The Ho norab le E dm und A. Sarg us, J r., United State s D istrict Judg e for the S outhern D istrict of * Ohio , s itting by

des ig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0439n.06 F iled: Jun e 22, 2007 Case No. 06- 5769 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

JOANN MA TILL A, ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED P lai nt iff-A ppe lla nt , ) STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR ) T H E E AS T E RN DI S T RI CT O F v. ) KEN TU CK Y, LON DO N D IV ISI ON ) SOUTH KENTUCK

Y RURA L ) ELE CTRIC COOP ERATIVE CORP ., ) ) Defendan t-Appellee. )

BEFORE: M OORE an d GIBBONS, Circuit Jud ges; and SARGUS, Distr ict Judge. * SARGU S, District Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant, J oann Matil la, appeals the decision of the dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt i n favo r o f A pp e lle e , So uth

Ke ntu c ky

Rur a l E le c tr ic Coo pe r a t i v e C o r

p o r a t i o n( “ S KR E C C ” )

. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtf o u n d t h a tt h e a c t s o f

t w o i n d i v i d

ua ls

wer e a supe rsedingcause of Matilla’s injuries which she sustained when she was struck by a 7,200 volt electric wire that was owned and operated by the Electric Cooperative. Be cause we c onclude that Matilla has not established that S KRECC owed her a duty to de-e lectrify

the line, we a ffirm on alternate g rounds. I. On Fe bruar

y 16, 2004, Appellant, Joann Matilla, suffere d serious phy sical injuries whe n she06-5769 -2-

The pa rties vig orously

dispute whether

Matilla and the other s were trespassingor had 1 permission to be on the prope rty for use s such as hunting and wood- cutting. T he district cour t declined to r esolve this conflict in the e vidence , concludinginstead that the que stions of fore seea bility and proximate cause wer e dispositive. SKRECC emphasizes, and the district cour t mentioned, that Matilla and some of he r 2 companions we re dr inking be er at the time of the incident. The rec ord, howe ver, pr ovides no indication that Matilla was impaire d by the “c ouple of be ers” she consumed, or that the alcohol had any relationship t o the ac cident. In any event, the district c ourt did not consider this evidenc e particula rly rele vant in arr iving at its ul timate conclusions and de termined instead that even omitti ng this fact would not alter its opini on that SKRECC could not have f orese en the c hain of events lea ding to Matilla’s injury

. was struc k by

a powe r line. Appe llee, South Kentucky Rural Elec tric Cooperative Corporation (“ SKR ECC ” ), ow ne d a

nd ma intain ed th e powe r l ine . A t th e tim e of he r i nju ri e s, Matil la

wa s a citizen of Ore go n b ut was tempora rily residingwith her then- boy friend, Mic hael Pitman. Pitm an had bee n in Kentucky

for a n extended period of time to attend to the affa irs of hi s mother’s estate. On F e br uary 16 , 2 00 4, Mat il la a ndP it man , al on g wit h J eff Gr egory andhi s gir lf

ri end , Bob bie McClure, we re c utting tre es on t he property of Oli ve Harness. The Ha rness prope rty

is located on 1 Roc ky Hi ll Roa d, a

g ra ve l c ounty

ro a d lo c a te d in

Pul a sk i Co un ty , K e ntu c ky . SKREC C se rv ic e s o nly tw o c us tom e rs on

Roc ky Hi ll Ro a d, Ol ive Ha

rn e ss a nd Pa tsy Va ug ht. Th e Ha

rn e ss prop ert y

is

s erv i ce d v i a a 7 , 2 0 0 -v o l t t ra n s m i s s i o n l i n e wh i ch i s o wn edan d m ai n t ai n edb y

S KR E C C

. T h e h i gh voltag e line traverse d Rocky Hill Road across a wooded are a alongthis county road. Matilla was

se a te d in the ba c k o f a

pic k- up tr

uc k o n Ro c ky

Hi ll r oa d und e rn e a th t

he po we r l ine s. 2 SKRECC is an el ec t ri c coope rative. Char g es for elec tricity

to the member- customers of SKRECC are calc ulated by monthly kilowatt usag e. I f, howeve r, a me mber uses le ss than one kilowatt hour per month, no kilowatt cha rg es ac crue , but SKRECC char g es the c ustomer a minimum monthly pay ment.06-5769 -3-

