NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2433-14T31

 A-2434-14T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES PURYEAR,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent.

___________________________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARKUS BROWN,

Defendant-Respondent.

___________________________________________

Argued May 11, 2015 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino, Leone, and Gilson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, 

Indictment Nos. 12-02-00556, 12-02-00557, 

and 12-02-00558.

 

1 These appeals originally calendared back-to-back are 

consolidated for purposes of this opinion only.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

June 24, 2015

APPELLATE DIVISION

June 24, 2015
2 A-2433-14T3

James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant/ 

cross-respondent Charles Puryear (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. 

Smith, of counsel and on the brief).

Andrew R. Burroughs, Special Deputy Attorney 

General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued 

the cause for respondent/cross-appellant 

(A-2433-14)/appellant (A-2434-14) State of 

New Jersey (Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex 

County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Burroughs, 

of counsel and on the brief).

Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel, 

argued the cause for respondent Markus Brown 

(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Ms. Adubato, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GILSON, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

These related interlocutory appeals raise questions 

concerning the admissibility of custodial statements given by 

co-defendants to law enforcement. Defendant Charles Puryear 

(Puryear) and defendant Markus Brown (Brown) were charged with 

crimes related to a fatal shooting that took place on November 

26, 2011, in Newark, and an armed robbery that took place 

several days later in a motel in Sussex County. Each defendant 

gave two custodial statements to law enforcement on December 5, 

2011. After a hearing, the trial court in Essex County 

ultimately suppressed the first statement given by Puryear, 

which concerned the robbery in Sussex County, and admitted 

Puryear's second statement, which concerned the Essex County 
3 A-2433-14T3

shooting. The trial court admitted Brown's first statement, 

which concerned the Sussex County robbery, and ultimately 

suppressed his second statement, which concerned the shooting in 

Essex County. 

On these interlocutory appeals, Puryear argues that his 

second statement also should have been suppressed, and the State 

argues that the trial court erred in suppressing Puryear's first 

statement and Brown's second statement. Given the related facts 

and procedural history, we issue this consolidated opinion 

addressing all of the interlocutory appeals. 

Having conducted a thorough review of the record in each 

case, and having considered all of the arguments, we affirm the 

well-reasoned decision by Judge Michael L. Ravin, and his 

companion order, issued on December 17, 2014, which suppressed 

one of the statements given by each defendant, but admitted the 

other statements.

I.

The State alleges that on November 25, 2011, at 

approximately 10:00 p.m., Puryear and Brown approached a group 

of people on a street in Newark, New Jersey. Puryear pointed a 

.22 caliber handgun at the group, and shouted, "Don't move." 

The group of people attempted to run away, and Puryear fired 
4 A-2433-14T3

nine shots, hitting and killing one person. Later, nine .22 

caliber shell casings were recovered at the scene.

Concerning the Sussex County incident, the State alleges 

that on December 4, 2011, Puryear and Brown committed an armed 

robbery at the Rolling Hills Motel in Sussex County. A gunshot 

was fired during that robbery, and the State Police were 

notified. When State troopers arrived, they encountered Brown,

who fled. Following a search, Puryear and Brown were eventually 

apprehended in the early morning hours of December 5, 2011, near 

the motel. 

When defendants were apprehended, they were both arrested 

and advised of their Miranda rights.2 Thereafter, defendants 

were taken to the State Police barracks. While at the State 

Police barracks, each defendant was separately interviewed twice 

by law enforcement officers. Puryear was first interviewed by a 

State Police detective and a State trooper. That interview 

began shortly after 5:00 a.m. on December 5, 2011, and primarily 

focused on the alleged robbery at the motel in Sussex County. A 

number of hours later, beginning at approximately 5:44 p.m. on 

December 5, 2011, Puryear was interviewed by two Essex County 

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

694 (1966). 
5 A-2433-14T3

detectives. That interview primarily focused on the alleged 

shooting in Newark. 

Brown was first interviewed on December 5, 2011, beginning 

at approximately 7:00 a.m., by the same State Police detective 

and State trooper who had interviewed Puryear. Several hours 

later, beginning at approximately 3:59 p.m. on December 5, 2011, 

Brown was interviewed by the same two Essex County detectives 

who would later interview Puryear. 

At the beginning of all four interviews, the officers 

advised each defendant of his Miranda rights and each defendant 

signed Miranda waiver forms. The interviews were audio and 

video recorded. During each interview, Puryear and Brown made a 

number of incriminating statements. 

II.

