TURKEY-KURDISH REGIONAL 

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AFTER THE

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ:

PUTTING THE KURDS ON THE MAP?

Bill Park

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

TURKEY-KURDISH REGIONAL 

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

 AFTER THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ:

 PUTTING THE KURDS ON THE MAP?

Bill Park

March 2014

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ISBN 1-58487-607-7
v

FOREWORD

When U.S. forces departed Iraq at the end of 2011, 

they left behind unresolved problems relating to that 

country’s governance, notably concerning the relationship between the federal authority in Baghdad 

and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government 

(KRG) in the north. Today, disputes over the territorial delineation of the KRG remain a source of tension, 

while the discovery of significant reserves of oil and 

gas within and straddling the borders of the KRG has 

raised the stakes. Tensions have been heightened still 

further by the determination of the KRG authorities 

to pursue an energy policy independent of the central 

government. This has involved entering into lucrative 

energy exploration and exploitation agreements with 

a number of major energy companies, among them 

the U.S.-based ExxonMobil and Chevron, and moving 

ahead with an energy partnership with neighboring 

Turkey involving the construction of direct pipelines 

across their shared border. Baghdad regards these activities as illegal, and fears that they could be a precursor to Kurdish independence and a break-up of the 

country. Baghdad also resents Turkey’s role in these 

developments, which has added to the tensions between these two countries that had already emerged 

as a result of the increasing authoritarianism and 

Shia sectarianism of the Iraqi government of Prime 

Minister Nouri al-Maliki. 

This monograph, authored by Mr. Bill Park, seeks to 

explore the ramifications of these developments, both 

for the region and for U.S. policy and interests. Turkey is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

ally, Iraq is a legacy of U.S. policy, and Washington 

was, in many ways, the midwife for the KRG’s initial 
emergence and subsequent growth. Furthermore, U.S. 

energy companies are now centrally involved in the 

evolution of the region and its relationships. Thus, the 

United States cannot remain indifferent to the march 

of events in and around Iraq and, whether it likes it 

or not, will be held at least partly responsible for the 

outcome. While this monograph makes a contribution 

to the ongoing debate about the legacy of the past U.S. 

approach to Iraq, it also performs the valuable service 

of bringing up to date developments in the region 

subsequent to the U.S. military withdrawal. To that 

end, the monograph throws the recent Syrian uprising 

into the mix. This has intensified sectarian divisions in 

the Middle East, further pitted Ankara against Baghdad, and additionally raised the specter of the Kurdish question. It has also brought about the deployment 

of NATO Patriot anti-air batteries into Turkey’s southeast, and thrown an additional spotlight on Washington’s relationship with its NATO ally, Turkey. 

Syria’s Kurds are currently seeking to carve an autonomous zone out of that country’s chaos, which has 

aroused the interest of Iraq’s Kurds and is profoundly 

worrying the Turks. Ankara fears that a Syrian Kurdish zone could serve as a refuge and base for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), weaken the opposition to 

Assad, complicate any post-Assad settlement in Syria, 

and altogether make it harder to keep a lid on its own 

Kurdish problem. Indeed, Ankara’s latest effort to resolve its domestic Kurdish difficulties is surely linked 

to events in neighboring Syria and Iraq. Thus, Mr. 

Park’s monograph is also a study of the geopolitical 

ramifications of a Kurdish bid for self-determination, 

and offers insight into the current struggle in Syria. 

vi
vii

Mr. Park’s timely monograph addresses a plethora of issues that are vital to a range of U.S. interests, 

and to the debate over the legacy and purposes of 

U.S. policy. 

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

BILL PARK is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of 

Defence Studies, King’s College, London University, 

and is based at the United Kingdom (UK) Defence 

Academy, Shrivenham. He is a frequent visitor to Turkey, and has spoken on Turkish affairs at various academic and official workshops and conferences around 

the world. Mr. Park has appeared as a Turkey expert 

on British, U.S., Turkish, Russian, French, Iranian and 

Australian TV and radio, has given written and oral 

testimony on Turkish issues to both UK Houses of 

Parliament, and occasionally consults on Turkish issues to various UK government agencies. He serves as 

a trustee and council member for the British Institute 

at Ankara, and is an Advisor to the Dialogue Society 

in London. Mr. Park is the author of journal articles, 

book chapters, and monographs on a range of Turkish 

foreign policy issues, including its European Union 

accession prospects, Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Cyprus problem, 

Turkey’s policies towards Northern Iraq, Turkey-U.S. 

relations, the Fethullah Gulen movement, and the Ergenekon affair. Among his publications are “Turkey’s 

Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Prospects,” Adelphi Paper No. 374 (International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, 2005), and Modern Turkey: People, 

State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World (Routledge, 2011). He is currently conducting a longer-term 

study of the three-way relationship between Turkey, 

the United States, and the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq in the wake of the U.S. troop 

withdrawal from Iraq. 

xi

SUMMARY

The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq at 

the end of 2011 left behind a set of unresolved problems 

in the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional 

Government (KRG), and the Federal Government in 

Baghdad—notably relating to the disputed boundaries of the KRG, and the extent of its autonomy. Tensions have since been compounded by the discovery 

of significant quantities of oil and gas in the KRG area, 

and Erbil’s pursuit of an energy policy independent 

of and in opposition to Baghdad. Turkey, uneasy with 

the increasingly sectarian and authoritarian flavor 

of the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, has 

since moved closer to the KRG, not least with respect 

to energy issues. This has deepened Turkish-Iraqi 

tensions still further. 

Added to the mix is the increasingly sectarian 

stand-off in the region as a whole, in large measure as 

a consequence of Syrian developments, which has further pitted Ankara against Baghdad and its ally, Iran; 

and the emergence of a bid for autonomy by Syria’s 

Kurds, which has complicated the stance of both Ankara and Erbil towards Syria and towards each other. 

Washington is in danger of being left behind by the 

fast-paced events in the region, while the ethnic Kurds 

of the region may be approaching a decisive moment 

in their long struggle for self-determination. 

1

TURKEY-KURDISH REGIONAL 

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

 AFTER THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ:

 PUTTING THE KURDS ON THE MAP?

INTRODUCTION

During a question-and-answer session with bureau chiefs in Ankara in early February 2013, the U.S. 

Ambassador to Turkey Francis J. Riccardione referred 

to “a lot of divergence” between Washington and Ankara with respect to policy towards Iraq.1

 In this, he 

was reflecting a growing and increasingly transparent U.S. unease with the close relationship that has 

evolved between the Turkish government on the one 

hand and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 

of northern Iraq on the other, coupled with and not 

unrelated to the ever-more fraught relationships that 

each has with Iraq’s central government in Baghdad. 

Ambassador Riccardione expressed American fears 

that, “if Turkey and Iraq fail to optimize their economic relations. . . . There could be more violent conflict in Iraq and the forces of disintegration within Iraq 

could be emboldened.” He declared that “a strong 

Iraqi-Turkish relationship” would be the “optimum 

outcome” not only for Iraq and Turkey, but for the 

United States and for the entire region. As a treaty ally 

of Turkey, friend of the KRG, and as “a partner and 

non-treaty ally with Iraq,” a closer relationship between Turkey and the whole of Iraq is very much an 

American interest too, and Riccardione made it clear 

that Washington is endeavoring to persuade Ankara, 

Baghdad, and the KRG of the mutual benefits of such 

an outcome. Washington would not interfere or act as 

an intermediary, but it would “offer confidence and 
2

support.” The ambassador concluded that, together, 

Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil (the KRG’s capital) “will 

profit very greatly. Separately, there are great risks 

and great dangers.”2

Energy issues featured strongly in Riccardione’s 

remarks, as they do in the three-way Ankara-ErbilBaghdad relationship. As a necessary means to achieve 

what he insisted are the shared interests of all three, he 

asserted that it is vital that Iraq’s feuding political factions agree on a federal hydrocarbons law that would 

set the terms for the development of Iraq’s rich energy 

resources, and for the distribution of its proceeds. This 

would give impetus to Iraq’s still-shaky economic reconstruction and political stability, and would enable 

Turkey to have access not just to the estimated 20 percent of Iraq’s oil and gas that is located in the Kurdish 

region, but to the resources of the entire country. It 

would also enable Turkey to “become a strategic alternative, for all of Iraq, to the straits of Hormuz in 

getting Iraqi oil and gas out to world markets.”3 This 

in turn would require the construction of new pipelines that could carry energy from Iraq’s fields directly 

into Turkey, and would reduce vulnerability to any 

disruption of the “strategic chokepoint” of Hormuz. 

Turkey and all Iraqis would be the beneficiaries. Indeed, Turkish businesses of all kinds would benefit 

from greater access to the entire Iraqi economy.

However, the ambassador’s comments appear 

more wishful thinking than realistic analysis. AnkaraBaghdad relations have gone from bad to worse since 

the end of 2011 with the U.S. military withdrawal 

from Iraq. Riccardione’s comments, which accurately 

reflect both the perspective and anguish that currently characterizes Washington’s view of Iraq, were 

delivered against the background of yet another illtempered exchange of insults between Ankara and 
3

Baghdad, in which Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 

Davutoglu accused Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki of “trying to cover up his failure” by again alleging that Turkey was interfering in Iraq’s domestic 

affairs.4

 Erbil-Baghdad relations have also deteriorated since the end of 2011. Within days of the sensitive Ankara-Baghdad exchange, the Iraqi parliament 

failed to agree on a national budget as a consequence 

of differences with Erbil over payments to the KRG 

for its oil production, a spat rooted in the absence of 

an agreed national framework for the development of 

Iraq’s hydrocarbons sector.5

 In fact, and notwithstanding Washington’s preferences, there is little prospect 

of a new Iraqi hydrocarbons law appearing over the 

horizon. Progress on this stalled over 6 years ago, due 

chiefly to disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil, 

and in 2007 the KRG pushed ahead with its own hydrocarbons legislation.6

 Within days of Riccardione’s 

warning, Iran delivered a similar message—not to risk 

the break-up of Iraq by developing too close a relationship with Turkey—to a visiting delegation from 

the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is the 

closest to Iran of the KRG’s two ruling parties.7 There 

appears to be a surprising degree of alignment between Washington and Tehran with respect to Iraq—a 

point made by Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Namik 

Tan when he noted that “the rhetoric of the U.S. 

sometimes resembles that of Iran.”8 Washington thus 

finds itself more in tune with the perspective of an 

increasingly centralized, authoritarian, sectarian, and 

Iranian-aligned regime in Baghdad than with those of 

its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally 

Turkey or of Erbil.

In fact, alongside or subsequent to the withdrawal 

of U.S. combat troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, 

there have been a number of developments which, 
4

taken together, are profoundly altering the three-way 

relationship between Turkey, the KRG, and the federal government in Baghdad. One of these developments is the remarkable transformation of the relationship between Turkey and the KRG. The shift from 

Ankara’s earlier hostile approach to Erbil towards a 

close economic, political, and even strategic embrace 

of the KRG began to emerge in 2008-09, before the U.S. 

troop withdrawal, and has since gathered additional 

momentum. A second development has been the pronounced cooling of the relationship between Ankara 

and Baghdad’s Shia-dominated government. This is 

largely a consequence of the increasing centralization 

of power in Maliki’s hands specifically, and Ankara’s 

belief that Maliki’s actions are serving only to destabilize and divide Iraq further. Turkey is also uneasy at 

the extent of Iranian influence in Baghdad.

Perhaps more predictably, the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad has further deteriorated 

since 2011. Iraq’s 2005 constitution, largely drawn up 

under the supervision of U.S. officials, left numerous 

loose ends in place. Most notably, both the degree 

and nature of Erbil’s autonomy from Baghdad and 

the future of the so-called “disputed territories,” including the oil-bearing city of Kirkuk but also tracing 

much of the entire border, or “green line,” between 

Arab Iraq and the KRG, were left decidedly vague. Yet 

these territories are largely under Kurdish control, in 

part as an outcome of the relationship between U.S. 

forces and the Kurds in the immediate aftermath of 

the 2003 invasion. Iraqis have proven to be incapable 

of resolving these differences. Indeed, the differences 

have deepened. The KRG’s energetic attempt to develop its energy resources has further inflamed the 

atmosphere. Erbil has entered exploration agreements 
5

with energy majors including U.S. based ExxonMobil 

and Chevron as well as Anglo-Turkish Genel Energy, 

French Total, and Russia’s Gazprom Neft.9 Baghdad 

regards these deals as illegal, as it does Erbil’s export 

of limited amounts of crude oil by truck. Turkey has 

taken Erbil’s side in this dispute. Indeed, Ankara 

and Erbil are cooperating on the construction of new 

energy pipelines which will transport the KRG’s oil 

and gas directly to Turkey, potentially bypassing the 

existing Baghdad-controlled pipeline infrastructure. 

If implemented, these developments will surely enhance the KRG’s scope for de facto economic and indeed political independence from Baghdad. Ankara’s 

readiness to facilitate Erbil’s dynamic energy policy 

has further contributed to the deterioration of its relationship with the federal government in Baghdad. The 

energy factor has become key to Ankara-Erbil, ErbilBaghdad, and Ankara-Baghdad relations, and serves 

to intertwine each of these relationships.

The final key development of note that has occurred since the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq 

and that also threatens Ankara-Erbil-Baghdad relationships relates to the so-called Arab Awakening, 

and particularly its manifestation in Syria. Turkey reacted to the increasingly fierce crackdown against the 

opposition in Syria by lending its weight to calls for 

the overthrow of the Damascus, Syria, regime, a move 

that Damascus; Baghdad; and Tehran, Iran, have been 

inclined to interpret in sectarian terms. As the Syrian 

revolt intensified, Turkey’s concerns focused increasingly on the Kurds of northern Syria. Largely under 

the guidance of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya 

Yekitiya Demokrat—PYD), which Turkey believes is 

aligned with its own separatist Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—PKK), Syria’s Kurds 
6

have established a degree of self-rule in those areas 

in which they constitute the majority. Ankara fears 

this could offer an additional springboard for Kurdish 

terrorist attacks into Turkey, and that it might further 

complicate its relationship with its own Kurdish population. Furthermore, Syria’s Kurds have kept their 

distance from the main Syrian Arab opposition due to 

its reluctance to agree to Kurdish autonomy in a postAssad Syria. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership, at least in 

the form of its President Massoud Barzani, shares Ankara’s mistrust of the PYD, although it favors Syrian 

Kurdish self-determination. In short, Syrian developments have underscored the sectarian dimension to 

Ankara-Baghdad relations, and have further highlighted the anomolous position of the region’s Kurds.

These still evolving developments, and their interconnectedness, contain potentially serious implications for Washington’s regional policies and interests. 

The United States generally enjoys close relationships 

with Ankara, Erbil, and Baghdad—the KRG has surely 

been the most pro-American entity in the region—and 

will be hard pressed to avoid entanglement in the 

complexities of their interactions. Some doubt that Baghdad and Erbil can resolve their differences without 

external mediation, which Washington is best placed 

to provide. KRG energy minister Ashti Hawrami has 

called on the United States to mediate the hydrocarbons row between Baghdad and Erbil.10 Furthermore, 

considerable political and moral hazard is lurking in 

Washington’s postures towards the two governments. 

Driven by its fears for Iraq’s stability and territorial 

integrity, the U.S. tilt towards Baghdad is exasperating its Iraqi Kurdish friends and Turkey, and puts it 

in opposition to the commercial behavior of some of 

its own energy majors. Nor can Washington expect 
7

to evade some political and moral responsibility for 

the territorial tensions between Erbil and Baghdad. 

Operations PROVİDE COMFORT and NORTHERN 

WATCH, the U.S.-led no fly zones over northern Iraq 

that commenced in 1991, helped create the opportunity for the formation of the KRG, while the U.S.-led 

overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 was 

highly instrumental in enabling Erbil to consolidate 

its autonomy and viability. Washington presided over 

the drawing up of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, and the 

subsequent course of the relationship between Iraq’s 

Kurdish and Arab components suggest that it might 

not be easy for the United States to detach itself from 

the unresolved territorial and governance issues it left 

in place. 