Matilla points out S KRECC did not establish that Mrs. Har ness maintained a

cooper ative 3 me mbe rs hip a g re e me nt. SKR ECC pr ov ide d a n und a te d a

pp lic a tio n f

or se rv ic e sig ne d b y

he r l a te husband for

“10 ac res on the w est side of Hig hway 80 . . . ,” which, a s Matilla contends, does not descr ibe the subjec t 280-ac re pr operty on Rocky

Hill Road. SKREC C did not produce a me mbe rs hip a g re e me nt s ig ne d b y Ol ive Ha rn e ss. SKRECC ’s billing re port in J une of 1997 indicates that the meter to the proper

ty never 4 reg istered a

ny elec trical usag e. Pole visual-inspec tion recor ds from SKRECC i ndicate that the meter ha d not refle cted e lectric al usag e of more than one kilowatt hour since October of 1998. Appellant-Matilla’s expert, J ames Ge ige r, a c onsulting eng ineer , inspected the line and 5 no te d th a t th e Ha

rn e ss e le c tr ic me te r w a s e ne rg ize d, but no po we r w a s b e ingde liv e re d f ro m th is line. He opined that the elec tricity on the line could have been tur ned off at the Va ug ht residenc e, at the be g inning of the roa d. He indicates that SKRECC could have disconnec ted the line in approxim ately

five minutes to make it safe beyond the point of disconnec tion. The Ha rness family beca

me a member of the S KRECC in 1969. After her husba

nd, Elmer 3 Ha rn e ss, pa sse d aw ay , Oliv e Ha rn e ss a ssume d th e a c c ount. Ol ive Ha rn e ss h a s r e c e ntl y

su ff e re d w ith Alzheimer’s disease

. Although Mrs. Har ness owns the proper

ty alongRocky

Hill Road where the

acc ident took place, he r af fairs a re nowhandled by her nie ce, Roxie J ohnson, who has a f ull power of attorne y . Virtually no elec tricity

has bee n consumed at the Har ness prope rty

since at least 1997. The 4 Har ness ac count, howeve r, has be en cha rg ed the minimum monthl y amount, and the account was

curr ent at lea st through D ece mber 2005. Although SKRECC service d both the Har ness and Va

ug ht proper ties on Rocky

Hill Road, pow er to the Har ness proper

ty could have be en discontinued without aff ectingservice to the Vaug ht premises. Neither Mrs. Har ness nor h er care taker , Mrs. J ohnson, 5

ever reque sted that SKRECC disconnec t or terminate the Har ness ac count. Mrs. Joh n s on speci fi ca l l y av er red that, at all times, she intended that ele ctricity be ava ilable to the meter on the pole. For many y ear s, Mrs. J ohnson paid $5.77 eac h month to make this electricity available to the06-5769 -4- H ar n e s s p r o p e rt y. On the date of the incide nt, Matilla, Pitman, Gre g ory and McClure ha d alre ady cut down one tree , sawe d it into pi ece s and loade d it into the back of a truck. Pitman and Gre g ory then attempted to cut down a locust tree. D uring the proc ess, the locust tree beca me lodg ed in an a djace nt pine tree

. I n an attempt to fre e the locust, Pitman and Gre g ory cut the pine tre e. As the locust fell towar ds the g round, i t struck the powe r line that ra n alongRocky

Hill Road. The line struck Matilla, who was sitti ng in the back of

Pitm an’s truc k whi ch was pa rked dire ctly

underne ath the powe r lines on the road. Matilla was knocke d off the tr uck fr om the forc e of the elec tric shock a nd sever ely

injured. Ma til l a f i l e d a l aw s u i to nA u g u s t8 , 2 0 0 4

. S KR E C C f i l e d a t h i r d

- p art y

c o mp l a i n ta g a i n st Mic ha e l Pitman a

nd Jef f Gr e g or y . Upo n mo tio n o f S KR ECC , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d d e fa

ult judgme nt ag ainst Pit man and Gr eg ory on J anuar

y 20, 2006. The district cour

t issued a sche duling or der o n No vember 22, 2004, which re quired initial disclosures under

Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 26 by Dec ember 1, 2004. The court set Plaintiff’s deadline to disc lose the identity of her expert witness to be used at trial a nd their written r eports for J une 15, 2005. All pre trial discover y was to be c ompleted by

Dec ember

1, 2005. Matilla did not meet the dea dline for initial disclosures under Rule 26 by

