alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 10
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear by T.D. 9359, 72 FR 54544, Sept. 26, 2007.

§ 10.8 Return preparation and application of rules to other individuals. ( a ) *Preparing all or substantially all of a tax return.* Any individual who for compensation prepares or assists with the preparation of all or substantially all of a tax return or claim for refund must have a preparer tax identification number. Except as otherwise prescribed in forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance, an individual must be an attorney, certified public accountant, enrolled agent, or registered tax return preparer to obtain a preparer tax identification number. Any individual who for compensation prepares or assists with the preparation of all or substantially all of a tax return or claim for refund is subject to the duties and restrictions relating to practice in subpart B, as well as subject to the sanctions for violation of the regulations in subpart C.
( b ) *Preparing a tax return and furnishing information.* Any individual may for compensation prepare or assist with the preparation of a tax return or claim for refund (provided the individual prepares less than substantially all of the tax return or claim for refund), appear as a witness for the taxpayer before the Internal Revenue Service, or furnish information at the request of the Internal Revenue Service or any of its officers or employees.
( c ) *Application of rules to other individuals.* Any individual who for compensation prepares, or assists in the preparation of, all or a substantial portion of a document pertaining to any taxpayer's tax liability for submission to the Internal Revenue Service is subject to the duties and restrictions relating to practice in subpart B, as well as subject to the sanctions for violation of the regulations in subpart C. Unless otherwise a practitioner, however, an individual may not for compensation prepare, or assist in the preparation of, all or substantially all of a tax return or claim for refund, or sign tax returns and claims for refund. For purposes of this paragraph, an individual described in 26 CFR 301.7701-15(f) is not treated as having prepared all or a substantial portion of the document by reason of such assistance.
( d ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable beginning August 2, 2011.
[T.D. 9527, 76 FR 32306, June 3, 2011]
#### Jennifer STURM, In re Hague Convention Petition for Return of Child to Petitioner, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-1118.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted June 13, 2002.

Decided June 18, 2002.

Robert N. Weckworth, Jr., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer Sturm, Appellee Pro Se.

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Christopher Harris appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), to reopen a case in the district court due to fraud. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no abuse of discretion and no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Sturm v. Harris,*No. CA-00-353-1 (M.D.N-C. Dec. 21, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials be*642fore the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

21 

KA 13-01756 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAMUEL J. SAELI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (KRISTIN M. PREVE OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (THOMAS B. LITSKY OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County

(Christopher J. Burns, J.), rendered June 19, 2013. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of offering a false

instrument for filing in the first degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in

the first degree (Penal Law former § 175.35). We agree with defendant

that his waiver of the right to appeal does not encompass his

challenge to the severity of the sentence. “[N]o mention was made on

the record during the course of the allocution concerning the waiver

of defendant’s right to appeal his conviction that he was also waiving

his right to appeal the harshness of his sentence” (People v Pimentel,

108 AD3d 861, 862, lv denied 21 NY3d 1076; see People v Maracle, 19

NY3d 925, 928; People v Peterson, 111 AD3d 1412, 1412). Although

defendant executed a written waiver of the right to appeal in which he

waived “any and all sentencing matters,” we conclude that the written

waiver “does not foreclose our review of the severity of the sentence

because [Supreme Court] ‘did not inquire of defendant whether he

understood the written waiver or whether he had even read the waiver

before signing it’ ” (People v Donaldson, 130 AD3d 1486, 1486-1487,

quoting People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 262). We nevertheless

conclude that the sentence of 6 months of incarceration and 5 years of

probation is not unduly harsh or severe. Defendant has completed

serving the term of incarceration, and the period of probation is

precisely what defense counsel requested at sentencing. In any event,

we conclude that the sentence is appropriate in light of defendant’s 
-2- 21 

KA 13-01756 

criminal history and the favorable nature of the plea bargain.

Entered: February 5, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
§ 41.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct. ( a ) *In general.* A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of excise tax under section 4481 shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) in the manner stated in § 1.6694-3 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78456, Dec. 22, 2008]
#### James D. Graziadei, Respondent, v Mohamed S. Mohamed et al., Respondents, and Delaware Court, Inc., et al., Appellants.

[803 NYS2d 868]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Nelson H. Cosgrove, J.), entered December 9, 2004. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the cross motion of defendants Delaware Court, Inc., Donald Denz and Kenneth Fiebelkorn, individually and as partners doing business as Delaware Court, for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint against them.

