J-S36002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CHRISTIANA TRUST, A DIVISION OF 

WILMINGTON SAVINGS, 

WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND 

SOCIETY FSB, AND MTGLQ 

INVESTORS LP

v.

CALVIN FIELDING, SR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3118 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered November 10, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 170402857

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2023

Calvin Fielding, Sr., appeals pro se from the order denying his petition 

to set aside the sheriff’s sale of his foreclosed-upon property. We affirm. 

We glean the following case history from the trial court opinion. In 

2006, Mr. Fielding took out a $96,000 loan secured by real property situated 

in Philadelphia. Although Mr. Fielding promptly signed a notice of recission on 

the day he received the funds, he did not follow through with the recission by

returning the money. The mortgage was assigned in 2007. Appellant stopped 

making payments in 2009, notice of intent to foreclose was sent in 2013, and 

the mortgage was reassigned to Christiana Trust, which initiated foreclosure 

proceedings in 2017. MTGLQ Investors, LP, became the plaintiff in the action 

and obtained a verdict and in rem judgment. Mr. Fielding filed no post-trial 
J-S36002-23

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motions, which resulted in his subsequent appeal being dismissed for failure 

to preserve any claims. MTGLQ initiated execution proceedings on its 

judgment, which were delayed by Mr. Fielding’s opposition and the COVID-19 

pandemic. 

A sheriff’s sale was eventually scheduled for October 4, 2022. Mr. 

Fielding filed an eleventh-hour emergency petition to stay it. The trial court 

held a hearing at which Mr. Fielding sought to relitigate the foreclosure action, 

reasserting the same defenses that had been rejected at trial. Finding that 

Mr. Fielding had “zero credible basis for his requested relief,” the trial court 

denied the petition. Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/23, at 5. The property was sold 

at auction the same day.

On October 17, 2022, Mr. Fielding filed a motion to set aside the sheriff’s 

sale, reiterating the same previously-rejected arguments about the validity of 

the foreclosure judgment. The trial court denied the motion by order of 

November 10, 2022. This timely appeal followed, and both Mr. Fielding and 

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Mr. Fielding presents the 

following questions for our review, which we have re-ordered for ease of 

disposition:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to set 

aside the sale, giving no basis for the denial and dismissal?

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to set 

aside the sale, since the sale should not have been permitted to 

proceed because a loan modification was offered and pending?
J-S36002-23

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3. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to set 

aside the sale, since the sale should not have been permitted to 

proceed because it was a breach of contract?

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to set 

aside the sale, since the sale should not have been permitted to 

proceed because the plaintiff admitted they never sent a correct 

notice of intent to foreclose?

5. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to set 

aside the sale, because the plaintiff lacked standing?

6. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly attach an 

opinion?

Mr. Fielding’s brief at 2-3 (cleaned up). 

The following principles govern our review:

We will not reverse a trial court’s decision regarding whether to 

set aside a sheriff’s sale absent a clear abuse of discretion. An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in 

reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the judgment 

is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by 

the evidence of record, discretion is abused.

A petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale is grounded in equitable 

principles. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing 

grounds for relief.

LSF8 Master Participation Tr. v. Petrosky, 271 A.3d 1288, 1291 

(Pa.Super. 2022). 

Upon a thorough review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and 

the applicable law, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion on the 

part of the trial court as to the issues raised by Mr. Fielding, and we affirm the 

order on the basis of the cogent opinion that the Honorable Anne Marie B. 
J-S36002-23

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Coyle issued on May 2, 2022.1 Specifically, Judge Coyle properly concluded 

that Mr. Fielding was well-aware of the court’s basis for rejecting his 

arguments based upon the prior proceedings, and that no statute or court rule 

required the preparation of an opinion explaining the denial of Mr. Fielding’s 

motion prior to the appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/23, at 6-7. Further, 

Judge Coyle acted well within her discretion in determining that Mr. Fielding 

presented no evidence to invoke the court’s equitable powers to stay the sale. 

Id. at 8-9. 

In short, Mr. Fielding had the opportunity to obtain appellate review of 

his issues concerning the validity of the mortgage foreclosure action and 

judgment in an appeal therefrom. He squandered that opportunity by failing 

to preserve the issues such that his appeal was dismissed. The trial court 

properly concluded that his collateral attack upon that judgment via the 

petition to set aside the sale is untenable. No relief is due.

Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________

1 MTGLQ argues that Mr. Fielding’s arguments are waived because he failed 

to properly: (1) preserve them in a post-trial motion or develop them in his 

brief, (2) cite pertinent authorities within his brief, or (3) ensure inclusion 

within the certified record of that the transcript of the hearing on the motion 

denied in the appealed-from order. See Appellee’s brief at 12-13. Instead of 

finding waiver, we have considered Mr. Fielding’s arguments to the extent that 

his brief and the certified record before us permits and have concluded that 

the trial court’s opinion ably disposes of them. 
J-S36002-23

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Date: October 11, 2023
Circulated 09/28/2023 06:48 PM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TRIAL DIVISION — CIVIL 

CHRISTIANA TRUST, A DIVISION 

OF WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND 

SOCIETY, FSB, AND MTGLQ 

INVESTORS LP, 

Plaintiff(s) 

