SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform

Actions Needed to Resolve Construction Delays at the 

Counter-Narcotics Justice Center 

August 27, 2009
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR 

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

 

SIGAR-09-4 Justice Reform Page i 

August 27, 2009

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

David T. Johnson

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

U.S. Department of State

Colonel Michael McCormick

Commander, Afghanistan Engineering District

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

This report presents the results of our review of delays in the construction of a detention facility at the 

U.S.-funded Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Center is a key component of 

U.S. and Afghan counter-narcotics efforts and addressing delays in the construction of the detention 

facility is critical to the successful operation of the Center. Consequently, the report includes two 

recommendations for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs to expedite the construction of that facility. 

A summary of our report is on page ii. The audit was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) under the authority of Public Law 110-181 and the 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final report, we considered written 

comments from the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - Afghanistan Engineer District on a draft of this report, and 

incorporated as appropriate. Copies of their comments are included in appendices II and III of this 

report. 

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page ii

SIGAR RESULTS

What SIGAR Reviewed

The U.S.-funded $11 million Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, Afghanistan, is a key component 

of U.S. and Afghan counter-narcotics efforts. The Center opened earlier this year, three years behind 

schedule, and has already reached capacity. The construction of additional facilities is critical for the 

successful operation of the Center. This report identifies factors that have contributed to delays in 

expanding the Center’s detention and support facilities under a $2 million interagency support 

agreement between the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - Afghanistan Engineer District. We conducted our review 

in Kabul, Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. in July 2009. Our work was conducted in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. This report is the first in a series of SIGAR audits 

addressing U.S. efforts to deter corruption and strengthen the rule of law. 

What SIGAR Found

Detention facilities at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, which became fully operational in May 

2009, have already reached capacity and narcotics-related offenders are being sent to other locations. 

Plans to construct additional detention and support facilities at the Center have been delayed for almost 

18 months because of insufficient funding and inadequate utilities. New construction has not begun 

because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was not able to secure any construction bids within the 

funding amount provided by the State Department under a $2 million interagency support agreement. 

In addition, according to Army and State Department engineers, new detention facilities would require 

upgrades to water, sewer, and electrical utilities because expansion would overtax the existing capacity 

of those utilities. Although the Corps of Engineers and the State Department agreed that utility 

upgrades should be completed prior to the construction of the new facilities, the Corps has not 

proceeded with those upgrades because they were not included in the original scope of work and 

because of questions regarding the validity of the appropriated funds. Delays in expanding the capacity 

of the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, which has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over significant 

narcotics cases, could impact U.S. and Afghan government efforts to combat the illicit drug trade in 

Afghanistan. Moreover, $1.4 million in appropriated U.S. funds to support these efforts remain unused. 

What SIGAR Recommends

To expedite the construction of additional detention and support facilities at the Counter-Narcotics 

Justice Center in Kabul, we recommend that the State Department amend the original interagency 

support agreement’s scope of work to include the recommended utility upgrades. We also recommend 

that the State Department either increase the amount of funding under that interagency support 

agreement to cover additional costs of planned detention and support facilities, or issue a new 

agreement to include the necessary amount of funding.
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background 1 

Insufficient Funding and Inadequate Utilities Continue to Delay Construction 3 

Connecting to City Electrical Grid Could Provide Significant Cost Savings 4 

Conclusion 5 

Recommendations 6 

Comments 6 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 7 

Appendix II: Comments from Department of State 8 

Appendix III: Comments from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 10

 

Abbreviations

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 1 

Actions Needed to Resolve Construction Delays 

at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center

This report identifies factors that have contributed to delays in the construction of additional detention 

facilities at the recently opened $11 million U.S.-funded Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, 

Afghanistan. Our work focused on $2 million provided under a 2007 interagency support agreement 

between the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan Engineer District for additional construction at the 

Center. The Center houses Afghanistan’s sole court for the prosecution and appeal of significant 

narcotics cases; therefore, delays in expanding the capacity of the Center could negatively impact U.S. 

and Afghan government efforts to combat the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan. A major goal of the 

Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is "eliminating the narcotics industry, which remains 

a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond." One of the key 

benchmarks under the ANDS Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights Pillar is that the Afghan 

Government will "increase the number of arrests and prosecutions of drug traffickers and corrupt 

officials." Since the Center houses the Central Narcotics Tribunal, which has exclusive nationwide 

jurisdiction over significant narcotics cases, the Center’s successful operation has a direct impact on the 

prosecutions of drug traffickers.1

 

This report is the first in a series of SIGAR audits addressing U.S. efforts to deter corruption and 

strengthen the rule of law. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. in July 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A discussion of our scope 

and methodology is in Appendix I.