Furthermore, the legacy of U.S. material and sometimes moral support for Turkey’s military campaign 

against the PKK, and its palpable unease with the 

possible course of Kurdish self-determination in Iraq, 

can also appear to pit Washington against minority 

rights in the region.11 Any post-Assad Sunni regime 

that could emerge out of the present chaos in Syria 

could well turn on its Christian, Druze, and Allawite 

as well as its Kurdish minorities, adding further scope 

for acute embarrasment to the mix. It is impossible to 

hit the right diplomatic note given the region’s current 

turmoil and tensions, but Washington needs to be on 

guard lest its policies towards—or perhaps its exhaustion with and neglect of—this interlocking set of issues inadvertantly strengthen authoritarian and in some 

instances anti-American regimes in the region, add to 

sectarian divisions, undermine the development of 

Iraq’s energy industry taken as a whole, upset its best 

friends in the area, and permit unresolved issues to 

build up pressures that could explode into violence. 
8

TURKEY AND THE KRG 

Massoud Barzani, President of the KRG and leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), one of the 

two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties that have carved up 

governance of the KRG between them, has over the 

years repeatedly referred to his aspiration for a fully independent Iraqi Kurdish state.12 Until relatively 

recently such comments were greeted with fury in 

Ankara, where Barzani was famously dismissed as a 

“tribal chieftain.” The deep Turkish unease at the very 

existence of the KRG, which could be a precursor of 

a sovereign Kurdish state; the impact this could have 

on Turkey’s own unsettled Kurds; and the belief that 

the KRG was enabling cross border raids into Turkey 

by PKK fighters based in the Iraqi Kurdish mountains, 

have in the past all fed Ankara’s hostility. The enlargement of the KRG’s territory to incorporate oil-rich 

Kirkuk was also a Turkish “red line,” as it was feared 

this could vastly improve the viability of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey also championed the Turkmen population of Kirkuk in order to muddy Kurdish 

claims to the region.13 Ankara shunned direct contact 

with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Indeed, former 

(2000-07) Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer even 

went so far as to refuse to receive his Iraqi counterpart, Jalal Talabani, on the grounds of his concurrent 

leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan’s other major political 

party, the PUK.14

Some leading figures in Turkey’s policymaking 

elite grew increasingly frustrated by this situation. 

They recognized that the KRG had become a fixture in 

the region, that it had Washington’s blessing, and that 

its cooperation would be useful in Turkey’s struggle 
9

with the PKK, given the latter’s use of bases located 

within KRG territory. Furthermore, Turkey’s decades-old militarized approach to its domestic Kurdish 

problem had not succeeded and showed few signs 

of doing so. They were also frustrated with the slow 

political progress in Baghdad and, as time passed, its 

uncertain political sympathies and alignments. Murat 

Ozcelik, who had served as Ankara’s Special Envoy to 

Iraq until his appointment as Ambassador to Baghdad 

in 2009, was one such player. There were circles within Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (Milli 

Istibahrat Teskilati, or MIT), such as Emre Taner who 

became head of the organization in 2005, who similarly sought a change in Ankara’s approach. In Erbil, 

too, some key players were increasingly writing off 

Baghdad as either an effective or benign political partner, and were on the lookout for alternative sponsors. 

President Massoud’s nephew and now the KRG’s 

prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, and Barham Salih 

of the PUK were early proponents of rapprochement 

with Turkey.15

On both sides, such rethinking was given additional impetus as U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq 

approached. However, nationalist sentiment in Turkey, embraced by many in its ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) as well as in the bureaucracy 

and the population at large, made any such policy 

shift difficult to effect. Chief of the General Staff Yasar 

Buyukanit (from 2006 until August 2008) was a formidable obstacle to any significant reconsideration of 

Turkish policy towards the KRG. In contrast, his successor, General Ilker Basbug, shared some of the frustrations of the “forward group” in Ankara and proved 

far more amenable to a change of tack.16 More recently, the military’s fall from grace as a political player 
10

in Ankara, as a consequence of ongoing investigations 

into its past political activities and of the JDP’s unprecedented dominance of the Turkish political scene, 

have in any case downgraded its capacity to influence 

Turkish policy. 

Yet into 2007 and beyond, the predominant sentiment in Ankara was that the KRG was harboring

PKK terrorists and that if neither Erbil or Washington would act against the PKK in their northern Iraqi 

hideouts, then Turkish forces should be unleashed 

against them, as they had been throughout the 1990s. 

Matters came to a head in late-2007 when a PKK attack launched from across the Iraqi border resulted 

in the deaths of 13 Turkish soldiers. Given the highly 

charged Turkish atmosphere that ensued, the administration of George W. Bush saw little option but to 

give the green light to a resumption of cross-border 

air and ground raids by Turkish security forces, and 

to facilitate them with the provision of real-time intelligence.17 Turkey had been denied this option since the 

2003 invasion had landed Washington with responsibility for Iraq’s security. With the November 2007 understanding, the post-invasion downturn in U.S.-Turkey relations came to an end, and the relationship has 

been on an upswing almost continuously since. More 

immediately, however, a substantial Turkish ground 

incursion in February 2008, named Operation SUN 

(Gunes), produced a confrontation with Iraqi Kurdish 

forces and American pleas to limit the scale and duration of the operation.18 Barzani, suspecting the real target was the KRG itself, threatened armed retaliation 

against Turkish forces.19 Accompanied by unconvincing denials that it was as a consequence of American 

pressure, the Turkish force somewhat precipitously 

withdrew. The PKK remained intact and may even 
11

have been emboldened. These events may have further convinced Ankara of the desirability of engaging 

with Erbil rather than seeking to intimidate it.20

Following informal contacts with Barzani in late2008, the first high level contact he had had with Turkish officials in 4 years, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s October 2009 visit to Erbil paved the 

way for an intense round of diplomacy and high level 

visits between Turkey and the Kurdish “quasi-state,”21

leading to the opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil 

in 2010. The relationship has subsequently been fully cemented. As just one indication of how Turkey’s 

recalibration of its approach has gone, in his Kurdish 

New Year (Newroz) address delivered in March 2012, 

Barzani once again hinted that the time for Iraqi Kurdish self-determination might be drawing closer. He 

cited the factional infighting in Baghdad and the disregard there of Iraq’s constitution, not least with regard to the resolution of the disputed territories.22 Article 140 of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, which promised 

the holding of a census and referendum on Kirkuk’s 

future, has not been implemented. The referendum 

was initially earmarked to take place in 2007, but has 

been put off indefinitely by Baghdad. Most observers 

anticipate that a referendum would confirm the desire 

of a majority of the region’s inhabitants to be incorporated into the KRG. For Barzani, Baghdad’s obstructiveness on this issue now combined with Maliki’s 

undemocratic, sectarian, centralizing, and unconstitutional behavior, to encourage a reconsideration of the 

Kurdish commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity and 

federative structure.23

Yet Barzani’s comments provoked barely a murmur from Ankara. In fact, in April, just weeks after 

he made them, he was given the red carpet treatment 
12

during a trip to Turkey, where he met with the Republic’s president, prime minister, foreign minister and 

intelligence chief. So far has the relationship now travelled that 2 years later, in the autumn of 2012, President Barzani was an honored guest at Turkey’s ruling 

JDP convention. It is evident that Ankara has come to 

regard Barzani in particular as a trusted partner and as 

a leader with political and personal integrity and deep 

roots in his community.24 Enthusiasts for the relationship on the Kurdish side, such as KRG Prime Minister 

Nechirvan Barzani, now use the term “strategic” to 

describe their relationship.25 Turkey’s once menacing 

policy of keeping the KRG at arms lengths has melted away. Ankara seems to have dissolved some of its 

own “red lines.”

There are additional factors behind this paradigm 

shift in Ankara’s relationship with the KRG. The 

growth of cross-border trade predated the improvement in the political atmosphere, and dates back at 

least to the lifting of sanction on Iraq following the 

overthrow of the Ba’athist regime. Although available figures vary slightly, trade with the KRG now accounts for well over half of Turkey’s trade with Iraq 

as a whole, which is Turkey’s second or third largest 

trading partner. Up to 80 percent of Turkish exports 

to Iraq are to the KRG, and around 80 percent of consumer goods available in the KRG are of Turkish origin. Tens of thousands of Turkish citizens work or 

have established businesses in Kurdish Iraq, many of 

them Turkish Kurds. Indeed, the potential economic 

benefits of the KRG’s booming economy to Turkey’s 

impoverished and predominantly Kurdish-inhabited 

southeast is not lost on Turkey’s ruling JDP, which is 

engaged in a competition for votes in the region with 

the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Baris ve 
13

Demokrasi Partisi—BDP). Almost half of all businesses 

established in the KRG originate in Turkey. Turkish 

companies are heavily engaged in construction, engineering, transportation, retail, banking, other areas 

of the service sector, and, of course, energy. Turkish religious groups have established schools and a 

university in the region. 

Turkish foreign policy has followed its trade patterns and reflects the importance Turkey’s current 

government attaches to “soft power” as an instrument 

or precursor to its influence. It also constitutes an expression of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero 

problems” and dialogue-based approach to neighborhood diplomacy. Indeed, his May 2009 elevation 

to that post was itself a factor in Turkey’s apparent 

paradigm shift in its approach to the KRG, although 

he was already a prime foreign policy mover in his 

former position as Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign 

policy advisor. All in all, the KRG is on the way to 

becoming part of a Turkish “near abroad,” politically 

and economically. Some might regard this as a manifestation of Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman” bid to establish 

itself as a key regional player. 

Ankara has also come to appreciate that prospects 

for its struggle with the PKK and for its bid to win the 

hearts and minds of Turkey’s Kurdish voters might be 

enhanced by Erbil’s cooperation. In his April 2012 trip 

to Turkey, Barzani reiterated his frequently-voiced 

call for the PKK to end its armed campaign, promised to pressure the PKK to end its cross-border raids 

into Turkey, and declared that he “will not allow the 

PKK to prevail in the [KRG] region”26—all music to 

Ankara’s ears, although it was hardly the first time 

Turks have heard such utterances from Iraq’s Kurdish leaders. Both the PKK and the BDP immediately 
14

warned Barzani against involving himself in Turkey’s 

Kurdish problem on behalf of Ankara, seeking to 

downplay the impact his intervention might have.27

Barzani and other Iraqi Kurdish leaders have also 

declared their support for the dialogue between Ankara and Turkey’s Kurds that has emerged in recent 

months. This follows the failure of the 2009 initiative 

to address politically Turkey’s Kurdish problem that, 

by 2011, had run into the ground.28 The more recent effort has involved engaging with the jailed PKK leader 

Abdullah Ocalan, but Turkey presumably hopes that 

the soothing words of Iraq’s Kurdish leaders will also 

hold some sway. 

For its part, the KRG leadership certainly wishes 

to minimize the PKK’s provocations against Ankara 

(and Tehran) launched from KRG territory, and to see 

an end to Turkey’s raids into KRG territory in pursuit 

of PKK targets. It has long been a Turkish demand 

that the KRG authorities take military steps to expel 

or weaken the PKK fighters based in northern Iraq, 

and the Iraqi Kurdish failure to comply has for just as 

long been a source of frustration to Turkey. However, Ankara now appears to have concluded that it is 

unreasonable to expect the KRG to be willing or even 

able to physically confront PKK forces in their remote 

hideouts in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq. 

Iraqi Kurdish appeals to the PKK to end violence, their 

silence in the face of Turkey’s cross border raids, and 

any intelligence and other assistance made available 

to Turkey’s security forces, now seem to be sufficient 

if not entirely satisfactory to Ankara.29
15

TURKEY AND BAGHDAD

Along with Barzani, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri 

al-Maliki was also invited to the JDP’s autumn 2012 

convention. Unlike Barzani, Maliki chose not to attend, 

which symbolized the cooling of the Ankara-Baghdad 

relationship. This is not a development Ankara had 

intended. Even as it moved closer to Erbil, Ankara’s 

overall stance towards Iraq remained what it had been 

since 2003—to shore up Baghdad, partly in order to 

minimize the scope for Iraqi Kurdish independence, 

but also in the hope of stabilizing Iraq and countering 

Iranian influence there. From the very beginning, Ankara regarded full Sunni Arab engagement with Iraq’s 

political reconstruction as a vital means to these ends. 

Thus, it was instrumental in limiting the Sunni boycott of the 2005 elections, and in coaxing Sunni participation in the 2009 provincial and 2010 parliamentary elections in Iraq. Ankara had since 2003 sought to 

cultivate relationships with all the country’s factions, 

including the Sadr Movement, which although Shia 

and close to Iran is also lukewarm towards Maliki and 

in favor of greater Shia-Sunni unity in Iraq. In 2008, 

Ankara and Maliki’s first government agreed to establish a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, and 

bilateral trade and political dialogue between the two 

capitals grew apace. In the 2010 elections, Ankara’s 

preference for the Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya non-sectarian bloc was clear, perhaps inadvisably so, given 

the eventual outcome. Although Allawi’s bloc gained 

the (marginally) largest share of the popular vote and 

of parliamentary seats and did indeed attract large 

Sunni but also Shia and even Turkmen support, it was 

Maliki who eventually emerged at the head of a coalition government in December 2010. Turkey’s aim 
16

was to encourage power-sharing, good governance, 

economic reconstruction, and stability in Iraq, not to 

favor one faction over another. Furthermore, its Iraq 

policy fitted with its wider endeavor to forge a more 

active and cooperative role in the region.30

Yet, despite these efforts, by January 2012 Maliki 

was condemning Turkey’s “interference” in Iraq’s affairs after Prime Minister Erdogan had warned him 

against stoking sectarian divisions in the country. 

Erdogan’s intervention had been prompted by the 

attempted arrest of Iraqi’s Sunni Vice-President Tariq 

al-Hashemi on the very day that U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta was overseeing the formal end of 

the American military presence in Iraq. The war of 

words between Baghdad and Ankara continued to 

deteriorate, particularly once Hashemi was granted 

protection by Turkey, after first receiving sanctuary 

in Iraqi Kurdistan.31 Maliki described Turkey as “hostile” towards Iraq and accused Ankara of pursuing 

a sectarian agenda.32 For his part, Hashemi declared 

that “hopes for early political solutions no longer exist” in Iraq,33 for which he laid the blame at Maliki’s 

door. Turkey’s perspective accords with Hashemi’s. 

Hashemi has also insisted that the refuge Ankara had 

offered him was based not on sectarian considerations but as a result of Turkey’s commitment to Iraqi 

democratization.34 He subsequently has been given 

five death sentences in absentia by Iraqi courts on 

terrorism charges.

Relations between Ankara and Baghdad have 

since progressively deteriorated. In January 2012, the 

Turkish Embassy in Baghdad was subjected to a rocket attack. In May 2012, Baghdad called in Turkey’s 

ambassador to protest that Turkey’s Basra and Mosul 

consuls were meddling in Iraq’s domestic politics.35 In 
17

July 2012, Baghdad even threatened to report Turkey 

to the United Nations (UN) Security Council for violations of Iraqi airspace as a consequence of Turkish air 

strikes against PKK targets within the KRG area, an 

activity which Iraq had hitherto generally tolerated.36

Similarly, in October 2012, Baghdad raised the issue 

of the presence of Turkish military bases on Iraqi soil, 

albeit within the KRG zone, an arrangement which 

had long been tolerated by successive Iraqi governments.37 Baghdad even considered deploying nonKurdish Iraqi troops on the border with Turkey in 

order to obstruct Turkish ground incursions.38 There 

have also been persistent rumors that Erdogan promised Barzani that Turkey would offer protection to the 

KRG in the event of an attack by Baghdad’s forces.39

The war of words between Ankara and Baghdad has 

been given additional impetus by other developments 

in the region, notably Turkey’s burgeoning energy 

relationship with the KRG and events in Syria.