Puryear and Brown were both indicted and charged with a 

number of crimes in Essex and Sussex Counties. In Essex County, 

they were charged under three different indictments. The 

charges against Puryear in Essex County included first-degree 

murder, first-degree robbery, and weapons-related offenses. The 

charges against Brown in Essex County included first-degree 

felony murder, first-degree robbery, and weapons-related 

offenses. The charges in Sussex County against both defendants 
6 A-2433-14T3

included first-degree robbery, second-degree burglary, 

aggravated assault, and weapons-related offenses. 

In Essex County, defendants moved to suppress their 

statements, and the State moved to admit all four statements. 

The State also moved to use portions of those statements that 

did not directly relate to the charges in Essex County under 

N.J.R.E. 404(b). 

The trial court conducted a three-day hearing. During that 

hearing, all four law enforcement officers who participated in 

the four interviews of defendants testified. The State also 

introduced and played at the hearing the audio and video 

recordings of each of the four statements. Transcripts of those 

statements were also provided to the trial court. The State 

also introduced into evidence copies of the Miranda waiver forms 

signed by each defendant. Defendants elected not to testify at 

the hearing and did not call any witnesses.

III.

The trial court twice addressed the motions to suppress and 

admit the statements. Initially, the trial court issued a 

written opinion and order, dated September 8, 2014, and ruled 

that all four statements were admissible. The court reserved on 

the Rule 404(b) portion of the motion, which concerned whether 

the portions of the statements that did not directly relate to 
7 A-2433-14T3

the Essex County charges could be used as evidence of motive or 

intent. The court stated that it would address at trial 

limitations and possible redactions under Rule 404(b).

Defendants then moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 

2014, the court granted partial reconsideration and issued a 

written decision and order. The trial court found that each of 

the defendants' Miranda rights had been violated in connection 

with one of the statements given by each defendant. The court 

also found that the other statement given by each defendant was 

admissible. 

With regard to Puryear, the trial court ruled that his 

first statement was inadmissible. The trial court focused on a 

statement made by a State Police detective when Puryear first 

came into the interview room. Specifically, the detective told 

Puryear that he could not hurt himself by giving the statement, 

but he could only help himself: 

DET. PAULIS: The only thing you can possibly 

do here is help yourself out. You cannot 

get yourself in any more trouble than you're 

already in. You can only help yourself out 

here.

So you've been helping yourself out with 

Trooper Donnelly. I just want to hear what 

you have to say as far as the explanation as 

to what happened tonight, all right.
8 A-2433-14T3

After making that statement, the detective then read 

Puryear his Miranda rights, and Puryear agreed to speak with the 

officers.

The trial court reasoned that the statement by the 

detective was incorrect and misleading. The court went on to 

reason that the statement by the detective "neutraliz[ed]" the 

Miranda warning that Puryear was given immediately after the 

detective's statement. The court then found that because of the 

detective's incorrect statement, the State had failed to show 

that Puryear made a knowing waiver of his Miranda rights.

Turning to Puryear's second statement, given to Essex 

County detectives, the trial court ruled that statement was 

admissible. The court found that Puryear was correctly advised 

of his Miranda rights and that Puryear knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently waived those rights. 

The trial court also considered, but rejected, a number of 

other arguments put forth by Puryear. In that regard, the trial 

court found that when Puryear asked to speak to the mother of 

his child, he was not invoking his right to silence or counsel. 

The court also rejected Puryear's contention that his failure to 

respond immediately when the detective asked if Puryear wished 

to speak was not an invocation of his right to silence. In that 

regard, Puryear was twice asked if he wished to speak and he 
9 A-2433-14T3

delayed responding for approximately four seconds and seven

seconds. When Puryear did not immediately respond, the 

detective reminded Puryear that he had the right not to speak. 

Thereafter, Puryear stated that he wished to speak to the 

officers. The court also found that Puryear had not been 

effectively ordered to sign the Miranda form. Finally, the 

court found that Puryear had been properly informed that there 

was a warrant out for his arrest.

Concerning the statements given by Brown, the trial court 

ruled that Brown's first statement was admissible, but his 

second statement was not admissible. The first statement, which

was given to a State Police detective and trooper, concerned the 

Sussex County robbery. The court found that the officers 

properly advised Brown of his Miranda rights and that Brown 

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights and 

agreed to speak with the officers. The court noted, however, 

that it was reserving "on whether this statement, which concerns 

that Sussex County robbery, is admissible [in the Essex County 

matters] under N.J.R.E. 404(b)." 

