 

Supplement to Office of Management and Budget, Circular A–11, Part 7: Planning, 

Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

8

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), Block 

1.0 After Action Report (AAR): From SBInet Acquisition to Operational Test and 

Evaluation, Version 1.1, (Washington, D.C.: July 2013). 

9

The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) is the operational test agency for the 

SBInet Block 1—the initial deployment of SBInet capabilities—deployment at Tucson. In 

this capacity, ATEC provides an independent evaluation of the system’s operational 

effectiveness and suitability. ATEC issued its final evaluation report in March 2011: U.S. 

Army Test and Evaluation Command, Operational Test Agency Evaluation Report for the 

Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) Block 1.0 (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: 

Mar. 29, 2011).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 62 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

In addition, we analyzed CBP data on apprehensions of illegal entrants 

and seizures of drugs and other contraband for the Tucson and Yuma 

sectors maintained in the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID), a 

DHS-shared common database repository for several DHS law 

enforcement and homeland security applications, as well as policy, 

planning, and budget documents provided by Border Patrol to determine 

whether such data could be used to determine the contributions of the 

SBInet technologies to apprehensions and seizures. We analyzed 

apprehension10 and seizure data for the Tucson and Yuma sectors within 

Arizona, because these are the Border Patrol sectors contained within 

Arizona and covered by the Plan.11 For the purposes of this report, we 

analyzed apprehension and seizure events recorded in the EID for fiscal 

years 2010 through June of fiscal year 2013.12

 10Although Border Patrol agents arrest both deportable aliens and nondeportable 

individuals whom they encounter during patrol activities, for the purposes of this report we 

define “apprehensions” to include only deportable aliens, to be consistent with Border 

Patrol’s definition. According to the Immigration and Nationalization Act, deportable aliens 

include those who are inadmissible to the United States or present in violation of U.S. law, 

who have failed to maintain their status or violated the terms of their admission, or who 

have committed certain criminal offenses or engaged in terrorist activities, among others. 

(See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 for a complete list of the classes of deportable aliens.) In some 

cases, Border Patrol apprehends a deportable alien but turns the individual over to 

another agency prior to initiating a removal. Aliens with lawful immigration status and U.S. 

citizens would be considered nondeportable.

An apprehension or 

11Although the boundaries of the Yuma sector extend beyond Arizona, because of the 

small percentage of apprehensions and seizures occurring outside of Arizona, we 

analyzed data for the entire sector. 

12Apprehension and seizure data for fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 were obtained 

from DHS’s EID. The totals from our analyses of apprehension and seizure data do not 

match Border Patrol’s year-end totals for this time frame for several reasons. First, Border 

Patrol reports apprehension and other data on an “end-of-year” basis, and these reports 

do not reflect adjustments or corrections made after that reporting date, whereas the data 

Border Patrol provided to us reflected these adjustments or corrections. Additionally, we 

used the “arrest site” or “seizure site” (i.e., the location at which an individual was arrested 

or a seizure was made as determined by Geographic Information Systems coordinates), 

rather than “processing site” (i.e., the location at which the arrest or seizure was 

processed), which is the Border Patrol’s standard reporting method to determine 

apprehension and seizure locations. Further, we removed from our analyses 

apprehensions and seizures for which there were no arrest or seizure site Geographic 

Information System coordinates. Moreover, the EID contains a “program area” data field in 

which agents are able to assign specific program area codes to apprehensions or 

seizures. These program area codes include, but are not limited to, Border Patrol, Joint 

Terrorism Task Force, and Law Enforcement Area Response Units. Our analysis of 

apprehensions and seizures includes those for which the Border Patrol “program area”

was assigned, and thus excludes those attributed to other program areas.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 63 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

seizure event is defined as an occasion on which Border Patrol agents 

apprehend an illegal entrant or seize drugs and other contraband. Each 

reported apprehension or seizure event is assigned a unique identifier in 

the EID, and Border Patrol agents assign an additional identifier to each 

individual illegal entrant or type of seized item associated with the event. 

As a result, a single apprehension event may involve the apprehension of 

multiple illegal entrants, and a single seizure event may result in the 

seizure of multiple items. Appendix IV contains the results of our analysis 

of all recorded apprehensions and seizures occurring across the Tucson 

and Yuma sectors during the specified time frame. For our analysis, we 

also obtained data on asset assists recorded in the EID for 

apprehensions and seizures. According to Border Patrol officials, the 

asset assist data field was added to the EID in May of 2009. Agents may 

select from a drop-down menu to identify whether a technological or 

nontechnological asset assisted in the apprehension or seizure. Multiple 

assets can be selected for a single event, if relevant. For the purposes of 

this report, technological assets identified within the Border Patrol’s asset 

assists data field drop-down menu are those assets for which Border 

Patrol continues to make significant funding investments and are included 

as part of the Plan, and include Cameras, Mobile Surveillance Systems, 

Scope Trucks, and Unattended Ground Sensors. According to Border 

Patrol headquarters officials, agents identifying “Cameras” are most likely 

attributing the asset assist to either SBInet towers or Remote Video 

Surveillance Systems.

In addition, for our analysis, we obtained Geographic Information 

Systems data for apprehensions, seizures, and Border Patrol’s two 

highest-cost surveillance systems—SBInet and RVSS towers—to show 

the latitude and longitude coordinates of apprehensions and seizures in 

relation to the location of SBInet towers and RVSS towers. We used 

Geographic Information Systems data to determine the percentage of 

apprehensions and seizures that occurred within the proximity of the 

radar and camera range of SBInet and camera range of RVSS towers, 

and the extent to which asset assists were reported for apprehensions 

and seizures occurring within the proximity of the surveillance systems. 

For the purposes of this report, the ranges of the SBInet and RVSS 

towers are “buffer ranges” that, according to Border Patrol headquarters 

officials, do not account for obstructions due to terrain, land features, and 

vegetation. To perform these analyses, we compared Border Patrol data 

on the longitude and latitude of apprehensions, seizures, SBInet towers, 

and RVSS towers with agency mapping data, which allowed us to 

determine the extent to which apprehensions and seizures occurred 

within the proximity of SBInet and RVSS towers. We interviewed Border 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 64 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Patrol headquarters officials regarding data collection and analysis 

procedures, and performance assessment activities.

We analyzed apprehensions and seizures data from fiscal year 2010 

through June 2013 because fiscal year 2010 was the first fiscal year for 

which data on asset assists were available following Border Patrol’s 

deployment of its SBInet technologies, and the collection of data on 

Geographic Information Systems coordinates for apprehensions and 

seizures was required.13 To assess the reliability of apprehensions and 

seizures data, including the asset assist and Geographic Information 

Systems data, we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials who 

oversee the maintenance and analyses of the data about agency 

guidance and processes for collecting and reporting the data. We 

determined that the apprehensions, seizures, asset assists, and 

Geographic Information Systems data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. However, as we reported in December 2012, 

because of potential inconsistencies in how the data are collected, these 

data cannot be compared across sectors but can be compared within a 

sector over time.14

 13Border Patrol began using SBInet at Tucson in February 2010 and at Ajo in August 

2010. Border Patrol began requiring the collection of longitude and latitude coordinates for 

all apprehensions and seizures in May 2009; therefore fiscal year 2010 was the first full 

year for which these data were available. 

We determined that the recorded data on asset assists 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, but found 

limitations with the consistency in which these data are recorded for all 

apprehensions and seizures, a fact that we discuss in the report. 

Although we determined that the latitude and longitude coordinates for 

some apprehensions and seizures were invalid—e.g., they were identified 

as occurring outside U.S. national boundaries—the numbers were not 

significant, and we determined that the Geographic Information Systems 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Location 

data that were determined to be invalid were not included in our analysis. 

