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Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

(U) Evaluation of the National Reconnaissance 

Office Crimes Reporting Process

Report Number IO-2013-002

April 2014

Important Notice

This report contains information that the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community has determined is 

confidential, sensitive, or protected by Federal Law, including protection from public disclosure under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. Recipients may not further disseminate this information without the express 

permission of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community personnel. Accordingly, the use, 

dissemination, distribution or reproduction of this information to or by unauthorized or unintended recipients may be 

unlawful. Persons disclosing this information publicly or to others not having an official need to know are subject to 

possible administrative, civil, and/or criminal penalties. This report should be safeguarded to prevent improper disclosure 

at all times. Authorized recipients who receive requests to release this report should refer the requestor to the Office of 

the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
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(U) Table of Contents

(U) Executive Summary .................................................................................................. 4

(U) Background............................................................................................................... 8

(U) Objective, Scope, and Methodology........................................................................ 17

(U) Findings................................................................................................................... 19

(U) NRO did not report some admissions of potential Federal crimes and 

UCMJ violations made in FYs 2009 through 2012..................................... 19

(U) NRO guidance usurped OIG statutory crimes reporting obligations........ 38

(U) NRO processes affected the time to report potential crimes ................... 40

(U) NRO implemented corrective actions to strengthen its crime reporting 

process ................................................................................................... 48

(U) 1995 MOU provisions do not address reporting violations of some state 

criminal laws .......................................................................................... 53

(U) Appendix A: Federal crime reporting exemptions.................................................... 57

(U) Appendix B: Laws and guidance............................................................................. 58

(U) Appendix C: NRO crimes reporting process............................................................ 63

(U) Appendix D: Objectives, scope & methodology....................................................... 66

(U) Appendix E: Reporting timeframes.......................................................................... 73

(U) Appendix F: Summary of recommendations ........................................................... 75

(U) Appendix G: Management comments ..................................................................... 77

(U) Appendix H: Abbreviations ...................................................................................... 85
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(U) List of Tables

(U) Table 1: Reportable criminal offenses identified in the 1995 MOU.......................... 10

(U) Table 2: Admissions made during NRO-administered polygraphs in FYs 2009 

through 2012.............................................................................................. 17

(U) Table 3: Number of days for OS&CI to notify NRO OIG about admissions related to 

child crimes after first notifying OGC in FYs 2009 through 2012................ 35

(U) Table 4: Average number of days for NRO OGC to report potential Federal crimes in 

FYs 2009 through 2012 ............................................................................. 48

(U) Table 5: Number of subjects, by affiliation, who made admissions of potential crimes 

involving sexual behavior in FYs 2009 through 2012................................. 69

(U) Table 6: Number of business days from admission to OS&CI notification to OIG in 

FYs 2009 through 2012 ............................................................................. 73

(U) Table 7: Number of business days from admission to OS&CI notification to OGC in 

FYs 2009 through 2012 ............................................................................. 73

(U) Table 8: Average number of business days for NRO OIG to report potential Federal 

crimes in FYs 2009 through 2012 .............................................................. 74

(U) Table 9: Number of business days for OGC to report admissions in CY 2013........ 74
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(U) Executive Summary

(U) On 10 July 2012, the McClatchy Company published an article claiming that the 

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) had not reported admissions of potential crimes 

that individuals voluntarily made during NRO-administered polygraph examinations.1

(U) At the request of the NRO Director, the NRO Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

conducted a special review of the NRO’s polygraph program administration and 

execution.2 Due to the NRO OIG’s role in the crimes reporting process, the NRO OIG

recused itself from evaluating the claims of unreported admissions of potential crimes. 

The NRO OIG requested that the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 

Community (IC IG) examine this matter on its behalf. 

(U) This is the second of two planned IC IG reports based on a review that examined

the NRO crimes reporting process, and that was conducted in response to the NROOIG 

request, media claims, and Congressional concerns expressed by Senator Charles E. 

Grassley.3 The objective of this evaluation was to assess the NRO’s compliance with 

laws, policies, and procedures to identify and report admissions of potential violations 

of Federal crimes made by contractors, government civilians, and military personnel 

during polygraph sessions administered by the NRO in Fiscal Years (FYs) 2009 

through 2012. During this review, we expanded the scope to also assess how the NRO 

handled reporting admissions of potential violations of state criminal laws and 

violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) due to the frequency of those 

types of admissions and because the NRO is a Defense Agency whose workforce 

includes personnel who are subject to the UCMJ.

(U) Highlights

 (U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO reported most, but not all, admissions 

of potential Federal crimes identified in the 1995 Memorandum of 

Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes (hereafter, 

the “1995 MOU”) made during NRO-administered polygraph examinations. 

 1 (U) National Reconnaissance Office Hasn’t Told Police of Crime Confession, Marisa Taylor, 

McClatchy Company (McClathcydc.com), July 10, 2012. 

2 (U) NRO OIG. NRO Special Review of the NRO Polygraph Program (Project Number: 2012-006 S).

3 (U//FOUO) Letter from the Ranking Member of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary to 

the NRO Inspector General, August 13, 2012. See our related report: Evaluation of Media Claims 

Regarding Non-Reporting by the National Reconnaissance Office of Certain 2010 Admissions of Potential 

Crimes. February 2014. (IO-2013-007).
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Similarly, the NRO reported most, but not all, admissions of potential UCMJ 

violations.4

 (U) Unreported admissions of Federal crimes dealt primarily with possession of

child pornography, illicit drug use or possession, and intentional omissions and 

falsification of Questionnaires for National Security Positions.5 Some unreported 

admissions, such as prostitution, were UCMJ violations that did not involve

Federal crimes identified in the 1995 MOU and did not meet reporting 

exemptions identified in the 1995 MOU (see Appendix A). Still, other 

unreported potential crimes, such as illegal drug use, could constitute either a 

state or a Federal criminal violation.

 (U) With few exceptions, Federal statutes, and IC policies do not create a legal 

obligation for IC elements, including the NRO, to report to DOJ or law 

enforcement organizations admissions of potential violations of state criminal 

laws that involve imminent threat to others, such as child molestation. 

Separate provisions in Federal law, but not included in the 1995 MOU, require 

IC employees working in certain professions, to report information about 

suspected child abuse to appropriate local law enforcement organizations, local 

child protective services, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).6 

However, most suspected child abuse crimes exist under applicable state laws 

that do not trigger an affirmative reporting obligation for IC employees under 

the 1995 MOU.

 4 (U) The 1995 MOU established the procedures for Intelligence Community (IC) elements to report to the 

Attorney General (AG) and to Federal investigative agencies information concerning possible Federal 

crimes committed by IC employees and specific Federal crimes committed by non-employees. 

The 1995 MOU exempts reporting of UCMJ violations when crimes information is received by a 

Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence component, concerns a Defense intelligence component 

employee who is either subject to the UCMJ or is a civilian and has been accused of criminal behavior 

related to assigned duties or position if the information is submitted to and investigated by Defense 

Criminal Investigative Organization (DCIO) and, in cases involving crimes committed during the 

performance of intelligence activities, the General Counsel (GC) provides a report to DOJ reflecting the 

nature and disposition of the charges. 

5 (U) The Questionnaire for National Security Positions is a standardized form used by the Federal 

Government to collect information from applicants for national security positions. The information may 

be used as the basis for future investigations, security clearance determinations, and employment 

suitability determinations.

6 (U) Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031 identifies requirements for “covered professionals” to report credible 

information learned of in their official capacities, that would give reason for them to suspect that a child 

has suffered an incident of child abuse, including child pornography and child molestation, to appropriate 

state and local authorities. Professions that are “covered” for purposes of this reporting requirement 

including psychologists, psychiatrists, and law enforcement personnel. Since becoming a Designated 

Federal Entity under the Inspector General Act of 1978 in October 2010, the NRO OIG also considers its 

Investigations staff to be covered professionals who have an obligation to report suspected child abuse to 

appropriate authorities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 13031.
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 (U) Still, no Federal statute, IC policy, or NRO guidance precludes IC officials 

from immediately reporting to law enforcement organizations admissions 

involving potential violations of state criminal laws or UCMJ violations when 

those admissions provide reasonable grounds for officials to believe an 

imminent danger to others may exist. Yet, absent a legal obligation to report 

such crimes, in FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO chose not to report to DOJ, 

law enforcement organizations, or DOD all admissions made during polygraph 

examinations of potential state criminal laws that involved imminent threats, 

such as child molestation.

 (U) We determined that in FYs 2009 through 2012 the NRO did not report some 

admissions of potential crimes because:

• (U) the 1995 MOU that established crimes reporting procedures for IC 

elements, permitted those GCs to not report Federal crimes that they 

consider to be relatively minor offenses if DOJ concurs. 

• (U) the 1995 MOU, IC policy, and NRO guidance are silent with regard to 

reporting non-Federal crimes. 

• (U) the 1995 MOU implies, but does not clearly state that IC elements must 

report all UCMJ violations to DCIOs. Therefore, the NRO OGC did not 

routinely report those violations.

• (U) NRO did not have documented processes to ensure consistent reporting 

to military commanders and appropriate Department of Defense (DOD) 

investigative organizations of admissions of potential crimes made by 

military personnel. 

• (U) the former NRO General Counsel (GC) and former Associate General 

Counsel (AGC) provided inconsistent and inaccurate advice regarding 

reportable admissions of potential crimes. 

 (U) Moreover, internal NRO processes and policies lengthened the time for the 

NRO OGC to report admissions of potential crimes to DOJ in FYs 2009 through 

2012. During that time, notification to the OIG of admissions of potential 

crimes was delayed or did not consistently occur, thereby limiting the ability of 

the NRO OIG to report to law enforcement organizations violations of state 

criminal laws, such as child molestation. 

 (U) Under the leadership of the current NRO Director, in July 2012, the NRO 

began to proactively implement corrective actions to address some deficiencies 

it identified in its policies and processes for reporting admissions of potential 

Federal crimes. The actions strengthened internal and external coordination 

and facilitated identification, referral, and reporting of potential crimes. 

However, the NRO still has not included all of those changes in its internal 
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guidance to ensure that those corrective actions continue. Therefore, we are 

making recommendations to strengthen the NRO crimes reporting process. 

 (U//FOUO) Following a March 2014 discussion with IC IG staff, the NRO 

Director issued a Policy Note, Reporting of Specified State Criminal Laws, 

establishing an internal Special Investigations Activity (SIA) within the NRO 

Office of Security and Counterintelligence. The SIA’s function is to promptly

report possible violations of specified state criminal laws, including crimes 

against children, to local law enforcement authorities and serve as the liaison 

between the NRO and local law enforcement agencies. The Policy Note directs 

NRO personnel to report possible crimes involving imminent threat or serious 

bodily injury to another human being immediately to the activity if the 

information is obtained in the performance of official duties. 

 (U) Discussions with several IC elements identified inconsistent practices within 

the IC for reporting admissions of non-Federal crimes and UCMJ violations that 

pose an imminent threat to others, such as sexual molestation. In a separate 

advisory letter to the DNI, the IC IG suggested—and the DNI concurred—

development of an IC-wide policy to address those inconsistencies.7 

(U) Management comments and our response

(U) The NRO concurred with the 13 recommendations made in this report. In its 

consolidated response, the NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC), Office of Security 

and Counterintelligence (OS&CI), and OIG provided additional information to clarify 

current actions and information contained in the report. We incorporated this 

information, as appropriate. In addition, based on comments received from the OIG, 

we revised recommendation number three. 

(U) Subsequent to completion of our work, the NRO implemented guidance or made 

changes to its crimes reporting process, thereby satisfying several recommendations 

made in this report. In those instances, we incorporated the information in this report 

and closed the relevant recommendations. See Appendix G for the NRO’s official 

comments. 

 7 (U) IC-Wide Issues Related to Polygraphs and Crimes Reporting Processes. IC IG. March 2014. 

(IO-2014-002).
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(U) Background

(U) Federal crimes reporting requirements 

(U) As both a Defense Agency and an IC element, the NRO must comply with Federal 

requirements for reporting potential Federal crimes including some violations of the 

UCMJ of which NRO personnel8 become aware while conducting their official duties.9 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) 

[a]ny information, allegation, or complaint received in a department or agency of 

the executive branch of government relating to violations of Title 18 involving 

Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously reported to the 

Attorney General by the head of the department or agency, unless— 

(1) the responsibility to perform an investigation with respect thereto is 

specifically assigned otherwise by another provision of law; or 

(2) the Attorney General directs otherwise with respect to a specified 

class of information, allegation, or complaint.10

(U) In addition to an obligation for individual Federal employees to report potential 

Federal crimes, provisions in Executive Orders (E.O.) require heads of agencies to 

report potential Federal crimes to DOJ. For IC elements, E.O. 12333 Section 1.6(b)11

also requires IC senior officials to 

report to the Attorney General possible violations of Federal criminal laws by 

employees and of specified Federal criminal laws by any other person as 

provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of 

the department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with the 

 8 (U) NRO personnel include government civilians, contractors, and military personnel. In January 2014, 

the NRO revised its definition of an employee to correspond to the definition in the 1995 MOU. The 

1995 MOU defines an “employee” as “(1) a staff employee, contract employee, asset, or other person or 

entity providing services to or acting on behalf of any agency within the IC; (2) a former officer or employee 

of any agency within the IC for purposes of an offense committed during such person’s employment, and 

for purposes of an office involving a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 207 (conflict of interest); and (3) any other 

Government employee on detail to the Agency.” NRO Instruction-80-2-1, Federal Crimes Reporting, 

22 January 2014.

9 (U) IC elements must report information about potential Federal crimes. Only Federal prosecutors in 

DOJ or DOD may determine whether a state crime may be assimilated as a Federal crime under the 

Federal Assimilative Crimes Act or Article 134 of the UCMJ. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 and 10 U.S.C. § 934. 

According to the Judge Advocate General (JAG) assigned to the NRO OGC, all violations of the UCMJ are 

Federal crimes. By extension, therefore, the NRO OGC should report all violations of the UCMJ to the 

relevant military service, JAG, and DCIO for disposition in accordance with the 2007 MOU between DOJ 

and DOD Relating to the Investigation and Prosecution of Certain Crimes and the UCMJ. 

10 (U) Title 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2006). Title 18 of the United States Code is the criminal and penal code of 

the Federal Government of the United States and codifies Federal crimes. Title 18 outlines the elements 

of several Federal and criminal procedures including terrorism; fraud; false statements; and sexual 

exploitation and other abuses of children, such as child pornography.

11 (U) In a revision to E.O.12333, that is cited in the Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of 

Information Concerning Federal Crimes, paragraph 1.7(a) was renumbered as section 1.6(b).
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protection of intelligence sources and methods, as specified in those 

procedures.12

(U) In 1995, the Attorney General (AG) and heads of IC elements issued the 

1995 MOU. The 1995 MOU established the procedures for IC elements to report to 

the AG and to Federal investigative agencies information concerning possible Federal 

crimes committed by IC employees and specific Federal crimes committed by nonemployees. Under the 1995 MOU, IC Offices of General Counsel and Offices of 

Inspector General share responsibilities for receiving reports of Federal criminal 

information concerning IC elements. The 1995 MOU delegates authority to the GC to 

determine information that must be reported to the National Security Division of DOJ 

or to Federal investigative agencies. 

(U) Reportable crimes

(U) The 1995 MOU identifies and differentiates among reportable offenses committed 

by IC employees and non-employees. The 1995 MOU requires IC employees to report 

to the GC or OIG facts or circumstances learned while performing their official duties

that indicate that an employee or non-employee of an IC element has committed, is 

committing, or will commit a violation of Federal criminal law identified in the 1995 

MOU. Reportable offenses include, but are not limited to, intentional serious physical 

harm (such as sexual assault), violent crimes, and any offense, that “if committed in 

the presence of a reasonably prudent and law-abiding person, would cause that 

person to immediately report the conduct directly to the police.” However, the 

1995 MOU is silent with regard to IC employees’ reporting obligations of potential 

non-Federal state criminal laws. Table 1 summarizes reportable offenses identified in 

the 1995 MOU.

 12 (U) E.O. 12333, § 1.7(a), 46 FR 59941 (1981). Also, under E.O. 12968, IC employees who hold security 

clearances are encouraged, although not obligated, to report any information that raises doubts as to 

whether another employee’s continued eligibility for access to classified information is clearly consistent 

with national security. Information or allegations of suspected criminal violations are considered as part 

of a department’s or agency’s determination of an employee’s continued eligibility for access to classified 

information. See E.O. 12968 § 6.2 (b), Employee Responsibilities, 60 FR § 40245 (1995).
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(U) Table 1: Reportable criminal offenses identified in the 1995 MOU

This table is Unclassified

Reportable criminal offenses

Employees Non-employees

• Violent crimes

• Any offense “if committed in the 

presence of a reasonably prudent 

and law-abiding person, would 

cause that person to immediately 

report the conduct directly to the 

police”

• Title 18 violations

• Crimes identified as reportable 

when committed by nonemployees

• Intentional infliction or threat of death or serious 

physical harm

• Acts of terrorism and other crimes likely to affect 

the national security, defense, or foreign 

relations of the U.S.

• Crimes involving foreign interference with the 

integrity of the U.S. government institutions or 

processes

• Unauthorized electronic surveillance or access to 

computer systems

• Violations of U.S. drug laws

• Money laundering

• Serious felony offenses that “if committed in the 

presence of a reasonably prudent and lawabiding person, would cause that person to 

immediately report the conduct directly to the 

police”

• Conspiracy or attempt to commit a reportable 

crime

(U) Source: Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes, 1995

(U) Certain violations of Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 704 and its associated 

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG), that govern eligibility for access to 

classified information, may also rise to the level of a Federal crime and therefore would

be reportable under the 1995 MOU.13 Those violations include, but are not limited to: 

• sexual behavior of a criminal nature, 

• personal conduct involving deliberate concealment, omission, or falsification of 

relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire,

• deceptive or illegal financial practices,

• illegal drug possession or distribution, and 

• other criminal activity.

 13 (U) ICD 704, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive 

Compartmented Information and Other Controlled Access Program Information, 1 October 2008 and 

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance Number 704.2, Personnel Security Adjudicative Guidelines for 

Determining Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and Other Controlled Access 

Program Information, 2 October 2008. ICD 704 established Director of National Intelligence personnel 

security policy governing eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and information 

protected within other controlled access programs. ICPG 704.2 identified several factors that are also 

violations of Federal criminal laws and that Federal agencies consider when evaluating individuals for 

access to classified information.
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(U) In addition to specifying reportable crimes, the 1995 MOU also identifies specific 

conditions that exempt reporting of potential Federal crimes. See Appendix A for 

reporting exceptions.

(U) Reporting requirements for information on suspected child abuse

(U) Separate provisions in Federal law, but not included in the 1995 MOU, identify 

requirements for “covered professionals” to report credible information of suspected 

child abuse including child pornography and child molestation to appropriate state 

and local authorities.14 Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031 identifies several professions that are 

“covered” for purposes of this reporting requirement including psychologists, 

psychiatrists, and law enforcement personnel.15 

(U) Under 42 U.S.C. § 13031:

a person who, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity described 

...on Federal land or in a Federally operated (or contracted) facility, learns of 

facts that give reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child 

abuse, shall as soon as possible make a report of the suspected abuse to 

the...[appropriate agency].

