alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Andrzej Sienicki et al., Appellants-Respondents, v 760 West End Avenue Owners, Inc., Defendant, and Restore-It, Inc., Respondent-Appellant. (And a Third-Farty Action.) 760 West End Avenue Owners, Inc., Second Third-Party Plaintiff, v Phoenix Building Restorer, Inc., Second Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[803 NYS2d 567]

*272Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marylin G. Diamond, J.), entered September 24, 2004, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the verdict on the issue of damages, denied defendant Restore-It’s cross motion insofar as it sought to set aside the verdict as to liability and the loss of services award, and ordered a new trial on the issue of past medical expenses unless plaintiffs stipulated to reduce that award to $7,479, unanimously modified, on the facts, to vacate the awards for past and future pain and suffering and remand for a new trial on those damages only, unless, within 20 days of service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry, defendant Restore-It stipulates to increase the awards to $100,000 and $150,000, respectively, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The injured plaintiff fractured his ankle, tore some ligaments, underwent two operations, and faces the prospect of a third operation. As of the time of trial three years after the accident, he still suffered pain, walked with a limp, and had to use a cane. Formerly a construction worker who played soccer and beach volleyball in his spare time, he now stays home most of the time because he has to soak his leg in cold water and elevate it. Under the circumstances, the jury’s awards of $25,000 for past pain and suffering and $25,000 for 10 years of future pain and suffering deviated materially from what is reasonable compensation (CPLR 5501 [c]; *cf. Grant v City of New York,*4 AD3d 158 [2004]). However, they are “not so ‘inexplicably low’ as to make a compromise verdict ‘most likely,’ ” and therefore require that a new trial be on liability as well as damages *(Tushaj v Elm Mgt. Assoc., Inc., 11*AD3d 259, 260 [2004]; *see also Figliomeni v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Syracuse,*38 NY2d 178 [1975]). The $100,000 jury award for loss of services over 10 years does not deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation where plaintiff spouse has had to increase her work hours substantially to support the family and can no longer talk to her husband to find solutions for problems because he has become withdrawn *(cf. Schultz v Turner Constr. Co.,*278 AD2d 76 [2000]). We have considered defendant *273Restore-It’s argument about past medical expenses and find it unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Marlow, Ellerin, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 7089

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. LUIS CARLOS MUCHADO, a/k/a Francisco Javier Montesrein

- Rodriguez, a/k/a Lois K, a/k/a Lex, a/k/a Luis Rodriguez , Defendant

- Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Newport News

. Arenda L. Wright Allen , District Judge. ( 4:12

- cr - 00039

- AWA

- RJK

- 9 ; 4:16

- cv - 00161

- AWA )

Submitted : February 15, 2018 Decided: February 16, 2018

Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Luis Carlos Muchado , Appellant Pro Se. Kevin Patrick Hudson, Eric Matthew Hurt , Assistant U nited S tates Attorney s, Adam Small , Newport News, Virginia, Jerome M. Maiatico, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY , Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ; Joseph Kevin Wheatley , UNITED S TATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , Washington, D.C., for Appellee

. Unpublishe d opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Luis Carlos Muchado seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on
proc edural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the r ecord and conclude that Muchado has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materia ls before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of American Biogenetic Sciences, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2003 (the“Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof, I, Richard Rubin, CEO, CFO and Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

1. TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ Richard Rubin

CEO, CFO and ChairmanDated: February 28, 2006

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to American Biogenetic Sciences, Inc.and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.
# L_2020166DE.01001101.xml

| 28.5.2020 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 166/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.5.2020

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 166/11

---

Berichtigung der Durchführungsverordnung (EU) 2019/1293 der Kommission vom 29. Juli 2019 zur Änderung der Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 577/2013 hinsichtlich der Liste der Gebiete und Drittländer in Anhang II und des Musters der Tiergesundheitsbescheinigung für Hunde, Katzen und Frettchen in Anhang IV

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 204 vom 2. August 2019
  )

Seite 11, Anhang III zur Änderung von Anhang IV Teil 1 der Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 577/2013, Teil II der Bescheinigung, erste Alternative der Nummer II.3, einleitender Satz:

Anstatt:

