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NEXT STEPS ON EGYPT POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 29, 2013

Serial No. 113–106

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

Near East Affairs, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 6

The Honorable Derek Chollet, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................................... 15

Ms. Alina Romanowski, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the Middle East, U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones: Prepared statement ..................................... 9

The Honorable Derek Chollet: Prepared statement .............................................. 17

Ms. Alina Romanowski: Prepared statement ........................................................ 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

Written responses from the Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on 

Foreign Affairs ..................................................................................................... 61

Questions submitted for the record to the Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones 

by: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Texas ............................................................................................. 73

The Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana .......................................................................................................... 75

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NEXT STEPS ON EGYPT POLICY 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing for the committee will come to 

order. 

Next steps on Egypt policy is what we’re looking at today and 

we’re looking at a very challenging U.S.-Egypt relationship. 

Since President Mubarak’s fall Egypt has been in political, economic and social turmoil. This has seriously strained and some 

have suggested imperiled our very important relationship with 

Egypt. It has certainly put our considerable interests in the region 

at risk. 

Like many Arab countries, Egypt is struggling to overcome a lack 

of democratic traditions. While the Muslim Brotherhood-led government was democratically elected, it governed autocratically. 

Yet the U.S. administration was perceived in the region as passive as President Mohamed Morsi grabbed power, squashing individual rights, sidelining the courts and declaring himself above the 

law. 

Coptic Christians in particular were left vulnerable, facing frequent deadly attacks. Today, it is critical the U.S. use its influence 

to help guide the new government toward a democratic constitution 

that respects individual liberties including those of women and minorities. 

Maybe enough Egyptians have realized that their proud and historic country could become violent and ungovernable if they refuse 

to move ahead in a peaceful and positive way. 

This will require that the government reach out to responsible 

opposition members instead of vilifying them with a broad brush. 

But it also demands a determined and sustained campaign 

against those Brotherhood activists who are deeply committed to 

violence and tyranny. The fact that these extremists are actively 

hostile to American interests binds us with the Egyptian Government. 

That is why I support a continued and robust military relationship with Egypt and today we’ll hear what the administration has 

planned in this area. 

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A too little noted reality is that Egypt has little chance of becoming a stable democracy given its destructive economic policies. 

Those policies have to change. 

The revolt against Mubarak was largely inspired by economic 

grievances. For those that remember, they had lines at the time. 

Renowned Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto testified to this 

committee earlier this year that Egyptian entrepreneurship suffers 

from a systemic lack of property rights. 

If you’ve got to pay 22 bribes to open a pharmacy, if you can’t 

get—exchange title to property, you’ve got a problem. Unfortunately, the current government is perpetuating the stagnant and 

corrupt Mubarak economic model complete with price controls on 

market vendors. 

It was market vendors who sparked revolts throughout the region in 2011 through self-immolation. So this is very problematic 

in terms of the failure to make the right economic reforms there. 

Our decades of economic aid to Egypt in the tens of billions 

propped up an economy that produced great unemployment and 

produced popular discontent. 

Development aid without fundamental economic reforms in 

Egypt is sure to be wasted. To date, the administration has had 

consultations—and some of those are pretty meaningless—with 

Congress on its aid plans. 

I’ve sat through some of those meetings and I have to tell you 

the point has to be made we’ve got to put together a plan that will 

address these issues of economic reform in that society. It has to 

change. 

Of course, Egypt is a crisis decades in the making. We should 

learn from our mistakes and, more importantly, Egyptians must 

learn from their mistakes. 

It is they who will determine their nation’s future, not us, and 

hopefully they’ll reject the form of extremism that will only lead to 

the rights of women being eviscerated and minorities under attack 

in a gutted judicial system. 

As one Egyptian recently told The Economist the Muslim Brotherhood was implementing a plan to burn down Egypt and destroy 

its foundation. 

While we would like a democratic partner for our many security 

interests in the region, we need a partner. We should push and 

pull with what influence we have, and I’ll now turn to the ranking 

member for his opening remarks. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for calling this important hearing. I listened to your 

statement and I agree with everything you said. 

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us today. 

You all have very difficult jobs and I appreciate your service. 

In managing America’s foreign policy there are times when our 

ideals and our security interests don’t conveniently align. The situation in Egypt today is case in point. 

For the time being, the Egyptian military’s recent removal of 

President Morsi has replaced one autocratic government with another. Over the last 3 months more than 1,000 people have been 

killed in the crack down on pro-Morsi protesters. 

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Freedom of the press remains stifled, the economy is rattled by 

instability and religious minorities don’t feel safe in their own communities. Yet the government the military replaced was no paragon 

of virtue. 

It is true that President Morsi won a reasonably free and fair 

democratic election with 52 percent of the vote. But at the time 

this rushed election took place the Muslim Brotherhood was the 

only organized political institution in the country. 

Morsi famously promised to rule for all Egyptians but upon taking office he failed to uphold basic democratic values and treated 

his election victory as a license to rule in any way he saw fit. 

President Morsi issued decrees that sacked the prosecutor general, immunized presidential decisions from judicial review and 

shielded the Islamic-dominated Shura Council and the constituent 

assembly from dissolution. 

He forced through a referendum on a new constitution that favored Islamists in conservative positions. His government drafted 

an NGO law that essentially placed civil society under state control. 

His judiciary raised bogus cases against journalists and activists. 

His economic ineptitude kept investors and tourists away and 

drove the Egyptian economy to the brink of collapse, and he took 

no meaningful steps to protect minorities or to institutionalize respect for human rights in Egypt’s Government or society. 

By the time the Egyptian military took the extraordinary step of 

removing Egypt’s first democratically elected President from power, 

Morsi was the President in name only. 

He had already brought his country to the brink of collapse and 

was no longer a legitimate ruler in the eyes of a majority of the 

Egyptian people. That was obvious. 

Indeed, the future that Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood had in mind 

for Egypt was one that would have been devastating to most Egyptians, to American interests and the interests of our allies in the 

region. 

It is important to recognize that the Brotherhood’s early doctrines provided the intellectual and theological underpinnings for 

numerous militant Sunni Islamist groups including al-Qaeda and 

Hamas. 

And while the Brotherhood officially renounced violence and terrorism in the 1970s, they have continued to operate in Egypt as a 

shadow state hoping to one day institutionalize Sharia law and 

build an Islamic caliphate through the region. 

So in the wake of Egypt’s most recent leadership transition we 

must ask ourselves a simple question. Are Egyptians and the 

United States better off with a Muslim Brotherhood-led government that was taking Egypt in a very dangerous and undemocratic 

direction or with a military-backed government that is slowly moving to a reboot of Egyptian democracy? 

I think the answer is clear. Immediately after the transition in 

July, I supported the temporary halt in F–16 deliveries to Egypt 

because I thought it sent a simple message that the U.S. was concerned about Egypt’s instability and direction. 

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But today I do not believe that suspending the military aid will 

make the Egyptian Government more democratic or make it easier 

for the United States to influence its behavior in the future. 

In fact, I think it’s more than likely to have the opposite effect 

and I’m afraid it could jeopardize the close U.S.-Egypt military cooperation that we’ve worked so hard to build over the last several 

decades. 

That military cooperation is important. We’ve spent billions of 

dollars. We’ve cemented relationships. Let’s use them. Let’s not destroy them. Let’s use them. 

This cooperation supports critical U.S. national security interests 

in the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. Our close relationship means that U.S. Navy ships are granted special access to the 

Suez Canal. 

U.S. military aircraft are allowed to overtly—I’m sorry, are allowed to overfly Egyptian air space, and that is important in what 

we’re doing in Afghanistan. 

Our military and intelligence services cooperate on numerous regional security issues. The Egyptian military strives to keep the 

Sinai safe and protect the Egyptian-Israeli border, and we cannot 

forget that Egypt fought side by side with us to expel Iraq from Kuwait in the first Gulf War. 

It’s clear that the Egyptian military has made some serious mistakes in managing the ongoing transition. I condemn the violence 

used to break up opposition sit-ins last August and urge the military to refrain from using similar tactics in the future. 

I also hope they will support the creation of an inclusive government that reflects the interests of all Egyptians. 

But if I were given the choice between the military and the 

Brotherhood, I’d take the military every time, understanding that 

this is really a choice for the Egyptian people. 

Finally, with regard to economic assistance, I wanted to take a 

moment to express my strong support for funding the U.S.-Egypt 

Enterprise Fund for which the administration has recently requested approval from the Congress. 

This fund is an excellent example of how we can leverage relatively modest amounts of funding to encourage significant private 

sector investments into Egypt’s economy. 

It’s my hope that we can look past our disagreements on other 

parts of the Egypt aid package and quickly approve funding for this 

program. 

During this fragile period we should be rebuilding partnerships 

in Egypt that enhance our bilateral relationship and support regional stability, and I hope the administration will reconsider its 

decision to suspend most military aid to Egypt. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to thank you for holding this 

hearing and I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We’ll go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairman emeritus of this 

committee and chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East and 

North Africa, for 2 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thanks to Chairman Royce and Ranking 

Member Engel for holding this important hearing because it has 

5

not been easy due to the administration’s uneasiness in addressing 

the American people’s concerns about the dire situation in Egypt 

and whatever the administration’s policy toward Egypt might be 

today. 

It is ever changing. By failing to act decisively before, during and 

after the Morsi era, we have lost so much credibility and leverage 

in Egypt. 

For not disavowing Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from the 

start, the moderate, secular and religious minorities in Egypt felt 

betrayed and believed that the international community was supporting terrorists at their expense. 

Morsi may have won an election but we all know that elections 

alone do not make a democracy. During his time, Morsi failed to 

live up to the principles of a democratic society. 

He oversaw a crack down on civil society, free speech and human 

rights. He imprisoned—he imposed burdensome restrictions on the 

media and imprisoned a high number of journalists. 

The uptick in confrontations in Egypt is a stark reminder that 

the transition to a new democracy is not an easy task but that is 

no excuse for anyone to resort to violence. 

The Obama administration must act responsibly and prioritize 

our foreign policy objectives in Egypt. It’s disappointing that the 

Obama administration recently suspended some aid to Egypt without consulting with Congress. 

We must use whatever leverage in our foreign assistance program to persuade the interim Egyptian Government to act responsibly, to return to the path of democracy and to protect the rights 

of all Egyptians. 

The balance of Egypt and the stability of the Middle East may 

depend on it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

The ranking member of the Subcommittee on Middle East and 

North Africa is Ted Deutch of Florida. We’ll go to him for 2 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding such an important hearing. 

I have many questions and concerns about the decision to suspend some of our assistance to Egypt. 

There is no denying that the violence and the deaths in the 

months following the ouster of Mohamed Morsi has been deplorable 

and it’s been tragic. 

Dictatorial violence runs counter to the Egyptian people’s desire 

to establish a genuine democracy, and as we look back we must remember that on June 30th a vast and historic gathering of millions 

of Egyptians took to the streets to demand the removal of Morsi 

and for a rebirth of true democracy in Egypt. 

It’s true that the military intervened at the request of the protesters only after Morsi made clear that he was not stepping down. 

The tactics used to transition to a new government have been deadly authoritarian and clearly regrettable. 

But when General Sisi announced Morsi’s removal he did so with 

a wide range of Egyptian civil society behind him including the 

Tamarod movement, the Coptic Pope and the Islamist Nour Party. 