(U) However, unless crimes information provides a basis to apply the Federal 

jurisdiction of the United States, most suspected child abuse crimes are prosecuted 

under applicable state laws that do not trigger an affirmative reporting obligation for 

IC employees under the 1995 MOU.16 Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031 also requires covered 

IC employees who, in their official capacities, learn of facts that would give reason for 

them to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse, to report the 

information to the appropriate local law enforcement organizations, local child 

protective services, or the FBI. A covered professional who is identified in 

 14 (U) Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031(a) and (c) define “child abuse” as the physical or mental injury, 

sexual abuse or exploitation, or negligent treatment of a child to include sexual molestation and 

child pornography.

15 (U) Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031(b)(2) & (6). While each IC element should identify those “covered 

professionals” within its respective organization, psychologists, psychiatrists, and law enforcement 

personnel are among the more common professionals within IC elements that are required to meet this 

reporting requirement. Under the Inspectors General Act of 1978, OIG investigators are considered 

“law enforcement personnel” and therefore are “covered professionals” with an obligation to report 

suspected information of child abuse to appropriate authorities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 13031. 

16 (U) Title 18 U.S.C. § 7. For example, if the information states that suspected child abuse is conducted 

on a Federal installation, on Federal property, or by a member of the Armed Services, then Federal 

jurisdiction may attach. An NRO GC legal determination is required to ensure that appropriate matters 

are reported.
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42 U.S.C. § 13031 and who fails to report suspected child abuse is subject to Federal 

criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2258.17 

(U) Department of Defense policies and NRO crimes reporting guidance 

(U) DOD guidance18 requires DOD organizations, including the NRO, that conduct 

polygraph examinations to report admissions of a serious criminal nature and matters 

involving counterintelligence, law enforcement, or security information developed 

during the course of a polygraph examination to appropriate authorities. In addition, 

Article 134 of the UCMJ identifies conduct that is punishable for military personnel

who act in a manner that is prejudicial to good order and discipline or that discredits 

the Military Services. Such conduct includes patronizing prostitutes, illicit drug use, 

and child abuse. 

(U//FOUO) As of August 2009, the NRO required its personnel to notify the OGC or 

OIG of possible violations of Federal criminal laws when such activities related to NRO 

funds, programs, property, operations, or activities and of which they become aware 

while performing their official duties.19 In May 2012, the NRO issued a written 

instruction that formalized existing practices requiring its security personnel to 

provide information obtained during the adjudicative process to the NRO OGC, OIG, or 

Counterintelligence Division (CID) within the Office of Security and Counterintelligence 

(OS&CI) when it was determined that an individual committed or had knowledge of a 

Federal crime.20 In June 2013, the NRO issued a directive formalizing the OGC’s

responsibility to expeditiously notify the AG whenever the GC has reasonable grounds 

to believe a violation of Federal criminal law occurred.21

(U) Appendix B summarizes selected laws and guidance related to crimes reporting in 

the IC, DOD, and NRO.

 17 (U) Title 18 U.S.C. § 2258. Failure to report suspected child abuse may result in a criminal fine or 

imprisonment of less than one year or both. 

18 (U) DOD Directive 5210.48, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program, (25 January 2007); 

DOD Instruction 5210.91, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Procedures, (12 August 2010); and 

DOD Instruction 5525.07, Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments 

of Justice and Defense Relating to the Investigation and Prosecution of Certain Crimes, (18 June 2007).

19 (U) Oversight Corporate Business Process Instruction, Obligation to Report Evidence of Possible Violations 

of Federal Criminal Law and Illegal Intelligence Activities, 80-3 (August 2009).

20 (U//FOUO) NRO

.

21 (U) NRO Directive 80-2, NRO Office of General Counsel Framework. 18 June 2013.
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(U) Crimes reporting roles and responsibilities for NRO officials 

(U) Within the NRO, the OS&CI, OGC, and OIG have responsibilities for identifying, 

referring, and reporting potential violations of Federal criminal laws.22 NRO guidance 

requires OS&CI to collect and adjudicate polygraph-derived information and to refer 

information about potential violations of criminal law to the NRO OGC, OIG, or CID, 

or to report the crimes information to other government organizations. 

(U) Office of Security and Counterintelligence 

(U//FOUO) Within OS&CI, the Personnel Security Division (PSD) processes personnel 

security and access requests for NRO-sponsored personnel. Within PSD, the 

following branches and staff have responsibilities related to crimes reporting: 

• (U//FOUO) Polygraph Management Branch (PMB) 

• (U//FOUO) Adjudications Branch (AB) 

• (U//FOUO) Special Actions Staff (SAS) 

 22 (U) For purposes of this report, we use the term “refer” when discussing notification of admissions of 

potential crimes that are shared internally with other NRO components. We use the term “report” when 

discussing notification made to external organizations, such as DOJ.
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(U) Office of General Counsel

(U) The NRO Director designated the NRO OGC as responsible for reviewing 

admissions of possible criminal acts and violations of Federal criminal law not related 

to NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or activities.23 In accordance with 

E.O. 12333 crimes reporting procedures and the 1995 MOU, OGC is responsible for 

reporting potential Federal crimes to DOJ or law enforcement organizations when the 

OGC determines that a reasonable basis exists to believe that a Federal crime was, is 

being, or would be committed. 

(U) Office of Inspector General

(U) In 2009, the NRO Director designated the NRO OIG as responsible for conducting 

preliminary investigative inquiries into potential criminal acts and violations of Federal 

criminal law that involve NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or activities.24

At that time, the NRO OIG was not yet subject to requirements in the Inspector 

General Act of 1978 (IG Act) that requires expeditious reporting to the AG whenever 

the IG has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal 

law.25 On 7 October 2010, the NRO OIG became a Designated Federal Entity under 

the IG Act. As a result, as of October 2010, NRO OIG has had a statutory obligation to

report violations to the AG and may also report crimes information to DCIOs and other 

investigative agencies, including those at the state and local levels.26 In July 2012, 

the OIG Investigations staff became the NRO point of contact for providing information 

to DOJ or law enforcement organizations about child abuse allegations, including 

molestation, that OGC referred to DOJ. The NRO OIG documented this responsibility 

in its investigations manual in February 2014.

(U) Reporting process

(U//FOUO) During the adjudicative process, if AB determines that an individual 

committed or had knowledge of an unreported Federal crime, AB forwards the 

information to SAS, which then prepares a notification letter containing information 

 23 (U) Id. and NRO Directive 80-2, NRO Office of General Counsel Framework, Business Oversight Function 

80, 18 June 2013.

24 (U) NRO Oversight-80, Obligation to Report Evidence of Possible Violations of Federal Criminal Law and 

Illegal Intelligence Activities, Instruction 80-3. August 2009.

25 (U) 5 U.S.C.A. App. 3 § 4(d).

26 (U) DOD Instruction 5505.3, Initiation of Investigations by Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations,

(24 March 2011) defines DCIOs as the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command, Air Force Office of 

Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service and Defense Criminal Investigative Service. 

A Military Criminal Investigative Organization (MCIO) includes all of the DCIOs with the exception of the 

Defense Criminal Investigative Service.
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about the unreported crime; fraud, waste, or abuse of government resources; or 

counterintelligence concerns.27 SAS disseminates the letter to appropriate NRO offices 

for assessment or possible investigation and may notify external Federal organizations

that have an “adjudicative interest” in the individual. 

(U//FOUO) If an admission involves potential danger to another person, risk to 

national security, or serious criminal offenses and requires action to prevent danger to 

individuals, facilities, systems, or national security, OS&CI may notify OGC, OIG, and 

CID via telephone within 24 hours of the admission and prior to completion of the 

adjudications process.28 However, in FYs 2009 through 2012, referral to OGC and 

OIG generally did not occur until the adjudications process was complete.29 OS&CI 

officials may notify other authorities, relevant NRO program offices or companies, and 

consult with the NRO OS&CI staff psychologist or NRO employee assistance program. 

SAS must notify adjudicative organizations at other government agencies about 

adverse actions taken by the NRO. 

(U) Once notified by OS&CI, OIG and OGC may notify DOJ, law enforcement

organizations, or other agency OIGs about the admissions of potential Federal crimes

or violations of the UCMJ. Appendix C describes the NRO process for reporting 

 27 (U//FOUO) In November 2013, OS&CI revised its procedures for referring information about potential 

Federal crimes to the OGC, OIG, and CID and for reporting information externally. Procedural changes 

no longer require OS&CI to make referrals when it is determined that an individual only “had knowledge 

of” an unreported crime. In addition, if it is determined during the adjudicative process that an individual 

may pose a counterintelligence threat or risk, then AB, not SAS, refers available information to CID. 

AB also tracks the status of those referrals.

28 (U//FOUO) The NRO formalized existing practices in an NRO PSD directive, Immediate Adjudicative 

Action (22 August 2013). Admissions requiring immediate adjudicative action include suicidal thoughts;

current child abuse or molestation by the subject or known about by the subject; prior child abuse or 

molestation by the subject or known about by the subject if a minor child is still accessible to the 

perpetrator; obstruction of justice or bribery of U.S. officials or witnesses in U.S. proceedings; imminent 

threat of serious bodily injury or unlawful harassment or intimidation against an individual; denials or 

violations of civil or human rights; threats to the President of the United States or other U.S. Government 

officials or candidates for election to national office; disclosures of classified information that endanger 

ongoing operations and/or those involved in such operations; deliberate unauthorized removal and 

storage of classified information; and unofficial contact with foreign intelligence officers or crimes, 

including acts of terrorism, that are likely to affect the national security, defense, or foreign relations of 

the United States.

29 (U//FOUO) In November 2013, OS&CI revised its procedures for referring admissions of potential 

Federal crimes to the OGC, OIG, and CID, and reporting information externally. The written guidance 

now includes procedures for referring admissions of potential crimes made by military personnel, use of a 

group email to refer admissions of potential crimes simultaneously to OGC and OIG, and a requirement to 

refer all potential criminal activity falling within Federal guidelines within 10 business days after 

completion of investigative actions. We did not evaluate OS&CI’s compliance with this policy as it was 

implemented after the timeframe of our evaluation.
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admissions made by civilians and military personnel in effect in FYs 2009 through 

2012 and new practices implemented in 2012. 

(U) Admissions of potential crimes made during NRO-administered 

polygraphs 

(U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO administered 44,493 polygraph sessions to 

31,122 individuals.30 Sixty-seven percent (21,144) of those individuals did not make 

admissions of potential Federal criminal acts or violations of ICD 704 and its 

associated implementing policy guidance.31 

(U) We used data obtained from the NRO’s

database to identify admissions involving potential violations of ICD 

704 or Federal criminal laws.32 We identified 19,830 admissions of potential violations 

of ICD 704 or of Federal criminal law made in FYs 2009 through 2012 during 

NRO-administered polygraph examinations. Following completion of polygraph 

examination sessions, NRO polygraph examiners categorized admissions in 

using the 13 guidelines identified in ICPG 704.2, Annex A of the Adjudicative 

Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented 

Information. Absent review by OGC of each security file and admission, it is not 

possible to determine, using data, the actual number of admissions of potential 

Federal crimes made in FYs 2009 through 2012. Therefore, the number of admissions 

shown in Table 2 that are potential Federal crimes and reportable under the 

1995 MOU may be over-inclusive. 

(U) Table 2 summarizes the number and types of admissions made during polygraphs 

administered by the NRO in FYs 2009 through 2012. 

 30 (U) The NRO may administer multiple polygraph sessions to a single individual. Therefore, the number 

of polygraph sessions does not equate to the number of individuals who were administered polygraphs by 

the NRO.

31 (U) ICPG 704.2, Personnel Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 

Sensitive Compartmented Information and Other Controlled Access Program Information, 2 October 2008.

32 (U) is the NRO’s authoritative database used to verify approvals of personnel security accesses. 

The database contains personnel, investigative, adjudicative, polygraph, and other security-related 

information on individuals who had, have, or are currently pending access to NRO programs. The 

database includes information on admissions made by individuals who voluntarily self-terminated the 

clearance process. For each completed examination, the polygraph examiner populates the 

database to identify the examination dates and session results, among other information. 
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(U) Table 2: Admissions made during NRO-administered polygraphs in FYs 2009

through 2012

This table is unclassified

Type of potential violation Number of admissions Percent of all admissions 

ICD 704a 12,399 63

Federal criminal lawb 7,431 37 

Total 19,830 100

(U) Source: IC IG analysis of NRO data 

(U) Notes: a Not all admissions related to potential violations of ICD 704 are reportable crimes under the 

1995 MOU. For example, admissions including outside activities; alcohol abuse; psychological 

conditions; inadvertent removal or disclosure of classified information; financial considerations; and 

minor security violations such as password misuse are neither crimes nor reportable under the 

1995 MOU. However, IC elements consider such admissions when making determinations whether to 

grant or continue eligibility for a security clearance. 

(U)b Admissions of potential Federal criminal law include: criminal activity; deliberate damage to 

government sponsored information systems, deliberate misuse of government defense systems or 

information systems; deliberate provision of classified information to unauthorized persons; deliberate 

removal of classified materials to unauthorized locations; fraud to include intentional falsification of 

documentation; involvement with terrorism; involvement with foreign governments or foreign intelligence 

services; general or security concerns, sexual misbehavior, and the use, possession, or sale of illegal 

drugs or narcotics. We calculated the number of admissions that are potential violations of Federal 

criminal law using the NRO’s self-categorization of admissions in and reportable crimes in the 

1995 MOU. However, the number of admissions of potential violations of Federal criminal law may be 

over-inclusive because not all potential violations are necessarily actual crimes. 

(U) According to OS&CI officials, during the first half of Calendar Year (CY) 2013, the 

NRO administered 3,069 polygraph sessions to 2,709 individuals. Less than 

one percent of those individuals made admissions of potential Federal crimes or 

violations of ICD 704. 

(U) Objective, Scope, and Methodology

(U) Objective 

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to assess NRO’s compliance with laws, policies, 

and procedures to identify and report admissions of potential violations of Federal 

crimes made by contractors, government civilians, and military personnel during 

polygraph examination sessions administered by the NRO in FYs 2009 through 2012. 

During this review, we expanded the scope to also assess how the NRO handled 

reporting admissions of violations of state criminal laws and violations of the UCMJ 

due to the frequency of those types of admissions and because the NRO is a Defense 

Agency whose workforce includes personnel who are subject to the UCMJ. 
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(U) Scope 

(U) We focused on admissions of potential crimes made by contractors, government 

civilians, and military personnel assigned to the NRO or for whom the NRO was 

assessing eligibility to access classified information. We limited our analysis to

NRO-administered polygraph examinations in FYs 2009 through 2012 and admissions 

of potential crimes that OS&CI referred to OGC or OIG from 1 January to 17 June 

2013. For CY 2013, we reviewed only those security files for individuals whom OS&CI 

identified as having made admissions of potential crimes. We did not independently 

verify whether there were additional admissions of potential crimes made during this 

time that OS&CI did not refer to OGC or OIG. 

(U) Methodology 

(U) To determine whether the NRO reported admissions in accordance with Federal

laws and other guidance, we reviewed Federal statutes and regulations, E.O.s, ICDs, 

and NRO and DOD policies in effect between 2009 and 2013 and related to reporting 

potential violations of Federal and state criminal laws, as well as violations of ICD 704

and the UCMJ. We also interviewed NRO officials who were responsible for identifying 

and reporting admissions of potential criminal violations made by NRO personnel and 

applicants during polygraph examinations. 

(U) We analyzed data obtained from . We supplemented that data with 

information obtained from the NRO OIG and OGC regarding admissions that OS&CI

referred to them in FYs 2009 through 2012. We consulted with NRO officials to 

resolve discrepancies in the data. Using those data, we selected two samples for 

analysis. One sample consisted of security information for 269 randomly selected 

individuals who participated in NRO-administered polygraph examinations in 

FYs 2009 through 2012. We are 90 percent confident, with a margin of error of 

+/- 5 percent, that the results of this sample are representative of all polygraph 

examination sessions administered by the NRO in FYs 2009 through 2012. We also 

selected and reviewed security files for 106 individuals who made admissions related 

to “sexual behavior” during NRO-administered polygraph examinations in FYs 2009 

through 2012.33 While the results of this sample should not be considered

representative of all admissions of sexual behavior made during that time, the results

 33 (U) The IC uses 13 guidelines to categorize admissions when determining whether to grant or revoke 

access to classified information. “Sexual behavior” is one of those guidelines. “Sexual behavior” includes 

deviant or criminal sexual behavior such as viewing child pornography, child molestation or abuse, rape, 

bestiality, patronizing prostitutes, and human trafficking. It also includes a pattern of compulsive, 

self-destructive or high-risk behavior that the person is unable to stop and that may be symptomatic of a 

personality disorder or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment. 
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provide insight into how the NRO referred and reported those potential crimes.34 In 

addition, we analyzed admissions made by 78 individuals that the NRO OIG and OGC 

reported to DOJ or law enforcement organizations in FYs 2009 through 2012.

(U//FOUO) To assess the NRO’s compliance with self-identified corrective actions 

implemented since July 2012 for reporting potential crimes, we reviewed admissions of 

potential crimes that OS&CI referred to OGC, OIG, or both NRO components during 

the first half of CY 2013.

(U) See Appendix D for additional information about our scope and methodology.

(U) Findings

(U) NRO did not report some admissions of potential Federal crimes and UCMJ 

violations made in FYs 2009 through 2012

(U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO reported most, but not all, admissions of 

potential Federal crimes made during NRO-administered polygraph sessions. During 

that time, the NRO also did not report all admissions of potential violations of the 

UCMJ, that according to the NRO JAG, constitute Federal crimes. According to the 

NRO JAG, UCMJ violations constitute Federal crimes. The lack of documented 

practices combined with inconsistent and inaccurate advice given by former senior 

OGC officials resulted in the NRO not reporting some admissions of potential crimes to 

DOJ or appropriate Federal investigative agencies. In addition, discrepancies between 

DOJ and UCMJ reporting expectations and practices and reporting requirements 

under the 1995 MOU created confusion regarding the necessity to report certain 

crimes and to whom. 

 34 (U) Not all sexual behavior issues involve criminal behavior. Thus, if an individual makes an admission 

to a polygraph examiner involving sexual behavior that is not a Federal crime, then there is no need to 

report the information, under the 1995 MOU, to DOJ for action. Although Federal statute, IC policy, and 

NRO guidance do not preclude the NRO from doing so, NRO OGC officials asserted, “the NRO has no 

[legal] obligation to report non-Federal crimes to law enforcement authorities.” In March 2014, the 

NRO Director established an internal activity within OS&CI with responsibility for promptly reporting to 

local law enforcement organizations possible specified violations of state criminal laws specifically 

involving crimes against children. The NRO Director also instructed all NRO personnel to report possible 

crimes against children immediately to “the activity” if the information is obtained in the performance of 

official duties.
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A. (U) NRO did not report some admissions of potential Federal crimes

(U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO reported most, but not all, admissions of 

potential Federal crimes that individuals made during NRO-administered 

polygraph examinations. The 1995 MOU and NRO guidance require the NRO OGC 

to report potential violations of Federal criminal law to DOJ. DOD guidance, to 

which the NRO is subject as a Defense Agency, requires reporting of potential 

crimes and violations of the UCMJ to DCIOs, military commanders, or JAGs. 