BACKGROUND

The United States recently completed construction of the first phase of an $11 million Counter-Narcotics 

Justice Center to support ongoing narcotics interdiction efforts by the Afghan Government. The Center 

is a dedicated secure facility constructed by the U.S. Department of Defense that provides a centralized 

location for the Afghan Government to prosecute and detain narcotics offenders. It houses

Afghanistan’s Central Narcotics Tribunal, which has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over significant 

narcotics cases, and the Criminal Justice Task Force consisting of Afghan prosecutors and investigators 

who receive mentoring by Department of Justice advisors. 

The first phase of construction was completed three years behind schedule, not becoming fully 

operational until May 1, 2009. Currently, the Center consists of a detention building, courthouse, offices 

for judges and prosecutors, and barracks for members of the protective Afghan Marshals Service. The 

detention building contains 28 cells that can accommodate a total of 56 prisoners with two prisoners 

per cell. The courthouse includes courtrooms for primary and appellate courts and chambers that 

accommodate 14 judges—7 for the primary court, including a chief judge, and 7 for the appellate court, 

including a chief judge. There are also offices for 35 investigators and 30 prosecutors, a dining facility, 

two diesel-powered generators for electricity, and barracks for 150 members of the Afghan Marshals 

 

1 The Central Narcotics Tribunal has jurisdiction over cases involving more than 2kg of heroin, morphine or cocaine, 

more than 10kg of opium and more than 50kg of hashish or precursors chemicals. 
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 2 

Service. Located near the Kabul International Airport, the Center will receive two years of operations 

and maintenance support from the State Department estimated at $3 million per year.

The second phase of construction for the Center was to include the design and construction of an 

additional detention facility and another set of barracks. In May 2007, the State Department and the 

Army Corps of Engineers signed an interagency agreement for the provision of goods and services 

related to the construction of facilities in support of State Department programs in Afghanistan. The 

agreement, pursuant to section 632(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, was valid 

until May 2010, or until a maximum ceiling amount of $50 million had been reached. 

According to the interagency agreement, requests 

from the Department of State for U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers assistance were to be documented by

support agreements containing, among other 

things, a final statement of work, as well as a 

timeline for acquisition, design and construction. 

Each support agreement was to address a separate 

project and specify the amount of funds to be 

obligated on that particular project. The fiscal 

terms of the interagency agreement stated that the 

obligation of funds would be based upon the

support agreements. 

In accordance with the interagency agreement, the 

State Department prepared a support agreement

to fund the construction of additional detention 

and barracks facilities for the Counter-Narcotics 

Justice Center. 2

 The support agreement provided 

the Army Corps of Engineers with $2 million to 

complete the work by January 2008. The scope of 

work included in the support agreement called for 

the design and construction of an additional 175-

bed detention facility, support functions for the 

new detention facility, and barracks for 60 local 

national security officers. The overall project was 

defined as “the design, material, labor, and 

equipment to construct buildings, parking, utilities 

and other infrastructure in support of managing 

defendants awaiting trial.” All construction done 

under the scope of work was to meet current U.S. design and building codes, safety and security 

standards, and applicable local standards. Further, the design of the detention facility was to be in 

accordance with the latest American Correctional Association standards for quality.

 

2 According to records reviewed by SIGAR, support agreement 2078728M32 was signed by a Department of State 

representative on May 2, 2007 and electronically signed by an Army Corps of Engineers representative on February 

6, 2008.

Photograph of a courtroom used to adjudicate 

narcotics-related cases at the Counter-Narcotics 

Justice Center. (Source: SIGAR)
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 3 

INSUFFICIENT FUNDING AND INADEQUATE UTILITIES CONTINUE TO DELAY CONSTRUCTION

Although the Center has only been fully operational for three months, its existing detention cells are 

already filled to capacity and nearly eighteen months have passed without the anticipated construction 

of an additional detention facility or the necessary upgrading of utilities.3

 Due to expected high 

demand, the Afghan commander of the Center is considering putting four prisoners in each cell rather 

than two—a move that could violate American Correctional Association standards for quality.4

 Newly 

arrested narcotics offenders were being sent to other locations because there was no available 

detention space at the Center. 

