Guide to Exercises in 

Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs 

MAY 1988 

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

GUIDE TO EXERCISES IN 

CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS 

Foreword 

This Guide has been prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

as a service to local and state chemical emergency response and planning 

authorities, including local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) and state 

emergency response commissions (SERCs) created pursuant to Title III of the 

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. It consists of 

three Technical Assistance Bulletins previously distributed by EPA: 

#l Introduction to Exercises in Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs 

#2 A Guide to Planning and Conducting Table-Top Exercises 

#3 A Guide to Planning and Conducting Field Simulation Exercises 

For purposes of this Guide, each of these original bulletins has been revised to ensure comprehensive coverage and consistent format. In addition, a fourth 

section, providing example simulation exercise scenarios, has been added to 

complement the three bulletins. 

The purpose of this Guide is to provide local and state officials with a 

self-contained manual for use in conducting a wide range of chemical emergency 

exercises. Many agencies have discovered that such exercises are an effective 

way both to test existing hazardous materials emergency plans and to identify 

priority concerns in developing new or revised plans. The resource materials 

provided here, as well as additional materials referenced herein, should 

enable emergency response and planning agencies to undertake exercises on 

their own. · 

PREPAREDNESS· & PREVENTION 

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #1 

Introduction· to Exercises in 

Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs 

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

1. INTRODUCTION 

EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION 

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #l 

INTRODUCTION TO EXERCISES IN 

CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS 

In recent years emergency planners and managers have employed various 

types of exercises in the development and testing of contingency plans and 

response capabilities for a wide range of emergencies. A number of these 

exercises have been conducted with the support of federal agencies such as 

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), as well as with the 

support of private industry, especially through the efforts of the Chemical 

Manufacturers Association (CMA). · 

Many communities have reported that they are confused by the existence 

of the various types of exercises and are often unsure as to which type(s) of 

exercises will meet their needs. This Technical Assistance Bulletin provides 

an overview of the major exercise types and describes some resources 

currently available for conducting exercises. 

2. AN OVERVIEW' OF EXERCISES 

The first section of this overview includes a discussion of the 

essential elements of exercises, differences among major exercise categories, 

descriptions of hypothetical exercises, and the use of exercises in the 

planning process. 

2.1 The Essentials Of Emergency Exercises 

A chemical emergency exercise is a distinctive type of directed activity 

with the following essential elements: 

• The triggering event of the exercise is a simulated 

hypothetical accident that generates problem(s) for 

participants; 

• The participants are representatives or principals of some, 

most, or all of the major organizations that would respond to 

an actual emergency, including first responders, HAZMAT teams, 

medical personnel, public works personnel, emergency services 

officials, city managers, and elected officials; 

• The participants solve the problems presented to them by using 

existing plans and operating procedures, activating emergency 

response systems, and/or deploying equipment; 

• Problems are presented sequentially and each problem requires 

some type of response by the participants, whether it be in 

the form of discussion, written messages, and/or actions; and 
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• Thes~ responses are related to one or more emergency 

activities (e.g., coordination of various response units, fire 

suppression, emergency medical services). 

Following the exercise the participants are debriefed, and a summary and 

critique of the exercise are prepared. 

2.2 Differences Among Exercises 

In addition to the shared exercise e~lements listed above, there are 

important differences among the various t:ypes of exercises that can be 

employed in emergency preparedness. Exe1~cises can hav.e differences in 

purpose, scope, level of stress, and types of responses or actions required 

of participants: 

Purposes. The purposes of emergency exercises range from training and 

familiarization of participants with their roles and responsibilities to a 

rigorous test of contingency plans and response capabilities. 

Scope. By scope of the exercise is meant the number of functions to be 

exercised and/or the depth to which the functions are examined. Among the 

functions that can be exercised are prevention and control, warning, incident 

assessment, and containment. (See Exhibit 1 for a list of major emergency 

response functions.) Exercises can deal with one, several, or all functions 

and/or some or all of the activities assc,ciated with each function. 

Stress. Exercises impose varying dc:lgrees of stress on participants. In 

low-stress exercises, participants are g:lven fairly simple problems and ample 

time to solve them. In high-stress exercises the problems are numerous, 

complex, and presented in real time. 

Actions. Participants in an exercise may be asked to respond orally to 

problems (e.g., to discuss_responses or actions that they might take, and/or 

verbally "walk through" a process); simulate actions that they would take ' 

without actually deploying personnel and equipment to the scene of an 

accident (e.g., activate the communication system, provide technical 

assistance); or simulate all actions that they would take in an emergency, 

including those at the scene of an accident. 

Exercise planners create different types of exercises by combining the 

variables of purpose, scope, stress, and actions in different ways. 

2.3 Major Exercise Categories 

There are three major categories of exercises -- table-top, functional, 

and field, each of which is described below. A list of the exercises and 

their sponsors is presented in Exhibit 2. Because the various agencies that 

sponsor exercises do not use consistent terminology to describe the various 

types of exercises, the subcategories in Exhibit 2 indicate some of the names 

used by different sponsoring agencies. While this list is representative of 

the types of chemical incident exercises available to states and local 

communities, it is by no means exhaustive. 
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EXHIBIT 1 

List of Major Emergency Response Functio~ 

Initial Notification of Response Agencies 

Direction and Control 

Communications (among responders) 

Warning Systems and Emergency Public Notification 

Public Information/Community Relations 

Health/Medical Services 

Response Personnel Safety 

Human Services 

Personal Protection of Citizens (Indoor Protection, Evacuation) 

Fire and Rescue 

Law Enforcement 

On-going Incident Assessment 

Resource Management 

Public Works 

Containment and Cleanup 

Documentation and Debriefing 

1 This list of functions, compiled from the National Response Team's 

Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, is not intended to suggest 

priorities among activities. 
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EXHIBIT 2 

Exercise Types Employed by EPA, FEMA, USCG and CMA 

------------Sponsoring Organizations------------

EXERCISE TYPES EPA FEKA USCG CKA 

Table-Tops X X X 

Functiona1 

Functional X 

Emergency X 

Operations 

Simulation 

OSC/RRT (Yorktown) X 

Field 

Drill X 

Field X 

Full-Field X 

OSC/Local X 

Full-Scale X 
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Table-top.Exercises. The first category of exercises is the 

"table-top." The distinctive characteristic of the participant action in all 

table-top exercises· is "talk," which may range from informal responses to 

questions about emergency situations to a verbal "walk-through" of procedures 

and processes. · 

"Table-tops" are generally low-stress activities. They are usually held 

for the purpose of training or familiarizing participants with plans and 

procedures. They may differ significantly in scope, however. Any given 

table-top may focus on one, several, or all of the major response functions. 

They may also differ in the depth to which each function is exercised. The 

principal output of a table-top is to highlight problems in broad response 

categories, such as communications or traffic control. Procedural training 

and equipment problems show up inore so in the field exercises. 

As shown in Exhibit 2, the specific types of exercises in this category 

include: 

• EPA's Table-top Exercise; 

• FEMA's assistance for Table-top Exercise; and 

• CMA's Table-top Exercise. 

(See Technical Assistance·Bulletin #2 for a more detailed discussion of 

table-top exercises.) 

Functional Exercises. The second major category of exercises is the "functional exercise", i.e., a simulated exercise with no actions in the 

field. The dominant feature of this category is the actual performance of 

some or all of the actions that would be required of participants in an 

actual emergency, except those activities that are performed at the scene of 

an accident. These functions could include the activation of emergency 

systems, such as warning or communications systems. 

Functional exercises tend to t~ve moderate to high stress. Often they 

focus on a single function (e.g., direction and control, providing technical 

assistance to responders). Their purpose is generally to test planning and 

response capabilities of personnel and systems without actually deploying 

response equipment. 

As shown in Exhibit 2, the exercises in this category include: 

• FEMA's Functional Exercise; 

• U.S. Coast Guard's OSC/Regional Response Team Simulation; and 

• CMA's Emergency Operation Simulation (EOS). 

Field Exercises. The third major category of exercises is the "field 

exercise". The dominant participant activity in field exercises consists of 

response operations conducted at the site of a simulated emergency. 
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Field exe~cises involve all or most of the emergency response functions. 

The common purpose of field exercises is to provide a rigorous test of 

emergency capabilities of the total emergency response system. Response 

equipment is deployed, realistic scenarios are used, medical personnel and 

equipment including·operating rooms are included, and plant managers and 

other industry employees are participants. Because these events involve key 

community groups and agencies, these exe1:cises often elicit media attention. 

As shown in Exhibit 2, the exercises in this category include: 

• EPA's Full-Field Exercise; 

• FEMA's Full-Scale Exercise; 

• CMA's Drill and Field Exercises; and 

• USCG's OSC/Local Response Terun Exercise.2 

2.4 Descriptions of Hypothetica1 Exercises 

The following capsule descriptions of a hypothetical chemical emergency 

exercise for each of the three categories may help illustrate the differences 

among these categories. These descriptions are in the form of brief 

"information bulletins" that might be issued by officials of a hypothetical 

"Lake City" following the conclusion of each exercise. These descriptions 

provide information on the purpose, participants, location, scope, and 

activities of exercise participants. 

Table-Top. During a recent table-t,op exercise, officials of Lake City 

reviewed the city's plans for responding to a major chemical emergency. 

Senior managers of the police and fire departments, the city's new Hazardous 

Materials Team, a representative from the Red Cross, a local hospital 

liaison, and the field commanders of all major response units conducted 

informal discussions of actions that their units would have taken if this had 

been an actual emergency. Their discussions covered the full range of 

required responses to such an emergency. A brief evaluation or "lessons 

learned" period followed the exercise. 

Functional Exercise. Officials in Lake City report the completion of a 

major test of the city's capabilities to provide emergency medical services 

to affected populations following a major leak of a highly toxic chemical. 

The test focused on the local Bayfront Chemicals plant on Bay View Avenue and 

nearby neighborhoods. Participants in the exercise included the City's 

Emergency Services Director, officials of the public health department and 

Bayside Hospital, and medical emergency units from the fire department. 

Emergency activities of interest in this test included the coordination of 

responses, the management of resources, and the identification of medical 

requirements arising from such an emergency. Participants simulated the 

activation of the emergency warning system and the city's new emergency 

medical response system. The major activities were conducted from the 

2 This exercise may also be a "functional exercise." For purposes of 

this analysis, we have listed it as a "field exercise." 
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operations center in City Hall. An evaluation was conducted by key 

participants following the exercise. 

Field Exercise. City officials announced today the completion of a 

major test of the city's new emergency operations plan for chemical 

accidents. The test involved all the major offices and departments of the 

city with responsibilities under the plan, including the mayor's office, and 

the police, fire, medical, public health and emergency services departments 

as well as a representative from the Salvation Army and the Red Cross. All 

aspects of emergency response were tested, including direction and control by 

officials in the emergency operations center (EOC), coordination of all 

operations at the site of the simulated accident (the local plant on Lakeview 

avenue), and all operations required to suppress the simulated'leak and treat 

all affected persons in the plant and the nearby residential area. An 

extensive debriefing was held and an evaluation of the exercise will be 

prepared. Following the evaluation, officials wiil revise the city's 

emergency plan and operating procedures. 

3. USE OF EXERCISES IN THE PlANNING . PROCESS 

The Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, recently issued by the 

U.S. National Response Team (NRT), suggests that local planning teams3 

complete four major tasks: 

• Review exis'ting plans; 

• Assess current response capabilities to respond to chemical 

emergencies; 

• Develop an emergency response plan for chemical accidents; and 

• Revise, exercise, and update the plan. 

The "exercises" referred to in the fourth task can be useful in the 

completion of the other planning process tasks as described below. 

Reviewing Existing Plans. Exercises provide insight into how response 

functions would actually be carried out under an existing plan. An existing 

contingency plan can be tested by presenting exercise participants with a 

simulated chemical accident requiring a simulated response based on the 

provisions of the local plan. Use of an exercise is often more effective in 

many cases than a review of the plan by a single planner. Exercises also are 

useful in obtaining input and expertise from a variety of people from 

different agencies, rather than from a single planner or set of planners. 

Field exercises provide the most complete review, and they are most useful 

when plans are relatively complete and formal. Table-top exercises can be 

used effectively in communities where resources are limited or existing plans 

are less complete. The results of these exercises can be used to revise and 

improve plans which lack sufficient provisions for chemical emergencies. 

3 These planning teams may be either a local emergency planning 

committee (required by Title III of SARA) or other local authorities. 
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Assessing Capabilities. Assessment of current capabilities is a major 

task for any planning team. An assessment: 

• Identifies gaps in resources and readiness that need to be 

addressed· in the planning proctass; 

• Produces an inventory of response resources within a community 

(e.g., chemical containment equipment, fire apparatus, 

hospital beds); and 

• Identifies the level of preparedness of emergency response 

units and systems in the event of serious chemical accidents. 

This assessment can be done through exercises designed specifically to test 

current capabilities. Exercises can uncover potential capabilities and 

weaknesses that are often overlooked by other methods. 

Developing. Revising or Updating the Plan. One of the basic principles 

of emergency planning is that each planning team needs to design its 

contingency plans to fit local circumstances. All of the elements of the 

plan (e.g., required procedures, policies, coordination mechanisms) need to 

be specifically related to the existing resources, capabilities; and 

organizational structure for the given community or emergency planning 

district. An exercise is a very useful way to identify gaps in existing 

emergency response procedures or to determine planning factors necessary for 

developing specific plans for chemical emergencies. In addition, an exercise 

can be a powerful stimulus for building interest in developing a 

comprehensive local emergency plan. 

4. AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR CONDUCTING EXERCISES 

This section of this Technical Assistance Bulletin includes a 

description of resources available for conducting exercises from the 

Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. 

Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Chemical 

Manufacturers Association, and the National Response Team. 

4.1 Environmental Protection Agency (EP.A) 

EPA provides training as well as technical assistance to develop and 

deliver table-top and field exercises. This assistance is offered through 

EPA Headquarters, Regional Offices, or through EPA's Environmental Response 

Team (ERT). In the case of joint EPA/FEMA training, the training is 

coordinated by FEMA's Emergency Management Institute located in Emmitsburg, 

Haryland. · 

EPA Headquarters. EPA Headquarters provides contractor support to EPA 

Regional Offices to conduct table-tops and field exercises in priority areas 

designated by the Regions in consultation with the States. Support for these 

exercises is coordinated by EPA's Regional Preparedness Coordinators. 
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EPA Headq~arters provides periodic Technical Assistance Bulletins such 

as this one, designed to provide technical information relevant to chemical 

emergency preparedness and prevention. Current Bulletins can be obtained 

from the EPA Regional Preparedness Coordinator. 

EPA Regional Offices. EPA's Regional Offices will provide States and 

communities in designated priority areas with the following assistance: 

• Programmatic and technical assistance to help communities 

determine the steps to follow in conducting an exercise; 

• Facilitation assistance for both table-tops and full-field 

exercises; and 

• Coordination of EPA Headquarters and Regional Office resources 

to assist States. 

This assistance is provided to States and communities upon request to the EPA 

Regional Preparedness Coordinator. (See Technical Assistance Bulletin #3 for 

the addresses of all EPA Regional Offices.) 

EPA's Environmental Response Team. The Environmental Response Team 

(ERT) provides technical assistance in developing and conducting full-field 

hazardous materials exercises. This support includes developing scenarios, 

working with EPA Regional Training Coordinators to provide assistance to the 

States and local communities i~ determining appropriate limitations of the 

exercise, serving as facilitators/evaluators during the exercise, and 

providing support in critiquing the exercise at the debriefing session 

following the exercise. ERT provides this assistance upon request from the 

EPA Regional Preparedness Coordinators or Regional Training Coordinators. 

(The ERT can be contacted at (513) 569-7537.) 

4.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEKA) 

FEMA provides exercise training courses, as well as direct assistance 

for personnel, training, and support materials to aid jurisdictions in 

developing and coordinating their own exercises. (See Technical Assistance 

Bulletin #3 for the addresses of FEMA Regional Offices.) 

FEMA's Exercise Training Courses. FEMA conducts classroom and field 

exercise training at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and at the 

State level. Using the EMI facility located in Emmitsburg, Maryland, FEMA 

delivers 12 to 14 exercises each year in t~e classroom as part of their 

Exercise Design Course (train-the-trainer) and the Integrated Emergency 

Management Course. Other FEMA emergency management courses, such as the 

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Planning Exercise Evaluation Course, also 

contain material useful in developing an exercise program, conducting 

exercises, and evaluating exercises. Additionally, FEMA provides instructor 

guides, student manuals, and resource manuals for resident and field courses. 

FEMA's Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement (CCA) mechanism provides 

funding for State and local attendees in the field. For access to these 

courses, contact the appropriate State Emergency Response Commission or the 

FEMA Regional Office. 
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FEMA's Exercise Assistance. All State and local jurisdictions receiving 

FEMA funds thr~ugh the CCA must exercise their emergency operations plans and 

procedures annually. Each jurisdiction must submit as part of its annual CCA 

statement of work an updated 5-year exereise plan. At least one full-scale 

exercise must be conducted during the 5 years, and a functional exercise is 

to be held in each of the other 4 years. Exercise scenarios must be rotated 

among national security, natural, and teehnological hazards. The exercise 

focus is on multi-agency and intergoverrunental involvement as well as public 

and private interaction. 