Maliki’s move against Hashemi, which included 

the arrest or marginalization of other leading Sunni 

politicians, appeared in Ankara as a challenge to power sharing and pluralism in Iraq, which Ankara sees 

as offering the best hope for political stability in the 

country; and as a Shia—and perhaps indirectly Iranian—bid for power and predominance in Iraq. Ankara 

had long been anxious about Maliki’s centralizing, 

authoritarian, and seemingly sectarian inclinations. 

Maliki has progressively subverted or bypassed the 

governing institutions put in place since 2003, and has 

concentrated power in his own hands by, for example, 

placing the military, the paramilitary special forces, 

and Iraq’s national intelligence forces under his direct 

control.40 Ankara has also remained close to some of 

Iraq’s Sunni elements, including those like Hashemi 
18

who had come to favor greater regional autonomy in 

Iraq as a counterweight to Maliki’s increasing autocracy.41 Nor is Turkey happy about the degree of influence it believes Iran wields in Maliki’s Iraq. In this 

context, the arrest warrant for Hashemi represented 

something of a last straw for Turkey. Turkish “zero 

problem” diplomacy had collided with Iraq’s fractious, fragile, and sectarian politics, although trade 

relations between the two neighbors have continued 

to prosper. 

ERBIL-BAGHDAD RELATIONS

More predictable has been the continuing tension 

between Erbil and Baghdad. Although the Kurdish 

bloc had supported Maliki in preference to Ayad Allawi’s bid to head the government and has held on 

to key, if increasingly notional, federal government 

posts (most notably Jalal Talabani’s incumbency as 

president and Hoshyar Zebari’s as foreign minister) 

before long there was mounting Kurdish frustration 

with the Maliki government’s disregard for the power-sharing foundation stone of the coalition and for 

the provisions of the constitution. In fact, Barzani had 

played a key role in brokering the November 2010 

deal, known as the “Erbil Agreement” that led to Maliki’s second spell as prime minister. This obliged Maliki to sign up to a 15-point list specifically designed to 

limit his accretion of power, a trend that had already 

been amply demonstrated during his spell as prime 

minister before the March 2010 elections. Maliki has 

subsequently almost entirely ignored the terms of 

this agreement, although at the time of this writing, it 

has as yet proved impossible to put together enough 

support for a no-confidence vote in Iraq’s Council of 
19

Representatives. Barzani has repeatedly condemned 

Maliki’s centralization of power and has especially 

singled out his increasing domination of federal Iraq’s 

security apparatus. He has criticized Washington’s 

readiness to supply arms to Iraq’s military, especially 

F-16s, which Barzani fears could be used against the 

Kurds, and has explicitly supported autonomous arrangements for Iraq’s Sunni provinces.42 Barzani’s 

April 2012 and subsequent threats to hold a referendum on Kurdish independence are a response to Maliki’s autocratic tendencies as much as or more than 

they are a reflection of ultimate Kurdish aspirations. 

Since the KRG came into being, a major source of 

difference with Baghdad has been the KRG’s claim that 

the governorate of Kirkuk and other heavily Kurdish 

populated areas along the “Green Line” border with 

the remainder of Iraq should be attached to the KRG. 

The entry of the Kurdish peshmerga into many of these 

areas ahead of or alongside U.S. troops in 2003, where 

for the most part they remain, appeared to enhance 

Kurdish prospects of success, as did the strong Kurdish political, administrative, economic, and security 

presence that was soon established in these “disputed” 

territories. Article 140 of the 2005 Constitution, which 

the Kurds played a major role in devising and Sunni 

Arabs almost none, undertook to “normalize” the disputed areas by reversing earlier “Arabization” programs. Recently settled Arabs would be encouraged 

to return to their places of origin and displaced Kurds 

and other minorities would be allowed to return. This 

was to be followed by a census, which would pave the 

way for a referendum to be held by December 2007. 

Exactly which territories were disputed and who 

had the right of return was left vague. In any case, 

the federal government holds the responsibility for 
20

implementing these measures, and it has shown itself 

unwilling to do so. Neither Erbil nor Baghdad appears likely to back down on its claim to these mixed 

population areas.

Tensions between Kurds and local Arab, Turkmen, 

and other ethnic groups in Kirkuk, the surrounding 

countryside, and other disputed territories of mixed 

demographic makeup remain high. Peace was initially 

maintained by joint U.S. Army, Iraqi Army, and Kurdish peshmerga patrols, but cooperation broke down in 

the wake of the American withdrawal. In the absence 

of U.S. forces, the risk of direct confrontation between 

the Kurdish security forces and those of other ethnic 

groups or the federal government has become serious.43 The disputed areas remain a flashpoint, as most 

recently evidenced by the violent clash between the 

Kurdish peshmerga and Baghdad’s Djila, or Tigris, Operational Command. This unit was formed by Maliki 

in mid-2012 in his capacity as Iraq’s Commander-inChief and justified on the basis of the requirement to 

provide security in and around Kirkuk—or to provide 

protection to Arab and other non-Kurdish communities from Kurdish forces in the area. This move was 

interpreted by the Kurds as a challenge to their position, and they demanded the force to be removed 

and disbanded. The pershmerga presence in the region 

was augmented. A three-star U.S. General was highly 

instrumental in defusing the tension, but Kurdish and 

Iraqi federal forces remain in place and confronting 

each other,44 as they do on the Syrian border following 

a confrontation there in July 2012.45

Maliki argues that federal Iraqi forces have the 

right and responsibility to ensure security for all Iraqis throughout the country, including in the disputed 

territories and along Iraq’s international borders. 
21

This stance helps swing Arab nationalist opinion, 

Sunni as well as Shia, to his side. Furthermore, Kurdish uncertainties about the outcome of a referendum, 

and differences between the KDP and the PUK as to 

which of them might take the lead role in various of 

the claimed areas, has in practice dampened Kurdish 

urgency. Furthermore, studies conducted by the UN 

Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which commenced in December 2007 but whose findings were 

never made public, largely served to muddy the more 

maximalist Kurdish demands.46 As a consequence of 

these factors, no referendum has been held, and the 

territories remain “disputed’—or, as Barzani and other Kurds prefer to call them, “detached.” Yet there has 

been little tempering of Kurdish rhetoric in support of 

their territorial claims, and Maliki’s unwillingness to 

deliver the constitutional promises has been a major 

factor in Barzani’s increasing frustration with Baghdad. The Kurds’ best opportunity to seize Kirkuk and 

other disputed territories for themselves was in 2003 

in the immediate aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion. 

Now, in the absence of a referendum, the KRG cannot 

acquire them by peaceful means and, with the passage 

of time, the capacity of Baghdad’s security forces to 

deny any forceful Kurdish acquisition of the territories may grow. Mooted U.S. arms sales will further 

enhance Baghdad’s relative and absolute military capacity vis-á-vis Erbil. The territorial issue remains a 

potential flashpoint.

In June 2013, Maliki paid a visit to Erbil in the latest attempt to patch up the government’s multifaceted 

quarrel with the Kurds in the north. Barzani described 

these talks as the “last chance” to resolve the differences between Erbil and Baghdad, and once again 

appeared to threaten Kurdish secession should they 
22

fail.47 The visit resulted in the establishment of seven 

joint committees to address the energy, budgetary, 

territorial, border crossing responsibilities, and other 

differences that have brought Baghdad and Erbil to 

the brink of armed conflict.48 The issues look intractable, and there seems to be little likelihood of an early 

agreement, if any agreement at all. 

THE ENERGY NEXUS: A GAME CHANGER?49

Kirkuk lies at the center of what was once Iraq’s 

biggest oil and gas field and has been heavily exploited since its discovery in the 1920s and neglected as 

a consequence of the more recent conflicts and sanctions. It nevertheless continues to hold considerable 

reserves. The twin pipelines that transport oil from 

Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean port at Ceyhan 

are controlled by the federal Iraqi government. Repeatedly sabotaged, they are currently operating far 

below capacity and are in dire need of refurbishment. 

Although the Kurds have insisted that their claim to 

Kirkuk and the surrounding countryside derives from 

its historical association with ethnic Kurds and the 

current demographic balance, Iraq’s Arabs and—in 

the past—Turkey have been inclined to interpret the 

Kurdish claim to the region as a bid to ensure the economic wherewithal for greater independence. 

The current constitutionally-sanctioned arrangement is that the KRG receives 17 percent of Iraq’s national budget, which is roughly in line with the KRG’s 

percentage share of Iraq’s population. As part of this 

arrangement, any earnings from oil and gas fields 

within the KRG’s territory should be transferred to 

Iraq’s national budget. In practice, the arrangement 

has been fraught with difficulty. In continuing dis-
23

putes over both the KRG’s deliveries of energy and 

over Baghdad’s liability to pay, Baghdad has repeatedly suspended payment, and Erbil has just as repeatedly suspended deliveries. Erbil’s resort to trucking 

oil, at below market prices, across its borders into Turkey and Iran as a consequence of the payments dispute cannot serve as a long-term export solution for 

the KRG, and even less so for those companies that are 

or soon will be in a position to bring oil to the surface 

from the substantial fields that have been newly discovered within the KRG’s borders. In any case, Baghdad regards these exports as illegal. Any payments 

that Baghdad does make to Erbil—as a result of an 

agreement made in September 2012, for example, but 

one that soon collapsed—are intended to cover the 

costs of exploration and production in the KRG’s new 

fields, but not the profits of the oil companies there. 

It is believed by the KRG that Baghdad should be 

content with the dynamic approach adopted by Erbil 

to the exploration and exploitation of new oil and gas 

fields in territory under Kurdish control. Iraq’s total 

national revenue would increase as the north’s energy resources are exploited and exported. However, 

Erbil insists that it has the legal right to initiate the 

development of new fields within the areas it controls, 

and has signed around 50 so-called Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) with energy companies, most of 

them small. The terms on offer theoretically permit the 

international energy companies operating in the KRG 

to retain around 20 percent of the profits, as opposed 

to the 1 or 2 percent that Iraq’s fee-per-barrel-of-oilproduced service contracts might typically yield. The 

estimates of energy reserves in the KRG area has substantially increased since Erbil decided to enter into 

its own exploration agreements, and, when combined 
24

with the investment-friendly KRG operating environment, there has been no shortage of international energy companies prepared to take a risk against the uncertain political environment. Indeed, although such 

estimates are notoriously varying and contingent, it 

is possible and even likely that around 30 percent of 

Iraq’s oil reserves lie in the Kurdish north of the country. If correct, the KRG alone would be the world’s 

10th most oil-rich country (Iraq as a whole ranks second), roughly on a par with Nigeria or Libya. Its actual 

production could very soon match that of Azerbaijan.

However, Baghdad’s interpretation of Iraq’s ambiguous and vague Constitution is that, as the federal 

government, it alone has the right to enter into negotiations with international energy companies concerning the exploitation of Iraqi national resources. In part, 

then, Iraq’s energy disputes can essentially be seen as 

disputes about the nature of the country’s federal arrangements and the degree of its decentralization—or 

even about Kurdish secession altogether. Baghdad’s 

suspicions are strengthened by the fact that some of 

the PSCs Erbil has negotiated cover territory that it 

controls but that lie within the disputed territories 

rather than within the KRG’s recognized boundaries. It is also concerned that the terms of agreements 

entered into by Erbil are not aligned with those that 

Baghdad negotiates. Baghdad’s response to what 

it regards as the KRG’s illegal activities has been to 

threaten to blacklist any energy company that does 

business with the KRG from bidding for contracts in 

Iraq’s larger southern fields. 

This approach was fine when the companies doing 

business in northern Iraq were small and unlikely to 

obtain much of a stake in Iraq’s southern fields. However, the stakes were considerably raised as a conse-
25

quence of the U.S. oil major company ExxonMobil’s 

surprising decision in November 2011 to sign an oil 

and gas exploration agreement with Erbil. Baghdad 

was obliged to implement its threat by excluding Exxon from a bidding contest in Iraq’s southern oil fields 

in retaliation, but for contractual reasons it could 

do nothing about Exxon’s existing stake in southern 

Iraq’s West Qurna 1 field. In a further blow to Baghdad, the exploration blocs that Exxon had acquired 

in its 20-year deal with Erbil include fields located in 

the disputed areas. Exxon is expected to start drilling 

in mid-2013. Although in early-2013 it appeared that 

Exxon might be prepared to sacrifice its agreement 

with the KRG to exact a better offer from Baghdad 

for its southern operations,50 the company has subsequently been reported as having entered into a KRG 

exploration agreement with a Turkish partner.51 In 

July 2012 ExxonMobil was followed by another U.S. 

oil giant, Chevron, when it acquired an interest in two 

exploration blocks in KRG territory; this was, in turn, 

followed within weeks by the French oil major company Total and by the Russian company, Gazprom. Like 

ExxonMobil these companies too seemed undeterred 

by Baghdad’s threats to exclude them from contracts 

in southern Iraq—in fact, Chevron has no stake in 

Iraq’s south52 and has since acquired a third exploration block in the north.53 Doing business with the KRG 

is far more lucrative and less frustrating than dealing 

with Iraq’s federal government. It is also possible that 

the oil majors have calculated that, in the longer term, 

a deal between Erbil and Baghdad will be struck because the riches at stake are too high—this is certainly 

the view of Tony Haywood, former British Petroleum 

(BP) Chief Executive and now Chief Executive of Genel Energy, which is a major energy investor in Iraqi 
26

Kurdistan.54 They may also calculate that Iraq will find 

itself unable to operate effectively without access to 

the capital and know-how of the oil majors.

Turkey Eyes the KRG's Energy Resources.

BP’s recent expression of interest in reviving the 

Kirkuk oilfield infrastructure is very much at the 

mercy of the Kurds who, given the physical presence 

of Kurdish forces and their substantial administrative control over the region, are well-placed to sabotage any initiatives from which they are excluded.55

Unsurprisingly, the KRG reacted negatively when in 

January 2013, BP announced it would make an initial 

short-term investment in the parts of the Kirkuk field 

that lie within the formally Baghdad-administered 

area, and that negotiations with Baghdad were still 

ongoing.56 Erbil declared this step as “illegal and unconstitutional.” The KRG simultaneously defended as 

legal and constitutional its decision a few days earlier 

to permit Genel Energy to export oil to world markets 

directly via Mersin in Turkey, bypassing Baghdad.57 

Hitherto, trucked exports of crude to Turkey had been 

in return for refined products, given the KRG’s lack 

of refinery capacity. Baghdad’s reaction to Genel’s export venture was to threaten to sue the company and 

to cut the KRG’s 17 percent share of Iraq’s national 

budget,58 a move that the February 2013 debates surrounding the Iraqi national budget suggests would be 

popular with Iraq’s Arab political leaders. 

The KRG’s problem—and that of the companies 

involved there—is how to export the oil and gas 

which is now being extracted in limited quantities, 

but production of which is scheduled to soar. In the 

absence of a solution to this problem, the investments 
27

made by the energy companies will have been in vain, 

and the energy reserves that have been discovered 

there will remain unavailable to the world market. It 

would be helpful if Erbil’s continuing legal and political differences with Baghdad over production, export, 

and payment could be resolved by the time production begins apace in 2014. If these difficulties, and the 

clashing territorial claims around Kirkuk, could be 

settled, then a restoration of the Kirkuk infrastructure 

and the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines—presumably with 

BP as the most likely contractor—would be in Erbil’s 

interest too. However, any such resolution appears 

to be a very long way off. The KRG’s limited storage, pipeline, and refining infrastructure compounds 

Erbil’s problem. 

