Department of Homeland Security
 

Transportation Security Administration’s 


Aviation Channeling Services Provider Project 


OIG-13-42 February 2013
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 Transportation Security Administration 

Anne L. Richards 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

FEB 22 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 John W. Halinski 

 Deputy Administrator 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 	 Transportation Security Administration’s Aviation 

Channeling Services Provider Project 

Attached for your action is our final report, Transportation Security Administration’s 

Aviation Channeling Services Provider Project. We incorporated the formal comments 

from the Transportation Security Administration in the final report. 

The report contains four recommendations aimed at improving the overall effectiveness 

of the Aviation Channeling Services Provider Project. Your office concurred with all four 

recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, 

we consider the recommendations resolved. Once your office has fully implemented 

the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so 

that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by 

evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any 

monetary amounts. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Mark Bell, Deputy Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 1 

Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 

Results of Audit ................................................................................................................... 4 

Aviation Channeling Services Provider Project ....................................................... 4 


Planning and Management ..................................................................................... 5 


Project Implementation .......................................................................................... 7 


Project Challenges .................................................................................................. 9 


Recommendations ............................................................................................... 10 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................... 11 


Appendixes 

 


Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ........................................... 14 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .............................. 16 


Appendix C: Aviation Channeling Services Provider Process ............................ 23 


Appendix D: History of Aviation Channeling Services ....................................... 24 


Appendix E: Major Contributors to This Report ............................................... 25 


Appendix F: Report Distribution ....................................................................... 26 


Abbreviations 

AAAE American Association of Airport Executives 

ACSP Aviation Channeling Services Provider 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CHRC Criminal History Records Check 

DAC Designated Aviation Channeler 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OTA Other Transaction Agreement 

STA Security Threat Assessment 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary 

The Honorable Bennie Thompson requested that the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct an audit to determine whether the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Aviation Channeling Services Provider 

project selected vendors according to Federal policies and procedures, and effectively 

planned for the implementation of the new services. 

TSA’s Aviation Channeling Services Provider project was initiated in response to concern 

that airports and airlines should be able to choose vendors for relaying information used 

to issue airport security badges. Although TSA selected three vendors using Other 

Transaction Agreements under the authority of the Aviation Transportation Security Act, 

it did not properly plan, manage and implement the project. Specifically, TSA did not— 

•	 Document the project’s plan, roles and responsibilities, budget and spending, and 

major decisions made while implementing the project; 

•	 Establish and enforce standard testing requirements and ensure that all vendors 

test system functionality with at least one airport to identify problems prior to 

deploying the new Aviation Channeling Services Provider system; and 

•	 Ensure that project challenges were adequately addressed. 

As a result, airports nationwide experienced difficulties causing a backlog of background 

checks. To address the backlog, TSA temporarily allowed airports to issue badges 

without the required background checks. Consequently, according to records available 

for our review, at least five airports granted badges to individuals with criminal records, 

giving them access to secured airport areas. TSA did not track which airports 

temporarily issued badges to individuals without the required background checks. 

Therefore, some individuals with criminal records may still have access to secured areas 

in our Nation’s airports. 

TSA concurred with our four recommendations. TSA agreed to develop a lessons 

learned report to use for future projects showing challenges that occurred throughout 

the Aviation Channeling Services Provider project; establish a policy that requires all 

projects include a comprehensive plan; communicate customer service expectations to 

vendors and monitor their performance for accountability; and require inspectors 

during fiscal year 2013 to conduct a review of badges issued without the required 

background checks. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 	 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

TSA is responsible for protecting the Nation’s transportation systems. The agency has 

the statutory responsibility for requiring individuals who have unescorted access to 

secured areas of the airport to be properly vetted.1 This is accomplished by comparing 

the applicant’s information against Federal criminal and immigration databases to 

discern whether the applicant is a threat to transportation or national security. In 

accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 49 Part 1542, and TSA 

Aviation Security Directive 1542-04-08G, applicants are required to undergo a 

fingerprint-based Criminal History Records Check (CHRC) and have an approved Security 

Threat Assessment (STA) from TSA before receiving a badge and obtaining unescorted 

access to secured airport areas. 

TSA reported that 446 airports currently are responsible for issuing badges to employees 

for access to secured areas of the airports. As of August 27, 2012, TSA reported that 

approximately 3.7 million badged employees had access to secured areas within the 

Nation’s airports. 

The badge vetting process is initiated when the airport transfers an applicant’s 

biographical and fingerprint information to a Designated Aviation Channeler (DAC), 

referred to in our report as a vendor. The vendor ensures that the information is 

properly formatted and complete before relaying the information to TSA for vetting 

against Federal criminal and immigration databases. Appendix C provides more details 

about the Aviation Channeling Services Provider (ACSP) process. 

In 2004, TSA entered into a noncompetitive agreement with the American Association 

of Airport Executives’ (AAAE) Transportation Security Clearinghouse for relaying 

background check information for airports, air carriers, and general aviation to TSA. We 

reviewed documentation dated in 2008 that showed that constituents requested that 

TSA provide competition for these services. In 2010, TSA created the ACSP project to 

address these concerns. The goal of the ACSP project was to introduce choice and 

competition for aviation channeling services to airports and aircraft operators. We 

reviewed all other contractual agreements that TSA had with AAAE between 2004 and 

present. Although these contracts were all sole source agreements, based on the 

information provided, we found no evidence that TSA improperly favored AAAE. 

