IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

North Allegheny School District, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1379 C.D. 2019

: ARGUED: October 13, 2020

North Allegheny Federation of :

Teachers, Local 2097, American :

Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO :

(Federation) :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 9, 2020

North Allegheny School District (School District) appeals from the August 

29, 2019 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) 

dismissing School District’s Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award (Petition to

Vacate) and confirming the April 1, 2019 arbitration award (Award) issued by Jane 

Desimone, Esquire (Arbitrator). In her Award, the Arbitrator sustained in part a

grievance filed by the North Allegheny Federation of Teachers, Local 2097,

American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (Union), on behalf of Paul Seneca. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm the Trial Court’s Order.

Background

Mr. Seneca has taught elementary school physical education for 43 years and 

has worked for School District for 22 years. During his 22-year employment with 

School District, Mr. Seneca received satisfactory performance ratings each year 

through the 2016-2017 school year. Most recently, Mr. Seneca was a physical 
2

education teacher at School District’s Hosack Elementary School during the 2017-

2018 school year.

On January 29, 2018, School District issued a Plan of Improvement (POI) to 

Mr. Seneca, stemming from an incident in which one of his students was injured 

during gym class in January 2018.

1

 The POI stated:

You are being placed on a [POI] due to unsatisfactory performances as 

specified in the deficiencies identified below. This plan is designed to 

help you correct those deficiencies. Upon successful completion of this 

plan, you will be returned to the general directed supervision track of 

evaluation. If this plan is not successfully completed according to the 

timetable designated by the administrative team, further disciplinary 

action may be initiated.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 118. The POI identified the following deficiencies in 

Mr. Seneca’s job performance:

Inadequate classroom procedures and poor classroom management 

have resulted in a classroom environment where no standards of 

conduct were evident. A pattern of insufficient supervision has led to 

an unsafe classroom environment resulting in a recent situation where 

a student received a serious injury, and the student leaving the 

classroom without the instructor’s knowledge. Finally, a lack of clear 

1 The Arbitrator described the January 2018 incident as follows:

[O]n January 10, 2018, [a] student was seriously injured in [Mr. Seneca’s] 

classroom, with a bloody nose and a concussion. The student went to the nurse’s 

office without [Mr. Seneca] being aware of what had occurred. . . . [A]s a result of 

this incident, [Mr. Seneca] received a one-day suspension and was placed on the 

POI. The one-day suspension was issued without a Loudermill hearing and was . . 

. thereafter rescinded.

Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 7. “A Loudermill hearing is a pre-termination hearing given to a 

public employee that is required by due process, as established in Cleveland Board of Education 

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532[] . . . (1985).” Ray v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 19 A.3d 29, 31 n.2 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
3

learning goals as to content and student behavior expectations have 

created an environment where students spend a significant amount of 

time off-task.

Id. (emphasis added). The POI stated that School District would conduct periodic 

observations of Mr. Seneca’s classroom and would hold a formal mid-point meeting 

with Mr. Seneca on March 22, 2018 and a final summary meeting on May 22, 2018.

School District officials conducted four observations of Mr. Seneca’s

classroom between February 26, 2018 and May 24, 2018 in accordance with the POI. 

On May 21, 2018, Union Representative Marcia Casey sent an email to Amanda 

Mathieson, Principal of Hosack Elementary School, stating that she could not attend 

the final summary meeting scheduled for the next day due to a scheduling conflict. 

Mr. Seneca completed his required 18 hours of online training by May 5, 2018, but 

he did not submit all of the required self-assessment paperwork until the evening of 

May 21, 2018.

On June 1, 2018, School District suspended Mr. Seneca without pay following 

two incidents that occurred during his gym classes on May 22, 2018 and May 24, 

2018. On June 4, 2018, School District issued a Notice of Loudermill Hearing

(Loudermill Notice) and a Statement of Charges to Mr. Seneca. In its Statement of 

Charges, School District alleged that Mr. Seneca engaged in the following 

misconduct:

• You were warned and had knowledge of [S]chool [D]istrict’s 

performance expectations[,] in particular its requirements for 

planned supervision of students, an[d] ethical execution of your 

professional responsibilities, and have failed to meet them.