We compared CBP’s reporting requirements and use of asset assists 

data against criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, which, among other things, call for ensuring effectiveness 

14GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform 

Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.10, 

2012).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 65 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

and efficiency of management operations, including the use of the entity’s 

resources.15

In addition, we visited Border Patrol’s Tucson sector in Arizona to observe 

Border Patrol agents operating SBInet technologies and other selected 

technologies, such as RVSS towers, and discussed agents’ experiences 

in using these technologies. While visiting the Tucson sector, we 

interviewed officials regarding the deployment and contributions of 

surveillance technologies within the sector. We visited the Tucson sector 

because of the presence of surveillance technologies, such as SBInet

and RVSS towers, in that sector and because, under the Plan, the 

Tucson sector has locations for which additional technology deployments, 

such as IFTs, are planned. While the information we obtained from our 

visit cannot be generalized to all Border Patrol sectors, it did provide us 

with insights about the use of the deployed surveillance technologies.

Finally, we analyzed documents, including CBP’s Multi-Year Investment 

and Management Plan for Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and 

Technology for Fiscal Years 2014-2017, and interviewed CBP officials 

responsible for overseeing the progress CBP and DHS have made in 

implementing our November 2011 recommendations to identify the 

mission benefits to be derived from technologies in the Plan and metrics 

to measure the extent to which border security is expected to improve by 

using these technologies.16

We conducted this performance audit from September 2012 through 

March 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 15GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

16Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Multi-Year 

Investment and Management Plan for Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and 

Technology for Fiscal Years 2014-2017 ( Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2013). Also, see 

GAO-12-22. 
Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan

Page 66 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 6: Integrated Fixed Tower Concept (Secure Border Initiative Network Tower)

Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan
Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan

Page 67 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 7: Remote Video Surveillance System
Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan

Page 68 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 8: Mobile Surveillance Capability
Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan

Page 69 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 9: Mobile Video Surveillance System
Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan

Page 70 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 10: Agent Portable Surveillance System
Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan

Page 71 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 11: Thermal Imaging System (RECON III)
Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies in 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan

Page 72 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 12: Unattended Ground Sensor
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 73 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Best practices for cost estimating and scheduling identify 10 practices 

associated with effective scheduling.1 These are (1) capturing all 

activities, (2) sequencing all activities, (3) assigning resources to all 

activities, (4) establishing the duration of all activities, (5) verifying that the 

schedule is traceable horizontally and vertically, (6) confirming that the 

critical path is valid, (7) ensuring reasonable total float, (8) conducting a 

schedule risk analysis, (9) updating the schedule with actual progress and 

logic, and (10) maintaining a baseline schedule.2

We assessed the extent to which the March 2013 schedules for CBP’s 

three highest-cost technology programs under the Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology Plan—IFT, RVSS, and MSC—met each of the 

10 best practices.

These practices are 

summarized into four characteristics of a reliable schedule—

comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled.

3

• Not met—the program provided no evidence that satisfies any of the 

criterion.

We characterized whether the schedules met each of 

the 10 best practices as follows:

• Minimally met—the program provided evidence that satisfies a small 

portion of the criterion.

• Partially met—the program provided evidence that satisfies about half 

of the criterion.

• Substantially met—the program provided evidence that satisfies a 

large portion of the criterion.

 1

GAO-09-3SP and GAO-12-120G.

2

A schedule is horizontally traceable if it reflects the order of events necessary to achieve 

aggregated products or outcomes and is vertically traceable if activities in varying levels of 

the schedule map to one another and key dates presented to management in periodic 

briefings are in sync with the schedule. A valid critical path represents the chain of 

dependent activities with the longest total duration. Total float refers to the amount of time 

by which an activity can slip before the delay affects a project’s estimated finish date.

3 We determined the overall assessment rating by assigning each individual rating a 

number: Not met = 1, minimally met = 2, partially met = 3, substantially met = 4, and met =

5. Then, we took the average of the individual assessment ratings to determine the overall 

rating for each of the four characteristics. The resulting average becomes the Overall 

Assessment as follows: Not met = 1.0 to 1.4, minimally met = 1.5 to 2.4, partially met = 2.5 

to 3.4, substantially met = 3.5 to 4.4, and met = 4.5 to 5.0. We developed this rating scale 

in consultation with cost-estimating experts who helped develop the Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide. 

Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment Results 

for the Integrated Fixed Towers, Remote Video 

Surveillance System, and Mobile Surveillance 

Capability Programs
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 74 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

• Met—the program provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion.

Table 7 provides the results of our analysis of the IFT, RVSS, and MSC 

schedules as of March 2013.
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 75 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 7: Our Assessments of the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability (MSC) Program Schedules, as of March 2013

Schedule characteristic or best practice Our assessment

IFT RVSS MSC

Comprehensive Partially met Partially met Partially met

Capturing all 

activities

Captures all 

activities, as 

defined in the work 

breakdown 

structure, which 

defines in detail the 

work for both the 

government and its 

contractors 

necessary to 

accomplish a 

program’s 

objectives.

Partially met

The schedule contains clear start 

and finish milestones and schedule 

activities were mapped to a 

program work breakdown structure. 

However, there were 174 activities 

(or 24 percent of detail activities) 

that did not have an assigned

program work breakdown structure. 

According to program officials, the 

schedule reflects 53 duplicate 

milestones that are not mapped to 

the work breakdown structure. The 

revised program work breakdown 

structure was approved in May 

2013 and program officials stated 

they planned to re-baseline the 

schedule after contract award. Rebaselining resets the estimated 

schedule that is used to determine 

how the program will be held 

accountable. However, current 

government activities and U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers activities 

were not mapped to a program 

work breakdown structure prior to 

its revision in May. According to 

scheduling best practices, aligning 

a schedule to a work breakdown 

structure can help ensure that the 

total scope of work is accounted for 

within the schedule. Further, our 

analysis found two detail activities 

for every milestone in the schedule. 

With this type of ratio of detail 

activities to milestones, it can be 

difficult to monitor progress for 

activities against milestones, 

according to best practices. Activity 

names in the schedule were also 

not unique. We found 94 activity 

names that were repeated at least 

once, including 17 names used 

more than 10 times and 10 names 

used more than 20 times. Best 

practices state that descriptive 

names should be unambiguous and 

Substantially met

The schedule activities were 

mapped to a program work 

breakdown structure; however, there 

were 12 milestones that did not have 

an assigned program work 

breakdown structure. According to 

program officials, the schedule 

reflects 12 duplicate milestones that 

are not mapped to the work 

breakdown structure. The schedule 

reflects all the work that needs to be 

accomplished and contains a clear 

start milestone, but we could not 

identify a project finish milestone in 

the schedule. Our analysis also 

found a less than expected level of 

detail within the RVSS schedule, 

with one detail activity per milestone.

As previously stated, with this type 

of ratio of detail activities to 

milestones, it can be difficult to 

monitor progress for activities 

against milestones, according to 

best practices.

Partially met

Fields within the schedule did not map 

activities to a program work breakdown 

structure, although a separate external 

mapping document provided by the 

program office did align with the 

program work breakdown structure. In 

addition, the schedule does not denote 

clear start and finish milestones. Our 

analysis found that high-level efforts 

from vendors were represented as 

milestones, as no integrated master 

schedule data item description was 

required in the contracts. While the 

vendors are delivering off-the-shelf 

production equipment—which typically 

precludes the need for a detailed 

production schedule—a best practice 

is to include the work of suppliers and 

vendors as activities rather than 

representing the promise date of the 

delivery in the schedule. This allows 

progress to be monitored and risk to 

be applied to the activity, as well as 

eliminating the need for artificial 

constraints on delivery dates. Thus, it 

is unclear what method the vendors 

use to inform U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) and its Office 

of Technology Innovation and 

Acquisition (OTIA) of their schedule 

progress. Finally, our analysis found 

119 activities that were repeated at 

least once, including one name used 

more than 20 times. As previously 

stated, best practices state that 

descriptive names should be 

unambiguous and should identify their 

associated product without the need to 

review high-level summary activity or 

preceding activity names. Descriptive 

activity names help ensure that 

decision makers, managers, control 

account managers, task workers, and 

auditors know what scope of work is 

required for each activity.
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 76 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Schedule characteristic or best practice Our assessment

IFT RVSS MSC

should identify their associated 

product without the need to review 

high-level summary activity or 

preceding activity names. 