However, we determined that the NRO did not report three percent of admissions

that involved possession of child pornography—a Federal crime—and were made 

during NRO polygraphs administered during those Fiscal Years.35 

(U) We also analyzed admissions categorized in as related to “sexual 

behavior” that were made by 106 individuals during NRO-administered polygraph 

examinations in FYs 2009 through 2012.36 Thirty of those 106 admissions 

involved child pornography or child abuse. Although the NRO did not report 

10 percent (3) of those 30 admissions, OS&CI usually suspended the individuals’ 

accesses to classified information—and therefore, employment with the IC—as part 

of the adjudicative process.37 

(U) Other types of potential Federal crimes that the NRO regularly did not report in 

FYs 2009 through 2012 included recreational illicit drug use or possession, and 

intentional falsification of Questionnaires for National Security Positions. According 

to the current NRO AGC, OGC usually does not report personal use of controlled 

 35 (U) We are 90 percent confident, with a margin of error of +/-5 percent, that the results of the sample of 

269 individuals is representative of all admissions made by all individuals who participated in 

NRO-administered polygraph examinations in FYs 2009 through 2012.

36 (U) We selected this sample for analysis because of the claims in an article published by the McClatchy 

Company and Congressional concerns that focused on the reporting by the NRO of admissions of 

potential crimes related to child abuse. Although the findings from this sample are not representative of 

all admissions of potential crimes involving “sexual behavior” made in FYs 2009 through 2012, the 

sample provides insight into how the NRO referred and reported those types of admissions and suggests 

that the NRO did not report all admissions that it potentially should have reported. The 106 cases 

included both criminal and non-criminal offenses related to “sexual behavior.” Non-criminal behavior 

includes sexual contact with foreigners and sexual addictions and disorders that could make an 

individual susceptible to undue influence or coercion. Thirty of the 106 cases involving sexual behavior 

included admissions involving possession of child pornography or child abuse, which are criminal 

offenses.

37 (U) Title 18 U.S.C. § 2258 defines child exploitation as including child pornography and prostitution. 

Child molestation usually exists as a state crime. While several provisions of Title 18 Chapter 109A, 

Sexual Abuse, prohibit sexual offenses against children, the Federal jurisdiction of the U.S. is limited to 

the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. Unless there is evidence that meets this 

jurisdictional requirement for a Federal crime (e.g., abuse occurred in a Federal facility), most suspected 

child abuse crimes are prosecuted under applicable state laws that do not trigger an affirmative reporting 

obligation for IC employees under the 1995 MOU. See 18 U.S.C. § 7. 
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substances even though use or possession is a reportable Federal crime under the 

1995 MOU. The 1995 MOU permits agency GCs to not report “relatively minor 

offenses” that would normally be reportable under the MOU if DOJ generally 

concurs with the overall categorization of that type of potential crime. A DOJ

official indicated that those types of admissions are common enough that it would 

be burdensome to prosecute, particularly if the quantities involved are de miminis. 

(U) Also, in FYs 2009 through 2012, neither OS&CI nor OGC routinely informed 

the OIG of potential admissions of Federal crimes or crimes involving child abuse 

under the belief that there was no requirement for OS&CI or OGC to do so. OS&CI 

and OGC officials usually limited OIG notification to potential crimes involving

waste, fraud, or abuse of NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or activities.

In addition, according to documentation in NRO security files for individuals who 

made reportable admissions of child abuse (including child pornography, sexting, 

and child molestation), in FYs 2009 through 2012, the former NRO AGC and GC

declined to notify DOJ of some of those admissions. In one case, those former 

officials asserted that the NRO was not [legally] obligated to report the admissions 

of potential crimes because the statute of limitations had expired, and DOJ would 

not be interested because the potential crimes were dated.38

(U//FOUO) In another case, the former AGC initially declined to report admissions 

made by a contractor who worked as a Security Officer at an NRO contractor 

facility. The admissions involved child sexual molestation, sexting, and viewing 

online nude images of girls whom the contractor believed to be under the age of 

eighteen. In an email to OS&CI, the former AGC explained his decision not to 

report the information to DOJ:

...doubt we have enough to interest the FBI, especially since we don’t have the 

last name or address and the alleged victim is fourteen years old and fully 

capable of calling the police herself.

(U//FOUO) Despite OGC’s initial assessment that it lacked information to make a 

report to DOJ, OS&CI continued to believe this admission should be formally 

referred to OGC and reported to DOJ with a copy of the report letter sent to the 

NRO OIG. Following OGC’s decision not to report the admission to DOJ, OS&CI 

shared the information with the NRO OIG which investigated the admissions in 

 38 (U) When we became aware of admissions that were not reported, we notified the NRO OIG and OGC. 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2012), the Federal statute of limitations does not exist for crimes involving 

the sexual abuse of children if the child is still alive. United States Code states “no statute of limitations 

that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or 

kidnapping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the 

child, or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.” 
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conjunction with DCIS.39 OIG and DCIS determined the identity of the victim, that 

the child molestation was not an isolated incident as the individual had originally 

claimed, and that the individual maintained continuing contact with the child 

thereby placing her in potential continued harm. OIG shared this information with 

the former AGC, who subsequently reversed his decision not to report the potential 

crimes to DOJ. 

(U//FOUO) At that time, the former AGC stated:

Both of these facts will be critical to a Justice Department determination in this 

case and should be mentioned in the referral letter. Additionally, these two new 

facts mean that we should get the letter to the Justice Department as soon as 

possible so that they can pursue the case before the girl is further victimized by 

[the subject].

(U) While OGC eventually reported this admission to DOJ, reporting took almost 

five weeks from the date when OS&CI first informed OGC of the admission. 

Without OS&CI’s initiative to inform the OIG of the admission, OGC would not 

have reversed its decision to report the admission to DOJ. 

(U) In neither case did the former NRO AGC or GC state that the NRO did not have 

a legal obligation to report to state and local authorities child molestation because 

that behavior is not a Federal crime. 

(U) With few exceptions, Federal statutes and IC policies do not create a legal 

obligation for IC elements, including the NRO, to report to DOJ or law enforcement 

organizations admissions of potential violations of state criminal laws, such as 

child molestation.40 However, nothing in Federal statute, IC policy, or NRO

guidance precludes NRO officials from voluntarily and immediately reporting to law 

 39 (U) DCIS had jurisdiction over criminal matters at the location where the contractor worked.

40 (U) Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031 identifies requirements for “covered professionals” to report credible 

information of suspected child abuse including child pornography and child molestation to appropriate 

state and local authorities. Professions that are “covered” for purposes of this reporting requirement 

include psychologists, psychiatrists, and law enforcement personnel. In accordance with DOD 

Instruction 5525.07, Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 

Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Defense Relating to Investigations and Prosecution of Certain Crimes

(18 June 2007) most Federal crimes committed outside a military installation by persons subject to the 

UCMJ that normally are tried by court-martial will be investigated and prosecuted by DOD with 

immediate notice of significant cases to the appropriate DOJ investigative agency. In some instances, 

information of a state crime allegedly committed by an individual who is subject to the UCMJ may also be 

reported if the violation could be assimilated as a Federal crime under the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act

or Article 134 of the UCMJ. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 and 10 U.S.C. § 934. Therefore, in some cases, 

information of a violation of a state crime is reportable in accordance with Federal criminal reporting 

requirements.
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enforcement organizations admissions involving potential violations of state 

criminal laws that they have a reasonable basis to believe create an imminent 

danger to others. 

(U) Yet, according to current NRO OGC officials, “OGC has no [legal] obligation to 

report those crimes to DOJ.” NRO OGC officials emphasized that they were not

legally obligated in FYs 2009 through 2012—nor are they currently legally

obligated—to report child sexual abuse to DOJ or law enforcement organizations

because child abuse is a state crime, not a Federal crime. Therefore, they generally 

chose not to report those crimes unless the admissions also involved Federal

crimes such as possession of child pornography. Furthermore, OGC officials 

stated that they have no [legal] obligation to inform the OIG of admissions of child 

sexual abuse because the authority of the OIG is limited to fraud, waste, and 

abuse involving NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or activities. 

(U) OIG officials stated that in the absence of a legal obligation and formal 

mechanism for NRO OGC to report to law enforcement admissions of potential 

state criminal laws involving an imminent threat to others, the OIG provisionally 

assumed the reporting function. However, as we discuss later in this report, the 

OIG was not consistently informed about all such potential crimes prior to 

July 2012, and was unable to effectively fulfill this function in FYs 2009 through 

2012.

(U) While NRO OGC officials assert that they “have no [legal] obligation to report 

non-Federal crimes such as those involving child sexual abuse,” current 

OGC officials recognize that possession of child pornography is a Federal crime and 

is reportable pursuant to the 1995 MOU. As we previously discussed, in FYs 2009 

through 2012, reporting of child pornography was inconsistent. However, as of

July 2012 it is the practice of current OGC leadership to report all admissions 

involving possession of child pornography to DOJ regardless of when the alleged 

activity occurred. According to a current NRO AGC, OGC made this change to its 

reporting practices after discussions with DOJ officials. DOJ officials confirmed 

that no statute of limitations exists for reporting potential crimes involving child 

pornography. In addition, the NRO OGC and OS&CI implemented a process in 

December 2012 to simultaneously notify the OIG of potential admissions of all 

crimes.

(U) Our limited review of admissions referred by OS&CI during CY 2013 indicates 

that NRO is complying with its new practices and 1995 MOU reporting 

requirements. However, at the time of our review, neither the NRO OGC nor OIG

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(U) Management Comments: 

(U) The NRO OS&CI, OGC, and OIG concurred with these recommendations, and 

provided additional clarifying information that is included in this report, as 

appropriate. 

(U) In its official response to this report, the NRO suggested that we overstated the 

number of cases involving “sexual behavior” that the NRO had not reported yet 

should have in FYs 2009 through 2012. We agree with the NRO that not all 

admissions related to “sexual behavior” are reportable crimes even though such 

admissions may rise to a level where OS&CI would revoke or suspend an 

individual’s access to classified information. However, the admissions that formed 

the basis for our assessment were limited to possession of child pornography or 

child sexual abuse. While our assessment is accurate, we added clarifying 

language to the report. The NRO did not report 10 percent (3 admissions) of the 

30 admissions involving child pornography or child abuse to DOJ or other law 

enforcement organizations. In some instances, OS&CI had referred the cases to 

OGC, but OGC officials informed OS&CI that the admissions were not of interest to 

DOJ or that the statute of limitations had expired. The NRO stated in its official 

comments that “OGC management has reported all child pornography cases 

(old and new) which have come to its attention and will continue to do so in the 

future.” Beginning in July 2012, DOJ informed the NRO OGC that all admissions 

involving child pornography—regardless of when the alleged activity occurred—

should be reported to DOJ. To our knowledge, since then, OGC has reported 

admissions involving child pornography of which it is aware. 

(U) The OIG also commented on recommendation 3 suggesting we revise the 

recommendation to more accurately reflect that the OIG “does not possess any 

alleged cases involving threats to children or others that were not properly 

addressed, nor does OIG have cases where it relied on OS&CI to take action in lieu 

of OIG.” We revised the recommendation accordingly. See Appendix G for the 

NRO’s complete comments. 
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B. (U) NRO Did Not Report All Admissions of UCMJ Violations

(U) DOD policies and Military Service-level guidance require the NRO OGC to report 

potential violations of the UCMJ to DCIOs and military commanders. The 

1995 MOU indirectly reinforces this expectation. However, no comparable 

reporting requirement exists in IC policies and none existed in NRO guidance until 

January 2014. In FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO did not report all admissions 

of UCMJ violations that military personnel made during NRO-administered

polygraph examinations. Those admissions included patronizing prostitutes; use 

or possession of illicit drugs; child molestation; and intentional omissions and 

falsification of Questionnaires for National Security Positions. According to 

NRO officials, they did not report those potential UCMJ violations because:

• no requirements exist in IC and NRO guidance to do so;

• OS&CI lacked training instructing them to notify OGC of such admissions; and

• confusion existed within OS&CI and OGC about the process to report

UCMJ violations.

(U) IC and NRO Policies Do Not Address Reporting of UCMJ 

Violations

(U) DOD policies and Military Service-level guidance require reporting of potential 

criminal violations to DCIOs as well as military commanders. Specifically, 

DOD Instruction 5505.3 and the Military Service-level guidance require military 

commanders to ensure that criminal allegations or suspected criminal allegations 

involving persons affiliated with the DOD or any property or programs under its

control or authority are referred to the appropriate DCIO, MCIO, or law 

enforcement organization.42 Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 535 requires that any 

information, allegation, or complaint relating to violations of Federal criminal law

and involving Government officials and employees be reported expeditiously to 

DOJ. 

 42 (U) DOD Instruction 5505.03, Initiation of Investigations by Defense Criminal Investigative 

Organizations, (24 March 2011); DOJ-DOD MOU, Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes, 

(August 1995); and Air Force Instruction 71-101 Volume 1 “Criminal Investigative Program”

(8 April 2011). Department of the Navy Instruction 5430.107, “Mission and Functions of the Naval 

Criminal Investigative Service” (28 December 2005) requires Department of the Navy commands and 

activities to immediately refer to the Naval Criminal Investigative Services any incidents of actual, 

suspected, or alleged offense punishable under the UCMJ, or similarly framed Federal, state, local, or 

foreign statutes, by confinement for a term of more than one year. Army Regulation 195-2 “Criminal 

Investigative Activities” § 1-7(b)(1) (6 September 2011) requires commanders to ensure criminal incidents 

or allegations are reported whenever an Army interest exists or that involve persons subject to the UCMJ, 

civilian employees and DOD contractors if related to their assigned duties or position, Government 

property is under Army jurisdiction, or those incidents occurred in areas under Army control are reported 

to installation law enforcement activity.
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(U) The exception to this requirement occurs when DOD is responsible for 

investigating the matter under the UCMJ or as otherwise provided by law or 

agreement such as in DOJ-DOD MOU, Reporting of Information Concerning Federal 

Crimes. The 1995 MOU indirectly reinforces the expectation that IC elements will 

report information about UCMJ violations by exempting from reporting any crime 

information received by a DOD intelligence component concerning a DOD 

intelligence component employee when crimes information is submitted to and 

investigated by the appropriate DCIO. However, absent a comparable reporting 

requirement in IC policy or NRO guidance, OS&CI officials did not refer all 

admissions made by military personnel during NRO-administered polygraph

examinations in FYs 2009 through 2012. Those admissions included patronizing 

prostitutes, illicit drug use or possession, child molestation, and intentional 

omissions and falsification of information on Questionnaires for National 

Security Positions. 

(U) During this review, the NRO OGC began developing an Instruction that, once 

issued, would require the OGC Judge Advocate General (JAG) to review OS&CI 

referrals to determine whether a UCMJ violation exists, and if so, to report the 

information to the appropriate commander and military legal office for disposition 

by the military. Concurrently, an NRO OGC attorney would evaluate the referral to 

determine whether a Federal crime may have been committed and should be 

reported to DOJ.43 The NRO OGC issued this instruction on 22 January 2014 and 

incorporated a recommendation we made in a prior report.44 The recommendation 

directed the NRO OGC to formally document in NRO guidance a process for 

reporting admissions of potential crimes and UCMJ violations made by military 

personnel. 

(U) OGC did not instruct OS&CI officials to report UCMJ 

violations

(U//FOUO) In FYs 2009 through 2012, OGC did not instruct OS&CI to refer to 

OGC admissions made by military personnel during NRO-administered polygraphs 

when those admissions may be violations of the UCMJ. During that time, OS&CI’s 

training focused on referring felony crimes, imminent threats, child pornography, 

child abuse, spouse abuse, tax evasion, and fraud. Each of those potential crimes 

is reportable as a Federal crime pursuant to the 1995 MOU.

 43 (U) NRO Business Function Instruction 80-2-1, Federal Crimes Reporting. 22 January 2014. 

44 (U) Evaluation of Media Claims Regarding Non-Reporting by the National Reconnaissance Office of 

Certain 2010 Admissions of Potential Crimes (Report Number IO-2013-007). February 2014.
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(U) The NRO did not include admissions involving UCMJ violations in its training, 

in part, because of the differing focus of the 1995 MOU and the UCMJ on actions 

that constitute reportable crimes. Although admissions related to violations of the 

UCMJ are not necessarily of interest to DOJ because they are not always Federal 

crimes, those same admissions may be of interest to DCIOs and military 

commanders. For example, the current NRO OGC JAG expects OS&CI to refer 

admissions involving the intentional falsification of Questionnaires for National 

Security Positions by military personnel if the falsifications occurred within the 

five-year statute of limitations.45 However, in FYs 2009 through 2012, the former 

NRO OGC JAG had not instructed OS&CI to report those admissions. As a result, 

OS&CI generally did not do so unless military personnel also made admissions of 

other Federal criminal violations. 

(U) NRO OGC officials, however, treat similar admissions made by non-military 

personnel differently. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 penalizes individuals for knowingly

and willfully making false statements on Federal Government documents, and that 

crime is reportable to DOJ under the 1995 MOU. Yet, according to NRO OGC 

officials, DOJ does not expect Federal agencies to report those potential crimes

unless admissions of other Federal crimes are also present. Both OGC and OS&CI 

officials stated that the omission and falsification of information on Questionnaires 

for National Security Positions is a common occurrence. As a result, the NRO OGC

exercised its authority under the 1995 MOU, with DOJ concurrence, and advised 

OS&CI not to refer those admissions to OGC unless admissions of other Federal 

crimes are also made.

(U) Because the NRO OGC has not provided training or guidelines to OS&CI 

regarding which admissions of UCMJ violations warrant referral to OGC, the 

potential exists that OS&CI may not refer certain reportable admissions to OGC or 

OIG because they are not aware of requirements to do so. In fact, the Chief of AB 

and some staff were not aware of OGC decisions made in 2013 regarding the types 

of admissions that OGC wants referred to it when military personnel make 

admissions of UCMJ violations.

(U) Reporting requirements for patronizing prostitutes

(U) According to the current NRO OGC AGC, the NRO does not report to DOJ 

admissions related to patronizing prostitutes when there is no evidence of ties to 

human trafficking because patronizing prostitutes generally does not constitute a 

 45 (U) Willfully making false official statements is punishable under Article 107 of the UCMJ.
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Federal offense.46 Yet, under Article 134 of the UCMJ, patronizing prostitutes is a 

crime whether or not the act involves human trafficking. Also, 18 U.S.C. § 1384 

makes engaging in prostitution or soliciting prostitutes a Federal misdemeanor 

when the activity occurs near a military or Navy establishment.47 Therefore, the 

NRO should be reporting to DCIOs and the military chain of command admissions 

of patronizing prostitutes made by military personnel. We identified eight military 

personnel in our combined samples48 who made admissions during NROadministered polygraph examinations in FYs 2009 through 2012 of patronizing 

prostitutes. The NRO reported none of those admissions to DCIOs or military 

commanders.

(U) Reporting Requirements for illicit drug use, possession, or 

sales

(U) Both Article 112(a) of the UCMJ and the 1995 MOU specifically identify illicit 

drug use, possession, and sales as a reportable Federal crime. Moreover, 

50 U.S.C. § 3325 requires any IC employee who has knowledge of a fact or 

circumstance that reasonably indicates that an employee, agent, or asset of an 

IC element is involved with the illegal manufacture, purchase, sale, transport, and

distribution of drugs to report that information. However, as previously discussed 

in this report, the NRO typically does not report de minimus illicit drug use, 

possession, or sales because DOJ concurred with the NRO GC determination that 

de minimus illicit drug use, possession, and sales meet the 1995 MOU exceptions 

for reporting. Therefore, reporting requirements among the 1995 MOU, Federal 

statute, UCMJ, and actual reporting practices are inconsistent.

(U) NRO reported admissions to organizations responsible for 

adjudicating clearances, but not always to law enforcement

organizations

(U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO reported several admissions of crimes 

made by military personnel to DOD organizations responsible for adjudicating 

clearances. The NRO believed the adjudicative organizations would inform the 

 46 (U) See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1581-1596.

47 (U) Title 18 U.S.C. § 1384, Prostitution Near Military and Naval Establishments, places violations on the 

same basis as other misdemeanors in violation of the general statutes of the United States and authorizes

punishment of persons subject to military or Naval law under such law. In case the military or Naval 

authorities turn the violator over to the civil authorities, the trial and punishment may be under the 

general law.

48 (U) The combined sample consists of 375 individuals and includes 106 individuals from our judgmental 

sample as well as 269 individuals that comprise our random sample. See Appendix D for information 

about those samples.
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appropriate DCIOs. Because the NRO did not concurrently notify DCIOs or other 

DOD law enforcement organizations, the DCIOs may not have been aware of or 

investigated admissions of UCMJ violations. For example:

• (U) The former NRO AGC advised OS&CI in 2010 to refer to the Air Force 

Central Adjudication Facility (AFCAF) admissions of viewing child pornography 

and engaging in child molestation made by an Air Force officer.49 AFCAF is 

responsible for granting and rescinding clearances for Air Force personnel. 

However, AFCAF is not a law enforcement organization or investigative entity 

and does not investigate potential crimes.50 While OS&CI notified AFCAF of the 

admissions, the NRO OGC did not notify the Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations (AFOSI) that conducts criminal investigations, the military 

officer’s commanding officer, or DOJ. A former AGC within the NRO OGC 

advised NRO OGC and OS&CI officials that, based on his understanding of NRO 

procedures for reporting prior criminal admissions made by military personnel, 

AFCAF would refer the case to AFOSI. The Air Force officer who made the 

admissions continued to service in the Air Force until his retirement, after 

which he worked as a cleared contractor for the United States Army.

• (U//FOUO) In 2010, the NRO debriefed an Air Force Technical Sergeant who 

admitted to deliberately misusing a government-sponsored information system. 

OS&CI notified the NRO OIG and informed AFCAF of the admission. However, 

the NRO did not report the crimes information to AFOSI or DOJ. As a result, 

the Air Force may not have had the opportunity to prosecute the individual or 

assess the impact on government information systems.

• (U//FOUO) In May 2010, a contractor admitted to deliberately misusing a 

government-sponsored system; fraud; use and possession of illegal drugs; and 

deliberate removal of classified information and transmittal of that information 

to an unauthorized person. In December 2012, the NRO notified the 

DOD Central Adjudicative Facility, but did not report the crimes information to 

DCIOs or DOJ for potential referral to the FBI. Not only did the NRO not 

comply with 1995 MOU reporting requirements, but the DCIOs and FBI may 

 49 (U) IC IG. Evaluation of Media Claims Regarding Non-Reporting by the National Reconnaissance Office of 

Certain 2010 Admissions of Potential Crimes. (Report Number IO-2013-007.) February 2014.

50 (U) AFCAF is responsible for determining whom within the Air Force and among certain contractors is 

eligible to hold a security clearance and have access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). 

AFOSI is a Federal law enforcement and investigative agency and is responsible for conducting criminal 

investigations of a variety of serious offenses and illegal activities that undermine the mission of the 

U.S. Air Force or the DOD.
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not have had the opportunity to investigate potential crimes and assess or 

counter potential damage to military operations.

• (U//FOUO) Four military officers admitted between 2010 and 2012 to 

patronizing prostitutes overseas. According to OS&CI and OGC officials, the 

NRO does not routinely notify DOJ or DCIOs of these types of UCMJ violations.

Although patronizing prostitutes is not a Federal crime in most cases, and the 

1995 MOU does not require reporting of non-Federal crimes, patronizing 

prostitutes is a violation of the UCMJ, and therefore, reportable to DCIOs.

(U) The lack of documented processes for referring admissions of potential crimes 

made by military personnel, combined with OGC and OS&CI misunderstandings 

that the centralized adjudicative facilities would notify the DCIOs, contributed to 

the NRO use of incorrect reporting procedures in FYs 2009 through 2012. 

(U) A draft of this report, shared with the NRO, included recommendations to 

address the lack of formal NRO guidance documenting the reporting process for 

admissions and violations of the UCMJ made by military personnel. The lack of 

guidance posed the risk that NRO officials might deviate from informal reporting 

practices.51 After reviewing the draft, on 22 January 2014 the NRO OGC issued 

NRO Instruction 80-2-1, Federal Crimes Reporting. This instruction establishes 

and implements processes for the NRO OGC to report admissions of potential 

crimes committed by contractors, civilians, and military personnel (see Appendix C 

for information on the NRO reporting process). However, this instruction still does 

not require the NRO to report the crimes information to the relevant DCIO in 

accordance with Military Service-level policies. According to the NRO JAG, the 

commanding officer is responsible for addressing the matter based on advice from 

the Military Service’s JAG. Involvement of DCIOs is at the commanding officer’s 

discretion. However, we believe that the NRO should also notify the DCIOs in 

accordance with Military service directives and instructions discussed earlier in 

this report.

 51 (U//FOUO) We contacted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) 

OGCs to learn how they handle admissions of potential Federal crimes or UCMJ violations made by 

military personnel. The CIA OGC notifies JAGs, whereas NSA reports admissions via the military chain of 

command and to DCIOs. Depending on the location of the alleged activity, the NSA OGC may also notify 

DOJ. 
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(U) Although the NRO OGC instruction does not require the NRO JAG to notify the 

DCIO of potential reportable UCMJ violations, overall the NRO instruction 

addresses the majority of our concerns and mitigates the risk that the NRO may 

not report UCMJ violations to the appropriate authorities.

(U) Management Comments: 

(U) The NRO concurred with this recommendation. See Appendix G for the NRO’s 

complete comments.

C. (U) NRO did not provide continuous training required by the 1995 crimes 

reporting memorandum of understanding

(U) The 1995 MOU requires IC elements to establish initial and continuing training 

to ensure that employees who are engaged in the review and analysis of collected 

intelligence are knowledgeable and compliant with the provisions of the MOU. 

While the NRO provides initial training to its adjudicators, it has not provided 

mandatory, periodic training in accordance with the 1995 MOU. 

(U) When OS&CI updated training documentation in 2013, it did not coordinate the 

training with the OIG to ensure inclusion of current roles and responsibilities for 

the crimes reporting process. For example, training materials do not explain that 

as of July 2012, following OGC notification to DOJ, the OIG acts as the point of 

contact to respond to DOJ requests for information related to child sexual abuse 

issues. Training materials also do not discuss the OIG legal obligation under 

42 U.S.C. § 13031 to report potential Federal crimes involving child molestation. 

Because OGC does not have a legal obligation to report those crimes to DOJ, and 

the 1995 MOU does not require reporting of non-Federal crimes or acknowledge 

reporting requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 13031, OS&CI officials may not notify 

the OIG when individuals admit to violating state criminal laws that pose an 

imminent danger to others, such as child molestation. 

(U) The NRO Assistant Inspector General for Investigations believes that 

mandatory, periodic training allows the OIG to educate adjudicators and polygraph

(U) RECOMMENDATION: 

4. (U) We recommend NRO OGC incorporate in Instruction 80-2-1 a 

requirement for the JAG to report admissions involving UCMJ violations 

to DCIOs simultaneously with notification to the appropriate commander 

and serving military legal office for military disposition.
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examiners about changes to referral processes and reportable crimes as well as 

share the results of their work. Moreover, periodic training would help establish 

relationships between OIG Investigators and OS&CI polygraph examiners that 

would encourage polygraph examiners, with the consent of their management, to 

contact OIG Investigators on those occasions when an individual admits to

possessing evidence of a crime or involvement in an ongoing crime that involves 

imminent harm to others. Neither polygraph examiners nor NRO OIG investigators

have custodial authority; therefore, they are unable to detain an individual even if 

that person admits to a crime. In such cases, it is critical that OS&CI contact the 

OIG during the polygraph examination to permit the OIG to notify local law 

enforcement who can act.

(U) As discussed, differences exist between the types of admissions that DOJ and 

military investigative organizations expect and want to receive. Without 

mandatory, periodic training that addresses such differences, the potential exists 

that OS&CI staff may not refer certain reportable admissions to OGC or OIG

because they are not aware of requirements to do so. Furthermore, opportunities 

to thwart recent, ongoing, or planned crimes or collect evidence may be missed if 

polygraph examiners and adjudicators are unaware of whom to contact to facilitate 

law enforcement response.

(U) Management Comments: 

(U) The NRO concurred with this recommendation. See Appendix G for the NRO’s 

complete comments.

D. (U) Notification to NRO OIG was delayed or did not occur in 

FYs 2009 through 2012

(U//FOUO) In September 2010, the National Security Agency (NSA) OIG reviewed

NRO OIG operations as part of a routine quality control assessment. The NSA OIG

identified delayed notification to the OIG of child pornography cases as a serious 

information access issue for the NRO OIG. The NSA OIG asserted that prompt 

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

5. (U) We recommend OGC and OIG provide mandatory, periodic 

training to OS&CI polygraph examiners and adjudicators. The 

training should address the broad types of potential crimes and 

UCMJ violations that OS&CI officials should refer to OGC and OIG 

and identify points of contact within both NRO components.
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notification allows for immediate referral of the matter to appropriate Federal law 

enforcement organizations and lessens the likelihood that evidence of crimes 

against children will be destroyed before law enforcement has an opportunity to 

respond. At that time, the NSA OIG recommended that the NRO establish a 

process for OS&CI to notify OGC and the NRO OIG Investigations staff 

simultaneously of admissions of potential criminal conduct and violations of 

Federal law involving child pornography.52 However, the NRO did not change its 

practices until two years later. The OGC did not document those practices in 

written guidance until January 2014. 

(U//FOUO) Our work validated the NSA OIG findings. In FYs 2009 through 2012, 

OS&CI notified the OIG of 68 percent of admissions related to child pornography 

and molestation that the NRO reported to DOJ. In most cases, OS&CI notified 

OGC of the admissions before notifying the OIG. Although OS&CI notified the OIG 

on the same day in some instances, in other instances, the OS&CI either did not 

notify the OIG or did so after a significant period of time had passed. According to 

a senior OS&CI official, until approximately 2010, OS&CI was not aware of an 

internal agreement between the OIG and OGC requiring OS&CI to notify the OIG of 

admissions related to potential Federal crimes involving children. OS&CI officials 

began to routinely notify the OIG when the NRO instituted a simultaneous 

notification process in 2012. 

(U) Table 3 summarizes the number of days in FYs 2009 through 2012 that OIG 

was notified after OGC.

 52 (U//FOUO) NSA Memorandum for Inspector General National Reconnaissance Office, Letter of 

Observations: Quality Assessment Review of the Investigative Operations of the Office of Inspector General, 

National Reconnaissance Office, June 7-11, 2010. NSA issued the report on 1 September 2010.
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(U) Table 3: Number of days for OS&CI to notify NRO OIG about admissions 

related to child crimes after first notifying OGC in FYs 2009 through 2012

This table is Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Admission Not 

informed

Number of Days

Same 

day

1-

10 

11-

20 

21-

30 

31-

40 

41-

50 

51-

60 

61-

70 

71-

80 

81-

90

91+

Child 

pornography 9 4 6 3 1 1 1 1

Child 

molestation 3 1 1 1

Child 

molestation 

and 

pornography

3 1 3 1

(U) Source: IC IG analysis of data provided by NRO OGC and OIG

(U) Note: The table does not include data for admissions made in FYs 2009 through 2012 that the 

NRO OGC should have, but did not, report to DOJ. For example, the data do not include one instance 

when OS&CI did not notify the NRO OIG until two years after a military officer admitted to viewing 

child pornography. The OIG reported the admission to the FBI and local law enforcement within 48 

hours of notification by the NRO OGC. The table also does not reflect that OS&CI notified the OIG 

before OGC for six admissions related to child pornography and child molestation.

(U) In July 2012, OS&CI implemented a process to notify OGC and OIG 

simultaneously via email of admissions of potential criminal conduct involving 

child pornography. The NRO also designated the OIG as the point of contact to 

respond to external agency and law enforcement requests for information about 

child pornography admissions. While this arrangement permits the OIG to use 

existing relationships with law enforcement, both the NRO OIG Counsel and 

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations stated that another NRO component 

could also fulfill this role. NRO OGC, OIG, and OS&CI officials stated that they are 

considering establishing an office within OS&CI that would assume the current 

OIG liaison function with local law enforcement regarding crimes. However, the 

NRO does not have the resources or funds to establish or staff this office. Until the 

NRO establishes this office, the OIG Assistant Inspector General for Investigations 

plans to continue liaising with local law enforcement and report potential 

non-Federal crimes, such as child molestation, which the NRO OGC has no legal 

obligation to report under Federal statutes. 

(U) Prior to July 2012, no practice or process existed within the NRO for OGC or 

OS&CI to notify the NRO OIG of crimes not related to fraud, waste, or abuse of 

NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or activities. However, since the NRO 

became a Designated Federal Entity in October 2010, the NRO OIG has had a 

statutory obligation to report expeditiously to the AG whenever the IG has 
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reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law.53 

Moreover, because OIG investigators are “covered professionals” in their roles as 

law enforcement officers, they have a legal obligation under 42 U.S.C. § 13031 to 

report to law enforcement agencies all admissions involving child sexual abuse of 

which OIG investigators become aware while conducting their official duties. 

(U) In the absence of legal obligation or formal process for OGC to report 

non-Federal crimes to DOJ or law enforcement, the OIG has assumed, with OGC 

concurrence, the liaison function with law enforcement authorities. Yet, both an 

OS&CI operating instruction and OGC guidance limit notification to the OIG to 

potential Federal crimes involving fraud, waste, or abuse of NRO funds, programs, 

property, operations, or activities. 

(U//FOUO) Our review of 32 admissions that NRO reported during CY 2013 found 

that since July 2012 the NRO OS&CI is simultaneously referring admissions of 

potential crimes to OGC and OIG, by email. During the first six months of 

CY 2013, NRO OIG and OGC reported to appropriate authorities, within four days 

of notification by OS&CI, 11 of the 14 admissions involving possession of child 

pornography or engaging in child molestation. OGC and the OIG reported the 

remaining three admissions within eight days of receiving notification from OS&CI. 

OS&CI also simultaneously referred to OGC and OIG all 18 admissions of 

non-child crimes that the NRO OGC reported to DOJ during the first half of 

CY 2013. In addition, OGC now identifies the OIG in written reports sent to DOJ 

as the NRO point of contact for additional information on admissions made by NRO 

employees related to child pornography and child-crimes. 

(U) In January 2014, the NRO OGC issued guidance requiring concurrent 

notification to the NRO OGC and OIG when OS&CI refers potential Federal crimes. 

However, OGC has not issued standard operating procedures that identify the OIG 

as the point of contact to respond to DOJ requests for information about potential 

crimes involving child abuse. Also, when we completed our review, the NRO OIG 

had not updated its internal operating instructions or finalized changes to its 

investigations manual to reflect this role. Therefore, the risk exists that these

practices will not continue.

(U) Since completion of our review, OGC issued NRO Instruction 80-2-1. 

The instruction identifies the circumstances and processes for concurrently 

referring admissions of potential crimes and UCMJ violations to OGC and OIG. 

(U) Despite this progress, the OGC has yet to incorporate the OIG responsibility in 

OGCs standard operating instructions or to make a determination whether the 

 53 (U) 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3 § 4(d).
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OGC should report potential crimes to DOJ when the OIG expresses an interest in 

an admission. Therefore, we are repeating and expanding upon a recommendation 

that we made in our recent report Evaluation of Media Claims Regarding NonReporting by the National Reconnaissance Office of Certain 2010 Admissions of 

Potential Crimes.54

(U) Management Comments: 

(U) The NRO concurred with these recommendations. On 4 February 2014, the 

NRO OIG updated its investigations manual and internal OIG operating procedures 

for crimes referrals. The OIG documented its legal responsibility to investigate 

allegations of possible fraud, waste, and abuse in NRO operations and to 

investigate other matters as directed by the NRO IG. In addition, the manual 

acknowledges the NRO OIG authority, as a Designated Federal Entity, to 

investigate matters that may raise questions concerning the possible violation of 

Federal criminal law that has a nexus to the NRO and is within the NRO OIG’s 

jurisdiction as authorized by the IG Act, as amended. Moreover, the manual 

identifies the OIG Investigations Staff as the NRO point of contact for providing 

information about child abuse allegations, including molestation, that OGC has 

referred to DOJ or to the OIG for investigation. Finally, the OIG stated in its 

internal policy that even if the “OIG expresses interest, OGC still has an obligation 

 54 (U) February 2014.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

6. (U) We recommend that the OGC incorporate the OIG’s role as 

the NRO point of contact for child related crimes reported to 

DOJ or external law enforcement organizations in its standard 

operating procedures and clarify the OGC’s role for reporting 

to DOJ potential crimes even when the OIG has expressed an 

interest in an admission.

7. (U) We recommend that the OIG incorporate into and finalize 

its investigations manual and operating instructions that 

address crimes reporting the OIG role as the NRO point of 

contact for responding to DOJ or external law enforcement

organization requests for information about child related 

crimes.
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to report the matter to DOJ.” These actions satisfy recommendation 7 of this 

report. We consider this recommendation closed. See Appendix G for the NRO’s 

complete comments.

(U) NRO guidance usurped OIG statutory crimes reporting obligations

(U) Nothing in NRO guidance or the 1995 MOU may usurp the OIG’s statutory 

obligation under the IG Act for reporting information about Federal crimes.55 

Under the IG Act, to which the NRO OIG has been subject since October 2010, the 

NRO OIG has a statutory and affirmative obligation to report expeditiously to the AG

whenever the IG has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of 

Federal criminal law.56 Moreover, as previously discussed, NRO OIG Investigations 

staff members are “covered professionals” in their role as law enforcement officers. 

Therefore, they have a legal obligation under 42 U.S.C. § 13031 to report to law 

enforcement agencies admissions of potential crimes involving child sexual abuse and

of which OIG investigators become aware while performing their official duties. 

