alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruben RAMIREZ-DIMAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-4045.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted June 13, 2002.

Decided June 21, 2002.

Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Arnold L. Husser, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Ruben Ramirez-Dimas appeals his sentence of ninety-six months imprisonment following his guilty plea to unlawful reentry of a deported alien after conviction of an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (West 1999). *701Ramirez-Dimas’ attorney has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting Ramirez-Dimas’ sentence was unduly harsh, but stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Ramirez-Dimas has not done so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Ramirez-Dimas argues his prior felony convictions should have been treated as an element of his offense, rather than a sentencing factor. Because the Supreme Court has held that § 1326(b)(2) sets forth a sentencing factor rather than an element of the offense, this claim is without merit. *See Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Ramirez-Dimas also contends the district court erred by imposing a sentence at the high end of the sentencing guidelines range. However, because his sentence is within the properly calculated sentencing guidelines range and is less than the statutory maximum sentence, it is not reviewable. *See United States v. Jones,*18 F.3d 1145, 1150-51 (4th Cir.1994); *United States v. Porter,*909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir.1990).

As required by *Anders,*we have examined the entire record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Ramirez-Dimas’ conviction and sentence. We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw at this juncture. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
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You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title: � Isabel�s story : how she and her familylearned about osteoporosis and bone health = La historia de Isabel : c�mo ellay su familia aprendieron sobre la osteoporosis y la salud de los huesos.
 
English | Espanol
 
SuDoc Number:HE 20.3902:OS 7/4/SPAN.-ENG.
Item Number:0508-T (online)
CGP systemNumber:000625234
 
December 27, 2017**
June 10, 2015 

 

Mr. Terry Camnitz 

233 Red Rose Cr. 

Orlando, FL 32835 

Dear Mr. Camnitz: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your May 20, 2015, exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-

1837), but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does 

not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request 

any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division 

Enclosure
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 151 (Friday, August 7, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 39717]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-18929]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD


Correction to Agency Forms Submitted for OMB Review, Request for 
Comments

SUMMARY: The Railroad Retirement Board is making corrections to the 
July 23, 2009 document appearing on page 36540, FR Doc. E9-17510 
titled, Agency Forms Submitted for OMB Review. Specifically, the 
Request for Comments for Information Collection Review (ICR); 
Application for Survivor Insurance Annuities (OMB 3220-0030) which was 
published with errors regarding the annual burden computation for the 
information collection.

Correction of Publication

    In the table titled ``Estimate of Annual Respondent Burden'', the 
AA-17b total burden hours should be 204 (not 270) and the total annual 
responses should be 3,722 (not 4,022).
    Under the Information Collection Request (ICR) heading, the 
``Estimated annual number of respondents'' should be 3,722 (not 4,022) 
and the ``Total annual responses'' should be 3,722 (not 4,022).

Charles Mierzwa,
Clearance Officer.
[FR Doc. E9-18929 Filed 8-6-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7905-01-P
www.gpo.gov

### §283z–8. Increase in lending to Caribbean

The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of the Bank to enter into discussions with the management of the Bank and with other member country governments to seek to increase Bank lending to the Caribbean region, directly or through appropriate financial intermediaries, for viable projects which will—

(1) result in expanded regional economic integration, diversification, and industrial and agricultural production, and improved infrastructure; and

(2) seek to ensure equitable and environmentally sustainable economic growth.

(Pub. L. 86–147, §36, as added Pub. L. 101–240, title II, §204, Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2499.)
39710.

#### SHOFFEITT v. THE STATE.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of manufacturing liquor and thereafter his motion for new trial based on the general grounds and one special ground was overruled. Error is now assigned on such j udgment adverse to him. *Held:*

1. The one special ground of the motion for new tria-l is based on alleged newly discovered evidence. Movant and his counsel made affidavits stating that they did not know of the alleged newly discovered evidence “before the trial,” and that a diligent investigation did not reveal the same. Movant’s brother William Andrew Shoffeitt’s affidavit was tantamount to a confession that he and not movant had committed the offense for which movant was convicted. The denial of a new trial on the ground of alleged newly discovered evidence is not error. “If they knew of the evidence during the trial, they could not go on with it, take the chances of a verdict *544in their behalf, and then complain of a verdict against them. Their affidavits should have affirmatively stated that they did not know of the evidence during the trial; failing in this, they have no cause for a new trial on the ground of the alleged newly discovered evidence.” *Collins v. State,*153 Ga. 95, 103 (111 SE 733). In the present case there is no affirmative statement in either affidavit that affiant did not know of the evidence *during*the trial. Such ground is without merit.