Descriptive activity names help 

ensure that decision makers, 

managers, control account 

managers, task workers, and 

auditors know what scope of work 

is required for each activity.

Assigning 

resources

Reflects what 

resources (for 

example, labor, 

materials, and 

overhead) are 

needed to do the 

work, whether all 

required resources 

will be available 

when needed, and 

whether any 

funding or time 

constraints exist.

Minimally met

Our analysis showed that the 

schedule is not resource loaded 

and the alternative method in use—

tracking resources by mapping 

summary activities to integrated 

project team names—limits CBP’s 

ability to identify resource 

constraints. A resource-loaded 

schedule implies that all required 

labor and significant materials, 

equipment, and other costs are 

assigned to the appropriate 

activities within the schedule. We 

identified 91 activities (7 percent of 

all activities) that had integrated 

project team responsibilities 

mapped to them, and those were 

mapped at the summary task 

level—with one exception (there is 

one detail task with an integrated 

project team mapping). Officials 

stated that through the use of these 

integrated project team mappings, 

OTIA can determine which 

resources are in demand and 

identify overall resource 

constraints. However, given the 

integrated project team mappings 

that were at the summary task level 

in the IFT schedule, and work 

hours were not estimated for each 

activity, it is difficult to identify 

resource constraints, according to 

best practices. Information on 

resource needs and availability in 

each work period assists the 

program office in forecasting the 

likelihood that activities will be 

completed as scheduled. If the 

current schedule does not allow 

insight into current or projected

Minimally met

Our analysis found that the RVSS 

schedule includes a total of 61 

resources designated as “work.”

However, the schedule reflects 

assigned resources (i.e., individual 

people and number of work hours) 

for 6 detailed activities, and our 

analysis showed that there were 119 

detailed activities without resource 

assignments. Information on 

resource needs and availability in 

each work period assists the 

program office in forecasting the 

likelihood that activities will be 

completed as scheduled. If the 

current schedule does not allow 

insight into current or projected 

allocation of resources, then the risk 

of the program’s slipping is 

significantly increased, according to 

our best practices. A schedule 

without resources implies an 

unlimited number of resources and 

their unlimited availability. As 

previously stated, if there is no 

justification for allocating and 

assigning resources, the schedule 

will convey a false level of accuracy. 

This is particularly important in a 

constrained resource environment 

where multiple projects are sharing 

critical resources, according to best 

practices.

Not met

Our analysis showed that the schedule 

is not resource loaded, and we found 

that the schedule did not include 

responsibility assignments. Further, 

program officials stated that they did 

not estimate resources because the 

schedule was developed under the 

assumption that the activities were to 

be fully resourced to do the work and 

that the personnel would be dedicated 

and not shared between the other 

programs. Information on resource 

needs and availability in each work 

period assists the program office in 

forecasting the likelihood that activities 

will be completed as scheduled. If the 

current schedule does not allow insight 

into current or projected allocation of 

resources, then the risk of the 

program’s slipping is significantly 

increased. According to our best 

practices, a schedule without 

resources implies an unlimited number 

of resources and their unlimited 

availability. Furthermore, if there is no 

justification for allocating and assigning 

resources, the schedule will convey a 

false level of accuracy. This is 

particularly important in a constrained 

resource environment where multiple 

projects are sharing critical resources, 

according to best practices.
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 77 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Schedule characteristic or best practice Our assessment

IFT RVSS MSC

allocation of resources, then the 

risk of the program’s slipping is 

significantly increased, according to 

best practices. Furthermore, if there 

is no justification for allocating and 

assigning resources, the schedule 

may convey a false level of 

accuracy. This is important in a 

constrained resource environment 

where multiple projects are sharing 

critical resources, according to best 

practices.

Establishing the 

durations of all 

activities

Establishes the 

duration of all 

activities, such as 

how long each 

activity will take, 

and allows for 

discrete progress 

measurement.

Estimated detail 

activity durations 

should be shorter 

than 2 working 

months, or 

approximately 44 

working days, for 

near-term effort.

Durations should 

be as short as 

possible to facilitate 

the objective 

measurement of 

accomplished 

effort.

Met

Our analysis found that the 

schedule activities were generally 

short enough to be consistent with 

the needs of effective planning. We 

found about 84 percent of detailed

activities were 44 days in duration 

or less; 19 activities, or 15 percent, 

have durations greater than 44 

days.a

Substantially met

Our analysis found that 44 activities, 

or 35 percent of remaining detailed 

activities, were 44 days in duration 

or less, and 81 activities or 65 

percent of remaining detailed 

activities had greater than 44 days.

The average duration of the 

remaining activities was 171 days. 

However, taking into account rolling 

wave planning, where near-term 

activities were planned in more 

detail than long-term activities, we 

found that durations were generally 

less than 2 business months. 

According to program officials, 

schedule activity durations were 

estimated to account for availability, 

distractions, leave, and training. 

While most activities were shorter 

than 44 days, we found that those 

durations may be unrealistic 

because management directed them 

to be artificial. The durations were 

shortened because, according to 

program officials, when the projected 

completion date was beyond senior 

management expectations, the 

durations were shortened to a more 

satisfactory length. 

Substantially met

Our analysis found that about 123 

activities, or 93 percent of remaining 

detailed activities, were 44 days in 

duration or less. The remaining about 

7 percent of detailed activities had 

greater than 44 days and were the 

logistical support activities noted by the 

program office. However, our analysis 

showed that while the project is 

scheduled to finish on September 16, 

2015, the base project calendar only 

includes holidays through June 30, 

2013. Other holidays will occur 

between June 30, 2013, and 

September 16, 2015, but these 

holidays are not reflected in the 

schedule.
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 78 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Schedule characteristic or best practice Our assessment

IFT RVSS MSC

Well constructed Substantially met Partially met Partially met

Sequencing all 

activities

Sequences all 

activities—that is, 

that all activities are 

logically sequenced 

with the most 

straightforward 

logic possible. In 

particular, activities 

that must be 

completed before 

other activities can 

begin (predecessor 

activities), as well 

as activities that 

cannot begin until 

other activities are 

completed 

(successor 

activities), should 

be identified.

Substantially met

Our analysis showed that the 

schedule has very few missing or 

incorrect logic links (less than 3

percent) and contains some 

number of date constraints (less 

than 3 percent). Missing logic refers 

to activities that are missing 

necessary predecessors or 

successors which in turn reduces 

the credibility of the calculated 

dates. The schedule contains 35 

activities (17 percent of remaining 

activities) with lags, and a total of 

38 lags throughout the remaining 

duration of the schedule, although 

some lags were used appropriately 

for future planning purposes. Lags 

are often used to put activities on a 

specific date or to insert a buffer for 

risk. In addition, we found that 92 

percent of the logic links in the 

schedule were finish-to-start 

relationships, allowing for intuitive, 

serial workflow. However, the 

schedule contains 3 activities with 

dangling logic—that is, either the 

start or finish dates for these 

activities are not properly tied to 

other activities. Specifically we 

found 2 activities that have 

predecessor logic that is not 

affecting their start dates and 1 

activity with successor logic that is 

not tied to its finish date. Finally, 

while the majority of activities have 

3 or fewer predecessors, 10 

activities (5 percent of remaining 

activities) have 4 or more 

predecessors, including the project 

completion milestone that has 16. 