1

 A secured area is a portion of an airport, specified in the airport security program, in which certain 

security measures specified in part 1542 are carried out. Additionally, secured areas are Security 

Identification Display Areas, or a portion of an airport (specified in the airport security program) in which 

the security measures specified in part 1542 are carried out. This area includes the secured area and may 

include other areas of the airport, such as the Air Operations Area. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

At the time of our review, the TSA offices responsible for managing the design, 

implementation, and deployment of the ACSP project were— 

• The Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement – programmatic, and 

• The Office of Intelligence and Analysis - technological. 

In 2011, TSA selected three vendors to provide aviation channeling services. This was 

done using Other Transaction Agreements (OTA) under the authority of the Aviation 

Transportation Security Act.

2

 The vendors TSA selected were AAAE, Telos ID, and L1 

Identity Solutions (now MorphoTrust Enrollment Solutions). The Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) does not apply to OTA agreements; therefore, TSA was not required to 

follow the FAR’s policies and regulations for full and open competition for the ACSP 

project. Yet TSA did advertise the solicitation on FedBizOpps, a public website that lists 

government contracting opportunities. TSA also performed market research and a 

review of proposals to select the three vendors for the ACSP project. All businesses had 

the opportunity to bid on the ACSP. Only five vendors applied; however, no small or 

disadvantaged businesses submitted proposals to TSA. 

As of July 1, 2012, one of the 446 airports had switched from AAAE to Telos ID for 

channeling services. The third vendor, MorphoTrust Enrollment Solutions, began the 

onboard systems functionality testing in July 2012. A timeline of the history of 

channeling services is provided in appendix D. 

The Honorable Bennie Thompson requested that DHS OIG review the solicitation and 

selection of the vendors, as well as project implementation, costs passed on to users, 

and vendor performance. This report responds to his request. Our objective, scope, 

and methodology are provided in appendix A. 

2 Policy for the Use of Other Transaction Agreements (TSA ACQ Letter No. 2011-002). An Other Transaction 

Agreement is a set of legally enforceable promises between TSA and the other party in the agreement. It is not a 

procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement, and is thus not subject to many of the Federal requirements 

that apply to those financial instruments. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Results of Audit 

Although TSA selected three vendors using OTAs under the authority of the Aviation 

Transportation Security Act, it did not properly plan, manage, and implement the 

project. Specifically, TSA did not— 

•	 Document the project’s plan, roles and responsibilities, budget and spending, and 

major decisions made while implementing the project; 

•	 Establish and enforce standard testing requirements and ensure all vendors test 

system functionality with at least one airport to identify problems prior to 

deploying the new Aviation Channeling Services Provider system; and 

•	 Ensure project challenges were adequately addressed. 

As a result, airports nationwide experienced difficulties, which caused a backlog of 

background checks. To address the backlog, TSA temporarily allowed airports to issue 

badges without the required background checks. Consequently, according to records 

we reviewed, at least five airports granted badges to individuals with criminal records, 

which gave them access to secured airport areas. TSA did not track which airports 

temporarily issued badges to individuals without the required background checks. 

Therefore, individuals with criminal records may still have access to secured areas in our 

Nation’s airports. 

Aviation Channeling Services Provider Project 

TSA’s ACSP project is still not completely implemented and continues to face 

challenges to accomplish its mission and provide airports with a choice of 

vendors to channel STA and CHRC data for airport badging. As of July 1, 2012, 

only one of the 446 airports had switched from AAAE to Telos ID for channeling 

services. The third vendor, MorphoTrust Enrollment Solutions, was still not 

active and began the onboard systems functionality testing in July 2012. 

TSA is not tracking vendor service performance. TSA established metrics to track 

the vendor system performance in the technical specifications for the project. 

However, these performance metrics are not related to how vendors provide 

customer service for the ACSP project. 

According to the Federal Register, the Federal Bureau of Investigations charges 

$14.50 for processing a fingerprint-based criminal history record check. In the 

OTAs, TSA required the vendors to collect this fee from the airports. This is the 

only cost that TSA passes on to the airports for ACSP services. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 	 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Planning and Management 

Document Project Planning and Decisions 

TSA did not have a written comprehensive plan for the ACSP project design and 

implementation. TSA maintained documentation for the solicitation and 

selection of the vendors for the ACSP project; however, it did not always 

maintain documentation to support project planning and management 

decisions. Management is responsible for establishing and maintaining internal 

control to achieve the objectives of effective and efficient operations, reliable 

financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.3 

Specifically, TSA did not maintain agency documentation when developing the 

ACSP concept. The only document that TSA provided as official evidence of the 

ACSP concept was a letter dated May 2008 from the Airports Council 

International-North America. The letter thanked TSA for providing the project’s 

technical specifications. 

To further examine project decisions made by TSA for the ACSP project, we 

inquired about TSA’s rationale for determining that three vendors would be 

sufficient for the services. According to the ACSP project manager, three 

vendors were selected to maintain a balance for— 

• Providing choice and competition; 

• The government's cost to manage, oversee, and accredit these vendors; 

• Vendors under their no-cost OTA; and 

• Security. 

TSA did not document management decisions or approvals throughout the 

evolution of the ACSP project. Although the ACSP project manager briefed 

senior leadership regarding the project status, there was no requirement to 

receive formal approvals from senior managers on project decisions. TSA project 

officials maintained that they did not require approvals because the ACSP project 

was not a formal acquisition program and there were no costs obligated under 

the OTA. The TSA officials asserted that the project existed as a temporary 

project under an existing program, yet could not provide evidence to support 

this claim. 