APRIL TERM 2017 

NO.- 20857 

0857 

V. SUPERIOR COURT 

NO. 3118 EDA 2022 

CALVIN FIELDING, SR., 

Defendant 

OPINION

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Appellant, Calvin Fielding, Sr., the Defendant in the above-captioned mortgage foreclosure 

civil action, seeks review of the Order that had been entered on November 10, 2022, by the 

Honorable Anne Marie B. Coyle, presiding as Judge of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, 

Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, hereinafter referred to as " this Court," denying 

Appellant's Petition to Set Aside the Sheriff's Sale' for property located at 7153 N. 19th St., 

Philadelphia, PA 19126. Review of the record reveals that Calvin Fielding, Sr. failed to introduce 

any evidence that had warranted this Court exercising its equitable powers to set aside the subject 

sale of the property located at 7153 N. 19th St., Philadelphia, PA 19126 on October 4, 2022 by the 

City of Philadelphia Sheriff's Department. 

OPFLD-Christiana Trust Vs Fielding 

11111111111111111111111111111111111111 17040285700146 

I Appellant in his respective filings has interchangeably referenced the subject pleading as both a Motion to Stay the 

Sale and a Petition to Set Aside Sheriff Sale. 

1 

Circulated 09/28/2023 06:48 PM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TRIAL DIVISION -- CIVIL 

CHRISTIANA TRUST, A DIVISION 

OF WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND 

SOCIETY, FSB, AND MTGLQ 

INVESTORS LP, 

Plaintiff(s) 

CALVIN FIELDING, SR., 

Defendant 

APRIL TERM 2017 

NO.20857 

00857 

SUPERIOR COURT 

NO. 3118 EDA 2022 

OPINION 

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Appellant, Calvin Fielding, Sr., the Defendant in the above-captioned mortgage foreclosure 

civil action, seeks review of the Order that had been entered on November 10, 2022, by the 

Honorable Anne Marie B. Coyle, presiding as Judge of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, 

Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, hereinafter referred to as "this Court," denying 

Appellant's Petition to Set Aside the Sheriffs Sale' for property located at 7153 N. I9th St., 

Philadelphia, PA 19126. Review of the record reveals that Calvin Fielding, Sr. failed to introduce 

any evidence that had warranted this Court exercising its equitable powers to set aside the subject 

sale of the property located at 7153 N. 19th St,, Philadelphia, PA 19126 on October 4, 2022 by the 

City of Philadelphia Sheriff s Department. 

0PFLD-Christiana Trust Vs Fielding 

III I

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'Appellant in his respective filings has interchangeably referenced the subject pleading as both a Motion to Stay the 

Sale and a Petition to Set Aside Sheriff Sale 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On September 18, 2006 Appellant Calvin Fielding, Sr. signed,and executed a promissory 

note ("Note") secured by a mortgage ("Mortgage") loan in the amount of $ 96,000, to refinance the 

real property located at 7153 N. 19th St., Philadelphia, PA 19126, hereinafter the "Property," with 

Mortgage Lenders Network, USA. See Procedural and factual history recorded in MTGLQ 

Investors, LP v. Fielding, Sr., 2020 WL 8024774, at * 1 (Pa.Com.Pl.). On September 18, 2006, 

after receiving the funds, Mr. Fielding signed a Notice of Rescission to attempt to rescind the loan 

pursuant to 15 USC § 1635 of the Federal Truth in Lending Act. However, Mr. Fielding failed to 

tender the received funds to Mortgage Lenders Network, USA, and to take required termination 

steps to terminate the Note and Mortgage. Id. Instead, he misappropriated the received funds to 

pay off several other outstanding debts and kept the excess cash. Id. As a result, Mortgage Lenders 

Network, USA, duly recorded the Mortgage with the Philadelphia County Recorder of Deeds 

Office and began servicing the Note and the Mortgage. Id. 

On or before February 2, 2007, Bank of America N.A., was assigned possession and 

servicer of the original loan. Id. On or about September 28, 2012, Bank of America, determined 

that they had lost the original Note and executed an Affidavit of Lost Note to affirm that they had 

not transferred the Note and had remained its rightful possessor. Id. at 3. 

Appellant stopped making payments on the Mortgage Loan and Note on May 1, 2009. 

Bank of America informed Appellant of the default due to his non-payment on August 12, 2009. 

Id. On April 12, 2013, Bank of America, also informed Mr. Fielding of their intent to foreclose via 

certified mail that had been sent to the Property. Pending the commencement of foreclosure 

litigation, the Note and the Mortgage Loan were transferred between several lenders and servicers 

before Christiana Trust became the holder of the Mortgage. Id. 