Several parallel activities 

converging or joining with a single 

successor activity is known as path 

convergence. According to best 

practices, these points are a 

concern because risk at the merge 

point is multiplicative. Because 

each predecessor activity has a 

probability of finishing by a 

particular date, as the number of 

Substantially met

Our analysis found no missing or 

dangling logic in the schedule. The 

schedule has 94 percent of finish-tostart logic link relationships, allowing 

for intuitive, serial workflow. The 

count of remaining logic 

relationships is split between finishto-finish and start-to-start logic. 

There were a total of 15 lags among 

8 activities (or 5 percent of 

remaining activities), but in most 

cases the lags were used to plan 

long-term future effort where details 

were likely to be unknown. Our 

analysis also found 11 constraints, 

but most of these were due to 

external dependencies related to 

construction projects and were 

justified as such in the schedule. We 

also found 13 activities (7 percent of 

remaining activities) that have 4 or 

more predecessors, including the 

planning stage completion milestone 

that has 23. As previously stated, 

several parallel activities converging 

or joining with a single successor 

activity is known as path 

convergence. These points are a 

concern because risk at the merge 

point is multiplicative, according to 

our best practices. That is, because 

each predecessor activity has a 

probability of finishing by a particular 

date, as the number of predecessor 

activities increases, the probability 

that the successor activity will start 

on time quickly diminishes to zero.

Substantially met

Our analysis showed that the schedule 

has 97 percent finish-to-start logic link 

relationships, allowing for intuitive, 

serial workflow. According to our 

analysis, we found that the remaining 

milestones and detailed activities in the 

MSC schedule do not have any 

dangling logic, and missing logic was 

explained by external vendor 

deliveries. We found 11 constraints in 

the schedule (6 percent of remaining 

activities). These constraints were 

necessary because vendor deliveries 

were modeled as milestones, rather 

than long vendor tasks, as noted 

above in “Capturing all activities.” In 

addition, we found 4 activities with 

more than 4 predecessors, including 

one activity with 12 predecessors. As 

previously stated, these points are a 

concern because risk at the merge 

point is multiplicative, according to best 

practices. That is, because each 

predecessor activity has a probability 

of finishing by a particular date, as the 

number of predecessor activities 

increases, the probability that the 

successor activity will start on time 

quickly diminishes to zero.
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

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IFT RVSS MSC

predecessor activities increases, 

the probability that the successor 

activity will start on time diminishes 

to zero.

Confirming that the 

critical path is valid

Establishes a valid 

critical path, which 

represents the 

chain of dependent 

activities with the 

longest total 

duration. A valid 

critical path is 

necessary to 

examine the effects 

of any activity 

slipping along this 

path.

Substantially met

Our analysis found the project 

critical path to be a straightforward 

sequence of activities from the 

status date to project completion. 

The critical path derived in the 

detail IFT schedule matches the 

critical path shown in management 

briefing slides, with only one 

exception. However, as discussed 

in the next section, the 

unreasonableness of total float 

means there are concerns with the 

critical path as calculated by the 

network.

Minimally met

Our analysis found that the critical 

path is not continuous from the 

status date to contract award.

According to program officials, there 

is a near-term critical path to 

contract award as well as the overall 

critical path. However, according to 

our analysis of the critical path—

defined as the path of longest 

duration through the sequence of 

activities with zero or less-than-zero

total float considered critical—it does 

not reflect a continuous path from 

the status date to the major 

completion milestones. The first 

critical activity does not occur until 

December 9, 2013. There were no 

critical activities between the status 

date of March 13, 2013, and 

December 9, 2013, because of a 

date constraint on the critical path.

Our analysis was able to derive a 

driving path of activities from the 

status date to the posting of contract 

award milestone, but this path has 7 

days of total float. That is, the date 

constraint could prevent the ability of 

activities to be dependent on one 

another. According to best practices, 

the schedule should produce a 

critical path that reflects the driving 

path of the project to help program 

managers be better able to provide 

reliable timeline estimates or identify 

when problems or changes may 

occur and affect their downstream 

work.

Partially met

Our analysis found that the critical path 

is not continuous from the status date 

because it begins with a date 

constraint on a vendor delivery activity 

3 months after the status date. That is, 

the date constraint could prevent the 

ability of activities to be dependent on 

one another. However, from the 

vendor delivery activity to the project 

closeout milestone, the critical path is 

continuous and drives the closeout 

milestone. We found that neither the 

limited user test activities nor the post 

implementation review milestones 

were on the critical path, yet these 

were activities noted by management 

as currently being monitored as critical. 

As with the RVSS, until the schedule 

can produce a true critical path, the 

program office may not be able to 

provide reliable timeline estimates or 

identify when problems or changes 

may occur and their effect on 

downstream work. Further, it will limit 

management’s ability to focus on 

activities that will have detrimental 

effects on the key project milestones 

and deliveries if they slip.
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

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IFT RVSS MSC

Ensuring 

reasonable total 

float

Identifies the total 

float time—the 

amount of time by 

which an activity 

can slip before the 

delay affects the 

program’s 

estimated finish 

date—so that a 

schedule’s flexibility 

can be determined.

Large total float on 

an activity or path 

indicates that the 

activity or path can 

be delayed without 

jeopardizing the 

finish date. The 

length of delay that 

can be 

accommodated 

without the finish 

date’s slipping 

depends on a 

variety of factors, 

including the 

number of date 

constraints within 

the schedule and 

the amount of 

uncertainty in the 

duration estimates, 

but the activity’s 

total float provides 

a reasonable 

estimate of this 

value. Float differs 

among activities, 

given their logical 

sequence in the 

network and the 

overall program 

duration. 

Management 

should not adhere 

to a target float 

value or specific 

float measure.

Partially met

Our analysis found excessive 

values of total float in the schedule.

For example, the schedule was 

showing extreme flexibility, with 49 

percent of the remaining activities 

able to slip at least 20 percent of 

the remaining duration of the 

project. Our analysis found 

approximately half of the total float 

values were greater than 87 days, 

with 25 percent being greater than 

204 days, and a maximum float 

value of 628 days. In other words, 

half of the remaining activities and 

milestones in the schedule were 

able to slip at least 4 working 

months before affecting the final 

key milestone; a quarter of the 

activities could slip at least 10 

months before affecting the final 

key milestone (assuming 20 

working days per month, the value 

used by the scheduling software).

There were no notes in the 

schedule related to the float values, 

and some activities appear to have 

questionable values of float. For 

example 3 activities had 462 days 

of total float (23 working months).

We found that unreasonable values 

of total float were likely due to the 

sequencing of activities in the 

network. For example, activities 

with 462 days of float were on the 

same path, and share 462 days of 

float because the end milestone of 

that sequence has no successor.

According to our analysis, it does 

not seem likely, then, that this float 

value represents true schedule 

flexibility. Without accurate values 

of total float, a schedule cannot be 

used to identify activities that could 

be permitted to slip and thus 

release and reallocate resources to 

activities that require more 

resources to be completed on time, 

according to best practices.

Partially met

Our analysis found relatively 

excessive values of total float in the 

schedule. We found approximately 

20 percent of remaining activities 

with float values exceeding 88 days 

(or 4 working months). This includes 

16 activities with float over 1,500 

days, 2 with float values between 

1,000 and 1,500 days, and 11 with 

float values between 100 and 300 

days. According to program officials, 

the total float values are reasonable, 

reflect schedule flexibility, and areas 

with high total float are due to the 

long-duration post-contract award 

planning packages. However, 

according to best practices, planning 

packages should be logically linked 

within the schedule to create a 

complete picture of the program 

from start to finish and to allow the 

monitoring of a program’s critical 

path. According to best practices, a 

critical path—which is defined by the 

lowest total float path—cannot be 

derived accurately if excessive float 

values exist because of a particular 

sequencing of planning packages. In 

addition, inaccurate values of total 

float falsely depict true project 

status, which could lead to decisions 

that may jeopardize the project, 

according to best practices.

Partially met

Our analysis found relatively excessive 

values of total float in the schedule.

We found approximately 61 percent of 

remaining activities had float values 

exceeding 156 days (over 7 working 

months). This includes 25 activities 

with float over 600 days, 79 with over 

500 days, and 3 activities with float 

between 161 and 250 days. According 

to program officials, the total float 

values are reasonable, reflect 

schedule flexibility, and areas with high 

total float are due to the long-duration 

contractor maintenance support 

planning packages. 
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 81 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

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IFT RVSS MSC

Credible Partially met Partially met Minimally met

Verifying that the 

schedule is 

traceable 

horizontally and 

vertically

Verifies that 

schedule is (1) 

horizontally 

traceable—that is, it 

reflects the order of 

events necessary 

to achieve 

aggregated 

products or 

outcomes—and (2) 

vertically 

traceable—that is 

that activities in 

varying levels of the 

schedule map to 

one another and 

key dates 

presented to 

management in 

periodic briefings 

are in sync with the 

schedule.

Substantially met

The schedule exhibited vertical 

traceability, as we were able to 

match select forecasted dates 

between the detailed schedule and 

higher-level management briefing 

slides. We also found the schedule 

exhibited horizontal traceability for 

the most part—that is, it links 

products and outcomes with 

sequenced activities. We tested the 

horizontal traceability of the 

schedule network by extending the 

durations of some activities by 

extreme amounts, and then 

observing the impact on the overall 

network. The network responded to 

the drastic changes, but in one 

example a delay did not carry

through the schedule because of 

dangling logic (as noted above in 

“Sequencing all activities”). Unless 

the schedule is horizontally 

traceable, activities whose 

durations are greatly extended will 

have no effect on key milestones, 

according to best practices. 

Substantially met

The schedule exhibited vertical 

traceability because we were able to 

match select dates between the 

detailed schedule and higher level 

management briefing slides. We 

tested the horizontal traceability of 

the schedule network by extending 

the durations of some activities by 

extreme amounts, and then 

observing the impact on the overall 

network. In each case, the network 

responded appropriately to changes. 

Partially met

The schedule exhibited vertical 

traceability because we were able to 

trace key production delivery dates 

between the detailed schedule and 

higher-level management briefing 

slides. We tested the horizontal 

traceability of the schedule network by 

extending the durations of some 

activities by extreme amounts, and 

then observing the impact on the 

overall network. We found that the 

MSC schedule responds to delays in 

the network in some instances but not 

in others. For example, we extended 

the duration of a vendor delivery 

activity. While it delayed planned 

activities, such as a planned 

operational readiness review and postimplementation review, it had no 

impact on the subsequent vendor 

deliveries because of the way that 

vendor delivery milestones were 

constrained, as discussed above in 

“Sequencing all activities.” According 

to best practices, unless the schedule 

is horizontally traceable, activities 

whose durations are greatly extended 

will have no effect on key milestones. 
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 82 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

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IFT RVSS MSC

Conducting a 

schedule risk 

analysis

Conducts a 

schedule risk 

analysis to predict a 

level of confidence 

in meeting the 

program’s 

completion date.

Minimally met

Program officials stated they 

conducted a schedule risk analysis 

in December 2011, which 

encompassed the scheduled 

activities from request for proposal 

to contract award. According to the 

documentation OTIA provided us 

and the results of our analysis, it 

did not describe how much 

contingency reserve (that is, time 

held in reserve for potential delays) 

the analysis suggested, the paths 

or activities most likely to delay the 

project, or whether correlation was 

accounted for between tasks.

Officials stated that all remaining 

durations were given three-point 

distributions based on global +/-

percentage factors. However, the 

schedule risk analysis does not 

appear to have been based on any 

connection between risks and 

specific activities. Officials stated 

that the risk register was not used 

to identify risk factors for the 

schedule risk analysis, project risks 

were not prioritized based on 

results of the schedule risk 

analysis, and contingency was not 

selected based on the results of the 

schedule risk analysis. A schedule 

risk analysis is used to select an 

amount of contingency to reach the 

appropriate confidence level for a 

successful—that is, on-time—

project completion date, according 

to best practices. In the absence of 

a complete schedule risk analysis, 

we could not determine the 

likelihood of the project’s 

completion date, how much 

schedule risk contingency is 

needed to provide an acceptable 

level of certainty for completion by 

a specific date, risks most likely to 

delay the project, how much 

contingency reserve each risk 

requires, and the paths or activities 

that are most likely to delay the 

project.

Minimally met

Program officials stated that the last 

schedule risk analysis was 

conducted in February 2013 and 

encompassed the schedule activities 

through to contract award. According 

to the documentation OTIA provided 

us with the findings and results of 

this analysis, remaining durations of 

activities were varied by global +/-

percentage factors rather than any 

connection to specific risks. Officials 

stated that the risk register was not 

used to identify risk factors for the 

schedule risk analysis, project risks 

were not prioritized based on results 

of the schedule risk analysis, and 

contingency was not selected based 

on the results of the schedule risk 

analysis. As previously stated, a 

schedule risk analysis is used to 

select an amount of contingency to 

reach the appropriate confidence 

level for a successful—that is, ontime—project completion date, 

according to best practices. In the 

absence of a complete schedule risk 

analysis, we could not determine the 

likelihood of the project’s completion 

date, how much schedule risk 

contingency is needed to provide an 

acceptable level of certainty for 

completion by a specific date, risks 

most likely to delay the project, how 

much contingency reserve each risk 

requires, and the paths or activities 

that are most likely to delay the 

project.

Not met

A schedule risk analysis was not 

performed for the schedule because, 

according to program officials, the 

program began in 2009 and the 

schedule risk analysis tool was not 

available for OTIA use until October 

2011.
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 83 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Schedule characteristic or best practice Our assessment

IFT RVSS MSC

Controlled Partially met Partially met Minimally met

Updating the 

schedule with 

actual progress and 

logic

Updates 

periodically using 

actual progress and 

logic to realistically 

forecast dates for 

program activities.

Substantially met

Our analysis showed that the 

schedule is well maintained, and 

the status date of March 13, 2013 

was current as of the date the 

schedule was requested. We found 

4 activities in progress, 2 of which 

were critical. We found no out-ofsequence activities and no date 

anomalies. However, no schedule 

narrative accompanies the weekly 

schedule update because there is 

no agency requirement to do so. 

According to best practices, all 

changes made to the schedule 

during statusing should be 

documented, and salient changes 

should be justified along with their 

likely effect on future planned 

activities. Moreover, best practices 

state that a schedule narrative 

should accompany the updated 

schedule to provide decision 

makers and auditors a log of 

changes and their effect, if any, on 

the schedule timeframe.

Substantially met

Our analysis showed that the 

schedule is well maintained, and the 

status date of March 13, 2013, was 

current as of the date the schedule 

was requested. We found 6 activities 

in progress. We found no out-ofsequence activities and no date 

anomalies. However, no schedule 

narrative accompanies the weekly 

schedule update. According to 

program officials, a schedule 

narrative is not a requirement for the 

government’s schedule. However, 

OTIA plans to impose this 

requirement on the technology 

vendor that is awarded the contract. 