„Die in Feld I.28 bezeichneten Tiere sind jünger als 12 Wochen und nicht gegen Tollwut geimpft, oder sie sind 12-16 Wochen alt und gegen Tollwut geimpft, doch seit Abschluss der Tollwut-Erstimpfung, durchgeführt gemäß den Gültigkeitsvorschriften in Anhang III der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 576/2013 (4), sind mindestens 21 Tage vergangen, und“

muss es heißen:

„Die in Feld I.28 bezeichneten Tiere sind jünger als 12 Wochen und nicht gegen Tollwut geimpft, oder sie sind 12-16 Wochen alt und gegen Tollwut geimpft, doch seit Abschluss der Tollwut-Erstimpfung, durchgeführt gemäß den Gültigkeitsvorschriften in Anhang III der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 576/2013 (4), sind nicht mindestens 21 Tage vergangen, und“.

---
# L_2019233DE.01002601.xml

| 10.9.2019 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 233/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.9.2019

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 233/26

---

Berichtigung der Durchführungsverordnung (EU) 2019/706 der Kommission vom 7. Mai 2019 zur Erneuerung der Genehmigung für den Wirkstoff Carvon gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1107/2009 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über das Inverkehrbringen von Pflanzenschutzmitteln und zur Änderung des Anhangs der Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 540/2011 der Kommission

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 120 vom 8. Mai 2019
  )

Seite 14, Anhang I, Tabellenspalte „Sonderbestimmungen“ Absatz 3 Satz 2:

Anstatt:

„Insbesondere sollte auf eine ausreichende Zeitspanne zwischen der Behandlung mit carvonhaltigen Pflanzenschutzmitteln und der Einlagerung geachtet werden.“

muss es heißen:

„Insbesondere sollte auf eine ausreichende Zeitspanne zwischen der Behandlung mit carvonhaltigen Pflanzenschutzmitteln und dem Betreten der Lagerräume geachtet werden.“

Seite 15, Anhang II Nummer 2, Tabellenspalte „Sonderbestimmungen“ Absatz 3 Satz 2 zur Änderung vom Teil B des Anhangs der Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 540/2011:

Anstatt:

„Insbesondere sollte auf eine ausreichende Zeitspanne zwischen der Behandlung mit carvonhaltigen Pflanzenschutzmitteln und der Einlagerung geachtet werden.“

muss es heißen:

„Insbesondere sollte auf eine ausreichende Zeitspanne zwischen der Behandlung mit carvonhaltigen Pflanzenschutzmitteln und dem Betreten der Lagerräume geachtet werden.“

---
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Re: Annual Statement ofCompliance for Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., CommercialMortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C31 Per the Pooling andServicing Agreement dated as of November 1, 2015 (the "Agreement"),the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asCertificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies asfollows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "ReportingPeriod"): 

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo'sactivities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under theAgreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and 

 

(b) To the best of suchofficer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period. 

 

February 27, 2017

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45114

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff

- Respondent

,

v.

DAVID ALEXANDER GREEN

,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2018 Unpublished Opinion No. 329

Filed: January 18, 2018

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Steven Hippler , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of two and one

- half years, for possession of methamphetamine, affirmed

.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; HUSKEY, Judge; and LORELLO, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

David Alexander Green pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine , Idaho Code § 37

-
2732(c) . The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum period of

confinement of two and one

- half years

. Green appeals, contending that his sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the tria l court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.2 1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Green ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
to 

Ledges Trail

Olde Eight Road

Bike & Hike Trail

to Brandywine Falls to Interstate 271 N

to Hudson

State Route 303

State Route 303

Akron Cleveland Road

to Peninsula & 

Interstate 271

to

Cuyahoga

Falls

 to

 Interstates

76 & 77 South

8

8

0

0

0.25 Kilometers

0.25 Miles

Happy Days

Lodge

Short

Cut

Boston Run Trail

Connector Trails

Other Trails

Streams

Trailhead

Parking

Picnic Area

Restrooms

Contour intervals: 10 feet 

Trail locations approximate

Boston Run Trail

Haskell Run Trail

(0.5 mile, easy)

Ledges Trail

North

Map updated 1/2012

Boston Run Trail

BOSTON RUN TRAIL

Full Loop Distance ........ 3.1 miles

Time ................................. 2 hours

Rating .......................... moderate

Elevation Change ............ 80 feet

National Park Service

U.S. Department of the Interior

Cuyahoga Valley National Park
BOSTON RUN

SALT RUN / LAKE

CROSS COUNTRY / LAKE

LEDGES AREA

State Route 303

Akron Peninsula Road

Truxell Road

Quick Road

to Peninsula

to

Akron

 to

 I-76

& I-77

South

to

Cuyahoga

Falls

Salt Run Trail

KENDALL HILLS

Cross Country Trail

Kendall Lake Trail

Lake

to

Buckeye

Sports

Center

Ledges

Trail

Ledges

Shelter

Octagon

Shelter

Pine Grove

Forest Point

Haskell Run Trail

Happy Days

Lodge

Bike & Hike Trail

to

Brandywine

Falls

to 

I-271

to 

Hudson

8Akron Cleveland Road

Boston Run

Trail

8 Kendall Park Road

Main Trails

Connector Trails

Other Trails

Parking

Picnic Area

Restrooms

Reservable Shelter

Scenic Overlook

0

0

0.5 Kilometers

0.5 Mile

North

Virginia Kendall Unit

National Park Service

U.S. Department of the Interior

Cuyahoga Valley National Park

1. Boston Run Trail

2. Ledges Area Trails

3. Cross Country & Lake Trails

4. Salt Run & Lake Trails

DETAILED TRAIL MAPS AVAILABLE
www.gpo.gov

### §1231. Persons eligible for equal share payments

The funds on deposit in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians which were appropriated (by the Act entitled “An Act making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, and for other purposes”, approved April 30, 1965 (79 Stat. 81)), to pay the judgment awarded by the Indian Claims Commission (dockets numbered 351 and 351–A), together with interest thereon, shall be distributed by the Secretary of the Interior (hereafter in this subchapter referred to as “Secretary”) in equal shares to those persons whose names appear on the roll prepared in accordance with section 1232 of this title.

(Pub. L. 91–417, §1, Sept. 25, 1970, 84 Stat. 868.)

#### References in Text

The Act entitled “An Act making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, and for other purposes”, approved April 30, 1965 (79 Stat. 81), referred to in text, is Pub. L. 89–16, Apr. 30, 1965, 79 Stat. 81. That portion of the act which appropriated the funds referred to was not classified to the Code.

The Indian Claims Commission, referred to in text, terminated Sept. 30, 1978. See Codification note set out under former section 70 et seq. of this title.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eurone White, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 826]

Appeal from a judg*765ment of the County Court of Ulster County (Bruhn, J.), rendered February 27, 2003, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of burglary in the third degree and criminal contempt in the first degree (two counts).

Defendant, charged in a multicount indictment with various crimes, agreed to plead guilty to burglary in the third degree and criminal contempt in the first degree in full satisfaction of the indictment and, in return, was to receive a sentence of six months in jail and five years probation. Prior to sentencing, defendant was rearrested. He waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by a superior court information charging him with two counts of criminal contempt in the first degree. In satisfaction of the new charges, he pleaded guilty to the two counts of criminal contempt in the first degree. Prior to defendant’s entry of his plea, County Court informed him that it would not abide by the original sentencing agreement and that he would be sentenced to concurrent prison terms of IV2 to 4V2 years on the burglary conviction and lVs to 4 years on the contempt convictions. Defendant agreed and was sentenced accordingly. He now appeals.

We find no merit to defendant’s sole claim that the sentence imposed by County Court is harsh and excessive. Notwithstanding defendant’s young age and lack of prior felony convictions, the crimes at issue evince a pattern of harassment of the victim and a complete disregard for the order of protection as well as the admonitions of the court. Defendant was fully aware of the consequences of his actions at the time of entering his initial plea. Consequently, we find that there are no extraordinary circumstances nor any abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice *(see People v Benjamin,*301 AD2d 876 [2003]; *People v Hale,*268 AD2d 691 [2000]).