2 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On September 18, 2006 Appellant Calvin Fielding, Sr. signed and executed a promissory 

note ("Note") secured by a mortgage ("Mortgage") loan in the amount of $96,000, to refinance the 

real property located at 7153 N, 19h St., Philadelphia, PA 19126, hereinafter the Property," with 

Mortgage Lenders Network, USA. See Procedural and factual history recorded in MTGLO 

Investors, LP ». Fielding, Sr,, 2020 WL 8024774, at I (Pa.Com.PI). On September 18, 2006, 

after receiving the funds, Mr. Fielding signed a Notice of Rescission to attempt to rescind the loan 

pursuant to 15 USC $1635 of the Federal Truth in Lending Aet. However, Mt. Fielding failed to 

tender the received funds to Mortgage Lenders Network, USA, and to take required termination 

steps to terminate the Note and Mortgage. Id. Instead, he misappropriated the received funds to 

pay off several other outstanding debts and kept the excess cash. Id. As a result, Mortgage Lenders 

Network, USA, duly recorded the Mortgage with the Philadelphia County Recorder of Deeds 

Office and began servicing the Note and the Mortgage. Id 

On or before February 2, 2007, Bank of America N.A., was assigned possession and 

servicer of the original loan. Id On or about September 28, 2012, Bank of America, determined 

that they had lost the original Note and executed an Affidavit of Lost Note to affirm that they had 

not transferred the Note and had remained its rightful possessor. Id. at 

Appellant stopped making payments on the Mortgage Loan and Note on May 1, 2009. 

Bank of America informed Appellant of the default due to his non-payment on August 12, 2009. 

Id On April 12,2013, Bank of America, also informed Mr. Fielding of their intent to foreclose via 

certified mail that had been sent to the Property. Pending the commencement of foreclosure 

litigation, 

the Note and the Mortgage Loan were transferred between several lenders and servicers 

before Christiana Trust became the holder of the Mortgage. Id 

2 
On April 20, 2017, Christiana Trust filed a Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure against the 

Property, requesting an in-rem judgment for $ 169,306.07. Over the course of lengthy litigation, 

the Mortgage and Note underwent several more transfers until the current Plaintiff and Appellee, 

MTGLQ Investors, LP., became holders and servicers of the Mortgage Loan and Note on June 21, 

2019. Id. 

On January 8, 2020 and January 9, 2020, the Honorable Stella Tsai, Judge of the Court of 

Common Pleas for the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania Civil Division conducted a bench 

trial. Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP was represented by Bradley J. Osborne, Esquire, and 

Appellant Calvin Fielding was represented by Joshua L. Thomas, Esquire. 2 Judge Tsai entered a 

verdict and judgment in rem in favor of Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP, on November 10, 2020. 

In a Memorandum Opinion supporting the Order of Judgement, Judge Tsai determined that 

Defendant Calvin Fielding, Sr. had been in default of the Note and Mortgage Loan due to his 

chronic non-payment toward his obligations, and recited the following three relevant findings of 

fact, inter alia: 

1. "Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP. had standing to enforce the Mortgage and 

Note. 

2. Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP was in possession of a valid Affidavit of 

Lost Note, properly effectuated by prior Note servicer Bank of America, NA. 

3. Defendant failed to properly execute recission of the loan." 

Id. at 4-8. 

On December 7, 2020, Mr. Fielding, through former counsel, filed a timely appeal of the 

Order and Judgment to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The appellate court quashed the appeal 

on February 16, 2021. On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP filed a Praecipe for 

z While the docketed record reflects that Mr. Thomas still represents Mr. Fielding, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

issued a two-year suspension of Mr. Thomas' license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on 

October 1, 2021. Appellant has proceeded pro se in the current litigation before this Court. 

3 

On April 20, 2017, Christiana Trust filed a Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure against the 

Property, requesting an in-rem judgment for $169,306.07. Over the course of lengthy litigation, 

the Mortgage and Note underwent several more transfers until the current Plaintiff and Appellee, 

MTGLQ Investors, LP., became holders and servicers of the Mortgage Loan and Note on June 21, 

2019. 

On January 8, 2020 and January 9, 2020, the Honorable Stella Tsai, Judge of the Court of 

Common Pleas for the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania Civil Division conducted a bench 

trial. Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP was represented by Bradley J, Osborne, Esquire, and 

Appellant Calvin Fielding was represented by Joshua L. Thomas, Esquire.' Judge Tsai entered a 

verdict and judgment in rem in favor of Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP, on November 10, 2020. 

In a Memorandum Opinion supporting the Order of Judgement, Judge Tsai determined that 

Defendant Calvin Fielding, Sr. had been in default of the Note and Mortgage Loan due to his 

chronic non-payment toward his obligations, and recited the following three relevant findings of 

fact, inter alia: 

Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP. had standing to enforce the Mortgage and 

Note 

2. Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP was in possession of a valid Affidavit of 

Lost Note, properly effectuated by prior Note servicer Bank of America, NA. 

3 Defendant failed to properly execute recission of the loan." 

Id at 4.8 

On December 7, 2020, Mr. Fielding, through former counsel, filed a timely appeal of the 

Order and Judgment to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The appellate court quashed the appeal 

on February 16, 2021. On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP filed a Praecipe for 

While the docketed record reflects that Mr. Thomas still represents Mr. Fielding, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

issued a two-year suspension of Mr Thomas' license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on 

October I,2021. Appellant has proceeded pro se in the current litigation before this Court. 

3 
Writ of Execution, and the Philadelphia Sheriff's Department initially scheduled a Sheriff's Sale 

of the Property for May 4, 2021. In response, Defendant Fielding filed a Motion to Strike the Writ 

on April 8, 2021 and the sale was continued until July 13, 2021. 