• A [POI] dated January 29, 2018 identifies your deficiencies as: 

inadequate classroom procedures; poor classroom management; 

insufficient supervision resulting in an unsafe classroom 

environment; an unsafe environment which resulted in a student 
4

receiving a serious injury and the student leaving your classroom 

to receive medical care without your knowledge; and an 

environment where students spend a significant amount of time 

off-task.

• You acknowledged that the [POI] dated January 29, 2018 was to 

address supervision, safe environment, monitoring student 

activity and keeping students on task.

• [Ms.] Mathieson[] . . . observed your classroom on May 22, [2018] 

during the 11:30-12:15 pm class period. During this time period, 

you were observed sitting and otherwise unengaged with your 

students. Once you noticed [Ms.] Mathieson’s entry into your 

classroom you immediately jumped up from your seated position 

and began to engage with your students. [Ms.] Mathieson 

observed you on your personal electronic device for an extended 

period of time and not providing active supervision to your 

students.

• [School] District received reports that a third[-]grade female 

student was found locked outside of the Hosack Elementary 

[School] [b]uilding during her scheduled class period with you. It 

was reported by a staff person that on May 24, 2018 between the 

hours of 2:45 and 3:00 pm a third grade student assigned to your 

classroom was found outside behind the building standing 

unsupervised. The student reported to the staff member that you 

sent her to go outside to clean up gym equipment and to bring the 

equipment inside. As the student was locked out of the building, 

the staff member let her back in and told her to return to your 

classroom. Thereafter, you sent the same student outside the 

school building along with other students unsupervised.

• You failed to report the student’s extended absence from your 

classroom to the [school a]dministration and you did not believe 

it was necessary as it was not a priority or serious matter.

• [Ms.] Mathieson[] . . . provided you written notice of your 

deficiencies and continued lack of supervision on May 29, 2018[.]
5

• You were aware and knew of [S]chool [D]istrict’s policies 

regarding student safety and deliberately chose to ignore them[.]

• You were informed that the conduct of sitting off to the side and 

failing to engage with your students was unacceptable[.]

• Your repetitive acts and omissions regarding the lack of 

supervision of your students was clearly exhibited in the video 

reviewed with you and [Union] representatives on June 7, 2018. 

The video identifies students repetitively exiting your classroom 

presumably to get a drink from the water fountain; another group 

of students exited the classroom after having received a set of keys 

from you and returned approximately ten minutes later; you are 

observed on your phone for an approximate period of twenty-five 

minutes and not supervising your students; and later observed 

sitting off to the side of the gym on a stool and not until [Ms.] 

Mathieson’s entrance are you observed supervising the students’ 

game of kickball.

• Your explanation that you did not jump to attention when caught 

by [Ms.] Mathieson was negated by the video. Additionally, your 

explanations for viewing your phone to review and set-up stations 

as well as the need for students to collect equipment were negated 

by the fact that prior to the class you have a [15-]minute window 

of time for set-up of the obstacle course as well as two successive 

plan periods prior to the 11:30-12:15 pm class period.

• You failed to exert reasonable effort to protect your students from 

conditions which interfere with learning or are harmful to the 

student’s health and safety.

R.R. at 101-03. 

Based on these allegations, School District charged Mr. Seneca with, inter 

alia: immorality; persistent negligence in the performance of duties; persistent and 

willful neglect of duties; persistent and willful violations of the school laws of the 

Commonwealth; and incompetence under Section 1122(a) of the Public School Code 
6

of 1949 (School Code), Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 11-

1122(a).

2

 Id. at 103.

Following the Loudermill hearing, School District’s Superintendent 

concluded that there were sufficient grounds to support “the allegations of [Mr. 

Seneca’s violation of] the Code of Conduct for Professional Educators, 

incompetency, negligence, persistent negligence in the performance of duties, 

willful neglect of duties and/or persistent and willful violations of[,] or failure to 

comply with[,] the school laws of the Commonwealth, as set forth in the School 

Code.” R.R. at 96. Thus, School District suspended Mr. Seneca without pay 

effective June 8, 2018. Following a public school board meeting, School District

approved Mr. Seneca’s dismissal on August 6, 2018. R.R. at 98.