According to TSA officials, TSA developed a collaborative Integrated Project 

Team of technical and programmatic representatives throughout the agency. 

3

 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

This project team, with the ACSP project manager as the chair, made project 

decisions. TSA did not maintain team meeting minutes but relied on agendas as 

evidence of actions assigned to each responsible member of the team. 

Formally Document Roles and Responsibilities 

TSA designated program managers responsible for the Office of Security Policy 

and Industry Engagement and Office of Intelligence and Analysis portions of the 

project. However, TSA did not identify a senior official responsible for oversight 

of these two offices and the project overall, leading to implementation problems 

and limited accountability. 

The ACSP concept was developed under the legacy Transportation Threat 

Assessment and Credentialing office, which no longer exists within TSA. At the 

time of our review, the technical services and support for the ACSP project were 

performed by TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Program management of 

the ACSP project was performed by the Office of Security Policy and Industry 

Engagement. 

TSA did not have documentation that provided the ACSP project manager with 

the authority to make project decisions. We reviewed the position descriptions 

for key officials involved with implementing the ACSP project. The roles and 

responsibilities were not clearly defined, which presented a problem regarding 

project oversight. TSA assigned roles and responsibilities on an ad hoc basis 

through the Integrated Project Team. The team’s meeting agendas included 

action items, which were assigned to an office and specific individuals involved in 

the ACSP project. 

As we attempted repeatedly to identify information sources and decision 

makers, TSA identified three different officials responsible for leading the ACSP 

project. Originally, TSA identified the ACSP project manager as the responsible 

official. The agency later identified the Office of Security Policy and Industry 

Engagement Assistant Administrator as the responsible official and finally 

directed us to the new Acting Branch Manager for the Office of Security Policy 

and Industry Engagement Program Management, Transportation Workers 

Vetting Division. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Document Project Costs 

TSA did not track and report all project costs related to implementing the ACSP 

project. TSA was only able to provide supporting documentation for project 

costs expended for the IBM Organizational Application Support and Information 

Services contract. This contract was issued to provide maintenance and 

production support to several screening services application programs. The 

screening services application programs included the Consolidated Screening 

Gateway, the system in which the selected vendors are required to provide the 

CHRC and STA data for processing by TSA. 

TSA could not provide documentation to support the costs incurred to perform 

certification and accreditation testing of the selected vendors’ systems. 

Although TSA maintained that costs to conduct certification and accreditation 

were a factor in selecting only three vendors, it did not develop an analysis of 

certification and accreditation costs or document costs incurred for the ACSP 

project. According to TSA officials, it was impossible to provide exact costs 

because the expenditures were not tracked in detail. However, those costs were 

incurred by TSA and should have been documented as allocated costs to the 

ACSP project. 

Since TSA did not maintain documented project decisions for selecting only three 

vendors or for other project costs, it is unable to establish whether more 

vendors could have been acquired for the ACSP project. Furthermore, TSA 

cannot be sure that it has not incurred unplanned additional costs. 

Project Implementation

Standard Testing Requirements 

TSA did not establish standard testing requirements, nor did the agency require 

that all vendors test system functionality with at least one airport. Although TSA 

required all vendors to complete system security testing and functionality 

readiness testing prior to providing channeling services to airports, the agency 

did not provide clear guidelines on the testing completion requirements. 

TSA required the vendors to have the following types of testing to receive an 

authority to operate from TSA and deploy their system for aviation channeling 

services: 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 Federal Information Security Management Act’s Certification and 


Accreditation system security testing managed by TSA’s Office of 


Information Technology, and 


•	 On-board system functionality readiness testing managed by TSA’s Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis. 

In August 2011, TSA was ready to begin the onboard testing phase for the 

selected vendors; however, according to TSA ACSP project officials, Telos ID and 

AAAE were not ready until several months later. The third vendor, MorphoTrust 

Enrollment Solutions, had not completed testing at the time we completed 

fieldwork. Since TSA did not establish testing timeframe requirements, the 

agency could not hold the vendors accountable for delaying the ACSP project 

schedule. According to TSA ACSP project officials, TSA did not provide specified 

requirements for vendors to complete testing because a Federal contract was 

not used and TSA did not pay the vendor for the ACSP services. 

Both AAAE and Telos ID successfully passed the testing portion and received the 

authority to operate by TSA’s Office of Information Technology. On March 9, 

2012, Telos ID completed 100 percent of the on-board testing and received the 

authority to operate. The vendor submitted test plans, which included a Test 

Readiness Review Checklist to document the success or failure of testing 72 

different test case scenarios. In addition, Telos ID completed all 72 test case 

scenarios and an airport volunteered to conduct pilot testing with them, which 

assessed their system’s transmittal of data to and from the airport. 

At the time TSA activated the AAAE DAC system, the vendor completed 

25 percent of the on-board system functionality testing and currently is providing 

services under the ACSP project. AAAE did not submit a Test Readiness Review 

Checklist and only completed 18 of the 72 test case scenarios. TSA officials 

explained that AAAE was not subject to the same system functionality testing as 

the new vendors because AAAE was the sole provider for aviation channeling 

services prior to the new DAC system. TSA officials further indicated that fully 

testing AAAE would have disrupted channeling service operations and prevented 

other vendors from offering these services. 

Without establishing or enforcing standard testing requirements, TSA cannot 

ensure that all systems were functioning properly before the project was 

deployed.

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 	 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Project Challenges
 

Alternate Measures 

On April 2, 2012, TSA deployed the new DAC system, which offered two vendors 

for aviation channeling services—AAAE and Telos ID—under the ACSP project. 