Given the fractious relationship with Baghdad, 

access to Turkey’s market and its energy infrastructure presents itself as the more desirable option for 

the KRG. Turkey is the most obvious export route for 

Iraqi Kurdish energy, and its hunger for energy makes 

it the KRG’s most obvious market. Kurdish oil and 

gas would also feed into Ankara’s aspiration to develop as an energy hub. Genel Energy is the largest of 

a number of Turkey-based companies engaged in the 

KRG’s energy sector. More significant is the growing 

involvement of the Turkish state. The direct exportation via Turkey of Genel’s crude oil could only have 

taken place with Ankara’s approval. More dramatic 

was the announcement in May 2012 of an agreement 

between Ankara and Erbil, following a visit to Ankara 

by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani59 and made 

without Baghdad’s involvement, that two new pipelines could be constructed to carry gas and oil directly 

across the border into Turkey.60 Although Turkey has 

yet to formally commit to plans to run the pipelines 
28

directly across the border, they were first publicly announced by the KRG’s Natural Resources Minister 

Ashti Hawrami at an energy conference in Erbil in 

the presence of a large Turkish delegation headed by 

Ankara’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz. Baghdad was 

not represented. In June 2013, Hawrami announced 

that an oil pipeline from the KRG to Turkey would be 

completed by September 2013, that the Anglo-Turkish 

company Genel Energy would begin exporting oil via 

the pipeline in 2014, and that gas exports to Turkey 

would begin in 2016.61 The oil pipeline is planned to 

reach the border alongside the Baghdad-controlled 

Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline at Fish Khabur, into which 

it could in principle feed in order that its throughput could be monitored by Baghdad. However, there 

would also be the option of constructing an entirely 

new stretch of line into Turkey, or joining it to the existing pipeline at a new monitoring station closer to 

the Turkish border—which could be controlled by 

Erbil rather than Baghdad—or even across the border 

inside Turkish territory.62 Although the KRG section 

of the pipeline is expected to be operated by Erbil, it 

is also assumed that the Kurds will take only their 17 

percent of the proceeds, and transfer the remainder 

to Baghdad’s coffers. A feasibility study for the gas 

pipeline has already been commissioned.63 There is 

also the option of a reversible-flow pipeline that could 

pump Kirkuk oil southwards to Basra, or southern oil 

northwards to Kirkuk and on to Turkey, and some 

limited pumping is apparently now viable again after 

the damage caused by U.S. bombing and sabotage.64

In spite of this, Baghdad has invested little in developing this element of its infrastructure, notwithstanding Turkish expressions of interest in helping develop 

Iraq’s north-south pipeline infrastructure.65
29

 It is possible that the new pipeline plans represent an attempt by Turkey to put pressure on Baghdad. However, there can be little doubt that Ankara is 

frustrated with the slow pace of Iraq’s energy policy 

and the absence of a federal energy law, and that it is 

impatient to exploit the opportunities offered by the 

KRG. As former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James 

Jeffrey put it: 

Sooner or later, hydrocarbons will be exported out 

of northern Iraq. The question is whether that would 

be done in cooperation with Baghdad, and thus 

reinforcing the unity and federal system in Iraq, or 

whether that would be done in another, maybe less 

helpful, way.66

He went on to say, “A major reason behind the failure has been Baghdad’s lack of cooperation, including not paying the second [installment] of payments 

to the companies in the north.”67 National elections 

are due in 2014 and could be held earlier still. Barzani 

has reportedly asserted that the Kurds of Iraq will go 

their own way should Maliki remain in power after 

2014.68 There is little reason to assume that the task 

of assembling coalitions in Baghdad that are inclusive 

of its sectarian and ethnic groups is likely to become 

easier in the future. Iraq’s Sunni provinces might also 

edge towards greater autonomy from a Shia dominated and centralizing Baghdad. When added to the 

persisting sectarian violence in Arab Iraq, the omens 

for the consolidation of Iraqi democracy and the establishment of stable governance are not good. Furthermore, Shia dominated Iraq’s increasing ties to Iran 

are unmistakeable and possibly irreversible. In short, 

reasons for optimism regarding Iraq’s future desirability as a regional partner, for Turkey or for Erbil, 

seem somewhat thin. 
30

The year 2014 coincides with the likelihood that the 

oil majors operating within the KRG area will be ready 

to export energy commercially. Only time will tell how 

far Turkey is prepared to go in the pursuit of an energy relationship with Erbil which would both enhance 

the KRG’s financial independence from Baghdad and 

symbolize its political estrangement, but the clock is 

clearly ticking.69 If, within a very few years from now, 

Maliki or some other equally awkward political leader is in power in Iraq, a federal hydrocarbons agreement remains in abeyance, and Ankara (and Erbil) are 

confronted with the choice of enabling the export of 

commercial quantities of energy or of seeing the energy majors such as Exxon and Chevron wind down 

their activities in the KRG, Turkey might take the risk. 

Indeed, the exigencies of pipeline construction might 

push them towards a still earlier decision.70 Energy is 

now widely regarded as a truly transformative factor 

in this three-way set of relationships between Ankara, 

Erbil, and Baghdad. In essence, it has brought Ankara 

closer still to Erbil, and distanced both from Baghdad. 

There is an increasing sense that the KRG’s energy resources could propel profound geopolitical changes in 

the region.

The Iraqi government clearly believes Turkey has 

already gone too far in its relationship with Erbil. 

Unsurprisingly, Baghdad reacted angrily to an unannounced visit to Kirkuk by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in August 2012. Davutoglu 

travelled to Kirkuk directly from Erbil without first 

informing the Iraqi government, according to Baghdad. Although the primary purpose of Davutoglu’s 

trip was to meet with and reassure the city’s Turkmen population and thus could not be construed 

as a show of support for Kurdish claims to the city, 
31

Maliki nevertheless accused Turkey of treating the 

KRG as an independent state, and threatened a review 

of Baghdad’s relationship with Ankara.71 In November 2012, Baghdad offered no explanation for its expulsion of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Turkiye Petrolleri A.O.—TPAO) from an oil exploration deal 

in Iraq’s south.72 In the following month, Baghdad 

even refused permission for the private jet carrying 

Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz to land at Erbil 

airport. Although it claimed the reason was technical, the incident came amidst reports that Yildiz was 

about to finalize the pipeline deal with Erbil.73 The indications are that Erbil is already within Ankara’s, far 

more than Baghdad’s, orbit, and that the likely future 

direction of travel will cement this. What might be the 

implications of this development?

WASHINGTON’S APPROACH

As already noted, the November 2007 agreement 

between the Bush administration and Prime Minister Erdogan whereby Washington undertook to provide “real time actionable intelligence” in support of 

Turkey’s attacks against PKK bases in northern Iraq, 

heralded the warming of a relationship that had entered a deep chill since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of 

Iraq. The agreement served as a reminder to the KRG 

that Washington’s relationship with Turkey enjoyed 

high priority, and encouraged Erbil’s opening to Ankara. The December 2008 Status of Forces agreement 

between the Bush administration and Baghdad led 

inexorably to the end of 2011 withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq, after it had proved impossible to 

agree on terms with Baghdad that would enable some 

U.S. forces to remain. This intensified Erbil’s anxiety, 
32

especially given the unresolved differences between 

Erbil and Baghdad over the disputed territories and 

the nature of the Iraqi federation.74 Iraqi Kurdish unease had already been sparked by President Obama’s 

November 2010 request that Iraqi President Talabani, 

a Kurd, give up his post for Ayad Allawi to take over.75

Iraq’s Kurds detect the possibility that Washington 

might sacrifice them, which would not be a new experience for them. Simultaneously, the likelihood 

that a Shia dominated Iraq would move closer to Iran 

made Ankara uneasy. These anxieties gave additional 

impetus to the relaxation of Turkish-KRG relations, 

as both parties sought to better position themselves in 

what was seen as the void left behind by the American 

departure. 

Had Turkey and Iraq been able to maintain a 

functioning relationship, the situation might have 

been more manageable. Turkey could have offered 

Iraq an alternative to political and diplomatic overdependency on Iran and a shared desire to limit the 

KRG’s autonomy, while the KRG would have been 

left in little doubt regarding its limited scope to pursue more expansive objectives. However, the political 

and diplomatic fallout between Ankara and Baghdad, 

the increasing energy significance of the KRG area, 

and the sectarian rifts that have become ever more 

evident in the region, have undermined the prospects 

of such a benign outcome. These developments have 

also demonstrated that Washington’s commitment to 

Baghdad, notwithstanding Maliki’s increasing authoritarianism and sectarianism, and to combating any 

apparent threats to Iraq’s territorial integrity, are no 

less a determinant of the U.S. stance than its alliance 

with Turkey and its residual and moral responsibility 

to Iraqi Kurdistan. This has produced a somewhat un-
33

anticipated situation in which Washington, which, in 

general, is pleased with the Turkey-KRG rapprochement, is nevertheless uncomfortable with some of its 

details and nervous about its possible implications 

for Iraq’s territorial integrity and for the stability of 

the region.76

This is most evident with respect to the KRG’s 

energy deals. Washington has advised U.S. energy 

companies that they should first clear with Baghdad 

any agreements they might be contemplating with the 

KRG, citing the legal uncertainty surrounding such 

agreements, although Washington also insists that it 

cannot directly interfere with commercial decisions.77

Furthermore, although Washington has been coy 

about admitting it, the United States has been putting 

pressure on Turkey to temper its energy relationship 

with Erbil, reminding Ankara that its approach threatens to contradict Turkey’s own opposition to an independent Iraqi Kurdistan.78 The Turkish response is 

that it cannot be expected to ignore the existence of 

such considerable energy resources on its doorstep, 

particularly in light of the fact that almost 50 energy companies, including a number from the United 

States, are actively engaged there.79 Ankara also sides 

with Erbil in rejecting Baghdad’s view that the KRG’s 

energy deals with third parties, including Turkey and 

the oil majors, are illegal.80 In effect, Washington is 

now more concerned than is Ankara with the implications for Iraq’s territorial integrity of the KRG’s drive 

to develop its energy sector.81

It is similarly noteworthy that the Obama administration appears determined to proceed with a major package of arms sales and training programs with 

Maliki’s government, even though Sunni politicians 

and even the then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James 
34

Jeffrey have expressed their disquiet.82 The deal includes the purchase of main battle tanks and 36 F16 

fighter jets due for delivery between 2014 and 2018.83

President Barzani has expressed his fears that the 

F16s in particular could be used against Iraqi Kurdistan, and believes Washington to be mistaken in its 

continued support of the Maliki government.84 Although some have detected an element of hyperbole 

in Barzani’s comments, there is some risk in Washington’s stance and some substance to Barzani’s concerns 

given the current military standoff between Kurdish 

and government forces around Kirkuk and elsewhere, 

the unresolved political differences between Baghdad 

and Erbil, and the long history of Arab-Kurdish conflict and violence in Iraq. Furthermore, Barzani’s comments were made in the context of a reported failure 

to obtain the security guarantees he sought during his 

April 2012 Washington visit.85

To some extent, Washington’s position might 

be explained by a degree of inertia in the American 

approach to Iraq. Although Iraq has not been a priority for the Obama administration, Washington has 

embraced the legacy of the extraordinary U.S. commitment to Iraq of the recent past and has sustained 

the direct personal relationship with Maliki.86 It has 

seemed content to allow the inherited political commitment to the Maliki government to dictate its approach. In any case, there is a widespread view in the 

United States that the KRG has achieved as much as 

it can reasonably expect, and that independence was 

not, and should not be, an option. Washington under 

Obama also appears aware of U.S. limitations in Iraq, 

and indeed in the wider region and beyond, is less intent on taking initiatives, and is particularly inclined 

to take account of Ankara’s perspectives.87 Its behav-
35

ior suggests a belief that there is little it can or should 

do beyond encouraging dialogue and consensus, although it is highly likely that Washington is applying 

pressure behind the scenes.

MOVING PARTS, UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS, 

AND PARADIGM SHIFTS: 

TIME FOR A STATE OF KURDISTAN?

However, the risks and opportunities in the region 

are now looking profoundly different from what they 

were at end of 2011. The Arab Spring, particularly its 

manifestation in Syria, has introduced new and unanticipated elements into the already complicated 

Ankara-Erbil-Baghdad triangular relationship. First, 

the sectarian dimension of the Syrian turmoil, and the 

manner in which this has both reflected and stoked 

sectarian schisms in the wider region, have served to 

deepen the rift between Turkey on the one hand and 

Baghdad and Tehran on the other. Second, the position of Syria’s Kurdish minority, which amounts to 

around 10 percent of its population, has added further 

complexity to Turkey’s relationships with the KRG 

and with its own Kurds, and has brought into greater focus the predicament of the region’s Kurds. Iraq’s 

Kurds are at the center of this monograph, but their 

fate is very much entangled with the fates of their 

Kurdish cousins in Turkey, Syria, and, indeed, Iran. 

In being denied a state of their own, the Kurds can be 

said to have been losers in history’s evolution thus far. 

Could this be about to change? Might the map of the 

region be redrawn to accommodate a Kurdish state? 

A number of seasoned commentators have ventured 

the argument that the prospect of eventual Kurdish 

independence has been strengthened immeasurably 
36

as a consequence of regional developments such as 

those in Iraq and Syria.88 Even an Iraqi newspaper 

editor said to be very close to Maliki has speculated 

whether the time has come for a negotiated separation 

of Arabs and Kurds in Iraq,89 while the U.S. National 

Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternative 

Worlds,

90 published in December 2012, speculated that, 

“in the event of a more fragmented Iraq or Syria, a 

Kurdistan would not be inconceivable”91 and that this 

would constitute a “blow to Turkish integrity.”92 Some 

of this speculation relates to a Kurdistan carved exclusively out of Iraq,93 and some to the prospect of a wider 

Kurdistan that might incorporate Turkey’s southeast. 

Politicians and statesmen generally employ shortterm perspectives, but history unfolds over a longer 

time scale, and involves dramatic change as well as 

stubborn continuity. It can involve the rise and fall of 

empires, the appearance and disappearance of states, 

chaos, and degeneration as well as order and growth 

and shifts in identities and perspectives. Time will tell 

whether we are currently witnessing the prelude to 

a changed order in the Middle East, and particularly 

with respect to the fortunes of its Kurds.94 However, 

Washington would be wise to think through the implications of a potentially profound reordering of the 

region’s arrangements. 

The Syrian Uprising, Sectarianism, 

and the Kurdish Question.

Prior to the Syrian uprising against the Ba’athist 

regime of Bashir al-Assad, which turned violent in the 

first half of 2011, Turkey had warmly embraced the 

Damascus regime, perhaps inadvisably given its poor 

human rights record and Washington’s disapproval. 
37

Bilateral trade mounted, visa free travel arrangements 

were put in place, and a host of other political, security, 

economic, and social agreements were signed. A High 

Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Damascus and Ankara held its first ministerial meeting in 

October 2009. However, as Assad’s regime responded 

to growing opposition with increasing violence, Ankara’s approach abruptly changed tack. Turkey was 

disappointed that its Syrian friends did not heed their 

advice to respond to the frustrations of the street, and 

found itself confronted with a flow of refugees across 

the Syrian border into a corner of Turkey that contains 

significant Alevi, Alawite, Arab, and Kurdish minorities, thus threatening an overspill of Syria’s sectarian 

and ethnic tensions into Turkey.95 The May 2013 car 

bombings in the Turkish border town of Reyhanli that 

killed 43 people seemed to confirm Turkey’s vulnerability to Syrian developments.96

Ankara was quick to take a leading role in the call 

for the removal of the Assad regime. It sponsored the 

formation in August 2011 of the Syrian National Council (SNC) and hosted it in Istanbul until it expanded 

and reformed as the Syrian National Coalition in November 2012, basing itself in Doha, Qatar. The SNC is 

closely linked to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which is 

largely formed and led by defectors from the Syrian 

government’s armed forces. Until November 2012, the 

FSA was headquartered in Turkey, where it is strongly

rumored to have received training and arms. Turkey 

is also a leading light in the largely western Friends 

of Syria group of countries. It joined the Arab League, 

the European Union (EU), and the United States in imposing sanctions on the Damascus regime. 

Following incidents of cross-border fire from Syria, in which two Turkish civilians were killed, and the 
38

shooting down of a Turkish fighter jet in June 2012, 

Turkey not only shelled Syrian military positions but 

also began calling for the creation of a “humanitarian 

corridor” in northern Syria, as a safe haven for refugees but also as a base for the FSA. In October 2012 

Turkey’s Grand National Assembly (NGA) voted to 

give the government a 1-year green light to militarily intervene in Syria should it be deemed necessary. 

