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presumed to be a petty offense and a jury trial is constitutionally required 

only in rare and exceptional cases. See United States v. Nachtigal,507 

U.S. 1, 3-5 (1993); Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Ct., 103 Nev. 623, 748 

P.2d 494 (1987), aff d sub nom. Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 

(1989). In those exceptional cases, a defendant must prove that statutory 

penalties in addition to the maximum authorized period of incarceration 

"are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the 

offense in question is a 'serious' one." Blanton,489 U.S. at 543. 

Pera claims that various collateral consequences of a 

conviction for domestic battery support his contention that it is a serious 

offense: (1) NRS 4328.157 and NRS 125C.230 create a rebuttable 

presumption that the perpetrator of domestic violence is unfit for sole or 

joint custody of his children; (2) he would lose the right to possess a 

firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); and (3) a conviction would render a 

misdemeanant deportable under federal immigration law. 2Pera also 

contends that the penalty scheme reflects the Legislature's determination 

that the offense is serious. Notably, in addition to the six month sentence, 

there are fines, fees, community service, counseling, civil liability, and 

reduced discretion on the part of the prosecutor and police. 3 

2Pera does not allege that he is not a United States citizen, and we 

therefore conclude that he has not demonstrated that he could suffer 

deportation. 

3Pera also argues that other courts have concluded that a significant 

suspension of one's driver's license has necessitated a jury trial. However, 

Pera has not demonstrated that he faces such a penalty if convicted of 

first-offense domestic battery. 

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While Pera states that his interest in raising his child and his 

right to bear arms are substantive and fundamental rights, he offers no 

convincing support for the proposition that the collateral consequences of a 

conviction—those imposed by courts other than the sentencing court or by 

other states or by the federal government—are relevant to determine 

whether the offense is "serious." Compare Foote v. U.S.,670 A.2d 366, 372 

(D.C. 1996) ("Blanton'spresumption that offenses carrying no more than 

six months incarceration are petty cannot, in our view, be effectively 

rebutted by reference to the potential remedies in hypothetical civil or 

administrative proceedings which have not been instituted."), and Smith 

v. U.S.,768 A.2d 577, 580 (D.C. 2001) (concluding that potential 

termination of employment following conviction is collateral and therefore 

cannot elevate petty offense to serious one), with Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 

F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that, although maximum jail 

term was six months for DUI conviction, offense was serious because 

statute also included possible 15-year driver's license revocation). 

Further, we note that this court has previously rejected the proposition 

that collateral consequences of a conviction should be considered in 

determining its seriousness. See Blanton,103 Nev. at 633-34, 748 P.2d at 

500-01. In addition, Pera has not demonstrated that the fines, fees, 

community service, and counseling that may be mandated by statute are 

so onerous that he has overcome the presumption that the legislature 

considers this a petty offense. See Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 4-5 (concluding 

that monetary fines and terms of probation were not as severe a penalty 

as six months in jail). 

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We therefore conclude that because Pera cannot overcome the 

presumption that the offense is petty, the district court properly denied 

his request for a jury trial. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

j. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. Stefany Miley, District Judge 

The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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