FEMA's Initial Response 

to the 2016 Catastrophic 

Flooding in Louisiana 

June 22, 2017 

OIG-17-80-D 
 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

FEMA’s Initial Response to the 2016

Catastrophic Flooding in Louisiana
 

June 22, 2017 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

On August 14, 2016, the 

President declared a 

major disaster in 

Louisiana following severe 

storms and catastrophic 

flooding. We deployed an 

Emergency Management 

Oversight Team to 

evaluate FEMA’s initial 

response and recovery 

activities. Our visibility 

and availability to FEMA, 

Louisiana, local officials, 

and others affected by the 

disaster provided a 

deterrent to potential 

fraud, waste, and abuse. 

What We 

Recommend 

This report contains no 

recommendations. 

However, we are planning 

several audits related to 

this disaster. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at DHSOIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

(FEMA) response to the catastrophic flooding in 

Louisiana was generally effective and consistent 

with Federal regulations. FEMA quickly deployed 

resources to the disaster-impacted area and 

worked with its Federal, State, and local partners 

to address the needs of survivors. 

In the first month, FEMA processed 143,069 

requests for Individual Assistance, completed 98 

percent of housing inspections, and provided 

more than $620 million in Individual Assistance 

to survivors. By October 14, 2016, FEMA disaster 

funding exceeded $1.4 billion and local 

governments had removed 89 percent of debris. 

From the onset, FEMA faced a critical housing 

shortage. The flooding damaged tens of 

thousands of homes, leaving few housing options. 

FEMA and Louisiana aggressively addressed this 

shortage using various sheltering and housing 

options, including developing an innovative 

Shelter-At-Home repair program. FEMA’s 

development of policy and procedures while 

responding to the disaster was remarkable, but 

risky. FEMA can reduce its risks by developing 

formal policies and procedures for innovative 

programs before disasters strike. We also advised 

FEMA that providing food to survivors in hotels 

may not be an eligible use of Federal funds. 

FEMA ultimately decided not to proceed with the 

purchase of about $1 million in food for survivors 

in hotels. 

FEMA Response 

This report contains no formal recommendations. 

FEMA’s written response is included at 

appendix B. 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-80-D 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

July 22, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

FROM: 

George A. Robinson 

Regional Administrator, Region VI 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

P-~~:a:- John E. McCoy II 

Acting Assistant Inspector General 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight 

SUBJECT: FEMA 's Initial Response to the 2016 Catastrophic 

Flooding in Louisiana 

Report Number OIG-17-80-D 

We audited the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) initial 

response to the Louisiana severe storms and catastrophic flooding that 

occurred in August 2016. Our assessment of FEMA's response focused on FEMA's 

activities just before and after the disaster declaration. We inquired into FEMA's most 

pressing challenges; evaluated FEMA's staffing and resources; examined how FEMA 

made disaster-sourcing decisions; and assessed how well FEMA coordinated its 

activities with its Federal, Louisiana, and local partners. 

To provide the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and Congress 

information on the effectiveness of FEMA's initial disaster response and 

recovery activities, we proactively deployed an Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

Emergency Management Oversight Team to evaluate FEMA's actions and help 

prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. Traditional audits typically assess an 

organization's financial and operational activities after they happen. By 

deploying staff to assess FEMA's disaster response and recovery activities while 

they happen, we position ourselves to better identify potential problems before 

they occur. It also improves the quality of the recommendations we make in 

other reports designed to improve the disaster assistance program's integrity by 

preventing applicants from misspending disaster assistance funds. The OIG 

Emergency Management Oversight Team deployed to the disaster 8 days after 

the declaration. 

Background 

On Thursday, August 11, 2016, a large low-pressure system began pouring 

rain over a large area in south Louisiana including Baton Rouge, the state's 

capital; Lafayette, a city of more than 120,000; and many smaller communities. 