Technical assistance is provided through a State Exercise Assistance 

Officer (100 percent FEMA-funded) and FEMA Regional Office Hazardous 

Materials Program staff for scenario development, pre-exercise training, and 

post-exercise evaluation. For information on upcoming exercises involving 

hazardous materials, contact the FEMA Regional Hazardous Materiais Program 

staff or the Regional Training and Educa1:ion officers. 

FEMA Exercise Support Materials. Fl~ furnishes a variety of exercise 

support materials, including a computer-aided exercise generator and an 

exercise library containing a variety of exercises developed by State and 

local jurisdictions. The computer-aided exercise generator covers· a number 

of different scenarios: hazardous materials accident, nuclear power plant 

accident, flood, winter storm, earthquake~, tornado, mass casualty, and 

nuclear attack. The generator has been incorporated into software packages, 

enabling the user to design different exercise patterns by varying the 

objective and timeframe. For more information, contact your State Emergency 

Management Agency or FEMA Regional Office. 

4.3 united States Coast Guard (USCG) 

The USCG annually conducts six On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) and Regional 

Response Team (RRT) simulation command post exercises. These simulations 

focus on specific issues of concern to the OSC and RRT and are designed to 

exercise the relationship among the pre-designated OSC, the RRT, and response 

coordinators of Federal, State and local agencies with responsibility for oil 

and hazardous chemical pollution. .epresentatives of potential pollution 

sources (i.e., truck, rail, vessel and facilities) and cleanup contractors 

are also included. (For information con·tact the USCG at (202) 267-2010.) 

4.4 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides reports and 

critiques on its past field simulation exercises. (These materials are 

available by contacting the Hazardous Ma·terials Responses Branch, Ocean 

Assessment Division of NOAA at 206-526-6273 or FTS 392-6273.) 

4.5 National Response Team (NRT) 

The NRT has recently published the ~azardous Materials Emergency 

Planning Guide to assist local planners in preparing emergency plans. This 

guide includes a description of the materials that should be included in a 

local emergency plan and provides a sample outline of a plan. The guide 

identifies exercises as a principal method for testing, revising, and 

updating plans. (Copies of the Guide can be obtained by contacting the EPA 
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Regional Office ·or the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program Hotline at 

(800) 535-0202 or (202) 479-2449.) 

4.6 Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) Exercise Assistance 

CMA members have conducted.several simulation exercises through CMA's 

local Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) programs. These 

exercises involve local industry and response officials (e.g., fire, police, 

Red Cross) and are often videotaped. CMA provides these and other tapes 

through their lending library. Funding for exercises is at the discretion of 

the local CAER coordinator and/or the sponsoring facility. (Contact the CMA 

hotline (202-463-1599) for additional information on exercises and the CAER 

program.) 

PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION 

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #2 

A Guide to Planning and Conducting 

Table-Top Exercises 

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

1. INTRODUCTION 

EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION 

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #2 

A GUIDE TO PLANNING AND CONDUCTING 

TABLE-TOP EXERCISES 

This guide provides a process for planning, conducting, and evaluating a 

table-top exercises. More specifically this guide: 

• Describes a set of specific preparatory steps that can be 

followed by any community desiring to use a table-top exercise 

to advance its own emergency preparedness; 

• Offers guidelines for use in conducting a table-top exercise; 

• Recommends metpods for debriefing participants and evaluating 

the exercise; and 

• Provides a description of a hypothetical table-top exercise 

held in "Lake City" and the Lake City exercise control 

materials. 

The distinctive characteristic of the participant action in all 

table-top exercises is "talk," which may range from informal responses to 

questions about emergency situations to a verbal "walk-through" of procedures 

and processes. Table-tops are generally low-stress activities. They are 

usually held for the purpose of training or familiarizing participants with 

plans and procedures. They may differ significantly in scope, however. Any 

given table-top may focus on one, several, or all of the major response 

functions (e.g:, coordination, evacuation, emergency notification). They may 

also differ in the depth to which ·each function is exercised. 

To give readers an example of materials prepared for and used in a 

table-top exercise, this general discussion is preceded by a brief summary of 

the table-top exercise held in "Lake City" (a pseudonym). The Lake City 

table-top exercise was a half-day event held in a conference room at the 

offices of a regional planning commission. The primary objective of the 

exercise (described more fully in Appendix A was to gain experience and 

insights that could be used to advance the chemical emergency planning 

process in the city. The participants were managers of the first line 

emergency response units of Lake City and neighboring jurisdictions, 

including representatives of police and fire departments and emergency 

medical services, a plant manager, a Red Cross representative, and other key 

community personnel. During the play of the exercise ("play" refers to the 

step-by-step execution of a table-top), the participants verbally responded 

to a sequence of events associated with a major chemical accident by 

describing the typical response actions that would occur in the event of a 

real emergency. Subsequently, they evaluated the exercise to identify 

preparedness and planning needs that Lake City was beginning to address in 

the development of its first hazardous materials accident contingency plan. 

(The materials used to conduct the Lake City table-top are provided in 

Appendix B. ) 
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2. MAJOR STEPS IN DEVELOPING A TABLE-T01~ EXERCISE 

The following discussion outlines the essential steps to be completed by 

those responsible for planning the exercises. (The order in which these 

steps are presented is suggestive only. Completing all of these steps is 

more important than following the prescribed order.) These steps include: 

• Describe the emergency response system to be exercised; 

• Develop a clear statement of the general objectives of the 

exercise; 

• Use the statement of objectives to define the scope of the 

exercise; 

• Present the results of the first three steps to the leadership 

of the necessary participating organizations (if they are not 

members of the exercise planning team) in order to secur~ 

their approval and commitments of participation; 

• Define the critical features of the accident to be simulated; 

• Decide on the identity of all .the table-top participants; 

• Deter ... 

will 

the identity and responsibilities of key persons who 

;:;t in conducting the ~~xercise; 

• Decide on the ground rules to be followed in the conduct of 

the exercise; 

• Arrange for all ~the logistical requirements, including space, 

exercise materials, and seating arrangements; and 

• Develop the exe~cise materials. 

In this discussion we assume that an exercise leader or a coordinator of 

the team effort has been designated by the local planning committee and that 

all of the major steps are completed in concert with the key offici.;tls 

concerned with preparedness and response. Although table-tops vary in their 

complexity, they all require planning and coordination. It is critical that 

problems that arise reflect genuine response capability problems, rather than 

problems that may be due to a haphazardly planned and coordinated exercise 

process. 

Step 1: Describe the emergency response system to be exercised 

The description of the emergency response system should contain, at a 

minimum, the following: 

• A listing of all the major response agencies, e.g., fire, 

medical and police departments, and HAZMAT team; 

• The emergency response roles and responsibilities of these 

agencies; and 
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• How the system would respond to a major chemical accident. 

··It is important to understand how the emergency system operates. To 

accomplish this, the exercise leader or coordinator should: (1) consult all 

available plans, procedures, agreements, etc., of the responsible agencies; 

(2) review prior exercises and reports on responses to past accidents; and 

(3) hold informal discussions with representatives of the major response 

units. It is not necessary for the system to be outlined in formal plans and 

procedures .fo~ this step to be completed. If formal plans do not exist, the 

exercise leader should identify the informal system of operating procedures 

that typically have governed response to previous incidents. 

Step 2: Develop a clear statement of the general objectives of the exercise 

Virtually all table-top exercises for chemical emergencies have the 

common objective of testing the capabilities of a jurisdiction's emergency 

system to respond to a chemical accide~t threatening public health and. 

safety. To this ·generic objective might be added something about the type 

and size of the accident or the emergency response functions to be tested. 

For example: 

"The objective of the exercise is to test the capabilities of the City's 

police and fire departments and emergency medical service units to 

respond to a major chemical accident at a fixed facility in the City and 

to minimize the effects of that accident on public health and safety." 

Step 3: Use the statement of objectives to define the scope of the ~xercise 

The scope of the exercise refers to the number and identity of response 

functions to be exercised and the depth to which any of the functions will be 

examined. For example: 

"The exercise will test the procedures for dispatching response 

personnel, containing an accident, and treating on-site injuries." 

Table-tops can deal with a single function, multiple functions, or all 

of the functions required for a major response. 

Step 4: Present the results of the first three steps to the leadership of 

the necessary participating organizations (if they are not aeDbers 

of the exercise planning team) in order to secure their approval 

and commitments of participation 

This may be an interactive process requiring the revision of some of the 

results of the first three steps. 
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Step 5: Define the critica1 features oJE the accident to be simll.ated 

Once the general objectives and scope of the exercise have been agreed 

upon, three specific features of the exeJrcise should be determined: 

• The nature of the accident whic::.h poses the threat; 

• The facility or transportation route where the accident is to 

occur; and 

• The characteristics of the neighborhood(s) threatened by exposure 

to accident effects. 

One or more of these features may b4:l dictated by the general objective 

of the exercise and/or by its· scope. Th4:l exercise scenario should be 

realistic and specific to the kinds of r4:lleases a particular community is 

likely to experience. For example, the objective provided in Step Two (i.e., 

" •.• to test the capabilities of the city's. police and fire departments and 

emergency medical service units to respond to a major chemical accident ... ") 

requires an exercise accident that causes injury to workers in the facility 

or nearby citizens. Otherwise there would be no problems "for which emergency 

medical services are called. Likewise a decision to test multiple functions, 

as illustrated in Step Three, leads to the requirement that the accident be 

complex enough to require the response of different units of the community's 

emergency system, each of which may be responsible for a different function. 

Step 6: Decide on the identity of a11 the tab1e-top participants 

The participants should include the directors of the various units 

(e.g., police, fire, Red Cross) that would be dispatched to an actual 

emergency of the type being simulated in the exercise, as well as local 

officials (e.g., mayor, city manager), and local plant representatives. 

Step 7: Determine the identity and responsibi1ities of key persons who wi11 

assist in conducting the exercise 

Persons assisting in conducting the exercise may include: 

• A facilitator, who will introduce the exercise events into the 

"play" of the exercise and facilitate the completion of 

responses; 

• A recorder, who will take notes during the exercise and 

collect materials; and 

• Observer(s)/evaluator(s), who will observe and evaluate the 

play of the exercise. 

Collectively these persons constitute the exercise control group. 
Step 8: 

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Decide on the ground JLUles to be followed in the conduct of the 

exercise 

Table-tops are conducted most effectively under a clear set of ground 

rules. These rules typically control such matters as actions expected of the 

participants, how their .decisions are to be reported to other participants 

and to the exercise control group, and the length of time to be allocated in 

responding to each event. ·It is crucial that these be developed in advance 

of the exercise and understood by the control group and the participants. 

(See Appendix G for an example set of table-top ground rules.) 

Step 9: Arrange for all the logistical requirements, including space, 

exercise uaterials, and seating arrangements 

All arrangements should be checked by a member of the exercise planning 

'team, who is designated as the exercise coordinator, to make sure that they 

will support the exercise design. An improperly configured conference room 

can make the conduct of a table-top very difficult, as can the lack of key 

exercise materials such as maps and copies of plans. It can be very helpful 

to have a large map showing the accident site, the surrounding neighborhoods, 

and key public facilities such as schools, hospitals, and potential 

evacuation facilities. 

Step 10: Develop the exercise materials 

The exercise materials consist of three parts: 

• The scenario which sets the stage for the exercise; 

• A sequence of events, which stimulates the play; and 

• Anticipated responses. 

The exercise material used in the Lake City Table-top Exercise is 

provided in Appendix B. The scenario is a brief written statement that 

provides an overview of the emergency situation. The scenario should contain 

the following: 

• A brief description of the community, the facility, and the 

area surrounding the facility; 

• A description of the chemical accident that is the triggering 

event for the exercise; and 

• Any other information that is important to the setting for the 

first event in the sequence of events (e.g., the wind 

conditions at the time of the accident, casualties, and the 

exact location of the accident). 

The sequence of events is presented to the participants, either orally 

or in writing one event at a time. The events are arranged in a logical and 

chronological sequence designed to portray the essentials of a developing 
-6-

emergency situation. The events represent changes in the circumstances of 

the accident or in conditions over which the participants have no control, 

e.g., a change in the weather or a major change in the rate of spill or 

leakage of the chemical. 

The events in this sequence should be: 

• Directly relevant to the response functions being exercised, 

the roles and responsibilities of the participants, the 

exercise objectives, and the locale of the accident; 

• Tailored to the specific characteristics of an actual facility 

and the community in which the accident occurs; and 

• Realistic, factual, and arranged in the proper sequence. 

In selecting the events for the exercise, the exercise coordinator will 

find it useful to construct a set of anticipated responses tied to the 

various events. These anticipated responses can be used by the exercise 

facilitators and evaluators as a standard against which to compare actual 

responses during the table-top. These st:andards are not shared with exercise 

participants in order to ensure realistic: responses. Anticipated response 

actions may be derived from relevant cont:ingency plans or standard operating 

procedures used by one or more of the pat~ticipating organizations. If plans 

or procedures do not exist, the anticipat:ed response measures should be 

developed and written down prior to the E~xercise, constructed logically from 

the circumstances being simulated, or idE~ntified through discussions with 

response p~rsonnel regarding their informal operations procedures. 

An example of an exercise event and an anticipated response follows: 

Exercise event: Flow of chemical continues at rapid rate. 

Anticipated response: First responders on the scene confer with the 

plant manager on the identity of thE~ chemical. 

Even if no intervention is required during the exercise, the process of 

developing anticipated responses will be valuable to the designer of the 

exercise events. The set of anticipated responses will provide a useful 

framework for discussion during the post··exercise evaluation session. 

3. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCliNG THE EXERCISE 

The major preparatory steps discussed above set the stage for a smooth 

conduct of the exercise by the exercise facilitator. On the day of the 

exercise, the facilitator must assume direct responsibility for the conduct 

of the exercise to ensure adequate accomplishment of its objectives. The 

facilitator's job is to: 

• Describe the ground rules for ·the exercise, including the 

roles that the various participants are to play; 

• Present the players with the exercise narrative; 
-7-

• Announce the first event of the scenario; 

• ?timulate player responses, ~ithout intervening in a way that 

assumes control of the play, unless it appears likely that the 

players will not initiate a r:esponse critical to the objective 

of the exercise; 

• Control the flow and pace of the exercise by introducing the 

remaining events in sequence; and 

• Keep the exercise on schedule· and terminate play at the 

specified end time. 

In general, it is best to let the exercise play develop naturally, with 

participants responding to prescribed eyents as they deem appropriate. 

However, some anticipated responses may be so critical to the purposes of the 

exercise that the exercise facilitator ~ill have to intervene in the play to 

assure that they take place. (The fact that such intervention is required 

will, of course, represent a very impor'tant lesson for the exercise 

participants and should be noted for further discussion in the post-exercise 

debrlefing and evaluation.) An example' would be the activation of an 

evacuation process during an exercise whose objectives include testing the 

community's evacuation plan. (Appendix D provides a lengthy "checklist" of 

suggestions for the successful conduct of table-top exercises.) 

4. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCfiNG A POST-mQmCISE DEBRIEFING AND EVALDATION 

A post-exercise debriefing and evaluation can be as valuable an 

experience as the exercise itself. These post-exercise sessions are critical 

for capturing the lessons of a table-top so that they can be used to revise 

and improve emergency plans and procedures. The facilitator should first 

conduct a debriefing sess~on, whose pr~mary objective is to review the 

experiences of the participants during :the exercise. A debriefing works best 

if the facilitator leads the participants through an event-by-event 

recapitulation of the exercise, discussing the actual responses and how they 

compared to anticipated responses. The debriefing may cover all events and 

responses before they are evaluated, or it may proceed one event at a time, 

allowing an opportunity for evaluation :as well. 

Once the debriefing is completed, the facilitator should elicit 

evaluations from the participants concerning both their own performance 

during the exercise and the characteris:tics of the exercise as a whole. This 

process will be enhanced if the participants understand that the purpose of 

the evaluation is to develop a set of r.ecommendations for improving the 

response system, rather than to find fault with the performance of the 

participants. These recommendations may include actions to improve emergency 

response plans, procedures, and equipment as well as additional training 

needs for members of the response system. 

It is important that problems in the response system (e.g., lack of 

plans or procedures) be separated from problems related to the specific 

exercise design or conduct (e.g., a scenario event that did not match 

conditions in the community). Thus the facilitator should allow opportunity 
-8-

for the participants to evaluate the exercise itself. The facilitator should 

be alert to both the possibility that participants may be more critical of 

the exercise than of their own performanc:e and the fact that problems with 

exercise design and conduct may have produced some responses that do not 

reflect existing plans, procedures, or the response capabilities of the 

participants. 