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Peters, Spain and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Fernandez, Appellant.

[806 NYS2d 476]

*318Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael J. Obus, J.), rendered June 19, 2003, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 25 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490 [1987]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury’s determinations concerning credibility *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). Defendant argues that the larceny aspect of the underlying crime of robbery in this felony murder case was not established because the robbers only stole drugs that had already been sold to one of the robbers. However, two witnesses gave credible testimony that the robbers stole additional drugs that were not part of the transaction.

The court properly denied, after a *Massiah*hearing *(Massiah v United States,*377 US 201 [1964]), defendant’s motion to preclude the testimony of a witness to whom he made admissions in prison. The fact that the witness had a prior cooperation agreement with the People and had provided information in other cases did not automatically make him an agent of the government with regard to this case *(see People v Cardona,*41 NY2d 333 [1977]; *People v Belgrave,*172 AD2d 335 [1991], *lv denied*78 NY2d 962 [1991]). The cooperation agreement the witness had previously entered into did not authorize him to undertake his own unrelated investigations, or to do anything without prior approval, and there was no evidence of a tacit understanding, as defendant alleges. Instead, the witness acted on his own, outside the scope of his agreement and without any kind of agency relationship with the prosecution.

The record establishes that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; *see also Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]).

Defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find no basis for reversal. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sullivan, Nardelli, Williams and Sweeny, JJ.
#### Doris Sayas et al., Appellants, v Merrick Transportation et al., Respondents.

[804 NYS2d 769]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Satterfield, J.), dated June 15, 2004, as granted the motion of the defendants Merrick Transportation and James Eldridge and that branch of the separate motion of the defendant Gustavo A. Vargas which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Doris Sayas did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the respondents Merrick Transportation and James Eldridge.

The defendants made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff Doris Sayas (hereinafter the plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) through the submission of the affirmed medical report of a neurologist who found no objective evidence that the plaintiff was suffering from any disability, and concluded that she was capable of performing her daily living activities *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Farozes v Kamran,*22 AD3d 458 [2005]; *Paykina v Golden,*21 AD3d 1021 [2005]; *Nelson v Amicizia,*21 AD3d 1015 [2005]). The affirmation of the plaintiffs treating chiropractor, which improperly relied upon unsworn medical and magnetic resonance imaging reports, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see *Sammut v Davis,*16 AD3d 658 [2005]; *Garces v Yip,*16 AD3d 375 [2005]; *Friedman v U-Haul Truck Rental,*216 AD2d 266, 267 [1995]). The chiropractor’s affirmation also failed to provide competent evidence to support a claim that the plaintiff was unable to perform substantially all of her daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days immediately following the accident due to a medically-determined injury or impairment (see *Nitti v Clerrico,*98 NY2d 345, 357-358 [2002]; *Paykina v Golden, supra; Farozes*
      *368
      *v Kamran, supra; Nelson v Amicizia, supra).*H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Krausman, Rivera and. Lifson, JJ., concur.
§ 53.4941(b)-1 Imposition of additional taxes. ( a ) *Tax on self-dealer.* Section 4941(b)(1) of the Code imposes an excise tax in any case in which an initial tax is imposed by section 4941(a)(1) on an act of self-dealing by a disqualified person with a private foundation and the act is not corrected within the taxable period (as defined in § 53.4941(e)-1(a)). The tax imposed by section 4941(b)(1) is at the rate of 200 percent of the amount involved and shall be paid by any disqualified person (other than a foundation manager action only in the capacity of a foundation manager) who participated in the act of self-dealing.
( b ) *Tax on foundation manager.* Section 4941(b)(2) of the Code imposes an excise tax to be paid by a foundation manager in any case in which a tax is imposed by section 4941(b)(1) and the foundation manager refused to agree to part or all of the correction of the self-dealing act. The tax imposed by section 4941(b)(2) is at the rate of 50 percent of the amount involved and shall be paid by any foundation manager who refused to agree to part or all of the correction of the self-dealing act. For the limitations on liability of a foundation manager, see § 53.4941(c)-1(b).
[T.D. 7270, 38 FR 9493, Apr. 17, 1973, as amended by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16301, May 2, 1986]