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Even now, General Sisi enjoys popular legitimacy among the 

Egyptian people. Our relationship with Egypt is of the utmost strategic importance to our nation and to regional security. 

Egypt provides us with special access to the Suez Canal, overflights in Egyptian air space and, most importantly, as a peace 

treaty with Israel that is vital to regional security, especially today 

as Egypt combats terror in the Sinai. 

Now, we all understand that our aid to the military might be better refocused to more shared security objectives such as counterterrorism and security in the Sinai. 

However, I have concerns about—both with the manner in which 

the suspension was communicated to Congress and to Egypt, and 

I worry that the results of these changes may mean that the 

United States may have less leverage to lead in Egypt. 

Just yesterday the UAE announced an additional $2.9 billion in 

aid for the Egyptian economy. Given the vast resources the Gulf 

States have provided to the interim government, we must act in a 

way to preserve our influence. 

Part of that is through assistance. Part of that is continuing to 

advocate for democracy. And as Egypt is currently working on a political roadmap that will include a new constitution and elections, 

now is the time to increase our leverage to ensure that human 

rights and inclusive democracy are cornerstones of the new government that’s in Egypt’s best interest but, most importantly, it’s in 

our own best interest. 

And I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

This morning we’re joined by representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID. 

Ambassador Jones is Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Near East and she previously served as deputy special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. She was the U.S. Ambassador 

to Kazakhstan back in ’95 to ’98. 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs, 

Derek Chollet is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on 

international security strategy and policy issues. 

And we have Ms. Alina Romanowski, who serves as Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle East bureau of USAID. She 

is responsible for oversight of assistance across the region. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be put in 

the record. Members here may have 5 legislative days to submit 

any statements or questions that they might have or extraneous 

material for the record. 

We’re going to ask our witnesses to summarize their statements 

today and we’ll begin with Ambassador Jones. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EAST AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador JONES. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 

inviting us to discuss next steps on U.S. policy toward Egypt this 

morning. 

7

This is a summary of my full statement. Egypt and the U.S.-

Egypt relationship matter to us. Egypt is a vital partner. 

Our long-standing partnership is predicated on shared interests—promoting a stable and prosperous Egypt, securing regional 

peace and maintaining peace with Israel, and countering extremism and terrorism throughout the region. 

This partnership has brought the United States significant benefits—as you have each mentioned, easy transit through the Suez 

Canal, military overflights that facilitate our activities and the 

counterterrorism and counterproliferation gains that come from 

Egypt’s efforts to control its borders with Gaza and security-challenged countries like Libya. 

There is no doubt that a reliable Egyptian partner is in U.S. 

strategic interests. We firmly believe that the best, most reliable 

Egyptian partner is a democratic Egypt. 

A sustainable, inclusive, non-violent transition to a democratically-elected government will give Egypt the best opportunity to 

succeed, and Egypt’s success can be the region’s success. 

Since the January 2011 revolution, Egypt’s history has centered 

on what Egyptians want for democracy, political and economic reform and how their government can meet their aspirations. 

Following the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 

Justice Party won the parliamentary elections and in 2012 President Morsi was voted into power in an election viewed as free and 

fair. 

However, Mr. Morsi proved unwilling or unable to govern inclusively, alienating many Egyptians. Responding to the desires of 

millions of Egyptians who believed the revolution had taken a 

wrong turn and who sought a return to security and stability after 

years of unrest, the interim government replaced the Morsi government. 

But the interim government has also made decisions inconsistent 

with inclusive democracy. We were troubled by the July 3 events 

and the violence of mid-August. 

The decision to remove Morsi, excessive force used against protesters in August, restrictions on the press, civil society and opposition parties, the continued detention of many members of the opposition, and extension of the state of emergency have been troubling. 

We have also consistently and strongly condemned the heinous 

violence and acts of terror against Coptic churches and the Coptic 

community. 

At the same time, we have condemned the continuing attacks on 

the security forces in the Sinai and elsewhere in Egypt. 

After the events of mid-August, the President said we could not 

continue business as usual with respect to our assistance. 

That decision—after careful review we recently announced a recalibration of this assistance. That decision ensures that assistance 

is directed toward core U.S. interest including helping Egypt secure 

its borders in the Sinai, preventing the flow of weapons into Gaza 

that threaten Israel and countering terrorists seeking to attack 

U.S. and Egyptian interests. 

We will continue military training and education as well as the 

sustainment of certain U.S.-origin military systems. However, we 

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are holding the delivery of several major weapons systems—the F–

16s, M1A1 tank kits, Harpoon missiles and Apache helicopters. 

We will work to provide economic support that directly benefits 

the Egyptian people including in the areas of health and private 

sector development but are not moving forward with any further 

cash transfers to the government. 

We will review these decisions informed by credible progress on 

the interim government’s political roadmap toward a sustainable, 

inclusive and peaceful transition to democracy. 

This recalibration reflects our effort to advance U.S. core interests in Egypt and the region while impressing upon the Egyptian 

leadership the importance of making progress toward a democratic 

transition—progress we believe the Egyptian people want. 

Our decision is designed to use our assistance to encourage such 

a transition and a strong private sector-led economy that can reinforce political stability. 

We welcome the interim government’s commitment to a political 

roadmap to restore a democratically-elected civilian government. 

We continue to urge the government to be inclusive, respect the 

rights of all Egyptians and respect the rule of law, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, the role of civil society and religious freedom. 

Beyond issues related to the roadmap, the United States has 

stayed firm to its principles and interests of advancing civil society 

engagement by encouraging the passage of an NGO law that conforms to international standards and Egypt’s own international 

commitments. 

We have registered concerns over the June trial verdict against 

NGO workers and have urged redress. We have also raised our 

concerns about the state of emergency which the government recently announced would not be extended when it expires on November 14. 

On the economy, we are encouraging the interim government to 

maintain economic stability, help restore growth and investment 

and create jobs. 

Egypt has an enormous opportunity now to pursue the aspirations of the 2011 revolution and to provide for the needs of the 

Egyptian people. The United States wants to help. 

To do that and to actively advance our core interests in Egypt 

and the region, we need to have the ability to continue U.S. assistance to Egypt. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel and distinguished members of this committee, we want to work closely with Congress to 

obtain the flexibility needed to continue our assistance relationship 

with Egypt consistent with the law and our national interest and 

to encourage progress on Egypt’s democratic transition. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

We’ll go now to Secretary Chollet. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. CHOLLET. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel and other 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the U.S. defense relationship with Egypt. 

The U.S.-Egypt military relationship is one of our most significant and enduring strategic defense relationships in the Middle 

East. It is also a two-way street. 

The Egyptian military is able to use our assistance to purchase 

U.S. military equipment and also receive the benefits of training 

with the world’s greatest military power. 

But as has been mentioned, the U.S. military is able to respond 

to contingencies and conduct operations throughout the region because of expeditious overflight rights and Suez Canal transits. 

This can be critical to mission success. As just one of many examples, in August 2013 just a few months ago, the USS San Antonio was approved to transit the Suez Canal within 24 hours of the 

request, quickly positioning it to respond to potential unrest in the 

region. 

Without Egypt’s expedited approval, we would have had to wait 

the requisite 23 days for approval or reprogram other fleet assets. 

Strong U.S.-Egypt military relations are also central to our core security interests in the Middle East. 

Our partnership with the Egyptian military assist in maintaining the Camp David peace treaty with Israel, securing the Sinai, 

countering transnational terrorist threats and securing global commerce by providing safe transit of ships through the Suez Canal. 

Yet, as President Obama, Secretary Hagel and Secretary Kerry 

have made clear, we have serious concerns with the events that 

transpired in July and August. 

Further, as President Obama has said, some decisions made by 

the interim government have been inconsistent with inclusive democracy. 

I can assure you that Secretary Hagel has expressed these concerns clearly and directly in as many phone calls with General alSisi over the past several months, and just last month during my 

own visit to Cairo I discussed these concerns with General al-Sisi 

and other senior military officials. 

The administration’s policy toward Egypt therefore seeks to 

achieve a delicate balance of continuing our strong military-to-military relationship while at the same time recognizing that we can’t, 

as President Obama has described it, continue business as usual. 

We are therefore moving forward with some aspects of our assistance and withholding others. We will continue assistance for border 

and maritime security, Sinai security and counterterrorism, all of 

which advance the goals of our military relationship. 

We will also continue to provide sustainment for existing weapons systems and funding for military education and training. This 

assistance, totalling hundreds of millions of dollars, is essential to 

advancing our core national security interests in the region. 

16

But we will hold deliveries of large-scale weapons systems including F–16s, M1A1 tank kits, Apache helicopters and Harpoon 

missiles. Delivery of these systems could resume pending Egypt’s 

progress toward an inclusive democratically-elected civilian government. 

Additionally, consistent with our many—the many conversations 

we have had with our Egyptian counterparts over the past several 

years, we will work with them to determine whether to sustain certain legacy systems that might otherwise be retired. 

Let me be clear. The United States considers Egypt to be a critical partner, one that has helped advance U.S. national security interests for over three decades. 

We want to continue a strong military-to-military relationship 

that preserves our strategic interests and we want Egypt to develop a military that is prepared to meet the threats of the 21st 

century. 

We also want to see Egypt succeed in moving toward an inclusive 

democratically-elected civilian government. This is in our national 

interest, it is in Egypt’s national interests and it is in the security 

interests of the broader Middle East. 

Mr. Chairman, the Congress is a critical partner in this process. 

Because of the events that unfolded in Egypt in July and August, 

it is imperative that we work with the Congress to move forward 

together. 

The Department of Defense looks forward to continuing these 

discussions with the Congress and our Egyptian partners and I 

look forward to your questions this morning. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chollet follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Alina, go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ALINA ROMANOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity today to discuss with you the impact of the administration’s 

recently announced Egypt policy on USAID-managed assistance 

and the efforts we are making to continue to support programs that 

directly benefit the Egyptian people. 

USAID’s assistance program in Egypt is a cornerstone of our bilateral relationship and we are proud of the accomplishments we 

have made over the last 30 years. 

For example, a recently completed early grade reading program 

improved fluency by 91 percent in pilot schools and the scaled up 

project reached 1.4 million students in all grade one classrooms 

across Egypt. 

Our assistance has awarded 185,000 scholarships to girls and 

built nearly a hundred schools serving over 44,000 students in 

under served communities throughout the country. 

Since 2011, USAID has helped start 58 innovative Egyptian companies, one-third of which are owned by women. We have assisted 

thousands of women in rural governorates to exercise their political 

and economic rights included helping 48,000 women receive government IDs. 

We’re also installing new water pipes in upper Egypt, employing 

hundreds of Egyptians and supplying water service for more than 

600,000 people in the five poorest governorates. These are just a 

few examples of the impact of our program. 

However, the events of July 3rd and the violence of mid-August 

are deeply troubling to us and as the President said we could not 

continue business as usual. 

At the same time, we want to make sure that we continue to do 

everything we can to promote a sustainable, inclusive and nonviolent transition to democracy. 

Therefore, moving forward we want to work with you to continue 

our valuable economic assistance that directly benefits the Egyptian people. We will pursue our democracy and governance programs, continue to strengthen civil society and encourage private 

sector growth. 

We will also continue programs that improve health outcomes, 

increase educational opportunities, stimulate private sector growth 

and create jobs. 

These programs demonstrate to the Egyptian people that the 

United States will continue to support their aspiration for democratic governance and economic opportunities. Consistent with current U.S. law and policy, programs that do not directly benefit the 

government will move forward unimpeded. 

These programs benefit a wide range of Egyptian society including youth, civil society and the private sector. For example, we recently notified an additional $60 million to further capitalize the 

Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, which will promote much 

22

needed development of the private sector in Egypt, expand access 

to credit and create opportunities for Egyptian small and medium 

enterprises. 

Relying on available legislative authorities, we will continue to 

provide support for projects that work with the government in 

areas of health and democracy. 

For example, USAID will support planned electoral events 

through the international election observation and voter education. 

We are not moving forward with the $260 million cash transfer 

that was to be provided directly to the Government of Egypt and 

the $300 million in loan guarantees that were under consideration 

for Fiscal Year 2014. 

We will work closely with the Congress to ensure that we have 

the authorities necessary to provide economic assistance that advances U.S. objectives in Egypt including fostering educational opportunities for Egyptian students. 

In the meantime, where we do not have these authorities certain 

projects that provide assistance to the Government of Egypt are 

being wound up. 

This includes our basic and higher education projects that work 

with public institution or employees and our work providing technical assistance to government ministries and authorities. 

We are working with our implementing partners to develop windup plans for these projects which will allow for the completion of 

certain project components. 

We also will not be able to initiate some planned activities in sectors that constitute assistance to the government like education 

and infrastructure, and we are considering ways that we can repurpose these funds to more directly support the Egyptian people such 

as providing scholarships to private universities or for study in the 

United States. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel and distinguished members of this committee, we want to work closely with you to continue providing assistance to the Egyptian people and build upon 

the valuable support we have provided to Egypt’s development over 

the last three decades. 

Such assistance is central to our objective in seeing an Egypt 

that is making progress on its roadmap and the progress toward 

a sustainable, inclusive and nonviolent transition to democracy. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Romanowski follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Ms. Romanowski, we thank you. 

Let me ask you a question because you see the press reports on 

the Egyptian Government’s move in the wrong direction with respect to economic reform—harassment of street vendors, you know, 

the price controls on the street vendors, undoing the privatizations 

undertaken by the Morsi government which was no friend to start 

with for economic liberalization. 

But you just don’t see anything to try to take the informal sector 

of the economy and make it formal and I suspect that all our efforts including Enterprise Funds are going to be wasted if it goes 

to defending the economic status quo in Egypt. 

If we don’t undertake the kind of transformation of the economy 

that will allow entrepreneurs, you know, the small entrepreneur, 

the vendor, to operate, to start businesses—if they don’t have access to property rights, I don’t—I don’t think you’re going to have 

anything except in Egypt that works for a few Egyptians. 

And I guess the question is why should we give economic aid in 

that kind of an environment. What are we doing? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Chair—Mr. Chairman, we have spent a good 

part of the last 2 years in reorienting much of our economic assistance to ensure that we have an opportunity to get to the private 

sector and to get to small and medium entrepreneurs. 

It is an area where we continue to believe that if you engage and 

demonstrate some best practices and some ways of supporting the 

small and medium entrepreneurs that we ultimately will be successful. 

Chairman ROYCE. I think ultimately what you do is—if you end 

up just throwing the money into the Enterprise Funds and not undertaking or walking the Egyptians through the reforms that will 

allow people to start businesses, you know, if the fundamentals 

aren’t there that money is not going to end up transferring people 

into the formal economy. 

Whereas if you would do—if you do what we’ve long known needs 

to be done it might not be easy—it might mean you’d really have 

to lean on the powers in Egypt, but I think you could make a lot 

of progress. 

We had a hearing here where we had Madeleine Albright. We 

had Hernando de Soto. We went through a lot of these issues, and 

instead we’re right back to the Enterprise Fund concept of how 

you’re going to dole out money. 

I’m very disappointed with the lack of more—of a more fundamental approach at looking how to reform the economy because I 

think it’s something that we could really do in a bipartisan way 

and help Egypt. 

But I’m going to go to Mr. Chollet and ask him—you mentioned 

our shared interest in counterterrorism. What is the administration 

doing to support the Egyptian military’s effort in the Sinai because 

that’s really slipped out of government control ever since 

Mubarak’s ouster. 

How does the administration’s suspension of military aid impact 

the Egyptian military’s ability to secure the peninsula? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the question. 

The Sinai has been something we’ve talked to the Egyptians 

about over the past several years and a year ago if we were having 

28

this hearing we would be talking about frustrations with their lack 

of action in Sinai, and over the past several months they have been 

taking significant action in Sinai, some of the most significant operations that we’ve seen in many, many years in terms of dealing 

with the extremist threat. So that’s a good thing. 

Chairman ROYCE. So you’re working with the Egyptians to better 

tailor their efforts to counterterrorism in Sinai? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, we encourage them. These are their own operations. We’re not working in cooperation with them in an operational way at all. 

But we stay in very close touch with them as do the Israelis on 

their operations in the Sinai because there are certain treaty restrictions that they have about the kinds of capabilities they can 

deploy to the peninsula under the Camp David treaty. 

The assistance that we are holding—the M1A1 tank kits, the F–

16s, the Harpoon missiles, even the Apaches—is not affecting their 

operational effectiveness in the Sinai at all. 

Those operations have been ongoing for several months and they 

have sufficient capability to take care of that problem. 

We do encourage them to do more and we stay in very close 

touch with them on their operations and in terms of any particular 

needs that they have. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Let me quickly go to Ambassador Jones for my last question. It 

was the concern about the Coptic Christian community that I 

raised in upper Egypt especially where many of Egypt’s Islamists 

have been active. 

You’ve got close to a hundred churches that have been burned 

there over the summer and across Egypt you have a lot of Christian-owned homes, businesses that have been vandalized or destroyed. 

How can we do more to ensure that that minority, the Coptic minority and other minorities, are protected in Egypt? 

Ambassador JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question. 

It’s a very important issue for the United States. It’s an important—it’s an important element of our constant conversation with 

the Egyptian—with the Egyptian Government. 

We have strongly condemned the attacks on Coptic churches and 

on Copts and we have called on the Egyptian Government to bring 

those responsible for these—what we consider heinous acts of terror to bring them to justice. 

The Egyptian Government has also condemned these attacks. 

But on your—to answer your broader question, this—the protection 

of minorities—Christian minorities as well as any other minority—

is a very important element of our ongoing conversation with the 

Egyptian leadership about what a democracy actually involves. 

It does involve, as far as we’re concerned and this is something 

that we advocate strongly to the Egyptian Government, it involves 

protection of minorities as well as protections—the whole list of 

protections that we’ve already talked about. 

This is something that we will continue to have a spirited conversation with the Egyptian leadership about to ensure that they 

recognize the importance of protecting their Christian minorities as 

well as assuring the rights of women, protection of the rule of law, 

29

protection of other human rights, protection of the press, protection 

of assembly. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thanks, Ambassador. 

We’ll go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to start off by again expressing my disapproval of the cutting off of aid to Egypt. I really think it’s like cutting off your nose 

to spite your face. I really do. 

I know the administration is trying to thread a needle and trying 

to say well, you know, we’re going to keep some aid going because 

we really don’t want to hurt our relationship but we’re going to 

withhold the tanks and helicopters and F–16s. 

The way I look at it, I think these actions make it tougher for 

us to influence them, not easier, because I think if you’re—if you’re 

helping you have some influence. If you’re petulantly pulling away 

then their attitude is going to be well, why do we have to listen 

to you. 

So tell me that I’m wrong, I mean, because I am really very, very 

upset about this and I just—you know, tell me that I’m wrong. And 

also, what does the Egyptian Government need to do for aid to be 

fully resumed, Ambassador Jones? 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Congressman Engel. 

That’s a very important question. It’s a question that we have 

discussed in considerable detail and extent with the Egyptian Government. 

We have explained to them that as much as we understood the 

events that took place from June 30th onward because of the millions of Egyptians that supported the action that the interim government took on July 3rd that we nevertheless, as the President 

put it, determined that we really could not continue business as 

usual given the violence that ensued in August. 

We therefore—as much as we do intend to continue working with 

the interim government, we have explained this in great detail to 

the interim government and we, as we recalibrated our assistance, 

focused on the core national interests of the United States and in 

areas that we cooperate on extensively with Egypt and that serve 

Egypt’s interests as well. 

The Egyptian Government has told us that they understood our 

decision. They’re disappointed by it but they understand it and 

they’ve told us that they are quite prepared to continue working 

with us on—in each of the areas that Mr. Chollet and Ms. 

Romanowski have described as well as on the roadmap that will restore Egypt to a democratically-elected civilian-led government. 

Mr. ENGEL. Anybody else care to comment? Mr. Chollet. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, I can just affirm what Ambassador 

Jones has said, that our conversation with our—and from a military-to-military perspective our conversation is ongoing, it’s continuous, it’s daily. 

And we have—I have detected—we have detected—the Defense 

Department no change at all in the level of the interaction and coordination that we have with the Egyptian military over the last 

several months. 

In fact, the closeness that we’ve developed over the three decades 

of working together has paid great dividends in the last several 

30

months in which we’ve needed those close contacts and close relationships. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this. I think that the policy on 

change on Egypt really cannot be looked at within a vacuum. The 

region is falling apart. Syria is spiraling out of control. Iran looms 

as a significant threat. 

It just seems to me it’s not very wise to risk alienating our traditional allies and friends including Egypt, Israel and the Gulf 

States. 

So what action did the administration take to consult with our 

regional allies regarding the plan to suspend some aid before the 

decision was made public? 

We’ve just seen Saudi Arabia lashing out. It just seems to me it 

doesn’t appear to be very wise to start alienating governments that 

we’ve had 30 and 40 years of cooperation with. Ambassador? 

Ambassador JONES. Congressman Engel, thank you for your 

question. 

It’s a concern that we are focused on. We want to be sure that 

we are clear as to why we are undertaking the—why we undertook 

the decisions that we did with regard to Egypt. 

We have had a very significant engagement throughout this period with the Egyptian Government and with all of our friends and 

partners around the world who are particularly—who are also as 

interested in Egypt’s success as we are, whether that be in Europe 

or in the Arab world. 

So as things—as things rolled out, as things were underway in 

Egypt we were in constant conversation with the Gulf States that 

you particularly asked about as well as with our European allies 

to think how best we could work with the Egyptians to talk 

through how best to—how best to manage the kind of events that 

they were—that they encountered as this—as the events unfolded 

in Egypt. 

So as we made the decisions that we did that were announced 

on October 9th, we of course discussed that with the Egyptian Government, with the Congress and with our friends and allies who 

would be—who were particularly interested in Egypt to make sure 

that they were informed of our decision and understood the reasons 

for it. 

So there was no surprise for them with the decisions that were 

made because we’d been in such detailed conversation with them 

throughout this period as to what it was that we expected from the 

Egyptian Government and what we—what our hopes were for 

progress in Egypt. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

The Morsi experiment in Egypt was doomed to fail and our administration’s lack of a coherent and consistent Egypt policy is part 

of this pathetic state of affairs. 

Morsi ruled as a dictator, yet for all his transgressions the 

Obama administration did not seek to curtail the amount of U.S. 

taxpayer dollars that we kept sending to Egypt. 

31

We did not make access to that money conditioned upon Morsi 

and the Muslim-led government meeting even minimal democratic 

reform benchmarks. 

Now Morsi has been removed from power and violent clashes 

continue between pro-Muslim brotherhood forces and the interim 

Egyptian Government. 