However, once it became evident that the Assad regime was not going to crumble quickly, and also that 

there was little support from Turkey’s NATO and EU 

allies for intervention, Ankara found that its rhetoric 

and behavior had left it in a somewhat exposed position.97 In December 2012, NATO acceded to a Turkish 

request to deploy Patriot anti-missile systems close to 

the Syrian border. Although Ankara has since had little alternative but to align itself with Washington and 

with wider diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the 

Syrian crisis, it continues to be at the forefront of calls 

to arm the opposition and to establish a humanitarian 

corridor. It is also accommodating an influx of Syrian refugees that numbered around half a million by 

mid-2013. 

One implication of the Syrian crisis has been the 

resurgence of sectarian rifts in the region, which have 

further damaged Ankara’s relationship with Baghdad 

and, indeed, Iran. Iran has stood by its ally in Damascus, while Maliki too has expressed his pro-Assad sympathies. On both the Syrian and Iraqi issues, 

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have lent their support to the 

anti-regime side. Given the largely Alawite makeup 

of the Syrian regime, and the essentially Sunni nature 

of the opposition, the fact that Iran and Turkey found 

themselves on opposite sides has—rightly or wrongly—been interpreted as suggesting that a sectarian 
39

undercurrent is now evident in regional diplomatic 

alignments. Thus, a Tehran-Baghdad (and Damascus) 

axis is pitted in opposition to a Turkey-Gulf Arab coalition. Turkey’s JDP government’s evident preference 

for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood faction within the 

SNC has added substance to these rifts.98 Ankara’s 

2011 agreement to host NATO early warning radar 

facilities as its contribution towards a ballistic missile 

defense shield, widely seen as directed primarily at 

Iran’s growing missile threat, was badly received in 

Tehran, which sees the Patriot deployments in a hostile light.99 Given the Sunni roots of Turkey’s ruling 

party, and the sense of exclusion felt by Turkey’s 

substantial Alevi population, regional sectarian tension could have unsettling domestic repercussions in 

Turkey also.

Syria’s minorities—Christians, Kurds, and Druze, 

as well as Alawites and secular Sunnis—are generally 

suspicious of the Arab nationalist and Muslim Brotherhood strands that appear to be dominant elements 

in the opposition to the Assad regime. Many of Syria’s numerous Kurdish factions have come together to 

form a Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has as 

its key demand the establishment of a Syrian federation 

to include an autonomous Kurdish region. Although 

worried by the prospect of Kurdish secession in the 

context of Syria’s turmoil, Ankara has sought to enlist 

KRG President Barzani in its endeavors to persuade 

the KNC to commit to the SNC. However, most of the 

squabbling elements that make up the increasingly Islamic and Arab nationalist SNC are hostile to Kurdish 

aspirations. In any case, Syria’s Kurds are almost as 

divided as the SNC,100 and although their plight under 

the Assad regime has been a far from happy one, some 

appear to distrust the Syrian opposition to Assad as 
40

much or more than they distrust Assad, and they have 

generally kept their distance from it. 

Behind Ankara’s reasoning, and that of Barzani, 

is the perceived threat posed by the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat—PYD), which 

has stayed aloof from the KNC and is seen by Ankara and Erbil alike as Syria’s PKK offshoot. However, 

the PYD appears to enjoy the support of the majority 

of Syria’s Kurds, and boasts a powerful armed wing. 

This has enabled the PYD to take control of most of 

the heavily Kurdish populated areas of northern Syria, an outcome eased by the withdrawal of Assad’s 

forces from the region at an early stage in the revolt. 

Notwithstanding some clashes between the PYD and 

pro-government forces in late-2012, and the PYD’s 

demands for Syrian Kurdish autonomy, Ankara suspects that the PYD is in an alliance of sorts with the 

regime, that the recent spike in PKK violence inside 

Turkey was linked to Syrian—and Iranian—displeasure with Ankara’s opposition to Assad,101 and that the 

prospect of a PKK haven opening up in northern Syria 

is aimed at deterring Turkish involvement in Syria’s 

domestic affairs. 

Many Turks are convinced that Damascus resuscitated its support for Turkey’s Kurds in retaliation 

for Ankara’s support for the SNC,102 with reports that 

around 2,000 PKK fighters moved from northern Iraq 

to the Syrian border with Turkey. As it is reckoned 

that as many as one-third of the PKK membership is of 

Syrian Kurdish origin,103 Ankara is obliged to take any 

such developments seriously. After all, the Damascus 

regime—especially in the form of Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafiz—has a track record of supporting and sheltering the PKK in its struggles against Turkey. Clashes 

between PYD and anti-government forces that broke 
41

out in late-2012 and early-2013 might suggest some 

credence to the Turkish view.104 However, it would 

appear that the anti-government tribal Arab and 

jihadist-inclined groups provoked the clashes, and that 

they may have operated with the support of Turkey—

even crossing from Turkey to mount their operations. 

Many Turks believe this; Syrian Kurds certainly do.105

Gradually, the Kurdish issue has emerged as an even 

bigger worry for Turkey than the ongoing conflict 

between Syria’s pro and anti-government forces. By 

July 2012, Turkey’s prime minister was warning of the 

possibility of Turkish air strikes against PKK elements 

in northern Syria.106

Barzani shares Ankara’s distaste for the PKK and 

PYD. He is keen to preserve his advantageous relationship with Ankara and to maintain the KRG’s economic progress, is irritated by the PKK’s presence in 

northern Iraq, and appears to genuinely believe that 

the JDP government in Ankara should be given the 

benefit of the doubt with respect to Kurdish aspirations. On the other hand, Barzani has expressed his 

support for the Syrian federation idea,107 and he recognizes the disadvantages that division carries for the 

Syrian Kurdish cause. At a gathering of Syrian Kurds 

in Erbil in summer 2012, he managed to broker a united front between the PYD and the KNC.108 His KDP 

has also been engaged in establishing and training 

a Syrian Kurds peshmerga that could form a fighting 

arm for those elements of the KNC that look to him 

for leadership. However, the PYD has prevented them 

from crossing into Syria from their northern Iraqi bases, which is just one indication of how unsuccessful 

Barzani’s efforts to forge greater Syrian Kurdish unity 

have been.109 In May 2013, the PYD arrested 74 members of an armed pro-KDP faction that apparently 
42

did manage to cross into Syria. In retaliation, Barzani 

closed the KRG-Syrian border.110 Skirmishes between 

the PYD and other Syrian Kurdish factions have reportedly occurred on a number of occasions at least 

since mid-2012.111

Despite these difficulties, the emergence of a Syrian “Kurdish question” and the interest Barzani has 

taken in it has introduced a note of disquiet into Ankara-Erbil relationships. Ankara does not wish to see an 

autonomous Kurdish zone in Syria, and is mistrustful of the role the Iraqi Kurdish leadership might be 

playing.112 On the other hand, should Syria continue 

its descent into “failed state” status, Ankara would 

prefer a Syrian Kurdish entity that is under Barzani’s 

influence rather than that of the PKK and its affiliates, and might welcome it as a buffer zone against a 

chaotic Arab Syria—much as the KRG functions with 

respect to Iraq. Should improvements in the circumstances of Turkey’s Kurds materialize, then enhanced 

economic, social, and even political interdependence 

with Ankara could prove to be an acceptable, and the 

most beneficial, outcome for Syria’s Kurds. In short, it 

is not unthinkable that Syria’s Kurds might arrive at 

arrangements not dissimilar to those enjoyed by their 

Iraqi cousins, with respect both to their relationship 

with Ankara and with their Arab neighbors.

An Iraqi Kurdistan?

Perhaps the primary threat to the KRG’s current 

status stems from its dependence on Baghdad for 

around 94 percent of its budget.113 The resentment 

shared by all the leading factions in Arab Iraq is putting at risk the KRG’s continued receipt of 17 percent 

of Iraq’s national budget—in fact, it already receives 
43

rather less than that. There is little doubt that Iraq’s 

Kurds could survive on far less, but there is also little 

doubt that a reduction in this allocation would give 

them pause for thought. Even so, how realistic is it to 

suppose that the Kurds would step back from their 

bid for maximum autonomy, given their experiences 

of struggle and repression in Iraq? Could the KRG 

leadership countenance the restoration of an Arab 

military presence on KRG territory, and a disarming 

or subordination of the peshmerga? 

With respect to Kirkuk and other disputed territories, there are as yet few signs that Iraq’s Kurds 

are prepared to forego their claim. However, Barzani 

long ago softened the KRG’s position on its claim to 

Kirkuk, at least rhetorically, by countenancing a power sharing arrangement for the city and its environs 

and by agreeing to give serious consideration to UN 

proposals for disputed areas of northern Iraq.114 However, there has been no progress on this issue, and it 

remains an open question whether, over the longer 

term, power sharing would work any better at the local level than it has at the national level. In any case, 

would Baghdad become more accommodating rather than more assertive if the Kurds were prepared to 

concede, and how might Kurds left on the “Arab” side 

of the “green line” be treated? Also, given Baghdad’s 

approach to the development of the energy resources 

of Arab Iraq, is it reasonable to anticipate that Baghdad would adopt a more dynamic approach to the development of the north’s riches, if it was allowed the 

capacity to do so? What can Kurds give to Baghdad 

beyond supine appeasement, and what does Baghdad 

want from Iraq’s Kurds beyond their subordination?

Of course, were Baghdad’s political processes to 

produce a more reasonable leadership, then there 
44

could be stronger grounds for a more positive assessment of the future for Arab-Kurdish relations inside 

a federal Iraq. Although all leading Arab Iraqi figures would seek to limit Kurdish autonomy, an improvement on the current atmosphere would surely 

require Maliki’s removal and the reinstatement of a 

power-sharing coalition in which the Kurds played 

a full part—as was the original hope. However, it is 

far from clear that this would produce anything other than resort to the blocking mechanisms, not least 

by the Kurds, that have plagued post-Saddam Iraqi 

politics from the outset. It would not follow that the 

territorial differences or energy disputes between Erbil and Baghdad would be resolved, or even that tension surrounding these issues would be reduced. That 

would necessitate a redrawing of the constitution and 

would probably require external pressure and guidance—which is unlikely to be forthcoming, including 

from Washington. On the other hand, a post-Maliki 

coalition Iraqi government might win Turkey over to 

a policy of re-engagement with Baghdad (and would 

presumably have the opposite effect on Tehran). This 

might in itself serve to isolate the Kurds, who once 

again could find themselves with, according to their 

proverb, “no friends but the mountains.” Optimists 

about Iraqi politics—and at least in its rhetoric the 

Obama administration should be so counted—would 

presumably be content with such an outcome. But it 

would fail to take account of Kurdish aspirations and 

fears, or of Turkey’s energy ambitions.

More pessimistic scenarios posit little improvement 

in Baghdad’s politics or in Arab-Kurdish relationships 

in Iraq. If this stream of supposition proves truer, then 

the spotlight will shine on Turkey particularly fiercely. 

If Ankara continues to find itself faced with an unco-
45

operative, perhaps hostile and dysfunctional regime 

in Iraq, how far would it go in its embrace of Iraqi 

Kurdistan? In an interview with Time magazine in December 2012 in which he was questioned on the prospects for Kurdish independence, KRG Prime Minister 

Nechirvan Barzani, believed by many to be the KRG’s 

next leader, replied that: 

first of all, we have to convince at least one country 

around us. Without convincing them, we cannot do 

this. Being land locked we have to have a partner, a 

regional power to be convinced and internationally, a 

big power to be convinced to support that.115

That “door of hope,” he said, “is Turkey. And if 

that door, that hope is closed, it will be impossible 

for us to surrender to Baghdad.”116 Nechirvan Barzani has been highly instrumental in engineering the 

rapprochement with Ankara, but he is far from alone 

among the KRGs, and especially its KDP, leadership. 

Another leading KDP and KRG figure, Safeen Dizayee, 

has said in an interview that “even if tomorrow when 

there is a Kurdish independent state in Iraq, it would 

be a dependent independent [country] whether on 

Turkey, Iran, Syria or Iraq,” 117 and made it clear that 

Turkey represents the preferred option. Falah Mustafa Bakir, head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign 

Relations, is another leading KRG figure who pins 

his hopes on the KRG’s relationship with Turkey.118

However, these KRG leaders understand that Turkey 

is not ready and may never be ready to countenance 

full Kurdish independence. They would also welcome a more accommodating regime in Tehran with 

which they could constructively engage. However, 

they all dismiss Baghdad as a fruitful partner, at least 

given the current composition of its government, but 

possibly existentially too. 
46

Ankara is clearly engineering an ever-closer relationship with the KRG, even while falling far short of 

supporting its formal independence. The objective appears to be to create an economic, and indeed political, “interdependence” between Turkey and the KRG, 

both because the KRG is a neighbor that possesses 

energy resources and markets that Turkey needs, 

but also as a means to lever Baghdad. If and when 

Baghdad adopts a more constructive policy towards 

the development of the KRG’s energy resources, then 

Iraq would support rather than oppose the geographically and economically-determined export of northern Iraq’s gas and oil via Turkey119—an outcome that 

would reflect American preferences. In other words, 

the KRG and Turkey will economically grow together 

in any case, not least via energy considerations. The 

only issue is whether and when Baghdad will give 

this development a green light. This, in turn, leads 

back to the question of the future of Baghdad’s political processes, and raises the question of what Turkey’s 

response would be were Baghdad to continue to be a 

dysfunctional or hostile neighbor.

At present, Turkey’s expectations of Baghdad are 

low. Furthermore, it has embraced the reality of the 

KRG’s de facto independence and is maximizing the 

economic benefit it can obtain from the situation.120

In aligning itself with the KRG on the issue of the legality of Erbil’s energy policy, including the export 

of crude oil by Genel Energy, Ankara is also aligning 

itself, and enabling, an interpretation of Iraq’s federalism that maximizes the KRG’s independence from 

Baghdad.121 Turkey depends on imports for over 90 

percent of its (growing) oil and gas consumption. Of 

that, Iran provides around half of its oil and one-fifth 

of its gas,122 and is the only neighboring country with 
47

which Turkey has a trade deficit. This degree of Turkish dependency on Iran is itself historically a function 

of the U.S.-inspired sanctions on and wars with Iraq, 

which had before the early-1990s been a more important trade partner for Turkey. Furthermore, Iranian 

gas is expensive, Tehran has proven to be a difficult 

trade partner, sanctions against Iran have put pressure 

on Turkey to find alternatives, and, in any case, Ankara’s overarching policy is to diversify its suppliers. 

Iraq generally, and northern Iraq in particular, offers 

a very real energy prospect for Turkey, whose aspiration to develop as an energy hub, where energy can be 

stored, refined, traded, and exported, reinforces Turkey’s interest in northern Iraq’s rich energy resources. 