As a result of the inadequate testing, airports began to experience significant 

problems with the new DAC system. For instance, TSA was not receiving 

enrollment data and badging offices could not see results in AAAE’s DAC system. 

Airport operations were hindered because of aviation workers’ inability to access 

secured areas without proper badge authority. To resolve the backlog of badges, 

TSA issued an “Exemption from TSA Regulations and Alternate Measures to 

Security Directive 1542-04-08 series.” 

The alternate measures gave airports the option to issue badges without the 

federally required CHRC and STA background checks. The alternate measures 

covered the period from April 20 to June 1, 2012 and applied to security badge 

applications submitted by the airports and waiting on results of CHRCs and STAs.

However, aviation workers who were issued badges were required to have their 

badges revoked if after 14 days TSA had not received their CHRC or STA results. 

TSA did not track which airports used the alternate measures and the number of 

badges that were issued under those measures. After an inquiry by our office, 

the Office of Security Operations initiated a survey in which TSA relied on the 

airports to self-report whether they decided to operate under the alternate 

measures and to track employees who were not fully vetted. The Office of 

Security Operations reported that of the 446 airports nationwide, 290 responded 

to Office of Security Operation’s request and 168 airports self-reported that they 

adopted the alternate measures. Five of the airports identified a total of 11 

individuals with criminal backgrounds, who received badges during the alternate 

measures period and would not have received badges if they had been properly 

vetted. Five of those individuals held their badge for more than 14 days, and 

therefore those airports were not in compliance with the alternate measure. 

TSA could have better informed airports on the program challenges. TSA did not 

inform the airports of the difficulties that were limiting the airport’s choice of 

vendors. Instead, TSA simply posted information on its WebBoard regarding 

available vendors without providing current project status and vendor availability. 

TSA could have improved communication with the vendors involved. For 

example, TSA did not promptly address AAAE regarding its deployment issues 

and the subsequent backlog of badges at airports nationwide. TSA’s Office of 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Security Policy and Industry Engagement met with AAAE to discuss performance 

issues. TSA considered sending AAAE a deficiency letter in May 2012. However, 

TSA officials informed us that they chose not to send the letter and would manage 

the performance of AAAE under their OTA in a “partnered-centered approach vs. 

issuing a derogatory letter (e.g., cure notice or letter of remediation) given TSA’s 

long-term and strategic partnership with AAAE in the area of aviation security.” 

Without explanation, TSA issued a modified version of the deficiency letter and 

considered it a performance letter dated September 6, 2012, which identified 

seven customer service and technology performance issues associated with 

AAAE. Although both parties discussed performance issues previously, according 

to AAAE officials, they were not informed of these seven particular matters until 

they received this formal letter. They further stated that these ACSP project 

issues were not discussed even though TSA and AAAE had a working group in 

which ACSP project issues were discussed weekly. 

Conclusion

Without appointing a designated responsible official for the ACSP project, TSA’s 

limited planning, management, and implementation led to deploying a system 

that did not provide the choice in vendors that TSA had intended. Without TSA's 

ability to maintain documented project decisions for selecting only three 

vendors or for other project costs, it is unable to establish whether more 

vendors could have been acquired for the ACSP project. Furthermore, TSA 

cannot be sure that it has not incurred unplanned additional costs. 

The need for better managed implementation of the ACSP project led to a 

backlog of vetting for individuals applying for badges that still existed at the time 

of our review. TSA did not track which airports temporarily issued badges 

without the required background checks. Therefore, individuals with criminal 

records may currently have access to secured areas in our Nation’s airports. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration’s Deputy 

Administrator: 

Recommendation #1: 

Develop a lessons learned report for future projects to show challenges that 

occurred throughout the Aviation Channeling Services Provider project. This 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

should include improving comprehensive system functionality testing of the 

channeling process and developing a resolution plan to address unresolved issues. 

Recommendation #2: 

Establish a policy that requires all projects include a comprehensive plan that— 

•	 Designates an official(s) responsible for overall project status and 


completion; 


•	 Documents decisions made throughout all phases of the project’s design, 

selection, testing, implementation, communication, and oversight; and 

•	 Tracks and reports all project costs. 

Recommendation #3: 

Immediately communicate customer service expectations to vendors and 

monitor their performance for accountability. This would include establishing a 

formal process or survey schedule to obtain feedback from vetting project 

stakeholders on vendor performance, services, and other related concerns. 

Recommendation #4: 

Conduct a comprehensive review of badges issued under the “Exemption from 

TSA Regulations and Alternate Measures to Security Directive 1542-04-08 

series.” Create a detailed report identifying the locations and badges involved in 

the use of alternate measures and the actions taken to ensure all badges issued 

during the backlog have been issued in accordance with Federal requirements 

and the proper security checks. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA provided formal comments to our report. A copy of TSA’s response in its 

entirety is included as appendix B. TSA also provided technical comments and 

suggested revisions to our report in a separate document. We reviewed the 

technical comments and made changes in the report when appropriate. 

TSA indicated that it has delivered on its promise to provide airports and aircraft 

operators with a choice of service providers and to provide selected businesses 

the opportunity to offer their services for work that had been sole-sourced to a 

single provider. TSA also noted that it properly selected three vendors as part of 

the ACSP Project, and the TSA process allowed market forces to drive the 

provision of choice for airports and air carriers and support competition among 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 	 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

qualified business entities. The agency provided additional information to 

explain how it addressed the ACSP challenges and required testing. TSA 

concurred with all four recommendations, and has begun to formulate plans to 

implement the recommendations contained in the report. A summary of the 

responses and our analysis follows. 