5. IMPROVING RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS FOili)WING THE EXERCISE 

The results of the debriefing/evaluation period, especially the remedial 

actions, need to be implemented by the response system in order to take 

maximum advantage of the table-top experience. These results should be 

included in the on-going planning and pre!paredness activities of the 

community. Local planners should initiat:e efforts to revise existing plans 

and procedures or develop new ones to reflect the lessons from the exercise 

(e.g., revise notification procedures, clarify responsibilities for providing 

services to an evacuated population.) Exercise planners should use the 

evaluation of the exercise itself to impi:ove future exercises. All other 

parties (e.g., police, fire, emergency, n1edical) should ~ake actions 

appropriate to their roles in the preparedness effort. Approximately three 

to six months following the exercise, the contingency plans and procedures · 

should be reviewed to ensure that appropi:iate changes and revisions were 

incorporated. 
Appendix 

A 

B 

c 

D 

-9-

LIST OF APPENDICES 

Title 

Lake City Advances Preparedness Through TableTop Exercise 

Lake City Table-Top Exercise Control Materials 

Example Table-Top Exercise Ground Rules 

Suggestions for the Conduct of Table-Top 

Exercises 

Introduction 

A-1 

APPENDIX A 

LAKE CITY ADVANCES PREPAREDNESS 

THROUGH TABLE-TOP EXERCISE 

On July 30, 1986, emergency response personnel from Lake City, 

Middletown, and Plainville, gathered at the offices of the Regional Planning 

Commission (RPC) to participate in a table-top Chemical Emergency 

Preparedness Program (CEPP) exercise. Also present were represen~atives of 

the State Police, the State Department of Environmental Protection, RPC, the 

American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Lake City Bus Transit, Lake City Air 

Quality Control, various chemical industries, EPA Headquarters staff, and EPA 

Regional staff. The immediate purpose of this exercise was to test and 

improve the response capabilities of Lake City's municipal agencies; another, 

longer-range objective was to provide impetus toward the development of a 

chemical emergency contingency plan for Lake City. 

Extensive preparatory activities had preceded the table-top exercise. 

This bulletin briefly discusses these activities as well as the broader 

context of chemical emergency preparedness in Middle County. The purpose of 

this bulletin is to share with other communities the "lessons learned" in 

Lake City, with the hope that those lessons will contribute to successful 

table-top exercises and related contingency planning efforts elsewhere. 

Background 

Lake City, located in Middle County, is a medium-sized industrial city. 

Lake City is home to numero4s chemical, oil, steel, and other industrial 

facilities. Although Lake City's police, fire, and emergency medical 

departments have been called upon to respond to numerous small-scale 

transportation-related .. hazardous materials incidents, and although the Lake 

City Fire Department has developed formalized procedures for so-called 

"hazmat" incidents, no comprehensive contingency plan has yet been developed. 

Among area jurisdictions, Lake City is not alone in this circumstance. 

Recognizing this situation, RPC has spearheaded the formation of a Middle 

County Hazardous Materials Task Force. 

Preparatory Activities 

EPA released interim guidance for its Chemical Emergency Preparedness 

Program (CEPP) late in 1985. The CEPP coordinator for EPA Region ZZ, decided 

that the Middle County area would be a suitable location for a case study of 

how CEPP guidance could be implemented at the local level. An RPC official 

meanwhile, saw the CEPP initiative as one way to foster cooperation and 

communication among various jurisdictions ··that faced potential chemical 

incidents from fixed facility releases and/or transportation accidents. The 

Safety, Health, and Environmental Director at the XYZ chemical plant in Lake 

City, offered use of plant grounds for a field simulation of a hazardous 

chemical incident to which nearby cities and towns could respond. 

Meetings at RPC involving various interested parties revealed that 

Middletown had recently developed and tested an emergency response plan. 

Other jurisdictions and industries in the area have informal cooperative 
A-2 

agreements to assist each other during e1nergencies, but those agreements are 

not written into contingency plans. Two counties bordering Lake City have 

hazmat teams, as does the City of Middletown. 

In 1986, EPA Regional officials held a series of meetings with 

interested parties to take more formal s·teps toward a field simulation 

exercise. Because adequate written contingency plans were not yet availabl~, 

officials agreed that a carefully-planned table-top exercise should precede a 

field simulation. It was also agreed that, because the XYZ company's · 

facility is located in Lake City, active cooperative leadership from Lake 

City officials would be essential to the success of any exercise. Lake City 

political leaders voiced their support for the proposal and the Deputy Police 

Chief agreed to lead the planning effort. 

In 1986, emergency response and saf.ety personnel from cities and 

chemical plants in the Lake City area were interviewed. The purpose of these 

interviews was to determine the existing response procedures in order to 

assure that the exercise scenario would present a realistic test of local 

response capabilities and practices. 

A one-page accident scenario narrative was developed and circulated for 

comment by interested parties in the Lake City vicinity. Potential 

participants were invited by EPA and RPC to be present. After the proposed 

narrative was approved, an exercise "script" was developed, in the form of a 

sequence-of-events that might realistically be expected to occur following 

the accident described in the narrative. 

The Table-Top Exercise 

Exercise participants and observers met at 8:30 a.m. Everyone 

introduced him/herself. Ground rules for the exercise were announced. Among 

the significant ground rules were the following: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Participants would "enter" the exercise, as specific events in 

the script unfolded, to represent those parties who would be 

involved in a response if the event were a real one; 

For each event, the appropriate participants would describe 

fully the actions that they wc1uld take in response; 

Because the exercise was especially meant to test the response 

capabilities and procedures of Lake City and neighboring 

jurisdictions (rather than thE! safety procedures of local 

chemical plants), industry representatives were not 

participants in the table-top; instead, realistic industry 

reactions were "built-into" the exercise script; and 

Exercise facilitators could call a time-out in the exercise 

whenever technical advice or information was needed to assure 

the fidelity of the simulation. 

Each individual event was projected onto a screen by an overhead projector 

while participants described response procedures. A recorder summarized the 
A-3 

responses. on large paper pads for use in future review and evaluation of the 

table-top. The simulation began at about 9:00 a.m. and lasted approximately 

two hours. 

After a fifteen-minute recess all participants and observers reconvened 

to discuss the, exercise. This discussion was not meant to produce a decision 

about the quality of the simulation exercise, nor to judge the 

appropriateness of the response decisions that had been made by the 

participants. Instead, the purpose of the discussion session was to have 

everyone identify issues that must be faced by area planners preparing for 

possible hazardous materials incidents. In this way, the table-top became a 

direct input into Lake City's ongoing contingency planning process. 

The major planning issues identified concerned the need to develop 

evacuation procedures and to improve formal coordination of and communication 

among area emergency responders. Participants noted a general emergency 

personnel shortage in ~he area. These issues and their constituent 

sub-issues were written down during the discussion session and will be 

revised over time. It is intended that this list serve in effect as a 

contingency planning agenda once the field simulation has·been completed. 

Next Steps 

Participants agreed that the next step is to constitute a planning 

committee, including representatives from each major Lake City emergency 

response agency, to develop plans for a field simulation. The ultimate end 

of Lake City's exercise effort, however, will be the completion of a 

contingency plan which will guide future exercises as well as, in the event 

of a real chemical emergency, future response actions. 

Lessons Learned 

Although Lake City's response officials are, as of this writing, still 

in the early stages of th~ contingency planning process, a few lessons can 

clearly be discerned from the Lake City experience to date: 

• Active local leadership is key to the successful planning of 

chemical emergency response exercises and the development of 

contingency plans. In Lake City, the leadership of the Deputy 

Police Chief and RPC staff has been instrumental in carrying 

process this far. 

• Close cooperation with local chemical plant officials is also 

very helpful. In Lake City, the XYZ Company's representative 

took an early lead both within the Middle County Hazardous 

Materials Task Force and in volunteering XYZ's plant site for 

the field simulation. Mo+eover, his technical knowledge will 

prove essential as Lake City turns its attention from the 

field simulation to contingency planning. 

• Although there is wisdom in the conventional approach of 

developing a contingency plan prior to undertaking response 

exercises, experience in Lake City clearly demonstrates that 

table-top exercises can usefully precede the planning effort. 

They can serve both as motiyators of the planning process (by 
A-4 

getting people energized to deal with demonstrated response 

weaknesses) and as substantive guides to the specific issues 

and problems the community needs to address in that process. 

• Emergency response exercises in one locality can help raise 

awareness and motivate hazmat planning over a broader 

geographic area. In the case of Lake City, the table-top 

exercise attracted county-wide participation and interest and 

has provided an impetus to similar efforts in neighboring 

jurisdictions. 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP 

EXERCISE CONTROL MATERIALS 

B-2 

LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP 

Scenario 

XYZ Chemicals, Inc., produces a small line of acids for sale in the 

manufacturing and trade markets. XYZ stores and handles a variety of 

chemicals on-site for use in its own processes; in addition, XYZ products are 

often stored on ~lant grounds pending shipment to customers. 

XYZ's Lake City plant is located in a neighborhood characterized by a 

mix of industrial and residential land uses. Local industrial facilities 

.include two large steel plants, an oil refinery and numerous specialty 

chemical plants. The XYZ facility itself is bounded on the north by a spur 

of the Union Railroad; on the south by the Grand River; on the west by Elm 

Street and a rail line; and on the east by First Street. Beyond the river on 

the south is an interstate highway that is heavily traveled. Within two 

miles north of the plant are seven schools and a hospital. Just north of the 

plant, across the Union tracks, is a residential neighborhood; additional 

residential zones of Lake City and Middletown lie one and one-half miles to 

the south and southwest,. and three miles to the southeast. 

Returning from their 12 p.m. break, two XYZ workers resume the task of 

transferring anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from a pressurized rail car to 

a 15,000 gallon outdoor storage tank. They had allowed the transferring pump 

to operate unattended and found upon returning that the failure of an 

automatic shutoff valve resulted in a spill of approximately 1000 gallons. 

The liquid AHF has begun to pool, giving rise to vapor. Inhaling these 

vapors, both workers suffer severe respiratory injury. Although one worker 

collapses immediately, the other succeeds in activating the plant safety 

alarm, thereby alerting the shift supervisor that an emergency has occurred 

at the transfer site. 

The supervisor drives to investigate the accident. Smelling the strong 

presence of HF vapors in the air, the supervisor stops his vehicle 200 feet 

from the accident site and radios the plant gate to notify the Lake City 

emergency response authorities by calling 911. In the process of suiting up 

with protective equipment, the supervisor himself collapses. 
B-3 

LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP 

Sequence of Events and Expected Actions 

EVENT 1: PI.ANT SUPERVISOR GALLS 911. 

Message 

• From: Plant employee 

To: 911 

"This is a drill. There has been a chemical spill at the XYZ plant on 

Elm Street." 

Note: No inforua.tion is provided on identity of chemicals involved. 

Expected Actions 

• 911 makes necessatY notifications, includingl: 

Police Department 

Fire Department 

Emergency Medical Servicels 

• Other notifications made, including: 

State Department of Envil~onmental Management 

State Police 

Plainville Fire Department (to activate mutual aid) 

Middletown Hazmat Squad 

GHEMTREC/CHEMNEI 

National Response Center 

lunderlining identifies most important response activities. 
B-4 

HOLD 

No fUrther events introduced until first responders arrive on scene 
EVENT 2: 

B-5 

FI.DW OF CHEMICAL CONTINU""".LHG AT A RAPID RATE PlANT PERSONNEL 

EVACUATE. SIX WORKERS SUFFERING EYE AND RESPIRATORY IRRITATION. 

CONDITION OF SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND 'NO WORKERS UNKNOWN. ALSO 

UNKNOW lmETHER ALL OTHER PERSONNEL ARE SAFELY OUT OF PlANT. 

Expected Actions 

First Responders (whether Fire, Police, or Emergency Medical Services (EMS)) 

• Situation assessment: 

Confer with plant personnel to determine identity of 

chemical(s) 

Count the number of evacuated personnel 

Messages 

• From: Plant employee 

To: First responders 

• 

"The chemical leaking from tank is Anhydrous Hydrofluoric 

Acid (AHF); judging from the rate of vapor formation, it is a 

rapid leak." 

From: 

To: 

Plant employee 

First responders 

"Plant personnel have evacuated. Six evacuated workers have 

suffered injury. Shift supervisor and two employees are 

known missing. Not knoW1~ whether all other workers have been 

safely evacuated." 

Police Department (when they arrive) 

• Close off access to plant 

EMS (when they arrive) 

a Establish treatment zone in a safe area 

• Begin examining/treating injured workers 

• Radio for backup units 

• Notify City Hospital to expect injured 
B-6 

Fire Department (when they arrive) 

• Establish command post in a safe area 

• Delineate "restricted areas", staging area, decontamination zone 

• Determine personnel and equipment needs 

Call for additional resources, as needed 

• Squad 1 personnel (and possibly Middletown Hazmat team) suit up in 

protective clothing to investigate leak and injured 

• Squad 1 approaches accident site from upwind position 

• Spokesman issues initial press statement 
B-7 

PAUSE 

Present the next event soon after all 3 agencies have arrived 
B-8 

EVENT 3: VIND OBSERVED BLOWING . OUT OF SOUTH/SOUTHWEST AT 5 MPH. 

Message 

• From: Exercise Director 

To: Fire Department Incident Commander 

"Winds blowing out of south/southwest at 5 MPH." 

Expected Actions 

• Begin consideration of evacuation option 

• Evacuation notifications begin: 

School bus company (to dispatch 3 buses) 

Red Cross, Salvation Army 

Lake City Civil Defense 
B-9 

HOLD 

No further events introduced tm.ti1 suffi4::ient time has passed to a11ow 

initia1 response actions to be we11 tm.der way 
B-10 

EVENT 4: THREE ADDITIONAL INJURED PLANT WORKERS DISCOVERED IN PLANT 

POWERHOUSE. 

Kess age 

• From: Exercise Director 

To: Fire Department Incident Commander 

"Three more injured workers have called in from plant powerhouse." 

Expected Actions 

• Fire Department/Middletown Hazmat personnel (with protective gear) 

dispatched to powerhouse to evacuate additional injured 

• Shift supervisor, two other initial injured employees evacuated by 

Squad 1 personnel to decontamination zone 

• Initial injured are decontaminated (as necessary) 

• Initial injured are taken to EMS treatment zone 

• EMS begins triage/hospital evacuation procedures on initial injured 
B-11 

HOI..D 

No further events introduced un.ti1 va1V'e is c1osed by Fire Depart:otent and 

flow of AHF is stopped 
B-12 

EVENT 5: AS A RESULT OF VALVE CLOSURE. THE FLOW OF AHF HAS STOPPED; VAPOR 

FORMATION STOPS. 

·Messages 

None 

Expected Actions 

• Fire Department crew notifies Fire Department Incident Commander that 

leak has been stopped 

• Fire Department begins vapor suppression, pool containment procedures 

• Fire Department personnel evacuate additional injured from powerhouse 

to decontamination zone 

• Squad 1 members, additional injured decontaminated (as necessary) 

• Additional injured taken to EMS treatment area 

• EMS begins triage/hospital evacuation procedures 
B-13 

HOLD 

No further events introduced until Fire Department contains AHF pool, 

completely suppresses AHF vapors 
B-14 

EVENT 6: RESPONSE COMPLETED; INCIDENT OVER. 

Messages 

• From: Exercise Director 

To: Fire Department Incident Commander 

"The incident is over." 

Expected Actions 

• All response personnel notified 

• Triagejhospital evacuation completed 

• Access to plant reopened 

• Clean-up contractor(s) notified 

• Press is briefed by press spokesman, plant spokesman 

C-1 

APPENDIX G 

EXAMPLE TABLE-TOP EXERCISE GROUND RULES 

• There will be two tables for participants at the exercise; one for "onscene" participation and the other for EOC or command post 

participation. Participants will "enter" the exercise, as specific 

events in the script unfold, to represent those parties who would be 

involved in responding if the event was real. It is important that 

participants do not enter the exercise until they normally or 

reasonably would do so. 

• For each event, the appropriate participants will describe fully the 

actions that they would take in response. Discussions as well as 

statements are encouraged. It is important to try and speak as loudly 

and clearly as possible for the benefit of those affected by the 

actions being described, as well as for the observers and the recorder. 

• The recorder will write down the actions taken as described by each 

participant on the event sheet to which it pertains. These sheets will 

later be reviewed in the self-evaluation portion of the exercise to 

compare the actual responses to the anticipated responses. 

• When a player's participation is no longer required at either table, 

the player should return to the observer section. 

• The exercise facilitator may call a time-out in the exercise if 

technical advice or information is needed to assure the realism of the 

simulation. 

• When anticipated responses which are critical to the purpose of the 

exercise are not carried out, the exercise facilitator may intervene in 

the play to assure that they take place. 

• All questions should be directed to the exercise facilitator. Comments 

by observers should be made during the evaluation period and not during 

the exercise. 

D-1 

APPENDIX D 

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF TABLE-TOP EXERCISES 

The following are some suggestions to assist in the conduct of table-top 

exercises. They are subdivided into four stages -- pre-exercise, exercise, 

break, and evaluation. 