So, if Iraq continues along its present path, how 

will Ankara square its declared commitment to Iraq’s 

territorial integrity with its embrace of a de facto independent KRG? Given the uncertain future of its own 

Kurdish problem, and the likely reaction of Iran in 

particular, it is hard to imagine Turkey supporting an 

Iraqi Kurdish declaration of independence. Even so, it 

should be noted that in the early days of the Republic, 

Ankara sought to incorporate within its own borders 

the Ottoman province of Mosul, which included the 

Kurdish populated areas of what later became Iraq. In 

1925, the League of Nations found in favor of British 

Iraq, but, at various junctures since then, Turks have 

revisited the terms and indeed the justice of this outcome. For example, in 1986 Ankara apparently warned 

the United States and Iran that it would demand the 

return of Mosul and Kirkuk (in effect, the former Ottoman viliyet of Mosul) in the event of disorder in Iraq 

as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq war.123 During the 

first U.S.-led war against Iraq, President Turgut Ozal 

mused about historic Turkish claims to the region in 

the event of an Iraqi collapse.124 In May 1995, Turk-
48

ish President Suleyman Demirel proposed that the 

border should be rectified in Turkey’s favor,125 and in 

December 2003 expressed regret that Turkey had been 

denied Mosul province in 1923.126 In August 2002, Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, admittedly a 

member of the far right National Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi—MHP), chose to remark that Iraqi 

Kurdistan had been “forcibly separated” from Turkey 

at the time of the Republic’s formation in 1923, and that 

Ankara retained a protective interest in the region.127

As U.S.-led military action against Iraq approached, 

Abdullah Gul’s predecessor as foreign minister of 

the new Justice and Development Party government, 

Yasar Yakis, apparently sought legal clarification of 

the status of Mosul and Kirkuk,128 while one of Turkey’s leading commentators pointed out that Mosul 

and Kirkuk were ceded to Iraq, not to any Kurdish 

state that might subsequently emerge.129 More recently, there have been unconfirmed reports that David 

Petraeus, as Central Intelligence Agency chief, raised 

with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan the possibility 

of independence for the KRG.130

Turks today are fond of pointing out that Iraq, 

and particularly its Kurdish north, is a neighbor with 

which Turkey’s own security is interconnected and towards which Turkey cannot be indifferent. This is not 

to predict that a Turkish annexation of northern Iraq is 

on the horizon, but it helps to be reminded—not least 

in the wake of the Soviet, Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian, 

Indonesian (East Timor), and Sudanese redrawing 

of state boundaries, not to mention the de facto and 

Turkish-sponsored autonomy of the Turkish Republic 

of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and in the context of the 

countless territorial disputes currently raging around 

the world—that the territorial legacies left behind by 

Europe’s departing colonial powers were often insen-
49

sitive to demographic and geopolitical realities, and 

need not necessarily endure indefinitely. Nowhere is 

this truer than in the lands inhabited by ethnic Kurds. 

The march of events can bring about unanticipated 

outcomes, and in the Middle East in general, events 

are undoubtedly on the march.

A more likely outcome, and one that is not necessarily a function of the make-up of Baghdad’s government, is that northern Iraq will evolve as a de facto 

Turkish satellite and dependency. Geography, the 

energy relationship, the shared transborder Kurdish 

ethnicity, and the sheer pull of Turkey’s economic 

dynamism, is likely to push the KRG into the arms 

of Turkey, whether Baghdad resents it or not. Ambassador Riccardione’s comments, outlined at the 

beginning of this monograph, envisage this outcome 

occurring via a benign process in which the entirety 

of Iraq economically, and maybe politically as well, 

aligns itself with Turkey. On current trends, this looks 

unlikely. Instead, the KRG’s dependency on Turkey 

might come about as a consequence of Ankara’s and 

Erbil’s shared frustration with Baghdad, and in the 

face of its opposition—and presumably that of Washington, too.131 Some Iraqi Kurds, especially from the 

PUK, would be uneasy about such an outcome.132 Yet 

others are even prepared to speculate about a de facto 

or de jure “Turkish-Kurdish” federation of some kind, 

at least as a distant possibility.133 There is scope for 

greater integration of the economies of Iraq’s Kurdish north and Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, and many 

Turkish Kurds have already benefitted from the economic opportunities across the border. The construction of the mooted gas and oil pipelines into Turkey 

would constitute part of this overall arrangement.
50

A Turkish Kurdistan?

The Turkish case is still more difficult to think 

through, but developments in Syria and hopes for 

the future relationship with the KRG have, in recent 

months, driven Ankara to embark on yet another 

domestic Kurdish initiative, dubbed the “Imrali process” because it has involved negotiations with the 

PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who is incarcerated on 

a Turkish island of that name. Following a complex 

series of behind-the-scenes consultations, a message 

from Ocalan was read out at the Kurdish new year, or 

Newroz, gathering on March 21, 2013, in Diyarbakir,134

in which he declared that “we have now arrived at 

the stage of withdrawing our armed forces outside the 

borders.”135 On May 8, PKK fighters did begin to trek 

through the mountains to their northern Iraqi bases—

seen in Baghdad as a slight on Iraqi territory136—but 

Ocalan’s address made no direct mention of what concessions Ankara had made in return. Nor has Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan been at all forthcoming, 

although it is for his government to initiate the next 

phase of the process. At the time of writing, no details 

of what this might look like had yet emerged. 

In fact, there are few indications that the prime 

minister will be willing or able to meet Kurdish expectations. Although these remain largely unspecified, 

they are believed to include Ocalan’s release or transfer to house arrest—something that Erdogan has specifically denied he has agreed to; the winding down of 

the so-called “village guard” system of governmentsponsored and armed Kurdish citizens; the release of 

the thousands of Koma Civakên Kurdistan activists currently held in detention; a reform of Turkey’s notorious anti-terror laws that are frequently used against 
51

political activists thought to be sympathetic to the 

Kurdish cause; education in Kurdish; establishing 

Kurdish as co-equal with Turkish as an official language of the Republic; the replacement of the current 

ethnic definition of citizenship with a civic one; an end 

to the 10 percent electoral hurdle for parliamentary 

representation; and, above all, some kind of devolution, self-determination, or “democratic autonomy” 

that would, in effect, introduce something tantamount 

to a federal political system in Turkey.137 There appear 

to be few indications that Erdogan, his party, the opposition parties, or public opinion, are at all ready to 

concede many, if any, of these demands. Erdogan appears to think in terms of an Islamic “brotherhood” 

between Turkey’s Turkish and Kurdish citizens, and 

appears not to recognize the pressure to embrace the 

pluralism that is inherent in Kurdish ethnic identity 

demands.138 Furthermore, the behavior and rhetoric of 

the government during the “Gezi Park” protests that 

erupted in spring 2013 hardly suggested that it is set 

firmly on a course of further democratization, reform 

and inclusiveness. 

Unsurprisingly, then, at the time of this writing, 

there is disquiet among some Kurdish leaders. In addition to impatience, voiced by Ocalan among others, 

at the government’s somewhat tardy response in the 

wake of the PKK cross-border withdrawal,139 many 

PKK fighters, led by their leader Murat Karayilan, 

have been skeptical from the beginning.140 Indeed, 

Karayilan has openly expressed his doubts regarding 

Ankara’s sincerity and has warned of the possibility 

of a renewed and even intensified war.141 At the June 

2013 Kurdish gathering in Diyarbakir, Ahmet Turk, a 

senior BDP figure, voiced similar doubts about Ankara’s intentions.142 It does indeed seem unrealistic to as-
52

sume that so long and bitter a conflict can be overcome 

easily or quickly, and without considerable sacrifice 

on the government side also. In short, a satisfactory 

outcome to the process should not at all be taken for 

granted. The major obstacles are still to be overcome. 

A case can even be made that neither the government 

nor the PKK are in great need of a settlement. Each 

deeply mistrusts the other. The PKK remains able to 

recruit and raise funds, might reasonably feel that 

time is on its side in light of the wider developments 

in the region, and will seek to preserve its legitimacy. 

For his part, Erdogan runs the risk of incurring the 

wrath of Turkish nationalist sentiment, of seeming to 

legitimize Ocalan and the PKK, and of the initiative’s 

failure. Nor is it necessarily the case that Ocalan, for 

all the status and symbolic significance he undoubtedly possesses, entertains aspirations that precisely 

accord with all elements of Turkey’s wider Kurdish 

movement.143

The Turkish state retains the capacity to sustain 

a crackdown on the PKK inside its own borders and 

in northern Iraq. Of course, negotiations that lead to 

some kind of Kurdish autonomy in Turkey could also 

evolve, although that hardly seems to be what Prime 

Minister Erdogan currently has in mind. It might 

even transpire that Turkey’s Kurds would be satisfied 

with little more than some relaxation of the cultural 

and language restrictions currently in force, which 

appears to be all that Ankara has in mind. Greater 

contact and interaction with a Turkey-leaning KRG 

might prove sufficient, not least as a consequence of 

economic benefits that might accrue. However, such 

an outcome would represent little return on decades 

of violent struggle against a very repressive and determined Turkish regime. Either the government needs 
53

to show willingness to go the extra mile in return for a 

lasting solution—which would probably need to consist chiefly of some kind of devolved government—or 

the struggle will surely continue. 

If that occurs, what would the implications be for 

Ankara’s relationship with the KRG? No doubt recalling earlier clashes with the PKK, such as during 

the mid-1990s, Barzani is wary of the expanded PKK 

presence on KRG territory that is a consequence of the 

“Imrali process,” seeing it as a potential rival and as 

posing the risk of intensified Turkish military activity 

inside KRG territory should the process be derailed.144

There is at least an outside possibility that failure of 

the “Imrali process” could result in heightened tension between Erbil and the PKK, particularly if that 

failure could be attributed to the PKK. This scenario 

would be still more probable in the event of tension 

between Erbil and a PYD-dominated autonomous 

Kurdish zone in Syria. On the other hand, should 

Ankara take the blame for a renewal of the struggle 

against the PKK and a denial of Kurdish rights in 

Turkey, Barzani would find himself under domestic 

pressure to distance the KRG from Ankara—pressure 

that Tehran, and perhaps the PUK, too, would seek 

to exploit. Turkey’s relationship with Iraq’s Kurds is 

conducted more through Barzani’s KDP than through 

the PUK, which historically has been relatively open 

to Iranian influence. The KRG is by no means a unified 

entity. The PUK is, in general, less enamored of the 

KRG’s new relationship with Turkey, more accommodating towards Baghdad, and closer than is the KDP 

to Syria’s PYD. 
54

An Iranian Kurdistan?

Iran’s Kurds are at least as geographically dispersed, politically fragmented, and cowed as their 

Syrian counterparts have been, and are even more understudied.145 Since 2004, Iran, like Turkey, has been 

in a struggle with Kurdish fighters operating from 

Iraqi Kurdish territory, in the form of the Party for 

Life and Freedom in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a 

Kurdistane—PJAK). Like Syria’s PYD, PJAK is widely 

assumed to be affiliated with the PKK. In the past, Ankara has cooperated with Iran against the PKK/PJAK 

threat from northern Iraq. Iran also suspects that PJAK 

is or was sponsored by the United States as a means 

to destabilize the Iranian regime. Certainly during the 

autumn of 2011, as the American withdrawal from 

Iraq approached, PJAK seemed to be on the lookout 

for a truce with Tehran. This eased the task of the KRG 

officials who helped broker the first ever ceasefire between PJAK and Iranian forces, which came into effect 

in September 2011, following an intensified summer 

campaign against PJAK by Tehran’s security forces.146

However, given the KRG’s autonomy, the establishment of a Kurdish self-governing zone in Syria, and 

the “Imrali process” in Turkey, Tehran must be feeling 

isolated and its ethnic Kurds left behind by the progress being made by their kin in neighboring countries. 

They could conceivably be inspired to emulate them.147

Such is Iranian Kurdish disunity, however, that attempting prediction is ill-advised, although recently 

there have been attempts to forge greater unity.148 In 

the past, Kurdish challenges in Iran have tended to 

materialize at moments of crisis in the country. An attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, or an implosion of 

the regime there, could lead to a scenario resembling 
55

that currently at play in Syria and that has created the 

current Iraqi situation, in which Kurdish elements 

could seek to exploit the chaos in order to establish 

some autonomy. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The pathway to a fully independent and pan-Kurdish state is hard to visualize. The geographical location and the history of the Kurds, inside and outside 

Iraq, are unenviable. For Iraq’s Kurds, in the absence 

of a functional government in Baghdad or of an Iran 

fully integrated into the regional and global system, a 

close embrace by an economically and politically dynamic Turkey, which can offer markets, investment, 

protection, and diplomatic connectedness, might not 

be the worst possible outcome, though it too would 

undoubtedly bring challenges.149 Syria’s Kurds could 

conceivably take a similar route. Of course, the road 

to any such outcome is strewn with risks and obstacles. Iran could object, but its protests might be stifled 

by the prize of preponderant influence in Shia Iraq. 

Tehran might also be appeased by Turkish and Iraqi 

Kurdish cooperation with respect to its own Kurdish difficulties. Baghdad, too, might be unhappy, but 

there would be little it could do in the face of Erbil’s 

economic and political dependency on a Turkey determined to tighten its hold over Iraq’s north. In fact, 

arguably a bigger risk for Iraq’s Kurds would be the 

risk of a cooling of the Ankara-Erbil relationship as 

a result of developments in Syria’s Kurdish lands, or 

of intra-Kurdish tensions that undermine the political 

cohesion of the KRG. It is possible—even likely—that 

splits within the Syrian and indeed Iranian Kurdish 

movements—splits that could appear in Turkey, too, 
56

if and when a political process there gets fully underway,150—could magnify the divisions inside the KRG 

between the PUK and the KDP. If the PYD retains its 

current ascendency in Syrian Kurdistan and is able to 

use it to enhance Kurdish autonomy—both of which 

are quite likely—then a great deal will depend on factors such as whether the PYD actively supports the 

PKK, whether Turkey is able to make such profound 

political progress that it leads to the effective disarmament of the PKK and the end of its violent struggle 

against Turkey’s security forces, and whether Barzani—or good sense—is able to steer Syria’s Kurds 

away from confrontation with Turkey in a manner 

that reassures Ankara. Much also depends on what 

kind of post-Assad regime emerges in Damascus and 

how its relationship with the country’s Kurds evolves.

Another possibility is that there could be some kind of 

fusion between Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish autonomous 

entities, although this, too, would depend on the fortunes of the PYD in Syria and its relationship with 

the KRG. 

However, it is clear that whatever transpires in 

Syria and whatever path the latest “Kurdish opening” 

in Turkey takes, the Kurds will have the capacity to 

deny stability to each of the countries in which they 

reside for so long as their aspirations are not considered. This applies to Iraq as well. In the seemingly unlikely event that the Arab politics of Iraq stabilize to 

such a degree that a more sustained onslaught against 

Kurdish autonomy can be mounted, the Kurds would 

undoubtedly resist and a bloodbath would ensue, the 

outcome and ramifications of which would be highly 

uncertain. Would Turkey seriously intervene on behalf 

of the KRG, as has been rumored it might? How would 

Washington, which bears heavy responsibility for the 
57

state of affairs in Iraq and which is currently arming 

Baghdad, react? How would Tehran react? In short, in 

today’s fast-moving regional environment, it is more 

difficult than ever to predict the future for the Kurds 

of Iraq, or indeed of the wider region. Washington’s 

ally, Turkey, finds itself torn between its vulnerability to the turmoil in its neighborhood, and a desire to 

act in order to change it, possibly dramatically. However, recent developments suggest that, whatever the 

future holds, it is very unlikely to resemble the past. 

Washington will determine for itself how actively it 

will engage in trying to shape that future. It will be 

less able to choose for itself how much that future impinges on its interests and preferences in the region.

Recommendations to U.S. Policymakers:

• Be more proactive in helping resolve the 

KRG-Baghdad relationship, in particular with 

respect to agreement on a hydrocarbons law. 

This would enable KRG energy resources to be 

exported to and through Turkey.

• Encourage Ankara and Baghdad to improve 

their relationship, and especially to explore 

the possibility of a north-south energy pipeline 

in Iraq.

• Encourage Prime Minister Maliki to adopt more 

inclusive and less confrontational policies towards the country’s Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and 

even its other Shia groups, so that Iraq can consolidate its democracy and achieve stability.

• Make rearming Iraq, especially the sale of 

F-16s, dependent on Baghdad adopting more 

conciliatory and inclusive domestic policies.

• In the event of a failure to improve relation-
58

ships in the region, consider the implications of 

its commitment to the Maliki government for 

U.S. relations with Turkey and the KRG, and 

for the development of Iraq’s energy resources.

• Prepare for the possibility that Syria and/or 

Iraq might fragment or descend into continued 

chaos, thereby potentially pushing Iraqi and 

Syrian Kurds into the Turkish orbit.

ENDNOTES 

1. See www.turkey.usembassy.gov/amb_ricciardone_020513.html.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. “Turkish FM slams Maliki,” Hurriyet Daily News, February 5, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-fmslams-maliki.aspx?pageID=238&nID=40577&NewsCatID=338.

5. Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraq budget opens new front in Kurdistan feud,” Reuters, February 16, 2013, available from www.ekurd.

net/mismas/articles/misc2013/2/govt2162.htm.

