In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-12-00124-CR 

RICHARD AHMED ZAMBRANA, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 131,171-2, Honorable Pamela Cook Sirmon, Presiding 

 

February 24, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Appellant Richard Ahmed Zambrana appeals from his conviction by jury of an 

assault against his wife causing bodily injury1and the resulting punishment of 45 days 

in county jail and a $300 fine. He presents two issues. Finding appellant has not 

shown the trial court erred, we will affirm the court’s judgment. 

 

1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West 2012). The conviction resulted from the 

second trial on this charge; the first trial ended in a mistrial. 
2

Background

The State’s information alleged appellant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

caused bodily injury to Tina Alexander-Zambrana,2by squeezing her arm with his hand, 

grabbing her with his hand, grabbing her hair with his hand or kicking her, and that she 

was then a member of his family or household. At the time of the assault in May 2011, 

Alexander and appellant were married but separated. They, however, “continued to 

work on their marriage.” The couple went to a restaurant to celebrate appellant’s 

birthday. Both had drinks with their meal. At the end of the two-and-a-half-hour meal, 

appellant argued with the restaurant manager. Alexander testified that when they left 

the restaurant, she asked appellant for his keys because he had too much to drink. 

Appellant became angry, grabbed her arm, pulled her hair and kicked her. She got out 

of the car and appellant drove off. Restaurant employees testified both to the 

confrontation between appellant and the manager, and to appellant’s conduct toward 

his wife like that alleged in the information.

Alexander also testified, over objection, that about six weeks after the incident at 

the restaurant, appellant called and asked her not to testify or to change her story and if 

she did not, he would “make things very obnoxious” for her. Appellant testified at trial, 

denying any assault to Alexander.

 

2 Hereafter, we refer to the victim of appellant’s assault as Tina Alexander, which 

is the name by which she identified herself at trial.
3

Analysis

Defect in Court’s Judgment

The judgment the trial court signed states the “offense convicted of:” as “assault 

(domestic violence).” It also states the “degree of offense:” as “class ‘A’ misdemeanor.” 

The judgment also later recites that appellant “pleaded Not Guilty to the offense as 

alleged in the Information herein, to wit: Assault (Domestic Violence), a Class ‘A’ 

Misdemeanor.” The judgment recites the verdict of the jury as finding appellant “guilty 

of the offense of Assault, Domestic Violence, as charged in the Information.”3 The 

judgment’s ordering paragraph states that appellant “is hereby adjudged guilty of the 

offense of Assault (Domestic violence), a Class ‘A’ Misdemeanor, as found by the Jury.” 

The judgment’s paragraph ordering appellant’s sentence repeats the same statement, 

decreeing that “[appellant], who has been adjudged guilty of the offense of Assault 

(Domestic Violence), a Class ’A’ Misdemeanor . . . .” 

The judgment further contains an affirmative finding “that the victim of this 

offense was a family member of the defendant or a member of the defendant’s 

household.”4

 

3 The recitation in the judgment is accurate. The verdict form reflects the jury’s 

finding of appellant “guilty of the offense of Assault, Domestic Violence as charged in 

the Information.” The court’s charge instructed the jury that “Our law provides that a 

person commits the offense of Assault, Domestic Violence if he intentionally, knowingly 

or recklessly causes bodily injury to a member of the Defendant’s family or household.” 

The charge further defined “family” to include “individuals who are married to each 

other.”

4 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.013 (West 2013) (requiring affirmative 

finding of family violence).
4

The judgment’s characterization of the offense as assault (domestic violence) is 

consistent with the offense’s characterization from the outset of the case. The 

information states at its outset, “Offense: Assault – Class A (Domestic Violence).”

Despite the quoted statements in the judgment, by his first issue appellant 

contends the judgment reflects his conviction only of a Class C misdemeanor offense. 

By appellant’s reasoning, because the judgment omits any reference to bodily injury, it 

must refer to an assault constituting a Class C misdemeanor offense. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 22.01(c) (West 2012) (providing, with exceptions, that assaults committed 

in the manners defined in § 22.01(a)(2) and (a)(3), not requiring bodily injury, are Class 

C misdemeanors). Because the information charged appellant with the means of 

assault causing bodily injury, that defined in § 22.01(a)(1), a Class A misdemeanor, see

§ 22.01(b), appellant sees what he describes as a “fatal variance” in the record, 

requiring his acquittal on the Class A misdemeanor offense.