As to Brown's second statement, the trial court found that 

Brown had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda

rights. Specifically, the court focused on an explanation 

provided by an Essex County detective when Brown asked for 
10 A-2433-14T3

clarification of what it meant that his statements could be used 

against him in a court of law. In response, the detective told 

Brown that it meant that if Brown lied, his statement could be 

used against him. In that regard, the second recorded interview 

of Brown had the following exchange:

DET. MCENROE: Okay. "Anything you say can 

be used against you in a court of law." You 

understand number - - number (2)?

MR. BROWN: "Anything you say can be used 

against you in a court of law." So that 

means I may have to stand up in their court 

and say this again.

DET. GONZALEZ: Well, what that's saying is 

anything you say can be used against you, -

-

MR. BROWN: (Indiscernible.)

DET. GONZALEZ: - - meaning if you lie, it 

can be used against you.

MR. BROWN: (Indiscernible.) Okay.

The court reasoned that the detective's explanation was an 

incorrect and misleading explanation of one of the Miranda

warnings. The court then found that the State had not shown 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown understood all of his 

Miranda rights and he had not knowingly waived his rights. 

IV.

 We granted the State leave to appeal the suppression of 

Brown's second statement. We also granted Puryear and the State 
11 A-2433-14T3

leave to appeal the rulings concerning Puryear's statements. On 

appeal, Puryear makes two arguments:

POINT I

BECAUSE THE AUTHORITIES NEVER WITHDREW OR 

CORRECTED THE ADVICE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT THAT 

"YOU CAN ONLY HELP YOURSELF OUT" BY GIVING A 

STATEMENT, HIS SECOND STATEMENT, MADE ONLY 

HOURS LATER, ALSO HAD TO BE SUPPRESSED AS 

NOT KNOWING OR INTELLIGENT.

POINT II

THE STATE FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR 

DEFENDANT'S CLEAR INDICATION THAT HE DID NOT 

WISH TO MAKE A STATEMENT UNTIL AFTER HE HAD 

SPOKEN TO HIS BABY'S MOTHER, THUS VIOLATING 

HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND OUR 

STATE CONSTITUTION.

The State argues that the trial court was correct in 

initially ruling that both statements by Puryear were admissible 

and it erroneously granted Puryear's motion for reconsideration. 

With regard to Brown, the State argues that the trial court 

erred in suppressing Brown's second statement.

V.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

guarantees all persons with the privilege against selfincrimination. This privilege applies to the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, in New Jersey, there is a 

common law privilege against self-incrimination, which has been 
12 A-2433-14T3

codified in statutes and rules of evidence. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; 

N.J.R.E. 503; State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 250 (1993). 

Accordingly, it has long been established that when a person is 

taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom

that person is entitled to certain warnings before he or she can 

be questioned. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at 

1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726. 

Before any questioning, the defendant must be advised that 

she or he has the right to remain silent, that anything she or 

he says can be used against her or him in a court of law, that 

she or he has the right to have an attorney present during 

questioning, and that if she or he cannot afford an attorney one 

will be appointed for her or him before any questioning if she 

or he so desires. Id. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

at 726. These warnings are commonly referred to as "Miranda

warnings."

After receiving Miranda warnings, a suspect may knowingly 

and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer 

questions or make a statement. Ibid. The State, however, must 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a waiver of the Miranda

rights was intelligent, voluntary and knowing. State v. 

Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 400-01, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 831, 130 
13 A-2433-14T3

S. Ct. 65, 175 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2009); State v. Presha, 163 N.J.

304, 313 (2000); State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993). 

In determining whether a statement is voluntary, courts 

consider the totality of the circumstances, including the 

characteristics of the accused and the details of the questions. 

State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462 (2005) (citing Galloway, 

supra, 133 N.J. at 654). "Relevant factors include the 

defendant's age, education, intelligence, advice concerning his

[or her] constitutional rights, [the] length of detention, and

the nature of the questioning." State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 135 

(1988) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 

S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)).

If a suspect invokes his or her right to silence or legal

counsel, law enforcement must "scrupulously honor" that 

assertion, and all questioning must cease. See Michigan v. 

Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326, 46 L. Ed. 2d 

313, 321 (1975); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-

85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981)

(applying the same standard); State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 624 

(2011) (same). 