Dec ember

1, 2004, wh ic h h e r c ouns e l e xpla ine d w a s th e re su lt o f d if fi c ult y in t ime ly ob ta ini nginf

or mation du e to Matilla’s ong oing he alth problems and the f act that she had moved to Ore g on. She rec eived a brief extension unt il J anuar

y 18, 2005 to provide the re quired infor mation. On J une 15, 2005, the de adline for Matilla to disclose expert repor ts, Matilla requested a

n extension unt il September 15, 2005 to disclose dama g e experts. The ne x t day , she di sclosed the06-5769 -5-

Matilla herse lf sent a pro se le tte r t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt a ft e r t he jud g me nt, e sse nti a lly 6 qu e sti on ingthe de c isi on

on the mot ion . ( Ap x., at 39 9. ) S KR ECC re c ite s so me of he r s tate me nts from the letter

in their brief

in an ef fort to ca st doubt on her compete ncy . (B rief of Appellee at n.2.) These communications are irrele vant to the issues prese nted to this Court. As counsel for Appellant points out, SKREC C’s choice to include the stateme nts is, at worst, “an a ppalling e ff or t” to t ake a dv anta g e of

Matil la ’s se ve re imp a ir

me nt t hat r e su lte d f

ro m th e inc ide nt whic h is the subject of he r ca se of ne g lige nce a g ainst the Cooperative. repor t of J ames Ge ige r, her

liability expert. The cour

t permit ted an e x tension until S eptember 1, 2005 to fi l e ad ditional ex pert disclosure s. On September 1, 2005, Matilla ag ain re quested a n extension t o disclose damag e experts. The c ourt g ave Matilla until October 1, 2005, and wa

rned he r that it was not inclined t o g ive any additional extensions of t ime. On October 4, 2005, Matilla filed the dis c los ur e of

he r v oc a tio na l e xpe rt

. On Nove m ber 15, 2005, SKRECC took the deposition of Matilla’s liabilit y expert, J ames Geig er. On that day , he provide d testimony reg ardinga sec ond, differ ent theory of liability , which followed a

n addit i o n al vi sit to t he sce ne of the acc ident on the morning of his deposition. Geig er testified that his second visit to the Har ness’ prope rty , during which he ma de “c loser obser vations,” wh ic h r e ve a le d a

se c on d h a zar do us c on dit ion . G e ig e r o pin e d f or the fi rs t tim e tha

t th e lin e sh ou ld have be e n d e -e ne rg ize d b e c a us e the me te r b ox and

outle ts c re a te d a

da ng e ro us c on dit ion . SKREC C filed a motion in limine, wh ic h the dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d o n Jan

ua ry 20 , 2 00 6, fi nd ingthat Matil la had bee n dilatory

in the discovery

proce ss and Geig er’ s addition a l expert opinion had been submitted well outside the time permitted. The district cour

t entere d summary

judgme nt on Febr

uary 28, 200 6 . Matilla, throug h her counsel, filed a

motion to amend and vac ate summary judgm en t o n M ar ch 10, 2006. The district court de nied the motion to amend and vacate on May 5, 2006. Matilla bring s this appeal fr om the

606-5769 -6-

Matilla is a resident of

the State of Or eg on; SKREC C is a Kentucky entity . The amount 7 in controver sy

exceeds the sum of $75,000. The events g iving r ise to Matilla’s cause of ac tion ar o s e i nP u l a s k i C o u n t y, K e n tu c ky. district court’s fina l judgment. II. The case came befor e the district c ourt on the basis of diver sity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 7 We re vie w the g ra

nt of summa

ry jud g me nt in fa

vo r o f S KR ECC de novo

. W atk ins v . Ci ty of B a t t l e Creek

, 2 73 F .3 d 6 82 , 6 85 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) ; Lukowski v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 416 F.3d 478, 48 2 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5)

. Sum mary jud g me nt is a pp ro pr iate “ if

the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g e nu ine is su e as to any

mate ri a l f

a c t.” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). A d isp ute ov e r a mate ri a l f

a c t is g enuine if a rea sonable jury could return a verdic t f or the nonmoving party

. Himmel v. Ford Motor Co ., 34 2 F .3 d 59 3, 59 8 (6 th Cir

. 20 03 ). I n d e c idi ngthe pr op ri e ty of a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, this Court vi ews a ll evidence in the light most favor able to the nonmovingparty