Response to Recommendation #1: TSA concurs. TSA will create a lessons 

learned report that is based on the specific experience and challenges faced 

throughout the ACSP Project. The report will address comprehensive testing 

requirements and develop a plan to address unresolved issues within TSA’s 

scope of authority and responsibility. TSA expects to complete this lessons 

learned report by May 2013. 

OIG Analysis: The recommendation will remain open and resolved until we have 

reviewed a copy of TSA’s lessons learned report. 

Response to Recommendation #2: TSA concurs. TSA will use the existing 

management control system or establish a policy that requires all projects to 

include a plan that designates the office or person responsible for the project’s 

overall status and completion, documents key decisions, and which identifies 

and tracks all estimated project costs. TSA expects this recommendation to be 

implemented by August 2013. 

OIG Analysis: The recommendation will remain open and resolved until we 

review the planned policy and ensure that it comprehensively addresses the 

identified concerns. 

Response to Recommendation #3: TSA concurs. TSA will reiterate its customer 

service expectations to the DACs and establish a process to periodically solicit 

feedback from stakeholders on vendor performance. The TSA Office of 

Acquisition will communicate by letter to all three DACs to re-emphasize the 

customer service expectations as an element of their responsibilities as a DAC 

provider. TSA will evaluate options on the best method to conduct a practical 

and viable survey, giving particular consideration to the most effective means of 

survey distribution. TSA is considering disseminating the survey through one or 

more airport associations or the airport Federal Security Directors. The 

associations will be engaged well in advance of the launch of the survey, to 

collaboratively establish a pathway to achieve a significant percentage of airport 

participation, as completion of the survey will be voluntary for the airports and 

aircraft operators. The first survey would be distributed in approximately 

6 months, allowing airports adequate time to evaluate vendor performance. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Once survey feedback is obtained, if the input indicates a failure of a specific DAC 

to meet OTA service expectations, TSA will address the issue with that DAC to 

establish accountability and result in improved performance. Target dates for 

implementation are in development. 

OIG Analysis: The recommendation will remain open and resolved until we 

examine evidence of communication and survey activity within 6 months. We 

need to verify that TSA is communicating customer service expectations to 

vendors and monitoring their performance for accountability. This would include 

establishing a formal process or survey schedule to obtain comments from 

vetting project stakeholders on vendor performance, services, and related 

concerns. 

Response to Recommendation #4: TSA concurs. At the time the exemption and 

alternative measure was implemented on April 20, 2012, TSA’s Office of Security 

Operations planned to determine and eliminate any security vulnerabilities 

potentially created by the waiver period. Per the exemption and alternative 

measure, airport operators were required to deactivate any badge issued during 

the waiver period if no results were returned at the end of 14 days or if results 

returned showing the individual ineligible for a Security Identification Display 

Area badge. 

Additionally, airport operators were required to manually check the names of all 

individuals against the TSA “No-Fly” and “Selectee” lists prior to issuing the 

badges. After the waiver period ended on June 1, 2012, TSA required airport 

operators to confirm whether the airport issued a badge to an individual who 

was later found to have a disqualifying offense. Transportation Security 

Inspectors then verified that all badges issued to individuals with a disqualifying 

offense were deactivated. TSA will direct that during fiscal year 2013, as part of 

their annual inspection plans, inspectors nationwide must focus on the waiver 

period when inspecting secured and sterile area badge issuance and compliance. 

OIG Analysis: The recommendation will remain open and resolved until we 

review evidence and details of the Inspections. We need to verify that TSA 

identified all individuals who obtained badges during the period of time when 

the use of alternate measures was permitted. We will review the actions taken 

to ensure that TSA issued all badges during the backlog in accordance with 

Federal requirements and with the proper security checks. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

In response to a congressional request, we conducted an audit of the recent contractual 

arrangements for vetting services under the TSA ACSP project and the new design of the 

project. Our objective was to determine whether TSA’s ACSP project selected vendors 

according to Federal policies and procedures, and effectively planned for the 

implementation of the new services. 

We performed work at TSA headquarters in Arlington, VA, and at TSA’s Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis in Annapolis Junction, MD, to meet the audit objective. We 

reviewed the contractual relationship established in April 2011 with AAAE, and in March 

2011 with L-1 Identity Solutions (now MorphoTrust Enrollment Solutions) and Telos ID, 

to determine whether TSA followed Federal policies and procedures, as well as DHSand component-specific guidance related to acquisition and implementation. We also 

examined prior audit reports to identify deficiencies related to AAAE’s performance as 

sole source channeling vendor prior to the ACSP project. 

We interviewed TSA staff responsible for the management, oversight, and execution of 

the ACSP project in the following offices: the Office of Security Policy and Industry 

Engagement, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of Information Technology, 

and the Office of Acquisition. We requested all documentation pertaining to the project 

and its implementation. 

We interviewed officials from the three aviation badge-vetting vendors awarded 

agreements with TSA to identify the services offered and the costs passed on to the 

airports. We met with Airports Council International-North America to identify the level 

of communication and outreach TSA applied to the project. We judgmentally selected 

and interviewed aviation officials at the following eight airports, which either had 

changed vendors or were possibly considering changing vendors: Austin Bergstrom 

International Airport, Honolulu International Airport, Oakland International Airport, 

Indianapolis International Airport, Sacramento International Airport, Mineta San Jose 

International Airport, San Francisco International Airport, and St. George Municipal 

Airport. We also judgmentally selected three airports to visit located close to our duty 

stations: Ronald Reagan Washington National, Philadelphia International Airport, and 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Miami International Airport, and interviewed aviation badge-vetting officials to 

determine whether the airports were interested in changing vendors and to discuss 

their experience with AAAE, the previous sole source provider. 

