Opinion filed March 2 8 , 201 8



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

___ __ ______ No. 11

- 1 7

- 00 2 74

- C V

_____ _ _____
IN THE INTEREST OF Z.C.I

. AND I.V.I ., CHILD REN

On Appeal from the 106 t h District Court Dawson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 16

- 05

- 19804

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
The trial court entered an order in which it terminat ed the parental rights of
the parents of Z.C.I

. and I.V.I

. The mo ther filed an a ppeal . On appeal, s he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest finding. We affirm. Termination Standards and Findings In a single issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that the evidence is legal ly and
factual ly in sufficien t to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of h er children. Appellant specifically argues2

that the trial court should have considered alternatives to termination, such as appointing h er as a poss essory conservator. Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001 (b) (West Supp. 2017)

. To determine on appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we re view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding

was true. In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3 d 17, 25

– 26 (Tex. 2002). To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed on e of the acts listed in
Section 161.001 (b) (1)(A)

– ( U ) and that termination is in the best interest of the child.
F AM

. § 161.001 (b) . In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well

- being, had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well

- being, and had failed to comply with provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children. See id. § 161.001 (b) (1) (D), (E), (O)

. Appellant does not challenge th ese finding s , but s he does challenge the trial court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best interest

. See id. § 161.001 (b)(2)

. Accordingly, we will uphold the order of termination if the
evidence is sufficien t to support the best interest finding

.3

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be proved. In re C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But courts may use the non

- exhaustive Holley factor s to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367, 371

– 72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical d anger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or b y the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent

- child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of th e parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best
interest. C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d at 266. Analysis The Department of Family an d Protective Services originally became
involved with the two young children in this case when I.V.I. was hospitalized after being found limp and unresponsive at home

. I.V.I. had suffered chronic subdural hemorrhages and required surgery to remove bloody fluid from around her brain

. Both parents were found “ reason to believe for phy sical abuse” by the Department. A monitored return to the mother was attempted after the initial removal; however,
the chil dren were removed a second time. At the time of the second removal, I.V.I. had what looked like a burn on the inside of one thigh and finger

- type bruising on the inside of the other thigh.4

The evidence at trial was undisputed that, while this case was pending, Appellant and her boyfrie nd engaged in domestic violence in the children’s

presence. Other instances of violence involving Appellant and her boyfriend
occurred while t his case was pending. The conservatorship caseworker testified that Appellant continued to engage in domestic violence, with Appellant being th e abuser
as well as the victim. Appellant testified that, at the time of trial, she was no longer in a relationship with the children’s father or with the violen t b oyfriend.
The uncontroverted evidence showed that Appellant did not comply with all
of the provisions of he r court

- ordered service plan , though she did complete some
of the required services

. In particular, Appellant failed to comple te domestic
violence c ounseling and failed to attend batt erer’s prevention intervention. The conservatorship caseworker testified that Appellant was not able to provide a safe
home for the children
, and Appellant seemed to agree with that assessment. For this reason, Appellan t asked that the children be placed with her father.
T he conservatorship case worker testified that the Department’s goal for the
children was adoption by the current foster parents. T he children’s guardian a d litem (CASA of West Texas ) and t he children’s attorney ad litem both believed that
termination of th e parents’ parental rights would be in the best interest of the
children. The children were placed in a foster home after the initial removal and
were returned to the same foster home after the monito red return to Appellant failed.
Th e placement is a foster

- to

- adopt home. The children ar e doing very well in that
home. The foster parents are meeting all of the children’s needs, including I.V.I.’s special medical needs. T he foster parents wish to ado pt the children if the children become available for adoption

. Based upon the Holley factors and the evidence in the record, we cannot hold that the trial court’s best interest finding is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence

. See Holley
, 544 S.W.2d at 371

– 72. T he trial court could reasonably have5

formed a firm belief or conviction that it would be in each child’s best interest for Appellant’s parental rights to be terminated. We hold that t he evidence is both legally and factually suffic ient to support the trial court’s best interest finding. We
overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal

. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the trial court’s order of termination

.

JOHN M. BAILEY
JUSTICE

March 28 , 2018
Panel consists of: Willson , J. , Bailey, J. , and Wright, S.C.J. 1

1 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sitting by assignment.