The U.S. continued to fund Egypt after Mubarak was ousted. 

During that time, the Supreme Council of the armed forces assumed control of the government and under its watch there was an 

unprecedented crackdown on pro-democracy groups that resulted in 

the arrests of 43 NGO workers, many of whom were Americans. 

Since then, the 43 workers were convicted in a ruling that had 

no basis in the rule of law yet no aid was suspended or recalibrated. No one turned off the spigot. 

It’s appalling that this administration has not prioritized the 

overturning of these politically motivated convictions. 

When will the administration push for Egyptian authorities to 

pardon these human rights advocates and what are you doing to 

support civil society programs in Egypt? 

Is the U.S. Government advocating specific reforms that it would 

like to see in the new NGO law? What are those? Earlier this 

month, the State Department said that the U.S.-Egypt relationship 

will be strongest when Egypt is represented by an inclusive democratically-elected civilian government based on the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and an open and competitive economy. 

But we’ve lost credibility and leverage throughout the Middle 

East due to our erratic policies in Egypt. Many Gulf nations have 

stated, as has been discussed, their frustration due to this administration’s handling of Egypt and Syria issues and because of our 

misplaced faith in the rhetoric of Rouhani in Iran. 

What are the benchmarks that will be used to assess the 

progress of Egypt’s transition toward democracy and what if any 

assurances has the Egyptian Government given that it is willing to 

cooperate? 

So we’ll start, if we could, on the convictions of the NGOs. 

Ambassador JONES. Madam Congresswoman, thank you for the 

series of questions. Those are important issues for the United 

States. 

On the convictions of the NGO workers, we have been—we have 

expressed our concern through each of the administrations that 

have overseen the trial of the NGO workers. 

We have—we have advocated repeatedly very strongly for redress for the convictions in what we consider to be a politically motivated NGO trial and there have been quite a number of representations made to try to address exactly that question. 

With regard to the NGO legislation, we have engaged extensively 

with the interim government and with civil society to make sure 

that the kinds of things that we believe are appropriate in an NGO 

law are included. 

These are—these are elements that are—that are important for 

internationally accepted NGO laws and we have been, as I said, in 

touch with civil society to make sure we are representing their interests in a clear way. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If I could interrupt you just a second. 

32

Ambassador JONES. Please. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. On the overturning of the conviction, what is 

the message that we are giving whatever government may be in 

place? Do we say you must do this—these people are innocent or 

what is our specific request? 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you for that. 

Our specific statement is that this was a politically motivated 

trial that has no place in a democratic government and therefore 

there must be redress—judicial redress, legal redress of some kind 

that——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What kind of—what kind of redress do we—

what options are we giving? 

Ambassador JONES. For example—for example, that they—that 

we have asked that they—that there be no extradition requested 

for them. 

We have asked that they not be notified to the—to Interpol so 

that there are no red notices out for them. Those are the kinds of 

things that we have—that we have asked specifically for. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And overturning of their sentences—of their 

convictions? 

Ambassador JONES. We have asked—yes, we’ve asked for redress 

for the sentences. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Redress. Thank you. Sorry, out of time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We’ll go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of California, the ranking member on the International Terrorism Subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

A number of my colleagues have addressed the concerns of the 

Coptic community. This House passed 402–22 just last month a bill 

that would create a special envoy to promote religious freedom of 

religious minorities in the Near East and South Asia. 

This would be the one concrete thing we could do here in Washington structurally to be effective in advocating for the Christian 

community of Egypt and similarly situated Christian communities. 

What is the position of the Department of State on that legislation, Ambassador Jones? 

Ambassador JONES. We have a very active freedom—religious 

freedom office in the State Department. We undertake considerable 

advocacy all over the world and especially in Egypt on behalf of religious minorities or religions, not only minorities. 

But I regret I don’t have the official position of the State Department of the U.S. Government on this particular legislation. I would 

like to either ask my colleagues to reply or take that question back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Please give us an answer in a few days. 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It’s clear that the new government in Egypt is 

better for the United States as a nation state, more consistent in 

its policies in the Middle East with regard to national security. 

On the other hand, we are also the keepers of the great flame 

of democracy and human rights. We haven’t always been consistent 

but our positions for democracy ring loud and clear decade after 

decade. 

33

Morsi was elected but he was elected in a way that gives credence to the view that when you elect the Brotherhood or similar 

organizations you get one person one vote one time and that is the 

last free election in that society. 

What have you done and the State Department done to explain 

that while Morsi was elected his departure is not a departure from 

the path of democracy, that he was not going on the path of democracy and that the actions taken by the military and others to depose him may be a detour that leads to democracy but certainly it’s 

not a departure from a pristine path? 

Ambassador JONES. Congressman, that’s an important question 

for the people of Egypt. We have been—we have been very clear 

as to the importance to us and the people of Egypt for them to 

move—continue to——

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, I think you misunderstand the question. We issue a human rights report. We comment all the time 

about democracy in other countries. 

The impression has been left, and I think Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

made this, that we didn’t criticize Morsi’s departure from democracy but we are criticizing Morsi’s departure. 

What has the State Department done to inform the world that 

Morsi’s departure may not be a—you know, was the departure of 

an autocrat in preparation rather than the departure of a pristine 

democratic figure? 

Ambassador JONES. At the time, Congressman, we were very 

clear that we understood that the removal of President Morsi was 

based on a very strong—very strong view by the—by the Egyptian 

people on the basis of millions of people on the street that they considered the administration not to have been democratic and we determined that we should continue to work with the interim government as they announced their roadmap to return to civilian—to a 

democratically-elected civilian government. 

Mr. SHERMAN. How much effort and good faith is Egypt putting 

in closing the tunnels between Sinai and Gaza? Are they doing all 

they can, Mr. Chollet? 

Mr. CHOLLET. I’m happy to take that one. 

They over the past several months have conducted significant operations to close the tunnels. Obviously, there’s still a tremendous 

amount flowing into Gaza but they have shown considerable resolve in addressing that issue recently. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Finally, I’ll say—and maybe you’ll have to respond 

to the record—Morsi came to power in a democratic way but after 

he got elected he was not terribly democratic. Yet we did not suspend aid to Morsi. 

Now we’ve got a new government that isn’t behaving any worse 

from a democracy standpoint than the Morsi regime and we’re suspending aid. Ambassador, respond as you will. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman, and thank you, 

Madam Ambassador. If you could respond in writing to Mr. Sherman that would be great because his time has expired. 

And now we will move to Subcommittee Chairman Smith from 

New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and welcome 

to our panelists to the committee. 

34

In the past couple of years, I’ve held three hearings on Egypt focused almost exclusively on the human rights situation there and 

the deterioration of human rights. 

A fourth hearing was scheduled during the shutdown. It’ll soon 

be rescheduled. The persecution of Coptic Christians in general and 

the abuse of young Coptic Christian teenage girls and young 

women for the purpose of coerced marriages to Muslim men was 

the focus of two of those hearings—the prime focus. 

And, frankly, Michele Clark, who is the adjunct professor with 

the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington 

University, was the former leader at the OSCE with regards to 

human trafficking—a very, very smart and knowledgeable and I 

think very competent human rights investigator. 

She came back after field trips to Egypt and said that the allegation of forced abductions, obviously abductions, and the coercion 

into these marriages is real. It is being underplayed and under recognized by the department. 

She pointed out that they—one of her trips just four lawyers told 

her of over 500 women, young girls, average age 12 to 14, who have 

been abducted and forced into these Muslim marriages. 

The question is I’ve asked Secretary Posner when he was our 

human rights Secretary—Assistant Secretary, I should say—he 

said they’re looking into it. 

When Ambassador Patterson Skyped into this committee, this 

was like 8 months after Frank Wolf literally took all of the testimony from Michele Clark, put it in her hand and practically 

begged her to investigate. 

Eight months later, I asked her what were the results of the investigation and she said, well, we haven’t gotten around to it—not 

gotten around to looking into little girls 12 to 14 and some older 

who are being forced into these Islamic marriages, mostly with the 

Salafists. 

They seem to be the ones that are doing it. The government 

doesn’t seem to take it seriously. When these concerns are brought 

to the police they are not only trivialized, they are just put aside 

and not investigated. 

It is a very serious human rights abuse and I’m wondering exactly what has the administration done to investigate these cases—

what has been the conversation exactly with the current government as well as the Morsi government to put a stop to this hideous 

practice. 

I mean, you can roll your eyes all you want but this is a very, 

very serious problem. 

I’ve met some of these parents who have lost their children when 

they were abducted. I’m a father of two girls. If somebody abducted 

my children I would not cease until I found them, and I’ve met 

with fathers including one in my own district whose daughter was 

abducted and was forced into one of these marriages and is being 

raped every single day. 

When Ambassador Patterson told me on this monitor she hadn’t 

gotten around to looking at it, I was shocked, I was dismayed and 

profoundly disappointed. What are we doing now to combat this? 

Ambassador JONES. Congressman, I can’t tell you how deeply I 

share your concern. We all do. 

35

We have issued many statements of deep concern for the—because of these practices but especially because of the rapes and the 

failure of the Egyptian police to investigate these rapes and to 

bring those to justice who are responsible for these. We have——

Mr. SMITH. If I could, in terms of the abductions, and there’s 

even houses where these girls are put in in province after province. 

What are we doing to say to the government this becomes a matter 

of conditionality for foreign aid to the Egyptian Government? Are 

we saying that? 

Ambassador JONES. Let me answer it this way, if I may. 

Mr. SMITH. Please. 

Ambassador JONES. We have—this has been a subject of discussion undertaken by Secretary Clinton and Secretary Kerry at the 

highest levels of the—and I mean the highest levels of the Egyptian Government and we have instituted programs to train Egyptian police in women’s issues, particularly Egyptian women police, 

so that they are empowered to investigate these crimes so that they 

are able to—so that women—girls and women feel safe going to a 

police station to report these——

Mr. SMITH. Again, this is a—thank you for doing that. But this 

is an issue that is systematic. It is getting worse. Michele Clark I 

just was on—in contact with her. She says it is getting worse. 

There are more of these, not less, and it’s targeted against Coptic 

Christian girls, and then they force them to become Muslims. And 

they even have a term for it. They call it Islamicizing the womb 

because any child she bears thereafter will be a Muslim. What are 

we doing simply on that? 

Ambassador JONES. I agree that it’s a terrible situation. The 

way—we believe the best way to deal with it is through rule of law, 

through enhancing the ability and the capacity of the Egyptian—

of Egyptian institutions——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Ambassador JONES [continuing]. To deal with these questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. 

Smith. 

I’m sorry you’re out of time. Mr. Schneider is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for joining us here today and for 

sharing your perspectives. One other thing—Egypt is clearly one of 

our most important allies in the region, has been for over 30 years. 

As I understand what you’re telling us, we are trying to convey 

a message of our commitment to the future and the aspirations of 

Egypt and the Egyptian people as a democratic country, as a pluralistic country, as a partner for peace and security in the region. 

I think one of the things you’re hearing from us—I hear from 

various groups is that we are sending somewhat mixed messages. 

The message isn’t getting clearly conveyed that we are supportive 

of the Egyptian people. 

We are supportive of the path they’re taking toward a democratic 

process, toward a constitution. But we have serious concerns about 

the actions—some of the actions being taken at the moment. 

How do we change the message? How do we tweak it so that that 

commitment to the Egyptian people, to the direction Egypt is taking is made more clearly? Ambassador Jones. 