(U) The IG Act does not limit the OIG’s affirmative reporting obligation to report 

criminal activity solely to those admissions of potential crimes related to NRO funds, 

programs, property, operations or activities. Furthermore, the 1995 MOU implies that 

the OIG should be receiving reports about potential crimes and reporting to DOJ or 

Federal investigative agencies crimes information of which OIG officials become aware 

while performing their official duties. Specifically, the 1995 MOU exempts from 

reporting any criminal information previously reported to the IG based on the 

understanding that the IG is already reporting such information to the AG. Moreover, 

the 1995 MOU states that the reporting obligations it creates do not alter any crimes 

reporting procedures between OIGs and DOJ. 

(U) Therefore, the OIG should be informed of any potential Federal crime committed by 

NRO employees or prospective employees regardless whether the potential crime 

involved fraud, waste, or abuse of NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or 

activities. However, both an OS&CI operating instruction and OGC instruction limited 

notification to the OIG to Federal crimes involving fraud, waste, or abuse of NRO 

funds, programs, property, operations, or activities. Specifically, NRO Instruction 

80-3 limited the OIG’s authority to conduct preliminary investigative inquiries into 

potential criminal acts and violations of Federal criminal law that involve NRO funds, 

 55 (U) Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (“A regulation 

which ... operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity.”)

56 (U) 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3 § 4(d).
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programs, property, operations, or activities.57 Under the instruction, the OGC was 

responsible for reporting all other violations of Federal criminal law to the AG. 

Therefore, NRO guidance erroneously usurped the statutory obligations of the OIG to 

report crimes to the AG. In June 2013, the NRO issued Directive 80-2, NRO Office of 

General Counsel Framework, that superseded NRO Instruction 80-3 and rectified the 

erroneous usurping of NRO OIG authority that was in effect until that time. 

(U//FOUO) However, in November 2013, when OS&CI revised an operating instruction

that provides guidance for referring information about potential crimes to the OIG, 

OS&CI continued to limit referrals to the OIG to fraud, waste, and abuse violations 

against the government. This practice may be inconsistent with the OIG’s reporting 

obligations under the IG Act and 42 U.S.C. §13031. Although the OIG may be made 

aware of other potential crimes via its inclusion in an email distribution list used by 

the NRO to concurrently notify OGC and OIG about potential crimes, the operating 

instruction implies that the OIG may not be consistently informed if the issue is not 

related to fraud, waste, or abuse of government funds and resources. As a result, the 

OIG's ability to report Federal crimes, such as child pornography, and non-Federal 

crimes, such as child molestation, to local law enforcement will be restricted. Also, 

the operating instruction further inhibits the OIG's ability to fulfill its function as the 

designated NRO point of contact to provide information to DOJ or other law 

enforcement agencies that request information following OGC reports of child-related 

crimes.

(U) To preserve its independence, only the OIG can determine whether reasonable 

grounds exist that warrant reporting of potential Federal crimes or place restrictions 

on the types of crime information provided to it. Therefore, ensuring that OS&CI and 

OGC notify the OIG of admissions of potential crimes is paramount. If the NRO OIG is 

not notified of potential admissions of Federal crimes or not notified in a timely 

manner, then the OIG cannot fulfill its responsibilities in accordance with the IG Act 

or 42 U.S.C. § 13031 and potentially 18 U.S.C. § 2258.

 57 (U) National Reconnaissance Office Instruction 80-3, Obligation to Report Evidence of Possible Violations 

of Federal Criminal Law and Illegal Intelligence Activities. August 2009.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

8. (U) We recommend OS&CI revise its operating instructions and 

guidance to eliminate restrictions on the types of potential crimes 

referred to the OIG. 
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(U) Management Comments: 

(U) The NRO concurred with this recommendation. The NRO added that OS&CI is 

currently referring, via email to the NRO Crimes Referral Working Group, 

admissions of potential Federal crimes in addition to some violations of state 

criminal laws involving certain threats to individuals that could result in serious 

bodily injury or harm. The NRO Crimes Referral Working Group includes OGC and 

the OIG. 

(U) The NRO also commented that 42 U.S.C § 13031 “does not create an obligation 

on non-covered professionals to report crimes to covered professionals so that the 

covered professionals’ duty to report is triggered per 42 U.S.C. § 13031. As such, 

even though OS&CI currently and voluntarily reports violations of state criminal 

laws involving child abuse to OIG and OGC via the Crimes Referral Working Group 

email, it is not required to do so per 42 U.S.C. § 13031.” 

(U) We agree with the NRO that non-covered professionals are not required to 

report crimes to covered professionals. Reporting requirements pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 13031 for covered professionals, such as NRO OIG investigations staff

members, activate when those professionals become aware of certain crimes. 

So long as OS&CI continues its practice to inform the OIG of potential crimes not 

limited to fraud, waste, or abuse of NRO resources, the OIG should be able to meet 

its reporting requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 13031. However, OS&CI’s 

November 2013 operating instruction that provides guidance for referring 

information about potential crimes to the OIG, limits referrals to the OIG to fraud, 

waste, and abuse violations against the government. Therefore, the guidance is 

inconsistent with current NRO referral practices. We believe OS&CI should 

continue to inform the OIG of admissions of potential crimes not limited to fraud, 

waste, or abuse of NRO resources, so the OIG is able to meet its reporting 

requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 13031. The 28 March 2014 NRO Director’s 

establishment of a Special Investigations Activity within OS&CI, and charge to that 

activity to promptly report possible violations of state criminal laws involving an 

imminent threat or serious bodily injury to another human being to local law 

enforcement agencies, does not negate the responsibility of covered professionals 

within the OIG who learn of certain crimes to report those crimes pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 13031. See Appendix G for the NRO’s complete comments.

(U) NRO processes affected the time to report potential crimes 

(U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, internal NRO processes and personnel leave 

practices negatively affected the time for the NRO to refer and report admissions of 

potential crimes. Although 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) and the 1995 MOU require 

“expeditious” or “timely” reporting of potential crimes, OS&CI usually refrained

from formally referring admissions of crimes to OGC, OIG or other Federal agencies 
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until the adjudications process was complete. Therefore, individuals could 

continue the criminal activity or tamper with or destroy evidence in the interim. 

The NRO implemented changes in August 2013 to expedite referrals to OGC and 

OIG of certain crimes requiring immediate action to prevent danger to individuals, 

facilities, systems, or national security. 

A. (U) Intertwined adjudications and crimes referral process delays 

referral and reporting of potential crimes

(U) Title 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) and the 1995 MOU require “expeditious” or “timely”

reporting of possible violations of Federal criminal laws, but do not define what 

constitutes “timely” or “expeditious.” Excluding “high-interest” admissions that 

require immediate adjudicative decisions to prevent danger to individuals, facilities, 

systems, and national security, in FYs 2009 through 2012, OS&CI routinely 

completed the adjudicative process prior to formally referring an admission of a 

potential crime to OGC or OIG. The adjudicative process may include:

• multiple polygraph sessions often occurring weeks or months apart for 

scheduling reasons; 

• multiple quality assurance reviews;

• AB review of admissions and supporting evidence; and 

• investigations by the NRO CID. 

(U) Each of those actions is a necessary aspect of the adjudicative process. Still, 

those actions took time to complete and ultimately lengthened the time before 

OS&CI referred admissions of potential crimes to OIG or OGC. However, nothing 

in NRO policy precluded OS&CI from notifying OGC or OIG of an admission prior 

to completion of the adjudicative process. In fact, in August 2013 OS&CI 

formalized guidance on its processes to notify OGC and OIG when action is 

required to prevent danger to individuals, facilities, systems, or national security. 

However, in FYs 2009 through 2012 OS&CI took an average of 106 days to refer an 

admission of a potential crime to OIG and 95 days on average to refer admissions 

to OGC. 

(U//FOUO) In November 2013, OS&CI updated its referral procedures to require 

AB to refer all potential criminal activity falling within Federal guidelines within 

10 business days after completion of all investigative actions. According to an 

OS&CI official, this change permits OS&CI to immediately report certain types of 

admissions prior to completion of the adjudication process. While this change 

should facilitate more timely referrals to OGC and OIG, it likely will not 

significantly shorten the overall time for OS&CI to refer admissions of potential 

crimes because AB must still complete the investigative process prior to 

recommending referral to OGC, OIG, CID, or other Federal government personnel 
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security entities that have an “adjudicative interest.” Moreover, OGC and OIG 

officials advised us that they do not report information to DOJ or law enforcement 

until OS&CI formally notifies them. 

(U//FOUO) Since 2009, OS&CI PMB has had a goal to notify AB within 24 hours of 

an individual making a high-interest admission. The goal for referring all other 

admissions to AB is three days. However, PMB does not track its performance 

against those internal goals. According to the Director/PMB, tracking timeliness 

based on data in would prove inaccurate because PMB may informally notify 

OGC or OIG via telephone calls and emails that does not capture. 

(U) Once formally notified, both NRO OGC and OIG reported relevant admissions to 

DOJ or other law enforcement organizations. The average number of days for both 

OIG and OGC to report admissions of potential crimes decreased significantly from 

FYs 2009 to 2012. The average number of days for the NRO OIG to report 

potential crimes decreased from 20 days in FY 2009 to 13 days in FY 2012, while 

the average number of days for the NRO OGC to report potential crimes decreased 

from an average of 226 days in FY 2009 to 62 days in FY 2012. 

(U//FOUO) During the first half of CY 2013, the NRO reported admissions in a 

more timely manner as a result of process changes. During that time, the average 

number of days for the NRO OGC and OIG to report an admission was three days.

(See Appendix E for information on reporting times in FYs 2009 through 2012 and

CY 2013.) 

(U) Management Comments: 

(U) NRO concurred with this recommendation stating it will update its guidance to 

require referral of cases prior to final adjudication when admissions involve Federal 

crimes and certain violations of state criminal laws including imminent threat, 

danger, or serious bodily injury to another person. See Appendix G for the NRO’s 

complete comments.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

9. (U) We recommend OS&CI, in conjunction with OGC and 

OIG, separate the crimes referral and adjudications processes 

to permit OS&CI to formally refer to OGC and OIG, and 

report to law enforcement organizations admissions prior to 

completion of the adjudication process, even when that 

admission is not a high-interest admission.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 

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B. (U) NRO process gives OS&CI responsibility for legal 

determinations 

(U) OS&CI’s responsibility for determining whether an admission meets criteria for 

notifying OGC or OIG effectively delegates a legal decision to OS&CI and may conflict 

with the GC’s responsibility for determining when an admission is reportable. 

Both the 1995 MOU and NRO guidance task OGC with making legal determinations 

and reporting potential crimes to DOJ. Yet, an OS&CI official told us that based on

informal advice by the former AGC, OS&CI does not consult with OGC or OIG on every 

admission of a potential crime and whether to refer those admissions. According to 

both OIG and OGC officials, nuances of law and varying county and state criminal 

laws make establishing specific thresholds that OS&CI can use to determine which 

admissions of potential crimes OS&CI should refer to OGC and OIG almost 

impossible. 

(U) Although OIG and OGC officials applauded OS&CI’s willingness to contact them for 

guidance on when an admission may be reportable, the potential exists for OS&CI 

staff to make inaccurate determinations of what constitutes reportable crimes. In fact, 

OS&CI officials acknowledged that they are not always aware of the types of potential 

crimes that should be referred to OGC and OIG. We believe that this confusion 

extends to referring UCMJ violations because OGC has not informed OS&CI about the 

need to refer those violations for OGC consideration. 

(U) The success of the NRO referral and reporting process depends on OS&CI officials 

correctly identifying admissions of potential crimes and accurately determining when 

an admission of a potential crime warrants referral to OGC and the OIG.58 Thus, the 

NRO has effectively delegated legal determinations to OS&CI staff. When the OGC and 

OIG are not made aware of admissions involving potential crimes, they cannot report 

them. 

(U) During our review, we observed that in 2013 OS&CI began to refer admissions of 

potential crimes that were made as early as 2010 to OGC and OIG. The OIG 

attributed retroactive reporting to improved working relationships between OS&CI, 

 58 (U//FOUO) The results of polygraph examinations are reported as either “no significant physiological 

response,” “no opinion,” or “significant physiological response.” Polygraph examiners
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OIG, and OGC as well as media and Congressional focus on NRO crimes reporting 

processes.

(U) NRO officials in the OGC, OIG, and OS&CI agree that involving OGC earlier in the 

referral process by embedding within OS&CI an attorney with responsibility for

reviewing all admissions of potential crimes and UCMJ violations could be beneficial.

Potential benefits include:

• (U) mitigating the possibility that OS&CI inadvertently may not refer an 

admission to OIG or OGC; 

• (U) ensuring that certain behaviors are uniformly identified as potential 

criminal acts or UCMJ violations;

• (U) providing additional assurance that OS&CI refers admissions to all 

stakeholders with adjudicative and criminal investigative interests; 

• (U) ensuring that changes in reporting requirements are expeditiously 

implemented; and

• (U) reducing the number of days to report potential crimes to DOJ or other 

law enforcement organizations. 

(U) We compared the NRO crimes reporting process with the NSA’s process. 

Notably, the NSA separates the adjudication and crimes reporting processes. 

According to NSA Security officials, they do not wait to complete the adjudications 

process before notifying OGC of admissions of potential crimes, especially when 

admissions involve potential danger to another individual. According to an NSA 

OGC official, the reporting delay that would likely occur if OGC waited for an 

adjudicative decision would be too long.59

(U) Although OGC has designated an attorney to act as the focal point for OS&CI 

legal matters, reliance on AB and SAS to determine which admissions are referred 

to OGC and OIG continues to raise concerns that OS&CI is making de facto legal 

decisions.

 59 (U) We did not obtain information on the average number of days for NSA to make adjudicative 

decisions when individuals made admissions of potential crimes.
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(U) Management Comments: 

(U) NRO concurred with this recommendation, and stated that it does not have the 

resources to devote a full-time attorney to OS&CI at this time. While we agree with 

the staffing constraint identified by OGC, we continue to believe that reliance on 

AB and SAS to determine which admissions are referred to OGC and OIG raises

concerns that OS&CI is making de facto legal decisions. See Appendix G for the 

NRO’s complete comments.

C. (U) OS&CI practices contributed to lengthier processing times

(U) OS&CI’s Polygraph Management Branch (PMB) administers polygraph 

examinations to NRO-sponsored individuals. Since 2009, PMB has required 

polygraph examiners and team chiefs to process polygraph examination reports 

within five working days for routine cases and within three working days for 

high-interest admissions or specific interest polygraphs. However, we determined 

that Quality Assurance (QA) procedures and staffing practices contributed to 

lengthier processing times for some admissions of potential crimes. 

(U//FOUO) According to the QA Executive Officer, QA officers and team chiefs 

work four 10-hour days each week. Therefore, no one who can review high-interest 

admissions that may require attention before the following week, is in the office on 

Fridays. The QA Executive Officer stated that although PMB implemented this 

leave policy to accommodate the desire of its staff, the approach has delayed

QA reviews. OS&CI officials stated that following discussions with IC IG staff as 

part of this evaluation, in October 2013, OS&CI eliminated the four 10-hour day 

schedule and adjusted work schedules so that there is coverage every Friday. 

(U//FOUO) We identified several instances when an individual made a 

high-interest admission, yet processing was delayed due to staff who were on leave.

For example, during a routine NRO polygraph a contractor admitted to molesting a 

child. According to the QA Executive Officer, PMB notified AB of the admission on 

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

10. (U) We recommend OGC embed an attorney within OS&CI. The

attorney should be responsible for reviewing admissions of certain 

behaviors to ensure they are uniformly identified as potential crimes 

and UCMJ violations for potential reporting separate from the 

adjudications process. 
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the same day as it was made, however an 11-day delay occurred from the date of 

admission to the date when QA sent its official report to AB for adjudication and 

possible referral to OIG and OGC. According to the QA Executive Officer, five days 

of the delay were due to review by a PMB team chief. QA took another six days to 

complete its review of the polygraph session. A flex-day, holiday, and an ongoing 

special investigation further contributed to the delay notifying AB. However, the 

Executive Officer experienced difficulty identifying the specific reasons for 

QA delays because this information was not documented in the polygraph 

technical report or in . In another instance, an individual made an 

admission involving child pornography. The QA review took one month, but the 

Executive Officer was unable to explain the reason for the lengthy review. The day 

after QA completed its review, QA forwarded the admission to AB. Given that both 

of those admissions qualified as high-interest reports, in accordance with its policy, 

PMB should have notified AB within 24 hours of when the admissions were made. 

(U//FOUO) NRO’s practice has been for the Executive Officer, who also serves as 

the Chief of Quality Assurance for PMB, to approve each Specific Issue Polygraph 

(SIP) that QA reviewed before forwarding the file to AB.60 The Chief usually does 

not review polygraph examinations that are not SIPs. Because no staff member is 

designated to act as a back-up when the Executive Officer is absent, QA does not 

send admissions made during SIPs to AB until the Executive Officer returns and 

reviews the files. According to the Executive Officer, past delegation of the review 

function resulted in problems. Therefore, PMB/QA discontinued the practice of 

designating a back-up reviewer. 

(U) In addition, the PMB quality assurance process caused delays referring some 

cases. As part of its quality control process, the PMB QA staff randomly selected a 

two-week period and reviewed all work products submitted during that time by a 

specific team or field office. During FY 2013, those reviews revealed extensive 

processing delays resulting from misplaced cases, examiners not processing cases 

within five working days, not making edits within the required three days, or not 

completing retesting within twenty-one days. PMB/QA also determined that team 

chiefs took significant time to conduct required reviews. In one case, it took twelve 

business days before the team chief conducted the first review and another month 

after the last polygraph session before QA received the case for processing and was 

able to forward the case to AB. 

 60 (U) The NRO administers specific interest polygraph examinations to assist in resolving specific 

ICD 704 issues or concerns. As a general rule, all government and contractor personnel sponsored by the 

NRO for SCI access or for access to the NRO information systems must complete, or have completed, a 

counterintelligence security polygraph prior to authorization for access. 
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 

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(U) According to the PMB/QA Executive Officer, as a result of discussions with 

IC IG staff during this review, PMB/QA modified how it identifies, tracks, and 

prioritizes cases to shorten the time before cases are forwarded to AB. 

In June 2013, PMB informed its staff via email that each team chief is responsible 

for directly notifying AB whenever PMB processes certain types of cases regardless 

of the type of polygraph examination that was conducted. According to NRO 

officials, this process effectively eliminates time-consuming quality assurance 

reviews by the Executive Officer at headquarters. Direct notification to AB must 

occur within 24 hours when: 

• High-interest information is obtained. This information includes, but is not 

limited to, child or spousal abuse, child pornography, felony crimes, 

imminent threats, tax fraud or evasion, serious criminal offenses, and issues 

impacting national security such as espionage or compromise of classified 

information; 

•

 

(U//FOUO) PMB incorporated those changes into its Case Administration 

Procedures in November 2013. The intent of this process is to alert AB of incoming 

cases that may require expedited processing by AB. PMB also expects the process 

to assist it to track its processing timeliness. We did not evaluate the effectiveness

of those changes as they were implemented after we completed our work.

(U) Management Comments: 

NRO concurred with this recommendation, noting that the June 2013 

modifications to its quality assurance process effectively eliminates time 

consuming quality assurance reviews by the Executive Officer at headquarters. 

