Attorney Grievance Commission v. Joseph Michael Stanalonis

Misc. Docket AG No. 74, September Term 2013 

Attorney Discipline – Judicial Elections − Statements Concerning 

Candidate for Judicial Office. A campaign flyer of a candidate for judicial office 

stated that the opposing candidate “[o]pposes registration of convicted sexual 

predators.” There was not clear and convincing evidence that the statement violated 

the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) when the hearing 

judge found that the candidate responsible for the flyer believed, and had a 

“demonstrable basis” for believing, the statement to be true. MLRPC 8.2(a), 8.4(c) & 

8.4(d). 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No.CAE14-04639 

Argued September 9, 2015 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

Misc. Docket AG No. 74 

September Term, 2013 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 

COMMISSION OF 

MARYLAND 

v.

JOSEPH M. STANALONIS 

 Barbera, C.J. 

 Battaglia 

 Greene 

 Adkins 

 McDonald 

 Watts 

 Harrell, Jr., Glenn T.

 (Retired, Specially 

 Assigned), 

 JJ.

Opinion by McDonald, J. 

Watts, J., concurs and dissents; 

Harrell, J., dissents. 

Filed: November 23, 2015 
1 

This case arose out of a hotly-contested primary election campaign for a 

position on the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County. An experienced prosecutor in the 

County sought to unseat a newly-appointed judge who, during the course of his 

career, had represented defendants in criminal cases in the County. As in many 

election campaigns, each candidate touted, with some exaggeration, his own 

experience and credentials. And each candidate disparaged, in various ways and 

without absolute accuracy, those of his opponent. The question before us is whether 

there is clear and convincing evidence that a statement in the challenger’s campaign 

flyer was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its truth 

or falsity and therefore violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 

(“MLRPC”). 

The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Commission”) charged Respondent 

Joseph M. Stanalonis with violating MLRPC 8.2(a) (false statement as to 

qualification or integrity of a judge, public legal officer, or candidate for such office), 

MLRPC 8.4(c) (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 

and MLRPC 8.4(d) (misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) by virtue 

of three statements about his opponent in a campaign flyer circulated on his behalf. 

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), this Court designated Judge Melanie M. Shaw 

Geter of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County1 to conduct a hearing 

 

1 The matter was originally assigned to a judge of the Circuit Court for St. 

Mary’s County, but was later re-assigned to Judge Shaw Geter. 
2 

concerning the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended 

conclusions of law. 

Following a hearing at which Mr. Stanalonis was present and represented by 

counsel, the hearing judge issued findings of fact and recommended conclusions of 

law. The hearing judge concluded that two of the statements did not violate the 

MLRPC, but that the third statement violated all of the cited rules, although Mr. 

Stanalonis had a “demonstrable basis” for making that statement. Mr. Stanalonis 

excepted to the conclusion that he had violated the MLRPC. We sustain that 

exception, and, as a result, shall dismiss the charges. 

Background 

The hearing judge’s fact findings are uncontested.2 Therefore, we treat them 

as established. Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A). Those findings, as well as undisputed 

matters in the record, establish the following. 

The 2012 Primary Election for Circuit Court Judge 

Mr. Stanalonis was admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 19, 1996 and, 

since that time, has been employed as an Assistant State’s Attorney in St. Mary’s 

County. In January 2012, Mr. Stanalonis declared his candidacy for the Circuit Court 

for St. Mary’s County. His opponent would be David W. Densford, whose 

appointment to the Circuit Court had been announced by the Governor a few weeks 

 

2 While Mr. Stanalonis registered no objection to the facts found by the hearing 

judge, he excepted the failure of the hearing judge to make certain additional findings 

favorable to his case. As a resolution of those exceptions would not affect our 

disposition of the case, we do not consider them. 
3 

earlier. Judge Densford took office on February 3, 2012. The primary election was 

scheduled for April 3, 2012. In that election, Mr. Stanalonis and Judge Densford 

would appear on both the Democratic and Republican ballots.3 As the hearing judge 

found, both candidates were active in their campaigns and, by all accounts, the 

ensuing election campaign was vigorous and contentious. 

The Stanalonis Campaign Flyer 

Judge Densford began to distribute campaign material on February 3, 2012, 

the day of his investiture. The campaign material included signs displaying a 

photograph of Judge Densford in a judicial robe with the words, “KEEP JUDGE 

DENSFORD, Experience Matters.” Judge Densford later testified that the 

“experience” to which this referred included: (1) the 60 days he would have served on 

the bench as of the date of the primary election in April and (2) his prior 27 years in 

private practice. 

On or about March 27, 2012, in response to Judge Densford’s campaign

material, Mr. Stanalonis’ campaign mailed a flyer to voters that purported to contrast 

the experience and outlooks of the two candidates. The left side of the flyer displayed 

a photograph of Mr. Stanalonis in a jacket and tie, below which appeared a number 

of statements about him, such as “16 Years as a St. Mary’s County Prosecutor” and 

“Protecting Our Community, Not the Criminals.” The right side of the flyer displayed 

a photograph of Judge Densford in a Hawaiian shirt, below which appeared a number 

 

3

 In a primary election, candidates for judicial office typically appear on the 

ballots of both principal parties. See Suessman v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 862 A.2d 1 

(2004). 
4 

of statements about him, such as “Donated $1,000 to O’Malley on July 14, 2010” and 

“Opposes your right to elect judges.” A panel at the bottom of the flyer displayed a 

photograph of Mr. Stanalonis with his family and reiterated his experience as a 

prosecutor. Judge Densford later responded with his own flyer comparing the 

qualifications of the two candidates. At issue before us is one of the statements in 

the Stanalonis campaign flyer that appears under Judge Densford’s photograph: 

“Opposes registration of convicted sexual predators.”

4 

Evidence concerning Judge Densford’s Views on Sex Offender Registration

Both Mr. Stanalonis and Judge Densford testified in this proceeding. Mr. 

Stanalonis testified that Judge Densford, while in private practice, had represented 

defendants in criminal cases involving sex-related offenses and that Mr. Stanalonis 

and his colleagues in the State’s Attorney’s Office had dealt with him in that capacity. 