On June 11, 2018, the Union filed a grievance report with School District on 

behalf of Mr. Seneca in accordance with the parties’ collective bargaining agreement 

(CBA).3 The Union averred that Mr. Seneca “was unjustly suspended without pay”

2 Section 1122(a) of the School Code states in relevant part:

The only valid causes for termination of a contract heretofore or hereafter entered 

into with a professional employe shall be immorality; incompetency; unsatisfactory 

teaching performance based on two (2) consecutive ratings of the employe’s 

teaching performance that are to include classroom observations, not less than four 

(4) months apart, in which the employe’s teaching performance is rated as 

unsatisfactory; . . . persistent negligence in the performance of duties; wilful neglect 

of duties; . . . [and] persistent and wilful violation of or failure to comply with 

school laws of this Commonwealth, including official directives and established 

policy of the board of directors[] on the part of the professional employe . . . .

24 P.S. § 11-1122(a) (emphasis added).

3 The CBA between School District and the Union was in effect from July 1, 2015 through 

June 30, 2020. The CBA provided that, for a professional employee, such as Mr. Seneca,

“[s]eniority shall be broken and employment terminated for . . . [d]ischarge in conformance with 

[the] School Code.” R.R. at 40; see Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 2.
7

and requested that he “be made whole, including recall to his job and full back pay 

for all lost wages and benefits.” R.R. at 104.

Pursuant to the CBA, the grievance matter proceeded to arbitration and was 

assigned to the Arbitrator on August 24, 2018.

1. Arbitration Proceedings

The Arbitrator held evidentiary hearings on October 15, 2018 and November 

16, 2018. At the outset of the proceedings, the parties stipulated that the principle 

of just cause is implied in the CBA and that the issue to be determined by the 

Arbitrator was whether School District had just cause to discharge Mr. Seneca. 

Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 1, 13; Trial Ct. Op., 12/12/19, at 7.

Following the hearings, the parties requested additional time to submit posthearing briefs. The Arbitrator received the parties’ post-hearing briefs on January 

14, 2019, at which time she closed the record.

The Arbitrator issued her Decision and Award on April 1, 2019. Based on her

review of the Statement of Charges, the Arbitrator determined that School District 

dismissed Mr. Seneca for: (1) two separate incidents of misconduct – one on May 

22, 2018 involving his fifth grade class, and one on May 24, 2018 involving a third

grade student; and (2) failing to complete the requirements of the January 29, 2018 

POI. Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 13-14.

4

 The Arbitrator made the following 

findings regarding each charge.

4

In her decision, the Arbitrator also explained her evidentiary ruling, made during the 

hearings, regarding earlier alleged incidents of negligent supervision as follows:

In addition to the conduct described in the Statement of Charges, the School District 

referenced events involving [Mr. Seneca] that occurred in 2014, 2015 and January 

of 2018. These events were raised at arbitration as evidence of [his] persistent and 

repetitive pattern of misconduct involving his lack of sufficient supervision of his 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
8

A. May 22, 2018 Incident

On May 22, 2018, Mr. Seneca initially planned to conduct his fifth grade gym 

class outside, but he moved the class indoors due to the heat and humidity. Id. at 15. 

Mr. Seneca’s students were playing a game in the gymnasium called “500,” which 

involved hitting softballs with bats and running bases. Id. Mr. Seneca was present 

during the game and used his cell phone for about 25 minutes. Id. Ms. Mathieson

observed the class after the game had already started, and a security camera captured 

the entire class period. The video footage was admitted into evidence. Id. at 15 n.2.

Based on Ms. Mathieson’s observations and the video footage, School District 

found that Mr. Seneca failed to adequately supervise his students and failed to 

engage with his students by being on his cell phone, and that the game was 

unstructured and chaotic. Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 15. Mr. Seneca, however,

testified that he was using his cell phone during class to access teaching materials 

because his school iPad was not charged. Id. He also testified that he positioned his 

seat so that he could keep an eye on the students and that any students who left the 

gym did so with his permission, to either retrieve equipment or use the restroom or 

water fountain. Id.

classroom and students. [School] District’s attempt to submit camera footage of 

these events was objected to by the [Union]. This objection was sustained, with the 

evidence ruled inadmissible because the earlier events were not cited in the 

Statement of Charges and [some of the events took place] up to four years prior [to 

Mr. Seneca’s discharge]. While reference and testimony as to the prior matters 

were deemed admissible as evidence of [Mr. Seneca’s] knowledge of [School] 

District’s performance expectations, it was deemed unfair to require [Mr. Seneca] 

to defend against old incidents at such a late time.

Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/1/9, at 14 (emphasis added).
9

The Arbitrator found Mr. Seneca’s testimony credible and consistent with 

both the video footage and Ms. Mathieson’s observations. Id. at 16. The Arbitrator

concluded:

Contrary to the assertions of the School District, there is no indication 

that [Mr. Seneca] willfully neglected his duties. While [Ms.] Mathieson 

may have had grounds to question how [Mr. Seneca] ran the class, 

none of the conduct either described or captured on camera footage 

came close to the alleged level of willful neglect, negligence of duty, 

incompetence, immorality or other unethical behavior. Likewise, there 

is no indication that [Mr. Seneca] abused his authority as a teacher.

As the evidence does not support these allegations, the charges as they 

relate to [Mr. Seneca’s] actions on May 22, 2018 are unfounded.

Id. (emphasis added).

B. May 24, 2018 Incident

On May 24, 2018, Mr. Seneca initially planned to conduct his third grade gym 

class outside, but he moved it indoors due to the heat and humidity. Id. Mr. Seneca

directed a female student to retrieve equipment to be used in the gym. Id. The 

student understood this to be a directive to retrieve equipment from outside. Id. 

After going outside, the student was unable to get back inside the building and was 

locked out for approximately 20 minutes. Id. The student was eventually seen by 

three paraprofessionals, who let her back into the building. Id. The student then 

returned to the gym and went with a group of students to retrieve the equipment. Id. 

While Mr. Seneca asked the student why she went outside, he did not report the 

incident to the school’s administration. Id. 

Mr. Seneca explained that he never directed the student to go outside, but only 

to retrieve equipment that was kept inside by the doors to the outside of the building. 

Id. Mr. Seneca believed that the incident was a “simple misunderstanding.” Id. Mr. 
10

Seneca testified that he did not report the incident to the school administration

because no student was injured. Id.

The Arbitrator credited Mr. Seneca’s testimony that the incident resulted from 

a misunderstanding. However, the Arbitrator nonetheless determined that Mr. 

Seneca’s conduct was negligent:

[T]he fact that [Mr. Seneca] did not direct the student to go outside does 

not alter the fact that he was unaware of the whereabouts of one of his 

young students for more than twenty minutes. Indeed, it is unclear why 

[Mr. Seneca] did not notice that she had not returned with [the] 

necessary equipment for a large portion of the scheduled class period. 

While fortunately nothing happened to the student while she was 

outside and unaccounted for, [Mr. Seneca’s] inattentiveness could have 

resulted in either physical or psychological injury to her. As a 

professional teacher, [Mr. Seneca] is charged with the safety of all of 

the students in his class. At a most basic level, this requires him to 

know their whereabouts. [Mr. Seneca’s] failure to meet this 

responsibility placed the student in harm’s way on May 24, 2018.

Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

As a result of these findings, the Arbitrator concluded:

[Mr. Seneca’s] conduct was not willful, immoral, or an abuse of his 

professional authority. Rather, it constituted a neglect of his basic duty 

to keep his students accounted for and safe. By directing the student to 

retrieve equipment and then not noticing when the student did not 

return to class after an extended period of time, [Mr. Seneca] failed in 

his basic obligations as a teacher. To allow this level of inattentiveness 

to continue without correction would be complicit in [Mr. Seneca’s]

inattentiveness, thereby rendering [School] District negligent as well. 

It is therefore concluded that the charges against [Mr. Seneca] as they 

relate to his negligence on May 24, 2018 are supported by the record

and [he] acted as charged in this regard.

Id. (emphasis added).
11

C. Failure to Complete the POI

Finally, with regard to Mr. Seneca’s failure to complete the requirements of 

the January 29, 2018 POI, the Arbitrator determined:

As of May 21, 2018, [Mr. Seneca] had completed all of the 

requirements of the POI, with only the final summary meeting to be 

held. Throughout this process, [Mr. Seneca’s] willingness to cooperate 

and learn better teaching techniques was documented by the School 

District. This documentation provides evidence both that [Mr. Seneca] 

was fully aware of his deficiency and his attempts to address the 

problem. His failure to keep track of a student on May 24, 2018 further 

demonstrates that he needs to do better [and that] his continued lack of 

supervision cannot be tolerated.

Id. at 18 (emphasis added).