The storm caused some areas to receive more than 30 inches of rain. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

By Friday, August 12, 2016, the National Weather Service had issued flash 

flood emergencies. Thirteen people died and thousands were forced into 

shelters as the flooding severely impacted whole communities such as Denham 

Springs, where 90 percent of housing was damaged. Complicating rescue 

efforts, many of the State and local emergency management personnel and 

responders were themselves impacted by the flooding. 

Figure 1: Survivors Evacuated by the U.S. Coast Guard 

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 

The flood was the worst natural disaster to hit the United States since 

Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The August storms dumped an estimated 6.9 trillion 

gallons across southern Louisiana — more than four times the amount of water 

contained in Lake Pontchartrain. Even before the floodwaters subsided, 

members of Federal, State, and local government agencies; volunteer 

organizations; and local volunteers started assisting survivors. On 

August 14, 2016, the President approved a major disaster declaration (DR4277), later amended to include 26 Louisiana parishes. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 2: Aerial View of Louisiana Flooding August 2016 

Source: FEMA 

Results of Audit 

FEMA’s initial response and recovery efforts were generally effective and 

consistent with Federal law and regulations. FEMA quickly positioned 

resources, deployed thousands of personnel to the disaster-impacted area, and 

worked with Federal, State, and local partners to assist survivors. 

In the first month, FEMA processed 143,069 requests for Individual Assistance, 

completed 98 percent of housing inspections, and provided survivors with more 

than $620 million in Individual Assistance. By October 14, 2016, 2 months 

after the flooding, FEMA disaster funding exceeded $1.4 billion and local 

governments had removed 89 percent of the debris. 

FEMA leadership and staff remained resilient and mission focused, pushed 

aggressive timelines, and addressed survivor needs and concerns. To its credit, 

FEMA is using the Joint Field Office1 environment to its advantage by 

capturing best practices and documenting lessons learned to improve future 

processes and program delivery. 

1 FEMA establishes a Joint Field Office in or near the disaster area. Federal and State staffs 

use this office as the focal point of disaster recovery operations. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 3: Louisiana Flooding Debris Operations 

Source: FEMA 

From the onset, FEMA faced a critical housing shortage. The flooding damaged 

tens of thousands of homes, leaving few available housing options. FEMA and 

Louisiana aggressively addressed the housing shortage through traditional 

disaster sheltering and housing programs — using hotels, activating the rental 

repair program, and installing manufactured housing. In addition, FEMA 

developed an innovative Shelter-At-Home repair program for survivors to 

shelter at their own homes while making repairs. FEMA’s development of the 

Shelter-At-Home program policies and procedures while responding to the 

disaster was remarkable, but very risky. FEMA can reduce its risks by 

developing formal policies and procedures for disaster recovery programs before 

disasters strike. 

We also provided FEMA with timely advice on several issues including 

Louisiana’s request for FEMA to provide food boxes to survivors in hotels. We 

advised FEMA that this action may not be an eligible use of Federal funds, and 

FEMA ultimately decided not to proceed with purchasing about $1 million of 

food. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Declaration Activities 

FEMA’s pre-disaster declaration activities were generally effective. As the extent 

of flooding became apparent, FEMA Region VI activated its Regional Response 

Coordination Center on Saturday, August 13, 2016, and deployed the first of 

several Incident Management Assistance Teams to assist Louisiana with 

emergency operations. FEMA positioned resources, including food and water at 

its Incident Support Base, activated eight Emergency Support Functions, and 

requested mission assignments to support disaster response and recovery. 

FEMA also accompanied the governor of Louisiana on aerial damage 

assessments and quickly responded to the governor’s request for an expedited 

declaration. On August 14, 2016, the President approved a major disaster 

declaration for the flooding. 

FEMA’s Most Pressing Challenges 

FEMA’s most pressing challenges were providing sheltering and housing to 

thousands of survivors, removing almost 4 million cubic yards of debris 

generated by the disaster, and addressing public perception and expectations. 