Pre-Exercise Stage 

• You should arrive in town the day before the exercise in order to make 

sure that all necessary arrangements have been made (meeting logistics, 

etc.) and to meet with your local contacts. 

• The meeting room should be arranged so that there is a large table and 

chairs at one end and a general seating area at the other. This 

arrangement facilitates the use of the table as the.simulated scene of 

the accident; exercise players come up to the table as if they were 

arriving at the scene of an actual emergency. You may include two 

tables, one for the accident scene and one for the EOC, for more 

complex table-tops. 

• If the exercise is to be videotaped, you should plan out in advance 

where the camera(s) should be located and make sure that all necessary 

equipment is available and in good working condition. 

• It is useful to have on the walls a large map of the area, clearly 

showing the site of the simulated accident and the key local 

infrastructure -- highways, schools, hospitals, etc. 

• Each event in the pre-scripted sequence should be written on a separate 

page of a "butcher-block" paper pad. (It is on this paper, under each 

event, that the exercise recorder will record the response actions 

taken during play.) 

• You should know the sequence-of-events by heart. The need may arise 

during the exercise to re-script as a result of unanticipated response 

actions. A thorough knowledge of the pre-scripted sequence will help 

you re-script quickly. 

Exercise Stage 

• You should begin the exercise itself by summarLzLng the objectives and 

scope of the table-top as formulated by the local officials. 

• Next you should clearly and quickly explain the groundrules for the 

exercise i.e., the role of the facilitator and recorder, that people 

should come up to the exercise table as they become involved in the 

simulated response, that people are to make decisions as realistically 

as possible, etc. 
D-2 

• You should also briefly tell people that the evaluation will follow the 

play (i.e., that there should be no evaluation during the exercise 

itself). Put people at ease regarding the evaluation by stressing that 

they will be evaluating themselves. 

• Start the actual exercise play by reading the narrative (each 

participant should have a copy in front of them). 

• Next you should begin by displaying (on the overhead projector) the 

first event. 

• In general, let exercise play proceed realistically, without much 

prompting or intervention either by facilitator/recorder team or by 

members of the audience. · 

• Some prompting may be necessary, however, either to remind people to be 

as realistic as possible in their actions (e.g., if certain responders 

in 'real life would confer before the incident commander makes a 

specific decision, they-should confer during the exercise) or to keep 

things moving. 

• As play proceeds, the facilitator should make mental or actual notes 

regarding the correlation between the actual response actions taken 

during the exercise and the "anticipated responses" identified in 

advat].ce. These notes will help later during the evaluation session. 

• In general, the exercise should take about 1 hour 45 minutes, followed 

by a 15 minute break and a 1 hour evaluation. If there is extra time 

available, it should go to the evaluation. It is important that the 

participants not feel that the exercise is "dragging"; they are busy 

people, don't waste their time. (The time constraint should be 

included in the initial "groundrules" announced at the beginning.) 

• The recorder should keep an ongoing list of response actions on the 

butcher-block paper mentioned above. 

• Stay on your toes! The need to re-script may arise at any time. If 

you need to call "time-out" in order to re-script or to confer before 

answering a procedural question, do so. But keep it brief! 

Break 

• During the break, the recorder and facilitator should tape each of the 

event/response sheets to a wall within easy eyesight. These will help 

as a reference point during the evaluation. 

• Keep the break to 15 minutes maximum. Any longer a break risks the 

danger of dissipating the energy and momentum generated during the 

exercise. 

Evaluation Stage 

• For the evaluation, the key responders should be back at the table. 
D-3 

• The facilitator should start things off by re-explaining the purpose 

and process of the evaluation. The goal is to produce a list of 

planning issues and response problems identified during the exercise 

that the local officials can use in improving their plans and response 

systems. 

• Next the recorder or facilitator should briefly (5 minutes) 

recapitulate the key response actions taken at each event. 

running short on time, dispense with this and skip straight 

evaluation. 

If you are 

to the 

• The faciiitator should then ask people to identify (in free-association 

style) the key issues or problems (and successes) that they observed 

during the exercise. Keep things moving. The recorder should register 

each of these either on a blackboard or on another sheet of butcherblock paper. If comments are long-winded, summarize in a few key 

words. 

• Identify and eliminate any duplication in the concerns raised. 

• Have people vote on those they believe are the 5 (more or less, use 

your judgment) most important. These then should each be discussed 

individually. The goal here is to identify very specific comments and 

concerns. 

• If questions arise about what actually happened during play, refer 

people back to the event/response summary sheets taped to the wall. 

• The list of concerns which comes out of this (including both the master 

list of issues and the more detailed.comments on the "top five" issues 

should be written up after the exercise and provided to the local 

officials as, in effect, an agenda for future action. 

PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION 

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #3 

A Guide to Planning and Conducting 

Field Simulation Exercises 

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

1. INTRODUCTION 

EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION 

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #3 

A GUIDE TO PLANNING AND CONDUCTING 

FIELD SIMULATION EXERCISES 

This bulletin is intended as a guide for local emergency preparedness 

and response personnel to use in planning, conducting, and evaluating field 

exercises. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 . 

requires Local Emergency Planning Committees to prepare emergency plans by 

October 17, 1988 and review the pl~ns annually. The exercises described in 

this guide may be used in formulating, testing, and revising those plans. 

Planning and exercises may be used as interactive elements to maintain an 

effective and up-to-date emergency response system. 

With this purpose in mind, this bulletin is organized as follows: 

• Section 3 describes the components of planning for a field 

exercise from the decision to perform a field exercise through 

the final pre-exercise check and set-up; 

• Section 4 provides guidelines for actually conducting the 

exercise; 

• Section 5 presents methods for the post-exercise debriefing 

and evaluation; 

• Section 6 relates the exercise experience to emergency 

preparedness planning; and 

• The appendices provide a sample exercise scenario and sequence 

of events, example planning checklists, an exercise evaluation 

guide, information contacts, and reference information. 

The information presented here can be supplemented by contacting the 

regional representatives of both EPA and FEMA (see Appendix E) and by 

. referring to other published guides to emergency exercises and planning (see 

Appendix F) . 

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FIELD EXERCISES 

Field exercises are the most complex and rigorous of the various types 

of emergency preparedness exercises (described in the overview of chemical 

emergency preparedness in Technical Assistance Bulletin #l). The procedures 

presented in this bulletin are based on the assumption that the community has 

either sufficient direct experience or expertise available to perform 

exercises of this complexity. 

Field exercises proceed according to a chemical accident scenario and 

pre-determined sequence of events to simulate, as realistically as possible, 

a chemical emergency. Problems are presented to participants for resolution 
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via existing plans, standard operating procedures, emergency response 

systems, and/or equipment deployment protocols. A~ defined here, field 

exercises vary in complexity: 

• A basic or limited field exercise involves testing single 

components of a community's emergency response system. Such 

an exercise may, for example, test only the warning and 

emergency public notification components. In place of a fullscale response, only certain first response agencies will be 

involved-- e.g., fire and emergency medical services. The 

exercise may involve a mix of on-scene response by a limited 

number of agencies and table-top simulation. 

• A full-scale field exercise involves extensive site activity, 

as if the emergency is actually occurring. In this type of 

exercise, the responders may not be told in advance that an 

exercise is going to occur. When the notification of a 

hazardous chemical incident is received, the emergency 

response system goes into action, including all components and 

auxiliary services. 

In order to appreciate the level of realism and complexity involved in a 

full-scale field exercise, the reader should refer to the appendices at the 

end of this bulletin. Appendix A provides an illustrative emergency scenario 

that might be used to commence an exercise. Appendix B provides the 

subsequent sequence of events that follo·w the beginning of the exercise and 

control the flow of exercise play. 

3. STEPS IN DEVEI.DPING A FIELD EXERCISE 

This section presents the various steps involved in developing a field 

exercise. The order in which the components are described is not necessarily 

the order in which they must be performed. Although some of these steps 

obviously must be performed before others, successful exercise planning will 

require interactions and overlaps among the components and should progress · 

according to the needs of the locality. The components are presented as 

follows: 

• Establish exercise objectives; 

• Determine the basic characteristics of the exercise; 

• Secure appropriate approval and commitments; 

• Design and plan the exercise; 

• Consider other factors such as involvement of media, or the 

extent of participation by public officials; and 

• Provide for staging, set-up, and pre-exercise tasks. 

Successful planning and execution of these components requires 

systematic attention. Toward this end, it is advisable to convene 

appropriate representatives of the agencies expected to participate in the 
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exercise as pa~t of a relatively formal exercise steering committee. Regular 

committee meetings should be held to make necessary decisions, assign 

planning and logistical responsibilities, and to make sure that everything is 

"on track" for a successful exercise. This steering committee is also a 

useful mechanism for ensuring that the results of the exercise evaluation are 

linked back to the planning process. 

Step 1: Establish Exercise Objectives 

The decision to perform a field exercise will be based on various local 

requirements or perceived needs.l A jurisdiction may wish, for example, to 

exercise a new component of its emergency response .system or a part of the 

emergency response system that has not been used or exercised for a long 

time. Testing multi-community response capabilities under a mutual aid 

agreement could also be an objective. The exercise may be based on existing 

emergency preparedness plans or be used as a tool in the development of such 

plans. 

The reasons for performing the exercise provide the basis for the 

exercise objectives. These objectives should include the functions that will 

be exercised and the purposes of the effort (e.g., new systems, new chemical 

hazards, training, new or updated plan, or to gain experience). A clear 

statement of the general objectives of the effort should be developed. For 

example, a statement of objectives for the exercise for which the scenario in 

Appendix A may be used, might read as follows: 

"The exercise will test the procedures for spill notification, 

emergency response dispatch, containment and control measures, and 

evacuation." 

Step 2: Determine the Basic Characteristics of the Exercise Based on 

Objectives 

Scale of the Exercise. As described above, the field exercise can range 

from a limited to a full-scale, on-scene response. In determining which type 

of exercise you want to stage, you should consider the number of people, 

amount of equipment, and time-frame, as well as the level of complexity 

(e.g., limited field or full-scale field). Decide if the responders are to 

be notified beforehand or if the exercise will occur as if it is a real 

situation. 

Functions/Systems to be Exercised. A clear statement of objectives will 

guide the development of the exercise. With the objectives and scale 

established, this component of planning should identify the emergency 

response system, sub-systems, or functions to be exercised. For example, the 

scenario in Appendix A, in keeping with the statement of objectives (above), 

could be used to test the emergency notification/ communications system; 

fire, rescue, and hazmat response units; and the contingency plan for 

evacuation. 

1 For assistance in making the decision to perform a field exerci~e 

refer to Exercise Design Course Guide to Emergency Management Exercises, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 1984, SM # 170.2, pp. 17-18. 
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Oq~anizations and Individuals Invobred. The basic characteristics of 

the exercise should also include the jurisdictions, agencies, and industries 

(if any) involved. The organizations participating should be those 

referenced in emergency response systems, contingency plans, or emergency 

preparedness plans.· (If no plans exist or organizations are identified that 

are not in the systems or p~ans, provisions should be made to follow-up the 

exercise by preparing or updating such systems or plans.) Industrial plants 

or other hazardous substance handlers may be invited to participate using 

their response capabilities. Each of the exercise participants should be 

represented in the exercise planning process, preferably by someone who in 

real life is involved in responding to emergencies but who will not be a 

"player" in the exercise. A clear distinction should be maintained between 

those who are responsible for planning a:nd those who will be responding. 

This distinction will aid in the assignment of responsibilities and preclude 

any special pre-exercise preparation, on the part of the players, that would 

compromise the integrity of the exercise as a test of the responders' 

capabilities. 

I2Pe and Number of Continuous or Simultaneous Activities. The type and 

number of continuing or simultaneous exercise activities should be described. 

These activities are those basic response functions which,tend to be ongoing 

throughout much of an emergency response, including first aid and triage, 

chemical spill abatement and containment, and notification and evacuation of 

local residents. Coordination of these activities is critical to the success 

of the exercise because they typically are critical in a real-life emergency. 

The type and number of continuous or simultaneous activities should be 

appropriate to fit the scale of the exercise, the functions that are to be 

tested, and the organizations to be tested, as previously determined in the 

exercise planning process. 

Level of Stress. The level of stress of the exercise should also be 

determined. Level of stress (as described in Technical Assistance Bulletin 

#l) varies with the type of exercise, problems presented to the participants, 

and time constraints. Full-scale field exercises impose the highest degree 

of stress. The level of stress in the field exercise will increase as the 

exercise i~ made more true-to-life. Simultaneous activities in greater 

numbers and complexity will increase the level of stress. For example, a 

full-scale response to the spill site in a mixed residential/commercial/ 

industrial area, described in the Appendix A scenario, will impose more 

stress than a limited field exercise testing only, for example, a 

communications facility under the same scenario. 

Step 3: Secure Appropriate Approva1 and Commitments 

A statement of the objectives and basic characteristics of the exercise 

should be prepared for presentation to, and approval (if warranted) by, the 

chief executive of the jurisdiction(s) involved. This prepared statement 

should also be presented to the leadership of the necessary participating 

organizations (if they are not members of the exercise steering committee) to 

secure their approval and commitments to participate. Press releases; 

announcements to interested parties; and invitations for support, volunteers, 

and observers may also be developed from the statement of objectives and 

characteristics, once they have been officially approved. Broad assignments 

or directives to participating agencies and their commitments to participate 

and support the exercise should be made final at this time. ' 
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Step 4: Design and Plan the Exercise 

Designing and planning a simulation exercise involves determining the 

appropriate emergency scenario and establishing the framework for preparing, 

managing, performing, and evaluating the exercise. Designing and planning 

efforts involve the following components: 

• The Scenario; 

• The Sequence of Events; 

• Control Mechanisms; 

• Participants; 

• Physical Facilities; 

• Simulation Equipment and Materials; 

• Special Effects; 

• Set-Up and Break-Down of Simulation; 

• Schedule and Tasks; 

• Communications; and 

• Community Impacts . 

Appendix C provides several checklists that may help systematize the 

planning process. 

The Scenario. The scenario, which should be directly based on the 

already determined exercise objectives and basic characteristics, describes 

the incident that is being simulated. In effect, the scenario is the script 

for the accident, and should provide the following types of information: 

• The hazardous materials involved including the threat they 

present, their form, the type of containment vessels from 

which they are leaking, and the quantity of leaking material; 

• The nature of the accident (e.g., release, spill, fire or a 

combination of the three); 

• The facility or transportation route where the accident 

occurs, including such specifics as location, setting, and 

building type or mode of transport; 

• The characteristics of the neighborhood(s) threatened by 

exposure to accident effects; 

• The initial number of victims, and potential victims; 

• Weather conditions. 
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The scenario is used to create the :simulated on-scene emergency which 

activates the emergency response system. Logistical considerations, such as 

scheduling, transportation, personnel assignments, and physical facilities, 

are central to the implementation of the scenario. The scenario should be 

realistic enough to meet the exercise objectives by presenting appropriate 

problems to the responders. The simulation, once initiated, should have the 

look and feel of an actual emergency, eliciting reactions from the response 

system without apparent interference from the exercise controllers. Problems 

that arise during the exercise should reflect actual weaknesses in local 

emergency response plans, procedures, and/or systems and not faults in the 

design of the exercise itself. 

Refer to the scenario in Appendix A for its description of the hazardous 

materials involved, the nature of the aceident, the facility, affected 

transportation routes, threatened neighborhoods, initial number of victims, 

and weather conditions. 

The Sequence of Events. A sequence of events should be developed to 

accompany the scenario. The sequence of events proceeds step-by-step through 

the simulation indicating the occurrence of events, written, verbal·, and 

simulation messages (e.g., seeing liquids spill or hearing warning devices) 

sent or received, and problems presented. 

The sequence of events is presented to the participants, either orally 

or in writing, one event at a time. The events are arranged in a logical and 

chronological sequence designed to portray the essentials of an evolving 

emergency situation. The events represent changes in the circumstances of · 

the accident or in conditions over which the participants have no control 

(e.g., a change in the weather or a major change in the rate of spill or 

leakage' of the chemical). 

The events in this sequence should be: 

• Directly relevant to the response functions being exercised, 

the roles and responsibilities of the participants, the 

exercise objectives, and the locale of the accident; 

• Tailored to the specific characteristics of an actual facility 

and the community in which the accident occurs; and 

• Realistic, factual, and arranged in the proper sequence. 

Appendix B is an example of a sequence of events that might accompany the 

scenario in Appendix A. 

Control Mechanisms. Control mechanisms, which are critical in 

maintaining the direction and intensity of the exercise, include: 

• Messages, both verbal and simulated, that provide response cues to 

the exercise players (examples of both types of messages have been 

included in Appendix B); 

• Anticipated responses, actions or dialogue of any actors 

involved; 
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• The duration of the response from incident to completion; 

and 

• Communications links to preserve the reality of the 

response, while not unduly alarming outside people or 

agencies (e.g., notification or requests for assistance 

to information services or local, state and federal 

agencies). 

