F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

C O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R ; C O L U M B I A -P A C I F I C C O M M O N S E N S E ; W A H K I A K U M F R I E N D S O F T H E R I V E R , Petitioners
,

v

.

U N I T E D S T A T E S C O A S T G U A R D , Respondent

,

L N G D E V E L O P M E

N T C O M P A

N Y , L L C, DB A Oreg on L

N G, Respondent-Intervenor

. N o. 12-73385

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the United States Coast Guard

Arg ued and Submitted May 1 2, 2014—Portland, Oreg on

F iled Aug ust 5, 2014

B e fore: Arthur L . Alarcón, A. W allace Tashima, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by J udg e I k

utaC O L U M B I A R I V E R

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SUMMARY *

Jurisdiction / U.S. Coast G uard

The panel dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction a petition f o r review o f the U.S. Coast Guard’s issuance o f a let t e r o f

recommen d a t i o n to the F ederal E nerg y Reg ulatory Commission reg arding the suitability of the Columbia River for vessel traffic associated w ith a proposed liquified g a s facility and pipeline.

The panel co n c luded that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Coast Guard’s letter of recommendation was not in p ractice a final ag ency action u nder 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1)

o f the N atural Gas Act, which authoriz es judicial review o f final ag ency orders and actions that “issue, condition, or deny
any permit, license, concurrence, or approval.”

COUNSEL

Thomas C. B uchele ( arg ued) and Aubrey B aldwin, Earthrise L aw Center, Portland, Oreg on; L a uren G oldberg

, Columbia Riverkeeper, Hood River, Oreg on, for Petitioners.

B rian C. Toth (arg

ued) a nd Robert J

. L undman, Attorney s, Appellate Section; Robert G. Dreher, Acting As s istant Attorney General, United S tates Department of J ustice, Environme n t & Natural Resources Division, Washing ton, D.C.; J ohn T. Dewey
, Curtis E

. B orland, F rank G. Nolan, a nd

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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B ronwy n Doug lass, U nited States Coast Guard, Washing ton, D.C., for Respondent.

Charles Scott, F u lbrig ht & J aworski, New York, New York, for Respondent-I

ntervenor.

OP INION

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e:

This appeal a d d r esses one of the several administrative
proc e e ding s in which Columbia Riverkeeper, ColumbiaPacific Common Sense, and Wahkiakum F riends of the River (collectively Riverkeeper) have attempted to intervene in an effort to prevent L

NG Development C ompany , L L C (doing business as O reg on L

NG), from constructi n g a liquefied natural g as facility a

n d pipeline along the Columbia River in O r e g on. As part of the leng thy terminal siting p roces s , t h e Coast G ua r d provided the F ederal Energ y Reg ulatory Commission (F ERC) with a letter of recommendation (sometimes referred to as a L OR) reg arding the suitability o f the waterway for vessel traffic as s o ci a t ed with the proposed facil i t y

. Riverkeeper petitions for review of the Coast Guard’s issuance of the letter of recommendation, contending that we have jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1), which authoriz es jud i c i a l review of a g ency orders and actions that “issue, c o n d ition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence,

or approval.” B ecause the letter o f r e commendation is not such an order or action, we conclude we lack jurisdiction a nd dismiss the petition for review.C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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I

L iquefied natural g as (L

NG) is natural g as that h a s been

“ supercooled into liquid form” and “reheated back into g a s form at natural g a s terminals” for transport to custo m ers. W a s h

. G as Light Co. v. FERC
, 532 F .3d 928, 929 n.1 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). A lthoug h the process for liquefy in g n a t u ral g a s has been known since the 19th Century and used commercially since the 1950s, interest in transpo r t ing L N G for commercial use increased first in t h e 1970s due to declines in g as reserves, and ag ain more recently

. See J acob Dweck, D avid W ochner, & Michael Br ooks, Liquefied Natural Gas (

LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy A c t of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting
, 27 E nerg y L .J

. 473, 4 73 (2006). T h e s upercooling process reduces the

vo l u m e o f the natural g as to 1/600th of natural g as in vapor form, and, according to the Coast Guard, makes transporting liquefied natural g as “the most e con o m ical way to import natural g as from overseas.” Once natural g as h a s been liquefied, it can be transported in an L NG tanker to an L

N G import terminal, w hich receives, stores a n d processes the L NG. These facilities are “ty pically sited in coastal areas with shipping access. ” A E S Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v

. Smith

, 527 F .3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 2008). B ecause activities involving L

NG have a potential for ex plosion s , fires, a nd spills, federal, state, and local g overnments have taken steps
to r eg ulate the siting a

nd o peration of L

NG terminal f

a cilities.