*1101It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when an unaffixed concrete parking barrier owned and maintained by Delaware Court, Inc., Donald Denz and Kenneth Fiebelkorn, individually and as partners doing business as Delaware Court (collectively, Delaware Court defendants), fell on him after allegedly being struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Munawar A. Ahmed. Supreme Court properly denied the cross motion of the Delaware Court defendants for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint against them. Those defendants “failed to demonstrate that under no view of the facts could [they] be found negligent in the happening of the accident . . . . Nor can it be determined, as a matter of law, that. . . [Ahmed’s conduct] was an intervening act that was a superseding cause of [plaintiffs] injuries” *(Ortiz v Pina,*298 AD2d 509, 510 [2002]; *see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, as we must *(see Russo v YMCA of Greater Buffalo,*12 AD3d 1089 [2004], *lv dismissed*5 NY3d 746 [2005]), and given the divergent views of the manner in which the accident occurred *(see generally Daly v City of New York,*235 AD2d 249 [1997]; *Accardi v City of New York,*121 AD2d 489, 490-491 [1986]), we conclude that there is an issue of fact whether Ahmed’s conduct constituted a superseding intervening cause of the accident that was not “a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the . . . [alleged] negligence” of the Delaware Court defendants *(Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp.,*51 NY2d 308, 315 [1980], *rearg denied*52 NY2d 784 [1980]; *see generally Pomeroy v Buccina,*289 AD2d 944, 945 [2001]). Present—Green, J.P., Hurlbutt, Scudder, Kehoe and Gorski, JJ.
#### In the Matter of George J. Panek, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[804 NYS2d 471]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules and revoked his participation in a temporary release program.

Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with violating the prison disciplinary rules that prohibit consuming alcohol *967and noncompliance with temporary release program rules. According to the misbehavior report, when petitioner returned from a one-day community service furlough, he had a red face, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and impaired comprehension and he smelled of alcohol. Two alco-sensor tests were administered resulting in positive readings. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of both charges. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determination of guilt.

We are unpersuaded by petitioner’s contention that the use of and positive test readings from the alco-sensor, as opposed to a urinalysis test as indicated in the temporary release agreement *(see*7 NYCRR 1902.1 [13]), requires that the determination be annulled. Even absent the alco-sensor test readings, the misbehavior report, written by the correction officer who personally observed petitioner’s appearance and behavior, together with the testimony at the hearing, provide substantial evidence, standing alone, to support the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Hicks v Selsky,*273 AD2d 584 [2000]; *Matter of Ross v Goord,*262 AD2d 904, 905 [1999]). Also unavailing is petitioner’s contention that he was improperly denied the right to call various witnesses inasmuch as the record supports the conclusions of the Hearing Officer that such testimony would be either redundant or irrelevant *(see Matter of Trammell v Selsky,*10 AD3d 787, 788-789 [2004]). Petitioner’s remaining contentions, to the extent they are preserved, have been reviewed and found to be without merit.

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Spain, Mugglin and Kane, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 155 (Thursday, August 13, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 40832]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-19386]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

U.S. Customs and Border Protection


Accreditation and Approval of Saybolt LP, as a Commercial Gauger 
and Laboratory

AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 
Security.

ACTION: Notice of accreditation and approval of Saybolt LP, as a 
commercial gauger and laboratory.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 19 CFR 151.12 and 19 
CFR 151.13, Saybolt LP, 710 Loop 197 North, Texas City, TX 77590, has 
been approved to gauge and accredited to test petroleum and petroleum 
products, organic chemicals and vegetable oils for customs purposes, in 
accordance with the provisions of 19 CFR 151.12 and 19 CFR 151.13. 
Anyone wishing to employ this entity to conduct laboratory analyses and 
gauger services should request and receive written assurances from the 
entity that it is accredited or approved by the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection to conduct the specific test or gauger service requested. 
Alternatively, inquires regarding the specific test or gauger service 
this entity is accredited or approved to perform may be directed to the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection by calling (202) 344-1060. The 
inquiry may also be sent to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7f1c1d0f51131e1d170e3f1b170c51181009"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="711213015f1d10131900311519025f161e07">[email protected]</span></a>. Please reference the Web 
site listed below for a complete listing of CBP approved gaugers and 
accredited laboratories. http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/operations_support/labs_scientific_svcs/commercial_gaugers/.

DATES: The accreditation and approval of Saybolt LP, as commercial 
gauger and laboratory became effective on March 24, 2009. The next 
triennial inspection date will be scheduled for March 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Anthony Malana, Laboratories and 
Scientific Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1300 
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Suite 1500N, Washington, DC 20229, 202-344-
1060.

    Dated: August 4, 2009.
Ira S. Reese,
Executive Director, Laboratories and Scientific Services.
[FR Doc. E9-19386 Filed 8-12-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-14-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### JEROME E. MORSE v. THE UNITED STATES.

[46 C. Cls. R., 361; 229 U. S. R., 208.]

*On the claimant's appeal.*

*Á*lieutenant in the Navy, retired for incapacity which did not originate in the line of his duty, is on the half-pay list when a special statute authorizes the Secretary to transfer him from the half-pay list to the 76 per cent pay list. Subsequently he is nominated for advancement to the grade of lieutenant commander on the retired list under the act 29th June, 1906, and his nomination is confirmed by the Senate. The question in the case is whether he is entitled to the retired pay of a lieutenant or of a lieutenant commander.