36

Ambassador JONES. Congressman, you’ve stated the—you’ve 

made the statement very eloquently and I appreciate that and I 

will—if I may quote that to——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Please. 

Ambassador JONES [continuing]. My Egyptian—my Egyptian colleagues. 

I argue that the best way to convey that message, your message 

which you stated so clearly, is repetition. It is—it is constant engagement, which we are undertaking. 

It is constant engagement at the senior level as well as—as well 

as all levels in Egyptian Government, Egyptian institutions and 

with civil society to help them understand how much we support 

their democratic aspirations, how much we support the breadth of 

what we believe goes into a democracy. It’s not just the roadmap. 

It’s not just a constitution and a referendum and an election. 

As one of your colleagues said very eloquently, there’s much more 

to democracy than an election and those are the kinds of concepts 

that we’re trying to get through in some of the training programs 

that we fund. 

In the military training that we undertake, it’s terribly important for our military colleagues to understand their role in a democracy, how much they are—their job is to support a civilian government and the best way we can do this is by constant engagement and by—and with your help to give us the flexibility so that 

we can continue the kinds of programs that allow us to work with 

civil society, that allow us to work with educators, that allow us 

to work with the Egyptian military, that allow us to work with 

Egyptian police to train women police on the kinds of things that 

Congressman Smith was talking about. 

It’s a constant intense effort that we—but we need your help in 

order to allow us to continue to have the flexibility and the legislation to continue these programs. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you. I think one of the key things 

it’s not either or. We need to have the progress made in civil society. 

We as a country look to Egypt to make sure they are protecting 

religious minorities. They are protecting young women from some 

of the serious crimes we’ve heard about. 

At the same time, Egypt has been a bulwark of the security arrangement piece with Israel. Mr. Chollet, I look to you. What are 

our long-term plans to make sure that Egypt is able to modernize 

its military to be able to secure Sinai, to close those tunnels? 

What are we doing to make sure that continues to move forward? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, Congressman, we’re seeking to continue this 

relationship. Although we are holding certain large weapons systems we are still continuing a large array of assistance to them and 

that helps sustain their existing systems to support operations in 

Sinai, for example. 

It also helps on the training piece because as they train on these 

new systems, work with our military and learning how to use 

them, it helps them develop skills that they don’t otherwise have. 

So we very much see this as a long-term relationship. The reason 

why we want to work closely with you to forge a way ahead is because we believe that over the long term this is in our security inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:56 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\102913\85312 HFA PsN: SHIRL
37

terests—that we want to encourage Egypt to move forward on a 

democratic process and inclusive transition. 

But we believe very firmly that it is in our security interest to 

have a strong defense relationship with the Egyptian military and 

that’s what we’re seeking to sustain. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If in the last few seconds I can take back, how 

are we doing? Because this relationship obviously isn’t in a vacuum. 

Russians are looking to build their relationship. How do we make 

sure that the primacy of our engagement with Egypt is maintained? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Very quickly, it’s a relationship we’ve built over 

three decades with them. I think that they want to work with us. 

They understand the great—the unique capabilities the United 

States military has and they want to learn and work with those capabilities. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

And we will go now to Subcommittee Chairman Dana Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, 

and let’s just note and repeat that the future of Egypt is vitally important to the stability of a huge section of the planet and we now 

face with the people who live in that section of the planet the 

threat of radical Islamic dictatorship and radical Islamic terrorism 

that affects us here. 

So we will not be safe if the outcome in Egypt is not the right 

outcome, and while we recognize that and we also recognize that 

we haven’t—there was an election. After years of authoritarian rule 

that it looked like Egypt was going toward a democratic goal. 

But that goal was being undermined by Mr. Morsi, who had been 

elected and used the power that he assumed in the election to try 

to destroy the direction of Egypt’s going to a more democratic country and that had said was trying to redirect that revolution toward 

a radical Islamic end, which would have, as I say, undermined stability. 

That we get from your testimony. You understand that. We all 

agree on that. 

What I don’t understand is while we—while we say that, at the 

same time we’re saying but, of course, General al-Sisi we do know 

and we’re very grateful to him for stepping in to prevent this radical Islamic shift that would have destabilized the region and affected our own national security. We recognize that. But we’re not 

going to give him any weapons. 

We’re hanging General al-Sisi and the people that we’re applauding for defeating radical Islam in Egypt—we’re leaving them hanging out to dry. Our words of—yeah, giving them foreign aid but not 

the ability to defend themselves means nothing. 

I remember the surge in—I guess it was ’75 when Congress decided not to provide weapons to the South Vietnamese Government. 

It cracked because they said we’re not going to be able to get the 

weapons to defeat this enemy. Well, if, Madam Ambassador, we are 

not going to give them the M1A tanks, we’re not going to give them 

Harpoon missiles, we’re not going to give them the parts for 

Apache helicopters, all of which are needed to make sure that we 

38

don’t have an uprising in the Sinai that will destabilize the region 

and perhaps end up putting everybody, you know, in jeopardy that 

we want to succeed, how can you justify—and when we were just 

over in Egypt and they were talking to us about how we need these 

Apache helicopters—how can we justify if we do believe that the 

elimination of Morsi was positive how can we justify not giving 

them the weapons they need to defeat the radical Islamicists that 

will change the nature of that situation? Madam Ambassador. 

Ambassador JONES. Congressman, let me give you a few top lines 

and maybe my colleague, Derek Chollet, can add to it. 

We hear your concern. We agree with that concern. That’s why, 

as we looked at the situation and decided on how we were going 

to proceed to send the right signals and yet make it possible for 

the Egyptian Government to undertake the kinds of—the kind of 

work that we thought suited U.S. national security interests and 

Egypt’s—that’s why we continued sustainment for this equipment 

so that they could continue to use the Apache helicopters that they 

have without difficulty in getting the spare parts and the training 

that they need for it. 

So these systems, both the sustainment and the training for 

these systems, is part of what we will continue. It’s the new systems that are on hold. But maybe my colleague can fill in further. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Sir, that’s right. So very briefly, we are continuing 

to sustain all of the weapons systems that we have been providing 

them previously. The policy at this point—the decision was to hold 

some new deliveries. 

Not cancel the contracts but hold some new deliveries that they 

would be getting so they already have 19 or 20 Apaches already. 

This would be holding four new ones that they were to get. So 

our judgment is this does not affect their operational capability 

right now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So in the middle of a conflict when people are 

using weapons and they are running down, meaning every time 

you use a weapon it has less life in it, we’re just going to let them 

run down until—and the word that we’re giving them and we’re 

sending the Islamicists oh, don’t worry, we’re not going to give 

them any new weapons. 

Do you think that will encourage the radical Islamicists in the 

Sinai or discourage them? 

Mr. CHOLLET. They have considerable operational capability in 

the Sinai that they are using and we are assisting them with sustaining those weapons systems that they do have which do overpower the extremists. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Limiting—I’ll leave it with this—limiting 

what we’re doing to help al-Sisi defend himself against radical 

Islam and defend Egypt against radical Islam—limiting that is 

harming his ability to defeat an enemy that affects our own national security and we better get—understand that and putting 

those limits now while he’s in conflict undermines the competence 

of his own soldiers that they’re going to be able to succeed. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This is the time——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. And not undermine——

39

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I’m sorry. I had lost track of time. 

Dr. Bera is recognized. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I want to thank 

the witnesses. 

We all acknowledge Egypt’s critical role here and that they are 

a vital and critical partner and a strategic partner. We also acknowledge, you know, as we’re looking at their transition over the 

past few years that democracy is much more than just a fair election. 

By all accounts, Morsi’s election was a fair election but he failed 

in making needed political reforms. He also failed in making needed economic reforms and, you know, as we look at our long-term 

goals, thinking about how we helped Egypt in this transition which 

is, you know, not going to be a matter of months—it’s going to be 

a matter of years to stability, economic reforms and political reforms, I’m going to—my questions are going to be to all three of 

you how we go about helping that. 

When we had Secretary Albright here earlier we did ask her directly the question of whether we should continue to provide aid to 

Egypt and military aid, and she was pretty direct in her answer, 

saying unequivocally yes because without providing that and without providing the continued aid we wouldn’t have a seat at the 

table. 

We wouldn’t have dialogue and if we wanted to continue to participate in this long-term strategy we would need to continue that. 

Would all of you agree with that statement? Great. 

We also—when we had Mr. de Soto here he focused specifically 

on the needed economic reforms that would ensure some stability 

of democracy and ensure some foundation of democracy, and maybe 

I’ll ask Ms. Romanowski to start off with. 

He really did focus on the importance of property rights and the 

importance of rule of law in terms of long-term foundation of democracy and, you know, from USAID’s perspective what are the 

things that we’re doing to help, you know, move Egypt in that direction of those reforms? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Thank you, Congressman, for the opportunity 

to talk a little bit about our programs and particularly under this 

policy what we hope to be able to continue both because we have—

can proceed with some legislative authorities. 

But specifically to your point, we—under our democracy rights 

and governance programs we can pretty much continue almost everything that we do that benefits the Egyptian people. We can continue to work with civil society to build their capacity to become 

advocates of their position. 

In fact, we are—we are able to continue the legal assistance for 

women and children that Congressman Smith was so concerned 

about and we are—we can continue through our work in anti-corruption promotion. 

On the economic growth, again, we talked—we are trying to 

focus more and more our assistance on helping the business environment and help the emerging entrepreneurs in Egypt to be able 

to get access to capital. The Enterprise Fund is one model. 

40

We are training young entrepreneurs who are coming out of universities as well as at the very local level to get the kind of training 

they need to build good business plans. 

We would like to work with Congress as we move forward to ensure that we can get back to doing the kinds of economic reforms 

that we can with—directly with the government. 

Mr. BERA. Right. And maybe for Ms. Romanowski or Ambassador 

Jones, part of the long-term strategy that Secretary Albright also 

pointed toward was building a political infrastructure. Obviously, 

part of how Mr. Morsi won the election was there was just one organized political party. 

So in a long-term political system, are we helping the Egyptians 

understand that political process and build that political infrastructure? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, Congressman, I think that’s a very important element of a lot of the work that we do, not only in terms 

of our assistance programs but in terms of the advocacy—the political advocacy that we undertake with the Egyptian—with the 

Egyptian Government, with Egyptian civil society. 

We work extensively with Egyptian civil society particularly on 

political, how to have a political party, what goes into a political 

party, how do you have a platform, how do you define a platform, 

how do you raise money—those kinds of things. So in some ways, 

the more technical side of political parties. 

But we also talk, as we have been working with civil society and 

with members of the government, how do you compromise—how do 

you attack a problem across party lines. You could talk about it on 

our terms or how do you talk about it across ideological lines if 

you’re not in a political party. How do you—how do you think in 

terms of the interests of the government or the country—how do 

you think in terms of the interests of a particular group of people 

in order to advocate for your position and to get the changes that 

you need in your position. 

One thing that we found after the—after the last election was 

that some of the minority groups—in particular, women, others—

were disappointed that their voices were no longer heard. 

They voted for the government that came in and then were disappointed that they no longer felt that their voices were being 

heard. We said it’s not just one—time thing. It’s not just a vote. 

It’s constant effort. 

It’s constantly rolling up your sleeves and advocating for your position and working across lines of other minority groups possibly—

other political parties—parties you may never occur to you to agree 

with that you may be able to make some kind of a joint program 

with in order to pursue your objective in ways that suits your community or suits your particular minority group. 