Appellant cites our opinion in Tanner v. State, 335 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2011, no pet.), as authority. Tanner involved a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the proof that the defendant’s prior misdemeanor assault had been committed against a 

family member, which proof was necessary to enhance his later assault to a third 

degree felony. Id. at 785; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A) (West 2012). 

Finding the evidence insufficient to establish the enhancement, we reversed his felony 

conviction and remanded the cause for entry of a misdemeanor conviction judgment 

and resentencing. Id. at 786. Tanner does not support appellant’s argument. There is 

no contention that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support conviction on the 
5

charged offense of assault causing bodily injury. The victim’s testimony was sufficient 

to show her bodily injury, and appellant does not contend otherwise.

Nor does this record present a fatal variance. “A variance occurs when there is a 

discrepancy between the allegation in the charging instrument and the proof at trial. In 

a variance situation, the State has proven the defendant guilty of a crime, but has 

proven its commission in a manner that varies from the allegations in the charging 

instrument.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). No 

discrepancy between the information, which charged assault causing bodily injury, and 

the proof at trial, which showed bodily injury, appears here. The State’s proof matched 

the allegations of its charging instrument.

None of the authority appellant cites supports his argument that because the 

judgment omits express reference to bodily injury, it must refer to assault as a Class C 

misdemeanor offense. See Johnson v. State, 409 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (modifying judgment but noting defendant cited no 

authority for complaint regarding manner in which offense was described in judgment). 

For all these reasons, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

Admission of Evidence of Extraneous Misconduct

During trial, Alexander testified that on two occasions, about six weeks after the 

incident at the restaurant, appellant contacted her, asking that she lie for him and say 

she “made everything up.” He also told her he would “make things very obnoxious for 

[her]” if she testified at trial. Appellant objected to the testimony, arguing Rule of 
6

Evidence 404(b) required its exclusion. The trial court disagreed. By his second issue, 

appellant complains of the court’s admission of the testimony. We overrule the issue.

Assuming, without deciding, the trial court erred by overruling the objections 

raised, we have no hesitation to conclude the error was harmless. 

Erroneous admission of the testimony would be subject to error analysis under 

the standard for nonconstitutional errors. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Hernandez v. State,

176 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We must disregard a nonconstitutional 

error that does not affect a criminal defendant's "substantial rights." TEX. R. APP. P. 

44.2(b). An error affects a substantial right of the defendant when the error has a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. King v. 

State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Reversible error has not occurred if 

we, after examining the record as a whole, have "fair assurance that the error did not 

influence the jury, or had but a slight effect." Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002).

In his testimony before the jury, appellant acknowledged his argumentative 

encounter with the restaurant manager. But he testified he engaged in no assaultive 

behavior toward his wife. Confronted on cross examination with her testimony, and that 

of the restaurant employee, appellant responded they were lying. Because of the sharp 

conflict between their versions of the incident, appellant argues, the improper admission 

of evidence of his later misconduct swayed the jury toward acceptance of Alexander’s 
7

account of the assault. Having reviewed the entire trial record, we cannot agree her 

testimony of their telephone conversations had such a substantial and injurious effect.

The testimony regarding the telephone conversations was like that regarding the 

assault: Alexander said he made the statements attempting to influence her testimony; 

appellant denied making the statements. There was no evidence he made the 

statements other than her testimony. We see no indication in the record of a likelihood 

the jury accepted her testimony about the assault only because they found her 

testimony about the telephone conversations credible. Said another way, if jurors did 

not believe Alexander’s version of the assault, we see no reason they should have 

believed her version of the telephone conversations. See Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 

254, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and 

is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony). Nor were the 

telephone conversations further emphasized to the jury; they were not mentioned during 

counsel’s arguments.

Viewing the record as a whole, we are fairly assured that any error in admitting 

Alexander’s testimony relating to the two conversations with appellant did not influence 

the jury, or had but a slight effect, in finding appellant guilty. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at 

417. 

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James T. Campbell

 Justice

Do not publish. 

.