A

To u n d erstand the role of the Coast Guard’s letter o f recommendation in the reg ulatory process, i t i s necessary to review the historical d evelopment o f the leg al framework for siting L N G terminal f

acilities. Prior to 2005, different federalC O L U M B I A R I V E R

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ag encies allocated responsibility for r eg ulating L N G terminal facilities a mong st themselves b y means o f interag ency ag reements, with little g uidance f rom Cong ress. The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) authoriz ed F ERC’s predecessor
ag ency (the Fe d eral Power Commission) to approve the import a nd ex port of natural g as, 15 U .S.C. § 717b ( 1 9 3 8 ), and the ex tension an d improvement of transportation facilities, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1938), but did not reference L N G terminal f

aci l i t y siting r esponsibility

. B eg inning in 1968, Cong r ess enacted a series of p ipeline safety statutes that g ave the D epartment of Transportati o n ( DOT) authority to issue minimum safety standards f or siting n ew liquefied natural g a s pipeline facilities, 49 U.S.C. § 60103. DOT and F E RC ultimately e n tered into an interag e ncy ag reement to allocate their respective r es p o nsibilities. See Memorandum o f U n derstanding between the Department of Tr a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d the F ed er a l E nerg y Reg ulatory Commission reg arding L iquefied Natural Gas Transportation F a cilities (1985).

I n addition, the Coast Guard a sserted authority over siting decisions a ffecting the safety and secur i t y o f port areas a nd navig able w aterway s under the Ports and W aterway s S a fety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 122 1

– 1236, the Mag nuson Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 1 9 1, and Ex ecutive Order No. 10173, 15 F ed. Reg

. 7005 (Oct. 18, 1 950). I n ea r l y 1 9 7 8
, the Coast Guard and a DOT subag ency (the Office of Pipelin e S a f ety Operation of the Materials Transportation B ure au) entered into a memorandum of understanding reg arding the division of reg ulator y responsibility over L NG terminals. B elieving that the ag r eement g ave it b r o a d r e g ulatory authority

, the Coast Guard c o mmenced a rulemaking proceeding a nd proposed reg ulations that would require any person siting an L NG facility

to obtain a “use permit” from the Coast Guard. L iquefied Natural Gas F acilities, 43 F ed. Reg

. 34362, 34365C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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(Aug

. 3, 1978) (proposed 33 C

. F .R. § 126.2012). After further cong r essional action sug g ested that the Coast Guard’s view of its reg ulatory authority was too broad, the Coast Guard reduced its a mbition. Pursuant to a revised memorandum of understanding with D O T, sig ned in 1986, the Coast Guard proposed revised reg ulations replaci ng its proposed “use permit” requirement with a requirement that a project proponent merely secure a letter of recomm e n d a tion from the Coast Guard. L iquefied Natural Gas W aterfront F acilities, 53 F ed. Reg

. 3370, 3377 ( F eb. 5, 1988) (proposed 33 C.F .R. § 127.009).

Be gi nning in the 1990s, there was a rapid increase in efforts to site L

NG import terminals. I n response to g rowing safety and e nviron m e n t al concerns, a number of states claimed authority to reg ulate L NG facilities under s p e c i fic
state L NG statutes o r u nder g eneral environmental, zoning

, o r construction laws. See Parfomake & V ann, Cong ressional Research Se r v i ce, Liquefied Natural Gas ( LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

, at 16–17 (Dec. 14, 2009); see also, e.g. , W

e a ver’s Cove Energy, L L C v

. R

. I. Coastal Res. M

gmt. Council

, 5 89 F .3d 458, 472–73 (1st Cir. 2009); AES Sparrows Point LNG
, 527 F

. 3d at 124. California also asserted ex clusiv e a u t hority to reg ulate L NG facilities that d id not impact interstate commerce, claiming that F E RC lacked authority under the NGA to reg ulate such sites. See,
e.g. , Re: Sound Energy Solutions

, Notice of I ntervention a nd Protest of the Public Utilitie s Commission of the State o f California, at 7–9, F ERC Docket No. CP04-58-000 (F eb. 23, 2004).