On June 15, 2021, Judge Tsai granted Defendant's Motion to Strike the Writ, after finding 

that the Prothonotary had lacked jurisdiction to enter the writ, due to then pending appeal. As a. 

result, the City of Philadelphia Sheriff's Department cancelled the July 13, 2021 sale of the subject 

Property. Thereafter, the matter was stayed for over a year due to the entry of Administrative Order 

No. 18, by the Court of Common Pleas for the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, which had 

directed a moratorium of all sheriff's sales due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Administrative Order No. 18, expired on December 31, 2021, and on June 29, 2022, current 

servicer, and Plaintiff, MTGLQ Investors, LP, filed a second Praecipe for Writ of Execution. Thd 

City of Philadelphia Sheriff's Department subsequently scheduled a sale of the Property f6i 

October 4, 2022. On October 3, 2022, at or around 6:24 P.M., Defendant Calvin Fielding Sr. filed 

an Emergency Petition to Stay Sale,' which was assigned to this Court as the presiding Judge of 

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Civil Motions program. In his Petition, Mr. Fielding 

repeated his previously disproven and completely resolved claims, that he had rescinded the loan, 

that the lost Note had been fraudulently obtained, and that Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, LP had 

lacked standing to foreclose on the Mortgage and Note. This Court scheduled an emergency 

hearing to address Appellant's Emergency Petition to Stay Sale for 10:00 A.M. on October 4,202i 

in Courtroom 446 City Hall Philadelphia, PA. 

At the hearing, Mr. Fielding appeared in person pro se, and Sara McCaffrey Esquire, 

appeared as counsel for Plaintiff by phone, because Appellant had filed to abide by this Court's 

3 Appellant interchangeably references this filing as both an Emergency Motion to Stay a Sale and a Petition to Stay 

Sale. 

4 

Writ of Execution, and the Philadelphia Sheriffs Department initially scheduled a Sheriffs Sale 

of the Property for May 4, 2021. In response, Defendant Fielding filed a Motion to Strike the Writ 

on April 8, 2021 and the sale was continued until July 13, 2021. 

On June 15, 2021, Judge Tsai granted Defendant's Motion to Strike the Writ, after finding 

that the Prothonotary had lacked jurisdiction to enter the writ, due to then pending appeal. As a 

result, 

the City of Philadelphia Sheriff's Department cancelled the July 13,2021 sale of the subject 

Property. Thereafter, the matter was stayed for over a year due to the entry of Administrative Order 

No. 18, by the Count of Common Pleas for the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, which had 

directed a moratorium of all sheriffs sales due to the COVID-I9 pandemic. 

Administrative Order No. 18, expired on December 31,2021, and on June 29, 2022, current 

servicer, and Plaintiff, MTGLQ Investors, LP, filed a second Praecipe for Writ of Execution. The 

City of Philadelphia Sheriff's Department subsequently scheduled a sale of the Property fot 

October 4, 2022. On October 3, 2022, at or around 6.24 P.M., Defendant Calvin Fielding Sr. filed 

an Emergency Petition to Stay Sale, which was assigned to this Court as the presiding Judge of 

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Civil Motions program. In his Petition, Mr. Fielding 

repeated his previously disproven and completely resolved claims, that he had rescinded the loan, 

that the lost Note had been fraudulently obtained, and that Plaintiff MTGLO Investors, LP had 

lacked standing to foreclose on the Mortgage and Note. This Court scheduled an emergency 

hearing to address Appellant's Emergency Petition to Stay Sale for 10:00 A.M. on October 4, 2022 

in Courtroom 446 City Hall Philadelphia, PA 

At the hearing, Mr. Fielding appeared in person pro se, and Sara McCaffrey Esquire, 

appeared as counsel for Plaintiff by phone, because Appellant had filed to abide by this Court's 

Appellant interchangeably references this filing as both an Emergency Motion to Stay a Sale and a Petition to Stay 

Sale 

4 
previously issued Ex Parte Order directing him to serve Plaintiff with a copy of his Emergency 

Petition to Stay and Rule and Notice of hearing date, time, and location. See Notes of Testimony 

from hearing on October 4, 2022 p. 13. 

Counsel for Plaintiff, Sara McCaffrey, Esquire, duly informed this Court that MTGLQ 

Investors, LP had previously and properly served Appellant with a copy of the Writ and Notice of 

the Sheriff Sale by certified mail and by posting to the Property. Id. at 16. Plaintiffs attorney 

further related that Mr. Fielding had rejected all offers of loan mitigation, contrary to his false 

representations to this Court. Id. at 17. In response, Appellant repeated his claims that he had 

rescinded the loan, and that the Affidavit of Lost Note had been fraudulently issued. He demanded 

that the matter be listed for another trial. Id. at 20. Having determined that Appellant had presented 

zero credible basis for his requested relief, this Court denied the Emergency Petition to Stay Sale: 

Id. at. 22. The Property was sold at sheriff sale and auction that same day. No appeal was filed. 