Mr. Stanalonis testified that Judge Densford had told him, in conversations related 

to the representation of his clients, that he “was opposed to the registration because 

it was a long-lasting − life-long impact on [defendants] and would carry with them 

forever,” and moreover “that the punishment should be what it is in the statute for 

 

4 In the charges initiating this proceeding, the Commission alleged that two 

other statements under Judge Densford’s photograph (“As Judge, has never 

sentenced a single criminal to jail” and “Opposes your right to elect judges”) also 

constituted professional misconduct by Mr. Stanalonis. The hearing judge concluded 

that one statement (concerning Judge Densford’s sentencing experience) was literally 

true when it was made, and that the second was, at worst, a misunderstanding of a 

nuanced position taken by Judge Densford in support of publicizing a county bar 

association resolution opposing the election of judges. The hearing judge concluded 

that neither of those statements violated the MLRPC. The Commission has not 

excepted to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to 

those statements and we do not consider them further. 
5 

the particular sex offense and that if the crime called for a maximum incarceration of 

ten years, that the maximum [time that] these individuals should be under the 

supervision of the Court should be ten years.” The hearing judge found, based on Mr. 

Stanalonis’ testimony, that Mr. Stanalonis “determined that [Judge] Densford 

opposed the [sex offender] registry” through “conversations surrounding the issue and 

interactions with fellow prosecutors.” 

Judge Densford, for his part, testified that he had not expressed opposition to 

the registration of sex offenders as a general matter. During his testimony he was 

asked, “At any time prior to your appointment on December 22, 2011, in your capacity 

as a private person or as a criminal defense attorney, did you express opposition to 

the registration of convicted sexual predators?” He replied, “No. Not as a group. I 

did when I represented individuals. I didn’t want particular people to have to register 

and would negotiate that. That had nothing to do with the offender registry. It had 

to do with representation.” He explained that he had sought to avoid having his 

clients “plead[] to [charges] that would get them registered as sexual offenders.” He 

testified that he preferred “a plea to assault instead of something that put them on 

the registry.” He stated that he did not believe that he had made a blanket statement 

opposing registration of sex offenders generally.

The hearing judge found the testimony of Mr. Stanalonis and Judge Densford 

“equally compelling.” In particular, she found credible Mr. Stanalonis’ testimony that 

Judge Densford routinely opposed registration of his clients on the sex offender 

registry while he was a defense attorney. On the other hand, she also credited Judge 
6 

Densford’s testimony that, while he had opposed plea arrangements that would result 

in his clients being placed on the sex offender registry, he had not discussed the topic 

with Mr. Stanalonis outside the context of representation of a client. She also noted 

that Judge Densford had never made a public statement concerning the sex offender 

registry. 

In the end, the hearing judge found that Mr. Stanalonis “had a demonstrable 

basis for believing that [Judge] Densford opposed the Sex Offender Registry.” But in 

concluding that Mr. Stanalonis had violated the MLRPC, she also opined that he 

should have made a “more substantial effort” to ensure the accuracy of the statement. 

Later in her opinion, she reiterated that it was not acceptable for a lawyer “to make 

representations regarding the identity or opinion of a public official, specifically a 

judge, without conducting a full and thorough investigation into the accuracy of the 

assertion.” 

Election Results 

On April 3, 2012, Judge Densford won the Democratic primary election; Mr. 

Stanalonis won the Republican primary election. Both advanced to the November 

2012 general election where Judge Densford ultimately prevailed. 

Complaint concerning Stanalonis Flyer 

In the interim, on April 20, 2012, attorney George E. Meng had filed a 

complaint against Mr. Stanalonis with the Maryland Judicial Campaign Conduct 
7 

Committee, Inc. (“MJCCC”),

5 a private entity devoted to promoting standards of the 

conduct for judicial elections in Maryland. The MJCCC found several violations of 

its standards for contested judicial elections. The Commission cited the MJCCC’s 

conclusions in the charges that initiated this case. 

Discussion 

 In her recommended conclusions of law the hearing judge proposed that we 

hold that Mr. Stanalonis violated MLRPC 8.2(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) based on the 

statement in his campaign flyer that Judge Densford “[o]pposes the registration of 

convicted sexual predators.” Mr. Stanalonis excepted to that recommendation. The 

Commission did not file any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or 

recommended conclusions of law. 

We review recommended conclusions of law without deference to the hearing 

judge pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(1). In the course of that review, we 

consider any exceptions filed by the parties.

A. MLRPC 8.2(a) 

MLRPC 8.2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall not make a 

statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth 

or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer, or 

 

5 The Maryland Judicial Campaign Conduct Committee was created in 2005. 

It has established certain standards for the conduct of contested judicial elections in 

Maryland and asks candidates to pledge to adhere to those standards. See 

www.mdjccc.org>. During the 2012 primary election, Judge Densford agreed to abide 

by those standards; Mr. Stanalonis did not. 
8 

public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal 

office.” MLRPC 8.2(a). To establish a violation of this rule, three things must be 

proven by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the lawyer made a false statement; 

(2) that the statement concerned the qualifications or integrity of a judge or a 

candidate for judicial office; and (3) that the lawyer made the statement with 

knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.6 In 

this case, the parties have focused on the third element – whether the statement in 

Mr. Stanalonis’ campaign flyer was made with knowledge that it was false or with 

reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.7

 

6 The rule is based on a model rule proposed by the American Bar Association. 

See American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 651 

(8th ed. 2015). Courts in other states that have adopted the rule have also recognized 

that it requires proof of these three elements. See In re Charges of Unprofessional 

Conduct Involving File No. 17139, 720 N.W. 2d 807, 813 (Minn. 2006). 

7 Although not at issue before us, there may be a question as to whether the 

second element of MLRPC 8.2(a) is met – i.e., whether this statement relates to the 

qualifications or integrity of a judicial candidate. While a particular view about the 

utility of sex offender registration may or may not be politically advantageous, it is 

not at all clear that it relates to the “qualifications or integrity” of a judicial candidate. 

“[O]pinions that a lawyer may have expressed before becoming a judge, or a judicial 

candidate, do not disqualify anyone for judicial service because every good judge is 

fully aware of the distinction between the law and a personal point of view.” 

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J., 

dissenting); see also Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2, comment 2 (“although each 

judge comes to the bench with a unique background and personal philosophy, a judge 

must interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or 

disapproves of the law in question”). Apparently, Mr. Stanalonis thought otherwise 

in including the statement on his campaign flyer and presumably that is why he did 

not argue that the second element was lacking.
9 

1. The Election Context 

This Court has applied the MLRPC, and MLRPC 8.2(a) in particular, to 

statements made by lawyers in a variety of contexts. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n 

v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 359-68, 85 A.3d 264 (2014) (statements by an attorney about 

judges and other public officials made in email sent to ex-wife and later forwarded to 

other attorneys); cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 835 A.2d 

548 (2003) (statements made by prosecutor about pending cases in press conferences). 

This case involves a statement made in the context of an election campaign. This 

context is relevant for three reasons. 