When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to 

suppress statements, appellate courts generally defer to the 

fact-findings of the trial court when they are supported by 
14 A-2433-14T3

sufficient credible evidence in the record. See Nyhammer,

supra, 197 N.J. at 409 (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 

243-44 (2007)); see also State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 603 n.4

(2011) ("As the finding of compliance with Miranda and 

voluntariness turned on factual and credibility determinations, 

we need only find sufficient credible evidence in the record to 

sustain the trial judge's findings and conclusions." (citing 

Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 242-44)). Moreover, we defer to a

trial court judge's findings "'which are substantially 

influenced by [the judge's] opportunity to hear and see the 

witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing 

court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 

(2010) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). When a defendant's 

statement is videotaped, however, and "the trial court's factual 

findings are based only on its viewing of a recorded 

interrogation that is equally available to the appellate court

. . . deference to the trial court's interpretation is not 

required." State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 566 (2012). We 

review de novo the trial court's legal conclusions that flow 

from established facts. See State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 337 

(2010).
15 A-2433-14T3

VI.

A.

We first address the trial court's decision to grant 

reconsideration. The State argues that the trial court erred in 

changing its decision on a motion for reconsideration. We 

reject that argument. The court has the discretion and right to 

reconsider an interlocutory ruling at any time before the entry 

of final judgment in "'the sound discretion of the [] court to 

be exercised in the interests of justice.'" See State v. 

Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 554 (1999) (quoting Pressler, 

Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3 on R. 1:7-4 (1995), and 

noting that there is not an explicit rule for motions for 

reconsideration in criminal matters, but holding that such 

motions are permitted in criminal matters), cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136, 151 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2001). See also

State v. Campbell, 436 N.J. Super. 264, 273 (App. Div. 2014) 

(explaining that "the court can even reconsider its previous 

decision to admit the evidence, if subsequent developments 

support such reconsideration" (citing Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. 

Super. 374, 384-88 (App. Div. 1996))). 

Reconsideration is not to be granted lightly and the 

grounds for reconsideration are generally limited. The proper 

object of reconsideration is to correct a court's error or 
16 A-2433-14T3

oversight. Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. 

Div. 2010). As we have explained, a motion for reconsideration 

is

not appropriate merely because a litigant is 

dissatisfied with a decision of the court or 

wishes to reargue a motion, but "should be 

utilized only for those cases which fall 

into that narrow corridor in which either 1) 

the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based 

upon a palpably incorrect or irrational 

basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt

either did not consider, or failed to 

appreciate the significance of probative, 

competent evidence."

[Ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. 

Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).]

 

See also R. 1:7-4(b) (governing reconsideration of final orders 

or judgments); Cummings, supra, 295 N.J. Super. at 384 

(explaining the grounds appropriate for reconsidering a final

judgment). 

Here, the trial court candidly found that it had failed to 

appreciate the significance of the explanation given by the 

detective to Brown during his second interview concerning his 

second Miranda warning; that second warning being that his 

statements could be used against him in a court of law. The 

trial court also found that it failed to appreciate the 

significance of the introductory statement made by the State 

Police detective to Puryear in his first interview advising 

Puryear that he could not hurt himself by answering the 
17 A-2433-14T3

detective's questions. Given the facts of these interviews, we 

find no abuse of discretion and no error by the trial court in 

its decision to grant reconsideration.

Indeed, it is entirely appropriate for a judge to 

reconsider a prior ruling given the right set of circumstances. 

Judges are not infallible. Judges who are willing to admit that 

they overlooked competent evidence, or failed to appreciate such 

evidence, should be commended because they are doing just what 

good judges do in the very limited circumstances where 

reconsideration is appropriate. Obviously, that is why there 

are rules for reconsideration. See R. 1:7-4(b); R. 4:42-2; R.

4:49-2. 

We also will address the court's ultimate substantive 

decisions concerning the suppression or admission of each of the 

statements given by defendants. Our grant of interlocutory 

appeal included appeals from all aspects of the order on 

reconsideration.

B.

We turn to the rulings on Brown's second statement. As 

already noted, the trial court admitted Brown's first statement, 

which principally concerned the Sussex County robbery. Brown 

has pled guilty to the charges in Sussex County, and he has not 

appealed the decision to admit his first statement. As 
18 A-2433-14T3

previously pointed out, when the case is tried in Essex County 

the trial judge will address whether and how much of the first 

statement can be used under Rule 404(b). 

The State appeals the decision to suppress Brown's second 

statement, which was given to Essex County detectives and which 

concerned the murder in Essex County. Specifically, the State 

argues that when Brown's second interview is reviewed in full 

context, Brown's inquiry about his second Miranda right - - that 

his statements could be used in court - - was really a concern 

that Brown did not want to testify in court.3 In other words, 

the State argues Brown understood and knowingly waived all his 

Miranda rights, including Miranda Right No. 2, but he made it 

clear that he did not intend to testify at trial.