Instead of filing any timely appeal of this Court's Order of October 4, 2022, Appellant filed 

a Motion to Set Aside the Sale on October 17, 2022, which regurgitated the same arguments that 

had been raised within his Emergency Petition to Stay the Sale and during prior oral argument and 

offered testimony. This Court formally denied the Motion to Set Aside the Sale on November 10, 

2022. Mr. Calvin Fielding filed an appeal of this Court's Order of November 10, 2022 denying the 

Motion to Set Aside the Sale on December 6, 2022. 

On January 4, 2023, this Court directed Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). In 

response, Appellant filed a 1925(b) Statement raising the following verbatim twelve ( 12) claims: 

1. "Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

giving no basis for the denial and dismissal... 

5 

previously issued Er Parte Order directing him to serve Plaintiff with a copy of his Emergency 

Petition to Stay and Rule and Notice of hearing date, time, and location. See Notes of Testimony 

from hearing on October 4, 2022 p. 13 

Counsel for Plaintiff, Sara Mccaffrey, Esquire, duly informed this Court that MTGLQ 

Investors, LP had previously and properly served Appellant with a copy of the Writ and Notice of 

the Sheriff Sale by certified mail and by posting to the Property. Id at 16. Plaintiff's attorney 

further related that Mr. Fielding had rejected all offers of loan mitigation, contrary to his false 

representations to this Court. Id. at 17. In response, Appellant repeated his claims that he had 

rescinded the loan, and that the Affidavit of Lost Note had been fraudulently issued. He demanded 

that the matter be listed for another trial. Id. at 20. Having determined that Appellant had presented 

zero credible basis for his requested relief, this Court denied the Emergency Petition to Stay Sale 

ld at. 22. The Property was sold at sheriff sale and auction that same day. No appeal was filed. 

Instead of filing any timely appeal of this Court's Order of October 4, 2022, Appellant filed 

a Motion to Set Aside the Sale on October 17, 2022, which regurgitated the same arguments that 

had been raised within his Emergency Petition to Stay the Sale and during prior oral argument and 

offered testimony. This Court formally denied the Motion to Set Aside the Sale on November 10, 

2022. Mr. Calvin Fielding filed an appeal of this Court's Order of November 10, 2022 denying the 

Motion to Set Aside the Sale on December 6, 2022. 

On January 4, 2023, this Court directed Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). In 

response, Appellant filed a 1925(b) Statement raising the following verbatim twelve (12) claims: 

Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

giving no basis for the denial and dismissal.. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

since The sale should not have been permitted to proceed because a loan 

modification was offered and pending.... 

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

since The sale should not have been permitted to proceed because it was a breach 

of contract... 

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

since the sale should not have been permitted to proceed because the Plaintiff 

admitted they never sent a correct Notice of Intent to Foreclose... 

5. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

because the Plaintiff lacked standing... 

6. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly attach an opinion... 

7. Whether the trial court erred fails to recognize the new evidence of the lost 

note robo signed documents and forge file by the plaintiff's complaint... 

8. Whether the trial court erred of the plaintiff complaint of having a clear 

chain of Title without proof of assignment... 

9. Whether the trial court erred in ignoring the Violation Cease & Desist order 

of evidence from the SEC filings that the companies have a long history of nonexisting and abuse and has been penalized an agreement with the SEC... 

10. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow for the defense Declaration 

of Private Investigator, Mortgage auditor William J. Paatalo ( sp) findings of 

Facts... 

11. Whether The trial courts allow a Volition of a false substitution after the 

default was entered in trial court proceeding was ongoing... 

12. Whether the trial courts erred to ignoring Violation Cease & Desist order of 

consent Judgements from the Office of the Comptroller of Currency by Continuing 

to use Deceptive Practices. Voide (sp) Notices of Default. Notices of sale." 

DISCUSSION

Despite Appellant's listing of a myriad of perceived errors, no claim has been presented 

that is deserving of appellate relief. Appellant complained in claims numbered one ( 1) and six ( 6), 

that this Court had erred by not attaching to its November 10, 2022 Order, a memorandum opinion 

stating the rationale for the dismissal of his Motion to Set Aside the Sale. Since neither the 

Pennsylvania nor the Philadelphia Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that a trial court include an 

Opinion or Memorandum with their Orders, these claims should be summarily dismissed. 

6 

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

since The sale should not have been permitted to proceed because a loan 

modification was offered and pending. 

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

since The sale should not have been permitted to proceed because it was a breach 

of contract. 

4 Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

since the sale should not have been permitted to proceed because the Plaintiff 

admitted they never sent a correct Notice of Intent to Foreclose... 

5. Whether the trial court erred in denying my motion to Set Aside The Sale, 

because the Plaintiff lacked standing. 

6. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly attach an opinion.. 

7. Whether the trial court erred fails to recognize the new evidence of the lost 

note robo signed documents and forge file by the plaintiffs complaint. 

8. Whether the trial court erred of the plaintiff complaint of having a clear 

chain of Title without proof of assignment. . 

9, Whether the trial court erred in ignoring the Violation Cease & Desist order 

of evidence from the SEC filings that the companies have a long history of nonexisting and abuse and has been penalized an agreement with the SEC... 

10, Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow for the defense Declaration 

of Private Investigator, Mortgage auditor William J, Paatalo (sp) findings of 

Facts... 

1 Whether The trial courts allow a Volition of a false substitution after the 

default was entered in trial court proceeding was ongoing... 

2. Whether the trial courts erred to ignoring Violation Cease & Desist order of 

consent Judgements from the Office of the Comptroller of Currency by Continuing 

to use Deceptive Practices. Voide (sp) Notices of Default. Notices of sale." 

DISCUSSION 

Despite Appellant's listing of a myriad of perceived errors, no claim has been presented 

that is deserving of appellate relief. Appellant complained in claims numbered one (1) and six (6), 

that this Court had erred by not attaching to its November 10, 2022 Order, a memorandum opinion 

stating the rationale for the dismissal of his Motion to Set Aside the Sale. Since neither the 

Pennsylvania nor the Philadelphia Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that a trial court include an 

Opinion or Memorandum with their Orders, these claims should be summarily dismissed 

6 
Moreover, since this Court had already responded to Appellant's previously filed and 

litigated Emergency Motion to Set Aside the Sale, which had included mirror imaged claims to the 

subject Motion to Set Aside the Sale, Appellant had demonstrated no prejudice for this Court's lack 

of additional comments within the subject Order. Appellant did not appeal this Court's ruling and 

had been well-advised of this Court's rationale and of Judge Tsai's previous relevant findings. 

Within appellate claim number two (2), Appellant asserted "that the sale should not have 

been permitted to proceed because a loan modification was offered and pending." This complaint 

directly contradicts credible evidence that had been introduced during the hearing held before this 

Court on October 4, 2022 in response to Mr. Fielding's last minute Emergency Petition to Stay the 

Sale. Indeed, the relevant evidence that had been introduced demonstrated quite convincingly that 

Appellant's claim of a pending loan modification had been patently false because Appellant had 

repeatedly refused Plaintiff's offers to him to modify the loan obligations. 

Additionally, Appellant's claim number three (3), recites that the sheriff sale should not 

have gone forward because it " was a breach of contract.," This complaint should be dismissed as 

it is too vague and overly broad. Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) requires an appellant to "concisely 

identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to 

be raised for the judge." A vague and overly broad issue is deemed waived as it is equivocal to not 

raising the claim at all. See Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); Hess v. 

Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 803-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). Mr. Fielding's third claim is so 

ambiguous that this Court must guess as to the source of his grievance. Thus, this patently meritless 

protest had been waived. Similarly, Appellant does not narrate a coherent sentence within claim 

numbered eleven ( 11). Since this Court again cannot reasonably determine what claim Appellant 

is asserting, it has been waived as undecipherable. 

7 

Moreover, since this Court had already responded to Appellant's previously filed and 

litigated Emergency Motion to Set Aside the Sale, which had included mirror imaged claims to the 

subject Motion to Set Aside the Sale, Appellant had demonstrated no prejudice for this Court's lack 

of additional comments within the subject Order. Appellant did not appeal this Court's ruling and 

had been well-advised of this Court's rationale and of Judge Tsai's previous relevant findings. 

Within appellate claim number two (2), Appellant asserted "that the sale should not have 

been permitted to proceed because a loan modification was offered and pending." This complaint 

directly contradicts eredible evidence that had been introduced during the hearing held before this 

Court on October 4, 2022 in response to Mr. Fielding's last minute Emergency Petition to Stay the 

Sale. Indeed, the relevant evidence that had been introduced demonstrated quite convincingly that 

Appellant's claim of a pending loan modification had been patently false because Appellant had 

repeatedly refused Plaintiff's offers to him to modify the loan obligations 

Additionally, Appellant's claim number three (3), recites that the sheriff sale should not 

have gone forward because it was a breach of contract_" This complaint should be dismissed as 

it is too vague and overly broad. Pa. R.A.P. 1925()(4(ii) requires an appellant to "concisely 

identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to 

be raised for the judge." A vague and overly broad issue is deemed waived as it is equivocal to not 

raising the claim at all. See Lineberger • Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); Hess v 

Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 803-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). Mr. Fielding's third claim is so 

ambiguous that this Court must guess as to the source of his grievance. Thus, this patently meritless 

protest had been waived. Similarly, Appellant does not narrate a coherent sentence within claim 

numbered eleven (H). Since this Court again cannot reasonably determine what claim Appellant 

is asserting, it has been waived as undecipherable. 

7 
Appellant's remaining complaints lack any legitimate factual or legal basis that could 

warrant any relief. Mr. Fielding submitted zero evidence to justify setting aside the sheriff sale of 

the subject property. Instead, his Motion to Set Aside the Sale simply reiterated his claims from 

previously litigated foreclosure action that had long since been entered as a Judgment and Order 

following trial. 

Specifically, Pa.R.C.P. No. 3132 sets forth direction for when petitions to set aside sheriff s 

sales may be allowed: 

"Upon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the personal property or 

of the sheriff's deed to real property, the court may, upon proper cause shown, set 

aside the sale and order a resale or enter any other order which may be just and 

proper under the circumstances." 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 3132. In determining whether to set aside a sheriff's sale, "[e]quitable 

considerations govern the trial court's decision." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Estate of Hood, 47 A.3d 

1208, 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (internal citation omitted). It is well settled that the burden of 

proof is on the petitioner: 

"As a general rule, the burden of proving circumstances warranting the exercise of 

the court's equitable powers is on the applicant, and the application to set aside a 

sheriff's sale may be refused because of the insufficiency of proof to support the 

material allegations of the application, which are generally required to be 

established by clear evidence." 