I n 2 004, F E RC, the Coast Guard, and a D OT subag ency (the Research and Special Prog r a ms Administrati on) responded to the terrori s t e v e n ts o f September 11, 2001 b yC O L U M B I A R I V E R

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entering into another interag e ncy ag reement to divi d e reg ulatory responsibility f or the safety and security review o f waterfront L

NG facilit i es. This ag reement confirmed that F ERC had lead reg ulatory authority for the siting a nd construction of onshore L NG facilities. The ag encies a l s o ag reed that F E RC w ould be the lead ag e ncy for preparing an environmental impact statement (EI S) u n der the National E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o l i c y A c t ( N E P A )

, 1 4 2 U

. S

. C

. §§ 4321–4370h.

I n 2005, consistent with this 2 004 interag ency ag r eement, the Coast Guard issued a “Navig ation and Vessel I n spection Circular,” NVI C 05-05, providing g u idance for persons “seeking a permit to build and o perate a shore-side L N G termina l.” The circular confirmed that F ERC was responsible for authoriz ing the siting and constructio n o f onshore L N G facilities, a

nd was the lead ag ency for the NEPA process. The circular stated that the Coast G u a rd would serve as a cooperating a g ency under N EPA, see 40 C.F .R. § 1501.6, a nd

w ould provide F ERC with a letter of recommendation (as required in the Coast Guard’s 1988 r e g ulations) that set forth its formal evaluation o f the suitability o f the waterway for L NG marine traffic. According to t h e Coast Guard, issuing such a letter of recommendation was a “federal action which

1 F o r all “ m aj or Fed eral actio n s sig n if ican tly af f ectin g th e q u ality o f th e h u m an en v iro n m en t” th e resp o n sib le o f f icial m u st co n d u ct en v iro n m en t al

an aly ses p u

rsu an t to NEP A

. 4 2 U.S.C. § 43 3 2 (C). Su ch an aly si s m u s t in clu d e a “ f

u ll an d f

air d i scu ssio n o f [th e actio n ’ s] sig n if ican t

en v iro n m en tal im

p acts an d sh all in f

o rm d ecisio n m ak ers an d th e pu b lic of th e reaso n ab le altern ativ es w h ich w o u ld av o id o r m in im ize ad v erse im p acts o r en h an ce th e qu ality o f th e hu m an en v iro n m en t.” 4 0 C .F.R. § 15 0 2 .1

. “ Maj or f

ed eral actio n s” in clu d e “ p ro j ects an d p ro g ram s en tirely

o r p artly f i n an ced

, assisted

, co n d u cted

, reg u lated

, o r ap pro v ed by f ed eral
ag en cies.” 4 0 C.F.R. § 1 5 08 .1 8 (a).C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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requires compliance w i t h NEPA” to the same ex tent a s F ERC’s authoriz ation f

o r construction and operation of an L NG facility

.

J ust a few mo n ths later, Cong ress enacted the E n erg y Policy Act (EPAct) of 200 5
, P u b

. L

. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, which finally clarified Cong ress’s intent reg a rding the division of r esponsibility for siting and o p e r a ting L N G terminal facilities. T he EPAct resolved a number o f important is s u e s

. F irst, the Act a mended the applicable section of the Natural Gas Act to g ive F ERC “th e e xclusive auth o r i ty to a

pprove or deny an application for the siting

, construction, ex pansion, or operation of an L N G t erminal,” id.

, § 311, 1 19 Stat. at 686, codified a t 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) ( emphasis added), thereby precluding o ther federal or s t a t e ag encies from asserting such authority

.
Second, in response to the states’ interest in having some control over L

NG import terminals within their jurisdiction, Cong r ess took a compromise position. Althoug h Cong ress’s
g rant of “ex clusive authority ” to F ER C in siting decisions precluded the states’ imposition o f state law requirements, the EPAct preserved the states’ au thority under several federal environmental laws to r equire project p roponents to obtain a state com p l i ance c e rtification. I d.