5

The Arbitrator ultimately concluded that “School District met its burden of 

proving a portion[,] but not all[,] of the charges against” Mr. Seneca, as follows:

[I]t is apparent that the Statement of Charges is overbroad, with alleged 

misconduct far beyond [Mr. Seneca’s] actions and culpability. There 

is no evidence to support the charge[s] of immorality, unethical 

behavior, abuse of authority, or even willful neglect of duties. These 

heightened allegations implying moral turpitude do not describe [Mr. 

Seneca’s] behavior, but rather, result in an avoidance of the heart of his 

conduct by eliciting an emotional response of denial. [Mr. Seneca’s] 

misconduct is limited to his inattentiveness with regard to a 3rd Grade 

student on May 24, 2018, when he failed to notice that she was absent 

from his class for an extended period of time. While this conduct did 

5

In its Opinion, the Trial Court further noted:

[Ms.] Mathieson’s own e-mail supports the fact that [Mr. Seneca] was only one 

meeting away from completion [of the POI] and the meeting was postponed[] only 

[due] to the unavailability of the Union Representative. [Ms.] Mathieson 

commented in the e-mail that all had gone well otherwise and [she] looked forward 

to the meeting.

Trial Ct. Op., 12/12/19, at 3 (emphasis added); see R.R. at 344-45.
12

not rise to the full scope of [School] District’s allegations, it 

nevertheless constituted an unacceptable neglect of duties that required 

a disciplinary response.

Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). The Arbitrator further noted Mr. Seneca’s lengthy 

teaching career and tenure with School District and concluded that “[w]hen [Mr. 

Seneca’s] negligent actions on May 24, 2018 are considered in conjunction with this 

extended record, . . . his discharge was unduly harsh and not consistent with the 

gravity of his conduct.” Id. at 18.

Therefore, the Arbitrator reduced Mr. Seneca’s discharge to a three-day 

suspension and directed that he “be returned to work, taking into account this 

suspension, and made whole for all resulting lost wages and benefits and with full 

seniority.” Id.

2. Trial Court Proceedings

On April 30, 2019, School District appealed to the Trial Court by filing the 

Petition to Vacate. On May 15, 2019, the Union filed an Answer. On August 29, 

2019, the Trial Court issued an Order dismissing the Petition to Vacate and 

confirming the Arbitrator’s Award.

In its subsequent Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the Trial Court determined that 

the Award satisfied the first prong of the essence test because “[t]he parties stipulated 

that the [CBA] contains an Implied Just Cause provision and that the matter both 

parties presented to [the] Arbitrator . . . was whether [School] District has just cause 

to discharge [Mr.] Seneca.” Trial Ct. Op., 12/12/19, at 7 (emphasis removed). The 

Trial Court also found that the Arbitrator’s decision was rationally derived from the 

CBA because the Award was “precisely based upon the applicable standard 

stipulated by both parties and incorporated into the [CBA] by case law.” Id. at 7-8.
13

The Trial Court agreed with the Arbitrator that School District’s Statement of 

Charges was overbroad, finding that “[School] District had absolutely no basis or 

any explanation for charging [Mr. Seneca] with actions that can only be described 

as exhibiting moral turpitude, such as immorality, intemperance and willful

misconduct, when only one day prior to the May [22, 2018] incident, [Ms. 

Mathieson] acknowledged the fact that [Mr. Seneca] was doing well and had 

completed his end of the voluntary requirements for the POI.” Id. at 8 (emphasis 

added).

The Trial Court also concluded that School District did not establish that the 

Award violated public policy, stating:

The Arbitrator specifically found that no laws were violated, and those 

findings are not grounds for an appeal. Just because [School District]

does not agree that the Arbitrator determined that all but one of the 

charges were unfounded, does not meet the narrow exception to its 

requirement that it cite[] only public policies which are well defined, 

dominant, and ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents 

that could have been violated by the arbitrator’s award. The 

Arbitrator’s Award is consistent with accepted public policy.

Id. at 9. School District now appeals from that decision.

Standard and Scope of Review

Our standard of review of a grievance arbitration award “is one of deference 

to the arbitrator’s award” and our scope of review is the essence test. Slippery Rock 

Univ. of Pa. of State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. 