Id. (internal citation omitted). A trial court's decision on a petition to set aside will "not 

[be] reverse[d] ... absent an abuse of discretion." Id. 

Appellant had requested this Court exercise its equitable powers based on a vague 

proclamation of fraud, and of a false statement that there had been a pending loan modification 

agreement. Mr. Fielding provided no evidence to support either assertion. To the contrary, 

Plaintiff, by and through its counsel, had previously and repeatedly debunked these bold claims 

both during the trial and later during subsequent hearing that this Court had conducted on October 

8 

Appellant's remaining complaints lack any legitimate factual or legal basis that could 

warrant any relief. Mr, Fielding submitted zero evidence to justify setting aside the sheriff sale of 

the subject property, Instead, his Motion to Set Aside the Sale simply reiterated his claims from 

previously litigated foreclosure action that had long since been entered as a Judgment and Order 

following trial 

Specifically, Pa.R.C.P. No. 3132 sets forth direction for when petitions to set aside sheriffs 

sales may be allowed: 

Upon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the personal property or 

of the sheriffs deed to real property, the court may, upon proper cause shown, set 

aside the sale and order a resale or enter any other order which may be just and 

proper under the circumstances." 

Pa.RC.P. No. 3132. In determining whether to set aside a sheriff's sale, "[equitable 

considerations govern the trial court's decision." Bank of Am., N.A. • Estate of Hood, 47 A.3d 

1208, 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (internal citation omitted). It is well settled that the burden of 

proof is on the petitioner 

As a general rule, the burden of proving circumstances warranting the exercise of 

the court's equitable powers is on the applicant, and the application to set aside a 

sheriffs sale may be refused because of the insufficiency of proof to support the 

material allegations of the application, which are generally required to be 

established by clear evidence." 

Id (internal citation omitted). A trial court's decision on a petition to set aside will "not 

[be] reverse[d] . absent an abuse of discretion." Id 

Appellant had requested this Court exercise its equitable powers based on a vague 

proclamation of fraud, and of a false statement that there had been a pending loan modification 

agreement. Mr. Fielding provided no evidence to support either assertion. To the contrary, 

Plaintiff, by and through its counsel, had previously and repeatedly debunked these bold claims 

both during the trial and later during subsequent hearing that this Court had conducted on October 

8 
4, 2022 to address the earlier Emergency Petition to Stay the Sheriff Sale. No appeal was filed 

following this Court Order that had been entered denying the Emergency Petition to Stay the 

Sheriff Sale on October 4, 2022. Instead, Appellant subsequently filed the meritless Motion to Set 

Aside the Sale which had constituted a belated and repeated attempt to revive previously disposed 

claims. 

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Sale, on its face, contained vague, repetitive, and 

conclusory written statements that had been devoid of any factual or legal support. For instance, 

Mr. Fielding referred to a "pending loan modification agreement" between himself and MTGLQ 

as justification to set aside the sale. However, the record soundly reflects that Mr. Fielding 

repeatedly rejected Plaintiff's offers to enter into a loan modification agreement leading up to the 

Sheriff's Sale. Nor did Appellant provide any documentation or evidence which had demonstrated 

that there had been any subsequent discussions about a loan modification. Given Mr. Fielding's 

characterization of Plaintiffs as "bottom-feeder debt collectors," there is no reason to believe that 

he had approached any loan modification effort with good faith intentions. 

Appellate claims numbered nine (9) and twelve ( 12), referenced unrelated findings against 

prior Plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, hereinafter "WSFS", made by the United 

States Securities and Exchange Commission, hereafter " SEC," and Office of the Comptroller of 

Currency. These criticisms lacked any nexus to Appellant's current circumstances.' Notably, Mr. 

Fielding's "Exhibit I" which documented an SEC decision to institute cease-and-desist 

proceedings against WSFS, pertained to their dealings with a Mr. Andrew Proctor. As such, this 

document was completely irrelevant and not permissibly entered evidence. Moreover, Appellant's 

references to these extraneous findings offered no justification to set aside the sale. 

4 While Mr. Fielding referred to an Office of the Comptroller of Currency decision as an attached Exhibit "J" in his 

petition, he failed to attach the exhibit. 

9 

4, 2022 to address the earlier Emergeney Petition to Stay the Sheriff Sale. No appeal was filed 

following this Court Order that had been entered denying the Emergency Petition to Stay the 

Sheriff Sale on October 4, 2022. Instead, Appellant subsequently filed the meritless Motion to Set 

Aside the Sale which had constituted a belated and repeated attempt to revive previously disposed 

claims. 