. Id

. “To su rv ive a motion for summary judgme nt, the non-moving party must present evide nce c reating more than a ‘metaphy sical doubt as t o the m ater ial fac ts.’ ” Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v . Massarone , 326 F.3d 8 1 3 , 8 1 5 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Ma tsu sh ita El e c . I nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986))

. In t h i s d i v e r s i t y o f

c i t i z e n s h i p c a s e , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt a p p l i e d t h e l aw o f t h e S t a t e o f K e n tu c ky. Erie Railroad Co., v. Thompkins , 304 U. S. 64 (1 93 8) . Thi s Co ur t r e vie ws the a

pp lic a tio n o f s tate law de novo

. The ob ald

v . B oa rd of C ou nty Com ’r s o f H am ilton Cou nty , 332 F.3d 414, 416 ( 6th Cir. 20 03 ); Spencev. Miles Laboratories, Inc. , 37 F.3d 1185, 1188 ( 6th Cir. 1994).06-5769 -7- I n diversity

case s, the Court applies state lawin acc ordanc e with t h e controlling dec isions of the state su

pr e me c ourt . I f t

hat c ourt ha s n ot ye t a dd

re sse d the r ele van t iss ue , th is C ourt mus t predic t how the state supre me cour t would rule by

looking at all the available data. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car System s, Inc. , 2 4 9 F.3d 450, 454 ( 6th Cir. 2001). “‘Rele vant data inc lude decisions of the state appellate courts, and those decisions should not be disreg arde d unless we a re prese nted with persua sive data that the [st ate supre me court] would decide otherwise.’ ” Id . (quoting Kingsley Assoc. v. M

oll Plasti Crafters, Inc ., 65 F.3d 498, 507 ( 6th Cir. 1995)). III . The district cour

t held that the acts of Mi chae l Pit man and Jeff Gr eg ory wer e a supe rseding

c a us e of Matil la ’s inj ur

y and the re fo re g ra

nte d SKREC C’ s motio n for summa ry jud g me nt. Matil la contends that t h e district cour t errone ously

analy zed the law of supe rsedingcause and misapplied the do c tr ine to t

he fa c ts o f t

his c a se . We re vie w the g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo and may aff irm on any

g rounds supported by

the re cord. City M

gmt. Corp. v . U.S. Chem. Co., Inc

. , 43 F.3d 2 4 4 , 2 5 1 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 4 ). Al t h o u ghwe d o n o tad dre s s t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s d ec i s i o nfi n d i n g a superse ding c ause, w e af

firm on the basis that Matilla has not established that SKRECC owed he r a duty to de-e lectrify

the line. To establish a c laim for neg lige nce unde r Kentucky law, a plaintiff must prove ea ch of the following elements: (1) the def endant owe d the plaintiff a duty of ca re; (2) the def

endant br eac hed that duty ; and (3) the breach caused the plaintiff' ’s damag es. Mu lli ns v . Co mm on we alt h Li fe In s. Co ., 839 S.W .2d 245, 247 (Ky . 1992). As the d i s t ri ct court noted, ne ither par ty contests the fa ct that Matilla suffer ed seve re injuries a s a result of phy sical conta ct with the hig h-voltag e ele ctrica l wire.06-5769 -8- The district cour

t also did not address whe ther SKRECC breac hed a duty of ca re ow ed to M atilla, be c a us e thi s q ue sti on wo uld be fo r a jur y to re so lve

. Thus , the dis tr ic t c ourt lim ite d it s ana ly sis to the re maining e lements, specif ically the duty of ca re ow ed to the Plaintiff and leg al ca usation. T h e qu e s t i o no f

w h e t h e r S KR E C C o w e d

M a t i l l a a d u t y o f c ar e tu r n s o n a t w o - p arti n qu i r

y, the standar d for whic h derive s from the seminal ca se, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. , 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.1928) . The Court must first examine the standard of car e that SKRECC owed to Matilla in the operation of its electrica l distributi on lines. Next, the Court mus t determine whether the ca use of Matilla’s injury was for esee able by SKRECC