Mr. BERA. Looks like I’m out of time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And now we will go 

to Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I appreciate the panelists being here. I want to build on what 

you said just here but I want to—before we go to that, you know, 

I look at what’s going on over in Egypt and I would like to have 

what you think we need to do different. 

41

I mean, I’ve got numbers here that we’ve spent—invested I’ll say 

70—over $73 billion from 1948 to 1997, roughly around $46 billion 

and that was a 50-year period and then the last 15 years we’ve invested roughly another—the balance of that, about another $30 billion. 

And what I see is just a repeat of the same thing. You know, 

we’ve got a fractured government more than we’ve ever seen in the 

last 30 years since Anwar Sadat. We’ve gone backwards, it looks 

like, and you were talking about how one voice that get the vote. 

But yet in a government that doesn’t respect the things that we 

hold dear in a Western society or Western values—human rights, 

freedom of speech, freedom of religion—how can you expect the 

voice to be heard by their government if that government doesn’t 

respect that and should we continue spending in the same manner 

that we have been, or what I want to hear from you is what do 

we need to do different. 

It just—what we’re doing is not working. I don’t see a good result 

for the money we’ve invested. 

Ambassador JONES. Congressman, thank you for that question. 

I’d point out—just to point to a couple of things that I think have 

worked very well over the years that we have been working with 

Egypt and providing the extensive assistance that you’ve talked 

about, I think one of the most important aspects of this is on the 

military-to-military cooperation that Derek Chollet has talked 

about, in particular in support of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. 

Thirty years ago, 40 years ago when I first started in the Foreign 

Service the idea that Egypt and Israel would be talking to each 

other as much as they are about Sinai security was an unheard of 

circumstance, and I think we can—we can be very pleased with the 

kind of assistance that we’ve provided and the kind of political support that we’ve provided that has brought that about. 

I think that’s very important. It’s terribly important as far as 

U.S. interests are concerned that Egypt is going after the Sinai security issues in the way that Derek Chollet has described. 

But I would also say that the work that we’ve done over the 

years in developing civil society even under the autocratic rule of 

Mubarak has been a—was very, very important in supporting the 

ideas that the Egyptian people themselves brought forward in 

Tahrir Square in 2011. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, I hear you say that but then we hear what Mr. 

Smith just said about the Coptic Christians and we just saw what 

happened, you know, with all the slaughter of them, basically. 

And so you’re telling me we’re making headway but I’m not seeing it. I’ve never been there and you have, obviously. But I’m just 

not seeing that and go ahead and—let me talk to Mr. Chollet. 

You were talking about the military, how we’re helping them advance it. Again, if we go back and look at history and the money 

that we’ve spent on military assistance it’s been $41 billion, $42 

billion over the last 50 years. Why has that government not rised 

up—raised up and developed their own strong military? 

What’s preventing them from doing it other than are they just 

corrupt to the point that they just have their hand out knowing 

that America will be there to help shore them up? 

42

When are they going to pick up the ball or the baton and run 

with it on their own without our assistance, or is that a possibility? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, in part what we’re trying to achieve is develop a strong partnership with them so part of our assistance allows them to buy U.S. systems. 

Mr. YOHO. How long is that going to take? I mean, we’ve been 

doing it, again, since the 70s. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, and the purpose of that—of the shift that we 

saw in the late 70s, early 80s was to get them off the Soviet systems——

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. CHOLLET [continuing]. That they then had onto U.S.-made 

systems, which is in our interest for a variety of reasons. It’s in our 

interest because they’re more capable. It’s in our interest because 

it goes down to U.S. jobs. 

It’s U.S. systems, U.S. weaponry that they’re purchasing and 

that they’re training on and that they’re learning on which is quite 

effective when it comes to dealing with their security needs but 

also our security needs. 

And I think one of the great benefits that we, the United States, 

has gotten out of this relationship over the many years of investment that we put into it is a capable military, a military that is 

able to address the real security threats that it faces and also a 

military that is living up to its commitments in the Camp David 

peace treaty, something that was unimaginable 40 years ago. 

But from the perspective today, Israel and Egypt are at peace 

and their militaries do work together to deal with common threats. 

Mr. YOHO. I have no—I’ll my turn my time back to you, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. Thank you. 

I’m pleased to yield time to my Florida colleague, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Nice to see you in 

the chair again. 

Assistant Secretary Jones, you discussed the best way to communicate our strategy in Egypt and you talked about repetition at the 

highest levels and expressing our values to military leaders. 

But how do we—the problem diplomatically I think is not—and 

it’s a box that I think in many ways we put ourselves in. It’s not 

how we communicate at the highest levels. 

It’s how we communicate to the Egyptian people, not waiting for 

the military leaders to start espousing great democratic ideals 

every day. But how do we let the Egyptian people know that that—

that these are ideals that matter to us, that they’re a fundamental 

part of our policy? 

Many, and you’ve heard this, and many of the Egyptian people—

the perception of many on the street in Egypt is that at best is that 

we simply support who’s ever in power, at worst that perhaps because we didn’t speak forcefully enough to them about democracy 

during the Morsi period that now they wonder how strong these beliefs really are. 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. I didn’t—I apologize. I didn’t 

mean to imply that we were speaking only at the highest levels. 

We certainly are speaking at the highest levels but we also have 

very extensive outreach at the grass roots level through tweets, 

through all kinds of public diplomacy programs, through engageVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:56 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\102913\85312 HFA PsN: SHIRL
43

ments with university students, with youth, with young entrepreneurs with as many groups and organizations that we can—that 

we can find and have—and have access to, and we have extensive 

access all over the country. 

It isn’t—as you yourself have said, it’s not an easy message to 

convey but it’s one that we work on all the time to try to help our 

Egyptian counterparts understand how much we support their aspirations, why we support their aspirations, what we think goes 

into the kind of democracy that they’re working toward, and to 

work with them in some of the training that we do and the techniques that one can use in order to get at some of the progress that 

they’d like to get to. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. At the risk of—at the risk of sounding perhaps just a tad cynical, as someone who loves to tweet as much as 

the next Member of Congress, what are we tweeting about that 

carries any sort of significance? 

What—in terms of social media all—there’s been so much discussion about the role that social media played and has played in 

Egypt, particularly at the outset of the democracy movement. What 

are we doing to contribute to that? How do we—how do we join in? 

Ambassador JONES. I regret that I’m the wrong generation to 

be—to explain it completely. But I’m always impressed with my 

very much younger colleagues who are very good at understanding 

how to get these kinds of ideas across in the short form of tweets 

but also in engagements with youth. 

So the engagements and the public diplomacy goes all the way 

from explaining that we haven’t cut off assistance. We are holding 

some and we’re continuing quite a bit. 

But it also goes to some of the—some of the political democracy 

issues that we talked about—what does freedom of the press mean, 

how do you find the balance between support for—expressing support for the government and yet having a free voice to say we don’t 

like what the government did on X issue and that’s—and to explain 

that that’s an absolutely appropriate thing for a stable democratic 

government that no one need fear. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And in my remaining minute, Ms. Romanowski, 

can you speak to—there’s been a lot of discussion here today and 

in the press about what’s been suspended. 

Can you speak to the specific civil society programs that are ongoing and what kind of democracy building we’re seeing through 

those programs? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. We have a number of democracy in governance programs that we’re continuing. We are working—we have 

implementers who are working on elections and, again, as my colleague said about how you build stronger political parties, how you 

advocate for your positions, how you’re more tolerant of other positions. So we do engage. 

We spend a lot of time trying to build up civil society. How do 

you—how do organizations become strong enough to and in many 

cases it’s the mechanics of building an organization that can advocate, that can raise funds, that can engage with both their colleagues at the local level and at the national level. 

We have programs that focus on anti-corruption. So we’re going 

to continue and we can continue with those programs. There was 

44

an earlier question about the reaction to the Government of Egypt 

on having to suspend some of our——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI [continuing]. Some of our programs. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I just hope, Madam Chairman, that all of those important civil society programs that we’re engaged in that we’re utilizing—that those young kids who are out there tweeting and on 

Facebook are making sure that the Egyptian people understand the 

involvement that—the role that we’re playing to promote democracy. 

Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. And now we will go 

to Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to follow up a little bit on the suspension, Ambassador 

Jones. We made a suspension to suspend part of the aid that we’re 

giving. Was that following law or was it a policy decision to advance U.S. foreign policy? 

Ambassador JONES. It was a policy decision to send a message 

to the Egyptian leadership that we were not happy. We were disappointed by the actions that they took that resulted in the violence in August, that we could not pursue business as usual but 

that we supported the roadmap that they had outlined. 

We supported the effort to get to a democratically-elected government and so we decided to hold on the deliveries. We didn’t suspend assistance. 

We decided to hold on the deliveries of some of the larger weapons systems that were not really necessary in order to accomplish 

the goals that we—that we outlined—that we wanted to continue 

Sinai security, border security, counterterrorism, the kinds of 

things that are critical. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So no—so no law at this point—we’re not complying with any law or going down that direction of saying that a 

law was violated and that’s why we’ve suspended or withheld however, you know, you want to classify it? 

Ambassador JONES. We decided that we did not have to make a 

determination about—you’re asking about whether or not a coup 

took place. We decided we did not have to make a decision on that 

or make a statement one way or the other. 

But we decided we should act consistent with the law and——

Mr. MEADOWS. I’m a little confused——

Ambassador JONES [continuing]. And that goes to what Ms. 

Romanowski has been talking about. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, I’m a little confused because both you and 

Ms. Romanowski have talked about legislative fixes and if these 

are policy decisions how would you need a legislative fix unless 

there was a law that was being violated? 

Ambassador JONES. We—it’s a good question. We have been 

briefing staff as much as we can on our—on how we think this 

should proceed. 

We decided that we did not have to make a determination one 

way or the other in terms of the definition but——

Mr. MEADOWS. So you don’t need a legislative fix? 

45

Ambassador JONES. But we felt that we decided that we had to 

act consistent with the law and therefore because of that we believe we need a legislative—we need legislative flexibility in order 

to continue the programs that we’ve been talking about this morning. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you’re abiding by the law but you haven’t violated the law. I don’t—I don’t understand that. Ms. Romanowski, 

do you want to comment on that? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Yeah. If I can—if I can give a very pointed example, being consistent with the law has allowed us actually to go 

forward under other authorities to be able to continue work that 

isn’t done directly with the Government of Egypt. 

The programs in the case of the economic assistance affect our 

basic and higher education because those programs, the bulk of 

which work directly with the Ministry of Education and work in 

public schools, so public institutions and——

Mr. MEADOWS. So if a coup had happened you couldn’t help with 

schools is what you’re saying? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Consistent with that law, abiding by the law 

we were not able to continue programs that we work with government and public institutions and public authorities. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So we can help with schools but we can’t help 

with the government? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. We cannot help with public schools or public 

institutions. We can continue work with private schools or we——

Mr. MEADOWS. So what legislative fix are you looking at? I mean, 

because I’m confused. I would think that the Egyptian Government 

would be confused. I mean, what are you—what are you looking for 

here? 

Ambassador JONES. We’re looking for flexibility in the legislation 

that would allow us to continue——

Mr. MEADOWS. That says that we——

Ambassador JONES [continuing]. Programs. 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. We didn’t have a coup. Is that what 

you’re looking for? 