First, as the Supreme Court has observed, “speech about the qualifications of 

candidates for public office,” including judicial candidates, is “at the core of our First 

Amendment freedoms.” Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 

(2002); see also McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) 

(“the First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the 

conduct of [election] campaigns’”) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 

272 (1971)). The speech at issue in this case — which purported to describe the views 

of a candidate for judicial office — is core political speech and has the highest level of 

First Amendment protection.8 This is important because the canon of constitutional 

 

8 The dissenting opinions would ignore or minimize the extent to which the 

First Amendment constrains government entities in regulating campaign speech. 

For example, Judge Harrell’s opinion relies heavily on the position of the MJCCC in 

framing its analysis. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Harrell at 1-2, 7 & nn.1-2. Unlike 

State entities, including this Court, the MJCCC is a private entity not constrained by 

the First Amendment. As the MJCCC’s website explains, it was created in part 

precisely because the First Amendment limits a state supreme court’s ability to 
10

avoidance requires that we be cognizant of the constitutional values at stake in 

construing the MLRPC: to the extent that MLRPC 8.2(a) “‘is susceptible of two 

reasonable interpretations, one of which would not involve a decision as to the 

constitutionality of the [provision] while the other would, the construction which 

avoids the determination of constitutionality is to be preferred.’” G. Heileman 

Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 763, 521 A.2d 1225 (1987) (quoting 

Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 505, 312 A.2d 216 

(1973)). Thus, any interpretation of MLRPC 8.2(a) in an election context must take 

into account the First Amendment protections for speech in election campaigns. 

Second, the election context is significant as there inevitably is some 

imprecision in language used during the heat of a political campaign. There are often 

short timeframes in which a candidate must respond to claims or criticisms made by 

an opponent, there may be limited time to vet language, and a short and snappy oneliner usually prevails over a lengthier, more carefully phrased sentence.9 Opposing 

 

restrict candidate speech in judicial elections. See <www.mdjccc.org/background. 

html>.

9 For example, a campaign flyer supporting Judge Densford’s election asserted 

that the County Judicial Nominating Commission had found Mr. Stanalonis “Not 

Qualified to be a Judge” when, in selecting among the applicants for appointment to 

a circuit court position it did not send his name to the Governor. As Judge Densford 

conceded during his testimony, this was a “technically inaccurate” description of the 

determination made by the nominating commission. See COMAR 01.01.2008.04F & 

COMAR 01.01.2015.09F (executive orders specifying the function of judicial 

nominating commissions).
11

candidates for judicial office do not have the opportunity to depose each other.10 And 

campaign flyers are not appellate briefs. In this context, imprecise wording is not 

necessarily a violation of MLRPC 8.2(a). 

Finally, although this particular case arises out of an election for judicial office, 

MLRPC 8.2(a) also regulates statements by lawyers about “public legal officers,” such 

as the Attorney General and State’s Attorneys, and candidates for those elective 

offices. Frost, 437 Md. at 261 & n.9. Thus, whatever we hold in this case will also 

control what a lawyer may say about a candidate for election as Attorney General or 

as a State’s Attorney.

2. The Applicable Standard 

In the charges that initiated this case, the Commission alleged that the 

statement in Stanalonis campaign flyer was “knowingly false” and did not assert that 

it was made with “reckless disregard” (although the pleading later quoted MLRPC 

8.2 in its entirety). Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action at p. 3, ¶ 7. In its 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted to the hearing judge 

following the hearing, the Commission maintained that position and asked the judge 

to conclude that the statement was “knowingly false,” although it argued that a 

negligent misrepresentation would also violate MLRPC 8.2(a).

As noted above, the hearing judge did not find that the statement was 

knowingly false, but rather concluded that it was made with “reckless disregard” as 

 

10They do not have the opportunity to depose one another about their respective 

positions unless they do so, as here, well after the campaign during a disciplinary 

proceeding. 
12

to its truth or falsity. Before us, the Commission did not except to the hearing judge’s 

conclusion and has dropped any contention that the statement was “knowingly 

false.”

11 Hence, the relevant standard under MLRPC 8.2(a) is whether the statement 

was made with “reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.” 

3. “Reckless Disregard as to Truth or Falsity”

In the First Amendment context, “reckless disregard for truth or falsity” evokes 

the subjective test for civil liability for defamation of a public figure set forth New 

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Under this test, “reckless disregard 

for truth or falsity” is not “measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would 

have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be 

sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained 

serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows 

reckless disregard for truth or falsity....” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 

(1968). The subjective test thus focuses on what the defendant personally knew and 

thought. The drafters of the model rule from which MLRPC 8.2(a) is derived 

apparently intended to import this test into the rule. See American Bar Association, 

Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Proposed Final Draft (May 30, 1981) at 206 

(explaining that Model Rule 8.2 is consistent with the New York Times standard). 

 

11 It thus appears that the Commission did not prove what it actually charged 

in the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action – a knowing falsehood. It may 

well be that, in outlining the underlying facts and quoting MLRPC 8.2 in its entirety 

at the end of the document, the Petition provided adequate notice to the Respondent 

that the charges against him might be established by proof of a recklessly made 

falsehood. In any event, Mr. Stanalonis has not excepted on this ground and, in light 

of our disposition of the case, we need not resolve it. 
13

As this Court observed in Frost, however, “[t]here appears to be disagreement 

among the states as to whether the general defamation standard announced in New 

York Times, i.e. the subjective test, should apply equally to attorney discipline cases.” 

437 Md. at 265 n. 11. The Court noted that a number of courts have preferred to 

develop an objective test not keyed to the knowledge or understanding of the 

particular lawyer. Id. A comparison thus might be made to other contexts where 

courts must apply a standard of “recklessness” or “reckless disregard.” For example, 

the test for recklessness in the context of reckless endangerment is “whether the 

[defendant’s] misconduct, viewed objectively, was so reckless as to constitute a gross 

departure from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe.” 

Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 443, 605 A.2d 138 (1992). Such a test is akin to gross 

negligence. In fact, the definition of “gross negligence” sometimes includes the phrase 

“reckless disregard.” See, e.g., Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 686, 118 A.3d 829

(2015) (“Gross negligence has been defined as, among things, ‘an intentional failure 

to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the 

life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the 

consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.’”) (quoting Barbre v. 

Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187, 935 A.2d 699 (2007)); State v. Pagotto, 361 Md. 528, 548, 762 

A.2d 97 (2000) (“In order for the accused's conduct to constitute gross negligence, the 

conduct must manifest a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 
14

 Finally, even if a court would normally favor an objective test in assessing the 

“reckless disregard” prong of MLRPC 8.2(a), there is a significant argument that a 

subjective test should be applied in an election context, in light of the “core” First 

Amendment values at stake. See In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Involving 

File No. 17139, 720 N.W. 2d 807, 813-15 (2006) (raising, but not resolving, the 

question whether the Minnesota Supreme Court would apply a subjective test in 

evaluating an alleged 8.2(a) violation in an election context, even though that court 

applies an objective test in other contexts). 