. See J

ames v . Meow Me dia, Inc. , 300 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2002)(interpr eting Kentucky law as it r elates to determinations of whe ther a duty of ca re

e xists ). Ke ntu c ky

c ourt s h ave c on c lud e d th a t de c idi ngthe e xiste nc e of a duty of c are is “ e sse nti a lly a policy deter mination.” Mullins , 8 39 S.W. 2d a t 24 8; Sheehan v . United Serv s. Auto. Ass’n , 913 S.W .2d 4, 6 (Ky . Ct. App.1996). Under Kentu ck y l aw , b o t h t he existence of a duty of ca re to a plaintiff and its underly

ing f orese eability

are pure que stions of law to be decided by the cour t. Meow Media, 3 0 0 F. 3 d

at 6 9 1 (c i t i n g Mullins , 839 S.W .2d at 248). Ke ntu c ky law i mpo se s a duty on e nti tie s pr od uc ingand tr ans mittin g e le c tr ic ity

to “ e xer c ise the highe st d e g re e of

c are and sk ill kn ow n in

the op e ratio n o f i ts b us ine ss t o p re ven t in ju ry to persons.” Kentucky

Utiliti es Co. v. W

oodrum’s Adm’r , 224 Ky

. 33, 38, 5 S.W .2d 283 (Ky . 1928). That duty , howeve r, is not absolute; Kentucky courts have never

held that elec tric utiliti es ar e insurers a g ainst all injuries which may be ca used by the operation of

their business. Id . at 286. A utilit y company owes this extremely high standard of car e only to a per son “at a ny place wher e they have a rig ht to be for e ither business or plea sure.” Id.06-5769 -9- As to t he sta nd ard of c are tha t SKREC C ow e d to Matil la , th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d, and thi s Court ag ree s, that in th e p re s en t case , the evidenc e conf licts conce rning whether

Matilla and her companions we re t respassing on the H arne ss’ land or whe ther she ha d permission to be on the proper ty for p u rp o s es such as c lear ing tr ees. G iven this varianc e in the fa cts, the Court ca nnot deter mine whether

SKRECC owed Matilla the highe st deg ree of care a nd skill i n the distribution of its e le c tr ic ity , o r t

he mor e g e ne ra l re a so na

ble c are un de r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s. Th is i ssu e , h ow e ve r, is not disposit ive. I t i s u n d i s p u t ed that SKRECC owed some de g ree of ca re to Matilla in the maintenanc e of its ene rg ized power lines, wh ether she wa s on the Har

ness’ pre mises without permission, or, as she c ontends, on a public roa d. “‘[D]uty ’ is a question of whe ther the defenda nt is und e r a ny ob lig a tio n f

or the be ne fi t of

the pa rt ic ula r p la int if f; and in n e g lig ence cases, the duty is alway s the same– to conf orm to the leg al s t an d ar d of re asonable conduct in the lig ht of the appar ent risk.” Prosser

and Ke eton on Torts (5th ed. 1984), § 53 p. 356. I n its practica l application, even if the elec tric coope rative w as oblig ed t o p ro v ide Matilla only an ordina

ry duty of ca re, consideringthe proportionate ly dang erous c hara cter

of ele ctricity , SKRECC still owed her, a nd the public at larg e, a r elatively high de g ree of ca

re to re duce pote ntial hazards. The scope of the duty

owed by SKRECC to de-e nerg ize the overhe ad powe r line is a question of fo re se e a bil ity

. Th e existe nc e of

e ne rg ize d p ow e r l ine s d oe s n ot c re a te a fo re se e a ble ri sk wi th

res pect to e ve ry

po te nti a l pl a int if

f who may

su ff e r i nju ry by c omi ngint o c on ta c t w iththo se lin e s. I n this case, Matilla ’s ex p er t , J ames E. Ge ige r, identified the ha zard as “the prese nce of elec trical

ener g y on the unus ed li ne.” (JA at 60.) Geig er opined that “[b] ut for allowing a n unused ele ctrica l lin e to r e ma in e ne rg ize d, ” Matil la ’s inj ur y c ou ld n ot have oc c ur

re d, and tha t SKREC C’ s f

a ilure to06-5769 -10-

Kentucky courts have held that an e lectric company ’s compliance with safety standards 8 does not, in and of itself, f ree the company

of neg lige nce. Lam be rt v . F ra nk lin Re al E sta te Co ., 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d