The State also argues that Brown had a prior criminal 

record and, therefore, he already understood his Miranda rights 

because of his prior interactions with the criminal justice 

system. See Knight, supra, 183 N.J. at 463 (explaining that it 

is relevant to consider a defendant's "previous encounters with 

law enforcement" in determining the voluntariness of a 

defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights). In addition, the 

 

3 The trial court and the parties have referred to Miranda Right 

No. 2. Though it might be more accurate to describe that as a 

warning (that is, the statements can be used in court), for 

consistency, we will also refer to it as Miranda Right No. 2.
19 A-2433-14T3

State argues that the trial court erred in relying on this 

court's decision in State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. 249, 268

(App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 572 (2003). 

In Pillar, the defendant's conviction was reversed "due to 

the improper admission of a highly incriminating statement made 

by [the] defendant to police at the time of his arrest." Id. at 

257. The defendant in Pillar was charged with sexually abusing 

a child. When questioned by law enforcement, the defendant 

invoked his right to have an attorney before providing a 

statement. Id. at 262. The defendant then stated that he 

wanted to "say something 'off-the-record.'" Ibid. After the 

detectives who were interviewing the defendant in Pillar agreed 

to listen, the defendant confessed to fondling the minor victim. 

This court held "that the statement, made immediately following 

administration of Miranda warnings and after an assurance from 

an officer that [the] defendant could make a statement 'off-therecord,' was not only obtained in violation of Miranda but was 

involuntary." Id. at 257.

The trial court correctly found that the detective's 

explanation of the Miranda Right No. 2 was incorrect. While the 

trial court acknowledged that Brown's request for clarification 

may have stemmed from a concern about testifying at trial, the 

court found that did not change that Brown was given an 
20 A-2433-14T3

incorrect explanation of his Miranda Right No. 2. It is the 

"responsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform 

defendants of their rights [] with the proper administration of 

Miranda warnings." State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 448 (1992)

(citing State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 47 (1968)). "A police 

officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of his 

mouth, the Miranda warnings just given out of the other." 

Pillar, supra, 359 N.J. Super. at 268. See also United States 

v. Ramirez, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1269-70 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

(telling a defendant if he or she did not answer questions "it 

would be worse" contradicted the Miranda safeguards).

The trial court also correctly found that the detective's 

incorrect explanation of Brown's Miranda rights was not cured by 

Brown's prior contact with the criminal justice system. Here, 

the State showed only that Brown had been arrested in 2005 and 

pled guilty in 2008, but did not offer proof that such prior 

experience enabled him to understand his Miranda rights despite

the detective's incorrect explanation of his Miranda Right No. 

2. Absent a more specific showing by the State, the trial court 

did not err in making such a finding.

The focus of a Miranda analysis should be on whether the 

defendant had a clear understanding and comprehension of his or 

her Miranda rights based on the totality of the circumstances. 
21 A-2433-14T3

Nyhammer, supra, 197 N.J. at 402. Moreover, as already pointed 

out, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that a defendant's waiver is knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent. The trial court here found that the State had not 

shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown understood the nature 

of his Miranda Right No. 2 and the consequences of waiving that 

right. We defer to such "factual findings made by the trial 

court[.]" Id. at 409. 

Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the 

trial court's findings that the State failed to prove that Brown 

completely understood all of his Miranda rights are adequately 

supported by credible evidence in the record. Moreover, our 

independent review of the video of Brown's second interview does 

not lead us to a different conclusion. Consequently, the trial 

court's decision to suppress Brown's second statement is 

affirmed.

C.

We now review the rulings on Puryear's statements. The 

State argues that we should reverse the trial court's ruling on 

reconsideration, which held that Puryear's first statement 

concerning the Sussex County robbery was inadmissible. Puryear 

argues that the trial court correctly suppressed his first 

statement, but erred in not suppressing his second statement 
22 A-2433-14T3

concerning the Essex County murder. We find neither of these 

arguments persuasive.

1.

On appeal, the State argues that "there is no credible 

evidence that [Puryear] did not understand his Miranda rights." 