We conducted this performance audit between April and September 2012 pursuant to 

the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-13-42 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

';8 ' 

u.s. lkp.,,'u .... t "rU,,",p.fqall Sn~ri:ly 

50! Smlfh 12lhlill<: "\ 

Arion"""". VA :::!QS9S 

TriUlSportation '" __ "J' ' Security ~ Administration 

JAN '5 2013 

INFORMATION 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Anne 1.. Ri~hards 

Assistant Inspector Gene-raj for A,udits 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (D'HS) 

FROM: J.W. Halinsk..icl..-

Deputy Admi~mtor 

SUBJECT: Response 10 Drafi Report. TrampOrllttion Sf:c.:uriIY 

Adminj,m'ation 's ,4\'iotion Channeling Services Provider 

Project, November 20 I 2 

Thi.s memot'"dIldum l:ons:lihlieS the T .... dn!!-ll~lr ali(m Secllrily Adllljnj~tration's erg,.\ } Te!""ponse 10 

t11e DHS Ofli~ ofthe lnspeetor General (DIG) drnft report. Transportation Security 

Admini. .. lrariotl .~ Aviation Channeling Services Provider Pn4ect, dated November 2012. 

Had(gmund 

In Apri120!2, in response to a Congressionnl requesl, OIGcondueted an audit of recent 

COlllractual arrangements for vetti.ng services under TSA's Aviation Chamlcliflg Services 

Provider (AL'SP) Project and il~ new design. OIU' :-! objective was to determinc whelilt!f TSA's 

ACS P Pn~iecl ~lecl.cJ 'Veodors accmding lJ., Federul policies ~md pruct!dures aDd ellb.:tively 

plonned tOr Ihe impJementation of new ser..:ices. 

Disc\lssion 

The ACSP Project supports most ofthe Nation's 450 airports. 6S U.S, t1.eggc.d air ('.arricrs, and 

19,000 g\:ncral aviation airpolis. TSA greatly apprccialcs the work done by 010 dUIing the 

course of this review and inhmds to usc this valuable informarioJl 10 Assist our efforts 10 continue 

to improve 'TSA and aviatiol) worker vetting. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

2 

TSA's ACSP Project Has Delivered on its Primanr Purpose 

The ACSP Project's primary purpose was to provide airports and aircraft operators a choice of 

service providers and to provide selected businesses the opportunity to offer their services for 

work that had been sole-sourced to a single provider. The ACSP Project also made important 

technical enhancements to TSA 1 S technical infrastructure that added to the overall efficiency and 

effectiveness of the security threat assessment process. For example. ACSP enabled data 

transfer ,,'lith multiple service pwviders; transitioned from outdated file transfer processes to a 

morc effident web services interface; and replaced the existing disparate and bifurcated vetting 

application processes with a new process based on one complete package. providing enhanced 

identity management capabilities. 

As a result of the ACSP Project allowing more choice in service providers. seven of the Nation's 

airports and the entire General A viatiun popuiation are using a new service provider or 

Designated Aviation Channeler (DAC), with (WO additional airports scbeduled to change service 

providers in January 2013. Each of the seven airports experienced a smoodl and seamless 

transition to a new DAC with no customer sen ice issues, no delays or backlogs in applicanL 

vetting (vetting results returned within 24 hours), and a reduction in fingerprint capture issues. 

TSA. Pronerly Selected Vendor!> 10rthe ACSP Project 

As confirmed by the DJ-IS 01G, TSA properly selected vendors for the ACSP Project according 

t(1 1'SA and Federal policies and procedures, and used an effective source selection process to 

implement the ACSP Project In addition, the DH$ OIO determined that 1'$A did not unfairly 

favor the American Association of Airpon Executives (AAAE), the incumbent provider, TSA's 

use of a no~cosl Other Transaction Agreement (OTA) was an innovative and cost~effective 

method to allow aviation users to obtain imponant aviation security services from qualified 

vendors. While not a contract, the DAC OTA established legally enforceable agreement., that 

included a tennination Jor cause provision, The OT A required the vendor to comply with all 

requirements stated within the OTA including the technical specifications, security standards, 

and OTA cited regulations and references. 

TSA tleteITTJined that it would select three DACs as part of the ACSP Project, and the TSA 

process allowed market forces to drive the provisilm of choice for airporLs and air carriers and 

support competition among qualified busine::'!:i entities. EVi:!ll though tb!.': Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) did not apply to the OT A, TSA applied F AR~based procedures to complete 

market research and advertised in FcdBizOpp to solicit proposals in an open a.'1d impartial 

manner. TSA also applied FAR-bused principles and source selection best practices to evaluate 

all the proposals against the stated technical and management evaluation criteria. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-13-42 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

3 

TSA selected the three most qualified offerors that demonstrated their ability and technical 

readiness to satisfy the requirements ofthe ACSP DAC. 

TSA Ensured Project Challenges Were Addressed 

The goal of ACSP was to replace a sole-source environment with one that gave the av-iation 

stakeholders a choice of service providers, This goal drove TSA's dec,isions and approaches in 

addressing challenges. 