7 7 0 (Ky . Ap p . 2 0 0 0 )( ci t i n g Vaught’s Adm’x v. Kentuck

y Utilities Co. , 296 S.W .2d 45 9, 46 2 ( 19 56 )) . T he Court , th e re fo re , d oe s n ot c on c lud e that c omp lia nc e wi th t he NE SCregulatory

scheme absolves SKRECC of liabili ty or that the re g ulations establish the amount of car e re quired unde r the c ircumstance s. de-e nerg ize the unused line was a substantial fac tor in her injuries. Thus, Matill a’s sole theory was that SKRECC had a duty

to de-e nerg ize the line and that such a duty arose from the fa ct that the line

wa s a ba nd on e d. Ge ig e r’ s u lti mate op ini on wa s th a t th e highe st d e g re e of c a re re qu ir e d SKREC C to d isc onne c t th e jum

pe r l ine a t th e residen c e . In th e e ve nt t hat a c us tom e r s ou g ht t o r e -e sta bli sh service , acc ording to Geig er, it would have require d approximately five mi nutes for SKR ECC to reconnec t the line to the residenc e. Geig er ba sed his opinion upon the regulations set forth in the National Elec trical Safe ty Code (“NE SC” ), pr omu lg a te d b y the I ns tit

ute of El e c tr ic a l and

El e c tron ic s E ng ine e rs , Inc . Th e se 8 regulations provide that “[l] ines and e quipment p erma nently abandone d shall be re moved or maintained in a safe condition .” NECS § 21:214(B) (3)( emphasis adde d). The NESC allows for lines to be either r emoved or maintained in a sa fe c ondition. Other than the fa ct that the line wa s

ener g ized, Geig er’ s written re port offe red no othe r opin io n th a t SKREC C’s equipment was de fec tive or that the powe r line wa s otherwise unsa fe. Thus, even if the line could be conside red a bandoned, Matilla has not shown that such aba ndonment require d SKRECC to de-e nerg ize it. I n th is c a se , th e re c or d d isc los e s th a t the c us tom e r’ s in te nt w a s to ma int a in t he ava ila bil ity of ele ctricity

to the Har

ness’ proper

ty

. Be cause Mrs. Har

ness suffe red from Alzheimer' s disease, he r business conce rns wer e mana g ed by Ms. J ohnson who was g iven a powe r o f att orney to act on Har ness’ be half. Johnson t estified that, at a ll times, she i ntended that e lectric ity be ava ilable to the06-5769 -11- Har ness’ pro p er t y . SKRECC ’s ac counting rec ords re flec t that the minimum member c harg e had been billed a

nd paid, and that the a ccount wa s curr ent at the time o f t h e d i s t ri ct cour t’s decision. Neither Mrs. Har

ness nor a

ny one on her

behalf had eve r re quested SKRECC to di sco n n ec t or te rm inate the a c c ount. Matil la a sse rt s th a t th e lin e to t

he Ha rn e ss’ pr op e rt

y wa s a ba nd on e d, and

that se rv ic e sh ou ld have be en ter

minated, beca

use SKRECC had knowledg e that the pa rticular line se rved no e lectric al loa d a nd re g ist e red no kil ow a tt u sa g e . Auti lity un de rt akin g to p ro vid e e le c tr ic ity to t he pu bli c in Ke ntu c ky , h ow e ve r, mus t su pp ly a de qu a te se rv ic e to a ll p e rs on s in that are a wh o d esir e it, and

is restric ted by

the state Public Service Commi ssion with respect to the a bility to terminate ser

vice: A util it y ma y r e f u s e o r te r mi n a te s e r

v ic e to a c u s to me r o n ly u n d e r th e f o llowing conditions ex cept a s pro v i d ed in subsections (2) a nd (3) of this section: (a) [f]or noncompliance with the utilit y ’s tar i ff ed rules or c ommissi on administrative regulations ... (b) [ f]or dang erous conditions

... (c) [f] or refusal of acc ess ... (d) [ f]or outstanding inde btedness ... (e ) [ f]or noncompliance with state, local or othe r code s

.. . [and ] (f ) [f ]or no np ay me nt o f b ill s. 807 Ky . Admin. Reg s.5:006, § 14 (2006). Notably , this li st of permissive base s for ter mination of elec tric ser

vices does not inc lude abandonme nt. I ndeed, “[a] utility shall not te rminate service to a

c u s t o m e r i f t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t : ( a ) [ i ] f p a y m e n t f o r s e r v i c e s i s m a d e . . . . ” 8 0 7 K y. Admin. Reg s. 5:006, Section 14(2). Matilla’s theory is premised entirely on Geig er’ s repor t, which found that the line had bee n abandone d, beca