Anticipated responses can be used by the exercise simulators and 

evaluators as a standard against which to compare actual responses during the 

exercise. These standards are not shared with participants in order to 

ensure realistic responses. Anticipated response actions may be derived from 

relevant contingency plans or standard operating procedures used by one or 

more of the participating organizations. If plans or procedures do not 

exist, the anticipated response measures should be develc,ped and documented 

prior to the exercise, constructed logically from the circumstanc_es being 

simulated, or identified through discussions with response personnel 

regarding their informal operations procedures. Appendix B provides 

illustrative anticipated responses appropriate to the sample sequence of 

events. 

Participants. All participants or players should be identified as early 

as possible in the exercise planning process. The number and roles of 

participants will vary depending on the characteristics of the exercise and 

available resources. (See Appendix G.1 for a checklist of potential 

participants.) Roles and responsibilities should be defined for each 

participant and an accurate roster compiled. The roles of responders and 

participating agencies should be defined in contingency plans; specific 

response units may be pre-selected as the responders on the exercise. Roles 

and responsibilities may include the following: 

• Exercise Coordinator. The exercise coordinator is in charge 

of the exercise. In that capacity, he or she is responsible 

for controlling the flow of events, coordinating all 

activities involving evaluation and taping, and determining 

the beginning and end of play. The exercise coordinator also 

explains to observers what actions are taking place and why. 

(See Section 3 below for a detailed discussion of the 

coordinator's role in conducting the exercise.) 

• Simulation Control Team. The simulation control team controls 

responder command post communications; monitors activities in the 

command post, on site, and in the "hot zone" (the area contaminated 

due to the incident) to keep responders aware of the effects of 

their actions and maintain the flow and direction of the 

simulation; documents events on paper, camera, and video if 

desired; and keeps the observers or audience informed. 

• Incident Commander. The incident commander is generally a senior 

official in the fire or police department or other local emergency 

response organization, often responsible for inter-agency emergency 

response coordination. The incident commander provides extensive 

assistance in planning the exercise and is in charge of all local 
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response personnel and coordination of responding agencies during 

the simulation. Although the expertise of the incident commander 

will be valuable throughout thE~ planning of the exercise, the 

incident commander should not be directly involved in the 

development of the simulation scenario in order to maintain the 

realism of the emergency and a,roid preparation for specific 

incident response. 

• Evaluators. Evaluators observE~ and assess various activities 

during the simulation in order to report, during the formal 

exercise evaluation session, the strengths and weaknesses in 

the emergency response operations. 

• Safety Officer. The safety officer checks that safety 

standards and plans are followed throughout the exercise, 

including the planning, perfonnance, and break-down stages. 

• Simulators. Simulators bring the scenario to life by handing 

notes to participants, controlling props (e.g., setting off 

smoke grenades), purposely getting in the way (e.g., "rubberneckers"), and performing as ac::tors (e.g., playing the role of 

"victims 11 ). 11Victims 11 in the simulation may be' played by 

representatives of participating response agencies, other 

emergency response auxiliary groups, or the general public. 

Playing the role of a victim may be a valuable learning 

experience in itself, providing emergency response personnel 

an opportunity to experience the response from the victim's 

perspective. 

• Observers. Observers may be s1alected by the planners for 

various substantive, political, and public relations reasons, 

and may include the press, local politicians, politicians or 

officials from neighboring jurisdictions, and officials from 

state and federal agencies inv•olved in the exercise. 

Physical Facilities. Arrangements must be made for pre-production work 

space, simulation support space, the simulation site, and post-exercise 

evaluation meetings. Meeting rooms and practice areas may need to be located 

and reserved in advance. Work plans should be reviewed to ensure that such 

facilities will be available when needed. 

Simulation site selection should be completed early in the planning 

stages to provide adequate time to notify neighbors and evaluate the 

logistics of using the site. If a simulation site is not identified in the 

development of the scenario, a site that will satisfy the scenario should be 

selected. The layout and size of the site should be such that the scenario 

can be successfully performed. On-site locations for the hot zone, an area 

for the command post and response equipment, documentation vantage points and 

seating, shelter, and restrooms for observers should be identified and 

confirmed. The site should be thoroughly researched and prepared to 

accommodate the exercise, with steps taken for the displacement of normal 

traffic flow or parking. 

Arrangements must be made for the transport of simulation equipment to 

and from the site, as well as for the set-up, staging, and break-down of the 
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accident site ... Transportation for observers and victims must also be 

considered. 

Materials and equipment to support the planning and staging of the 

simulation should·be identified and acquired. An inventory of equipment and 

materials should be prepared with notes on sources, availability, and costs. 

Planning and staging equipment and materials may be available through 

participating groups or other local agencies. 

Identify Simulation Equipment and Materials. An array of equipment will 

be needed to make the simulation realistic. Necessary equipment should be 

identified and purchase arrangements made as early as possible during the 

exercise planning process. (See Appendix G.3 for an equipment checklist.) 

The participating groups may have equipment on hand that they can use or loan 

to.other participants. Other organizations or local groups may be willing to 

loan or donate equipment (e.g., portable bleachers ·for the observers, or 

junked cars for the accident scene). Some equipment may·need to be purchased 

outright; such equipment, as"well as a source, should be identified early. 

Private industry facilities are often a good source of "loaner" equipment. 

Various materials will be needed to conduct the simulation. In addition 

to or in lieu of special effects materials described below, victims will need 

such items as refreshments and background information materials (e.g., the 

scenario and sequence of events); documenters will need paper, cameras, or 

video recorders and film; and the simulation scene may need signs, props, 

cleanup materials, or other items to enhance the realism of the accident. 

Special Effects. The exercise should be as realistic as possible. The 

realism of a simulation can be greatly enhanced by special effects such as 

props, make-up for the victims, imitation spills and vapor plumes, fire, and 

smoke. Special effects should be linked to the scenario to ensure 

appropriate timing and cue actors, victims, or responders to perform certain 

actions. The materials should be acquired and tested in advance; sufficient 

quantities must be available at the time of the simulation. Also, the 

special effects must be able to function under all conditions (e.g., rain). 

Set-Uo and Break-Down of Simulation. Provisions should be made for the 

orderly and timely set-up and break-down of the simulation scene. The. set-up 

of props, such as overturned vehicles, should be completed the day before the 

exercise if possible. Safety of exercise participants, observers, and site 

neighbors, as well as site security, should be provided for as long a time asthe exercise activities require personnel or equipment on the site. Set-up 

also includes seating, food, and restrooms for observers, narrators, 

documenters, and other participants, as well as roadblocks or warning tape to 

delineate parking/no parking areas and detours. 

The exercise plan should provide for the orderly dismantling and 

restoration of the simulation site to provide an orderly and timely breakdown. Break-down of the site should proceed as quickly as possible after the 

simulation to ensure the safety and convenience of site neighbors. Clearing 

wreckage could be included in the exercise as an element of the emergency 

response. 

Schedule and Tasks. Field exercises are complex activities that depend 

on effective organization for success. Scheduling and tasking should begin 
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early in the p+anning process, as soon as possible after approval of the 

exercise by the necessary officials. Scheduling and tasking essentially 

involve the development of a work plan to assign responsibilities for 

specific activities, with deadline dates, to the participating groups and 

individuals. The sehedule should include such items as meeting dates, 

procurement and preparation milestones, scenario development deadlines, and 

simulation set-up and performance dates. 

Communications. Reliable communication is a necessity for responders in 

actual emergency response, and critical for simulators in an exercise. 

Telephone service, equipment, and directo•ries should be provided where 

appropriate during the planning stage and particularly during the exercise 

itself. Communication linkages in preparedness plans should identify 

hardware and frequency compatibilities or incompatibilities to ensure that 

responders know who they can contact. A network of telephones is extremely 

important during the exercise to simulate! and control the flow of information 

in a realistic fashion. The incident con~and post will require phones for 

the incident commander and other response officials, and separate lines for 

the simulation control team. In some cases actual lines and phone numbers 

may be used, in other cases the numbers of various response and support 

agencies may be assigned to certain simulators or locations. For example, in 

a limited field exercise, an exercise room with several desks equipped with 

phones may be set up to simulate some of the response activities. 

Responders and simulation participants may be using "walkie-talkies" to 

communicate. The radio frequencies and compatibility among the response 

groups and simulators should be identified. If radio contact is not 

possible, alternatives should be identified and acquired. 

Community Impacts. Impacts from the simulation on the community should 

be anticipated, monitored, and controlled. A simulation may require a number 

of disruptive actions including re-routitlg of traffic, use of public areas or 

facilities, and use of emerge~cy vehicles. Parties who may be affected by 

the simulation-- e.g., residents and businesses at or near the simulation 

site --should be notified well in advance. 

Step 5: Consider Other Factors 

Performing an emergency response exercise is a complex undertaking; many 

peripherally-related, but nonetheless important considerations must be kept 

in mind throughout the various phases of an exercise. The type and number of 

these factors often depends on the community sponsoring the exercise. 

Although this guide does not go into detail on any of these considerations, 

they are mentiohed here to ensure that planners are aware of them: 

Safety. Safety of all participants, observers, and curious on-lookers 

should be considered throughout the exercise. The designated safety officer 

will have the responsibility of ensuring this safety, but will need the 

cooperation of all participants and the aid of safety plans and protocols. 

The more complex and realistic the exercise, the greater the likelihood of 

accidents. 

Liability. Especially in full-scale field exercises, there is 

significant potential for accidents to participants, observers, and "innocent 

bystanders." Potential liabilities should be considered and minimized. The 
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signing of a. liability waiver might be considered for all participants and 

official observers. 

Cost. The cost of field exercises varies greatly with the scale and 

nature of the exercise itself. In many cases, however, the cost of the 

equipment and supplies needed to stage a field simulation will be 

significant. Private facilities participating in the exercise should be 

urged to donate time and the use of equipment. Even where such donations are 

made, field exercises require a great deal of coordination and pre-planning 

and, therefore, consume scarce public agency staff time. Before undertaking 

~n exercise, the planning committee should carefully identify and estimate 

all likely expenses and evaluate all available means of re~ucing those 

expenses. 

Step 6: Provide for Staging and Set-Up, Pre-Exercise Check, and Briefing 

for Participants 

After weeks or .months of planning and coordinati~g, performance of the 

exercise should not be jeopardized by last-minute problems. Staging and setup of the exercise should be done a day in advance if possible. This will 

provide for last-minute problems with the site or equipment and, time and 

resources permitting, a shake-down or trial-run of all props and special 

effects. Omissions or oversights may be caught at this time and corrected. 

Immediately before the exercise, the pre-exercise check should be performed 

as a last-minute run through of checklists and logistics. The pre-exercise 

briefing may be used to inform participants of last-minute changes or · 

problems that may require alternative actions and resolve any uncert.ainties 

the participants may have. 

4. GUIDELINES .FOR CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE 

The major exercise development steps, discussed above, set the stage for 

the smooth conduct of the exercise by the exercise coordinator. On the day 

of the event, the exercise coordinator must assume direct responsibility for 

the conduct of the exercise 'to ensure adequate accomplishment of its 

objectives. The exercise coordinator's job is to: 

• Describe the "ground-rules" for the exercise, including the 

roles that the various participants are to play; 

• Present the players with the exercise narrative; 

• Announce the first event of the scenario; 

• Stimulate player responses, without intervening in a way that 

assumes control of the play, unless it appears likely that the 

players will not initiate a response critical to the ~­

objectives of the exercise; 

• Control the flow and pace of the exercise by introducing the · 

remaining events in sequence; and 

• Keep the exercise on schedule and terminate play at the 

specified end time. 
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In general,· it is best to let the exercise play develop naturally, with 

participants responding to prescribed evj:mts as they deem appropriate. Some 

anticipated responses, however, may be so critical to the completion of the 

simulation that the exercise coordinator will have to intervene in the play 

to assure that such'responses take place. (The fact that intervention is 

required will, of course, represent a very important lesson for the exercise 

participants and should be noted for further discussion in the post-exercise 

debriefing and evaluation.) An example, based on the scenario in Appendix A, 

would be the activation of the evacuation process (one of the objectives on 

which the scenario would have been based). If the participants in an 

exercise using the Appendix A scenario did not respond to messages or cues 

with activation of the evacuation process, the exercise coordinator would 

intervene. 

5. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING A POST-EXERCISE DEBRIEFING AND EVAIDATION 

A post-exercise debriefing and evaluation can be as valuable an 

experience as the exercises. These post-exercise sessions are critical for 

capturing the lessons of the field exercise so that they can be used to 

revise and improve emergency plans and procedures. The exercise coordinator 

should first conduct a debriefing sessio·n, in which the primary objective is 

to review the experiences of the participants during the exercise. A 

debriefing works best if the exercise coordinator leads the participants 

through an event-by-event recapitulation of the exercise, discussing the 

actual responses and how they compared to the anticipated responses. The 

debriefing may cover all events and responses before they are evaluated, or 

it may proceed one event at a time, allowing an opportunity for evaluation as 

well. 

Once the debriefing is completed, the exercise coordinator should elicit 

evaluations from the participants concerning both their own performance 

during the exercise and the characteristics of the exercise as a whole. This 

process will be enhanced if the participants understand that the purpose of 

the evaluation is to develop a set of recommendations for improving the 

response system, rather than to find fault with the performance of the 

participants. These recommendations may include actions to improve emergency 

response plans, procedures, and equipment as well as additional training 

needs for members of the response system. Appendix D provides criteria that 

may be useful in conducting the debriefing or exercise evaluation. 

It is important that problems in the response system (e.g., lack of 

plans or procedures) be separated from problems related to the specific 

exercise design or conduct (e.g., a scenario event that did not match 

conditions in the community or a special effect that failed). Thus, the 

exercise coordinator should allow opportunity for the participants to 

evaluate the exercise itself. The exercise coordinator should be alert to 

both the possibility that the participants may be more critical of the 

exercise than of their own performance and the fact that problems with 

exercise design and conduct may have produced some responses that do not 

reflect existing plans, procedures, or response capabilities of the 

participants. 

Following the debriefing and self-evaluations by the participants, the 

exercise coordinator or exercise sponsors may want to open up discussions 
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with community.groups, local industries, and the press. A mock or actual 

press conference may be called. An open forum to discuss the exercise may 

aid in community relations and cooperation by allowing citizens and 

representatives of perhaps controversial local industries to comment on the 

exercise and emergency response system. This type of evaluation, conducted 

some time after the exercise, may prove to be a useful complement to the 

immediate debriefing session. Intervening time and the participation of a 

broader cast of evaluators may provide fresh or at least additional 

perspectives. 

6. USING EXERCISES TO IMPROVE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, PLANNING, AND 

RESPONSE 

The results of the debriefing/evaluation period, in the form of 

improvements in the response system, need to be implemented if the exercise 

is to be of maximum benefit. These results should be included in the 

continuing planning and preparedness activities of the community. Local 

planners should initiate efforts to revise existing plans .and procedures or 

develop new ones to reflect the lessons from the exercise (e.g., revise 

notification procedures, clarify responsibilities for providing services to 

an evacuated population). Exercise planners should use the evaluation of the 

exercise itself to improve future exercises. All other parties (e.g., 

police, fire, emergency, medical) should take actions appropriate to their 

roles in the preparedness effort. Approximately three to six months 

following the exercise, the contingency plans and procedures should be 

reviewed to ensure that appropriate changes and revisions have been 

incorporated. 
Appendix 

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

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LIST OF APPENDICES 

Tit1e 

Sample Field Exercise Scenario 

Sample Sequence of Events 

Sample Planning Checklists 

Criteria for Assessing State and Local 

Preparedness 

Regicmal Federal Agency Contacts 

References to Additional Information 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

Sample Field Exercise Scenario 

The PQX Chemical Co. plant, located on Lee Highway, manufactures a 

variety of corrosive, toxic, and flammable chemicals. Many of these 

chemicals are stored at the plant pending shipment to customers. The plant 

occupies 50 acres of land and is situated in an area composed of commercial, 

industrial, and residential buildings. The plant property is bounded on the 

north by Lee Highway, on the east by a rail line, on the south by Interstate 

20 and on the west by the Black River. Beyond the river to the west, is the 

Black River Estates housing development. South of Interstate 20 is the 

Clover Hill housing development. On the north side of Lee Highway lies a 

mixture of commercial and industrial buildings. East of the railroad line, 

there are a variety of industrial facilities. A railroad siding extends in~o 

the plant property to the outside storage area. 

One clear Saturday morning, a day when the plant is not operating, a 

repair crew is working on replacing a section of pipe that is connected to 

the top of·an empty tank. After disconnection, a crane is used to lower the 

pipe onto a flat bed truck. As the crane boom is swung over a nearby tank of 

liquid sulfur trioxide, the cable snaps, thus, dropping the pipe. The 

falling pipe shears off the S03 tank's feedline between the tank wall and the 

first block valve. The four-inch diameter feedline leading from the tank to 

the process plant begins leaking immediately. An excess flow valve between 

the leak and the tank limits the rate of flow to 30 gallons per minute. 