Although some work was accomplished under the second phase of construction at the Center, the 

construction of an additional detention facility, scheduled to be completed by January 24, 2008, had not 

been started as of July 2009, due to several factors: 

• The Army Corps of Engineers was unable to secure any bids within the funding amount allotted 

for the new detention facility. 

• Army and State Department engineers determined that the additional detention facility would 

overtax the existing Center’s water, sewer, and electrical utilities and recommended that utility 

upgrades be done before constructing the new detention facility. 

• Although State Department officials agreed with that recommendation, the Corps did not 

proceed because the utilities work was not included in their original scope of work and because 

Corps officials believed that the funds provided under the interagency agreement had expired 

and were no longer valid.

 

Insufficient Funding Resulted in Lack of Acceptable Bids

The Army Corps of Engineers used about $600,000 of the $2 million to complete or repair work from the 

Center’s original construction and to construct a new set of barracks. However, the Corps was unable to 

obtain a bid to construct the additional detention facility within the remaining amount provided under 

the original support agreement with the State Department. According to Corps officials, all bids that 

were submitted in response to its request for proposal to build the new detention facility were above 

the amount provided under the original support agreement. Consequently, the Corps did not accept 

any bids and did not begin construction of the new detention facility as planned. 

Additional Detention Facility Would Overtax Existing Utilities

Further complicating the delayed construction of the new detention facility was the fact that, during 

final inspection and after analyzing the construction site, State Department and Corps engineers, 

respectively, determined that the additional facility would overtax the Center’s existing sewer, water, 

and electrical utilities. Engineers from both agencies recommended that those utilities be upgraded. 

 

3 According to State Department officials, the majority of detainees are low-level drug criminals, whereas the 

Center was originally developed to house mid- and high-level drug traffickers. This issue will be addressed in a 

separate SIGAR letter report to be issued to U.S. Embassy-Kabul later this month. 

4 American Correctional Association standards require 4.6 square meters (50 sq ft) of unencumbered space for 

each two-person cell.
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 4 

Specifically, the engineers found that the existing sewer system, which was designed to accommodate 

about 200 personnel, required daily emptying by sewage trucks and would be immediately overloaded 

with the additional personnel expected to occupy the new facility. With regard to water, the engineers 

found that, although the existing well pump capacity could supply the average daily water demands for 

the projected population of people, there was no additional capacity, test results indicated that the 

water was saline, and the existing water well system was undersized for future loading. More 

importantly, since there was only one well pump, the Center had no backup system in the event of 

pump failure. Finally, according to the engineers, the generators being used to provide electricity to the 

Center were not synchronized to operate in parallel, and whichever generator was in operation was

already near its capacity and would not be able to handle the future loading. 

Engineers from both agencies recommended that these utility shortfalls be addressed by installing a 

packaged wastewater treatment plant, adding a second well to be dedicated for domestic kitchen use, 

and obtaining additional electrical power by connecting to the city power grid. According to Corps

engineers, the sewer, water, and electrical upgrades would cost approximately $1.25 million, well within 

the $1.4 million balance remaining under the interagency support agreement.

Utilities Upgrades Not Included in Original Scope of Work 

The State Department agreed in a letter dated May 18, 2009 to allow the Corps to use the remaining 

funds to perform the utility upgrades recommended by its engineers. However, Corps officials then 

determined that they could not use the remaining funds because: 1) the utility upgrades were not 

included in the original scope of work for those funds, and 2) by then, Corps officials believed that the 

authority to expend the funds had expired. Consequently, the Army Corps of Engineers refused to move 

ahead, despite assurances from State Department officials that the funding was still valid and that the 

work could continue. After discussions with SIGAR, and further legal review, Corps legal staff agreed 

that the remaining funds had not expired and could be used to perform the recommended utility 

upgrades as long as the original scope of work was properly modified by the State Department.