use no ele ctrica l load was attached to the Har ness’ equipment and that the ac count his tor y sh ow e d n o k ilo watt u sa g e fo r s e ve ra l y e ars . Ne ith e r of the se c on dit ion s is a pe rm iss ibl e ba sis und er t h e Public Service Commi ssion’s regulations upon which SKRECC could have terminated service to the Har

ness’ proper

ty , particula

rly in light of the f

act that r egular monthly

pay ments were06-5769 -12-

Matilla relies upon Styles v. Eble n , 436 S.W .2d 504 (Ky . 1969) to support her a rgument 9 that SKRECC ’s continued maintena nce of its energ ized lines under the cir cumstance s constitutes ne g lig e nc e . M a til la

c on te nd s th a t Sty le

s stands for the pr oposition t hat SKRECC was under a duty to de-e nerg ize a line that is not serving a usef ul purpose. Styles , howeve r, did not involve a claim ag ainst a utility

company that service d the public. Rather, Sty le s addre ssed the liability

of a prope rty

owner who owned a

nd maintained its own power lines. The prope rty

owner owned both the equipment throug h which the e lectric ity flowed a nd controlled the de livery of the elec tricity on the over

head pow er lines. Id. at 504-05. I n Styles , a number

of livestock we re e lectroc uted when a dead tr ee f

ell on the power lin e s d ur inga wi nd sto rm . T he pla int if f s uc c e ssf ull y argue d th a t th e pr op e rt

y ho lde r h a d a

duty to de-e nerg ize the power lines be cause the lines had not bee n used for approximately

two y ear s and serve d no useful purpose . The Sty le s c ourt re a so ne d th a t th e pr op e rt y ow ne r’ s f

a ilure to de -e ne rg ize its lin e s c on sti tut e d n e g lig e nc e be c a us e the po we r l ine s w e re c on str uc te d s ole ly

to supply power to oil recove ry

pumps. W hen the r ecove ry operation cease d, the pumps were dismantled and the lines runningto the pumps were disconnec ted, but not de-e nerg ized. The lines, the court r easone d, no longe r ser ved any useful purpose and, ther efor e, should have been de-e nerg ized. Id. at 505-06. I n Styles , the owner ’s intent to abandon wa s made c lear by the re moval and disconne ction of the pumps and the f

act that it controlled the overhe ad powe r lines. B eca use the owne r and supplier wer e the same entity , no issue arose conce rning utilit y customer’ s intent. Moreover , the landowner

in Styles , unlike Mrs. Har ness, did not pay

a monthly

amount to a utility

company that re- aff irmed her intent to have ele ctricity

available to her home. U nlike the pumps in Styles , the r e s i d e n c e , a l t h o u g hu n o c c u p i e d , w a s s t i l l i np l a c e o n t h e r e a l t y. made f or member ship fees to ke ep the a ccount a ctive. 9 Matilla did not ti mely

prese nt evidence that the Har ness power

line was unsaf

e or that service was other wise prope rly

subject to termination u n d er Kentucky regulations. L ate in the litigation, howeve r, Matilla soug ht to introduce additional expert evidenc e and te stimony related to a diffe rent ha zar d a nd the or y of lia bil ity . D ur inghis No ve mbe r 1 5, 20 05 de po sit ion , Ge ig e r opi ne d for the fi rs t time that the line sh o u l d h av e b een de-e nerg ized, because the meter box and outer

appar atuses

cre ated a safe ty hazard, a n opinion he had not re duced to wr iting. The distr i ct co u rt excluded the evi d e n c e o nth e g r o u n d s th a t i t w a s n o t t im e ly d is c lo s e d

b e f o r e th e d e a d li n e f

o r s u p p le menting06-5769 -13- expert repor

ts. Matilla argues on appe al that this ex clusion was er ror. We reviewthe district court’s decision to e x clude Geig er’ s repor t f or an abuse of

discretion. So mm e r v . D av is , 317 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2003). District courts have broad discr etion to exclude untimely disclosed expert-witness testimony