Ambassador JONES. In the—in Section 7008 that’s——

Mr. MEADOWS. So basically you’re looking for us to say that a 

coup didn’t happen? 

Ambassador JONES. We’re looking for the flexibility in the legislation that allows us to continue programs with the Egyptian Government that we otherwise are not continuing because we believe 

we must act consistent with the law. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Let me, in the 30 seconds I have remaining, a whole lot has been talked about democracy and we’re 

all for democracy. 

But the underlying—in this hearing months ago the underlying 

foundation was economic, economic, economic and it seems like 

we’re missing a whole lot of the economic viability that creates instability. I’d love for you to comment if you have time and if not 

in written reply later. 

Ambassador JONES. I’ll make a very quick comment. I agree with 

you. We all agree with you that economic reform is a critical element to what will bring Egypt to the stable country that we all aspire to. 

46

The kind of economic reforms that are the most appropriate are 

ones that have been suggested already by the—by the international 

financial institutions. 

Those kinds of reforms are ones that we’ve also advocated to the 

Gulf States that are providing economic assistance right now to 

Egypt as appropriate for them to advocate for so that—so that the 

institutional reforms are undertaken in ways that produce the kind 

of Egypt that we all look for. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I’m out of time. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield 

back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman. We go to Mr. Juan 

Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and, again, 

thank you for holding this hearing and I appreciate it and thank 

you for the witnesses—for being here. 

I have to say that I had great concern when President Morsi was 

elected. I believed that the country was going to head toward radical Islam, and a little test for you here. What’s the largest country 

in population in the Middle East? 

Ambassador JONES. It’s Egypt. 

Mr. VARGAS. It is Egypt—84 million people. I mean, if you take 

a look at the size of Egypt, 84 million people, Iran 76 million, Iraq 

35 million, Saudi Arabia 30 million. 

I think if you have a nation like the size of Egypt sliding into 

radical Islam I think it’s very problematic. What’s the second largest nation in the Middle East? 

Ambassador JONES. I would say my—off the top of my head I 

think it’s Iran. 

Mr. VARGAS. It is, with 76 million people and we saw what happened when you have a nation that large slide into radical Islam. 

So I think it’s very important that we remain very engaged with 

Egypt. 

I think it’s especially important because of our relationship with 

Israel, our strongest ally. If you want to talk about democracy, 

now, there’s a democracy. They could teach us a little bit about democracy and that’s why I think we’re such allies with Israel. 

Now, the relationship between Israel and Egypt is such an important relationship to remain—to keep the peace in the Middle 

East. 

I do have great concerns when we start to cut off this aid. I do. 

Now, my understanding then from what I hear today is that we cut 

off some of the aid but at the same time we continue to work with 

them, with their protection and you were describing that a little bit 

more but it seems that the Israelis don’t see it that way. 

They have some great concerns as I do that we’re taking an ally 

here and we’re hurting them, maybe debilitating them in such a 

way that it would become very problematic for our own national interests. 

So I just want to voice the same concerns that Mr. Elliot Abrams 

did. I have great concerns about that. I would want to ask this, 

though. Numbers—a number of numbers were thrown out there so 

I’d like to ask this. What was our economic aid to Egypt last year? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. The economic support funds that we give to 

Egypt annually are $250 million. 

47

Mr. VARGAS. So if you divide that into 84 million people, and I’m 

not very good at math, what is that number? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Can I pull out my computer? I’m afraid 

I’m——

Mr. VARGAS. You can—you can round it off here. What do you think it is? $250 million, 84 million people. Someone want to help 

on the panel? 

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Three—$2 to $3 at best. 

Mr. VARGAS. Like $3—a little over $3. A slice of pizza in New 

York City. 

I mean, it’s interesting listening to the numbers here thrown out 

like somehow we’re, you know, the aid that we’re giving is incredible and, you know, we’re going to be able to force them to change 

everything because of the $3, the slice of pizza that we give each 

one of their citizens. And that’s not going to—that’s not going to 

happen. 

I mean, I am very concerned what’s happening with the Coptic 

Christians, very much so. I’m a former Jesuit and I think what’s 

happening there is outrageous and we have to do something about 

it, and I think that we are. But at the same time, there’s 84 million 

people there. 

I mean, I do think we have to engage the best we can to go after 

because I think the comments that were made are real and we 

have to do something about that but understanding, again, the situation. 

We can’t walk away from this nation that’s so central to what 

we’re attempting to do to bring peace to that region. 

So I do have great concerns, once again, about our—I don’t want 

to call it disengagement but our somewhat disengagement there by 

giving less military aid. I think it is problematic. 

I want to see us—I want to see us continue to work with Egypt, 

not abandon Egypt. I think that would be a horrible mistake. 

Would you like to comment about that, Ambassador? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, Congressman. Thank you very much. 

We agree completely that under no circumstances should we be 

walking away from Egypt and we designed this policy precisely to 

be sure that we don’t do that. 

So that’s why we are working so extensively with the Egyptian 

Government about their roadmap to elected government, to elected 

civilian government with what all of the rights of minorities, freedom of the press, those kinds of things, that we have talked about 

this morning. 

And as we see their progress we will be reviewing our assistance 

situation with a look to lifting the holds on—that we have—that we 

have—lifting these holds so that we can get back to the full relationship that you and we and they would like to have. 

Mr. VARGAS. Okay. Because I—again, my concern is that we 

have some friends in the region. Let’s not stiff arm our friends. 

Ambassador JONES. Absolutely. 

Mr. VARGAS. That’s a bad policy. Thank you very much. I yield 

back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

We’re going to go to Mr. DeSantis at this time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

48

Did we consult with Israel prior to the decision to withhold military aid from Egypt? 

Ambassador JONES. As events unfolded in Egypt from just before 

June 30th—let me throw out June 30th through July 3rd through 

the violence in August we were in constant conversation with 

Israel as well as with other countries who are as interested as we 

are in Egypt’s success. 

So as the situation unfolded we were in constant discussion with 

them as with others as to what our concerns were, what our hopes 

were for Egypt to get back on track to a democratically-elected civilian-democratically-elected civilian government so that as we 

made the announcement on October 9th as to the decisions on how 

we were going to demonstrate our concern about what had happened the—we informed the Israeli Government as well as other 

governments and so that—and because we’d have been in such extensive conversation with them this is no surprise to them and no 

surprise to others. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So in terms of the peace treaty between Israel 

and Egypt does this decision with military assistance from Israel’s 

perspective is that helping to solidify that or is that making that 

a little more tenuous? 

Because when Morsi came in I thought that there was—it didn’t 

seem to me that that was necessarily viable. I mean, maybe, maybe 

not. But under Mubarak we knew that was a bedrock of the politics 

of that region. 

So that decision—what did Israel say in terms of how that would 

affect the viability of that peace treaty? 

Ambassador JONES. From everything that—from every conversation that we had with the Israelis we emphasized the importance 

of doing what we—of ensuring that the decisions we made would 

be fully—would allow Egypt to continue to be fully in support of 

the peace treaty. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And did you want to——

Mr. CHOLLET. Sir, if I could just comment briefly. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Sure. 

Mr. CHOLLET. From the military perspective we are in constant 

contact with the Israelis. We have been throughout this process. 

In fact, the very week that our policy announcement was made 

Israeli Defense Minister Ya’alon was in Washington with his senior 

team meeting with Secretary Hagel, meeting with all of us in the 

Defense Department about Egypt but also many other issues in the 

region. So there were no surprises here and they are fully aware 

of our thinking on Egypt moving forward. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So in terms of the Sinai, what is being done if 

anything to support the Egyptian military’s efforts? Because I 

know Morsi had threatened to move force in there and I know 

Netanyahu pushed back on that. 

And, obviously, we even have some U.S. troops there as part of 

a peacekeeping mission. 

So what is being done to support the military and then what contingencies if any do we have if there is a prospect of a period of 

instability in that canal zone? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, sir, as you mentioned we have about 600 

U.S. troops that are in the Sinai right now as part of the multiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:56 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\102913\85312 HFA PsN: SHIRL
49

national force observer mission that was created by the Camp 

David peace treaty. 

We do support the Egyptian military in sustaining many of the 

systems that are being used in the Sinai. So although we don’t 

have an operational role in what they are doing in the Sinai the 

systems that we help them sustain and train on and use are being 

used in the Sinai. 

We keep in very close touch with the Egyptian military. Our Embassy in Cairo and our defense team there as well as us here in 

Washington talk with our Egyptian counterparts constantly about 

Sinai as well as our Israeli counterparts because there are certain 

restrictions that the Egyptians have on them through the Camp 

David peace treaty about what sort of equipment they can use and 

deploy into Sinai and they have to coordinate with the Israelis on 

some of those movements of equipment to ensure that there’s 

transparency and that both sides are comfortable with what’s happening there. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And this could be for whoever wants to speak 

about it but when Morsi was elected that was viewed as a positive 

sign for Hamas. 

Now that we have the military who is in charge can you describe 

the relationship between what we call the Egyptian Government at 

this point and Hamas and do you believe that a continued deterioration in our relationship with Egypt would benefit Hamas? 

Ambassador JONES. Hamas has taken some hits as a result of 

the actions that Egypt has taken in the Sinai to close down the 

tunnels, to close down the ability of—to close down transportation 

of goods into Gaza. 

So my expectation is that Hamas will continue to suffer as a result of the—as a result of the interim government in Egypt. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. I’m out of time and I yield back to the 

chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman. 

We go now to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Royce, and I think today’s hearing 

really brings to home, first of all, that it’s important that we be a 

model for the world and keep our Government open. I think that 

would be a good thing. 

But I want to say that Mr. Rohrabacher did lead a trip this—

last couple months that I had the honor of going on. It was—we 

went to Cairo and it was probably, for me, one of the most amazing 

experiences I had because we got to literally spend hours with 

President Mansour, with General al-Sisi, with the Coptic Pope 

Tawadros II. 

They said some things to me. I don’t have a lot of time to discuss 

them all but I want to sort of very simply summarize what they 

said and tell me whether you agree. 

But let’s see, we were told that they felt that the peace treaty 

with Israel is secure. They would honor it, that they were committed to also protecting the Gaza Strip, that President Morsi had 

overreached and was incompetent, that they had a plan to get to 

elections. 

50

They were reforming their constitution now and then they—and 

they were going to have elections for Parliament and then a President. 

We were told by the Coptic Pope that Morsi had burned churches 

and prosecuted Christians and also I did ask the question and this, 

I think, Congressman Royce picked up on this and I really agree. 

I asked the question what is your economic plan. I asked that to 

them several times with absolutely no answer. So my first question 

to you is whether or not those assertions or comments that were 

made to us seem correct and I just want to say one other thing 

really to pick up on something that the chairman said. 

The biggest observation I had when I went to Cairo was literally 

the hundreds and hundreds of cars on the street that I saw, which 

led me to believe that people are really actually trying to get on 

with their life, trying to go to work. I mean, that seemed—that 

really seemed obvious to me. So if you could comment on that. 

Ambassador JONES. Let me just make a couple of quick comments. 

I think definitely we understand exactly as you were told that 

there is a strong desire to protect the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, to 

honor the peace treaty and to work with it both in spirit and in 

substance. 

Second, on the constitution there is work underway to revise the 

constitution, to bring it into line with what the committee believes 

would reflect the views of Egyptian society now. 

There will be a referendum after that, and as I told you it’s just 

part of the road plan that they outlined the elections—for Parliament elections for President. 