Partially met

Our analysis showed that the schedule 

is well maintained, and the status date 

of March 13, 2013, was current as of 

the date the schedule was requested.

However, we found several date 

anomalies in the schedule. According 

to our analysis, the MSC schedule 

contains a total of 13 activities that 

have planned start or finish dates in 

the past without actual start or finish 

dates (8 have starts in the past with no 

actual start, and 5 have finish dates in 

the past but no actual finish—although 

1 activity is planned to finish on the 

status date). If these activities have not 

started, according to best practices, 

their planned start dates should be at 

least the current status date, as 

activities cannot be planned to start in 

the past. Further, according to best 

practices, if the activities have not 

actually finished, they should at least 

finish on the status date. Our analysis 

showed that the MSC schedule does 

not contain activities with actual start 

or finish dates in the future. We also 

found 2 activities in progress, though 

neither one is critical. At least 1 inprogress activity should be critical 

because the critical path must be 

continuous, according to best 

practices. 
Appendix III: Our Schedule Assessment 

Results for the Integrated Fixed Towers, 

Remote Video Surveillance System, and Mobile 

Surveillance Capability Programs

Page 84 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Schedule characteristic or best practice Our assessment

IFT RVSS MSC

Maintaining a 

baseline schedule

Maintains a 

baseline schedule 

to measure, 

monitor, and report 

the program’s 

progress.

Minimally met

Officials stated that the schedule 

does not currently have a baseline.

A baseline was originally set in July 

2011 as the pre-award baseline, 

but the program has been delayed 

since then and no changes have 

been made to the baseline. Further, 

we found the schedule does not 

currently have a baseline schedule 

document. Officials also stated that 

the IFT Acquisition Program 

Baseline serves as the baseline 

schedule document. However, the 

Acquisition Program Baseline and 

related guidance presents an 

overview of OTIA schedule policy 

rather than assumptions specific to 

individual program schedules. In 

addition, according to best 

practices, a baseline schedule 

document is a single document that 

describes, among other things, the 

organization of the schedule; the 

logic of the network; the basic 

approach to managing resources; 

the schedule’s unique features; and 

justification for lags, date 

constraints, and long activity 

durations. According to best 

practices, thorough documentation 

is important for validating and 

defending a baseline schedule. 

Thorough documentation also 

helps with analyzing changes in the 

program schedule and identifying 

the reasons for variances between 

estimates. 

Minimally met

According to program officials, the 

baseline schedule is the basis for 

measuring the RVSS schedule 

efficiency. However, our analysis 

could not determine a completely 

valid baseline within the schedule 

file provided. The latest baseline 

dates in the file were set in 

September 2012, or 603 calendar 

days after the start date of the 

project kick-off milestone. In 

addition, we found 154 activities (25 

percent) in the schedule that did not 

have baseline start or finish dates. 

According to best practices, a 

formally established baseline 

schedule to measure current 

performance against can help 

managers identify or mitigate the 

effect of unfavorable performance. 

We found the schedule does not 

currently have a baseline schedule 

document. Program officials state 

that the RVSS Acquisition Program 

Baseline, which was approved in 

September 2012, serves as the 

baseline schedule document. 

However, the Acquisition Program 

Baseline and related guidance 

present an overview of OTIA 

schedule policy rather than 

assumptions specific to individual 

program schedules. In addition, 

according to best practices, a 

baseline schedule document is a 

single document that describes, 

among other things, the organization 

of the schedule; the logic of the 

network; the basic approach to 

managing resources; the schedule’s 

unique features; and justification for 

lags, date constraints, and long 

activity durations.

Not met

Program officials stated that a 

schedule baseline document does not 

exist and a baseline schedule for the 

MSC was not established. As 

previously stated, a baseline schedule 

document is a single document that 

describes, among other things, the 

organization of the schedule; the logic 

of the network; the basic approach to 

managing resources; the schedule’s 

unique features; and justification for 

lags, date constraints, and long activity 

durations. According to best practices, 

without a formally established baseline 

schedule to measure current 

performance against, management 

cannot identify or mitigate the effect of 

unfavorable performance.

Source: GAO analysis of CBP and OTIA data.

Notes: Not met—OTIA provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. Minimally met—OTIA 

provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met—OTIA provided 

evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. Substantially met—OTIA provided evidence that 

satisfies a large portion of the criterion. Met—OTIA provided complete evidence that satisfies the 

entire criterion.

a

For the remaining about 1 percent of the schedule activities, we could not determine durations.
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 85 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

DHS’s Enforcement Integrated Database includes a field that enables 

Border Patrol agents to identify whether a technological or 

nontechnological asset assisted in the apprehension of illegal entrants or 

the seizure of drugs or other contraband.1 This appendix provides 

summary statistics on the reporting of asset assists by Border Patrol 

agents in the apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and 

other contraband across the Tucson and Yuma sectors from fiscal year 

2010 through June 2013.2

As mentioned earlier, because CBP does not require data on asset 

assists to be recorded and tracked within the EID, our analysis provides 

information on the extent to which asset assists were recorded during the 

specified time frame across the Tucson and Yuma sectors. Because 

agents are not required to report asset assists data within the EID, it is 

unclear when the asset assist field is left blank whether it was because an 

asset was not a contributing factor in the apprehension or seizure or 

whether an asset was a contributing factor but was not recorded by 

agents. Accordingly, for the purposes of our analysis, we refer to 

instances in which asset assists were not recorded as “unreported asset 

assists.”3

 1

The EID is a DHS-shared common database repository for several DHS law enforcement 

and homeland security applications that contains data on apprehensions and seizures. 

For the purposes of this analysis, we identify asset assists involving technology as those 

Border Patrol technological assets identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data 

field for which Border Patrol continues to make significant investments and are included 

as part of the Plan. Thus, technology assets that may be selected from the asset assist 

field’s drop-down menu include Cameras, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Scope Trucks, 

and Unattended Ground Sensors. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, 

agents identifying “Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to either SBInet or 

RVSS towers.

Moreover, because of potential differences in the collection and 

reporting of data on asset assists across sectors and over time, and 

differences in the types of surveillance technologies deployed across 

2

As mentioned in appendix I, this time frame was selected because fiscal year 2010 

represents the first full fiscal year for which data on asset assists were available. This 

timeframe was also selected because fiscal year 2010 represents the first year for which 

SBInet surveillance technologies were operationally deployed. 

3

For the purposes of this report, “unreported asset assists” could include instances for 

which an asset was not a contributing factor in apprehensions and seizures.

Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the Reporting 

of Asset Assists Data for Apprehensions and 

Seizures across the Tucson and Yuma Sectors 

from Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013

Numbers of Apprehension 

and Seizure Events
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 86 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

sectors, conclusions about the differences in reported asset assists 

across sectors and differences within sectors over time cannot be made.4

As shown in tables 8 and 9, the 166,976 apprehension events that 

occurred in the Tucson sector from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 

resulted in the apprehension of 549,357 illegal entrants, and 20,322 

seizure events that occurred in the Tucson sector over the same period 

resulted in the seizure of 21,973 items.5 The 8,237 apprehension events 

and 6,828 seizure events occurring in the Yuma sector during the same 

time period resulted in the apprehension of 17,580 illegal entrants and 

7,892 seized items. The two tables also show that the percentages of 

reported asset assists for apprehension events and seizure events and 

the resulting apprehensions and seizures differed across the Tucson and 

Yuma sectors and in both sectors and over time.6

 4

According to CBP officials, while SBInet surveillance technologies were deployed to the 

Tucson sector during our specified time frame, these technologies were not deployed, and 

thus are not present, within the Yuma sector. Thus, reported technological asset assists 

for the Yuma sector include assists from technological assets such as RVSS, Scope 

Trucks, and Unattended Ground Sensors. 