Decided September 18, 1962.

*Stow ■& Andrews, Frank B. Stow, Robert E. Andrews,*for plaintiff in error.

*Jeff C. Wayne, Solicitor General, Frank Strickland, Jr., Charles Dent Bostick,*contra.

2. As for the general grounds, there was ample evidence to authorize the verdict and the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankum and Jordan, JJ., concur.*
----

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 28 November 2006 — Milbert and Others v Commission

(Case T-47/04) (1)

(Officials - Career development report - 2001/2002 appraisal procedure)

(2006/C 331/73)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Alex Milbert (Hesperange, Luxembourg), Saturnino Durán Vidal (Brussels, Belgium), Roland Hanff (Dudelange, Luxembourg), Maria Anita Nuotio (Brussels), Paraskevi Papageorgiou (Brussels), Andrea Ranschaert (Drongen, Belgium), Reinhard Rieder (Brussels) and Ioannis Terezakis (Brussels) (represented by: initially G. Bounéou and F. Frabetti, then F. Frabetti, lawyers)

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: J. Currall and H. Krämer, Agents)

Re:

Primarily, application for annulment of the 2001-2002 appraisal procedure in so far as it concerns the applicants or, in the alternative, annulment of the applicants' career development reports in respect of that procedure

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

----

(1)OJ C 94, 17.4.2004.

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcus B. BROADWAY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-4939.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 30, 2002.

Decided June 21, 2002.

Frederick H. Marsh, Hill, Tucker, *&*Marsh, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul F. McNulty, United States Attorney, Stephen W. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Marcus Broadway was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999 *&*Supp.2001), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000). He was sentenced to 170 months imprisonment. On appeal, he maintains that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the firearms charge. We affirm.

*697This court must affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to support the verdict. *Glasser v. United States,*315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). In determining whether the evidence is substantial, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and inquires whether there is evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. *United States v. Burgos,*94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency *of*the evidence, this court does not review witness credibility and assumes the fact finder resolved all contradictions in the evidence in the Government’s favor. *United States v. Romer,*148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir.1998). The fact finder, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented, and if the evidence supports different reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which to believe. *United States v. Murphy,*35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994).

We have reviewed the record and we find sufficient evidence to support Broadway’s firearm conviction. Accordingly, we affirm Broadway’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.6657-1 Bad checks. ( a ) *In general.* Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, if a check or money order is tendered in the payment of any amount receivable under the Code, and such check or money order is not paid upon presentment, a penalty of one percent of the amount of the check or money order, in addition to any other penalties provided by law shall be paid by the person who tendered such check or money order. If, however, the amount of the check or money order is less than $500, the penalty shall be $5 or the amount of the check or money order, whichever amount is the lesser. Such penalty shall be paid in the same manner as tax upon the issuance of a notice and demand therefor.
( b ) *Reasonable cause.* If payment is refused upon presentment of any check or money order and the person who tendered such check or money order establishes to the satisfaction of the district director that it was tendered in good faith with reasonable cause to believe that it would be duly paid, the penalty set forth in paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply.
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.6501(d)-1 Request for prompt assessment. ( a ) Except as otherwise provided in section 6501 (c), (e), or (f), any tax for which a return is required and for which: ( 1 ) A decedent or an estate of a decedent may be liable, other than the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 of the Code, or
( 2 ) A corporation which is contemplating dissolution, is in the process of dissolution, or has been dissolved, may be liable, shall be assessed, or a proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall be begun, within 18 months after the receipt of a written request for prompt assessment thereof.
( b ) The executor, administrator, or other fiduciary representing the estate of the decedent, or the corporation, or the fiduciary representing the dissolved corporation, as the case may be, shall, after the return in question has been filed, file the request for prompt assessment in writing with the district director for the internal revenue district in which such return was filed. The request, in order to be effective, must be transmitted separately from any other document, must set forth the classes of tax and the taxable periods for which the prompt assessment is requested, and must clearly indicate that it is a request for prompt assessment under the provisions of section 6501(d). The effect of such a request is to limit the time in which an assessment of tax may be made, or a proceeding in court without assessment for collection of tax may be begun, to a period of 18 months from the date the request is filed with the proper district director. The request does not extend the time within which an assessment may be made, or a proceeding in court without assessment years from the date the return was filed. This special period of limitations will not apply to any return filed after a request for prompt assessment has been made unless an additional request is filed in the manner provided herein.
( c ) In the case of a corporation the 18-month period shall not apply unless: ( 1 ) The written request notifies the district director that the corporation contemplates dissolution at or before the expiration of such 18-month period; the dissolution is in good faith begun before the expiration of such 18-month period; and the dissolution so begun is completed either before or after the expiration of such 18-month period; or
( 2 ) The written request notifies the district director that a dissolution has in good faith been begun, and the dissolution is completed either before or after the expiration of such 18-month period; or
( 3 ) A dissolution has been completed at the time the written request is made.
§ 31.3134-1 Recapture of credits. ( a ) *Recapture of erroneously refunded credits.* Any amount of credits for qualified wages under section 3134 of the Code that is treated as an overpayment and refunded or credited to an employer under section 6402(a) or 6413(b) of the Code and to which the employer is not entitled, resulting in an erroneous refund to the employer, shall be treated as an underpayment of the taxes imposed under section 3111(b) and so much of the taxes imposed under section 3221(a) as are attributable to the rate in effect under section 3111(b), as applicable, and may be assessed and collected by the Secretary in the same manner as the taxes.
( b ) *Advance credit amounts erroneously refunded.* The determination of any amount of credits erroneously refunded as described in paragraph (a) of this section must take into account any amount of credits advanced to an employer under the process established by the Internal Revenue Service in accordance with section 3134(j) and 3134(m).
( c ) *Third party payors.* For purposes of this section, employers against whom an erroneous refund of the credits under section 3134 can be assessed as an underpayment of the taxes imposed under section 3111(b) and so much of the taxes imposed under section 3221(a) as are attributable to the rate in effect under section 3111(b), as applicable, include persons treated as the employer under sections 3401(d), 3504, and 3511, consistent with their liability for the section 3111(b) or 3221(a) taxes against which the credit applied, and also include those persons' common law employer clients that remain subject to all provisions of law applicable to employers with respect to the payment of wages or compensation, as applicable.
( d ) *Applicability date.* This section applies to all credit refunds under section 3134 advanced or paid on or after September 8, 2021.
[T.D. 9978, 88 FR 48125, July 26, 2023]
§ 46.4377-1 Definitions and special rules. ( a ) *Definitions.* The following definitions apply for purposes of sections 4375 and 4376 and §§ 46.4375-1 and 46.4376-1. ( 1 ) *Accident and health coverage.* The term *accident and health coverage* means any coverage that, if provided by an insurance policy, would cause such policy to be a specified health insurance policy (as defined in section 4375(c) and § 46.4375-1(b)(1)). Accident and health coverage also includes coverage for an active employee, a former employee, or a qualifying beneficiary that is continuation coverage required under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) or similar continuation coverage under other federal law or under state law.
( 2 ) *Individual residing in the United States* — ( i ) The term *individual residing in the United States* means an individual with a place of abode in the United States.
( ii ) *Determination of place of abode.* For purposes of paragraph (a)(2) of this section, an issuer or a plan sponsor may rely on the most recent address on file with the issuer or plan sponsor and may treat the primary insured and the primary insured's spouse, dependents, or other beneficiaries covered by the policy as having the same place of abode. For this purpose, the primary insured is the individual covered by the policy whose eligibility for coverage was not due to that individual's status as the spouse, dependent, or other beneficiary of another covered individual.
( 3 ) *United States.* The term *United States* includes American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and any other possession of the United States.
( 4 ) *Federal fiscal year.* The term *Federal fiscal year* means the year beginning on October 1 and ending on the following September 30.
( b ) *Treatment of exempt governmental programs* — ( 1 ) *In general.* The fees imposed by sections 4375 and 4376 do not apply to any covered life under an exempt governmental program as defined in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
( 2 ) *Exempt governmental program.* For purposes of this section, *exempt governmental program* means any— ( i ) Insurance program established under title XVIII of the Social Security Act;
( ii ) Medical assistance program established by title XIX or XXI of the Social Security Act;
( iii ) Program established by Federal law for providing medical care (other than through insurance policies) to individuals (or their spouses and dependents) by reason of such individuals being (or having been) members of the Armed Forces of the United States; and
( iv ) Program established by Federal law for providing medical care (other than through insurance policies) to members of Indian tribes (as defined in section 4(d) of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act).
( c ) *Effective/Applicability date.* This section applies to all policy and plan years that end on or after October 1, 2012, and before October 1, 2019.