. Pr idev . B IC Cor p ., 218 F.3d 566, 578-79 (6th C ir. 2000)(upholdingthe exclusion of untimely expert-witness re ports and af fidavits). F e de ra l Ru le 26 (a )( 2) (B ) re qu ir e s pa rt ie s to make mand a tor

y dis c los ur e s a

bo ut t he ir e xpe rt s. The Rule cle arly

require s a par

ty using a reta ined expert to furnish a wr itte n re p o rt containing“a complete state ment of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and rea sons the ref or.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)( 2)(B ). F eder al Rule of Civil P ro ce d u re 3 7(c) (1) r equire s compliance with Rule 26(a), “‘ma ndat[ing] that a trial court punish a party for discovery violations in connec tion with Rule 26 unless the violation wa s harmless or is substantially justified.’” Roberts v. Gale n of Virginia, Inc. , 3 2 5 F. 3 d 7 7 6 , 7 8 2 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 3 )( qu o t i n g Sa lga do v . G e ne ra l M oto rs C or p ., 15 0 F .3 d 73 5, 74 2 ( 7th Cir. 1998)(noting that “the sanction of exclusion is automatic and ma ndatory unless the sanc tioned party can showthat its viol ation of Rule 26(a ) wa s either justified or ha rmless.”)) Th e sanc tio n issu e d by the dis tr ic t court e xclu din g Ge ig e r’ s se c on d o pin ion wa s n ot a n a bu se of discre tion. The deadline for producing liability expert repor ts f or use at trial was J une 15, 2005. Geig er pr oduced his fir st report wi t h i n t his deadline, a nd the district court pe rmitted Geig er’ s te sti mony wi th r e sp e c t to his op ini on s c on ta ine d w ith in i t. Geig er f irst opined in J une, 2005 that SKRECC had violated its duty of ca re by allowing an abandone d line to rema in ener g ized. On the morning of his deposition on November 15, 2005, howeve r, Geige r m ade a s econd visit to the s cene of t he accident, although the conditions were the06-5769 -14-

same a nd nothing in the a

rea had not bee n observa

ble on his first visit. During his Nove mber 15, 20 05 de po sit ion , Ge ig e r opi ne d for the fi rs t ti me that th e lin e sh ou ld h ave be e n d e -e ne rg ize d b e c a us e t h e m et er b o x an d o u t er co n d

u i t s cr ea t eds af

et y h az ar d s , an o p i n i o nh e h adn o tre d u ce d t o wr i t i n g. B e c a us e the c on dit ion s at th e sc e ne of the a c c ide nt h a d n ot c ha

ng e d, thi s se c on d th e or

y of lia bil ity

wa s b a se d o n p re e xistin g fa c ts. We defe r to the district court’ s judgme nt that Matilla “ha[d] been dilatory in the discovery pr oc e ss a nd [that] Ge ig e r’ s a dd iti on a l e xpe rt op in io n [wa s] su bmi tte d w e ll o uts ide the tim e permitted.” See Primus v. United States , 389 F.3d 231 , 234-36 (1st Cir. 2004)(holdingthat the district court prope rly

excluded supplemen t al ex pert e vidence wher e plaintiff ha d been grante d multipl e discove ry extensions, had filed the s upplemental dis closures months afte r t he dea dline, and the su pp le me nta l inf

or matio n wa s c umu lativ e of oth e r e xpe rt

e vid e nc e ); Nic ho las v . P e nn sy lv an ia Sta te Un iv

. , 2 2 7 F

. 3 d 1 3 3 , 1 4 8 ( 3 d Ci r . 2 0 0 0 ) ( a f f ir mi n g e xc lu s io n o f s u

p p le me n ta

r y Ru le 26 dis c lo s u r e s w h e r e p la inti f f in e xc u s a b ly d e la y e d s u c hd is c lo s u r e s , w h ic hw o u ld h av e n e c e s s it a ted

su bs tanti a l a dd iti on a l pr e pa ratio n a nd mig ht h ave de lay e d tr ia l) ; Metro Ford Truck Sale s, Inc. v

. Ford Motor Co. , 145 F .3 d 3 20 , 3 25 (5 th C ir . 1 99 8) (h old ingtha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its discretion in deny

ing pla intiff permission to de signate an expert one wee k afte r the de adline, whe re the expert’s written r eport wa s not filed until three months later be cau s e “[ t ]he purpose of supplementary disclosures is just that– to supplement. Such disclosures ar e not intended to provide an extension of the expert desig nation and re port production dea dline.” (f ootnote omitted)). IV. Becaus e the p ro pe rl y

e xclu de d s up ple me nta

ry e vid e nc e is t

he on ly su pp or t f or he r c la im,06-5769 -15- Matilla cannot e stablish that SKR ECC breac hed the duty of care that it alleg edly owed to her. The judgme nt of the district court is there fore AF F IRMED on this ground.