In Frost, this Court expressly did not resolve whether the test for “reckless 

disregard” in applying MLRPC 8.2(a) should be a subjective one or an objective one. 

437 Md. at 265 n. 11. We need not resolve that question for purposes of deciding this 

case either, as our resolution is the same under either standard. 

 4. Whether There is Clear and Convincing Evidence of Reckless Disregard 

The question that we must resolve is whether there is clear and convincing 

evidence that Mr. Stanalonis made a statement concerning Judge Densford’s views 

about sex offender registries with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that 

statement. In testimony that the hearing judge found credible, Mr. Stanalonis stated 

that he was familiar with Judge Densford as a criminal defense attorney and with 

his efforts to keep his clients off the sex offender registry. The hearing judge found 

that, in reliance on conversations, and interactions with other prosecutors, Mr. 

Stanalonis “determined [Judge] Densford opposed the registry,” although she also 

found that his determination proved to be incorrect. 
15

Perhaps the Stanalonis campaign flyer could have been more precise in its 

description of his understanding of Judge Densford’s position and the source of that 

understanding. For example, according to Judge Densford’s testimony in this 

proceeding, a sentence that read “While in private practice and representing clients, 

attorney David Densford opposed placing his clients on the sex offender registry,” 

would have been more accurate than, “Opposes registration of convicted sexual 

predators.” But Mr. Stanalonis was speaking in the context of an election campaign, 

and MLRPC 8.2(a) does not require absolute precision in the expression of political 

speech as part of an election campaign. Mr. Stanalonis apparently drew an incorrect 

inference from his conversations with Judge Densford that Judge Densford opposed 

the registration of convicted sex offenders generally but, as the hearing judge found, 

there was a “demonstrable basis” for making this inference. 

In short, whatever Judge Densford’s true feelings, Mr. Stanalonis appears to 

have actually believed that Judge Densford opposed the registry according to his 

testimony (which the hearing judge generally credited). There is no evidence that 

Mr. Stanalonis “entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his” statement, see St. 

Amant, 390 U.S. at 731. Thus, the statement in the campaign flyer would not satisfy 

the subjective test for “reckless disregard” as to truth or falsity. 

Given the testimony of both Mr. Stanalonis and Judge Densford concerning 

their discussions of the sex offender registry, the hearing judge’s finding that Mr. 

Stanalonis had a “demonstrable basis for believing” that Judge Densford opposed the 
16

sex offender registry finding was not clearly erroneous.12 In light of that 

demonstrable basis, we cannot say that there is clear and convincing evidence that 

Mr. Stanalonis’ belief was a “gross departure” from the understanding that a 

reasonably prudent lawyer in his position would have.13 It is not a gross deviation 

from the behavior of a reasonable attorney to make a statement that one has a 

demonstrable basis for believing, even if that belief turns out to be incorrect. 

In sum, there is not clear and convincing evidence that the statement in the 

campaign flyer was made with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the 

statement, regardless of whether a subjective or objective test is applied. 

Accordingly, we conclude that a violation of MLRPC 8.2(a) has not been proven. 

B. MLRPC 8.4(c) 

MLRPC 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 

“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” This 

prohibition “is not limited to conduct in the practice of law, but extends to actions by 

an attorney in business or personal affairs that reflect on the individual's character 

 

12 Although the hearing judge made this finding in a portion of her opinion 

entitled “Conclusions of Law” discussing the alleged violation of MLRPC 8.2(a), it 

appears to be a finding of fact, and so we review it for clear error. 

13 In her conclusions of law, the hearing judge observed that, while Mr. 

Stanalonis had a demonstrable basis for his understanding the Judge Densford had 

opposed the sex offender registry based on his discussions with Judge Densford and 

had vetted the statement with others who were familiar with Judge Densford, he 

should have made “a more substantial effort in ensuring the accuracy” of the 

statement. The hearing judge did not indicate what that effort would involve and, 

short of requiring a candidate to vet campaign material with the opposing candidate, 

it is not clear what that effort would be. 
17

and fitness to practice law.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Coppock, 432 Md. 629, 

644, 69 A.3d 1092 (2013). 

Not all attorney statements that turn out to be untrue violate MLRPC 8.4(c). 

“While this Court has sometimes drawn fine distinctions among the four horsemen of 

the rule – dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation – each pertains to a false 

statement by an attorney only if the attorney makes use of the false statement 

knowing that it is untrue.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 442 Md. 14, 34, 109 

A.3d 1184 (2015);14 see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mungin, 439 Md. 290, 310, 

96 A.3d 122 (2014) (ordinarily, “this Court will not find a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) 

when the attorney’s misconduct is the product of negligent rather than intentional 

misconduct”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

 Although it has been suggested on occasion that an attorney might violate 

MLRPC 8.4(c) by means of a negligent or an “inadvertent” misrepresentation, this 

Court has generally required that there be a “conscious objective or purpose” to the 

misrepresentation or omission and the facts of those cases might be more aptly 

described as intentional failures to communicate truthful information, as opposed to 

negligent falsehoods. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nwadike, 416 Md. 180, 194-

95, 6 A.3d 287 (2010) (respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c) when she acted with a 

 

14

 “Dishonesty is the broadest of the four terms, and encompasses, inter alia, 

conduct evincing a lack of honesty, probity or integrity of principle; [a] lack of fairness 

and straightforwardness. . . . Thus, what may not legally be characterized as an 

act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty.” Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 555, 103 A.3d 629 (2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
18

“conscious objective or purpose” to conceal information from her client and Bar 

Counsel); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 566, 894 A.2d 518 

(2006) (respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by “deceitful and misleading” conduct 

when she received a check for full settlement of client’s case, deposited the check into 

her own bank account, and did not inform her client for more than a year of the receipt 

of the funds); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688, 715, 867 A.2d 259 

(2005) (respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c) when he acted with “conscious objective or 

purpose” in concealing fact of ongoing representation of a client). 

 The hearing judge did not analyze the application of MLRPC 8.4(c) separately 

from MLRPC 8.2(a). We agree that, in this context, the two rules should be 

considered in concert. The hearing judge did not find – and the Commission no longer 

argues – that the statement in question constituted a knowing falsehood. Nor is 

there evidence of an omission or misrepresentation with a “conscious objective or 

purpose” to conceal truthful information. There is not clear and convincing evidence 

of a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). 