Faculties, 916 A.2d 736, 740 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

The essence test requires a reviewing court to affirm an arbitration award so 

long as it draws its essence from the applicable CBA. Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 

Lock Haven Univ. v. Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Faculties, 193 A.3d 486, 494 
14

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), appeal denied, 203 A.3d 980 (Pa. 2019). The essence test is 

comprised of two prongs. The court must determine: (1) whether the issue is 

properly defined within the terms of the CBA; and (2) whether the arbitration award 

is rationally derived from the CBA. Id. “[A] court will only vacate an arbitrator’s

award where the award indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails 

to logically flow from, the” CBA. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 v. 

Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. 

Ass’n, PSEA/NEA, 939 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2007).

Under the essence test, the arbitrator’s findings of fact are binding, and the

reviewing court may not conduct any independent factual analysis. Pa. State Sys., 

193 A.3d at 495. In addition, the court may not review the merits or reasonableness 

of the arbitrator’s award under the guise of the essence test. Id.

Analysis

1. Essence Test

First, School District argues that the Arbitrator’s Award fails to draw its 

essence from the parties’ CBA and is not a rational interpretation of the CBA. 

Specifically, School District contends that the Award contravenes School District’s

clear right to terminate professional employees for “persistent negligence in the 

performance of duties” under Section 1122(a) of the School Code. School District 

claims that it discharged Mr. Seneca not for the final two incidents of misconduct, 

but “for his repeated and alarming behaviors in failing to adequately and 

appropriately supervise the students under his care” dating back to 2015. Sch. Dist. 

Br. at 20. Thus, School District claims that the Arbitrator improperly modified the 

terms of the CBA when she limited the scope of the proceedings to the two incidents 
15

referenced in the Statement of Charges, effectively creating a heightened pleading 

standard that is not required by the School Code. We disagree.

Section 1127 of the School Code provides: “Before any professional employe 

having attained a status of permanent tenure is dismissed by the board of school 

directors, such board of school directors shall furnish such professional employe 

with a detailed written statement of the charges upon which his or her proposed 

dismissal is based and shall conduct a hearing.” 24 P.S. § 11-1127 (emphasis 

added). Section 1127 also mandates that the school district send “[a] written notice 

signed by the president and attested by the secretary of the board of school directors 

. . . to the professional employe setting forth the time and place when and where such 

professional employe will be given an opportunity to be heard either in person or by 

counsel, or both, before the board of school directors and setting forth a detailed 

statement of the charges.” Id. (emphasis added).

In this case, the Statement of Charges specifically identified, and described in 

copious detail, only the May 22, 2018 and May 24, 2018 incidents. See R.R. at 101-

03. The Loudermill Notice also referenced only the May 22, 2018 and May 24, 2018 

incidents. See R.R. at 91-92. School District did not identify or describe any other

incidents of misconduct in either the Statement or Charges or the Loudermill Notice

issued to Mr. Seneca.

6

 Consequently, those were the only two incidents that the 

Union was prepared to litigate at the hearings. See Bethel Park Sch. Dist. v. Bethel 

Park Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1607, 55 A.3d 154, 159 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) 

6 The Statement of Charges generically referenced the January 2018 incident involving a 

student who was injured during gym class, but only in the context of School District’s allegation 

that Mr. Seneca failed to complete his POI. See R.R. at 101. The Arbitrator ultimately determined 

that this allegation was unfounded, because Mr. Seneca completed the requirements of his POI as 

of May 21, 2018 and was waiting for the final summary meeting to be rescheduled. Arbitrator 

Decision, 4/1/19, at 18.
16

(recognizing that, for purposes of due process, a “‘public employee is entitled to oral 

or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s 

evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story’”) (citation omitted); 

Dunn v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 819 A.2d 189, 192 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003) (stating that procedural due process requires that an individual be 

given adequate notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to be heard). 

Therefore, we conclude that the Arbitrator properly limited her inquiry to whether 

School District had just cause to discharge Mr. Seneca based on the two incidents of 

misconduct expressly identified in the Statement of Charges.

To the extent School District challenges the Arbitrator’s evidentiary ruling 

with regard to the prior alleged incidents of misconduct, we note that the Arbitrator 

only precluded the introduction of video footage from a 2014 incident, because the 

“earlier events were not cited in the Statement of Charges and were from up to four 

years prior” to Mr. Seneca’s discharge. Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 14. The 

Arbitrator did, however, permit School District to present evidence relating to prior

incidents “as evidence of [Mr. Seneca’s] knowledge of [School] District’s 

performance expectations.” Id. We conclude that the Arbitrator did not abuse her 

discretion with regard to these evidentiary rulings. See AFSCME Dist. Council 88 

v. Cty. of Lehigh, 798 A.2d 804, 808 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (noting that “the 

determination of the probative value and reliability of evidence are left to the sound 

discretion of the arbitrator”).