5 

CONNECTING TO CITY ELECTRICAL GRID COULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT COST SAVINGS

According to the Army Corps of Engineers, connecting the Center to the city electrical grid could achieve 

significant cost savings. By one estimate, the savings due to lower fuel consumption would be between

$300,000 and $600,000 per year. Although connection to the nearby grid would cost as much as 

$300,000, that amount could be recovered within six to twelve months, depending on the stability of 

the voltage from the grid.6

 Reducing the Center’s operating costs would also help improve the 

Government of Afghanistan’s ability to sustain the Center should U.S. support be reduced or eliminated 

in the future. 

 

5 Since the interagency agreement was executed under section 632(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 

amended, the obligation of funds occurred at the time the agreement between the Department of State and the 

Army Corps of Engineers was signed, rather than when the Corps obtained contracts to expend the funds. 

6 During an inspection of the first phase of construction, a State Department engineer noted that another 

transformer would be required to connect to the nearest aerial power line. 
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 5 

The State Department has agreed to provide two years of operations and maintenance support for the 

Center--estimated at $3 million per year, including the provision of electrical power. Along with 

recommending that the State Department address utility shortfalls before constructing the additional 

detention facility, engineers from the Army Corps of Engineers and the State Department specifically 

recommended connecting the Center to the city electrical grid and using the more expensive generators 

for backup power. 

Photograph showing the proximity 

of the Counter-Narcotics Justice 

Center to Kabul city power lines. 

(Source: SIGAR)

CONCLUSION

In order for the $11 million Counter-Narcotics Justice Center to operate as intended, it needs additional 

detention cells. Existing cells are filled to capacity and narcotics-related prisoners are being sent to 

other locations. Several factors have resulted in the delayed construction of additional detention 

facilities, while the State Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have been deadlocked over 

funding issues. Action is necessary to expedite the construction of these much-needed facilities. 

Furthermore, due to the Center’s continued lack of connection to the Kabul electric grid, considerable 

cost savings are being forgone. Relieving the Center’s dependency on expensive generators may

provide cost savings to the United States estimated at $300,000 to $600,000 a year, and potentially

improve long-term sustainability. 
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 6 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To expedite the construction of the planned detention facilities at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center 

in Kabul, Afghanistan and to utilize approximately $1.4 million in remaining U.S. appropriations we 

recommend that the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs: 

• Amend the original scope of work under interagency support agreement number 2078728M32 with 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan Engineer District to include the utility upgrades for the 

Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, Afghanistan, that remain under that agreement, or 

reprogram those funds to accomplish the same work through another mechanism. 

• Modify the interagency support agreement number 2078728M32 with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers-Afghanistan Engineer District to increase the amount of funding to cover the costs of 

constructing the additional detention facility envisioned under the original second phase of 

construction for the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, Afghanistan, or alternatively use 

another mechanism. 

COMMENTS

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan Engineer District provided written comments on a draft of this 

report, which are included in appendices II and III. The Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs also provided technical comments which we incorporated in this report, as 

appropriate. 

The Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs generally concurred 

with the report’s findings and recommendations. The Bureau stated that they generally agreed with 

both recommendations to amend the agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers but objected to 

the provision that funding be limited to a specific interagency support agreement. The Bureau suggested 

that a variety of mechanisms would present contractual and cost savings options for completing the 

utility upgrades and detention center construction. We did not intend to restrict the funding 

mechanism and modified the recommendation accordingly. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan 

Engineer District-North concurred with the report’s recommendations. The Commanding officer 

indicated that the Corps would work closely with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs to ensure completion of the expansion of the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center after 

execution of an amended or new interagency support agreement. 
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 7 

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHOLOGY 

We conducted audit work during July 2009 in Washington, DC, and in Kabul, Afghanistan to determine 

why the construction of an additional detention facility at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul, 

Afghanistan had not been completed as intended. This audit is the first in a series of SIGAR audits 

addressing U.S. efforts to deter corruption and strengthen the rule of law. 

To accomplish our objective, we reviewed correspondence and documentation provided by U.S. 

Government officials in Washington, DC, and at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan; interviewed

officials from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs in Washington, DC and at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, and from the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers-Afghanistan Engineer District in Kabul, Afghanistan; and conducted a site visit to the 

Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul. We consulted with Army Corps of Engineers legal officials to 

determine the validity of funding and researched provisions under section 632(b) of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. The audit was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended.
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 8 

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 9 
SIGAR Audit-09-4 Justice Reform Page 10

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-007A.)
_________________________________________________________________________________ 

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors; 

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

 reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline: 

 

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

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Arlington, VA 22202