The court below decides;

I.The *act 29th June, 1906*(34 Stat. R, 554), provides that any officer on the retired list of the Navy who has been “ *retired on account of wounds or disability incident to the service ”*may, in the discretion of the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, be placed on the retired list with the rank and retired pay of one grade above that actually held by him at the time of retirement. But this advancement by the President and Senate will not entitle an officer to the pay of the higher grade to which he has been advanced unless he was “ *retired on account of wounds or disability incident to the*service.”

II.A special act, *act 10th June,*1902 (32 Stat. B., 1444), which authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to transfer an officer on the retired list “ *from the half-pay list to the 15 per centum list under section 1588, Revised Statutes,”*will not operate to change his status from that of an officer retired for incapacity not incident to the service to that of an officer retired for incapacity incident to the service.

III.The Revised Statutes (§ 1588) limits the increase of pay to such officers only as were retired, among other things, “ *on account of incapacity resulting from long and faithful service, or from wounds received in the line of duty, or from sick*
      *511
      *ness or exposure therein."*An officer retired from active service wiien comparatively a young man because of a disease of his eyes, which the retiring board found did not originate in the line of duty, is not entitled to the benefits of the statute.

The decision of the court below is affirmed on the same grounds.

May 26, 1913.

Mr. Justice Pitney

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1064

To repeal the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 27, 1995

Mr. SENSENBRENNER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and, in addition, to the

Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the

Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within

the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To repeal the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 681

4 et seq.) is repealed.

Æ
IA

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 164

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to provide

8-year terms of offices for judges of Federal courts other than the

Supreme Court.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 19, 1996

Mr. RIGGS (for himself, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. METCALF, Mrs. CHENOWETH,

Mr. COBURN, Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. PETE GEREN

of Texas, Mr. DUNCAN, and Mr. COOLEY of Oregon) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States to provide 8-year terms of offices for judges of

Federal courts other than the Supreme Court.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two3 thirds of each House concurring therein), That the follow4 ing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu5 tion of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents

6 and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by

7 the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States with-
2

•HJ 164 IH

1 in seven years after the date of its submission for ratifica2 tion:

3 ‘‘ARTICLE—

4 ‘‘The term of office for a judge of a court ordained

5 and established by Congress shall be 8 years. Any time

6 (but not more than 6 years) served as a judge before the

7 date of the ratification of this article of amendment shall

8 be counted toward the first term of that judge under this

9 article.’’.

Æ
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 156 (Friday, August 14, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 41145]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-19501]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)


Disease, Disability, and Injury Prevention and Control Special 
Emphasis Panel (SEP): Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Research 
Centers, Special Interest Project Competitive Supplements (SIPS) (U48 
Panels N-P), RFA-DP09-101SUPP09, Initial Review

    Cancellation: The notice was originally published in the Federal 
Register on July 21, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 138] [page 35877]. The 
following panels are cancelled: N, O and P.
    Contact Person for More Information: Brenda Colley-Gilbert, Ph.D., 
Director, Extramural Research Program Office, CCCH, 4770 Buford 
Highway, MS K-92, Atlanta, GA 30341, Telephone (770) 488-6295.
    The Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, has been 
delegated the authority to sign Federal Register notices pertaining to 
announcements of meetings and other committee management activities, 
for both CDC and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

Elaine L. Baker,
Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.
[FR Doc. E9-19501 Filed 8-13-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-18-P
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Roberto Murray, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 506]

Motion to dismiss appeal granted. Memorandum: Appeal unanimously dismissed and matter remitted to Monroe County Court to vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss the indictment *(see People v Matteson,*75 NY2d 745 [1989]). (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Frank P. Geraci, Jr., J.—Attempted Mur*1160der, 1st Degree). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Hurlbutt, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
#### § 43.0-1 Introduction.

The regulations in this part 43 are designated “Excise Tax on Transportation by Water.” The regulations relate to the taxes on transportation by water imposed by section 4471 of the Internal Revenue Code. See part 40 of this chapter for regulations relating to returns, payments, and deposits of taxes imposed by section 4471.

[T.D. 8442, 57 FR 48185, Oct. 22, 1992]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6078

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus CHARLES EDWARD YOUNG, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (CR-97-128; CA-03-137-6-24) Submitted: June 22, 2005 Decided: July 20, 2005 Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charles Edward Young, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Jean Howard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* To the extent that Young attempts to raise issues in his informal brief that were not properly presented to the district court, we note that he cannot raise them for the first time on appeal. See Muth v. United States , 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993). - 2 - PER CURIAM: Charles Edward Young, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Young has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. * We dispense- 3 - with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED