1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) ZACHARY JOHNSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 13

- 1642 (BAH) ) ERIC HOLDER, JR., et al. , ) ) Defendants. )

___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on the application to proceed in forma pauperis of Zachary Johnson and the pro se complaint of Zachary Johnson and Russell Keith Hill

. The plaintiffs have named as defendants the Attorneys General of the United States and of the State of Mississippi, an employee of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and eight Federal District and Circuit Court Judges. See Compl., generally , ECF No. 1

- 1. Russell Kei th Hill did not submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis . Even if he had, the Court likely would not have granted it. Hill has been barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act , see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). He “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to st ate a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. ; see Hill v. Epps , 169 F. App’x 199, 200 (5th Cir. 2006) (assessing third “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Hill v. Fed. Judicial Ctr. , No. 05

- 1567 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 14, 2008) (order revokin g in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Furthermore, the Court would not2 be inclined to allow Hill to circumvent the “three strikes” rule by bringing an action with a co

plaintiff who is not subject to such limitations. See Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, 2013 WL 5423107, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (“This Court will not allow [prisoner barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)] to circumvent the three

- strike rule by a ttempting to join the Plaintiff’ s complaint through joinder [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)].”). Russell Keith Hill will be dismissed as a party to this action, leaving Zachary Johnson as the sole plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, “Royce C. Lambert[h], in his ‘official capac ity’ as CHIEF JUDGE of the D.C. District Court[,] demonstrates ‘discrimination’ and ‘retaliation’ against the plaintiff[] for exercising [his] constitutional right to file [a] TORT CLAIM.’” Compl. [ECF No.
1

- 1] at 3 (emphasis removed). In addition, plai ntiff alleges, judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi likewise have thwarted plaintiff’s attempts to pursue his legal claims and thus have violated his ri ghts under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution , s ee id. at 3

- 5 , and the United Nations Convention Against Torture, see id. at 13

. As compensation for this un defined tort, plaintiff demand s “MONETARY DAMAGES” IN TH E AMOUNT OF “ONE (1) ZILLION DOLLAR[S] , ” i d. at 15 (emphasis removed) , among other relief, see id. at 13

- 14. Although the Court “must construe pro se filings liberally ,” Richardson v. United States , 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), “[ a] pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to do so. Its purported claims “lack[] even an arguable basis in law ,” Nei tzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989), rendering the complaint3 subject to dism issal as frivolous. Moreover, plaintiff’s purported tort claim against the judges could have arisen only in the course of pe rforming their judicial duties, and “[f]ew doctr ines were more solidly established

. . . than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547, 553

- 54 (1967) ; see Mirales v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam) (“[G]enerally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.”); Forrester v. White , 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 355

- 57 (1978); Sindram v. Suda , 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ; see al so Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S 511, 525 (1985) (noting that “the essence of absolute immunity is its possess or’ s entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.”)

. Their “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of ba d faith or malice , ” Mirales , 502 U.S. at 11, such as those plaintiff attempts to assert. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the complaint with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). 1 An Order is issued separately.

/s/ 

# Beryl A. Ho well BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge DATE: November 25, 2013

1 Three of the eleven named defendants

– Eric Holder, Jr., Jim Hood, and Phyllis J. Pyles

– are not federal judges. The basis for the plaintiff’s claims against the DOJ and the Mississippi State Attorney General are unclear but to the extent intelligible appear to stem from these agencies not providing relief from judicial action, s ee Compl. at 6 (“Finally, the [p]laintiff[s] have sought relief through the U.S. Department of Justice, to [n]o avail”), or somehow being responsible for Congressional enactment of the PLRA, see id . at 4 (alleging in connection with “the adoption of the PLRA,” “a ‘subtil’ [sic] and ‘deceptive tactic’ schemed by the Attorney Generals offices through out the United States”). The Complaint fails to assert a cognizable legal claim against the se defendants, who will therefore be dismissed as parties to this action

.