Spilled liquid from the S03 tank collects within the containment dike 

surrounding the tanks. Upon contact with the moisture in the air, the 

spilled S03 vaporizes into a white mist resembling steam. The wind, coming 

from the northwest at 5 mph, blows· the vapors directly onto the nearby repair 

crew that had removed the old piping. ·Three of the four repairmen are 

affected by the vapors, with two of them lying unconscious on top of the tank 

they had been working on. The lone conscious repairman drags the remaining 

workers from the hazardous area and then runs into the main plant to report 

the accident. Experienci~g burning eyes and difficult breathing, he decides 

to remain indoors awaiting the arrival of the fire department. 

B-1 

APPENDIX B 

Sample Sequence of Events 

EVENT #1: The northeasterly wind blows the vapor cloud coming off the 

spilled S03 towards the southwest across plant property. Arriving 

fire/rescue personnel find an unconscious person just beyond the diked area. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will set off a white smoke grenade or other 

smoke/cloud generation device to simulate the S03 vapor cloud. Large 

portable fans may have to be employed to direct the v~pors in the desired 

direction dictated by the exercise. An exercise "victim" should be lying 

outside of the diked area but away from the white smoke/cloud. Water from a 

hoseline attached to the feedline of the S03 tank will be flowing at a rate 

of 30 gpm into the diked area to simulate the leaking S03. 

VrittenjVerbal Messages: None. 

Expected Actions: 

1. First arriving fire/rescue units report the on-s~ene situation to the 

emergency communications center and request additional fire/rescue and 

police units (if necessary). 

2. Rescue unconscious person near diked area and provide emergency medical 

treatment following rescue. 

3. Incident commander take~ command and establishes: 

• Command post (in safe location) 

• Communications among response agencies at scene 

• Staging area for in-coming apparatus 

• Mechanism for on-going incident assessment 

4. Ensure that emergency personnel wear appropriate protective gear. 

5. Secure area around the incident scene. 

6. Attempt to locate a plant official who can identify the leaking material 

and provide technical expertise concerning the tank, feedline_, control 

valves, dike, etc. 
B-2 

EVENT #2: The injured repairman that reported the accident advises 

fire/rescue personnel of the two unconscious workers on top of the tank next 

to the leaking tank; The repairman tells how the accident occurred and warns 

of the hazards of the vapors emanating from the spilled liquid. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate a white cloud to 

simulate the vaporizing S03. The simulated leak will also be continued. The 

repairman "victim" will be acting as if he is having trouble breathing and a 

burning sensation in his eyes. 

Verbal. Message: 

To: Fire/Rescue Personnel 

From: Injured Repairman 

Message: Joe and Charlie are still up .on the tank. I think they've passed 

out. Do you see them? They W·ere still up there when the pipe fell 

from the cable and hit the other tank. I don't know what that 

leaking stuff is, but watch it, it's nasty. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Plan strategy for the rescue of the two unconscious workers on top of 

the tank. 

2. Provide emergency medical treatment for the repairman experiencing 

difficult breathing and burning eyes. 

3. Contact CHEMTREC and/or other technical assistance organization for 

assistance in identifying the leaking chemical. 

4. Activate the off-site emergency operations center (EOC) and notify key 

officials and agencies of the local government. 

5. Continue efforts to locate a plant official. 

6. Continue efforts to identify the leaking material. 

7. Identify strategies and options for controlling the leak. 

8. Arrange for specialized equipment to be brought to the scene: 

• Encapsulated s~its 

• Self-contained breathing apparatus 

• Environmental monitors 

• Patching/plugging materials 

• Foam 

• Diking materials 

• Emergency medical supplies 
B-3 

9. Notify the following: 

• Community Emergency Coordinator 

• National Response Center 

• State Environmental Protection Agency 
B-4 

EVENr #3: The vapor cloud is approachin1~ Interstate 20. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud but 

not in amounts great enough to transport the cloud to the interstate, thus 

avoiding obstructing the view of passing motorists not involved in the 

exercise. The purpose of the cloud is fc>r realism at the actual storage· tank 

area. 

Verbal Message: (via two-way radio) 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: Emergency Communications Cente:r 

Message: Motorists on Interstate 20 are reporting 11white smoke" just north 

of the interstate. Could that be coming from your location? 

Expected Actions: 

1. Initiate monitoring of vapor cloud and spill. 

2. Confirm vapor cloud movement. 

3. Close Interstate 20 downwind of the vapor cloud. 

4. Consider protective actions for residents south of Interstate 20. 

5. Request mutual aid (if necessary): 

• Fire/rescue 

• ... tazardous materials team 

• Emergency medical services 

• Law enforcement 

6. For arriving mutual aid units: 

• Brief them about incident 

• Assign tasks to them 

• Ensure they wear appropriate protective gear 

• Establish inter-organizational communications 

7. Establish communications between the on-scene command post and the EOC, 

and coordinate all response actions. 

8. Expand efforts to secure the area around the incident scene: 

• Roadblocks 

• Rerouting of traffic 

• Spectator control 
B-5 

9. Establish a media center and appoint a public information officer. 
B-6 

EVENT #4: Fire/rescue personnel have located the two unconscious workmen on 

top of the tank next to the leaking tank. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud and 

allow the 30 gpm flow of water into the diked area to continue. The two 

ttvictims" on top of the tank should lie still to simulate unconsciousness. 

~rittenjVerbal Messages: None. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Rescue the two unconscious workers if it is decided that adequate 

protective gear is available at the scene for rescuers. 

2. Provide emergency medical treatment for the two unconscious workers 

following their rescue. 

3. Establish an on-scene triage area fCir injured workers and emergency 

response personnel. 
B-7 

EVENT #5: The vapor cloud has moved as far as Interstate 20 and is fast 

approaching the Clover Hill housing development. A plant official arrives on 

the scene and advises the incident commander that the leaking product is 

liquid sulfur trioxide and that the 70-ton capacity tank was approximately 

80 percent full prior to the accident. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud in 

the area near the tanks and continue the flow of water into the diked area. 

Verbal Messages: 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: Emergency Communications Center 

Message: Motorists are now reporting a white mist coming across the 

interstate from ·the northwest. They advise that it's irritating to 

their eyes and throats. 

To: On-Scene Police Department Commander 

From: Patrol Unit 

Message: The vapors from your location have reached Interstate 20 and are 

heading towards Clover Hill. Please advise. 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: PQX Chemical Company Official 

Message: The leaking product is sulfur trioxide. As of close of business 

yesterday, it contained approximately 55 tons of so3. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Evacuate Clover Hill and other nearby residences. 

2. Open emergency shelters for evacuees. 

3. Disseminate information to all emergency response personnel and agencies 

involved in the incident that the leaking material has been identified 

as liquid sulfur trioxide. 
B-8 

4. Contact CHEMTREC and/or other technical assistance organizations for: 

• Chemical specific information 

• Associated health hazards 

• Recommended control/cleanup actions 

5. Ensure that protective gear is compatible with S03 is worn by all 

emergency personnel operating in the vicinity of the leaking tank and 

vapor cloud. 

6. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud. for movement and concentration. 

7. Identify strategies and options fot:· reducing the quantity of vapors 

emanating from the spilled S03. 

8. Continue efforts to identify strategies and options for controlling the 

leak. 

9. Coordinate response efforts between the on-scene incident commander, ' 

plant officials, and the EOC. 

10. Provide public information concerni.ng: 

• Hazards 

• Evacuation 

• Safety/precautions 

• Details of remedial actions 
B-9 

EVENT #6: Despite vaporization, the diked area is filling up rapidly with 

spilled liquid. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to allow the water to flow from 

the hoseline into the diked area at a rate of 30 gallons per minute. The 

white cloud will also continue to be generated to simulate vaporization of 

product. 

Written Message: (via messenger) 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: Simulator 

Message: The diked area contains a considerable amount of S03 and continues 

to fill at a rapid rate. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Arrange for the off-loading of the S03 from the damaged tank to other 

large capacity tanks that are compatible with S03. 

2. Identify strategies and options for removing the S03 contained within 

the dikes. 
B-10 

EVENT #7: Winds begin to shift from the northeast to the southeast. The 

National Weather Service's forecast call:s for temperatures and humidity to 

increase as winds shift. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will employ the use of large fans (if 

necessary) to simulate a wind shift so that the white cloud will blow towards 

the west instead of the southwest. The simulated S03 spill will be continued 

at 30 gpm. 

Vritten Messages: (via messenger) 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: National Weather Service 

Message: Be advised that winds will be shifting over the next 10-12 hours to 

the southeast at 3 mph. Tempel::-atures will rise 5-7 degrees, and 

humidity will increase as well .. 

Verba1 Messages: (via two-way radio) 

To: On-Scene Police Department Cownander 

From: Patrol Unit 

Message: I'm at the roadblock along wes1:bound Interstate 20. It looks as 

though the vapor cloud is heading more towards the west now, in the 

direction of Black River Estates. 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: Emergency Communications Centel: 

Message: Citizens are reporting irritating vapors in the Black River Estates 

area. We've received several c~alls on this. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Disseminate information to all emergency response personnel and agencies 

involved in the incident concerning the wind shift and weather forecast. 

2. Evacuate the Black River Estates housing development. 

3. Open additional emergency shelters for evacuees. 
B-11 

4. Expand efforts· to secure the area to the west of the plant: 

• Set up roadblocks 

• Reroute traffic 

• Control spectators 

5. Consider evacuating the commercial/industrial area northwest of the 

plant. 

6. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration. 
B-12 

EVENT #8: An unconscious person has been spotted in a canoe floating down 

the Black River just west of the plant. In addition, numerous residents west 

of the plant have been injured. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will continue their efforts to direct a white 

cloud towards the west. They will also continue to allow water to flow at 

30 gpm into the diked area. One "victim" will lie in a slumped position in a 

canoe in a calm spot on the river. Seve:r·al "victims" in the Black River 

Estates will act as though they are experiencing difficult breathing and 

burning eyes. 

Verba1 Messages: (via two-way radio) 

To: Emergency Medical Services Commander 

From: Emergency Communications Center 

Message: Ye've received a report of an unconscious person in a canoe on the 

Black River between the PQX plant and Interstate 20. The caller 

saw the canoe floating from thE~ area affected by the vapor cloud.· 

To: Emergency Medical Services Comnander 

From: Emergency Communications Center 

Message: Police report finding numerous persons in the process of evacuating 

Black River Estates who have requested emergency medical treatment 

for irritated eyes and noses. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Provide emergency medical treatment for numerous injured persons. 

2. Prepare the local hospital for numerous chemical-related casualties and 

make arrangements for transporting patients to other hospitals, if 

necessary. 

3. Rescue the unconscious canoeist. 

4. Evacuate the commercial/industrial area northwest of the plant. 

5. Expand efforts to secure the area to the northwest of the plant: 

• Set up roadblocks 

• Reroute traffic 

• Control spectators 

6. Contlnue monitoring vapor cloud for movement and concentration. 
B-13 

7. Apply acid-based foam (if available) to the surface of the contained S03 

to prevent the release of hazardous vapors. 
B-14 

EVENT #9: Two railroad tankcars have beE~n brought onto the siding next to 

the S03 tank. Off-loading operations of the tank will be difficult due to 

the presence of spilled liquid around thH tank within the diked area. 

Siau1ation Message: Simulators will con1:inue to allow water to flow into the 

diked area and will continue to generate a white cloud and direct it towards 

the west. 

Verbal Messages: 

To: Plant Official 

From: Railroad Engineer 

Message: How should I position the two ~~mpty tankcars for off-loading 

operations? 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: Senior Fire Departm~nt Officer 

Message: We're going to have a difficult time ga~n~ng access to the 

unloading outlet on the tank with all this liquid S03 around the 

base of the tank. It would be unsafe to have anyone walk through 

the liquid, even if they're wearing Level A protective gear. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Identify strategies and options for ga~n~ng access to the unloading 

outle. on the so3 tank without endangering the lives of the personnel 

assigned the task. 

2. Off-load the S03 from the tank to the railroad tank cars. 

3. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration. 
B-15 

EVENT #10: The product has been completely off-loaded from the tank to the 

railcars, thus, ending the leak. Vapors, however, continue to be given off 

from the spilled liquid within the dikes. 

Simulation Message: Simulators will continue to generate a white cloud and 

direct it towards the west until actions are taken to prevent the 

vaporization of product and/or pump the product to tanks. 

Verbal Messages: 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: Senior Fire Department Officer 

Message: We just finished off-loading the S03 to the tankcars. The leak has 

stopped. 

To: On-Scene Incident Commander 

From: Senior Fire Department Officer 

Message: The contained liquid is still vaporizing. 

Expected Actions: 

1. Disseminate information to all emergency responders and agencies 

involved in the incident that the leak has been stopped but that 

hazardous vapors continue to·be generated from the spilled material. 

2. Continue monitoring.the vapor cloud for movement and concentration. 

3. Apply acid-based foam (if available) to the surface of the contained S03 

to prevent the release of hazardous vapors (if not already done). 

4. Pump liquid. S03 from the containment dikes into rail tank cars·or other 

compatible tanks. 

5. Consider post-incident operations, following the complete elimination of 

hazards, including: 

• Cleanup 

• Decontamination of personnel, equipment, apparatus, and 

property 

• Removal and disposal of hazardous wastes 

• Re-entry of evacuees to residential areas 

• Opening of roads and the evacuated commercial/industrial area 

• Continued air monitoring 

Appendix 

C.l 

C.2 

C.3 

APPENDIX C 

Sample Planning Checklists 

Title 

List of Possible Simulation 

Exercise Participants 

Planning Checklist 

Equipment Checklist 

C-1 

APPENDIX G .12 

List of Possible Simulation Exercise Participants 

Fire Departments 

Local 

Industrial 

Medical 

Ambulance 

Rescue squads 

Toxicologists 

Doctors 

Poison control center 

Hospital 

Red Cross 

Police Departments 

Local 

County 

State 

Highway patrol 

Sheriff 

Industrial security 

2 This list adapted from "The Day Before ... ," a simulation exercise 

planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see 

Appendix F) . 
Civil Defense/Disaster Services 

Local 

State 

C-2 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

Health Departments 

Local 

State 

Federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 

PUblic VorksfUtilities 

Water 

Sewage treatment 

Electric/gas 

Environmental Scientists 

Local 

State 

Private 

Universities 

Local Emergency Response Contractors 

Mitigation 

Removal 

Heavy equipment 
C-3 

Federal Agencies 

U.S. Coast Guard 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Department of Transportation 

Army Corps of Engineers 

National Guard 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Geologic Survey 

Fish and Wildlife Service 

Local Hazardous Materials Carriers 

Truck 

Rail 

Barge 

Chemica1 Experts 

Industry 

University 

CHEML{EC 

Meteorologists 

National Weather Service 

Tele·hsion 

Airport 

Communications 

Radio 

Television 
Key Threshold Actions 

C-4 

APPENDIX G. 23 

Planning Checklist 

• Has the site of the simulated incident been identified? 

• Is there a local contingency plan or standard operating procedures in 

effect? 

• Have planning issues or response nE~eds been identified? If so, what are 

they? 

• What type of simulation do you want: to undertake? 

• Who will participate in the exercise? 

• How will the exercise be documented? 

• Has the scenario description been developed? 

• Have the sequence of events and control materials been written? 

• What equipment is required for the exercise? (See separate list in 

Appendix G. 3.) 

Pre-Production Planning and Logistics 

• Has the date been set for the exercise? 

• Have the participants oeen notified? 

• Has the site of the exercise been identified and arranged for? 

• Is there an area for observers? 

• Is there an area for the narrator? 

• Where will video equipment be located? 

• Where will the press be located? 

• Have special effects been arranged for? 

3 This list adapted from "The Day Before ... ", a simulation exercise 

planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see 

Appendix F) . 
C-5 

• Is there someone designated to manage special effects? 

• Have all essential equipment, supplies, and props been acquired? 

Simulation Staging 

• Are all members of the Exercise Steering Committee prepared? 

• Have site arrangements been confirmed? 

• Have invitations to and arrangements for observers been confirmed? 

• Has the press been notified? 

• Has video documentation been arranged? 

• Are all equipment, supplies, and props in ready condition? 

• Have all necessary manifests or bills of lading been prepared? 

• Has set-up and staging help been arranged for? 

• Has prop placement and set-up plan been completed? 

Follow-up Review and Evaluation 

• Has a meeting room been arranged? 

• Have necessary audio-visual aids been arranged? 