Any testing delays only impacted the projected schedule as to when TSA could provide a choice 

of service providers to aviation stakeholders. TSA kept its focus on establishing multiple 

operational DACs to end the sole~source arrangement. TSA could have heJd the vendors 

accountable tor delaying the ACSP Project schedule by tenninating the OTA with the DAC, mit 

it would not have allowed TSA to achieve its objective of providing choice to the aviation 

community. 

From the project's inl:eption, TSA used a cms.. .... runctional Integrated Project Team OPT) 

composed of representatives from across TSA to help effectively manage the scope and scale of 

the project. The IPT worked together to create the technical and business requirements that 

fanned the basis for ACSP. The IPT worked expeditiously through issues with subject matter 

experts from affected TSA organizations. This helped ensure issues were tracked and referred to 

the proper TRA nrgani:t:atinn in a timely maImer. 

Throughout the project, the ACSP IPT worked through issues in an effective and collaborative 

fashion. The ACSP 1PT was empowered by senior leadership to make infonned, resfX}flsible 

recommendations and decisions, and the IPT ensured TSA Senior Lenders were kept infonned 

via regular, bi-weekly progress briefings. 

TSAEstablished Onboard Testing Requirements with all Designated Aviation Channelers 

TSA established onboard testing requirements and testing timeframes between TSA and the 

DACs, and did not include testing between DACs and their respective airports as part of the 

ACSP Project. The scope of the testing was specific to the DACs and TSA because each DAC 

must individually negotiate arrangements with aviation stakeholders. Each DAC is responsible 

for ensuring the aviation stakeholder data is transmitted to TSA Olld meets TSA technical 

specifications. The onboard testing requirements and guidelines were clearly documented in a 

variety of project documents. to include: ACSP Test and Evaluation Master Plan, ACSP Test 

Scenarios, DAC Onboard Test ScenaIios, each DAC's Test Plan. ACSP Onboard Test Summary. 

DAC Integration Testing Summary, and each DAC's own lest schedule. 

Consistent with the technical reqtiirements and OTA, TSA required onboard testing of the form 

and manner of data-exchange between the DAC providers and TSA to ensure the establishment 

www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-13-42 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

4 

ofa standard daTa interface. TSA'5 approach and scope for onboard testing did not Include 

interfaces between DACs and their respective airports for the reasons stated above. TSA 

performed onboard Test Readiness Reviews with each DAC to specify what was expected and to 

determine the readiness of the DAC to begin testing. In addition, test scenarios were devetoped 

and communicated to each DAC to guide the testing process. The TSA technicai specifications, 

test scenarios, and test cases were clear and sut1icient for the purpose and scope ofthe ACSP 

Project, muncly to demonstrate a DAC's ability to confonn to TSA technical specifications and 

test requirements for transmitting applicant data to TSA for vetting purposes. 

At the close of the initially established testing timeframe, only one DAC, Telos ID, had 

completed testing with TSA. To not proceed with the system cut-over as·scheduled would have 

increased technical DAC testing support costs, maintained the sole-source arrangement with 

fu\AE, and etJectively prevented T'SA from ot1ering il choice in service providers to aviation 

stakeholders via the first qualified DAC, Telos ID. During testing, AAAE had successfully 

transmitted 'enrollment' transactions. 'update biographic' transactions, and 'cancel enrollment' 

transactions to TSA. These transactions represented the most critical test scenarios and 

25 percent of total lest cases Jor the ACSP Pmject. The decision to proceed with the system cutw 

over on April 2, 2012, considered that AAAE had successfully performed the enrollment 

function for the aviation sector for approximately a decade, had served as the exclusive system of 

record for aviation workers since inception, had successfully completed the rigorous certification 

and accreditation (C&A) process, and successfully demonstrated its ability to submit enrollment 

transactions to TSA during onhoard testing between TSA and AAAE, 

TSA Immectnrs Confirm Control of Badges Issued During Waiver Period 

Finally, teclmical issues between aviation stakeholders and the incumbent DAC, AAAE, resulted 

in a backlog of badges while TSA transitioned to n new DAC system. As a result of this 

backlog, TSA issued an exemption from TSA regulations and provided airports with alternate 

measures to issue badges without the federally required background checks. At the time the 

exemption and alternative mea'iures were implemented, TSA began strategizing how to later 

evaluate the airport operators' compliance. The waiver and altemalivt; measure deliberately 

required the airport operator to conduct a fbllow·up verification on each badge issued during the 

exemption period. The verification was 10 ensure that the individual ultimately received all 

required background cbecks with any verification problems requiring that the issued badge be 

revoked. TSA Inspectors in local field offices contacted each airport's security coordinator, who 

is designated by the airport in accordance witb 49 eFR 1542.3(b) to review and control the 

results of background checks, to verify the airport had in fact ensured all background checks 

were completed. As a re~mlt or the review, TSA wa."> ahle to confirm that airport operators had 

controlled badges as required, 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

5 

Conclusion: 

TSA recognizes the important issues set forth in this report and is committed to working to 

address these issues. TSA has already begun to formulate plans to implement the 

recommendations contained in the report. Our specific response to each recommendation 

follows. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-13-42 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

U.S. Department nfHomeland Securit:y 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

Response to OIG Draft Report, 

Transportation Securi(l-' Administra1irm 's Aviation Channeling Services Pro't'ider ProjectNovember 2012 

Recommendation #1: Dt:vt:lop <l lessons le<lmed report for future projects to show challenges 

that occurred throughout the ACSP Project. This should include improving comprehensive 

system functionality testing of the channeling process and developing a resolution plan to 

address unresolved issues. 