The trial court, however, ultimately found otherwise. The court 

focused on the instruction given by the State Police detective 

that Puryear could not hurt himself and could only help himself 

by providing a statement. The court found that instruction was 

incorrect and directly contradicted the Miranda warning that 

anything the suspect says can be used against him in a court of 

law. The court then found that the detective's incorrect 

explanation of the consequences of giving a statement was not 

cured by Puryear's prior contact with the criminal justice 

system. Thus, the court found that the State had not carried 

its burden of proving that Puryear knowingly waived his Miranda

rights. 

The factual findings by the trial court are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record. The State contends 

that "while awkwardly phrased," the detective's instruction 

simply informed defendant that the evidence against him was 

overwhelming. That characterization of the instruction does not 

change the fact that the instruction contradicted a key Miranda
23 A-2433-14T3

warning. Moreover, the instruction by the detective was not a 

permissible interrogation technique. See Pillar, supra, 359 

N.J. Super. at 268; cf. State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 31, 

46 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 (2003) (explaining 

that New Jersey courts allow some "trickery" in interrogation 

techniques, but do not allow fabrications of evidence). That 

the State seeks to admit Puryear's statement against him shows 

that Puryear could hurt himself by giving the statement. 

The State also points out that in its initial decision 

admitting Puryear's first statement, the trial court relied upon 

State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978), but on reconsideration it 

did not explain how Miller was distinguishable. In Miller, the 

Supreme Court held that it was not a violation of Miranda for a 

police officer to "[a]ppeal[] to a person's sense of decency and 

urg[e] him to tell the truth for his own sake." Miller, supra, 

76 N.J. at 405. The Court went on to recognize, however, that 

depending on the context, such techniques can move into a 

"shadowy area." Id. at 403-04. Consequently, Miller is 

distinguishable on the specific facts of this case.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has clarified the fact-sensitive

basis of motions to suppress because in another case, the Court 

upheld the suppression of a statement because the defendant was 

advised that by answering questions she "would actually benefit" 
24 A-2433-14T3

herself. State ex rel. A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 151 (2010). In 

A.S., the Court held that advice "contradicted the Miranda

warning provided to [the defendant]: that anything she said in 

the interview could be used against her in a court of law." 

Ibid. (citing Pillar, supra, 359 N.J. Super. at 268).

In short, it is well-established that the question of 

whether Miranda rights are knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily waived is a fact-specific analysis. Based on the 

specific facts found by the trial court, we find no error in the 

court's decision to suppress Puryear's first statement.

2.

We also find no error in the trial court's decision to 

admit Puryear's second statement. The second statement was 

given several hours after the first statement and primarily 

focused on a different crime. Importantly, the second statement 

was given to different law enforcement officers, who gave 

Puryear fresh Miranda warnings and had Puryear execute a 

separate written Miranda waiver form. Thus, the trial court 

found that that second statement was given after Puryear 

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda

rights.

Puryear argues that the second statement was contaminated 

by the incorrect instruction given during the first statement. 
25 A-2433-14T3

Puryear goes on to assert that his situation is analogous to an 

impermissible "question first and warn later" technique. See

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-12, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 

2610, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 655 (2004). In Seibert, the police 

interrogators adopted an official policy of inducing confessions 

prior to providing Miranda warnings and then eliciting the same 

confession to the same crime. The United States Supreme Court 

stated that such a procedure "render[ed] Miranda warnings 

ineffective." Id. at 611, 124 S. Ct. at 2610, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 

654. The facts in Seibert are clearly distinguishable. 

Moreover, the trial court here found that there was a clear 

break between the two separate interviews and that fresh Miranda

warnings cured any problem with the instruction given at the 

beginning of the first interview. Again, those fact-findings 

are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. 

Puryear also argues that because he repeatedly asked to 

speak with the mother of his child, he was effectively 

expressing a desire to remain silent. Puryear, however, told 

the detectives that he wanted to tell the mother of his child 

that she should move on without him. The trial court reviewed 

the video of the interview and found that the request by Puryear 

to speak with the mother of his child was not an invocation of 

his right to remain silent. Our independent review of the 
26 A-2433-14T3

recorded interview supports that same finding. In short, 

Puryear's request to speak with the mother of his child was not 

an invocation of his right to remain silent. See Diaz-Bridges,

supra, 208 N.J. at 567 (holding that "requests by an adult to 

speak with someone other than an attorney . . . do not imply or 

suggest that the individual desires to remain silent" (citing 

State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 228-32 (1993))).

VII.

In summary, we find no reversible error in the trial 

court's decision to suppress Brown's second statement and 

suppress Puryear's first statement. We also find no reversible 

error in the trial court's decision to admit Puryear's second 

statement.

Affirmed.