, § 311, 119 Stat. at 686, codified at 1 5 U

. S.C. § 717b(d). B u t to prevent states from using this authority to block L N G p rojects completely

, see Dweck, W ochner, & B r ooks, sup ra , at 483–85 (ex amining Connecticut’ s successful efforts to block the I slander E a st pipeline project using its water quality certification authority under the CW A), the EPAct allowed for federal judicial review o f an order or action of a “State administrative ag ency acting pursuant to F ederal law to issue, condition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or a p proval,” Pub. L

. No. 109-C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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5 8, § 313, 1 19 Stat. a t 689–90, codified at 15 U.S. C

. § 717r(d)(1); see Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. D ep’t of Envtl. Prot.
, 482 F .3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating t h at leg islative history confirms that this p rovision was enacted to allow ex pedited federal judicial r eview of a state’s denial o f

a required f

e d eral permit); see also Dweck, W ochner, & B rooks, supra , at 482–83 (noting that the conflict b etween I slander East and Connecticut led C o ng ress to enact § 717r(d)).

F inally

, the EPAct confirme d that F ERC was the “lead
ag ency for the purposes of coordinating all applicable F ederal autho ri z ations and for the purposes of comply ing with” NEPA. Pub. L

. No. 109-58, § 313, 1 19 Stat. at 689, codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1). I t required F ER C t o p r omulg ate reg ulations for NEPA c ompliance that require a p re-filing o f L NG import terminal siting applications. Id.

, § 311, 119 Stat. at 687, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(a).

A l t h o u g h the E PAct did not speak directly to the Coast Guard’s r ole in siting L N G facilities, after t h e E P Act’s enactment, the Coast Guard r evisited its internal procedures, and issued a new “Navig ation and Vessel I nspect i on Circular,” NVI C 05-08, on December 22, 2 0 0 8. Now understanding that its letter of recommendation was not a final decision, but rather mere advice to F ERC (the ag ency with e x clusive authority to make all siting decisions under the EP A c t )

, the Coast Guard determined its letter o f recommendation did not “const i t ute a permitting action a nd
must not impose requirements or conditions mandated by the Coa s t G uard.” According ly

, the Coast Guard no long er deemed its letter of recommendation to r equire separate

co m p l iance with NEPA. I n 2010, Cong ress confirmed this approach. I n § 813 of the Coast Guard A uthoriz ation Act o fC O L U M B I A R I V E R

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2010, Cong ress required “the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating ” to “make a recommendation, a fter considering recommend a t ions made by the States, to the F ederal E n erg y Reg ulatory Commission

as to whether the waterway to a proposed waterside liquefied natural g as facility is suitable or unsuitable for the marine traffic associat e d wi th such facility .” Pub. L

. No. 111-281, § 813, 1 2 4 S t a t. 2905, 2999. This lang u ag e confirmed Cong r ess’s intent to limit the Coast Guard’s role in licensing L NG facilities to issuing letters of recommendation.

B

Accordingl y , by 2009 (the y ear the Coast Guard issued the letter of recommendation in this case), t he reg ulatory framework for a party

seeking to site a

n L NG facility was a s follows. F ERC w as the ex clusive siting authorit y and “lead
ag ency ” under NEPA. 1 5 U

. S

. C. § 717n(b)(1). F E RC required an applicant to e n g a g e in a p r e-filing procedure before filing an application. S ee 18 C.F .R. §§ 153.12, 157.21 (2009). Among other pre-filing step s , t h e applicant had to file a letter of intent and waterway suitability assessment with the captain o f the port 2 of the z one in which the facility would be located, pursuant to 3 3 C.F .R. § 127.007 (2009) and 18 C.F .R. § 157

. 2 1 (2009). After reviewing the letter of intent and accompany

ing assessment, the captain of the p ort would issue a letter of recommendation reg a rding the proposed facility

. 33 C.F .R. § 1 27.009 (2009). Under C o a s t G u a r d
reg ulations, a person “direct l y a ffected” by the letter o f recommendation could “request reconsideration by the Coast Guard o fficer respo n s ible,” id. § 127.015(a) (2009), a nd

2 A “ cap tain o f th e p o rt” is th e o f f i cer so d e s ig n ated b y th e Co m m an d an t o f

th e Co ast Gu ard . 1 4 U.S.C. § 6 3 4 (a).C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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p u rsue two additional levels of a dministrative review, id