C. MLRPC 8.4(d) 

MLRPC 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 

“engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” “Generally, a 

lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer's conduct negatively impacts the 

public’s perception of the legal profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Basinger, 

441 Md. 703, 712, 109 A.3d 1165 (2015) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

McDowell, 439 Md. 26, 39, 93 A.3d 711 (2014)). “The prejudice to the administration 
19

of justice may also be measured by the practical implications the attorney’s conduct 

has on the day-to-day operation of our court system.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Hamilton, 444 Md. 163 118 A.3d 958 (2015) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Smith, 442 Md. 14, 31, 109 A.3d 1184, 1194 (2015)). Whether there has been a 

negative impact is judged by an objective standard. Basinger, 441 Md. at 716. 

Here, Mr. Stanalonis, a candidate for judicial office, made a statement in a 

campaign flyer about the views of his opponent, Judge Densford. The hearing judge 

concluded that the statement reflected negatively on the legal profession because the 

Stanalonis campaign made it without “conducting a full and thorough investigation” 

into its accuracy. Nevertheless, Mr. Stanalonis had a “demonstrable basis” for 

believing the statement and, according to his own testimony (which the hearing judge 

credited), did believe it. It is hard to imagine that making such a statement would 

negatively impact that public’s perception of the legal profession, except insofar as 

any campaign material that slights the qualifications of an opponent has a negative 

impact on the public perception of the opponent who, as in this case, is an attorney 

who holds public office.15 But such a standard would be incompatible with the State’s 

current policy, incorporated in the State Constitution, of holding contested elections 

 

15 One might therefore read MLRPC 8.4(d) to prohibit all campaign material 

on behalf of a lawyer that negatively portrays an opponent in an election, because all 

such material might negatively impact the public’s perception of the legal profession. 

However, such an interpretation would raise a serious First Amendment question, 

and, in light of the canon of constitutional avoidance, we decline to interpret it in this 

way. 
20

for circuit court judgeships and public legal officers such as the Attorney General and 

State’s Attorneys. Accordingly, there was no violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). 

Disposition 

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 

Action is dismissed. 

Although we have concluded that there is insufficient evidence to establish a 

violation of the MLRPC, our disposition of this case should not be taken to endorse 

the use of (in Judge Densford’s words) “antics and semantics” in contested judicial 

elections. Every Maryland attorney takes an oath to act “fairly and honorably.”

16

Those who seek judicial office must resist the temptation to advance at the risk of 

violating that pledge. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. PETITIONER SHALL PAY ALL 

COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT,

INCLUDING THE COST OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,

PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH 

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF JOSEPH 

MICHAEL STANALONIS AGAINST THE ATTORNEY 

GRIEVANCE COMMISSION. 

 

16 Maryland Code, Business Occupations & Professions Article, §10-212.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

Misc. Docket AG No. 74 

September Term, 2013 

______________________________________ 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND 

v. 

JOSEPH M. STANALONIS 

______________________________________ 

Barbera, C.J. 

Battaglia 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts 

Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Retired, 

Specially Assigned), 

JJ.

______________________________________ 

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J. 

______________________________________ 

Filed: November 23, 2015 

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CAE14-04639

Argued: September 9, 2015
 Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. I would hold that Joseph M. 

Stanalonis (“Stanalonis”), Respondent, violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 

Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.2(a) (Judicial and Legal Officials) and MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct 

That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice).1 Accordingly, I would reprimand 

Stanalonis. 

 I disagree with the Majority’s determination that clear and convincing evidence did 

not support the hearing judge’s conclusion that Stanalonis violated the MLRPC. See Maj. 

Slip Op. at 16, 19-20. Plainly put, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing 

judge’s conclusion that Stanalonis violated MLRPC 8.2(a) and 8.4(d). MLRPC 8.2(a) 

provides: 

A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with 

reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or 

integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a 

candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.

Recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 262-63, 85 A.3d 264, 274 

(2014), this Court explained MLRPC 8.2(a) in greater detail, stating:

The Preamble to the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 

Conduct provides that “[6] . . . a lawyer should further the public’s 

understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system 

because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular 

participation and support to maintain their authority.” In other words, 

“[m]embers of the legal profession have a responsibility to refrain from 

engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Attorney 

 

1

I agree with the Majority that clear and convincing evidence did not support the 

hearing judge’s conclusion that Stanalonis violated MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, 

Deceit, or Misrepresentation). See Maj. Slip Op. at 16-18. The hearing judge gave no 

separate analysis that warranted finding Stanalonis violated MLRPC 8.4(c) independent of 

MLRPC 8.2(a). Absent any analysis of why a reckless disregard for the truth constitutes a 

violation of MLRPC 8.4(c), I concur with the Majority on this point. 
- 2 - 

Grievance Comm’n v. DeMaio, 379 Md. 571, 581, 842 A.2d 802, 808 (2004). 

[MLRPC] 8.2(a) furthers this principle by requiring lawyers to refrain from 

impugning the qualifications or fitness of judicial and public legal officers. 

As Comment [1] to MLRPC 8.2(a) clarifies, “[e]xpressing honest and candid 

opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of 

justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine 

public confidence in the administration of justice.” See also In re Simon, 913 

So. 2d 816, 824 (La. 2005) (“While a lawyer[,] as a citizen[,] has a right to 

criticize [judges, judicial officers or public legal officers] publicly, he [or 

she] should be certain of the merit of his [or her] complaint, use appropriate 

language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate 

statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system.”). In other 

words, the purpose of [MLRPC] 8.2(a) is not to protect judges, judicial 

officers, or public legal officials from unkind or undeserved criticisms. 

Rather, [MLRPC] 8.2(a) protects the integrity of the judicial system, and the 

public’s confidence therein, and it does so in a limited way. Statements in 

violation of [MLRPC] 8.2(a) must (1) be false, (2) impugn the integrity or 

qualifications of judges, judicial officers or public legal officers, and (3) be 

made by the attorney knowing them to be false or with reckless disregard for 

their truth or falsity.

(Ellipsis and some alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 

MLRPC 8.4(d) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage 

in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” “Generally, a lawyer 

violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct negatively impacts the public’s 

perception of the legal profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDowell, 439 Md. 

26, 39, 93 A.3d 711, 719 (2014) (citation, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Stated otherwise, a lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct “tends to 

bring the legal profession into disrepute.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reno, 436 Md. 