6. For background and analysis of this issue, see Iraq and the 

Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit, Middle East Report 

No. 120, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, April 

19, 2012.

7. Hevidar Ahmed, “Iran tells Iraq’s Kurds: don’t think about 

independence or closer ties to Turkey,” Rudaw, available from 

www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/5732.html. 

8. Sevgi Akarcesme, “Ambassador Tan: U.S. rhetoric at times 

resembles that of Iran’s on the issue of Iraq,” Sundays Zaman, January 8, 2013, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-303463-

ambassador-tan-us-rhetoric-at-times-resembles-irans-on-the-issue-ofiraq.html.
59

9. For a full list of energy companies operating in the KRG, 

see “Active oil companies in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Kurdnet, January 

8, 2013, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/1/

invest898.htm. 

10. “Minister Hawrami at Baker Institute in Houston: U.S. can 

help Baghdad and Kurds make fair energy deal,” April 23, 2013,

available from www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=47315. Also, author’s 

interview with Mahmoud Othman, member of Iraqi parliament 

and former member of Iraq Interim Governing Council, London, 

United Kingdom (UK), May 18, 2012.

11. For an overview of U.S. policies towards the Kurds, see 

Marianna Charountaki, The Kurds and U.S. foreign policy: international relations in the Middle East since 1945, London, UK, and New 

York: Routledge, 2011.

12. Ofra Bengio, “Will Barzani declare independence?” Jerusalem Post, April 22, 2012. For a commentary on this, see www.jpost.

com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=267115. For the 

KRG’s governance system and the relationship between its two 

leading parties, see Gareth R.V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political 

Development and Emergent Democracy, Abingdon, Oxon, UK, and 

New York: Routledge, 2003. 

13. For further detail on earlier Turkish perspectives on the 

KRG, see Bill Park, Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems 

and Perspectives, Adelphi Paper 374, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2005. 

14. F. Stephen Larrabee and Gonul Tol, “Turkey’s Kurdish 

Challenge,” Survival, Vol. 53, No. 4, August-September 2011, 

p. 144. 

15. Soner Cagaptay and Tyler Evans, Turkey’s Changing Relations with Baghdad: Kurdistan Up, Baghdad Down, Policy Focus 122, 

Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2012, p. 1. Further references to Barzani will always be to 

President Massoud, unless specifically indicated otherwise.

16. Henri J. Barkey, Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq; Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan, Special Report 237, Washington, DC: United 
60

States Institute of Peace, May 2010, pp. 10-12; author’s interviews 

with senior Turkish and other Western diplomats, Erbil and Ankara, May 2012, and Washington DC, June 2012.

17. Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “U.S. works with Turkey to counter 

PKK in Iraq,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 14, 2007.

18. Gareth Jenkins, “A military analysis of Turkey’s incursion into northern Iraq,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6, 

No. 5, March 7, 2008, available from www.jamestown.org/

programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4774&

tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1.

19. “Kurds ‘will fight Turkish raids’,” October 19, 2007, available from www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7052566.stm.

20. Author’s interview with senior KRG figure, Erbil, 

May 2012.

21. This term to describe the KRG was used by Denise Natali, 

The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf 

War Iraq, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2010.

22. For analysis of the Kirkuk issue, see Liam Anderson and 

Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: the Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 

Compromise, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 

2009; Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk crisis, Middle East Report No. 64, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, April 

19, 2007. 

23. “On the eve of Kurdish New Year, President Barzani delivers key address,” available from www.krg.org/a/d.

aspx?l=12&a=43432. See also Lara Jakes’s Associated Press interview with Barzani, “Iraq’s Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani 

hints at secession,” Kurdnet, April 25, 2012, available from www.

ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/4/state6155.htm.

24. Author’s interviews with senior Turkish diplomat and 

KRG officials, Erbil, May 2012. 

25. Sefer Levent, “Turkey strategic partner, says Iraqi Kurd 

premier,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 7, 2012, available from www.

hurriyetdailynews.com.
61

26. “Massoud Barzani says won’t allow PKK to operate from 

Iraqi Kurdistan,” Kurdnet, April 20, 2012, available from www.

ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/4/turkey3893.htm.

27. “Barzani isn’t the addressee of the Kurdish problem in 

Turkey: BDP co-chair,” April 21, 2012, available from www.ekurd.

net/mismas/articles/misc2012/4/turkey3897.htm; and “PKK leader 

says Massoud Barzani should not let AKP use him,” April 21, 

2012, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/4/

turkey3894.htm.

28. For Turkey’s earlier failed “Kurdish opening,” see Michael 

Gunter, “The closing of Turkey’s Kurdish opening,” Columbia 

Journal of International Affairs online, September 20, 2012, available 

from www.jia.sipa.columbia.edu/closing-turkey%E2%80%99s-kurdish-opening. For the recent initiative, see Aliza Marcus, “How Turkey can make peace with the Kurds,” New York Times, January 

15, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/opinion/howturkey-can-make-peace-with-the-kurds.html?_r=0. 

29. Author’s interviews with senior Turkish and KRG officials, Ankara and Erbil, May 2012.

30. Turkey’s Changing Relations with Baghdad; Mehmet Yegin 

and Hasan Selim Ozertem, Turkey-Iraq Relations: From Close Partners to Adversaries, Washington DC: The German Marshall Fund 

of the United States, January 7, 2013; Mesut Ozcan, “Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009,” Perceptions, Vol. XV, No. 3-4, 

Autumn-Winter 2010, pp. 113-132.

31. Nimrod Raphael, “Turkish and Iraqi leaders at logger 

heads,” Inquiry and Analysis Series Report No. 830, Washington, 

DC: Middle East Media Research Institute, May 2, 2012, available 

from www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6318.htm.

32. For an account, see Ibid.

33. Ipek Yezdani, “No hopes for political solutions in 

Iraq,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 5, 2012, available from www.

hurriyetdailynews.com.
62

34. Author’s interview with Tariq al-Hashemi, Istanbul, Turkey, February 7, 2013.

35. “Iraq summons Turkish envoy again as tensions grow,” 

Today’s Zaman, May 17, 2012, available from www.todayszaman.

com/news-280709-iraq-summons-turkish-envoy-again-as-tensionsgrow.html.

36. “Iraq warns Turkey against violating airspace of Kurdistan,” Kurdnet, July 17, 2012, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/

articles/misc2012/7/govt2041.htm.

37. Shayma Adel, “Baghdad to rethink allowing Turkish military bases in Iraq,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2012, available from 

www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/iraq-16-turkish-militarybases-on-our-territory.html.

38. “Iraq intends deploying troops in Kurdistan to prevent 

Turkish army’s operations,” Kurdnet, October 18, 2012, available 

from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/10/govt2095.htm.

39. Minhac Celik, “Turkey’s rapprochement with KRG should 

not overstep Baghdad, US experts warn,” Today’s Zaman, January 

3, 2013, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-303037-turkeys-rapprochement-with-krg-should-not-overstep-baghdad-us-expertswarn.html. 

40. Toby Dodge, “Iraq’s Road Back to Dictatorship,” Survival, 

Vol. 54, No. 3, June-July 2012, pp. 147-168.

41. Author’s interview with Tariq al-Hashemi. 

42. “Iraq’s Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani hints at 

secession.”

43. For background, see Peter Bartu, “Wrestling With the Integrity of a Nation: the Disputed Internal Boundaries of Iraq,” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 6, November 2010, pp. 1329-1343; 

Stefan Wolf, “Governing (in) Kirkuk: Resolving the Status of a 

Disputed Territory in Post-American Iraq,” International Affairs, 

Vol. 86, No. 6, November 2010, pp. 1361-1379; Sean Kay, “Iraq’s 

Disputed Territories: a View of the Political Horizon and Implica-
63

tions for U.S. Policy,” United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks 

No. 69, March 2011; “Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears,” Middle East Report No. 103, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, March 28, 2011.

44. Jane Arraf, “Kurdish-Iraqi government talks collapse amid 

fear of civil war,” Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 2012, 

available from www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/1130/

Kurdish-Iraqi-government-talks-collapse-amid-fear-of-civil-war.

45. Abdullah Niheli, “Kurdish forces stop Iraqi army advance 

near Syrian border,” Rudaw, July 29, 2012, available from www.

rudaw.net/english/kurds/5016.html.

46. “Wrestling With the Integrity of a Nation: the Disputed 

Internal Boundaries of Iraq”; “Iraq’s Disputed Territories: a View 

of the Political Horizon and Implications for U.S. Policy.” Both 

authors contributed to UNAMI’s work on the disputed territories.

47. Isobel Coles, “Iraqi Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani 

says Baghdad talks last chance,” Reuters, June 3, 2013, available 

from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/6/state7108.htm.

48. Armando Cordoba, “Maliki visit to Erbil results in joint 

committees to resolve disputes,” Rudaw, June 9, 2013, available 

from rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/090620132.

49. “Iraq and the Kurds: The High Stakes Hydrocarbons 

Gambit,” Middle East Report No. 120, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, April 19, 2012, available from www.

crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-irangulf/iraq/120-iraq-and-the-kurds-the-high-stakes-hydrocarbons-gambit.

aspx. Raad Alkadiri, “Oil and the question of federalism in Iraq,” 

International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 6, 2010; Matthew J. Bryza, “Turkey’s dramatic shift towards Iraqi Kurdistan: politics before peace 

pipelines,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2012, 

pp. 53-61; Robin M. Mills, “Northern Iraq’s oil chessboard: energy, politics and power,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 

2013, pp. 51-62; Joel Wing, “Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government’s oil policy: an interview with Samuel Ciszuk,” Musings 

on Iraq, November 6, 2012, available from www.musingsoniraq.

blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/iraqs-kurdistan-regional-governments.html; 
64

author’s discussions with Iraqi energy analyst Shwan Zulal, Ankara and London.

50. Isabel Coles, “With or without Exxon, Iraq Kurds strive 

for energy autonomy,” Reuters, January 30, 2013, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/us-iraq-exxon-idUSBRE90T09

M20130130.

51. Hacer Gemici, “Turkey, ExxonMobil going ahead with gas 

project in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Al-Monitor, May 20, 2013, available 

from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/05/turkey-and-exxonexplore-oil-in-iraqi-kurdistan.html.

52. Ahmed Rasheed, “Iraq blacklists Chevron for Kurdish 

oil deals,” Reuters, July 24, 2012, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2012/07/24/us-iraq-chevron-idUSBRE86N12A20120724; Mohamad Ali Harissi, “Iraq gives Total ultimatum over Kurdish 

oil deal,” AFP, August 12, 2012, available from www.google.com/

hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gWtZJBzCXD6vArp07rTq06HYpTV

Q?docId=CNG.8a95bf6fc2dee49c9ce2778a158ef7fb.111.

53. “US energy giant Chevron signs oil deal with Iraqi Kurdistan,” Kurdnet, June 18, 2013, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/

articles/misc2013/6/invest921.htm.

54. Peg Mackey, “Iraq’s Kurd oil row too big to last: Genel’s Haywood,” Reuters, September 7, 2012, available from

www.in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/07/us-genel-kurdistanidINBRE8860K620120907.

55. “Kurdistan says Iraq must seek approval for Kirkuk oil 

field upgrade,” Kurdnet, March 27, 2012, available from www.

ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/3/kirkuk726.htm.

56. Peg Mackey and Andrew Callus, “BP moves to front line 

of Iraq-Kurdistan stand-off,” Reuters, January 17, 2013, available 

from www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/17/energy-iraq-faceoff-idUSL6N0AM8TS20130117.

57. “Kurdistan starts independent crude oil exports,” 

Reuters, January 8, 2013, available from www.in.reuters.

com/article/2013/01/07/kurdistan-crude-exports-idINL5E9C7A

JW20130107.
65

58. “Iraqi Kurds defend oil policy, reject BP Kirkuk deal,” 

Reuters, January 18, 2013, available from www.uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/uk-energy-iraq-kurdistan-idUKBRE90H09N20130118; 

“BP moves to front line of Iraq-Kurdistan stand-off,” Reuters, 

January 17, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/17/energy-iraqfaceoff-idUSL6N0AM8TS20130117. 

59. Author’s interview with senior Genel Energy executive, 

Ankara, May 23, 2012.

60. Palash R. Ghosh, “Iraq warns Kurdistan against striking 

oil deal with Turkey,” International Business Times, May 21, 2012, 

available from www.ibtimes.com/iraq-warns-kurds-against-strikingoil-deal-turkey-699345; Joel Wing, “Iraq’s Kurds’ gambit on pipelines to Turkey may not pan out,” Kurdnet, May 29, 2012, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/5/invest841.htm; 

Shwan Zulal, “The real deal behind Turkish-Kurdish oil plans: 

pipe dreams or reality?” Kurdnet, June 22, 2012, available from 

www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/6/state6311.htm.

61. “Turkey-Kurdistan oil pipeline to be completed in September,” Kurdnet, June 19, 2013, available from www.ekurd.net/

mismas/articles/misc2013/6/invest922.htm.

62. Isabel Coles and Ahmed Rasheed, “Iraqi Kurdistan pressures Baghdad with Turkey oil pipeline push,” Reuters, July 1, 

2013, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/iraq-kurdspipeline-idUSL5N0F33ZN20130701.

63. “Turkey’s dramatic shift”; “Northern Iraq’s oil 

chessboard.”

64. “Iraq ‘reopens strategic pipeline’,” Iraq Business News, 

December 6, 2012, available from www.iraq-businessnews.

com/2012/12/06/iraq-reopens-strategic-pipeline/. 

65. “Third oil pipeline in line between Turkey and Iraq,” 

Hurriyet Daily News, April 2, 2013, available from www.

hurriyetdailynews.com/third-oil-pipeline-in-line-between-turkey-andiraq.aspx?pageID=238&nid=44063.
66

66. Tolga Tanis, “Turkey’s focus ‘shifts’ from Syria to Baghdad,” Hurriyet Daily News, February 1, 2013, available from www.

hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-focus-shifts-from-syria-to-baghdad.asp

x?pageID=238&nID=40265&NewsCatID=338.

67. Ibid.

68. “Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears,” p. ii.

69. Author’s interviews with Turkish, Iraqi Kurdish and British officials, and senior energy consultants, Ankara and Erbil, 

May 2012.

70. A point made by exiled Iraqi Vice-President Tariq alHashemi, author’s interview, Istanbul, February 7, 2013.

71. “Turkey treating Iraqi Kurdistan ‘as independent’,” AFP, 

August 11, 2012, available from www.google.com/hostednews/afp/

article/ALeqM5jGm5ZuKAvm5rx6r7lHmX0jlDVlFQ?docId=CNG.0a

4e52814bdbb17f662d0a35c58373db.5c1. 

72. “Iraq expels Turkey’s TPAO from energy exploration 

deal,” Hurriyet Daily News, November 7, 2012, available from 

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iraq-expels-turkeys-tpao-from-energyexploration-deal.aspx?pageID=238&nid=34144.

73. “Iraq wants to open new chapter with Turkey: PM,” AFP, 

December 6, 2012, available from www.google.com/hostednews/afp/

article/ALeqM5gbBnRBb0ibana4hF_Mln0ZYkQ8lg?docId=CNG.19a5

f06becd20ab6e0f183d0b94b8247.471.

74. “Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears.”

75. Michael R. Gordon, “In U.S. Exit from Iraq, Failed Efforts 

and Challenges,” New York Times, September 23, 2012.

76. John Hannah, “Turkey, Kurdistan and the Future of 

Iraq: Time for Washington to Tune Back In,” Foreign Policy blog,

May 31, 2012, available from www./shadow.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2012/05/31/turkey_kurdistan_and_the_future_of_iraq_time_for_

washington_to_tune_back_in. 
67

77. “US says oil firms should respect Baghdad government,” Kurdnet, August 21, 2012, available from www.ekurd.net/

mismas/articles/misc2012/8/govt2064.htm; “Nuland on Iraq oil 

deals,” Turkish Radio and television Corporation (TRT), January 9, 

2013, available from www.trt-world.com/trtworld/en/newsDetail.

aspx?HaberKodu=3d31f4cf-fe09-4026-a320-7f4c9ae9390c. 