On the economic plan, we have advocated very strongly as my 

colleague, Alina Romanowski, has said how important it is for 

there to be economic reforms and reforms of economic institutions 

to allow the Egyptian people to go about their business just as you 

observed so that they can have the—they can have education for 

their children, health for their families—health care for their families, jobs for their families and a country that abides by the rule 

of law. 

Ms. FRANKEL. May I just interrupt because I have one other 

question that is very important for me to get an answer which is—

because there’s a debate about whether to continue with support or 

not. 

I personally, from what I’ve heard, would—I am in favor of continuing support. But I think there’s some confusion on this coup 

clause. 

And do you favor or suggest that we change that provision? Is 

that—is that what is driving the decision of the administration to 

cut funding? 

Ambassador JONES. The decision on assistance and how we 

would—how we would—what items we would hold was driven by 

the events on the ground. It was driven by the need to send a message that the kind of violence that we saw in August was not an 

appropriate way to pursue the democratic pursuits of the—of the 

Egyptian people. 

What we’re asking for is legislative flexibility so that we can continue the programs that we think are terribly important to assure 

51

the strengthening of the Egyptian institutions that we’ve all talked 

about, you in particular, that are important for the Egyptian people 

to be able to proceed with their lives in ways that they support and 

we support. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Mr. Chair, if maybe I could get or this committee 

could get an answer—a written answer specifically on whether we 

need to change the coup clause. That seems to be—may be driving 

some of these decisions. 

Chairman ROYCE. We might be in consultation afterwards with 

our witnesses on this. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. Good suggestion. All right. Let’s go to Mr. Ted 

Poe from Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. 

I’ll talk, first of all, about the Coptic Christians. Forty churches 

bombed and burned since August, untold amount of damage. Has 

anybody been arrested? To your knowledge, has anybody been arrested for these crimes? 

Ambassador JONES. I’m not sure I know all the details but there 

have been some arrests. But I apologize, I don’t know the details 

of how many have been arrested in each incident. 

But it is a subject that we have discussed in detail regularly, especially after each of these things happened with the Egyptian 

Government and we issued——

Mr. POE. But you’re—excuse me, Ambassador. So people have 

been arrested, to your knowledge? 

Ambassador JONES. So far as I recall, yes. 

Mr. POE. All right. Who are these people? Who—what group or 

groups are behind the 40 bombings of the churches? 

Ambassador JONES. I don’t think I can give you a generalized answer to that question. 

Mr. POE. Well, who are some of them? 

Ambassador JONES. Some of them are simply people who—some 

of them are just—they’re simply anti-Christian. Some of them 

are—it’s vendettas in communities. There are a great variety of 

reasons. 

I’m not sure I know all of—I certainly don’t know all of them and 

I haven’t been privy to the questioning of those who have been arrested. 

Mr. POE. Is the United States helping Egypt in any way to find 

these criminals or not? 

Ambassador JONES. We have worked very hard with the police 

to provide training programs so that—so that investigations can be 

done in a professional manner and to over——

Mr. POE. Specifically on these bombings or generally? 

Ambassador JONES. Actually, more specifically—more specifically 

related to crimes against women but also in general on investigations of any crime. 

Mr. POE. All right. Would you follow up and find out the answer 

to that first question as to how many people if any have been arrested in these bombings? 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, absolutely. 

52

Mr. POE. All right. It’s been mentioned about Hamas. Still not 

very clear on what the government’s position is—the Egyptian Government is now on Hamas. What is their position? Is it cozier, less 

cozy? 

It’s a tough choice between the government when they have to 

choose between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, not two very 

outstanding groups, in my opinion. So what is their current relationship with Hamas and the Egyptian Government? 

Ambassador JONES. The Egyptian Government, of course, is closing down the tunnels that are—that is an unwelcome event for 

Hamas and Gaza. There is, I think it’s safe to say, no love lost between the interim Egyptian Government and Hamas in Gaza. 

Mr. POE. I’ve heard conflicting reports that human trafficking is 

on the increase. It’s on the decrease on the Gaza and the Sinai. 

Ambassador, you should know. What is it? Has it increased or has 

it decreased? 

Ambassador JONES. I don’t know in which period we’re talking 

about but in general it has increased. It’s a subject of deep concern 

to us. It’s something that we’ve been talking with the Egyptian 

Government about. 

It’s one of the things that will be—is addressed to some degree 

by closing the tunnels because that’s how the—how the trafficking 

is undertaken. 

But we’ve also been talking with the Egyptian Government about 

the importance of arresting the traffickers, investigating them and 

bringing them to justice. 

Mr. POE. Is that occurring? 

Ambassador JONES. It’s not occurring to the extent that we 

would like. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Chollet, did you want to weigh in on that? I see 

you nodding your head so I thought maybe you wanted to say 

something. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Just in agreement. 

Mr. POE. All right. Be specific, if you would, Ambassador. What 

do you mean by trafficking? What is—is this human sex trafficking? Is it drugs? Is it guns? Is it workers? And be specific, if 

you will, on where it’s going and where it’s coming from. 

Ambassador JONES. The trafficking regrettably involves all of 

those things. It’s coming across Sinai from parts of Africa, generally, and it’s something that we have been investigating, documenting and bringing to the attention as much as we possibly can 

to the authorities to see if we can get the kinds of investigation——

Mr. POE. Where is it going? Excuse me. I’m just down to 30 seconds. So it’s coming across Africa. Where is it going? 

Ambassador JONES. Into Israel through Gaza. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Sir, one quick thing to add in the remaining seconds here is that’s one of the reasons why one of the programs that 

we are continuing is to work with the Egyptian military on border 

security in particular because the problem is they’ve got bad things 

coming in to their country throughout, let’s say, from Libya, for example, transiting through Sinai and ending up in Gaza. 

Mr. POE. And some of those include guns? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

53

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

Gerry Connolly from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. 

Ambassador Jones, in reading your testimony I assume this testimony was vetted in the State Department and other councils of foreign policy in the United States Government. 

Ambassador JONES. Yes, it was. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m reading what I think is one of the most extraordinary statements I’ve ever read from a United States official. 

Following the historic January 2011 revolution, the Brotherhood’s 

Freedom and Justice Party won parliamentary elections and President Morsi was voted into power in an election viewed as free and 

fair. 

I assume that statement means he was—it was a democratic 

process and he was democratically duly elected as President. Is 

that correct? 

Ambassador JONES. That was the assessment at the time, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. No, it’s the assessment today. 

Ambassador JONES. Right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You made that assertion. 

Ambassador JONES. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Morsi, however, proved unwilling or unable 

to govern in a way that was inclusive, alienating large swaths of 

Egyptian society and the interim government that replaced him 

July 3rd responded to the desires of millions of Egyptians who believe the revolution had taken a wrong turn. 

Am I to understand from that that the United States Government is saying even if you win a free and democratic election if you 

alienate people in your governance it’s okay to overthrow it? Because I can think of some American administrations that might 

qualify for that. 

Ambassador JONES. We assessed the situation on the ground on 

June—leading up to June 30th, July 1st as being a—because of the 

millions of Egyptians in the street we assessed that as demonstrating considerable discomfort and unhappiness with the direction that the Egyptian democratic experiment was moving under 

President Morsi. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Ambassador, you and I are old enough 

to remember the Vietnam War protests. I participated in them. 

There were millions of Americans who went in the streets of this 

country for years protesting President Johnson, President Nixon 

and the Vietnam War policy. Under your logic, that would have 

delegitimized those two administrations. 

Ambassador JONES. Here’s the way I would describe it. There is 

a difference—I think a clear difference between the institutions of 

government in the United States and the fledgling institutions of 

government in Egypt in which the Egyptian people could see that 

their—that the voice that they were—that they exercised in the 

election was no longer heard by Morsi who had begun to take over 

various elements of the government in ways that they did not support. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So let me get this straight. We favor democracy 

unless it’s a fledgling government, in which case we have a special 

category, and we put them under a certain scrutiny and if they 

54

don’t meet standards that are not explicit it’s okay to overthrow 

that democratically-elected government even if we don’t like it. 

Ambassador JONES. It’s not a question of what we liked or didn’t 

like. It was a question of what the Egyptian people—what the 

Egyptian people felt was a wrong turn in their revolution. But 

we——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Ambassador, based on what? Based on 

protests—street protests? Because if you’re going to use that standard you could argue this interim government is equally illegitimate. Millions of people have protested this government and hundreds have lost their lives in the form of that protest. 

Ambassador JONES. Congressman, that’s also why we’ve been so 

engaged and so—and have discussed though extensively with the 

interim government the importance of their getting back on track 

to a civilian-led government through a democratic process. 

That’s why—that’s why we support their roadmap but that’s also 

why we have expanded on what we understand the elements of democracy to be and the elements that we would promote. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You know, Madam, I’m sorry. I’m running out of 

time. I’m also old enough and so are you to remember that this is 

precisely the logic used to overthrow the Allende government and 

to justify our support for the Pinochet government, and it led to 

years of repression in the oldest democracy in the Western hemisphere—in the southern part of the Western hemisphere. 

It led to thousands of people being killed, tortured and disappeared. In my view, it is not okay for the United States of America to say it’s okay to overthrow a democratically-elected government however fledgling and however much we disagree with it. 

And it’s a sad day for me to sit here and see my Government 

make such a statement. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding back and 

I’ll just in closing go to something that Ambassador Jones made 

reference to in pointing out, I think, the IMF type reforms that—

essentially balancing the books. 

I want to make it pretty clear that I don’t think any economists 

believe that that’s going to do anything to spark the Egyptian economy. 

I mean, that might be good governance but that’s not going to 

take care of the problem in Egypt. I’ve raised this issue endlessly. 

The administration doesn’t listen on this issue and I think that, 

as Madeleine Albright testified here and Hernando de Soto, the 

bottom line is until we have economic freedom in that country, 

Egypt is going to stagnate. 

You can’t have—I think Cairo is probably close to 90 percent informal. You know, it’s an easy thing—it’s already been done in the 

past to go through and try to affix addresses, set up a property registry, give people title, put something through so that people can 

start a business without having to pay bribes. 

This is the area that cries out. A lot of work’s been done and 

never implemented by the Mubarak government, and to not confront that, to not wrestle with that is going to compound the problems in Egyptian society going forward, in my opinion. 

55

The other point I would make, Mr. Chollet, in response to my 

question earlier, and I know you’ve made some comments on this 

larger weapons systems premise including Apache helicopters to 

the sense that this is not going to harm Egypt’s ability to confront 

a very growing terrorist presence in the Sinai, I understand your 

point—well, there’s 20 of them out there. 

There’s 20 that are getting a lot of wear and tear, and I don’t 

know how you know that that’s all that’s needed in an environment 

out there where, what, they’ve closed 57 tunnels down. 

But in the meantime, al-Qaeda is very present along with a lot 

of other radical groups and we’ve got our own national security interests in seeing that the Sinai—that the anarchy there be 

quelled—that these radical organizations be pushed back. 

And it’s the Egyptian military that’s engaged in confronting 

these groups with this increased operation, which is clearly degrading their weaponry. I mean, they’re also engaged up in northern, 

you know, Egypt with the same kind of challenge. 

And I would just urge the administration to reconsider its decision to withhold the sale of weapons systems that are going to be 

increasingly important to Egypt’s ability to confront terrorist organizations and I think you ought to rethink that. 

But I do want to thank all our witnesses for coming and testifying here today and we stand adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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