504, 511, 83 A.3d 781, 785 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 442 Md. 197, 205, 112 A.3d 375, 379 (2015), 

we further explained: 
- 3 - 

In determining whether a lawyer violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by engaging 

in conduct that negatively impacted the public’s perception of the legal 

profession, this Court applies the objective standard of whether the lawyer’s 

conduct would negatively impact the perception of the legal profession of a 

reasonable member of the public . . . , not the subjective standard of whether 

the lawyer’s conduct actually impacted the public and/or a particular person 

(e.g., a complainant) who is involved with the attorney discipline proceeding. 

(Citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted) (ellipsis in original).

 Here, Stanalonis, while running for Judge of the Circuit Court for Saint Mary’s 

County, disseminated campaign flyers that stated that his opponent, Judge David W. 

Densford (“Judge Densford”), among other things, “[o]pposes registration of convicted 

sexual predators.” At the disciplinary hearing, Stanalonis testified that he based the 

assertion that Judge Densford “[o]pposes registration of convicted sexual predators” on: 

(1) his personal knowledge that Judge Densford, while serving as a defense lawyer, 

routinely opposed the registration of his clients in the Maryland Sex Offender Registry; 

and (2) his conversations with other prosecutors in the St. Mary’s County Office of the 

State’s Attorney. Judge Densford testified that he could not recall ever expressing 

opposition to the registration of convicted sexual offenders in general, but stated that, as a 

defense lawyer, he did attempt to avoid the registration of his clients in particular, 

explaining: “[W]hat I had opposed is my clients pleading to things that would get them 

registered as sexual offenders, if I could keep that from happening.” 

The hearing judge found that Stanalonis “had a demonstrable basis for believing 

that [Judge] Densford opposed the Sex Offender Registry.” Nonetheless, the hearing judge 

also found that the only measure Stanalonis took to verify the truth of the assertion was to 

“s[eek] input” from his campaign volunteers, who did not dispute the veracity of the 
- 4 - 

assertion. The hearing judge concluded that Stanalonis “was obligated to make a more 

substantial effort in ensuring the accuracy of the proffered statement, and he failed to do 

so.” As such, the hearing judge determined that Stanalonis “acted with reckless disregard 

to the truth of the statement that Judge Densford ‘Opposes the registration of convicted 

sexual predators.’” 

Under these circumstances, I would agree with the hearing judge that Stanalonis 

violated MLRPC 8.2(a). As Judge Densford’s testimony demonstrated, while representing 

individual criminal defendants, Judge Densford attempted to prevent his clients from 

pleading guilty to crimes that would result in registration as sex offenders; there is no 

evidence that Judge Densford expressed publicly or privately a general opposition to the 

registration of convicted sex offenders. Having a demonstrable basis for holding a 

particular belief is not the same as knowing that the belief is true or accurate. For example, 

I may believe that Christmas will be on a Saturday in 2016 because it is on a Friday in 

2015. I have a demonstrable basis for my belief, but my belief is inaccurate. Checking the 

calendar would advise that Christmas will be on a Sunday in 2016 because 2016 is a leap 

year. Having a demonstrable basis for believing something does not give a lawyer license 

to publish such information as though it were accurate or fact. In making the statement on 

campaign flyers that Judge Densford “[o]pposes registration of convicted sexual 

predators[,]” Stanalonis acted with reckless disregard for the statement’s truth or accuracy. 

Indeed, Stanalonis knew only that, as a defense lawyer, Judge Densford had attempted to 

have his clients not be required to register as sex offenders. And, as such, Judge Densford 

was acting in his capacity as an attorney pursuing his clients’ interests. Stanalonis’s 
- 5 - 

statement that Judge Densford “[o]pposes registration of convicted sexual predators” 

impugned the integrity and qualifications of Judge Densford and was made with reckless 

disregard for its truth or falsity. This was all that was needed to support the hearing judge’s 

conclusion that Stanalonis violated MLRPC 8.2(a). 

I would also agree with the hearing judge that Stanalonis violated MLRPC 8.4(d) 

by disseminating campaign flyers stating that Judge Densford “[o]pposes registration of 

convicted sexual predators.” Although Stanalonis did not make the statement with actual 

knowledge its inaccuracy, he acted with a reckless disregard as to the statement’s truth or 

falsity, and failed to undertake meaningful efforts to ensure that the statement was accurate. 

Indeed, other than his personal observations of Judge Densford when Judge Densford was 

a defense lawyer and some discussions with prosecutors in the St. Mary’s County Office 

of the State’s Attorney, the only measure that Stanalonis took to test the veracity of his 

theory was to “s[eek] input” from his campaign volunteers, none of whom apparently 

contradicted him. Even viewing it in the most favorable light to Stanalonis, the statement 

did not accurately describe what Judge Densford did when he was a defense lawyer. 

Such conduct “would negatively impact the perception of the legal profession of a 

reasonable member of the public[.]” Marcalus, 442 Md. at 206, 112 A.3d at 380 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, no reasonable member of the public would 

expect a lawyer to make an inflammatory statement on campaign flyers concerning a sitting 

Judge’s opinion of the Maryland Sex Offender Registry with a reckless disregard for the 

truth and without taking measures to ensure the statement was accurate in the first instance. 

Such a cavalier attitude toward the truth “reinforces the most damaging cynicisms 
- 6 - 

concerning lawyers’ honesty, avarice, and candor.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Levin, 

438 Md. 211, 228, 91 A.3d 1101, 1111 (2014). 

 Based on Stanalonis’s violations of MLRPC 8.2(a) and 8.4(d), in accord with the 

Commission’s recommendation, I would reprimand Stanalonis. Cf. Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Basinger, 441 Md. 703, 721-22, 109 A.3d 1165, 1176 (2015) (This Court 

reprimanded a lawyer who violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by mailing to a client letters in which 

he called the client, among other things, “A TRUE C[**]T[.]”); Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 268-69, 920 A.2d 458, 464-65 (2007) (This Court 

reprimanded a lawyer who violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by, among other things “disrupting the 

court proceedings and . . . walking out while the trial judge rendered his oral opinion from 

the bench[.]”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 701-02, 693, 835 

A.2d 548, 574-75, 569 (2003) (This Court reprimanded a lawyer who violated MLRPC 

3.6(a) (Trial Publicity) by making extrajudicial statements about a defendant’s confession, 

discussing a plea offer made to another defendant, and providing his opinion as to the guilt 

of two defendants.). 

 For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

Misc. Docket AG No. 74 

SEPTEMBER TERM, 2013 

 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND 

v. 

JOSEPH M. STANALONIS 

 

 Barbera, C.J., 

 Battaglia, 

Greene,

Adkins,

McDonald,

 Watts, 

Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Retired, Specially 

Assigned),

 JJ.

 

Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J. 