(U) RECOMMENDATION: 

11. (U) We recommend the Chief/PMB cross-train an individual to 

act as a backup when the Executive Officer is out of the office 

for an extended period.
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As a result, we consider this recommendation closed. See Appendix G for the 

NRO’s complete comments.

D. (U) OGC reporting of potential crimes was lengthy in FYs 2009 through 

2012

(U) OGC also experienced significant delays reporting potential crimes in FYs 2009 

through 2012. For those fiscal years, we identified 76 occurrences when it took 

OGC more than a week to notify DOJ of an admission of a potential Federal crime.

During that time, OGC reported to DOJ only one admission in under a week.

Lengthy delays in reporting are a concern, particularly when admissions involve 

serious offenses that pose an imminent threat to others. As mentioned previously

in this report, the risk exists that a crime may continue or that individuals may 

alter or destroy evidence in the interim between an admission and reporting.

(U) Table 4 shows the average, median, and range for the number of days OGC

took to report admissions of potential Federal crimes to DOJ in FYs 2009 through 

2012.

(U) Table 4: Average number of days for NRO OGC to report potential Federal crimes 

in FYs 2009 through 2012

This table is Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Fiscal 

Year

Number of 

subjects

Average Median Range

(in days)a

FY 2009 21 226 125 27 to 1,114

FY 2010 26 126 75 24 to 704

FY 2011 21 103 63 5 to 312

FY 2012 9 62 31 12 to 219

Total 77 139 78 5 to 1,114

(U) Source: IC IG analysis of NRO data

(U) Note: a Number of days was rounded to the nearest whole number.

(U) During the first half of CY 2013, the average number of days for OGC to report 

admissions declined to three days, indicating that OGC is more expeditiously 

reporting potential crimes to DOJ. 

(U) NRO implemented corrective actions to strengthen its crime reporting 

process

(U) Under the leadership of the current NRO Director, in July 2012, the NRO began 

to proactively implement corrective actions to address deficiencies that it 

discovered in its policies and processes for identifying and reporting admissions of 

Federal crimes made during polygraph examinations. Congressional interest and 
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the McClatchy Company claims of non-reporting of certain egregious admissions

drove the NRO to focus on strengthening internal and external coordination to 

facilitate the identification, referral, and reporting of potential crimes as well as

improving tracking of reported admissions. In addition, in March 2014 following 

discussions with IC IG staff, the NRO Director established an internal activity to 

promptly report possible violations of specified state criminal laws, including 

crimes against children, to local law enforcement authorities and serve as the 

liaison between the NRO and local law enforcement agencies. 

A. (U) Internal coordination

(U) Prior to July 2012, the NRO did not have strong processes to facilitate timely 

communication and sharing of information about admissions of potential crimes

among NRO stakeholders involved in the crimes referral and reporting process. 

The NRO implemented the following changes beginning in 2012:

• (U) OS&CI concurrently refers to NRO OIG and OGC admissions of potential 

Federal crimes. In January 2013, the NRO implemented the NSA 

recommendation to establish a process whereby OS&CI notifies NRO 

OIG/Investigations concurrently with OGC when admissions of potential 

criminal conduct involve child pornography. The NRO created an email 

distribution list to facilitate simultaneous notification of OIG and OGC

personnel regarding all criminal referrals from OS&CI, and did not limit the 

use of the email notification to admissions involving potential child 

pornography. In addition, OGC now copies OIG on all notification letters it 

sends to DOJ. Previously, OGC copied the OIG only when admissions of 

potential crimes involved child sexual abuse, and notification was not a 

consistent practice. In November 2013, OS&CI incorporated this change 

into its referral procedures.

• (U//FOUO) OGC documents and communicates decisions and reasons not

to report admissions of potential crimes. The AGC now informs the GC, 

OIG, and OS&CI when deciding not to report to DOJ an admission of a 

potential Federal crime. Previously, the AGC informed only OS&CI that 

OGC had determined that notification to DOJ was unnecessary. In 

November 2013, OS&CI updated its written procedures requiring SAS to 

document when OGC determines that no report to DOJ is necessary. 
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• (U//FOUO) OGC tracks OS&CI referrals of admissions. OGC tracks the 

names of individuals whom OS&CI refers, even when OGC does not report 

the individuals to DOJ. The sheet includes reasons that OGC declined to 

report admissions to DOJ. Previously, OGC tracked only information for 

admissions that it reported to DOJ and did not consistently track reasons 

for declining to send the information.

• (U//FOUO) OS&CI formalized process to refer high-interest admissions to 

OGC and OIG immediately. As previously discussed, in August 2013, 

OS&CI established policies and procedures to refer to OGC and OIG

admissions that involve threats to individuals, facilities, systems, and 

national security within 24 hours as opposed to waiting to complete the 

adjudicative process.61 Immediate referrals include, but are not limited to, 

– admissions of current child abuse or molestation by an individual or 

when known about by the individual;62 

– past child abuse or molestation by an individual or when known about 

by an individual if a minor child is still accessible to the perpetrator;

– that endanger ongoing operations 

and/or those involved in such operations;

– and 

– or crimes that are 

likely to affect United States national security, defense, or foreign 

relations.

(U//FOUO) In November 2013, OS&CI revised its procedures for referring potential 

crimes information to the OGC, OIG, and CID, and reporting that information 

externally. The written guidance now includes procedures for referring admissions 

of potential crimes by military personnel, use of a group email to refer admissions 

of potential crimes simultaneously to OGC and OIG, and a requirement to refer all 

potential criminal activity falling within Federal guidelines within ten business 

days after completion of investigative actions. 

(U//FOUO) Following a March 2014 discussion with IC IG staff, the NRO Director 

issued a Policy Note, Reporting of Specified State Criminal Laws, establishing an 

internal SIA within OS&CI. The SIA’s function is to promptly report possible 

 61 (U) NRO Personnel Security Division. Immediate Adjudicative Actions. 22 August 2013.

62 (U) Although OS&CI requires its personnel to immediately refer to OIG and OGC of admissions 

involving child molestation, Federal law, IC policy, and NRO guidance do not require the OGC to report to 

DOJ or Federal investigative organizations those referrals that involve violations of state criminal laws

such as child molestation. According to the current AGC, OGC may voluntarily report crimes information 

related to child molestation, although the NRO OGC “has no [legal] obligation to do so.” 
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violations of specified state criminal laws, specifically crimes against children, to 

local law enforcement authorities and serve as the liaison between the NRO and 

local law enforcement agencies. The Policy Note also directs NRO personnel to 

report possible crimes against children immediately to the SIA if the information is 

obtained in the performance of official duties. However, the new SIA will not 

necessarily include an embedded attorney who possesses the legal expertise to 

decode which admissions should be referred to local law enforcement. In addition, 

officials within the new SIA likely will not be covered professionals under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 13031. Therefore, we, and the NRO OIG, believe it is important that OS&CI and 

OGC continue to inform the NRO OIG of admissions involving potential violations 

of state criminal laws involving child abuse and the admissions that the activity 

decides to report. 

(U) We believe those changes will strengthen situational awareness, coordination, 

oversight, clarify reporting obligations, and expedite reporting of egregious crimes. 

B. (U) External coordination

(U) Beginning in July 2012, the NRO implemented several changes to strengthen 

coordination with DOJ by:

• (U//FOUO) addressing notification letters to specific recipients. OGC began 

sending unclassified notification letters via email to specific individuals 

within the DOJ Criminal and National Security Divisions. This process 

replaced faxing classified letters to the DOJ Criminal Division without

identifying a specified recipient.

• (U//FOUO) providing personally identifying information about individuals 

who made admissions in notification letters to DOJ. OGC modified 

notification letters to include personally identifying information such as the 

full name, social security number, date of birth, and last known address of 

the individual who made an admission of a potential Federal crime. 

Previously, the NRO did not include this information. Previously, OGC used 

a naming convention that required the recipient to contact the NRO for 

information about the individual who made the admission.

• (U//FOUO) designating the NRO OIG as the point of contact to respond to 

requests from DOJ on all child-related notifications of potential crimes that 

OGC reports to DOJ. OGC remains the DOJ point of contact for all other 

types of potential crimes reported by OGC to DOJ.
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• (U//FOUO) incorporating a statement in notification letters to DOJ 

regarding NRO OIG intent to open investigations if DOJ does not respond to 

NRO stating its intent to investigate potential crimes. If DOJ does not notify 

the NRO within ten calendar days of receiving a report from OGC that DOJ 

intends to pursue the issue, then the NRO OIG may open its own 

investigation. According to the DOJ attorney who receives NRO reports of 

potential crimes, the NRO OIG should not wait for a response from DOJ if 

the OIG feels that it should conduct an investigation.

• (U) including a statement in notification letters alerting DOJ to potential 

violations of state criminal laws, when applicable. According to NRO 

officials, in December 2012 OGC began including a statement in notification 

letters to DOJ stating that admissions included potential violations of state 

criminal law and may be shared with local authorities for lead purposes. 

We believe inclusion of this statement facilitates information sharing with 

local and state law enforcement. Moreover, addressing reporting of potential 

violations of state criminal laws, although no Federal requirements or ICDs 

establish requirements for IC elements to report such crimes, is an 

improvement. 

(U) We believe those changes should help to ensure receipt of written reports by the 

correct DOJ and law enforcement organizations and reduce reliance on DOJ to 

coordinate or disseminate information internally. Also, the changes should reduce 

the time needed for DOJ to obtain information for investigation and potential 

prosecution of potential crimes. The DOJ attorney assigned to receive crimes 

reports from the NRO supports the changes. 

(U) However, the NRO OGC has not similarly incorporated all of the changes made 

since 2012 in its written operating instructions. For example, OGC has yet to 

identify the OIG as the point of contact for DOJ inquires following OGC reports of

child related potential crimes. Also, OGC guidance does not require inclusion of a 

statement alerting DOJ to potential violations of state criminal laws in its reports 

to DOJ. Therefore, the risk exists that the practices will not continue.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

12. (U) We recommend OGC incorporate changes implemented 

since July 2012 into official operating instructions and 

guidance. 
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(U) Management Comments: 

(U) NRO concurred with this recommendation. Based on prior discussions with the 

IC IG, both OGC and OIG incorporated changes to NRO Instruction 80-2-1 and the 

OIG Investigations Manual and Operating Instruction respectively, as noted by the 

NRO in its official comments to this report. However, as we state in this report, 

OGC has yet to incorporate all changes in its operating instructions. For example, 

Instruction 80-2-1 does not identify the OIG as the point of contact for DOJ 

inquiries following OGC reports of child related potential crimes, or require 

inclusion of a statement alerting DOJ to potential violations of state criminal laws

in its reports to DOJ. Therefore, the risk exists that the practices will not continue. 

See Appendix G for the NRO’s complete comments.

(U) 1995 MOU provisions do not address reporting violations of some state 

criminal laws

(U) The 1995 MOU established procedures by which each IC element is obligated to 

report to the AG and to Federal investigative agencies information concerning possible 

Federal crimes committed by IC employees and non-employees.63 However, the 

1995 MOU is silent with regard to the obligation of IC element officials to report 

potential violations of state criminal laws. The Military Services require reporting of 

violations of crimes to DCIOs.

A. (U) Requirements for Federal agencies to report violations of 

state criminal laws

(U) The 1995 MOU requires IC employees to report information that reasonably 

indicates that an IC employee has committed, is committing, or will commit a 

violation of Federal criminal law.64 However, while the MOU is silent with regard to 

IC employees’ reporting obligations of potential violations of state criminal laws, the 

1995 MOU does allow IC element GCs to use their discretion to report possible 

criminal activity to state or local authorities in conjunction with reporting to DOJ. 

While the 1995 MOU does not establish clear requirements for Federal agencies to 

report violations of state criminal laws, the MOU contains provisions that imply 

IC elements should report such crimes. Specifically, the 1995 MOU states that its 

procedures are not intended to affect whether an intelligence agency reports 

activities that appear to constitute a crime under state law to state or local 

authorities. If an intelligence agency considers it appropriate to report to state or 

 63 (U) Title 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2006).

64 (U) Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes. 1995.
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local authorities possible criminal activity that may implicate classified information 

or intelligence sources or methods it should inform DOJ. 

(U) According to senior NRO OGC officials, the NRO has no specific written 

guidance concerning the reporting of admissions of potential violations of state 

criminal laws. However, under the IG Act, when made aware of any crime, 

including violations of state criminal laws, the NRO OIG must report imminent 

threats of harm or injury to another person—including those that fall outside of its 

jurisdiction—to local law enforcement. Also, the Military Services expect 

commanders to report to MCIOs, DCIOs, or law enforcement organizations criminal 

allegations or suspected criminal allegations involving persons affiliated with the 

DOD or any programs under their control or authority.

(U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, OS&CI usually referred admissions that involved 

possible violations of both state and Federal criminal laws to OGC and/or OIG. 

When individuals made admissions that potentially violated only state criminal 

laws, OS&CI was unlikely to refer those admissions to OGC or OIG. For example, 

OS&CI did not usually refer admissions involving illicit drug use or possession to 

OIG or OGC. According to an OS&CI official, the former AGC instructed OS&CI 

that it was not necessary to refer those types of admissions due to the frequency 

with which individuals made those admissions. Moreover, the 1995 MOU permits 

GCs to use their professional judgment not to report relatively minor offenses to 

which the 1995 MOU normally applies when the DOJ concurs with that opinion. 

According to OGC and OS&CI officials, admissions of illicit drug use and 

possession generally involve de minimus amounts and, therefore, are addressed via 

the adjudicative process. 

(U) In FYs 2009 through 2012, OS&CI did not refer to OGC or OIG all admissions 

made by military personnel that involved violations of the UCMJ particularly

admissions of illicit drug use, patronizing prostitutes, and child abuse. However, 

OS&CI considers admissions of UCMJ violations when adjudicating security 

clearances and access to NRO systems and facilities.

(U) In December 2012, OGC began including a statement in some of its notification 

letters to DOJ advising that “information concerning possible violations of state 

criminal law may be passed to local authorities for lead purposes only, without 

attribution to NRO.” However, OGC has not incorporated this statement into its

standard operating instruction.

B. (U) Reporting requirements for admissions of suspected child 

abuse

(U) Several provisions in law identify requirements for reporting child abuse, 

including child pornography and child molestation. While 18 U.S.C.
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Chapter 109A, Sexual Abuse Crimes, prohibits sexual offenses against children, the 

Federal jurisdiction of the United States is limited to the special maritime and 

territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Therefore, unless evidence satisfies the 

jurisdictional requirement for a Federal crime, most suspected child abuse crimes 

are prosecuted under applicable state laws. Those laws do not trigger an 

affirmative reporting obligation for IC employees pursuant to the 1995 MOU.65

However, certain IC employees, known as “covered professionals,” are subject to 

Federal requirements to report information of suspected child abuse to appropriate 

authorities. Those professionals include psychologists, psychiatrists, and law 

enforcement personnel. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 13031, 

a person who, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity...on Federal 

land or in a Federally operated (or contracted) facility, learns of facts that give 

reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse, shall as 

soon as possible make a report of the suspected abuse to the...[appropriate 

agency...designated by the Attorney General].66

(U) Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031 is unclear concerning its applicability to a Federal 

building that does not have facilities in which children are cared for or reside, such 

as the NRO. Therefore, admissions of child abuse made during NRO polygraph 

examinations may not meet Federal reporting requirements. However, given the 

severity of the potential crimes and potential for harm to others, the statutory 

application of the reporting requirements should be construed broadly, according 

to the Office of Legal Counsel.67

(U) Despite these reporting obligations, when NRO officials reviewed polygraph 

admissions of suspected child abuse in FYs 2009 through 2012, the NRO did not 

have policies articulating the reporting requirements for NRO covered professionals 

to report such information in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 13031. The lack of 

policies potentially contributed to failures to report those admissions. Moreover, 

the NRO did not have policies encouraging all NRO employees to report information 

of suspected child abuse to NRO “covered professionals.” According to the NRO 

OGC, “Federal employees are not [legally] obligated to report suspected child abuse 

to covered professionals.” Therefore, the only affirmative reporting obligations 

known to NRO OS&CI, OGC, and OIG personnel prior to 7 October 2010 were for 

information involving violations of Federal crimes, which would not include the 

 65 (U) Title 18 U.S.C. § 7.

66 (U) Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031(a).

67 (U) See Op. O.L.C. WL 5885536 (2012). 
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majority of child abuse allegations involving sexual molestation, as those generally

exist as violations of state criminal laws. 

(U) Management Comments: 

(U//FOUO) NRO concurred with this recommendation. In an Office of the Director 

Policy Note, Reporting of Specified State Criminal Laws, (28 March 2014), the 

Director of the NRO established the SIA within OS&CI. The SIA’s function is to 

promptly report possible violations of specified state criminal laws, specifically

crimes involving an imminent threat or serious bodily injury to another human 

being, to the local law enforcement authorities. In addition, the policy note advises 

NRO personnel to report those crimes immediately to the SIA within OS&CI if the 

information is obtained in the performance of official duties. For purposes of the 

policy, NRO personnel include NRO contractors, civilians, and military personnel 

who support NRO activities. 

(U//FOUO) The Director of National Intelligence plans to issue IC-wide policy 

regarding reporting of state criminal laws to local law enforcement. The Director of 

the NRO will amend the policy note as appropriate.

(U//FOUO) We consider the NRO Director’s policy to constitute significant progress

to address reporting of violations of state criminal laws that pose an imminent 

threat to others, particularly children. See Appendix G for the NRO’s complete 

comments.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: 

13. (U) We recommend the Director/NRO issue guidance encouraging all 

NRO employees to report to the OIG, OGC, and OS&CI crimes 

committed by NRO employees that pose an imminent threat to others, 

such as child molestation. 
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(U) Appendix A: Federal crime reporting exemptions

(U) The Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal 

Crimes (1995) identifies specific exemptions for reporting of potential Federal crimes, 

including:

• reported to an IG previously68;

• alleged to have occurred more than ten years prior to the date when the crimes 

became known to the agency and are not part of a continuing pattern of 

behavior, unless the information is related to homicide or espionage; 

• collected and disseminated to it by another department, agency, or 

organization, so long as the receiving agency does not uncover additional crimes 

information during its analysis. If the agency has a reasonable basis to believe 

the alleged criminal activities that occurred more than ten years ago relate to,

or are part of, a continuing pattern of criminal activities that continued within 

that ten-year interval, then the agency must report that information;

• received by a DOD intelligence component and concerns a Defense intelligence 

component employee who is subject to the UCMJ or a civilian who is accused of 

criminal behavior related to their duties or position. This exemption applies 

only when the information is submitted to and investigated by the appropriate 

Defense Criminal Investigative Organization (DCIO). When the crimes were 

committed during the performance of intelligence activities, the GC must 

provide information to DOJ explaining the nature and disposition of the 

charges;

• collected by an intelligence component of a department that also has a law 

enforcement organization and the information involved non-employee crimes 

identified in the 1995 MOU. To meet the reporting exemption, the department’s 

law enforcement organization must have jurisdiction to investigate, and the 

department must submit the information to its law enforcement organization 

for investigation and handling in accordance with its policies and procedures;

• involves crimes against property in the amount of $1,000 or less if committed 

by non-employees, or $500 or less if committed by an employee; or

• de minimus or a relatively minor offense in the opinion of the GC, and the AG 

concurs that the crimes do not warrant reporting.