The catastrophic flooding required FEMA to act aggressively and, at times, 

creatively. The collective efforts by FEMA, other Federal agencies, Louisiana, 

non-profit organizations, and the survivors themselves provided hope and a 

way forward for affected communities to rebuild. 

Sheltering and Housing 

FEMA and Louisiana acted quickly to address the housing shortage. On 

August 18, 2016, FEMA and Louisiana established the Strategic Housing 

Solutions Task Force to plan, coordinate, and implement a statewide sheltering 

and housing strategy using both conventional and unconventional approaches: 

Shelters – On August 12, 2016, local authorities and churches began sheltering 

survivors as the flooding worsened. By August 15, 2016, more than 10,000 

survivors occupied shelters across the State. In subsequent weeks, FEMA and 

Louisiana Individual Assistance personnel focused on finding alternative 

housing for survivors and reducing the shelter population. The last shelter 

closed on October 6, 2016. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Hotels – FEMA’s Transitional Sheltering Assistance program uses hotels to 

provide temporary sheltering to survivors.2 At the program’s peak on 

September 15, 2016, 2,787 households occupied hotels. However, the housing 

shortage in the disaster area required FEMA to continue extending this shortterm program; 2 months after the disaster, more than 2,500 households 

remained in hotels in Louisiana and outside the State. 

Multi-family Lease and Repair Program – FEMA and Louisiana activated the 

Multi-family Lease and Repair Program in an effort to provide more housing 

resources.3 The program identifies and pays for repairs to eligible multi-unit 

rental properties with the requirement that the restored units are leased to 

disaster survivors. In the first 2 months following the disaster, FEMA assessed 

42 rental properties (representing 680 units) and identified 24 eligible 

properties (representing 325 units), but had only signed contracts to repair 

7 properties (representing 85 units) for this program. 

Shelter-At-Home Program – FEMA and Louisiana acted quickly to establish the 

Shelter-At-Home program as an alternative sheltering option. Within days of 

the declaration, FEMA developed guidance and Louisiana announced the 

program. Shelter-At-Home, a modification of the Sheltering and Temporary 

Emergency Power (STEP) pilot program FEMA implemented in Hurricane 

Sandy, funded minimal repairs for homeowners to safely return to their homes 

while rebuilding.4 

Generally, FEMA limited Shelter-At-Home work to single-family, owneroccupied properties with less than $15,000 in repairs needed to make the 

home safe and habitable. FEMA quickly approved $143 million in Public 

Assistance funds, and Louisiana contracted with nine construction firms and a 

program manager to perform the work. By the end of September, Louisiana 

received more than 20,000 registrations, and by mid-October, Louisiana 

contractors had completed 9,801 initial inspections and repaired 2,873 

individual homes. FEMA and Louisiana actively coordinated and monitored the 

2 FEMA activates the Transitional Sheltering Assistance program at the request of the grantee 

and makes payments directly to participating hotels. The grantee does have a cost share in this 

program. The initial period of assistance is 5–14 days. FEMA, in conjunction with the State, 

may extend this period of assistance, if needed. See also section 403 of Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (Stafford Act), and FEMA’s Disaster 

Assistance Policy 9443.2. 

3 The Multi-family Lease and Repair Program provide funds directly to the property owner. The 

property must have been in use as a multi-unit lease property at the time of and damaged by 

the disaster. See also Stafford Act, section 408(c)(1)(B); Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 

2013, section 1103; and FEMA Recovery Policy 9459.1. 4 The Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) Pilot Program provided essential power 

to affected residences allowing survivors to return to or remain in their homes. The program 

provided funds to the State and did have a cost share. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

program, and quickly addressed program issues and concerns with the 

program manager. A FEMA official said FEMA would conduct a post-program 

survey to determine program effectiveness. 

Figure 4: Louisiana Shelter-At-Home Program Repairs 

Source: DHS-OIG 

While the Shelter-at-Home program was expedient and timely, FEMA had to 

develop the program guidance at the Joint Field Office while responding to the 

disaster because FEMA had not formalized a sheltering policy since 

implementing STEP in November 2012. In our December 2012 report on STEP, 

we cautioned FEMA about the need to institute adequate internal controls and 

address vulnerabilities associated with implementing pilot programs such as 

STEP.5 Our February 2017 follow-up report on STEP further recommended 

that FEMA review and improve, as necessary, policies and procedures that 

protect government resources used to support disaster response and recovery 

activities.6 If FEMA intends to provide home sheltering as a permanent housing 

option, developing formal policies and processes before disaster strikes will 

lessen the program’s vulnerabilities. Due to inherent risks associated with 

disaster-specific programs, we may review the Shelter-At-Home program in 

more detail in a future audit. 

5 OIG Report OIG-13-15, FEMA’s Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power Pilot Program, 

December 12, 2012 

6 OIG Report OIG-17-38, FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary 

Essential Power Pilot Program, February 10, 2017 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Manufactured Housing Units (MHU) – Although FEMA provides MHUs to 

survivors only when no other solution is available, FEMA had to provide more 

than 4,000 MHUs in this disaster because of limited housing options. To 

address this large requirement, FEMA initially provided $242 million to fund 

the MHU program. In addition, FEMA directly purchased units from retail lots, 

waived floodplain rules, located group housing sites, and procured commercial 

pad leases to meet its internal milestone of 1,000 MHU installations by midOctober 2016. 

Debris Removal 

FEMA’s challenges often begin with debris removal, and FEMA officials are 

experienced in helping local governments collect and dispose of debris in 

roadways. However, to maintain any hope of repairing their homes, survivors 

immediately needed to remove all waterlogged elements from their homes — 

mud, carpet, furniture, wall board — and move it to the curb for collection. 

FEMA partnered with the Corporation for National and Community Service’s 

AmeriCorps to “muck and gut” homes throughout impacted neighborhoods for 

survivors who were unable to perform this time-sensitive work. In the first 

2 months, young adults from AmeriCorps helped remove 14,938 cubic yards of 

debris from damaged homes. 

FEMA’s coordination with Federal, State, and local partners contributed to the 

efficient removal of 89 percent of estimated debris within 2 months after the 

disaster. FEMA led a debris task force consisting of Federal, State, and other 

stakeholders. The task force provided technical guidance to local governments, 

monitored contractor debris operations, and addressed issues such as 

obtaining proper permits and waivers and ensuring proper disposal of debris. 

In addition, FEMA Public Assistance provided accelerated funding for debris 

removal projects. 

Public Perception and Expectations 

Although FEMA quickly responded to the disaster, some survivors and local 

government officials said FEMA was slow to provide help. During a 

congressional hearing in September 2016, elected officials complained that 

FEMA had not provided water to local communities and was ineffective in 

addressing survivors’ housing needs. However, based on our observations, 

these criticisms indicate a misunderstanding of FEMA, state, and local roles 

and responsibilities during disaster response and the complexity of the MHU 

installation process. To manage expectations and improve public perception, 

FEMA developed simple and clear messages, especially in housing-related 

information. FEMA also monitored traditional and social media to proactively 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

address emerging issues and emphasized timely communications with State 

and local officials. 

Most Significant Resource Shortfalls 

FEMA’s most significant resource shortfall in this disaster was the insufficient 

number of available MHUs. Gaps in personnel and technology resources also 

presented challenges. However, FEMA quickly took necessary actions to 

address the MHU and personnel shortfalls. 

Manufactured Housing Units – FEMA did not have sufficient available MHUs to 

provide the more than 4,000 MHUs needed for this disaster. FEMA officials 

said that, by the start of this housing mission, other recent declarations had 

already depleted most of FEMA’s MHU inventory of about 1,500 units.7 To 

address this shortfall, FEMA provided $242 million in initial funds for the MHU 

program; and installed more than 500 of the 4,000 plus units needed for this 

disaster by October 14, 2016. FEMA officials said, while this was short of their 

internal milestone goal of 1,000 installations by mid-October 2016, the 

installations occurred much more quickly than in past disasters. However, 

FEMA officials also acknowledged that some survivors might not receive units 

until early 2017. 