5

In table 8, apprehension events and apprehensions that did not involve deportable 

subjects have been eliminated.

6

We define “apprehension events and seizure events” as the occasions on which Border 

Patrol agents make an apprehension of an illegal entrant or a seizure of drugs or other 

contraband. The event is recorded in the EID and a date and unique identifying number 

are assigned. These events can involve the apprehension of one or multiple illegal 

entrants or one or more types of seized items, and each individual illegal entrant 

apprehended or type of item seized in the event will be associated with the assigned 

unique identifying number.
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 87 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 8: Numbers of Apprehension Events and Apprehensions, and Percentages with Unreported Asset Assists, Technology 

Asset Assists, and Other Asset Assists in the Tucson and Yuma Sectors, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013 

Tucson sector Yuma sector

2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

1. Number of apprehension 

events 55,905 38,110 39,378 33,583 166,976 2,569 2,096 2,188 1,384 8,237

2. Percentage of events with 

unreported asset assists 82.1% 72.8% 60.8% 53.3% 69.2% 92.3% 87.0% 85.0% 79.2% 86.8%

3. Percentage of events with 

technology asset assists 7.7% 13.2% 21.2% 25.7% 15.8% 2.1% 3.7% 3.7% 5.1% 3.4%

4. Percentage of events with 

other asset assists 10.2% 13.9% 17.9% 21.0% 15.1% 5.6% 9.3% 11.3% 15.7% 9.8%

5. Number of apprehensions 211,417 120,701 118,675 98,564 549,357 5,414 4,480 4,440 3,246 17,580

6. Percentage of 

apprehensions with 

unreported asset assists 72.1% 63.2% 49.1% 38.9% 59.2% 89.4% 81.9% 81.6% 73.7% 82.6%

7. Percentage of 

apprehensions with 

technology asset assists 12.7% 17.8% 26.7% 33.7% 20.6% 3.2% 4.7% 5.2% 8.1% 5.0%

8. Percentage of 

apprehensions with other 

asset assists 15.1% 19.0% 24.2% 27.4% 20.1% 7.4% 13.4% 13.2% 18.2% 12.4%

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data.

Note: For the purposes of our analysis, we define “apprehension event” as an occasion on which 

Border Patrol agents make an apprehension of an illegal entrant. The event is recorded in the 

Enforcement Integrated Database. An event can involve the apprehension of one or multiple illegal 

entrants. Additionally, for the purposes of this analysis, we identify known asset assists involving 

technology as those Border Patrol technological assets identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset 

assists” data field for which Border Patrol has made investments are included as part of the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan, such as Cameras or Mobile Surveillance Systems. According 

to Border Patrol officials, agents identifying “Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to 

either Secure Border Initiative Network or Remote Video Surveillance Systems towers.
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 88 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 9: Numbers of Seizure Events and Seizures, and Percentages with Unreported Asset Assists, Technology Asset 

Assists, and Other Asset Assists in the Tucson and Yuma Sectors, Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data

Note: For the purposes of our analysis, we define “apprehension event” as an occasion on which 

Border Patrol agents make an apprehension of an illegal entrant. The event is recorded in the 

Enforcement Integrated Database. An event can involve the seizure of one or multiple illegal items. 

Additionally, for the purposes of this analysis, we identify known asset assists involving technology as 

those Border Patrol technological assets identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field 

for which Border Patrol has made investments are included as part of the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan, such as Cameras or Mobile Surveillance Systems. According to Border Patrol 

officials, agents identifying “Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to either Secure 

Border Initiative Network or Remote Video Surveillance Systems towers.

Figure 13 shows that the percentages of apprehension events and 

apprehensions in the Tucson sector for which asset assists were not 

reported decreased from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013. Figure 14 

shows that in the Yuma sector, the percentages of apprehension events 

and apprehensions for which asset assists were not reported were higher 

than in the Tucson sector, but similarly decreased over that time period. 

For the first three quarters of fiscal year 2013, asset assist information 

was not reported for more than one-half of the apprehension events in the 

Tucson sector and nearly four-fifths of the apprehension events in the 

Yuma sector.

Tucson sector Yuma sector

2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

1. Number of seizure events 5,119 4,892 5,284 5,027 20,322 2,528 2,129 1,280 891 6,828

2. Percentage of seizure 

events with unreported 

asset assists 38.2% 34.3% 29.0% 24.7% 31.5% 78.0% 69.0% 52.3% 51.4% 66.9%

3. Percentage of seizure 

events with technology 

asset assists 29.4% 31.3% 32.8% 37.0% 32.6% 0.5% 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.5%

4. Percentage of seizure 

events with other asset 

assists 32.4% 34.5% 38.2% 38.3% 35.8% 21.6% 30.2% 47.4% 48.0% 32.6%

5. Number of seizures 5,383 5,378 5,753 5,459 21,973 2,823 2,417 1,516 1,136 7,892 

6. Percentage of seizures 

with unreported asset 

assists 38.2% 34.5% 29.5% 25.4% 31.8% 77.5% 68.6% 52.8% 51.7% 66.3%

7. Percentage of seizures 

with technology asset 

assists 28.5% 29.8% 31.1% 35.6% 31.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5%

8. Percentage of seizures 

with other asset assists 33.3% 35.8% 39.4% 38.9% 36.9% 22.1% 30.7% 47.0% 47.8% 33.2%

Reported Asset Assists by 

Type of Asset for 

Apprehensions and 

Seizures
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 89 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 13: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Tucson Sector for Apprehensions Events and Apprehensions, 

Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013

Note: Numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding. For the purposes of this analysis, we 

identify known asset assists involving technology as those Border Patrol technological assets 

identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field for which Border Patrol has made 

investments are included as part of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, such as 

Cameras or Mobile Surveillance Systems. According to Border Patrol officials, agents identifying 

“Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to either Secure Border Initiative Network or 

Remote Video Surveillance Systems towers. Because agents may identify assists from more than 

one type of asset within the asset assists data field, assists from technological assets could be the 

result of technology assets alone or some combination of other asset assists.
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 90 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 14: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Yuma Sector for Apprehension Events and Apprehensions, 

Fiscal Year 2010 through June 2013

Note: For the purposes of this analysis, we identify known asset assists involving technology as those 

Border Patrol technological assets identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field for 

which Border Patrol has made investments are included as part of the Arizona Border Surveillance

Technology Plan, such as Cameras or Mobile Surveillance Systems. According to Border Patrol 

officials, agents identifying “Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to either Secure 

Border Initiative Network or Remote Video Surveillance Systems towers. Because agents may 

identify assists from more than one type of asset within the asset assists data field, assists from 

technological assets could be the result of technology assets alone or some combination of other 

asset assists.

Figures 13 and 14 also show that the percentages of apprehension 

events and apprehensions for which technological asset assists and other 

asset assists were reported increased during that period in both sectors. 

Because it is difficult to determine whether unreported asset assists do 

not involve asset assists, or do involve asset assists that were not 

recorded, it is difficult to determine whether the increases in the 

percentages of apprehension events and apprehensions involving 

technology asset assets and other assists involve real increases, or 

increases resulting from fewer asset assists going unreported. The higher 
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 91 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

percentage of apprehension events and apprehensions involving 

technology asset assists in the Tucson sector relative to the Yuma sector 

may also be partly due to differences in the two sectors in unreported 

asset assists, and also to differences in the number of technology assets 

in the two sectors.

Figure 15 shows that for seizure events and seizures in the Tucson sector 

from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013, as was the case for 

apprehension events and apprehensions, the percentages for which 

asset assists were unreported declined, while the percentages for which 

technology asset assists and other asset assists were reported increased. 

Unreported asset assists were lower for seizures than for apprehensions 

in the Tucson sector, and the changes with respect to the percentages of 

seizures involving unreported asset assists, technology asset assists, and 

other asset assists in the Tucson sector were not as pronounced as the 

changes with respect to apprehensions.
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 92 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Figure 15: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Tucson Sector for Seizure Events and Seizures, Fiscal Year 2010 

through June 2013

Note: Numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding. For the purposes of this analysis, we 

identify known asset assists involving technology as those Border Patrol technological assets 

identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field for which Border Patrol has made 

investments are included as part of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, such as 

Cameras or Mobile Surveillance Systems. According to Border Patrol officials, agents identifying 

“Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to either Secure Border Initiative Network or 

Remote Video Surveillance Systems towers. Because agents may identify assists from more than 

one type of asset within the asset assists data field, assists from technological assets could be the 

result of technology assets alone or some combination of other asset assists.

Figure 16 shows that in the Yuma sector over the same period, the 

percentages for which asset assists were unreported declined, and the 

percentage for which other (nontechnology) assets were reported 

increased. In the Yuma sector, the percentage of technology asset 

assists was small (less than 1 percent) in each of the fiscal years and 

there was no discernible trend in the percentage of technology asset 

assists. As with apprehensions, it is difficult to determine how much of the 

increase in technology asset assists in the Tucson sector and other asset 
Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the 

Reporting of Asset Assists Data for 

Apprehensions and Seizures across the 

Tucson and Yuma Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2010 through June 2013

Page 93 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

assists in both sectors involves the increased use of technology and other 

assets, or changes in reporting of asset assists.

Figure 16: Percentage of Asset Assists Reported across the Yuma Sector for Seizure Events and Seizures, Fiscal Year 2010 

through June 2013

Note: Numbers may not add to 100 because of rounding. For the purposes of this analysis, we 

identify known asset assists involving technology as those Border Patrol technological assets 

identified within the Border Patrol’s “asset assists” data field for which Border Patrol has made 

investments are included as part of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, such as 

Cameras or Mobile Surveillance Systems. According to Border Patrol officials, agents identifying 

“Cameras” are most likely attributing the asset assist to either Secure Border Initiative Network or 

Remote Video Surveillance Systems towers. Because agents may identify assists from more than 

one type of asset within the asset assists data field, assists from technological assets could be the 

result of technology assets alone or some combination of other asset assists.
Appendix V: Mission Benefits Identified by U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection of Its 

Surveillance Technologies

Page 94 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Table 10 summarizes the mission benefits to be derived from each of the 

technologies to be deployed as part of the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan as outlined in CBP’s Multi-Year Investment and 

Management Plan for Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and 

Technology for Fiscal Years 2014-2017.

1

Table 10: Mission Benefits Identified by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Technologies Deployed or 

Planned for Deployment under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

According to CBP officials, each 

of the seven technologies deployed or planned for deployment as part of 

the Plan will increase situational awareness and enhance the ability of 

Border Patrol agents to detect, identify, deter, and respond to threats 

along the border.

Technology Mission benefits Summary of CBP identified mission benefits 

Agent Portable 

Surveillance Systems 

(APSS) 

• Improved situational 

awareness

• Agility

• Rapid response

• Agent safety

The APSS capabilities provide situational awareness and a better 

understanding of cross-border flows and activities. The portable, rugged 

ground-sensing radar system can be deployed and operated on short 

notice in the harshest border terrain, exemplifying APSS’s agility. 

Integrated Fixed Towers 

(IFT) 

• Improved situational

awareness

• Agent safety 

In threat areas where mobile surveillance systems cannot be a viable or 

long term solution, IFTs equipped with sensor suites and communication 

equipment can be deployed to provide automated, persistent wide area 

surveillance for the detection, tracking, identification, and classification of 

illegal entries. When multiple IFT units are integrated Border Patrol 

expects to be able to increase situational awareness of and be able to 

monitor a larger area of interest, whereas previously, multiple agents 

exposed to threats were required to provide coverage in the same amount 

of area. 

Mobile Surveillance 

Capability (MSC)

• Agility

• Rapid response

• Agent safety

The purpose of MSC is to provide mobile area surveillance in remote rural 

areas. This allows CBP to adjust the location of its surveillance 

capabilities to keep pace with the ever-changing border threat. The 

capabilities of MSC are detection, identification, and tracking of items of 

interest until successfully culminating in a law enforcement conclusion.

Mobile Video Surveillance 

Systems (MVSS) 

• Improved situational 

awareness

• Agility

• Rapid response

• Agent safety

The MVSS enhances CBP’s capability to provide persistent video 

surveillance and situational awareness, resulting in timely and effective 

responses from law enforcement in predominately rural, remote areas. 

The system’s agility provides Border Patrol with dynamic surveillance 

capability, demonstrated by the ability to relocate video surveillance 

assets on the basis of changes in threat patterns and behavior and 

provides video surveillance coverage (as needed) between fixed tower 

assets. 

 1

Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Multi-Year 

Investment and Management Plan for Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and 

Technology for Fiscal Years 2014-2017 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2013).

Appendix V: Mission Benefits Identified by 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection of Its 

Surveillance Technologies
Appendix V: Mission Benefits Identified by U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection of Its 

Surveillance Technologies

Page 95 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Technology Mission benefits Summary of CBP identified mission benefits 

Remote Video 

Surveillance Systems 

(RVSS)

• Agent safety

• Improved situational 

awareness

• Intelligence analysis

• Rapid response

RVSS cameras provide the persistent ground surveillance capability 

needed by Border Patrol agents to effectively deter, detect, track, identify, 

classify, and respond in a timely and effective manner to items of interest 

located along the U.S. borders. Additionally, an RVSS is to provide 

continuous monitoring of encounters, which supports another Border 

Patrol mission element—to ensure agent safety. RVSS is also to provide 

archival data of items of interest regarding incursions and encounters to 

support analysis, intelligence activities, and incident resolution.

Thermal Imaging Devices 

(TID)

• Improved situational 

awareness

• Agent safety

• Rapid response

The outcome and mission benefit is increased situational awareness for 

Border Patrol operators, which can contribute to more timely and effective 

responses. In support of the physical security and safety of Border Patrol 

agents, the corresponding Remote Viewing Kit—a device that when 

combined with TIDs allows agents to remotely control patrol operations—

is expected to reduce agent fatigue during long-term deployment of the 

long-range TID.

Unattended Ground 

Sensors (UGS) and 

Imaging Sensors (IS)

• Improved situational 

awareness

• Rapid response

• Agent safety

UGSs are to provide situational awareness and persistent surveillance. 

Along with the tower-based surveillance systems that UGSs are intended 

to augment, the sensors are to increase the Border Patrol’s strategic 

intelligence. The information gathered from these combined systems is to 

contribute to a greater understanding of border activities.

Source: GAO analysis of CBP information.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 96 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 97 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 98 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 99 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan
Page 100 GAO-14-368 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Rebecca Gambler, at (202)512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jeanette Espinola (Assistant 

Director), David Alexander, Charles Bausell, Frances Cook, Katherine 

Davis, Joseph E. Dewechter, Jennifer Echard, Shannon Grabich, Yvette 

Gutierrez, Eric Hauswirth, Richard Hung, Jason Lee, Grant Mallie, Linda 

Miller, John Mingus, Anna Maria Ortiz, Karen Richey, Doug Sloane, Karl 

Seifert, Nate Tranquilli, Katherine Trimble, Jim Ungvarsky, and Michelle 

Woods made key contributions to this report.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441212)
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