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Sale, on its face, contained vague, repetitive, and 

conclusory written statements that had been devoid of any factual or legal support. For instance, 

Mr. Fielding referred to a pending loan modification agreement" between himself and MTGLQ 

as justification to set aside the sale. However, the record soundly reflects that Mr. Fielding 

repeatedly rejected Plaintiffs offers to enter into a loan modification agreement leading up to the 

Sheriffs Sale. Nor did Appellant provide any documentation or evidence which had demonstrated 

that there had been any subsequent discussions about a loan modification. Given Mr. Fielding's 

characterization of Plaintiffs as "bottom-feeder debt collectors," there is no reason to believe that 

he had approached any loan modification effort with good faith intentions 

Appellate claims numbered nine (9) and twelve (2), referenced unrelated findings against 

prior Plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, hereinafter WSFS", made by the United 

States Securities and Exchange Commission, hereafter "SEC," and Office of the Comptroller of 

Currency. These criticisms lacked any nexus to Appellant's current circumstances. Notably, Mr, 

Fielding's "Exhibit I" which documented an SEC decision to institute cease-and-desist 

proceedings against WSFS, pertained to their dealings with a Mr. Andrew Proctor. As such, this 

document was completely irrelevant and not permissibly entered evidence. Moreover, Appellant's 

references to these extraneous findings offered no justification to set aside the sale. 

While Mr. Fielding referred to an Office of the Comptroller of Currency decision as an attached Exhibit l in his 

petition, he failed to attach the exhibit 

9 
The remainder of Mr. Fielding's claims, lack of evidence notwithstanding, constituted 

nothing more than baseless attacks upon the validity of the underlying final judgement that had 

been entered in 2020. Notably, a trial court may not modify an Order after thirty ( 30) days of its 

entry. P.A.R.C.P § 5505. See also Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 504 A.2d 335, 337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1986) ("A entered in adverse proceedings becomes final if no appeal therefrom is filed within 

thirty days.") Once this window passes, a trial court may not rescind an order or relitigate the 

underlying issues. Simpson at 337. Similarly, a court may not relitigate issues determined by a 

court of higher or concurrent jurisdiction. Com. v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) 

(discussing the " law of the case" doctrine). 

Appellant's claims, that as the previous Defendant, he had rescinded the Note and 

Mortgage, and that the Plaintiff MTGLQ had lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure, and that 

the Affidavit ofLost Note had been fraudulent. Each assertion had been previously presented during 

trial before Judge Tsai, who found them without merit, and entered a judgement in favor of the 

Plaintiff in 2020. Mr. Fielding appealed the verdict, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

dismissed his appeal. Thus, the Order and Judgment had become final well before Appellant 

appeared before this Court on the eve of the Sheriff Sale and again after the property had been 

sold. Since the underlying facts of this case had been long since settled, Appellant is not entitled 

to relitigate them. 

Summarily, Appellant has failed to present any clear evidence or reason to warrant this 

Court to exercise its equitable power to set aside the Sheriff's Sale. Instead, he presented this 

Court with wild, baseless claims to illegally relitigate a long- settled matter. Since there had been 

no proper cause demonstrated to set aside the Sheriff's Sale, this Court had committed no error or 

1 

abuse in discretion by denying Mr. Calvin Fielding's Motion to Set Aside the Sale. 

10 

The remainder of Mr. Fielding's claims, lack of evidence notwithstanding, constituted 

nothing more than baseless attacks upon the validity of the underlying final judgement that had 

been entered in 2020. Notably, a trial court may not modify an Order after thirty (30) days of its 

entry. P.A.R.C.P $ 5505. See also Simpson • Allstate Ins. Co., 504 A.24 335, 337 (Pa. Super. Ct 

1986) (A entered in adverse proceedings becomes final if no appeal therefrom is filed within 

thirty days.") Once this window passes, a trial court may not rescind an order or relitigate the 

underlying issues. Simpson at 337, Similarly, a court may not relitigate issues determined by a 

court of higher or concurrent jurisdiction. Com ». Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) 

(discussing the "law of the case" doctrine). 

Appellant's claims, that as the previous Defendant, he had rescinded the Note and 

Mortgage, and that the Plaintiff MTGLQ had lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure, and that 

the Affidavit of Lost Note had been fraudulent. Each assertion had been previously presented during 

trial before Judge Tsai, who found them without merit, and entered a judgement in favor of the 

Plaintiff in 2020. Mr. Fielding appealed the verdict, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

dismissed his appeal. Thus, the Order and Judgment had become final well before Appellant 

appeared before this Court on the eve of the Sheriff Sale and again after the property had been 

sold. Since the underlying facts of this case had been long since settled, Appellant is not entitled 

to relitigate them 

Summarily, Appellant has failed to present any clear evidence or reason to warrant this 

Court to exercise its equitable power to set aside the Sheriffs Sale. Instead, he presented this 

Court with wild, baseless claims to illegally relitigate a long-settled matter. Since there had been 

no proper cause demonstrated to set aside the Sheriffs Sale, this Court had committed no error or 

abuse in discretion by denying Mr. Calvin Fielding's Motion to Set Aside the Sale 

IO 
CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully requests that its Order of November 

10, 2022 denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Sale be affirmed. 

BY THE COURT: 

Hon. - ✓- Anne arie 1•_ - / B. Coyle, J. 

11 

CONCLUSION 

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully requests that its Order of November 

10, 2022 denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Sale be affirmed. 

RY THE COURT: 

-;? H:n. Anne ;�rlc B. 

�oyle, 

J.