 

Filed: November 23, 2015

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No.CAE14-04639

Argued September 9, 2015
I dissent. 

My views regarding the appropriate disposition of this case are informed by the 

aphorism “Judicial Elections Are Different.”1

 Contested circuit court judgeship elections 

are different than other types of contested elections for public office because special rules 

and processes distinguish them as a category apart. They should be treated and seen as 

different also because of the unique nature of the office being sought. In addition to 

complying with State election laws generally, judges’ political activities are regulated by 

Rule 4.1 through 4.6 of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct (Md. Rule 16-813). 

Attorneys who seek judicial office are regulated by Rule 8.2 of the Maryland Lawyers 

Rules of Professional Conduct (MLRPC) (Md. Rule 16-814). These regulations aim to 

protect the integrity of judicial office and the legal profession. The Maryland Judicial 

Campaign Conduct Committee (MJCCC) was formed to focus attention on and foster 

integrity and civility in this specific genre of the Maryland judicial election process. It 

was the MJCCC (having received a complaint from an attorney) that highlighted for the 

 

1

 This is also the title of a pamphlet published by the Maryland Judicial Campaign 

Conduct Committee (MJCCC), an organization created in 2005, at the behest of former 

Chief Judge Robert M. Bell of this Court and the Judicial Ethics and Public Trust and 

Confidence Committees of the Maryland Judicial Conference. The MJCCC was formed 

to foster integrity and civility in contested elections for Maryland circuit court 

judgeships. 
2

Attorney Grievance Commission the problematic conduct of Stanalonis that resulted in 

the charges brought in the present case.2 

No such inhibitions regulate or seek to influence the contestants or the contests for 

other elective offices. Thus, contested judicial elections in Maryland are different from 

other electoral contests. 

 

2

 The MJCCC website, explaining the organization’s “Statement of Purpose,” 

characterizes why it seeks to uphold dignity in the conduct of contested judicial elections 

for circuit court judgeships: 

The frankly partisan, occasionally bare knuckles, conduct that we have 

come to tolerate in campaigns for legislative and executive office are 

inconsistent with the dignity we rightly count on in those who hold judicial 

office. The exaggerated rhetoric often employed in contemporary 

discussions of political issues, when used in the context of judicial 

elections, is corrosive of the public’s perception of the integrity of the court 

system. Such campaign tactics damage the integrity of the judiciary --

regardless of whether the communication falls within the ambit of 

constitutionally protected speech. 

Maintaining the dignity of the judiciary is necessary to protect the rule of 

law --- a root principle of our social compact and the one sure standard 

upon which this diverse and frequently fractious nation believes it can rely. 

The rule of law promises justice, neutrality and fairness. It does not 

exaggerate to say that the concept has an iconic status and that faith in the 

rule of law is akin to a civil religion. Judges are symbols of the rule of 

law. Therefore, those who aspire to judicial office have a special 

responsibility -- a duty in fact-- to conduct themselves in their campaigns 

with a dignity that reflects and honors the public’s reverence for the unique 

office they seek. 

Candidates for circuit court judgeships in an election are offered the opportunity by the 

MJCCC to pledge publicly to conduct themselves and their campaigns in accordance with 

the hortatory standards published by the MJCCC. Stanalonis chose not to make this 

pledge. Of course, that fact alone does not bear directly on the outcome of this case, but 

it gains prescience in hindsight. 
3

As the Majority opinion appears to concede, the present case, as it reaches us, 

distills to the single question of “whether the statement in Mr. Stanalonis’ campaign flyer 

[that Judge Densford, as a judge, ‘[o]pposes registration of convicted sexual predators’] 

was made . . . with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.” Maj. slip op at 8 (footnote 

omitted). The hearing judge concluded that Stanalonis violated the Maryland Lawyers’ 

Rule of Professional Conduct (MLRPC) 8.2(a) and MLRPC 8.4(c) and (d) by including 

that statement in his flyer. I stand with her. 

So as not to risk paraphrasing or summarizing inaccurately or incompletely the 

evidence weighed by the hearing judge and the conclusions she reached from that 

evidence (after assessing the relative credibility of the two main antagonists here), I 

recount what she stated relevantly in her findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT 

* * * 

Respondent Stanalonis and several other Assistant State’s Attorneys 

in St. Mary’s County prosecuted cases involving sex offenses wherein 

attorney Densford served as private counsel. Based on his experience and 

that of other prosecutors in the St. Mary’s County Office of the State’s 

Attorney, Respondent testified that attorney Densford routinely opposed the 

registration of his clients on the sex offender registry. In reliance, on 

conversations surrounding the issue and interactions with fellow 

prosecutors, he determined that Densford opposed the registry. 

Judge Densford’s testimony with respect to the registration of 

convicted sexual predators is as follows: 

DIRECT

Q: At any time prior to your appointment on December 22, 2011 in 

your capacity as a private person or as a criminal defense attorney, 

did you express opposition to the registration of convicted sexual 

predators? 

A: No. Not as a group. I did when I represented individuals. I 

didn’t want particular people to have to register and would negotiate 
4

that. That had nothing to do with the offender registry. It had to do 

with representation. 

Q: At any time prior to your appointment on December 22, 2011 in 

your capacity as a private person or as a criminal defense attorney, 

did you express opposition to the registration of convicted sexual 

offenders? 

A: No 

CROSS EXAMINATION 

Q: So, you put in as an election issue, your experience of 27 years in 

private practice, correct? 

A: I did.

. . .

Q: No. My question is, as a criminal defense practitioner, during that 

27 years, you, in fact, had opposed the registration of convicted 

sexual predators, correct? 

A: No, that is not true. And what I had opposed is my clients 

pleading to things that would get them registered as sexual 

offenders, if I could keep that from happening. 

Q: All right. So your position during the 27 years as a criminal 

defense practitioner, you would oppose your clients being convicted 

of a crime that would require them to be registered as a convicted 

sexual predator, correct? 

A: If I could get them a plea to assault instead of something that put 

them on the registry, particularly since Mr. Stanalonis and I had a 16 

year-old facing charges, yes, I tried to avoid that. Yes, I did. 

. . .

Q: Okay. And you would from time to time tell people privately in 

conversations that as a criminal defense practitioner [you were] 

opposed to registration of convicted sexual predators, correct? 

A: No. 

Q: No? You never said that in private conversation? 

A: That’s been alleged by the State’s Attorney’s Office. It is false. 

Q: Okay. So, just so I’m clear, your testimony is that in private 

conversations while a criminal defense practitioner, you have never 

said in a private conversation over dinner or elsewhere, that you 

would oppose the registration of convicted sexual predators. 

A: I don’t believe I’ve ever made that blanket statement to anybody 

privately or publicly. 
5

(Internal citations omitted). 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

* * * 

[as to the relevant flyer statement and related testimony] 

Respondent’s testimony, which this court finds credible, revealed 

that he as well as other Assistant State’s Attorneys in St. Mary’s County 

prosecuted several cases involving sex offenses, wherein attorney David 

Densford served as defense counsel. Respondent testified that he knew 

from his own experience and the experiences of other prosecutors in St. 

Mary’s County, that attorney David Densford would routinely oppose the 

registration of his clients on the sex offender registry. 

At his deposition, Judge Densford testified that he opposed his 

“clients pleading to things that would get them registered as sexual 

offenders, if [he] could keep that from happening.” He denied, however, 

making any such statements as a member of the judiciary, and further 

stated, that he never had any conversations concerning the Sex Offender 

Registry with Respondent outside of the context of the representation of a 

client. 

This court finds the testimony of both Judge Densford and 

Respondent equally compelling. Because of Densford’s history as a 

defense attorney and discussions with several Assistant State’s Attorneys, 

Respondent had a demonstrable basis for believing that Densford opposed 

the Sex Offender Registry. Additionally, he sought input on the issue from 

his campaign volunteers and no one disputed the veracity of this assertion. 

However, this court finds that Respondent was obligated to make a more 

substantial effort in ensuring the accuracy of the proffered statement, and 

he failed to do so. 

As a result, Respondent acted with reckless disregard as to the truth 

of the statement that Judge Densford “Opposed registration of convicted 

sexual predators.” Judge Densford never made any public statement 

regarding the sex offender registry, and Respondent took no measures 

outside of those outlined above to ensure the truth of his assertion. 

Additionally, Respondent’s justification presupposes that Judge Densford 

personally shared and upheld the values and opinions of the individuals he 

represented. Respondent’s statement violated Rule 8.2(a), and 8.4(c).
6

Petitioner also contends that Respondent’s statement that Judge 

Densford “Opposes registration of convicted sexual predators” violated 

Rule 8.4(d). Specifically, Petitioner argues that Respondent’s conduct was 

prejudicial to the administration of justice. This Court agrees. The actions 

of Respondent were reckless and had the effect of undermining public 

confidence in the administration of justice. Conduct that reflects negatively 

on the legal profession and sets a bad example for the public at large is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice. Attorney Grievance 

Commission v. Brady, 422 Md. 441 (2011) (citing Attorney Grievance 

Commission v. Goff, 399 Md. 1 (2007). Respondent failed to make a 

substantial effort to ensure that the statement was accurate. Thus, in 

making the statement that Judge Densford “opposes registration of 

convicted sexual predators” Respondent sent a message to the public that it 

is acceptable to make representations regarding the identity or opinions of a 

public official, specially a judge, without first conducting a full and 

thorough investigation into the accuracy of the assertion. 

In sum, Petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that Respondent violated Rule 8.2(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) of the Maryland 

Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. 

The Majority opinion sets-up principally its ultimate toleration of Stanalonis’ 

mis-representation of the view attributed to Judge Densford, as a sitting judge, as 

protected speech and/or merely imprecise language chosen during the “heat” of nothing 

more than a generic political campaign. Maj. slip op. at 9-11. The Majority’s setting of 

this scenic backdrop does not convince me to buy-in to its analysis that followed. 

Wishful thinking and recklessness should not be protected. Contested judicial elections 

are not merely generic political campaigns.3

 

3

 The Majority seems to want to “try” Judge Densford in absentia in this case 

through its digressions into examples of his reputed campaign statements about 

Stanalonis, which the Majority implies to have been less-than-praiseworthy. If the 

Majority is invoking either the principle that “two wrongs cancel out each other” or the 

doctrine of invited error, it wanders off the path charted for us. 
7

 The “reckless disregard” standard of the MLRPC should be assessed under an 

objective standard (see Maj. slip op. at 12-13). This analytical tool is better suited to 

policing judicial electoral campaign conduct because it allows for closer regulation of any 

tendencies on the part of candidates to do or say whatever is in their best interest, 

especially as they are likely to handicap favorably their ability to get away with it. A 

subjective standard merely plays into the hands of candidates who want to take advantage 

of the shadowy margins. I am persuaded that an objective standard is the safer fork in the 

road to take also because I agree with the goals of the MJCCC and the Maryland Rules as 

regards conduct in contested judicial elections.

The Majority opinion is mistaken entirely in its apparent assumption that Judge 

Shaw Geter “generally credited” (Maj. slip op. at 15) Stanalonis’ determination that 

Judge Densford “opposed the registry.” Id. Rather, by finding credible Judge Densford’s 

testimony that he, while an attorney in private practice and as a sitting judge, did not 

make any sweeping or generic statement of opposition to the sex offender registry 

statutory scheme, Judge Shaw Geter rejected Stanalonis’ self-serving bid to establish a 

springboard from attorney Densford’s client advocacy to Stanalonis’ patently wrong 

attribution to Judge Densford of what Stanalonis may have believed he had a 

“demonstrable basis” to think attorney Densford’s view may have been. I see a wide gap 

between holding a candidate for judicial office to a standard of “absolute precision in the 

expression of political speech as part of an election campaign” (id.) and gross 

carelessness in injecting into the public debate (where little practical or timely 

opportunity to defend against it existed) a claim for which a reasonable promoter of the 
8

claim had no legitimate basis to publish it, but rather a duty to inquire further or verify 

before leaping to a self-serving and logically faulty premise. Stanalonis, eschewing 

further inquiry or verification, tailored to his ends, at best, an impermissible and 

unsupported leap of logic to infer from attorney Densford’s advocacy of his clients’ best 

interest to a generic and false view of opposition to the statutory scheme held by 

Densford as a judge. He cared little apparently for whether his starting-point statement 

was true, accurate, or taken out-of-context, standing pat on the claim that apparently none 

of his State’s Attorney colleagues spoke up against his unsubstantiated extrapolation 

from a false starting-point. Stanalonis’ conduct was a gross departure from what a 

reasonably prudent lawyer challenging a sitting judge should have done and a gross 

deviation from the kind of conduct we should expect from any candidate for judicial 

office. Toleration of such shenanigans in general electoral campaigns is one thing, but is 

not acceptable here. The Majority opinion’s forgiving attitude toward Stanalonis’ 

misconduct will reap the whirlwind in future contested circuit court elections. 

I would overrule Respondent’s exceptions and accept Bar Counsel’s sanction 

recommendation of a reprimand, in view of the mitigating circumstances found by the 

hearing judge.