78. Ben Van Heuvelen, “Turkey weighs pivotal oil deal with 

Iraqi Kurdistan,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2012.

79. Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Ankara asks Washington 

to keep its nose out of Turkey’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan,”

Rudaw, April 19, 2013, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/

articles/misc2013/4/turkey4662.htm. 

80. Sevgi Akarcesme, “Ambassador Tan: U.S. rhetoric at times 

resembles that of Iran’s on the issue of Iraq,” Sundays Zaman, January 8, 2013, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-303463-ambassador-tan-us-rhetoric-at-times-resembles-irans-on-the-issue-of-iraq.

html; Serkan Demirtas, “Turkey, U.S., to hold intensified Iraq 

talks,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 8, 2013, available from www.

hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-us-to-hold-intensifed-iraq-talks.aspx?pa

geID=238&nID=38575&NewsCatID=338; Turkey defies Washington and Baghdad to pursue Iraqi Kurdistan energy ties,” Kurdnet,

February 19, 2013, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/

misc2013/2/turkey4532.htm.

81. Seda Kirdar, Erbil, Baghdad, Ankara and Washington: the 

complex politics of Kurdish oil, Ankara, Turkey: The Economic 

Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), August 2012, 

available from www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1345710573-7.Erbil_Baghdad_Ankara_and_Washington_The_Complex_Politics_of_

Kurdish_Oil.pdf. 

82. Michael S. Schmidt and Eric Schmitt, “Weapons Sales to Iraq 

Move Ahead Despite U.S. Worries,” New York Times, December 28, 

2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/world/middleeast/

us-military-sales-to-iraq-raise-concerns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

83. “The new Iraqi air force: F16IQ Block 52 fighters,” Defense Industry Daily, December 17, 2012, available from www.

defenseindustrydaily.com/iraq-seeks-f-16-fighters-05057/.
68

84. Wladimir van Wildenburg, “Barzani suggests Baghdad 

might use F16s against Kurds,” Rudaw, April 9, 2012, available 

from www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4608.html. 

85. Gonul Tol, “Turkey cozies up to the KRG,” Washington, 

DC: Middle East Institute, May 24, 2012, available from www.mei.

edu/content/turkey-cozies-krg. 

86. Author’s interview with senior western diplomats in Ankara, Erbil and Washington, May-June 2012. 

87. Author’s interviews with a variety of U.S. and UK officials 

and Turkish analysts, Washington, Erbil and Ankara, May 2012. 

88. For a sample of such commentary, see Ofra Bengio, “Will 

the Kurds get their way?” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 2, 

November/December 2012; Patrick Cockburn, “A decade after the invasion of Iraq, the Kurds emerge as surprise winners,” 

The Independent, February 17, 2013; David Hirst, “This could be 

the birth of an independent Kurdish state,” The Guardian, January 9, 2013; Yusuf Kanli, “A Kurdish state?” Hurriyet Daily News,

January 10, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/

a-kurdish-state.aspx?pageID=449&nID=38804&NewsCatID=425; 

Lyuba Lulko, “The Great Kurdistan about to be created,” November 13, 2012, available from www.english.pravda.ru/hotspots/

conflicts/13-11-2012/122791-great_kurdistan-0/; Patrick Seale, “The 

Kurds seize their chance,” December 26, 2012, available from 

www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=56202; Stanley Weiss, 

“It’s time for an independent Kurdistan,” May 11, 2012, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/stanley-weiss/its-time-for-anindepende_b_2077126.html. 

89. David Hirst, “A Kurdish state is being established, 

and Baghdad may accept it,” The Daily Star (Lebanon), December 24, 2012, available from www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/

Commentary/2012/Dec-24/199715-a-kurdish-state-is-beingestablished-and-baghdad-may-accept-it.ashx#axzz2LY2iYWi9. 

90. See www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf.

91. Ibid., p. 74.
69

92. Ibid., p. 131.

93. Former U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith advocates this. 

See “Better a smaller independent Kurdistan than to be stuck in 

Iraq forever: ex-US diplomat,” Kurdnet, January 2, 2013, available 

from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/1/state6757.htm. 

94. For speculation on this, see Gareth Stansfield, “The unravelling of the post-First World War state system? The Kurdistan 

Region of Iraq and the transformation of the Middle East,” International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2, March 2003, pp. 259-282.

95. Christopher Phillips, “The impact of Syrian refuges on 

Turkey and Jordan,” The World Today, Vol. 68, No. 8/9, October 

2012, pp. 34-37.

96. “Turkey warns of response after Syria border town 

bombs,” May 12, 2013, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-22498891.

97. Erol Cebeci and Kadir Ustun, “The Syrian quagmire: 

what’s holding Turkey back?” Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 2, 

Spring 2012, pp. 13-21; Christopher Phillips, Into the Quagmire: 

Turkey’s Frustrated Syria Policy, Briefing Paper, London, UK: 

Chatham House, December 2012.

98. Into the Quagmire, Turkey’s Frustrated Syria Policy, p. 7.

99. “Iran furious over Patriot missiles in Turkey,” International 

Iran Times, December 21, 2012, available from www.iran-times.com/

iran-furious-over-patriot-missiles-in-turkey/.

100. For analyses of Syria’s Kurdish politics, see Denise Natali, “Syria’s Kurdish Quagmire,” Kurdnet, May 3, 2012, available 

from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/5/syriakurd486.htm; 

Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, Middle East Report 

No. 136, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, January 

22, 2013; Who Is the Syrian Kurdish Opposition?: The Development of 

Kurdish Parties, 1956-2011, KurdWatch, Report 8, December 2011.

101. Serkan Demirtas, “Syria supporting PKK, says intelligence report,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 23, 2012, available 
70

from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/report-syria-supporting-pkk.aspx?

pageID=238&nid=16699; Cengiz Candar, “Turkey claims Iran 

providing logistical support for PKK,” Al-Monitor, December 

30, 2012, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/

al-monitor/iran-turkey-shiite-sunni-pkk.html.

102. “Syria supporting PKK”; Oytun Orhan, “Syria’s PKK 

game,” Today’s Zaman, February 14, 2012, available from www.todayszaman.com; Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey enlists northern Iraq’s 

help in countering threat of Syria-PKK alliance,” Today’s Zaman, 

March 23, 2012, available from www.todayszaman.com.

103. Nihat Ali Ozcan and H.Erdem Gurkaynak, “Who are 

these armed people on the mountains?” February 2012, available 

from www.tepev.org.tr. 

104. For details, see www.kurdwatch.org.

105. Statement Regarding Terrorist Attacks on Syrian Kurdish Town Sere Kaniye/Ras al-Ain, National Coordination Body 

for Democratic Change in Syria, Kurdnet, January 20, 2013, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/1/syriakurd

726.htm.

106. “Turkey warns it would strike Kurdish PKK fighters 

inside Syrian Kurdistan,” Kurdnet, July 26, 2012, available from 

www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/7/turkey4047.htm.

107. Ipek Yezdani, “Syrian Kurds aim to establish ‘federal 

state’,” Hurriyet Daily News, February 7, 2012, available from 

www.hurriyetdailynews.com. 

108. David Pollock, “Syrian Kurds unite against Assad, but not 

with opposition,” Policywatch 1967, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, July 31, 2012; “The Kurdish National Council in Syria,” Beirut, Lebanon: Carnegie Middle East Center, February 15, 

2012, available from www.carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48502. 

109. Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, pp. 4-5, 25.

110. Wladirmir van Wildenburg, “Border arrests reveal disunity, conflict among Syrian Kurds,” Al Monitor, May 21, 2013.
71

111. Wladimir van Wildenberg, “Danger of Kurdish civil war 

in Syrian Kurdistan,” Rudaw, July 8, 2012, available from www.

rudaw.net/english/science/columnists/4931.html. Also see www.

kurdwatch.org. 

112. “Turkey warned Iraqi Kurds that autonomy would not 

be applied in Syria: PM,” Hurriyet Daily News, November 2, 2012, 

available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-warned-iraqikurds-that-autonomy-would-not-be-applied-in-syria-pm.aspx?pageID=

238&nID=33802&NewsCatID=338. 

113. Denise Natali, “Who will pay IOCs in Iraqi Kurdistan?” 

Al-Monitor, February 20, 2013, available from www.al-monitor.com/

pulse/originals/2013/02/iraq-turkey-pipeline-reduce-tensions-betweenbaghdad-ankara.html. 

114. “Iraq Kurd prime minister says ready for power sharing in Kirkuk,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 4, 2008, available from 

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=iraq-kurdpm-says-ready-for-power-sharing-in-kirkuk-2008-06-04.

115. Jay Newton-Small, “An interview with Nechirvan Barzani: will there be an independent Kurdistan?” Time, December 21, 2012, available from www.world.time.com/2012/12/21/aninterview-with-nechirvan-barzani-will-there-be-an-independentkurdistan/.

116. Ibid.

117. Barcin Yinanc, “Kurdish state has to depend on neighbors,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 15, 2012, available from 

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurdish-state-has-to-depend-onneighbors.aspx?pageID=238&nid=32420. The emphasis on Turkey 

was strongly confirmed in the author’s interview with Dizayee, 

Erbil, May 27, 2012.

118. Author’s interview, Erbil, May 25, 2012.

119. Tulin Daloglu, “Turkey seeks ‘interdependence’ with 

Iraqi Kurdistan,” Al-Monitor, January 23, 2013, available from 

www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/contents/articles/opinion/2013/01/

turkey-iraq-kurdistan.html.
72

120. Semih Idiz, “Turkey’s new thinking in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Al-Monitor, December 27, 2012, available from www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/turkey-kurdistan-iragbarzani.html.

121. Necdet Pamir, “Turkey contributes to Iraqi fragmentation,” Al-Monitor, February 20, 2012, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/turkey-krg-relations-strain-futureiraq-oil-interests.html.

122. Turkey, Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 1, 2013, available from www.eia.gov/

countries/cab.cfm?fips=TU.

123. Robert Rabil, “The Iraqi opposition’s evolution: from 

conflict to unity?” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, 

No. 4, December 2002.

124. William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East, and the Gulf crisis,” International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4, October 1992, p. 691.

125. Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis, London, UK: MacMillan, 1999, p. 118.

126. “If Turkey had kept Mosul, there would be no N.Iraq issue, says Demirel,” Turkish Daily News, December 19, 2003, quoted in Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq, p. 16.

127. Nicole Pope, “Cross border concerns,” Middle East 

International, No. 683, September 2002, p. 11; Jan Gorvett, “A 

hugely unpopular war,” The Middle East, No. 328, November 

2002, p. 11.

128. Nicole Pope, “Eyes on Turkey,” Middle East International, 

Vol. 691, No. 10, January 13, 2003, pp. 14-15.

129. Gunduz Aktan, “If Iraq operation takes place,” TDN, 

November 20, 2002, quoted Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern 

Iraq, p. 16.

130. Alan Rawand, “Why is USA supporting a Kurdish state 

in Iraq’s Kurdistan region?” Kurdnet, March 27, 2012, U.S. En-
73

ergy Information Administration, available from www.ekurd.net/

mismas/articles/misc2012/3/state6034.htm.

131. “Turkey defies Washington and Baghdad to pursue Iraqi 

Kurdistan energy ties,” AFP, February 19, 2013, U.S. Energy Information Administration, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/

articles/misc2013/2/turkey4532.htm.

132. For a flavor of this, see B. Mohammed, “Barzani’s foreign 

policy risks damaging Kurdistan’s interest,” Kurdish Aspect, February 3, 2013, U.S. Energy Information Administration, available 

from www.kurdishaspect.com/doc020413BM.html; “A PUK leader 

warns against Turkish ‘trap’,” Insight Kurdistan, January 3, 2013, 

U.S. Energy Information Administration, available from www.

insightkurdistan.com/tag/tigris/.

133. Author’s interview with senior Iraqi Kurdish official, 

May 27, 2012.

134. For the full text, see www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/

misc2013/3/turkey4603.htm.

135. Ibid.

136. “Baghdad government says PKK not welcome in Iraq,” 

Reuters, May 9, 2013, available from uk.reuters.com/

article/2013/05/09/us-turkey-kurds-iraq-idUSBRE9480L020130509.

137. “Kurdish conference ends with list of demands from 

gov’t,” Today’s Zaman, June 17, 2013, available from www.

todayszaman.com/news-318516-kurdish-conference-ends-with-list-ofdemands-from-govt.html.

138. Johanna Nykanen, “Identity, narrative and frames: assessing Turkey’s Kurdish initiatives,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 

2, Spring 2013, pp. 85-101.

139. “Government needs to move on: PKK leader,” Hurriyet 

Daily News, June 17, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.

com/government-needs-to-move-on-pkk-leader.aspx?pageID=238&nID

=48932&NewsCatID=338.
74

140. Patrick Markey and Isobel Coles, “Insight: Hopes, suspicions over peace in Kurdish rebel hideout,” Reuters, March 27, 

2013, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/27/us-iraqturkey-pkk-insight-idUSBRE92Q0J520130327.

141. Tim Arango, “Rebel keeps Kurds’ guns close at hand in 

peace talks with Turkey,” New York Times, April 11, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/world/middleeast/rebel-kurdkarayilan-defiant-in-turkish-talks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

142. “Ahmet Turk blames Ankara government, warns the 

peace talks will fail,” Kurdpress, June 11, 2013, available from www.

kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=4733#Title=%0A%09

%09%09%09%09%09%09%09Ahmet Turk blames Ankara government, warns the peace talks will fail%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09.

143. For these arguments, see Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Prospect for resolution of the Kurdish question: a realist perspective,” 

Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2013, pp. 69-84.

144. Denise Natali, “PKK challenges Barzani in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Kurdnet, May 10, 2013, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/

articles/misc2013/5/state7069.htm.

145. For the most recent comprehensive studies of Iran’s 

Kurds, see Abbas Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of 

Kurdish Identity, London, UK, and New York: I. B. Tauris and Co., 

2011; and Kerim Yildiz and Tanyel Taysi, The Kurds in Iran: Past, 

Present and Future, London, UK, and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto 

Press, 2007.

146. David Enders, “Iran-Kurdish rebel ceasefire holds amid 

scepticism,” November 7, 2011, available from www.pulitzercenter.

org/reporting/iraq-cease-fire-kurdish-rebels-iran-government; Alex 

Vatanka, “Probing the reasons behind Iran’s ‘pre-emptive’ military offensive against Kurdish rebels,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 9, 

No. 36, September 22, 2011, available from www.jamestown.org/

single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38440&tx_ttnews

%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=6557ff162fd.

147. Jake Hess, “Iran awaits ‘Kurdish spring’,” Al Jazeera, 

June 29, 2013, available from www.aljazeera.com/indepth/featur
75

es/2013/06/2013627152045730568.html; Wladirmir van Wildenburg, “Iranian Kurdish Struggle Linked to Turkey, Syria,” Al 

Monitor, June 14, 2013, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

originals/2013/06/iran-Revolutionary-guard-syria.html; Bayram 

Sinkaya, “Iran cautious of Turkey’s Kurdish approach,” Al Monitor,

March 16, 2013, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

politics/2013/03/iran-cautious-turkey-kurds.html.

148. Sakar Abdullazada, “Iranian Kurdish parties Komala, KDPI treaty is preparation for collapse of Tehran regime,” 

Kurdnet, September 5, 2012, available from www.ekurd.net/mismas/

articles/misc2012/9/irankurd881.htm; Fuad Haqiqi, “Iran’s Kurdish parties KDP, KDPI meet for the first time since 2006 split,”

Kurdnet, December 14, 2012, available from www.ekurd.net/

mismas/articles/misc2012/12/irankurd901.htm.

149. Joost R. Hiltermann, “Revenge of the Kurds: breaking 

away from Baghdad,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 6, NovemberDecember 2012, pp. 16-22.

150. Author’s interview with senior western diplomat, 

Ankara, May 24, 2012.
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