• Has a review and evaluation procedure been determined? 
C-6 

APPENDIX C. 34 

Field SiDul.ation Uquip111.ent List 

Props 

Drums 

Tanks 

Boxes 

Vehicles 

Moulage 

Water 

Simulated hazardous materials 

Smoke 

Pyrotechnic supplies 

Other 

Firefighting/Suppression 

Trucks/apparatus 

Tools/equipment 

Foam and equipment 

Fire extinguishers 

Other 

4 This list adapted from "The Day Before ... ", a simulation exercise 

planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see 

Appendix F) . 
Rescue and First Aid 

Vehicles 

Stretchers 

First aid/trauma kits 

Oxygen 

Other 

Containment Devices 

Booms 

Patches, plugs 

Sand bags 

Pneumatic bags 

Plastic sheetsjtarps 

Neutralizers 

Sorbents 

Shovels 

Other 

Personal Protective Equipment 

Respirators 

Pressure demand SCBA 

Air-purffying respirators 

Chemical protective clothing 

Splash suits 

Fully-encapsulating suits 

Gloves 

Boots 

Disposables 

C-7 
Hardhats 

Eye protection 

Face shields 

Duct tape 

Other 

Honi;toring Instruments 

Combustible gas indicators 

Oxygen meters 

Detector tubes 

Organic survey meters 

Radiation survey meters 

Passive dosimeters 

Specific survey instruments 

Litmus paper, pH paper 

Other 

Sa.pling Equipment 

Sampl..r..ng devices 

Containers 

Labels 

Packaging 

Other 

Coamunications Equipment 

Radios/"walkie-talkies" 

Telephones 

Megaphones 

C-8 
Horns 

Other 

Contamination Reduction Equipment 

Buckets, tubs, containers 

Plastic 

Brushes 

Water 

Detergent 

Sprayers 

Other 

References 

C-9 

EPA Extremely Hazardous Chemicals Profiles 

Department of Transportation Emergency Response Guidebook 

Documentation Equipment 

Video cameras 

Still cameras 

Tape recorders 

Note pads 

Other 

Heavy Equipment 

Backhoes 

Dump trucks 

Vacuum trucks 

Offload tankers 

Cranes 
Bulldozers 

Other 

Hiscel.laneous 

Meteorological equipment 

Clipboards 

Binoculars 

Salvage drums 

Barriers for site control 

Tools 

Other 

C-10 
D-1 

APPENDIX J>5 

Criteria for Assessing State and Loca1 Preparedness 

C. 1 INTRODUCTION 

The criteria in this appendix, an adaptation of criteria developed by the Preparedness 

Committee of the NAT in August 1985, represent a basis for assessing a State or local 

hazardous materials emergency response preparedness program. These criteria reflect 

the basic elements judged to be important for a successful emergency preparedness 

program. 

The criteria are separated into six categories, all of which are closely interrelated. These 

categories are hazards analysis, authority, organizational structure, communications, resources, and emergency planning. 

These criteria may be used for assessing the emergency plan as well as the emergency 

preparedness program in general. It must be recognized, however, that few State or 

local governments will have the need and/or capability to address all these Issues and 

meet all these criteria to the fullest extent. Resource limitations and the results of the 

hazards analysis will strongly influence the necessary degree of planning and preparedness. Those governmental units that do not have adequate resources are encouraged to 

seek assistance and take advantage of all resources that are available. 

Other criteria exist that could be used for assessing a community's preparedness and 

emergency planning. These include FEMA's CPG 1-35 (Hazard Identification, Capability 

Assessment and Multi-Year Development Plan for Local Governments) and CPG 1-SA. 

Additionally, States may have issued criteria for assessing capability. 

C. 2 THE CRITERIA 

C.2.1 Hazards Analysis 

"Hazards Analysis" includes the procedures for determining the susceptibility or vulnerability of a geographical area to a hazardous materials release, for identifying potential 

sources of a hazardous materials release from fixed facilities that manufacture, process, 

or otherwise use, store, or dispose of materials tnat are generally considered hazardous 

· in an unprotected environment. This also includes an analysis of the potential or probable 

hazard of transporting hazardous materials through a particular area. 

A hazards analysis is generally considered to consist of identification of potential hazards, 

determination of the vulnerability of an area as a result of the existing hazards, and an 

assessment of the risk of a hazardous materials release or spill. 

The following criteria may assist in assessing a hazards analysis: 

o Has a hazards analysis been completed for the area? If one exists, when was it 

last updated? 

o Does the hazards analysis include the location, quantity, and types of hazardous 

materials that are manufactured, processed, used, disposed, or stored within 

the appropriate area? 

5 These criteria have been reprinted from the Hazardous Materials 

Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1), prepared by the National Response Team. 
D-2 

0 Was it done in accordance with ccJmmunity right-to-know laws and prefire 

plans? 

0 Does it include the routes by which the hazardous materials are transported? 

0 Have areas of public health concern been identified? 

0 Have sensitive environmental areas been identified? 

o Have historical data on spill incidents been collected and evaluated? 

o Have the levels of vulnerability and probable locations of hazardous materials 

incidents been identified? 

0 Are environmentally sensitive areas· and population centers considered in analyzing the hazards of the transportation routes and fixed facilities? 

0.2.2 Authority 

"Authority" refers to those statutory authorities or other legal authorities vested in any 

personnel, organizations, agencies, or other •:mtities in responding to or being prepared 

for responding to hazardous materials emergc:mcies resulting from releases or spills. 

The following criteria may be used to assess the ~xisting legal authorities for response 

actions: 

0 Do clear legal authorities exist to establish a comprehensive hazardous materials 

response mechanism (Federal, State:~, county, and local laws, ordinances, and 

policies)? 

0 Do these authorities delegate command and control responsibilities between the 

different organizations within the same level of government (horizontal), and/or 

provide coordination procedures to be followed? 

o Do they specify what agency(ies) has (have) overall responsibility for directing 

or coordinating a hazardous materials response? 

o Do they specify what agency(ies) has (have) responsibility for providing assistance or support for hazardous materials response and what comprises that 

assistance or support? 

o Have the agency(ies) with authority to order evacuation of the community been 

identified? 

0 Have any limitations in the legal authorities been identified? 

0.2.3 Organizational Structure 

"Organization" refers to the organizational structure in place for responding to emergencies. This structure will, of course, vary considerably from State to State and from locality 

to locality. 

There are two basic types of organizations involved in emergency response operations. 

The first is involved in the planning and policy decision process similar to the NAT and 

ART. The second is the operational response group that functions within the precepts set 

forth in the State or local plan. Realizing that situations vary from State to State and 
D-3 

locality to locality and that emergency planning for the State and local level may involve 

the preparation of multiple situation plans or development of a single comprehensive plan, 

the criteria should be broadly based and designed to detect a potential flaw that would 

then precipitate a more detailed review. 

0 Are the following organizations included in the overall hazardous materials emergency preparedness activities? 

• Health organizations (including mental health organizations) 

• Public safety 

o fire 

o police 

o health and safety (including occupational safety and health) 

o other responders 

• Transportation 

• Emergency management/response planning 

• Environmen~al organizations 

• Natural resources agencies (including trustee agencies) 

• Environmental agencies with responsibilities for: 

o fire 

o health 

o water quality 

o air quality 

o consumer safety 

• Education system (in general) 

o public education 

o public information 

• Private sector interface 

o trade organizations 

o industry officials 

• Labor organizations 

o Have each organization's authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities been determined for pre-response (planning and prevention). response (implementing 

the plan during an incident), and post-response (cleanup and restoration) activities? 
D-1+ 

o Has one organization been given the command and control responsibility for 

these three phases of emergency response? 

0 Has a "chain of command" been •~stablished for response control through all , 

levels of operation? 

0 Are the roles, relationships, and coordination procedures between government 

and non-government {private entitit3s) delineated? Are they~understood by all 

affected parties? How are they instituted (written, verbal)? 

0 Are clear interrelationships, and coordination procedures between government 

and non-government (private entitit3S) delineated? Are they understood by all 

affected parties? How are they instituted (written, verbal)? 

o Are the agencies or departments that provide technical guidance during a response the same agencies or departments that provide technical guidance in 

non-emergency situations? In otht3r words, does the organizational structure 

vary with the type of situation to be addressed? 

o Does the organizational structure provide a mechanism to meet regularly for · 

planning and coordination? 

0 Does the organizational structure provide a mechanism to regularly exercise the 

response organization? 

o Has a simulation exercise been conducted within the last year to test the organizational structure? 

o Does the organizational structure provide a mechanism to review the activities 

conducted during a response or exercise to correct shortfalls? 

0 Have any limitations within the orgMizational structure been identified? 

0 Is the organizational structure compatible with the Federal response organization 

in the NCP? 

0 Have trained and equipped incident commanders been identified? 

0 Has the authority for site decisions been vested in the incident commanders? 

o Have the funding sources for a response been identified? 

0 How quickly can the response systc3m be activated? 

C.2.4 Communication 

"Communication" means any form or forms t::>f exchanging information or ideas for emergency response with other entities, either internal or external to the existing organizational 

structure. 

Coordination: 

0 Have procedures been established for coordination of information during a response? 

0 Has one organization been designated to coordinate communications activities? , 
D-5 

o Have radio frequencies been established to facilitate coordination between different organizations? 

Information Exchange: 

o Does a formal system exist for information sharing among agencies. organizations, and the private sector? 

o Has a system been established to ensure that "lessons learned" are passed to 

the applicable organizations? 

Information Dissemination: 

o Has a system been identified to carry out public information/community relations 

activities? 

o Has one organization or individual been designated to coordinate with or speak 

to the media concerning the release? 

o Is there a communication link with an Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) point 

of entry (CPCS-1) station? 

o Does a communications system/method exist to disseminate information to responders, affected public, etc.? 

o Is this system available 24-hours per day? 

o Have alternate systems/methods of communications been identified for use if 

the primary method fails? 

0 Does a mechanism exist to keep telephone rosters up-to-date? 

o Are communications networks tested on a regular basis? 

Information Sources af'!d Database Sharing: 

o Is a system available to provide responders with rapid information on the hazards of chemicals involved in an incident? 

o Is this information available on a 24-hour basis? Is it available in computer software? 

o Is a system in place to update the available information sources? 

Notification Procedures: 

o Have specific procedures for notification of a hazardous materials incident been 

developed? 

o Are multiple notifications required by overlapping requirements (e.g .• State, 

county, local each have specific notification requirements)? 

o Does the initial notification system have a standardized list of information that is 

collected for each incident? 

0 Does a network exist for notifying and activating necessary response personnel? 
D-6 

0 Does a network exist for notifying or warning the public of potential hazards resulting from a release? Does this network have provisions for. informing the 

public what hazards to expect, what precautions to take, whether evacuation is 

required, etc.? 

o Has a central location or phone number been establishe~ for initial notification of 

an incident? 

0 Is the central location or phone number accessible on a 24-hour basis? 

0 Does the central location phone system have the ability to expand to a multiple 

line system during an emergency? 

Clearinghouse Functions: 

o Has a central clearinghouse for hazardous materials information been established with access by the public ancl private sector? 

C.2 .5 Resources 

"Resource" means the personnel, training, equipment, facilities, and other sources available for use in responding to hazardous matorials emergencies. To the extent that the 

hazards analysis has identified the appropriate:. level of preparedness for the area, these 

criteria may be used in evaluating available resources of the jurisdiction undergoing review. 

Personnel: 

0 Have the numbers of trained personnel available for hazardous materials been 

determined? 

0 Has the location of trained personnel available for hazardous materials been 

determined? Are these personnel located in areas identified in the hazards 

analysis as: 

• heavily populated; 

• high hazard areas- i.e., numbers of chemical (or other hazardous materials) production facilities in well-·defined areas; 

• hazardous materials storage, disposal, and/or treatment facilities; and 

• transit routes? 

0 Are sufficient personnel available to maintain a given level of response capability 

identified as being required for the area? 

0 Has the availability of special technical expertise (chemists, industrial hygienists, 

toxicologists, occupational health physicians, etc.} necessary for response been 

identified? 

0 Have limitations on the use of above personnel resources been identified? 

0 Do mutual aid agreements exist to facilitate interagency support between organizations? 
D-7 

Training; 

o Have the· training needs for the State/local area been identified? 

o Are centralized response training facilities available? 

o Are specialized courses available covering topics such as: 

• organizational structures for response actions (i.e., authorities and coordination); 

• response actions; 

• equipment selection, use, and maintenance; and 

• safety and first aid? 

o Does the organizational structure provide training and cross training for or between organizations in the response mechanism? 

o Does an organized training program for all involved response personnel exist? 

Has one agency been designated to coordinate this training? 

o Have training standards or criteria been established for a given level of response 

capability? Is any certification provided upon completion of the training? 

o Has the level of training available been matched to the responsibilities or capabilities of the personnel being trained? 

o Does a system exist for evaluating the effectiveness of training? 

o Does the training program provide for "refresher courses" or some other 

method to ensure that personnel remain up-to-date in their level of expertise? 

o Have resources and organizations available to provide training been identified? 

o Have standardized curricula been established to facilitate consistent Statewide 

training? 

Equipment: 

o Have response equipment requirements been identified for a given level of response capability? 

o Are the following types of equipment available? 

• personal protective equipment 

• first aid and other medical emergency equipment 

• emergency vehicles available for hazardous materials response 

• sampling equipment (air, water, soil, etc.) and other monitoring devices 

(e.g., explosivity meters, oxygen meters) 

• analytical equipment or·facilities available for sample analyses 
D-8 

• fire-fighting equipment/other equipment and material (bulldozers, boats, 

helicopters, vacuum trucks, tank trucks, chemical retardants, foam) 

0 Are sufficient quantities of each type of equipment available on a sustained basis? 

0 Is all available equipment capable of operating in the local environmental conditions? 

0 Are up-to-date equipment lists maintained? Are they computerized? 

o Are equipment lists available to all responders? 

0 Are these lists broken down into the various types of equipment (e.g., protective clothing, monitoring instruments, medical supplies, transportation equipment)? 

0 Is there a mechanism to ensure that the lists are kept up-to-date? 

0 Have procedures necessary to obtain equipment on a 24-hour basis been identified? 

o Does a program exist to carry out required maintenance of equipment? 

0 Are there maint.enance and repair nacords for each piece of equipment? 

0 Have mutual aid agreements been established for the use of specialized response equipment? 

0 Is sufficient communications equipment available for notifying personnel or to 

transmit information? Is the equipment of various participating agencies compatible? 

0 Is transportation equipment available for moving equipment rapidly to the scene 

of an incident, and its state of readiness assured? 

Facilities: 

0 Have facilities capable of performin~~ rapid chemical analyses been identified? 

0 Do adequate facilities exist for storage and cleaning/reconditioning of response . 

equipment? 

0 Have locations or facilities been identified for the storage, treatment, recycling, 

and disposal of wastes resulting from a release? 

o Do adequate facilities exist for carrying out training programs? 

0 Do facilities exist that are capable of providing medical treatment to persons 

injured by chemical exposure? · 

0 Have facilities and procedures been identified for housing persons requiring 

evacuation or temporary relocation as a result of an incident? 

o Have facilities been identified that are suitable for command centers? 
D-9 

C;2.6 Emergency Plan 

The emergency plan, while it relates to many of the above criteria, also stands alone as a 

means to assess preparedness at the State and local level of government, and in the 

private sector. The following questions are directed more toward evaluating the plan 

rather than determining the preparedness level of the entity that has developed the plan. 

It is not sufficient to ask if there is a plan, but rather to determine if the plan that does exist 

adequately addresses the needs of the community or entity for which the plan was developed,. 

o Have the levels of vulnerability and probable locations of hazardous materials 

incidents been identified in the plan? 

o Have areas of public health concern been identified in the plan? 

0 Have sensitive environmental areas been identified in the plan? 

o For the hazardous materials identified in the area, does the plan include,information on the chemical and physical properties of the materials, safety and emergency response information, and hazard mitigation techniques? (NOTE: It is not 

necessary that all this information be included in the emergency plan; the plan 

should, however, at least explain where such information is available.) 

o Have all appropriate agencies, departments, or organizations been involved in 

the process of developing or reviewing the plan? 

o Have all the appropriate agencies, departments, or organizations approved the 

plan? 

0 Has the organizational structure and notification list defined in the plan been 

reviewed in the last six months? 

o Is the organizational structure identified in the plan compatible with the Federal 

response organization in the NCP? 

o Has one organization been identified in the plan as having command and control 

responsibility for the pre-response, response, and post response phases? 

o Do~s the plan define the organizational responsibilities and relationships. among 

city, ~ounty, district, State, and Federal response agencies? 

o Are all organizations that have a role in hazardous materials response identified 

in the plan (public safety and health, occupational saf_ety and health, transportation, na~ural resources, environmental, enforcement, educational, planning, and 

private sector)? 

o Are the procedures and contacts necessary to activate or deactivate the organization clearly given ir:t the plan for the pre-response, response, and post-response phases? 

o Does the organizational structure outlined in the plan provide a mechanism to 

review the activities conducted during a response or exercise to correct shortfalls? 

o Does the plan include a communications system/method to disseminate information to responders, affected public, etc.? 
D-10 

o Has a system been identified in the plan to carry out public information/community relations activities? 

o Has a central location or phone number been included in the plan for initial notification of an incident? 

o Have trained and equipped incident commanders been identified in the plan? 

0 Does the plan include the authority for vesting site decisions in the incident commander? 

o Have government agency personnel that may be involved in response activities 

been involved in the planning process? 

o Have local private response organizations (e.g., chemical manufacturers, commercial cleanup contractors) that are available to assist during a response been 

identified in the plan? 