Finally, School District argues that by reducing Mr. Seneca’s discharge to a 

three-day suspension, the Arbitrator “usurp[ed] the authority of [School] District” to 

terminate Mr. Seneca’s employment in accordance with the CBA and Section 

1122(a) of the School Code. Sch. Dist. Br. at 31. We disagree. 
17

This Court has recognized that “absent a clear limitation in the CBA, it is 

within an arbitrator’s authority to modify the discipline imposed by a school 

district.” Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Com. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, Teamsters Local 502, 

160 A.3d 928, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). “It is well-established that an arbitrator may 

fashion a remedy in a particular case that is not explicitly prescribed in the CBA so 

long as the remedy furthers the essence of the CBA.” Pa. State Sys., 193 A.3d at 

495; see also Rose Tree Media Secretaries & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n v. Rose Tree 

Media Sch. Dist., 136 A.3d 1069, 1080 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (“In accord[ance] with 

the CBA, it is solely within [the a]rbitrator’s province to find just cause for discipline 

under the facts of the case. This includes the authority to modify discipline.”)

(emphasis added); Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Soister, 758 A.2d 742, 745 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2000) (holding that where the CBA neither explicitly reserved to the school 

district the sole discretion to determine the penalty imposed, nor precluded an

arbitrator from making that decision, the arbitrator could set aside the employee’s 

termination and impose a lesser penalty).

Here, School District has cited no provision in the CBA, nor have we found 

any such provision, that gives School District the sole authority to determine the 

penalty for a professional employee’s misconduct. In fact, the parties stipulated at 

the outset of the arbitration proceedings that the Arbitrator would determine the 

proper penalty. See Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 1 (stating that “[t]he issue to be 

determined is whether [Mr. Seneca] was discharged for just cause” and “[i]f not, 

what shall the remedy be[]”). Consequently, after reviewing the evidence of record, 

the Arbitrator fashioned what she deemed to be the appropriate level of discipline 

based on the gravity of Mr. Seneca’s misconduct, as she was empowered to do.
18

For these reasons, we conclude that the Arbitrator’s Award has its foundation 

in, and logically flows from, the CBA and, thus, satisfies the essence test.

2. Public Policy Exception

Next, School District argues that, even if the essence test is satisfied, the 

Arbitrator’s Award violates established public policy favoring the safety of children 

in schools.7 Specifically, School District contends that there is a well-defined, 

dominant public policy requiring professional educators to ensure the safety of the 

students under their supervision. In this case, the Arbitrator found that Mr. Seneca 

neglected this duty, yet she erroneously reinstated Mr. Seneca and allowed him to 

return to the classroom. According to School District, a teacher who “is unaware of 

the whereabouts of one of his young children for more than twenty minutes,”

Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 17, does not maintain a safe educational environment 

for his students. Thus, School District contends that the Trial Court erroneously

concluded that the Award does not violate public policy. We disagree.

Once the essence test is satisfied, a reviewing court may then consider whether 

the arbitration award violates a well-defined, dominant public policy of the 

Commonwealth. Pa. State Sys., 193 A.3d at 498. In deciding whether to apply the 

public policy exception, the court must consider: (1) the nature of the employee’s 

conduct leading to discipline; (2) whether the employee’s conduct implicates a welldefined, dominant public policy; and (3) whether the arbitration award poses an 

unacceptable risk that it will undermine the implicated policy. Slippery Rock Univ. 

of Pa., Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Faculty, 71 

A.3d 353, 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). The public policy exception is narrow and 

7 Whether an arbitration award violates public policy is a question of law for which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Phila. Housing Auth. v. Am. 

Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 33, Local 934, 52 A.3d 1117, 1121 (Pa. 2012).
19

“prohibit[s] a court from enforcing an arbitrat[ion] award that contravenes public 

policy.” Shamokin Area Sch. Dist. v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. Dist. 

Council 86, 20 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). However, “we may not vacate 

an arbitrator’s award under the public policy exception simply because the conduct 

at issue is unacceptable in a public employment setting.” Sch. Dist. of Phila., 160 

A.3d at 939.