 68 (U) IGs are required to report to the AG whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe there has 

been a violation of Federal criminal law. See IG Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. App. 3 §4. Nothing in the 

1995 MOU may alter this reporting requirement nor an employee’s obligations, either by statute or by 

agency regulation, to report potential criminal behavior to the IG. If an IG determines that the reported 

information is not subject to its jurisdiction and that the information may be reportable under the 

1995 MOU, the IG may forward the information to DOJ or to the agency’s GC for a determination whether 

the 1995 MOU requires reporting of the information to DOJ in accordance with the 1995 MOU.
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(U) Appendix B: Laws and guidance

(U) This appendix identifies and summarizes selected laws, executive orders, and other 

guidance in effect in FYs 2009 through 2012 and during Calendar Year 2013 and that 

govern crimes reporting at the NRO. 

(U) Laws

• (U) Title 18 of the United States Code is the criminal and penal code of the 

Federal Government of the United States. It deals with Federal crimes and 

criminal procedures to include the reporting of child abuse by certain persons 

who, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity on Federal land or in a 

Federally operated (or contracted) facility learns of facts that give reason to 

suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse. 

• (U) Title 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) requires that the head of a department or agency 

expeditiously report any information, allegation, or complaint received relating 

to violations of Title 18 involving government officers and employees to the AG. 

Exceptions exist when (1) the responsibility to perform an investigation is 

otherwise assigned by another provision of law; or (2) the AG directs otherwise 

with respect to a specified class of information, allegation, or complaint. 

• (U) Title 42, Chapter 132, § 13031, Subchapter IV—The Public Health and 

Welfare, Victims of Child Abuse Reporting Requirements requires certain persons 

who engage in a professional capacity or activity on Federal land or in a 

Federally operated or contracted facility, and learn of facts that give reason to 

suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse, make a report of 

the suspected abuse to the designated agency as soon as possible. Those 

professionals include law enforcement personnel. Title 42 U.S.C. § 13031(c)(1) 

further explains that the term ‘sexual abuse’ includes the employment, use, 

persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or 

assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, 

molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, or 

incest with children.

• (U) The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires the IG to 

expeditiously report to the AG whenever the IG has reasonable grounds to 

believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law.
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• (U) Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109, 10 U.S.C. Chapter 47 is the 

foundation of military law in the United States. The UCMJ applies to active 

duty and reserve military members of the United States Air Force, Army, Coast 

Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy. Cadets and midshipmen at the States military 

academies and retired members of the uniformed services who are entitled to 

retirement pay are also subject to the UCMJ. General Article 134 

(10 U.S.C.A. § 934 ) states that military personnel are subject to the UCMJ 

jurisdiction for violations of state and Federal crimes that could prejudice the 

good order and discipline in the armed forces, bring discredit upon the armed 

forces, and crimes and offenses not capital.

(U) Executive orders

• (U)Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, as amended, requires heads of IC elements to 

report possible violations of Federal criminal laws by employees and of specified 

Federal criminal laws by any other person to the AG. Crimes are to be reported 

in compliance with procedures agreed upon by the AG and the head of the 

department, agency, or establishment concerned and consistent with the 

protection of intelligence sources and methods. 

• (U) E.O. 12968 encourages employees with access to classified information to 

report any information that raises doubts as to whether another employee’s 

continued eligibility for access to classified information is clearly consistent 

with the national security.

(U) Intelligence community guidance

• (U) Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal 

Crimes (1995) applies to all organizations and agencies within the Intelligence 

Community (IC). The MOU requires employees of an IC element to report to the 

General Counsel or IG facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate that an 

employee has committed, is committing, or will commit a violation of Federal 

criminal law. The MOU requires IC elements to report information concerning 

possible Federal crimes by employees of an intelligence agency or organization, 

or violations of specified Federal criminal laws by any other person, when the 

information is collected by the IC element during its performance of its 

designated intelligence activities as defined in E.O. 12333 §§ 1.8-1.13. The 

MOU also requires IC elements to develop internal procedures and establish 

initial and continuing training to ensure that its employees engaged in the 

review and analysis of collected intelligence are knowledgeable and in 

compliance with the MOU.
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• (U//FOUO) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Secretary of Defense 

and the Director of National Intelligence Concerning the National Reconnaissance 

Office (2010) identifies the NRO as a defense agency and an element of the IC. 

(U) DOD guidance

• (U) DOD 5240-R.1, DOD Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 

Components that Affect United States Persons (December 1982), Chapter 12

applies to the provision of assistance by DOD intelligence components to law 

enforcement authorities. It authorizes cooperation with law enforcement 

authorities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign 

powers, international narcotics activities, or international terrorist activities; to 

protect DOD employees, information, property, and facilities; and to prevent,

detect, or investigate other violations of law. It also authorizes DOD intelligence 

components to provide to law enforcement incidentally acquired information 

reasonably believed to indicate a violation of federal, state, local or international 

law. 

• (U) DOD Instruction 5525.07, Implementation of the Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) Between the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Defense 

Relating to the Investigation and Prosecution of Certain Crimes, (18 June 2007)

establishes policy for DOJ and DOD with regard to the investigation and 

prosecution of criminal matters over which the two departments have 

jurisdiction. The MOU delineates when DOJ or DOD will investigate certain 

types of crimes. For example, the DOD investigative agency concerned will 

investigate crimes committed on a military installation or when committed by a 

person subject to the UCMJ. In those instances, the concerned military 

department also prosecutes those crimes, and DOD provides immediate notice 

to DOJ of significant cases in which an individual subject and/or victim is not a 

military member or dependent. When a crime occurs on a military installation 

and there is reasonable basis to believe that some or all of the individuals who

committed the crime are not subject to the UCMJ, then the DOD investigative 

agency immediately notifies the appropriate DOJ investigative agency unless 

DOJ has relieved DOD of the reporting requirement for that type of class of 

crime.

• (U) Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-052—DOD Guidance for Reporting 

Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters 

(17 June 2009) applies to defense agencies and all other organizational entities 

in the Department of Defense. The DTM requires reporting to the Assistant to 

the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight of any intelligence activity 

that has been or will be reported to the AG, or that must be reported to the AG

as required by law or other directive, including the 1995 MOU. 
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• (U) Air Force Instruction 71-101, Volume 1, Criminal Investigations Program 

(8 April 2011) requires commanders and directors at all levels to ensure that 

criminal allegations or suspected criminal allegations involving persons 

affiliated with the DOD or any property or programs under their control or 

authority are referred to the appropriate military criminal investigative or law 

enforcement organization. 

• (U) SecNavInst 5430.107, Mission and Functions of the Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service (28 December 2005) sets forth the authority, 

responsibilities, mission, and functions of the Naval Criminal Investigative 

Service (NCIS). The Instruction requires Department of Navy commands and 

activities to immediately refer to NCIS any incidents of actual, suspected, or 

alleged offenses that are punishable under the UCMJ or similarly framed 

federal, state, local, or foreign statutes by confinement for a term of more than 

one year.

• (U) Army Regulation 195-2, Criminal Investigative Activities, (15 June 2009)

requires commanders to report known or suspected criminal activity to the 

U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command. The regulation cites 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 535 that requires any information, allegation, or complaint 

relating to violations of Federal criminal law, involving government officials and 

employees to be reported expeditiously to DOJ, unless the responsibility to 

investigate the matter is conferred upon the DOD or as otherwise provided by 

law or agreement with the Attorney General.

(U) NRO guidance

• (U//FOUO) NRO Corporate Business Process 80, Oversight (November 2010)

defines the scope, authorities, and responsibilities specific to oversight for the 

OGC and OIG. The Corporate Business Process instructs the IG to directly 

report to appropriate law enforcement authorities information concerning 

violations of Federal criminal laws within the IG’s jurisdiction and in 

accordance with E.O. 12333 and DOD Instruction 5505.02.

• (U) NRO Corporate Business Practice Instruction (80-3) Obligation to Report 

Evidence of Possible Violations of Federal Criminal Law and Illegal Intelligence 

Activities (August 2009) established procedural guidance for NRO personnel to 

report any possible violations of Federal criminal law or illegal activities that 

relate to NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or activities. Under the 

Corporate Business Practice Instruction, the NRO OIG is responsible for 

reporting evidence of possible violations of Federal and criminal law to the 

Department of Justice, Criminal Investigative Service, or other appropriate law 

enforcement agencies. The NRO OGC was responsible for immediately 
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reporting allegations of evidence concerning possible violations of Federal 

criminal law not related to NRO funds, programs, property, operations, or 

activities. 

• (U//FOUO) NRO Business Function 80, Oversight, (April 2012) supersedes and 

replaced NRO Corporate Business Process 80 and describes the overarching 

roles of the OGC and OIG with regard to oversight.

• (U//FOUO) NRO Directive 80-2, NRO Office of General Counsel Framework, 

(June 2013) defines the scope, authorities, and responsibilities specific to NRO 

Business Function 80, Oversight. This directive designated the NRO GC as the 

exclusive authority for the expeditious notification to the AG whenever the GC 

has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal 

law. The directive also requires all NRO personnel to report to the GC any 

possible violation of state or Federal criminal laws learned in the course of their 

official duties in accordance with E.O. 12333 § 1.6(b); DOD 5240.1-R sections 

C.12.2.2 and 15.3.3.3; and 28 U.S.C. § 535. 

• (U//FOUO) NRO Polygraph Support Division, Referral Program Procedures, 

(22 November 2013) updates existing procedures to include procedures for 

referring admissions of potential Federal crimes made by military members to 

OGC for potential reporting to military leadership. 

• (U) NRO Instruction 80-2-1, Federal Crimes Reporting, (22 January 2014) 

establishes procedures for reporting potential Federal crimes made by 

contractors, civilians, and military personnel. 

• (U//FOUO) National Reconnaissance Office Polygraph Management Branch 

Case Administration Procedures (20 November 2013) identifies behaviors 

requiring immediate reporting by personnel assigned to OS&CI’s Polygraph 

Management Branch to the Polygraph Support Division to prevent danger to 

individuals, facilities, systems, or national security. 

• (U//FOUO) Office of the Director Policy Note, Reporting of Specified State 

Criminal Laws, (March 2014) establishes an internal activity within OS&CI. 

The SIA’s function is to promptly report possible violations of specified state 

criminal laws, specifically crimes against children, to local law enforcement 

authorities and serve as the liaison between the NRO and local law enforcement 

agencies. The Policy Note directs NRO personnel to report possible crimes 

against children immediately to the SIA if the information is obtained in the 

performance of official duties. 
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(U) Appendix C: NRO crimes reporting process 

(U//FOUO) Prior to 2013, the NRO had no formal written guidance describing the 

process for OS&CI to refer and OGC or OIG to report potential crimes to DOJ or other 

Federal investigative entities. The NRO also lacked written procedures explaining the 

process to report admissions of potential crimes or UCMJ violations made by military 

personnel. In November 2013, OS&CI developed written procedures describing the 

process for referring admissions of potential crimes, including admissions made by 

military personnel. On 22 January 2014, the NRO OGC issued written guidance 

specifying those procedures. In February 2014, the NRO OIG updated its investigative 

manual and operating instructions.

(U) NRO process for reporting admissions of potential crimes by civilians

(U) FYs 2009 to 2012

(U//FOUO) Prior to 1 May 2012, the NRO had no written guidance describing the 

process for OS&CI to refer and OGC and OIG to report potential crimes to DOJ or 

other Federal investigative entities. In practice, OS&CI referred to OGC admissions of 

potentially reportable crimes usually by email. OGC reviewed those referrals to 

determine whether a Federal crime may have been committed and whether the crimes 

information should be reported to DOJ. If OGC determined a reportable Federal crime 

was committed, OGC assigned a “John Doe” number to the case and used this 

anonymous identifier to ensure the recipient did not have personally identifying 

information about the individual who made the admission.69 OGC then sent a 

classified fax to DOJ and copied OS&CI on the report. If OGC decided not to report an 

OS&CI referral, OGC also informed OS&CI of its decision. 

(U) During this time, OS&CI did not consistently refer to the OIG all admissions of 

potential crimes because they were not aware of the requirements to do so. As a 

result, generally, notification was limited to admissions involving fraud, waste, or 

abuse of NRO programs, operations, funds, property, or activities. 

(U) FY 2012 to present

(U) Beginning in July 2012, the NRO implemented new referral and reporting practices 

that it documented in its written guidance in January 2014. In October 2013, the 

NRO began drafting an instruction documenting OGC reporting practices OGC has 

 69 (U) The “John Doe” number is a naming convention that consists of “John Doe” in lieu of an 

individual’s name followed by the year of the report and the number of the referrals made during the 

calendar year. For example, John Doe 10-03 indicates that the individual made reportable admissions 

during 2010 and that this was the third report, but first for this individual, that OGC sent to DOJ during 

2010. 
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used since July 2012.70 Also, in November 2013, OS&CI updated its guidance to 

reflect its process for referring admissions of potential crimes to OGC and OIG. 

(U) Following notification of the potential Federal crime, the AGC reviews the referral to 

determine whether a Federal crime may have been committed and should be sent to 

the DOJ for further consideration. If the referral is not reported to DOJ, the AGC 

notifies OS&CI and OIG via email and documents the rationale for declining to report 

the crimes information. SAS documents in its security files when OGC determines a 

report to DOJ is not necessary. If the AGC determines the crimes information should 

be reported to DOJ, the attorney informs the OIG and OS&CI by email. SAS maintains 

a copy of the signed written report to DOJ in its security file. 

(U) At the time, OGC assigns a unique identifier, consisting of the calendar year and 

the individual’s last name, to the case in lieu of using a John Doe number. The NRO 

GC reviews and approves the report to DOJ. OGC sends the report via email to the 

Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division; the Assistant Attorney General, 

Criminal Division; and to OS&CI. OGC copies the OIG as well to permit the OIG to 

fulfill its reporting requirements under the IG Act and 42 U.S.C. § 13031.

(U) OGC maintains both an electronic and hard copy of the notification and logs the 

report in a master OGC Crimes Referral Spreadsheet.

(U) NRO process for reporting admissions of potential crimes by military 

personnel

(U) FYs 2009 to 2012

(U) Between FYs 2009 and 2012, OGC did not have a formal consistent practice to 

report admissions of potential Federal crimes or UCMJ violations by military 

personnel. When a military member made an admission of a Federal crime or UCMJ 

violation, OS&CI and OGC consulted with each other to determine the best approach 

and points of contact to whom to report the potential crimes or UCMJ violation. 

(U) FY 2012 to present

(U) Beginning in July 2012, the NRO OGC established new referral and reporting 

practices that it documented in official written guidance on 22 January 2014.71 In 

November 2013, OS&CI revised its guidance to reflect its process for referring 

admissions of potential crimes to OGC and OIG. According to the instruction, when a 

military member makes an admission of a potential Federal crime or reportable UCMJ 

 70 (U) NRO Instruction 80-2-1, Federal Crimes Reporting.

71 (U) Ibid.
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violation, OS&CI notifies both OGC and the OIG via an email that includes an initial 

referral letter summarizing the potential Federal crime and UCMJ violation. 

(U) Following notification by OS&CI, the OGC Military Judge Advocate General (JAG) 

reviews the referral to determine whether there is a UCMJ violation necessitating 

reporting through military command channels. Simultaneously, the AGC reviews the 

referral to determine whether a Federal crime may have been committed and whether 

a report should be sent to DOJ. If the JAG or AGC determine the admission does not 

need to be reported, then OGC notifies the OIG and OS&CI by email and explains its 

rationale for declining to report the admissions. SAS documents in its files when OGC 

determines a report to DOJ is not necessary. 

(U) However, if the AGC determines the information should be reported to DOJ, then 

reporting is done in accordance with the NRO process for reporting admissions of 

potential crimes by civilians previously described in this report. If the JAG determines 

the information should be reported to the military command, the JAG notifies OS&CI 

and OIG simultaneously via email. Additionally, the JAG contacts the appropriate 

NRO military point of contact to coordinate the referral and requests the NRO military 

point of contact to identify the relevant commander who should receive the report.72 

After the NRO GC reviews the letter, the NRO JAG sends the notification letter to the 

appropriate commander and serving military legal office to report the matter for 

military disposition.

(U) Similar to the process used to report admissions of potential crimes made by 

civilians, the NRO OGC assigns a referral number and also emails a copy of the letter 

to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division; the Assistant Attorney 

General, Criminal Division; and to OS&CI, which maintains a copy of the signed 

written report to DOJ in its security file. Additionally, OGC copies the OIG to permit 

the OIG to fulfill its reporting requirements under the IG Act and 42 U.S.C. § 13031.

(U) OGC maintains both an electronic and hard copy of the notification and logs the 

letter in its Crimes Referral Spreadsheet.

 72 (U) At the NRO, the military point of contact is the Air Force or Navy personnel element within the NRO 

Office of Strategic Human Capital. 
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(U) Appendix D: Objectives, scope & methodology

(U) Objectives

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to assess the NRO’s compliance with laws, 

policies, and procedures to identify and report admissions of potential violations of 

Federal crimes made by contractors, government civilians, and military personnel 

during polygraph sessions administered by the NRO in FYs 2009 through 2012. 

We also assessed how the NRO handled reporting of admissions of violations of state 

criminal laws and violations of the UCMJ due to the frequency of those types of 

admissions and because the NRO is a defense agency whose workforce includes 

personnel who are subject to the UCMJ.

(U) Scope 

(U) We focused on admissions of potential crimes made by contractors, government 

civilians, and military personnel during polygraph examinations administered by the 

NRO in FYs 2009 through 2012, and admissions of potential crimes OS&CI referred to 

OGC or OIG between 1 January 2013 and 17 June 2013 (CY 2013). For CY 2013, we 

reviewed only those security files that OS&CI identified as containing admissions. We 

did not independently verify that those admissions were the only admissions made. 

(U) Methodology

(U) To determine whether the NRO reported admissions in accordance with provisions 

in Federal law and other guidance, we reviewed Federal laws, Executive Orders, ICDs, 

and NRO and DOD policies governing crimes reporting in effect between CYs 2009 and 

2013. We discussed those laws and policies and their application to reporting of 

crimes with knowledgeable NRO officials and a DOJ attorney who is responsible for 

receiving NRO crimes reports from OGC. We reviewed previously issued OIG reports 

related to the NRO polygraph and crimes reporting processes and discussed 

recommendations made in those reports with NRO officials to learn whether the NRO 

had implemented changes and to assess the effectiveness of those changes. We also 

interviewed officials in the Offices of General Counsel, Security, and Inspector General 

at the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, as well as the OGC at 

the Defense Intelligence Agency about their practices and policies for reporting 

admissions of potential Federal crimes made during polygraph examinations. 
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(U) Those discussions identified inconsistent practices within the IC for reporting 

admissions of non-Federal crimes and UCMJ violations that pose an imminent threat 

to others, such as sexual molestation. In a separate advisory letter to the Director of 

National Intelligence, the IC IG has suggested that the DNI issue IC-wide policy to 

address those inconsistencies.73

(U) Survey 

(U//FOUO) We designed and administered two surveys focused on OS&CI staff 

identification, training, and reporting of admissions of potential crimes. We emailed 

the surveys to NRO polygraph examiners and PMB staff who were responsible for 

conducting quality assurance of polygraph examinations, and to staff within the 

Adjudications Branch (AB). In each survey, we asked respondents a series of open 

and close-ended questions regarding the NRO crimes reporting process, their ability to 

identify admissions of potential crimes, and their understanding of the OS&CI policies 

for referring admissions of potential crimes to the NRO OGC and OIG. We also 

provided respondents with the opportunity to provide their contact information should 

they want to share additional information about any concerns with the NRO crimes 

reporting process. Three respondents to the survey sent to polygraph examiners and 

quality assurance officials asked that we contact them to discuss concerns they had 

with the crimes reporting process. We obtained response rates of almost 43 percent 

on the survey sent to PMB personnel and 30 percent on the survey sent to officials in 

AB. Because these surveys did not use a statistically representative sampling 

methodology, the results and the comments provided by respondents should not be 

considered representative of all NRO OS&CI staff who administer or review polygraph 

examinations or who adjudicate admissions of potential crimes. However, their 

responses provide insight into OS&CI staff understanding of the NRO crimes referral 

process.

(U) Adjudicators who responded to the survey indicated that regardless of the length of 

time they worked in AB, they were confident they could identify a reportable crime if 

an individual made an admission of a potential crime during a polygraph session. 

Also, 69 percent of responding adjudicators agreed or strongly agreed that OS&CI is 

referring admissions obtained during polygraph sessions. Respondents who indicated 

OS&CI has not always referred admissions to OIG or OGC explained that admissions 

of potential crimes that were not referred (1) did not meet the OGC reporting 

requirements in June 2009; (2) the admission of a potential crime was previously 

developed by another government agency and no new information was developed 

 73 (U) IC-Wide Issues Related to Polygraphs and Crimes Reporting Processes. IC IG. March 2014. 

(IO-2014-002). 
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during the NRO-administered polygraph examination warranting reporting; or (3) 

former NRO OGC officials advised the admission was not significant enough to report 

to DOJ or the potential crime was not ongoing and, therefore, no immediate action 

was needed.

(U) Analysis 

(U//FOUO) To determine the number of admissions of potential crimes made during 

NRO polygraph examinations conducted by the NRO in FYs 2009 through 2012, we 

obtained and analyzed information from the NRO’s authoritative 

. 

(U) data showed that the NRO administered 44,493 polygraph sessions to 

31,122 individuals in FYs 2009 through 2012. We removed records for multiple 

polygraph sessions associated with a single individual. We also removed records for 

individuals who made admissions of potential crimes other than during polygraph 

examinations because those records fell outside the scope of this evaluation. 

We determined that 172 individuals made admissions of potential crimes or ICD-704 

violations in FYs 2009 through 2012. The NRO OGC reported 78 of those individuals. 

The NRO OGC did not report the remaining individuals because those admissions, 

among other reasons were:

• excluded from reporting under the 1995 MOU (see appendix B); 

• not Federal crimes; 

• no longer prosecutable because the subject who made the admission died; or 

• de minimus in scope.

(U) We also analyzed several data samples to determine whether the NRO had 

identified, referred, and reported all required admissions of potential crimes in 

FYs 2009 through 2012.

(U) Sample One 

(U//FOUO) To determine whether the NRO identified, referred, and reported all 

required admissions of potential Federal crimes and UCMJ violations made during

NRO-administered polygraph examinations in FYs 2009 through 2012, we randomly 

selected 269 individuals from a population of 9,979 individuals. This sample included 

202 individuals who made no admissions and 67 individuals who made admissions of 

potential crimes or violations of ICD 704. We reviewed the security files for each of the 

269 individuals in our sample. We are 90 percent confident, with a margin of error of 

+/- 5 percent, that the results of this sample are representative of all NROadministered polygraph examination in FYs 2009 through 2012.
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(U) Sample Two 

(U//FOUO) To determine the extent to which the NRO reported admissions involving

child sexual abuse, including child pornography and child molestation, we 

judgmentally selected 106 of 270 individuals who made admissions during 

NRO-administered polygraph examinations conducted in FYs 2009 through 2012 and 

during the first half of CY 2013.74 The NRO categorized in each of the 

admissions made by the 106 individuals as involving questionable “sexual behavior.”75 

We focused primarily on this category of admission because the letter from Senator 

Grassley and claims of non-reporting made in an article published by the McClatchy 

Company focused on this type of admission. In addition, the types of crimes in this 

category may pose continued imminent harm to a victim if not reported and, therefore, 

could constitute high-interest admissions. 

(U) When selecting our sample, we considered whether the individual who made the 

admission was a government civilian, contractor, or member of the military. 

Table 5 summarizes the affiliation of individuals in the populations from which we 

selected our sample.

(U) Table 5: Number of subjects, by affiliation, who made admissions of potential crimes 

involving sexual behavior in FYs 2009 through 2012

Table is Unclassified//For Official Use Only 

Affiliation Total

Contractor/Consultant Government 

civilian

Military personnel 

(officer/enlisted)

254 5 11 270

(U) Source: IC IG analysis of data provided by NRO.

(U) Note: We do not break out the data by fiscal year since a single individual may have had polygraph 

examinations that took place in multiple fiscal years. Also, the number of admissions does not correlate 

to the number of subjects because some subjects made multiple admissions of potential crimes involving 

sexual behavior during polygraph examinations administered during multiple fiscal years. 

(U) Because of the small population, we selected as part of our sample all military 

personnel and all government civilians who made admissions of potential crimes 

 74 (U) Judgmental sampling is a nonprobability sample method in which the researcher selects subjects 

for the study based on personal judgment about which subjects will be most representative. Judgmental 

sampling design is used usually when a limited number of individuals possess the trait of interest. It is 

the only viable sampling technique in obtaining information from a very specific group of people. 

75 (U) The IC uses 13 guidelines to categorize admissions when determining whether to grant or revoke 

access to classified information. “Sexual behavior” is one of those guidelines. “Sexual behavior” includes 

deviant or criminal sexual behavior such as viewing adult or child pornography, child molestation or 

abuse, rape, bestiality, use of prostitutes, or trafficking in humans. It also includes a pattern of 

compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk behavior that the person is unable to stop, that may be 

symptomatic of a personality disorder, or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment. 
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involving sexual behavior and whom OS&CI did not refer to OGC or OIG. We also 

selected records for contractors who made an admission involving “sexual behavior” 

that OS&CI did not refer to OGC or OIG. To determine whether OS&CI, OGC, and OIG 

records were complete and accurate, we compared OS&CI records of referrals with 

similar records independently maintained by OGC and OIG. 

(U) The level of detail of the information did not permit us to tell what type of 

sexual behavior was involved in those admissions or whether the admissions were 

potential Federal crimes until we reviewed the security files. We do not know whether 

the population from which we selected the 106 individuals for review was complete 

because polygraph examiners and adjudicators assign categories, such as 

“sexual behavior,” based on their professional judgment and whether the polygraph 

examination focused on specific issues. Also, the NRO OIG expressed concerns about 

the accuracy and completeness of data in because of OS&CI reliance on 

manual processes and polygraph examiners’ subjective opinions when coding 

admissions. Therefore, the NRO may not have identified all subjects who made 

admissions related to “sexual behavior” in . As a result, our findings from this 

sample should not be considered representative of all admissions of “sexual behavior” 

made during NRO-administered polygraph examinations in FYs 2009 through 2012 

and during CY 2013. However, our findings provide insight into how the NRO handled 

those admissions and whether the NRO reported the potential crimes to DOJ and law 

enforcement organizations.

(U) Timeliness of reporting

(U) To evaluate the time the NRO took to refer and report admissions of potential 

crimes, we analyzed data for 78 admissions reported by NRO to DOJ or law 

enforcement organizations in FYs 2009 through 2012. We calculated the number of 

business days from the date of each admission to the date that OS&CI referred the 

admission to OIG or OGC. We also calculated the number of business days that 

passed between the date when OIG or OGC told us they received notification from 

OS&CI and the date when OGC or OIG reported the potential violations of Federal 

crimes to DOJ or other law enforcement organizations.

(U) Compliance with corrective actions 

(U//FOUO) To assess the NRO’s compliance with self-identified corrective actions 

implemented since July 2012, we asked OS&CI to identify individuals who made 

admissions during the first half of CY 2013 and who OS&CI referred to OGC, OIG, or 

both components. According to OS&CI officials, they referred information on 32 

individuals who made admissions of potentially reportable crimes. Twenty of those 

individuals made admissions during prior years, yet OS&CI did not refer those 

individuals to OGC and the OIG until CY 2013. According to OS&CI officials, OS&CI 
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directed adjudicators to immediately notify OGC and OIG of potential Federal crimes

rather than wait until AB adjudicated the case. 

(U) For our analysis, we reviewed the referral memos sent by OS&CI to OGC and/or 

NRO OIG. We also reviewed email traffic among OS&CI, OGC, and OIG pertaining to 

the admissions and data obtained by OS&CI from that shows the key referral 

and reporting dates. We also reviewed notification letters sent by OGC to DOJ or law 

enforcement. We compared those records with corrective actions and processes 

implemented by the NRO since July 2012. However, we did not review entries 

to verify independently that OS&CI had identified all individuals who made admissions 

of potential crimes during this time. We also did not verify that those individuals who 

OS&CI identified as having not made admissions of potential crimes did not, in fact, 

make any admissions. Further, we did not review security files for individuals who did 

not make any admissions of potential criminal acts or violations of the UCMJ during 

polygraph examinations administered by the NRO during CY 2013. 

(U) IC IG investigations

(U) We referred to IC IG/Investigations seven admissions related to child pornography 

and molestation made during NRO-administered polygraphs in FYs 2009 through 

2012 but that the NRO had not reported. We also referred admissions by one 

individual involving UCMJ violations including abuse of system administrator 

privileges, viewing of adult pornography on an unclassified Navy information system, 

and patronization of prostitutes overseas. We identified those admissions during our 

review of security files. The IC IG referred the admissions to the NRO OIG for further 

review and potential reporting to law enforcement organizations. We also informed 

NRO OGC and OS&CI about the unreported admissions.

(U) Violations of state criminal laws 

(U) Due to the number of admissions of potential violations of state criminal laws

made during NRO-administered polygraph sessions in FYs 2009 through 2012, we 

reviewed legislation and legal opinions governing the reporting of potential violations of 

state criminal laws by Federal agency personnel. We discussed requirements for 

reporting possible violations of state criminal laws with senior managers and staff 

from the NRO OS&CI, OGC, and OIG to determine their understanding of the 

requirements and NRO policy for reporting those potential crimes. 
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(U) Reliability of computer-processed data 

(U) To assess the reliability of and other data provided by OGC and OIG, we 

interviewed officials in OS&CI, OGC, and OIG who are responsible for identifying, 

referring, reporting, and tracking this information. We also reviewed analysis and 

interviews conducted by the NRO OIG as part of their review of NRO’s polygraph 

process. The NRO OIG expressed concerns about the accuracy and completeness of 

data in because of OS&CI reliance on manual processes and polygraph 

examiners’ subjective opinions when coding admissions that resulted in input errors 

by polygraph examiners and misleading data. To mitigate concerns about the 

accuracy and completeness of the data, we verified selected dates, subject names, and 

admissions in with information contained in OS&CI’s security files. We also 

compared and security file information with data separately maintained by the 

NRO OGC and OIG. We discussed discrepancies with NRO officials in OGC, OS&CI, 

and OIG, and updated our records accordingly. Our testing found the data was

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

(U) Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 2012 Quality

Standards for Inspections and Evaluation

(U) We conducted our work in accordance with Council of Inspectors General on 

Integrity and Efficiency 2012 Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluation. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform our work to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objectives. 
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(U) Appendix E: Reporting timeframes

(U) This appendix summarizes the average number of business days in FYs 2009 

through 2012 for OS&CI to refer admissions of potential crimes to OGC and OIG and 

for OIG and OGC to report those admissions. This appendix also summarizes the 

average number of business days for OGC and OIG to report admissions of potential 

Federal crimes during the first half of CY 2013.

(U) Table 6: Number of business days from admission to OS&CI notification to OIG in 

FYs 2009 through 2012

This table is Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Fiscal 

Year

Number of 

subjects

Average Median Range 

(in days)

FY 2009 6 90 75 17 to 199

FY 2010 15 133 92 21 to 295

FY 2011 12 98 61 20 to 316

FY 2012 4 53 29 19 to 134

Total 37 106 87 17 to 316

(U) Source: IC IG analysis of NRO data. 

(U) Notes: Days are rounded to nearest whole number.

(U) Because OS&CI did not refer all admissions of potential crimes made in FYs 2009 through 2012 to the 

OIG, the total number of individuals in Table 7 does not match with Table 6.

(U) Table 7: Number of business days from admission to OS&CI notification to OGC in 

FYs 2009 through 2012

This table is Unclassified//For Official Use Only 

Fiscal Year Number of 

subjects

Average Median Range 

(in days)

FY 2009 21 115 83 18 to 278

FY 2010 26 87 56 16 to 297

FY 2011 22 103 62 1 to 309

FY 2012 9 60 27 12 to 217

Total 78 95 55 1 to 309

(U) Source: IC IG analysis of NRO data 

(U) Notes: Days are rounded to the nearest whole number. 

(U) Because OS&CI did not refer all admissions of potential crimes made in FYs 2009 through 2012 to the 

OIG, the total number of individuals in Table 6 does not match with Table 7.
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(U) Table 8: Average number of business days for NRO OIG to report potential Federal 

crimes in FYs 2009 through 2012

This table is Unclassified//For Official Use Only 

Fiscal Year Number of 

subjects

Averagea Median Rangeb

(in days)c

FY 2009 18 20 0 0 to 314

FY 2010 22 29 0 0 to 134

FY 2011 20 34 1 0 to 223

FY 2012 8 13 0 0 to 100

Total 68 26 0 0 to 223

(U) Source: IC IG Analysis of NRO data

(U) Notes: 

(U) a The time to report an admission was calculated as the number of days between the date that OIG 

was notified of an admission to the date that the OIG reported the admission to DOJ or other law 

enforcement organization.

(U) b “0” number of days indicates same day reporting. 

(U) c Number of days was rounded to the nearest whole number.

(U) Table 9: Number of business days for OGC to report admissions in CY 2013

This table is Unclassified//For Official Use Only 

Number of subjects who 

made reportable admissions

Average Median Range

(in number of days)

27 3 2 1 to 9 

(U) Source: IC IG analysis of NRO data 

(U) Note: The time to report an admission was calculated as the number of days between the date that 

OS&CI referred an admission to OGC or OIG and the date that OGC or OIG reported the admission to 

DOJ or other law enforcement organizations. 
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(U) Appendix F: Summary of recommendations

(U) This appendix summarizes the report recommendations.

1. (U) We recommend OS&CI review all admissions in its database that are 

categorized as “sexual behavior,” and notify both the NRO OIG and OGC of any 

admissions involving possession of child pornography made in FYs 2009 

through 2012 that OGC or OIG did not report. If OS&CI discovers admissions 

involving child molestation or other violations of state criminal laws that pose 

an imminent danger to others, we recommend that OS&CI inform both OGC 

and OIG even though those crimes may not be Federal crimes. 

2. (U) We recommend OGC report any admission related to child pornography of 

which OGC was informed and did not report to DOJ and, when appropriate, to 

DCIOs and military commanders, regardless of the admission date. 

3. (U) We recommend OIG report any subsequent admissions of violations of 

Federal or state criminal laws that pose an imminent threat to others, 

including child sexual abuse regardless of the admission date if the allegation 

has not been otherwise addressed by the OIG. 

4. (U) We recommend that the NRO OGC incorporate in Instruction 80-2-1 a 

requirement for the JAG to report admissions involving UCMJ violations to 

DCIOs simultaneously with notification to the appropriate commander and 

serving military legal office for military disposition.

5. (U) We recommend OGC and OIG provide mandatory, periodic training to 

OS&CI polygraph examiners and adjudicators. The training should address 

the broad types of potential crimes and UCMJ violations that OS&CI officials 

should refer to OGC and OIG and identify points of contacts within both NRO 

components.

6. (U) We recommend that the OGC incorporate the OIG’s role as the NRO point 

of contact for child related crimes reported to DOJ or external law enforcement 

organizations in standard operating procedures and clarify the OGC’s role for 

reporting to DOJ potential crimes even when the OIG has expressed an interest 

in an admission.

7. (U) We recommend that OIG incorporate into and finalize its investigations 

manual and operating instructions that address crimes reporting the OIG role 

as the NRO point of contact for responding to DOJ or external law enforcement

organization requests for information about child related crimes.
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8. (U) We recommend OS&CI revise its operating instructions and guidance to 

eliminate restrictions on the types of potential crimes referred to the OIG. 

9. (U) We recommend OS&CI, in conjunction with OGC and OIG, separate the 

crimes referral and adjudications processes to permit OS&CI to formally refer 

to OGC and OIG, and report to law enforcement organizations admissions prior 

to completion of the adjudication process, even when that admission is not a 

high-interest admission.

10. (U) We recommend OGC embed an attorney within OS&CI. The attorney 

should be responsible for reviewing admissions of certain behaviors to ensure 

they are uniformly identified as potential crimes and UCMJ violations for 

potential reporting separate from the adjudications process. 

11. (U) We recommend the Chief/PMB cross-train an individual to act as a 

backup when the Executive Officer is out of the office for an extended period.

12. (U) We recommend OGC incorporate changes implemented since July 2012

into official operating instructions and guidance. 

13. (U) We recommend the Director/NRO issue guidance encouraging all NRO 

employees to report to the OIG, OGC, and OS&CI crimes committed by NRO 

employees that pose an imminent threat to others, such as child molestation. 

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(U) Appendix H: Abbreviations

(U) AB Adjudications Branch

(U) AFCAF Air Force Central Adjudications Facility

(U) AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations

(U) AG Attorney General 

(U) AGC Assistant General Counsel

(U) 

(U) C.A.A.F. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

(U) CID Counterintelligence Division

(U) CY Calendar Year

(U) DCIO Defense Criminal Investigative Organization 

(U) DNI Director of National Intelligence

(U) DOD Department of Defense

(U) DODCAF Department of Defense Central Adjudications Facility

(U) DOJ Department of Justice

(U) E.O. Executive Order 

(U) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

(U) FY Fiscal Year

(U) GC General Counsel

(U) IC Intelligence Community

(U) ICD Intelligence Community Directive

(U) IC IG Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

(U) ICPG Intelligence Community Policy Guidance

(U) IG Inspector General

(U) JAG Judge Advocate General
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(U) MCIO Military Criminal Investigative Organizations

(U) MOU Memorandum of Understanding

(U) NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service

(U) NRO National Reconnaissance Office

(U) NSA National Security Agency

(U) OGC Office of General Counsel

(U) OIG Office of Inspector General

(U) OLC Office of Legal Counsel

(U) OS&CI Office of Security and Counterintelligence

(U) PMB Polygraph Management Branch

(U) PSD Personnel Security Division

(U) QA Quality Assurance

(U) SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information 

(U) SAS Special Actions Staff

(U) SIA Special Investigations Activity 

(U) SIP Special Issue Polygraph

(U) UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

(U) U.S.C. United States Code