0 Does the plan provide for frequent training exercises to train personnel or to test 

the local contingency plans? 

o Are lists/systems that identify emergency equipment available to response personnel included in the plan? 

0 Have locations of materials most likE~Iy to be used in mitigating the effects of a 

release (e.g., foam, sand, lime) been identified in the plan? 

0 Does the plan address the potential needs for evacuation, what agency is 

authorized to order or recommend an evacuation, how it will be carried out, and 

where people will be moved? 

o Has an emergency operating center, command center, or other central location 

with the necessary communications capabilities been identified in the plan for 

coordination of emergency respons1~ activities? 

o Are there follow-up response activities scheduled in the plan? 

0 Are there procedures for updating the plan? 

o Are there addenda provided with the plan, such as: laws and ordinances, statutory responsibilities, evacuation plans, community relations plan, health plan, 

and resource inventories (personnel, equipment, maps [not restricted to road 

maps], and mutual aid agreements)? 

o Does the plan address the probable simultaneous occurrence of different types 

of emergencies (e.g., power outaget and hazardous materials releases) and the 

presence of multiple hazards (e.g., flammable and corrosive) during hazardous 

materials emergencies? 
E-1 

APPENDIX E 

Regional Federal Agency Contacts 

The following are contacts at the Regional offices of both EPA and the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that can be of assistance in 

planning and conducting field simulation exercises. 

EPA REGIONAL OFFICES (direct inquiries to "EPA Regional Preparedness Staff") 

Region I (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 

Vermont) 

John F. Kennedy Building, Rm. 2203 

Boston, MA 02203 

(617) 565-3715 

Region II (New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico., Virgin Islands) 

26 Federal Plaza, Room 900 

New York, NY 10278 

(212) 264-2525 

Region III (Delaware, Washington, D.C., Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 

West Virginia) 

841 Chestnut Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 

(215) 597-9800 

Region IV (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, 

South Carolina, Tennessee) 

345 Courtland Street, N.E. 

Atlanta, GA 30365 

(404) 347-4727 

Region V (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin) 

230 S. Dearborn Street 

Chicago, IL 60604 

(312) 353-2000 
E-2 

Region VI (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas) 

1445 Ross Avenue 

Dallas, TX 75202-2733 

(214) 655-6444 

Region VII (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Neb1~aska) 

726 Minnesota Avenue 

Kansas City, KS 66101 

(913) 236-2800 

Region VIII (Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming)· 

999 18th Street, Suite 500 

Denver, CO 80202-2405 

(303) 293-1603 

Region IX (Arizona, California·, Hawaii,, Nevada, American Samoa, Guam) 

215 Fremont Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105 

(415) 974-8153 

Region X (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington) 

1200 6th Avenue 

Seattle, WA 98101 

(206) 442-5810 

FEMA REGIONAL OFFICES (direct inquiries to "Hazmat Program Staff") 

Region I 

Region II 

442 J.W. McCormack POCH 

Boston, MA 02109 

(617) 223-9540 

Room 1338 

26 Federal Plaza 

New York, NY 10278 

(212) 238-8200 
Region III 

Region IV 

Region V 

Region VI 

Region VII 

Region VIII 

Region IX 

E-3 

Liberty Square Building 

105 S. 7th Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

(215) 931-5500 

Suite 700 

1371 Peachtree Street, N.E. 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

(404) 347-2400 

4th Floor 

175 W. Jackson 

Chicago, IL 60604 

(312) 431-5500 

Federal Center 

Attention Hazmat 

800 N. Loop 288 

Denton, TX 76201 

(817) 898-9399 

911 Walnut Street, Room 200 

Kansas City, MO 64106 

(816) 283-7063 

Denver Federal Center, Building 710 

Box 25267 

Denver, CO 80225-0267 

(303) 235-4811 

Building 105 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 

(415) 923-7100 
Region X 

E-4 

Federal Regional Center 

130 228th St., S.W. 

Bothell, WA 98021-9796 

(206) 481-8800 
F-1 

APPENDIX F 

References to Additional'Information 

The following sources have been used as background information in.the 

preparation of this Technical Assistance Bulletin and may be useful in 

planning specific exercises: 

• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Environmental Response Tea,!Jl (ERT) 

26 W. St. Clair St. --

Cincinnati, OH 45268 

(513) 569-7537 

The ERT has considerable experience in planning and evaluating 

field exercises. They can assist directly in state and local 

exercises; alternatively, they have resource material (e.g., 

sample scenarios and checklists) that can be used. 

• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region VII Technical 

Assistance Team: "The Day Before ... Chemical Response Planning 

Through Simulation, A Production Guide." Contact: Regional 

Preparedness Staff at (913) 236-2800. 

A very useful, hands-on guide to planning and conduction field 

simulation exercises. 

· • Federal Emergency Management Agency: "Exercise Design Course Guide 

to Emergency Management Exercises." (See Appendix E for FEMA 

Regional contacts.) 

Although this was prepared as an accompaniment to a course 

taught by FEMA, it is also useful as a stand-alone 

introduction to designing all types of emergency exercises. 

• National Response Team: Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning 

Guide (NRT-1), March 1987. Contact National Response Team at GWER/12, 2100 2nd St., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593. 

This is the Federal "bible" on planning for hazardous 

materials emergency responses. It is intended to provide 

state and local agencies with very specific guidance in their 

own planning efforts. Will be helpful in evaluating the 

results of a field simulation exercise and in linking 

exercises to an effective planning process. 

~ S~ION ~CISE SCENARIOS 

Scenario 1: Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride Spill During Transfer Operations 

XYZ Chemicals, Inc., produces a small line of acids for sale in the 

manufacturing and trade markets. XYZ stores and handles a variety of 

chemicals on-site for use in its own processes; in addition, XYZ products are 

often stored on plant grounds pending shipment to customers. 

XYZ's Lake City plant is located in a neighborhood characterized by a 

mix of industrial and residential land uses. Local industrial facilities 

include two large steel plants, an oil refinery, and numerous specialty 

chemical plants. The XYZ facility itself is bounded on the north by a spur 

of the Union Railroad; on the south by the Grand River; on the west by Elm 

Street and a ra~l line; and on the east by First Street. Beyond the River on 

the south is an interstate highway that is heavily traveled. Within two 

miles north of the plant are seven schools and a hospital. Just north of the 

plant, across the Union tracks, is a residential neighborhood; additional 

residential zones of Lake City and Middletown lie one and one-half miles to 

the south and southwest, and three miles to the southeast. 

Returning from their noon break, two XYZ workers resume the task of 

transferring anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from a pressurized rail car to 

a 15,000 gallon outdoor storage tank at a transfer point 200 yards from the 

main part of the plant. They had allowed the transferring pump to operate 

unattended and find upon returning that the failure of an automatic shutoff 

valve has resulted in a spill of approximately 1000 gallons of AHF. The 

liquid AHF has begun to pool, giving rise to vapor. Inhaling these vapors, 

both workers suffer severe respiratory injury. Although one worker collapses 

immediately, the other succeeds in activating the plant safety alarm, thereby 

alerting the shift supervisor that an emergency has occurred at the transfer 

site. 

The supervisor drives to investigate the accident. Smelling the strong 

presence of AHF vapors in the air, the supervisor stops his vehicle 200 feet 

from the accident site and radios the plant gate to notify the Lake City 

emergency response authorities by calling 911. In the process of suiting up 

with protective equipment, the supervisor himself collapses. 
-2-

Scenario 2: so3 Spill From Severed Feedline 

The PQX Chemical Co. plant, located on Lee Highway in Blackrock City, 

manufactures a variety of corrosive, toxic, and flammable chemicals. Many of 

these chemicals are stored at the plant pending shipment to customers. 

The Blackrock plant occupies 50 acres of land and is situated in an area 

composed of commercial, industrial, and residential land uses. The plant 

property is bounded on the north by Lee Highway; on the east by a rail line; 

on the south by Interstate 20; and on the west by the Black River. Beyo~d 

the river to the west, is the Black Rive·r Estates housing development. South 

of Interstate 20 is the Clover Hill housing development. On the north side 

of Lee Highway lies a mixture of commercial and industrial buildings. East 

of the railroad line, there are a variety· of industrial facilities. A 

railroad siding extends into the plant property to the outside storage area. 

One clear Saturday morning, a day when the plant is not opera~ing, a 

repair crew is working on replacing a section of pipe that is connected to 

the top of an empty tank. After disconnection, a crane is used to lower the 

pipe onto a flat bed truck. As the crane boom is swung over a nearby tank of 

liquid sulfur trioxide, the cable snaps, dropping the pipe. The falling pipe 

shears off the S03 tank's feedline between the tank wall and the first block 

valve. The four-inch diameter feedline leading from the tank to the process 

plant begins leaking immediately. An excess flow valve between the leak and 

the tank limits the rate of flow to 30 gallons per minute. 

Spilled liquid S03 collects within t:he containment dike surrounding the. 

tanks. Upon contact with the moisture in the air, the spilled S03 vaporizes 

into a white mist resembling steam. The wind, coming from the northwest at 

5 mph, blows the vapors directly onto the nearby repair crew that had removed 

the old piping. Three of the four repai~uen are overcome by the vapors, with 

two of them lying unconscious on top of the tank on which they had been 

working. The lone conscious repairman drags the remaining worker from the 

hazardous area and then runs into the main plant to report the accident. 

Experiencing burning eyes and difficult breathing, he decides to remain 

indoors awaiting the arrival of the fire department. 
-3-

Scenario 3: Petroche.ical/Chlorine Spill From Truck/Train Collision 

Alpha Transfer Depot, In~ .• facilitates the transfer of various bulk 

commodities from trains to trucks for local delivery within the Junction City 

metropolitan area. Alpha's specialty is the bulk handling of petroleum and 

hazardous substances. 

Alpha's facility is located adjacent to a regional train yard. Alpha's 

facility and the train yard itself are bounded by an interstate highway, 

which serves as a commutation route between Junction City's outlying suburbs 

and its Central Business District (CBD), and Small Creek, which is a 

tributary of Big River, which in turn flows through the CBD. The 

neighborhood surrounding the depot and train yard, which are 3 miles from the 

CBD, is primarily a run-down industrial/warehouse district. On the opposite 

creek bank, however, is a large mobile home park primarily populated by 

elderly and low-income people. 

At 6:00 on a warm summer .morning, an Alpha delivery truck carrying a 

full load of 55-gallon drums containing various petrochemical products 

accidentally collides with a slow-moving haul train towing 2 tank cars of 

liquid chlorine. Both tank cars derail, with substantial denting and a 

puncture occurring to one, resulting in a rapid leakage of chlorine. The 

truck overturns,· spilling and rupturing many of its barrels with a resulting 

leakage of a significant quantity of petrochemicals. Light, directionally variable winds begin spreading chlorine fumes. Liquid chlorine and 

petrochemicals begin to mix on the ground. 

The acc·ident is observed from a distance by another truck driver who 

notifies the manager-on-duty. The conductor of the haul train, although 

shaken and suffering eye irritation due to chlorine fumes, is able to rescue 

the truck driver, who has been overcome by chlorine fumes, dragging him away 

from the accident site. The·exertion of the rescue and additional ·exposure 

to the fumes finally cause the conductor to pass out. Both men are attended 

to by a skeleton crew of depot workers. Realizing that both the truck driver 

and conductor are unconscious, and seeing evidence of skin burns, the depot 

manager calls 911 to ensure that emergency medical personnel and hazmat units 

are summoned. 
-4-

Scenario 4: Acid Spill From Ruptured Pipeline 

Lakeside Chemicals, Inc., produces a variety of acids for sale as 

intermediates to other chemical manufacturers. Lakeside stores and handles a 

wide variety of chemicals on-site, both for process use and in storage for 

shipment to customers. 

Lakeside's plant is located in a neighborhood which is primarily 

industrial in nature. There are several other industrial plants nearby as 

well as a number of warehouses. The wart:~houses are adjacent to port 

facilities along Muddy River, which carries a significant volume of barge and 

recreational boat traffic. Lakeside's plant is adjacent to a spur of the IHR 

Railroad on the north; warehouses on the south and east; and a metal plating 

facility on the west. Kennedy Boulevard and Eisenhower Avenue, both major 

arterial streets, intersect one block from the plant gate. Just across the 

IHR tracks is the Lakeside Community Airport, which provides commuter service 

to major airports in the region. Muddy River lies a quarter-mile to the 

east. 

The nearest dense residential neighborhoc>ds are two miles distant to the 

north and west. 

At 3:30 on a drizzly weekday afternc>on, a charter plane carrying 6 

people takes off from the Lakes_ide Airport. The plane· experiences engine 

trouble and fails to achieve sufficient altitude. The pilot attempts to make 

an emergency landing on vacant land within Lakeside's plant property. After 

safely touching down, the plane collides with a pipeline carrying sulfuric 

acid from a Lakeside storage facility to the IHR rail spur for loading on 

tank cars. The plane flips over and catches fire 100 yards from the 

pipeline. The pipeline immediately begins to spew acid, which comes in 

contact with rain puddles that have formE~d over two days of rainy weather. 

Winds are light and blowing from the sou1:h. 

The incident is observed from a dis1:ance by plant workers in the midst 

of a shift change. One of the workers calls the safety manager, who in turn 

directs the plant's emergency crew into operation. The emergency crew 

approaches within 200 yards of the accidE~nt scene, Spotting acid fumes 

rising from the area of the pipeline, thE~ crew stops and radios the safety 

manager. Informed about the fumes, the safety manager instructs the crew not 

to approach any closer. He calls 911 to summon the Lakeside Fire Department. 

There are no immediate signs of survivors from the plane crash. 
-5-

Scenario 5: Ammonia Spi11 At A Pesticides P1ant 

The <Green Fertilizer Company manufactures a variety of fertilizers for 

sale in the retail market. Their·Exurbia Township plant specializes in 

ammonia-based fertilizers, which are produced a~d trucked to Green's regional 

distribution centers around the country. 

Green's Exurbia plant is located ten miles outside Centerville, a major 

regional trading center. Exurbia Township is sparsely populated and is 

characterized primarily by a mix of agricultural and light industrial_ land 

uses. Along the western boundary of the is Ample River, which serves as the 

maJor source of drinking water for Centerville. In the immediate vicinity of 

the plant are a large truck stop along an interstate highway, 150 yards east 

of the plant; and a county farm labor housing project, 300 yards south of the 

plant. 

At 10:00 on a blustery winter weekday morning, plant workers hear a loud 

noise coming from the vicinity of a pipe carrying,Anhydrous Ammonia from a 

10,000 gallon storage vessel into the building housing the fertilizer 

manufacturing process. The pipe has ruptured, resulting in the rapid flow of 

product onto the ground. Although the Ammonia is rapidly vaporizing, it has 

also begun to pool. The weather is relatively warm, due to a temperature 

inversion. Winds are blowing out of the northwest. 

r 

A plant worker walks out of the plant building to investigate the noise. 

Seeing the leaking ammonia and smelling fumes, the worker ~uickly retreats 

inside the building and radios the plant safety manager. The plant manager 

in turn rad.ios the plant emergency response team to report -for duty, .!!,nd 

calls. the Exurbia Township Fire Department to request back-up assistance. 
-6-

Scenario 6: Nitric Acid/Diesel Fuel Spill At A Munitions Plant 

Precision Weaponry Co. manufactures ordnance for sale to the U.S. 

Government and private companies. Its principal products include explosives 

and ammunition. Although Precision does store a small quantity of its 

products on its Middlesex County plant site, it consciously strives to 

minimize explosion hazards by maintaining minimum inventories. 

Precision's Middlesex facility is quite large, with idle ground used as 

a buffer between production facilities and the plant fenceline. When it was 

constructed after World War II, the plant was in an isolated location. 

However, development over the last two decades has introduced a variety of 

low-density industrial and commercial land uses into the immediate 

neighborhood. A large retiree mobile home village, located two miles south, 

is the nearest residential development. The Precision plant lies in the 

Whisky River Valley, a two mile-wide drainage basin framed by the Saddleback 

Hills. 

At 3:00 one weekday afternoon, a tanker truck delivering diesel fuel to 

the plant collides with an empty Precision delivery truck. The force of the 

impact drives the Precision truck into a 20,000 gallon tank full of Nitric 

Acid stored for use in manufacturing explosives. The Nitric Acid tank begins 

to leak profusely. The delivery truck immediately catches fire. The diesel 

tanker truck careens into an adjacent utility building, causing a release 

valve to open. Diesel fuel begins to leak and mix with Nitric Acid ponding 

on the ground. Fumes immediately begin forming. 

The driver of the diesel tanker is unhurt and is able to climb out of 

his cab. Immediately assessing the situation, he runs 100 yards to the 

nearest building to notify pl~nt management. Shortly thereafter, the driver 

collapses, suffering from respiratory difficulties. The plant safety manager 

begins to marshall his emergency response team and calls for assistance from 

the Middlesex County Hazmat Squad.