Here, the Arbitrator found that Mr. Seneca’s misconduct was limited to his

negligence in failing to know the whereabouts of a third grade student for 20 minutes

on May 24, 2018. Arbitrator Decision, 4/1/19, at 17-18. Significantly, the Arbitrator 

determined that the remaining allegations against Mr. Seneca were unsupported by 

the evidence and not sufficient grounds for just cause. Id. at 16-17. Because we are 

constrained by the Arbitrator’s factual findings on appeal, we must limit our inquiry 

to whether the Arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Mr. Seneca – in light of her finding 

that he was negligent in supervising a third grade student – contravenes a welldefined, dominant public policy. See Sch. Dist. of Phila., 160 A.3d at 939;

Blairsville-Saltsburg Sch. Dist. v. Blairsville-Saltsburg Educ. Ass’n, 102 A.3d 1049, 

1052 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (stating that, when applying the public policy exception, 

“[t]he focus must be on whether the arbitration award, if enforced, would 

contravene public policy, not whether the employee’s misconduct violated public

policy”) (emphasis added).

School District argues that by reinstating Mr. Seneca to his teaching position, 

the Arbitrator violated an established public policy of ensuring children’s safety in 

schools. However, the Arbitrator determined that the May 24, 2018 incident resulted 

from a mere misunderstanding between the student and Mr. Seneca, finding “no 

indication that [Mr. Seneca] directed the student to go outside, but rather, believed 
20

her to understand that the gym equipment would be located inside the building.” 

Arbitration Decision, 4/1/19, at 16. She also found “no evidence to support the 

charge[s] of immorality, unethical behavior, abuse of authority, or even willful 

neglect of duties.” Id. at 17. Despite these findings, the Arbitrator nonetheless 

concluded that Mr. Seneca’s inattentiveness in failing to notice that the third grade 

student was absent from his class for 20 minutes constituted negligence that required 

some level of discipline.

In deciding to reinstate Mr. Seneca, the Arbitrator considered the gravity of 

the offense in conjunction with Mr. Seneca’s lengthy teaching career, his history of 

satisfactory performance reviews through 2017, and the fact that, at the time of the 

offense, he was one day shy of successfully completing his POI. Moreover, during 

the five months that he worked on completing the POI, Mr. Seneca “demonstrated a

willingness to cooperate with School District and learn better teaching techniques,” 

as documented in several School District e-mails. Id. at 18. In fact, the evidence 

showed that “after both [the May 22, 2018 and May 24, 2018] incidents, [Mr. 

Seneca] was asked to supervise up to 75 students during a [p]arent [v]olunteer 

[b]reakfast on May 25, 2018.” Id. at 9. Thus, the Arbitrator concluded that, although 

it is evident that Mr. Seneca still “needs to do better” with supervising his students, 

“his discharge was unduly harsh and not consistent with the gravity of his conduct.” 

Id. at 18; see N. Penn Sch. Dist. v. N. Penn Educ. Ass’n, 58 A.3d 848, 858 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012) (“[An arbitration award] under the public policy analysis [must 

draw] the necessary balance between the public employer’s duty to protect the 

health, safety and welfare of the public, and the fair treatment of public 

employees.”).
21

We conclude that, under these circumstances, the Arbitrator’s Award 

reinstating Mr. Seneca to his teaching position does not violate a well-defined, 

dominant public policy. Cf. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 160 A.3d at 939 (“This Court has 

not previously recognized a public policy exception that would prevent an 

administrator from being reinstated based on mere negligence, and we decline to 

recognize one based on the facts of this case.”) (emphasis added).

Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that the Arbitrator’s Award was within the terms of the 

CBA and was rationally derived from the CBA. Based on the credible evidence of 

record, the Arbitrator correctly determined that most of the charges against Mr. 

Seneca were unfounded and that School District did not have just cause to dismiss 

him for his act of negligent supervision on May 24, 2018. Furthermore, we conclude 

that School District failed to establish that the Arbitrator’s Award, reducing Mr. 

Seneca’s discipline to a three-day suspension and reinstating him to his teaching 

position, violated a well-defined, dominant public policy. Accordingly, we affirm 

the Trial Court’s Order.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

North Allegheny School District, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1379 C.D. 2019

:

North Allegheny Federation of :

Teachers, Local 2097, American :

Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO :

(Federation) :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of November, 2020, the Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County, filed on August 29, 2019, is hereby 

AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge