alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Jeffrey M. Johns, Appellant, v Kevin M. Rampe et al., Respondents.

[808 NYS2d 18]

*284Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles J. Tejada, J.), entered August 24, 2004, which dismissed the proceeding as untimely, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

There is no merit to petitioner’s argument that the timeliness of the proceeding is governed by the one-year-and-90-day limitations period in Urban Development Corporation Act ([UDCA] L 1968, ch 174, § 1) § 31-a (McKinney’s Uncons Laws of NY § 6281-a), not the four-month limitations period in CPLR 217 (1). By its terms, UDCA § 31-a applies to an action in tort, not a proceeding in the nature of mandamus, clearly the case here in which petitioner seeks to annul the determination of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) selecting the winning design in the competition for the World Trade Center memorial on the ground that LMDC did not follow its own rules governing the competition. The proceeding therefore had to be commenced within four months after petitioner received notice of the determination that aggrieved him *(see New York State Assn. of Counties v Axelrod,*78 NY2d 158, 165-166 [1991]). A party is aggrieved by a determination when “able to understand [its] consequences [and] impact” *(id.; see also Matter of Edmead v McGuire,*67 NY2d 714 [1986]). Here, the decision that had an impact on petitioner was not that made on January 6, 2004 selecting the winner of the competition from the eight Stage II finalists, but the decision made on November 19, 2003 eliminating all but eight of the 5,201 Stage I entries, including petitioner’s *(see Matter of GFI-Genfare, Div. of Gen. Signal Tech. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth.,*184 AD2d 334 [1992], *lv denied*80 NY2d 759 [1992] [four-month period began to run not when contract awarded but when petitioner advised that any bid it might make would not be considered]).

We also reject petitioner’s argument that the statute of limitations never began to run because he was not given individual written notice of his elimination. Under the circumstances, i.e., *285a worldwide competition with over 5,000 entrants, the November 19, 2003 publication of the eight finalists on LMDC’s Web site and in news media, including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, Reuters and television broadcast and cable network channels, sufficed as notification. There was no requirement in LMDC’s guidelines governing the competition, and petitioner cites no statute or rule, entitling entrants to individual written notice of their elimination, and respondents’ submissions as to the widespread dissemination of LMDC’s November 19, 2003 announcement of the finalists establish that petitioner knew, or should have known, of his elimination at that time *(see 90-92 Wadsworth Ave. Tenants Assn. v City of N.Y. Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev.,*227 AD2d 331, 331-332 [1996]). Thus, it was incumbent on petitioner to show, at least prima facie, that he did not receive or should not have known of the public announcement, which he did not do. Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Friedman, Sullivan and Malone, JJ.
| (logo) WELLS

           FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334

 

  |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

** **

** **

Reference is herebymade to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of November 1,2015, by and among CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., asDepositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, MIDLANDLOAN SERVICES, A DIVISION OF PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as SpecialServicer, PENTALPHA SURVEILLANCE LLC, as Operating Advisor, WELLS FARGO BANK,NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Certificate Adminstrator, and WILMINGTON TRUST,NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, with respect to Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C4 (the "Agreement").Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meaningsassigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section10.07 of this Agreement, I, Leslie Hayton, Managing Director of CommercialMortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.           Areview of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January1, 2018 through December 31, 2018 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and

 

2.           To thebest of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer, has fulfilledall of its obligations under this Agreement in all material respects throughoutthe Reporting Period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day ofFebruary 2019.

 

 

/s/Leslie Hayton

Leslie Hayton 

Managing Director

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank,  N.A. | (logo) Together  we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
§ 157.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns or claims for refund for other persons. ( a ) *In general.* A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of tax under section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties for failure to furnish a copy to the taxpayer under section 6695(a) of the Code, failure to sign the return under section 6695(b) of the Code, failure to furnish an identification number under section 6695(c) of the Code, failure to retain a copy or list under section 6695(d) of the Code, failure to file a correct information return under section 6695(e) of the Code, and negotiation of a check under section 6695(f) of the Code, in the manner stated in § 1.6695-1 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78463, Dec. 22, 2008]
§ 54.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund filed. ( a ) *In general.* Each tax return or claim for refund of tax under Chapter 43 of subtitle D prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by § 1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in § 1.6109-2 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78458, Dec. 22, 2008]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lydell Harris, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 435]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated June 7, 2004 *(People v Harris,*8 AD3d 402 [2004]), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered May 20, 2002.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Prudenti, P.J., Florio, Krausman and Spolzino, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 35.5



|     |  |                                                                                                          
|---- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|LOGO |  | Commercial Mortgage Servicing D1050-084, 8th Fl 401 South Tryon Street
Charlotte, NC 28202 1-800-326-1334

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of September 1, 2016, by and among Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc., as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, LNR Partners, LLC as Special Servicer,    Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Wilmington Trust, National
Association, as Trustee and Park Bridge Lender Services LLC, as Operating Advisor and Asset Representations Reviewer with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2016-C30 (the
Agreement). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

Pursuant
to Section 11.09 of the Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:



| | 1. | A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from September 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016 (the Reporting Period), and of its performance per the Agreement during such
period has been made under my supervision, and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer, has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of
February 2017.



LOGO

|                        
|------------------------
|Daniel Bober            
|Executive Vice President
|Wells Fargo Bank        



|                       |  |     
|---------------------- |  | ----
|Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. |  | LOGO
Exhibit 32.1

# CERTIFICATION OF
PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORTS

Solely for the purposes of complying
with Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, William D. Gehl, Chairman of the
Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer, and Thomas M. Rettler, Vice President of
Finance and Chief Financial Officer, of Gehl Company, certify, based on our knowledge,
that:

| | (1) | the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three-month period ended September 25,
               2004 (the Quarterly Report) to which this statement is an
exhibit                fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities                Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (2) | information
contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material
               respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Gehl
Company.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated:  November 8, 2004

| |    
| | ---
| | By:
| |    
| | By:
| |
Exhibit 32.1

Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of HQ Sustainable Maritime Industries, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Norbert Sporns, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated: November 3, 2006/s/ Norbert SpornsNorbert SpornsChief Executive Officer
Exhibit 21.1

 

SUBSIDIARIES OF OWL ROCK CAPITAL CORPORATION II

 

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| Name                      | Jurisdiction |
|                      |         |
| OR LENDING II LLC         | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| ORCC II FINANCING LLC     | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| ORCC II FINANCING II LLC  | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR DH II LLC              | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR MH II LLC              | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR HH II LLC              | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR HEH II LLC             | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR Long Island MH II LLC  | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR Garden State MH II LLC | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR Toronto MH II LLC      | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR Midwest MH II LLC      | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR Jemico MH II LLC       | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
| OR Atlanta MH II LLC      | DELAWARE     |
|                      |         |
§ 31.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct. ( a ) *In general.* A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in § 1.6694-3 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78454, Dec. 22, 2008, as amended by T.D. 9436, 74 FR 5105, Jan. 29, 2009]
#### Henry Young *v.*Polish Loan and Industrial Corporation et al.

Maltbie, C. J., Hinman, Avert, Brown and Jennings, Js.

Argued February 6

decided February 23, 1940.

*Samuel Rosenthal,*with whom was *Monroe S. Gordon,*for the appellants (defendants).

*Thomas F. McDonough,*for the appellee (plaintiff).

Per Curiam.

The plaintiff secured a judgment for damages for personal injuries due to the negligence of the defendants and a decree setting aside a conveyance of real estate by the named defendant on the ground that it was fraudulent. The defendants *715filed an appeal to this court. Subsequently the plaintiff made a motion in the action that a receiver be appointed to manage the real estate and collect the rents and profits therefrom. The trial court granted the motion and appointed a receiver. At that time the defendants had filed a request for a finding but none had been made. The defendants filed this appeal from the granting of the motion appointing the receiver as from a separate judgment. The appointment of a receiver of rents in a pending action is not ordinarily a final judgment which can be made the basis of an appeal. *Silver*v. *Kingston Realty Corp.,*114 Conn. 349, 351, note, 158 Atl. 889. When such an order is made after judgment in the action has been rendered but while an appeal is pending from that judgment, a claim that the order was erroneous may be included in that appeal. *Valluzzo*v. *Valluzzo,*103 Conn. 265, 266, 130 Atl. 126. This can be done by securing an additional finding, if necessary, and amending the assignments of error. Practice Book, § 395. The order appointing a receiver was not a final judgment and we must, therefore, even in the absence of a motion, dismiss the appeal. *In re Application of Title & Guaranty Co.,*109 Conn. 45, 51, 145 Atl. 151; *Curry*v. *Civil Service Commission of Bridgeport,*125 Conn. 344, 347, note, 5 Atl. (2d) 846.

The appeal is dismissed.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: G. H. v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 13

- 00422

- CV and 01

- 13

- 00423

- CV

Trial court case number: MH4237 and MH4237A

Trial court: Probate Court of Galveston County

Appellant has filed an unopposed motion to consolidate the appeals. The motion is

denied . Appellant may, however, file one brief for both cause numbers, if appellant so

chooses, and the appeals will be submitted to the same panel on the same date. Briefing

deadlines are suspended in each appeal and will be set once the record is complete

.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura C. Higley

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: June 6, 2013
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<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
   PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

           The undersigned Chief Executive Officer of First Keystone Financial,
Inc. (the "Registrant") hereby certifies that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended March 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Registrant.

                                   /s/ Thomas M. Kelly
                                   --------------------------------------------
                                   Name: Thomas M. Kelly
                                   Title: President and Chief Executive Officer

Date: May 16, 2005

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been provided to First Keystone Financial, Inc. and will
be retained by First Keystone Financial, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 54.6011-4 Requirement of statement disclosing participation in certain transactions by taxpayers. ( a ) *In general.* If a transaction is identified as a *listed transaction* or a *transaction of interest* as defined in § 1.6011-4 of this chapter by the Commissioner in published guidance (see § 601.601(d)(2)(ii)( b ) of this chapter), and the listed transaction or transaction of interest involves an excise tax under chapter 43 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to qualified pension, etc., plans) the transaction must be disclosed in the manner stated in such published guidance.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section applies to listed transactions entered into on or after January 1, 2003. This section applies to transactions of interest entered into on or after November 2, 2006.
[T.D. 9350, 72 FR 43154, Aug. 3, 2007]
#### In the Matter of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellant, v Robert Fernandez, et al., Respondents. Sharlisha D. Jackson et al., Proposed Additional Respondents.

[805 NYS2d 599]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to stay arbitra*481tion of an uninsured motorist claim, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Dunne, J.), dated August 16, 2004, which, without a hearing, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for joinder of the proposed additional respondents Hanover Insurance Company and Sharlisha D. Jackson, and the arbitration is temporarily stayed pending an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the offending vehicle was insured at the time of the accident, and a new determination on the petition.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1) creates a presumption that a driver uses a vehicle with the owner’s express or implied permission *(see Murdza v Zimmerman,*99 NY2d 375 [2003]) which may be rebutted only by substantial evidence sufficient to show that the vehicle was not operated with the owner’s consent *(see Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Dukes,*14 AD3d 704, 705 [2005]; *Murdza v Zimmerman, supra).*Although evidence that a vehicle was stolen at the time of the accident will rebut the presumption of permissive use, here, the affidavit of the vehicle owner Sharlisha D. Jackson was insufficient to rebut the presumption *(see Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Dukes, supra; Minaya v Horner,*279 AD2d 333 [2001]). In her affidavit, Jackson admitted that she left the car keys in the vehicle at the time of the theft, which raised a triable issue of fact whether the purported disclaimer of coverage by Hanover Insurance Company was proper under the circumstances *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1210 [a]; *Matter of Merchants Ins. Group v Haskins,*11 AD3d 694 [2004]). Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ., concur.