TSA Concurs. TSA will create a lessons learned report that is based on the specific experience 

and challenges faced Ihroughoutthe ACSP Projt:ct. TSA will address comprehensive 

functionality testing opportunities and develop a plan to address unresolved issues within TSA's 

scope of authority and responsibility, TSA expects to complete this lessons learned report by 

May 20l3. 

Recommendation #2: Establish a. policy that requires all projects include a comprehensive plan 

that: 

• Designates an official(s) responsible for ovt!rall projecl status and completion; 

• Documents decisions made throughout all phases of the project's design, selection, 

testing, implementation, communication, and oversight; and 

• Tracks and repm1s all prQject costs. 

TSA Concurs. TSA will harness the existing management control system or establish a policy 

that requires all projects to include a plan that designates the office or person responsible for the 

project's overall status and completion. documents key decisions, and which identifies and tracks 

all estimated project costs. TSA expects this recommendation to be implemented by August 

20lJ. 

Recommendation #3: Immediately communicate customer service expectations to vendors. 

This would include establishing a formal process nr survey schedule 10 ohtain ft':edbi-lck from 

vetting project stakeholders on vendor performance, services, and other related concerns. 

TSA Concurs. TSA win Tt:iterale its cu~i.omer service expectations to the DACs and establish a 

process to periodically solicit feedback from stakeholders on vendor performance. 

The TSA Office of Acquisition will communicate by letter to all three DACs to re-emphasize the 

customer service expectations as an element of their responsibilities as a DAC provider. 

TSA will undertake an evaluation of options on how best to conduct a survey that is practical and 

viable. giving particular consideration to the most effective means of survey distribution. TSA is 

considering disseminating the survey through one or more airport associations or the airport 

Federdl Security Directors. The associations will he engaged well in advance of the launch of 

www.oig.dhs.gov 21 OIG-13-42 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

2 

the !>'ulvey, to collaboratively establish a pathway to achieve a significant percentage of airport 

participation, as compldllln ()f the survey will be voluntary for the airports and aircraft operators. 

The first survey would be distributed in approximately 6 months, allowing airports adequate time 

to evaluate vendor performance. 

Once SUt"\lCy feedback is obtained, if the input indicates a failure of a specific DAC to meet OTA 

service expectations, TSA via OA will address the issue with that DAC to establish 

accountability and result in improved perfonnance. Target dates for implementation are in 

development. 

Recommendation #4: Conduct a comprehensive and thorough review of badges issued under 

the "Exemption from TSA Regulations and Alternate Measures to Security Directive 1542-04-08 

series." Create a detailed report identifying the locations and badges involved in the use of 

alternate measures and the actions taken to ensure all badges issued during the backlog have 

been issued in accordance with Federal requirements and the proper security checks, 

TSA Concurs: At the lime the exemption and alternative measure was implemented on 

April 20, 2012, TSA's Office of Security Operations planned for dctcnnination of and 

elimination of any security vulnerabilities potentially created by the waiver period. Per the 

exemption and alternative measure, airport operators were required to deactivate any badge 

issued during the waiver period if either no results were returned at the end of fourteen (14) days 

or if results returned showing the individual ineligible for a Security Identification Display Area 

(SlDA) badge. Additionally, airport operators were required to manually check the names of all 

individuals against the TSA "No·Fly" and "Selectee" lists prior to issuing the badges. After the 

waiver period ended on June 1,2012, TSA required airport operators to confinn hy July 13. 

2012, whether or not the airport issued a SIDA badge to an individual who was later found to 

have a disqualifying offense. Transportation Security Inspectors (ISIs) then verified that all 

badges issued to individuals with a disqualifying oftense were deactivated. Going fOIv,rard, TSA 

will direct that during Fiscal Year 2013, as patt of their annual inspection plans, TSIs nationwide 

must fOCus on the waiver period when inspecting SIDA and sterile area badge issuance and 

compliance. 

 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Aviation Channeling Services Provider Process 

Source: TSA Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement 


www.oig.dhs.gov 23 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

History of Aviation Channeling Services 

Source: DHS OIG 

Acronyms
 AAAE: American Association of Airport Executives 

ACSP: Aviation Channeling Services Provider 

ATO: Authority to Operate 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration 

FOC: Full and Open Competition 

OIT: Office of Information Technology 

OTA: Other Transaction Agreement 

RFP: Request for Proposal 

SBSS: Security Background Screening Services 

SSA: Sole Source Agreement 

TSC: Transportation Security Clearinghouse 

www.oig.dhs.gov 24 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Patrick O’Malley, Audit Director 

Shelley Howes, Audit Manager 

Shamika Scott, Auditor-in-Charge 

Megan McNulty, Program Analyst 

Marissa Weinshel, Program Analyst 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Kevin Donahue, Referencer 

www.oig.dhs.gov 25 OIG-13-42 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Transportation Security Administration

Administrator 

Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Operations 

Transportation Security Administration Audit Liaison 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 26 OIG-13-42 
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To expedite the reporting of alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any 

other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) programs and operations, please visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov 

and click on the red tab titled "Hotline" to report. You will be directed to complete and 

submit an automated DHS OIG Investigative Referral Submission Form. Submission 

through our website ensures that your complaint will be promptly received and 

reviewed by DHS OIG. 

Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

to: DHS Office of Inspector General, Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline, 245 

Murray Drive, SW, Building 410/Mail Stop 2600, Washington, DC, 20528; or you may 

call 1 (800) 323-8603; or fax it directly to us at (202) 254-4297. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.