Figure 5: FEMA Manufactured Housing Units 

Source: FEMA 

7 FEMA discontinued travel trailer units as a housing option following Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita. FEMA currently only provides U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD)-certified manufactured housing units. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In addition to the shortage of units, FEMA coordination issues also delayed 

MHU deliveries. FEMA officials said this MHU mission was the largest since 

FEMA restructured the program in 2012. They also said that many past issues 

remained uncorrected, such as unclear roles of Individual Assistance and 

Logistics staff in the MHU program, insufficient training in the Housing 

Operations Management Enterprise System (HOMES), and a lack of integration 

between HOMES and the National Emergency Management Information 

System.8 FEMA officials added that, until this housing mission, FEMA had 

simply worked around these known deficiencies. 

To correct these issues, FEMA brought in a program developer and a project 

manager to work with the MHU program. This effort resulted in a draft 

Individual Assistance Unified Program and Logistics Support Plan to identify 

goals and milestones, resolve problems and recommend solutions, and capture 

processes to guide future housing missions. Although FEMA’s corrective action 

was timely, implementing a costly program with known process deficiencies 

was very risky and exposes FEMA to potential fraud, waste, and abuse. We 

previously reported on risks related to FEMA’s temporary housing, but we plan 

to revisit the subject in a future audit.9 

Personnel – Joint Field Office managers generally agreed that response 

activities went well for this disaster, but systemic personnel challenges such as 

the shortage of qualified staff and lack of proper training are sources of 

constant frustration. The managers said risks associated with the lack of 

proper training and the shortage of qualified staff included ineffective program 

delivery, improper survivor interaction, and increased fatigue related to 

compounded responsibilities. They also said FEMA’s current deployment and 

qualification systems do not have mechanisms to identify and request 

personnel based on required skillset or by name.10 

FEMA addressed personnel shortfalls through additional training and crosstraining at the Joint Field Office, reassigning staff to assist programs with 

significant shortfalls, and hiring local workers for routine tasks to allow 

experienced staff to focus on helping survivors. In addition, FEMA instituted a 

8 FEMA uses the Housing Operation Management Enterprise System (HOMES) and National 

Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) as systems of record in its Individual 

Assistance program. After the restructure, Individual Assistance retained survivor interface 

responsibilities; while Logistics assumed responsibilities for MHU inventory, site inspections, 

and installation and maintenance oversight. 

9 OIG Report OIG-13-102, Unless Modified, FEMA’s Temporary Housing Plans Will Increase 

Costs by an Estimated $76 Million Annually, June 25, 2013 

10 FEMA’s Deployment Tracking System (DTS) assigns and tracks personnel requests and 

deployments; FEMA Qualification System (FQS) provides a process of “qualifying” and 

credentialing FEMA’s incident management workforce. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

structured check-out process that ensured personnel departures to other 

disasters, such as Hurricane Matthew in September 2016, did not compromise 

FEMA’s mission or damage trust with survivors.11 These concerns are 

consistent with our prior report conclusions, and FEMA is addressing these 

systemic issues to effectively respond to future major disasters.12 

Technology – FEMA logistics managers said technological shortfalls in this 

disaster included the continuing inability to track resources in WebEOC — 

FEMA’s designated disaster resource tracking application — and the absence of 

a backup mobile communications carrier.13 

FEMA Logistics managers said, although WebEOC is FEMA’s disaster resource 

tracker, FEMA has not integrated this application with other FEMA information 

systems.14 As a result, FEMA does not have full visibility and awareness of all 

its resources during disaster response until personnel manually enter 

information from other systems into WebEOC or communicate the information 

by other means such as emails. FEMA Logistics managers said not having the 

information in one place increases FEMA’s risk of improperly allocating 

resources, especially in the event of multiple disaster declarations. 

In addition, when FEMA’s mobile communications contractor experienced a 

loss of service from the flooding, FEMA field personnel could not communicate 

because FEMA did not have a backup carrier. To prevent similar future service 

disruptions, FEMA should consider the benefit of acquiring a redundant mobile 

communications carrier for field operations. 

FEMA Disaster Sourcing Decisions 

FEMA used various sourcing methods to effectively address disaster 

requirements. 

Incident Support Base, Federal Staging Areas, and Joint Field Office – FEMA 

used its existing assets in Louisiana to effectively respond to the disaster. 

FEMA’s Incident Support Base at Camp Beauregard in Pineville staged 

resources and prepositioned 1.2 million liters of water and 750,000 

11 Hurricane Matthew in September 2016 resulted in multiple disaster declarations. 

12 OIG-16-127-D, FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster Incident 

Workforce, September 2, 2016 

13 FEMA and many states use WebEOC, a commercial software for emergency resource and 

task management. 

14 Other systems include: Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS), FEMA’s mobile 

telecommunications and logistical support function; Deployment Tracking System (DTS), 

FEMA’s personnel resource tracker; and Network Optimization System (NiOS®), FEMA’s 

communication equipment ordering system. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

prepackaged meals. In addition, FEMA used two existing Federal Staging Areas 

in Boyce and Baton Rouge to receive MHU deliveries to prepare them for 

installation. FEMA also expanded the existing Joint Field Office facility from 

the spring floods declaration (DR-4263) to quickly stand up the Joint Field 

Office for this disaster. 

Mission Assignments – As of October 14, 2016, FEMA had issued 38 mission 

assignments and obligated almost $89 million to other Federal agencies in 

support of disaster operations. Key mission assignments included the following 

requests: 

x Health and Human Services to tend to the medical needs of evacuees; 

x General Services Administration to assist with locating and leasing 

facilities; 

x Federal Protective Services to provide security services; 

x Tennessee Valley Authority to assist with project formulation and cost 

estimations; and 

x U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to direct and monitor the manufactured 

housing “haul and install” process and plan and design group housing 

sites. 

Personnel Deployment – FEMA used its Deployment Tracking System to quickly 

deploy more than 2,400 personnel to the Joint Field Office in the first week 

following the disaster declaration. FEMA further demonstrated its commitment 

to the survivors by deploying some of its most senior and experienced 

leadership. At times, the Joint Field Office included the FEMA Administrator, 

two FEMA Regional administrators, and several Federal Coordinating Officers. 

FEMA also used the Louisiana Recovery Office facility next to the Joint Field 

Office to set up a Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration 

(RSOI) process to expedite security checks and badging, and distribute 

equipment and work assignments. 

Procurements, Contracts and Purchases – By October 14, 2016, FEMA had 

provided $242 million to purchase, transport, install, and maintain MHUs. 

FEMA also funded $52 million to activate its national technical assistance 

contracts for the Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard 

Mitigation programs. For local sourcing requirements and purchases, FEMA 

used the Joint Field Office’s acquisitions and resource ordering units. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

FEMA’s Coordination with Disaster Partners 

FEMA coordinated with Federal, State, and local officials to respond to the 

disaster in a timely manner. 

Expedited Declaration – After the governor of Louisiana declared a state of 

emergency on August 12, 2016, FEMA officials accompanied the governor on 

aerial damage assessments the next day and quickly responded to the 

governor’s request for an expedited declaration. On August 14, 2016, the 

President declared a major disaster, and by August 15, 2016, FEMA and 

Louisiana had signed the FEMA-State Agreement. A Louisiana official said 

FEMA’s proactive actions were very helpful because the flooding had affected 

many Louisiana employees who could not immediately respond to the disaster. 

Joint Field Office – FEMA effectively coordinated with Louisiana by aligning the 

Joint Field Office’s three branch offices with the Louisiana Governor’s Office of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) regions.15 In 

addition, as previously discussed, FEMA used mission assignments and formed 

various task forces composed of representatives from Federal and Louisiana 

agencies to address the most urgent needs proactively. 

Local Coordination – FEMA proactively coordinated with local officials and 

communities to provide assistance. FEMA officials helped Louisiana with Public 

Assistance applicant briefings, conducted kickoff meetings with local officials to 

assess public infrastructure damages, and regularly hosted calls with elected 

officials to address survivor concerns. In addition, FEMA External Affairs 

arranged for subject matter experts to attend community meetings to answer 

questions from local officials and citizens. FEMA also — 

x deployed hundreds of Disaster Survival Assistance personnel to local 

communities to “assess, inform, and report” survivor needs, 

x embedded hazard mitigation staff in local government offices to offer 

guidance on rebuilding, 

x provided substantial damage assessment data to local floodplain 

managers, and 

x conducted mitigation education and outreach programs to help 

communities reduce future disaster damages. 

15 In the National Incident Management System’s incident command structure, a “branch” has 

functional, geographical, or jurisdictional responsibility for incident operations. In this disaster, 

the Joint Field Office operated branch offices in Hammond, Baton Rouge, and Lafayette, 

Louisiana. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

OIG Deployment Activities 

Our visibility and availability to FEMA, Louisiana, local officials, and others 

affected by the disaster provided a deterrent to potential fraud, waste, and 

abuse. By deploying staff to assess FEMA’s disaster response and recovery 

activities while they happen, we better position ourselves to identify potential 

problems before they occur. We also helped educate State and local officials at 

applicant briefings and kickoff meetings about typical audit findings and the 

Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines they need to follow to avoid 

improperly spending disaster assistance funds. 

During our deployment and audit fieldwork, FEMA officials invited the 

deployment team to observe the Shelter-At-Home program development 

process. In addition, we often met with FEMA officials to discuss critical issues 

they were facing. Although we must remain independent and not participate in 

management decisions, our standards allow us to take positions on whether 

certain activities comply with Federal law and regulations. In one such 

instance, FEMA requested our assistance in reviewing a proposed program for 

providing food to disaster survivors in hotels. 

Proposal to Provide Food to Disaster Survivors 

As part of the strategic housing plan, Louisiana submitted a request to FEMA 

to purchase 30-day supply food boxes for survivors staying in hotels in the 

Transitional Sheltering Assistance program. In the request, Louisiana asked 

FEMA to purchase $1.46 million in 30-day supply food boxes, with the option 

for two additional 30-day periods. In October 2016, FEMA approved (but did 

not obligate) $1,055,500 in Federal funds to address this request. FEMA 

officials said that, according to its data analysis, survivors had consistently 

ranked food as an unmet need, and FEMA asserted it could provide food as 

essential assistance under section 403 of the Stafford Act. 

In October 2016, FEMA requested us to review its proposed delivery method — 

providing the food boxes to area food banks for distribution to FEMA applicants 

in hotels. However, we could not address the proposed delivery method 

because we contend that providing food to disaster survivors staying in hotels 

is not eligible for FEMA funding. Section 413 of the Stafford Act and 44 Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) 206.151 assigns the authority to provide disaster 

food assistance to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, not FEMA. Further, we 

disagreed with FEMA’s position that providing food to survivors in hotels 

3 months after the disaster met the Stafford Act, section 403, criterion of 

“meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major 

disaster.” 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In November 2016, we informed FEMA of our position — that providing food to 

disaster survivors would not be eligible for FEMA funding. We advised FEMA 

that, if it decided to move forward with the program, establishing robust 

controls would be essential to prevent potential fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Because of our concerns, FEMA opted not to go forward with the program, thus 

avoiding the purchase of at least $1 million of food. 

Discussion with Management 

We discussed the results of our audit with FEMA officials during our audit 

and included their comments in this report, as appropriate. We also provided
 

a draft report to FEMA officials and discussed it at an exit conference on 

March 7, 2017. FEMA officials agreed with our observations and audit 

results, and a FEMA official stated that the Emergency Management Oversight 

Team’s access and perspective were very helpful to FEMA. On March 30, 2017,
 

FEMA Region VI officials provided a written response to this report 

(see appendix B). 

We appreciate the cooperation FEMA officials provided us during this audit. 

This report contains no recommendations; therefore, we consider it closed. 

We will post the final report, including FEMA’s written response on our 

website.
 

The Office of Emergency Management Oversight major contributors to this
 

report are Tonda L. Hadley, Director; Christopher Dodd, Director (retired);
 

Kathy Hughes, Audit Manager; Tai Cheung, Senior Auditor-in-Charge;
 

Angela Huddleston, Auditor; Jeffrey Campora, Senior Auditor; 

Rebecca Hetzler, Senior Auditor; and Sharon Snedeker, Independent 

Reference Reviewer.
 

Please call me with any questions at (202) 254-4100, or your staff may 

contact Paul Wood, Acting Deputy Assistant Inspector General, at (202) 254­

4100 or Tonda L. Hadley, Director, Central Regional Office - South at (214)
 

436-5220.
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-17-80-D 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Our overall audit objectives were to determine whether FEMA’s initial 

response to the Louisiana flooding was effective, and whether FEMA’s 

actions, resources, and authorities were consistent with Federal 

regulations and FEMA guidelines in effect at the time of the disaster. To 

accomplish our objectives, we focused on answering the following 

questions: 

1.	 What activities did FEMA perform before and after the disaster 

declaration?
 

2.	 What were the most significant challenges FEMA faced in this disaster? 

3.	 What were the most significant resource shortfalls? 

4.	 How did FEMA make disaster-sourcing decisions? 

5.	 How well did FEMA coordinate its activities with Federal, State, and local 

officials? 

To evaluate FEMA’s initial response to this disaster (FEMA-4277-DR-LA), 

we performed the following procedures: 

x	 Deployed staff to the FEMA Joint Field Office in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 

x	 Reviewed Initial Action Plans and Situation Reports; analyzed reports, 

executive summaries, and fact sheets; and monitored media reports. 

x	 Interviewed FEMA and Louisiana officials. 

x	 Visited Disaster Recovery Centers throughout the State. 

x	 Attended Applicant Briefings led by Louisiana Governor’s Office of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Management and attended FEMA 

Public Assistance kickoff meetings. 

x	 Attended Joint Field Office Meetings. 

x	 Visited damaged areas. 

We also performed other procedures considered necessary to accomplish our 

objective. The audit covered FEMA’s response and recovery activities for 

Disaster Number FEMA-4277-DR-LA for the period August 13, 2016, through 

October 14, 2016. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16	 OIG-17-80-D 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A (continued) 

We conducted this performance audit between August 2016 and 

March 2017 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 

and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We did not assess the 

adequacy of FEMA’s internal controls applicable to disaster response 

because it was not necessary to accomplish our audit objective. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-17-80-D 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

FEMA Region VI Management Response 

www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-17-80-D 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B (continued)
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-17-80-D 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Regional Administrator, FEMA Region VI 

Chief of Staff 

Chief Counsel 

Chief Financial Officer 

Associate Administrator for Policy, Program Analysis, and International 

Affairs 

Director, Risk Management and Compliance 

FEMA GAO/OIG Liaison 

FEMA Audit Liaison, Region VI 

Audit Liaison, FEMA (Job Code: G-16-052-EMO-FEMA) 

Federal Coordinating Officer, DR-4277 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-17-80-D 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs 

at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click on the red 

"Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at (800) 323-8603, fax our 

hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305