. § 127.015 (2009). 3

After the project p ropone nt filed an a pplication with F ERC, F E RC would undertake an ex tensive review a nd consultation process w i t h v arious federal, state, and local
ag encies, as wel l a s private parties, and also convene public hearin g s. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b(e)(2)(B ), 717b-1. This
process included the work necessary to comply with NEPA. Other stat e a n d federal cooperating ag encies assist F ERC in preparing an E I S

. T h e project proponent was r equired to obtain all necessary permits an d approvals from state a nd

o t h e r f e deral bodies, and could challeng e the d e nial of any permits or approvals required u nder federal law in a federal
court of appeals. See id. § 717r(d)(1). Once this process was completed, F ERC c ould issue a final decision approving o r deny ing the application. See id. § 717b(e)(2). FE R C could

a p prove the application “in w hole or part, with such modifications and upon such terms and cond i t i o ns” as it found necessary

and appropriate. I

d. § 717b(e)(3).

Upon F ERC’s i ssuance of the order, any person could apply for rehearing within 30 day s. Id. § 717r(a). W ithin 60 day s o f F ERC’s order on the application for r e h earing

, an ag g r ieved party could obtain review of the order in the court

3 In 2 0 1 2
, th e Co ast Gu ard am en d ed its reg u latio n s to p ro v id e t h at th e let ter o f reco m

m en d atio n is n o t ap p ealab le b ecau se it “ is a

reco m m en d atio n fr o m t h e [cap tain o f th e p o rt] to th e ag en cy h av in g j u risd ictio n ” an d “ d o es n o t co n stitu te ag en cy actio n f

o r th e p u rp o se of § 1 27 .0 1 5 o r th e A d m in istrativ e P ro ced u re A ct.” 3 3 C.F.R. § 1 2 7 .0 09 (b ) (2 0 1 2). T h at reg u latio n d o es n o t ap p l y retro activ ely

. S ee id

. § 1 2 7 .0 0 9 (e) (2 0 1 2).C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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of appeals “wherein the natural-g as compa n y to which the order relates is located” by filin g a w ritten petition. Id. § 717r(b).

I I

W e now turn to the facts of this case

. I n 2007, O reg on L NG beg an the pre-filing process: I t made a n i nitial filing with F ERC an d filed a letter of intent and a preliminary waterway suitability assessment w i t h the captain o f the port for Portland for a proposed L NG terminal and pipeline. The letter stated that Oreg on L NG intended to construct an L N G facility on the East Skipanon Peninsula, near the confluence of the S k i p anon and the Columbia River in W arrenton, Oreg on. I n Aug ust 2007, F ERC published a notice of intent
to prepare an EI S for the East Skipanon L NG terminal. L

N G Development Company
, L L C and Oreg on P i p e l i n e Company ; Notice of I

ntent, 72 F ed. Reg . 50356 (Aug

. 31, 2007).

Oreg on L NG filed its f

o r m a l application f

or the E a st Skipanon L

NG terminal with F ERC in October 2008, prompting F E RC to issue a no t i c e o f application. L N G Development Company
, L L C ( d / b /a O reg on L NG); O reg on Pipeline Company
, L L C; Notic e of A pplications, 73 F ed. Reg

. 653 0 1 ( N ov. 3, 2008). Riverkeeper and other environmental o r g aniz ations intervened in t h e F E RC proceeding s pursuant to 1 8 C

. F. R. § 3 85.214 on N ovember 17, 2008. 4

On A pril 24, 2009, the captain of the port issued the letter of recommen dation at issue in this case, and the
accompany

ing analy sis for Oreg on L NG’s East Skipanon

4 T h e FERC p ro ceed i n g s are o n g o in g

.C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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L NG terminal, pursuant to 33 C.F .R. § 127.009. The lette r stated the ca ptain’s determination “ that the applicable portions of the Columb i a R i v e r and its approaches are not currently suitable, but could be made suitable for the ty p e a nd frequency of L

N G marine traffic associated with this project.” The letter of re c ommendation included the following statement:

W h ile this letter has no e n f o rcement status, the d eterminations, analy sis, an d ultimate recommendation as to the su i t a bility of this waterway , a s c ontained in this letter, would be referenced in co n c e rt with a Captain of the Port O rder, should an L NG transit be attempted along thi s waterway without full implementation of the ri s k m itig ation

measures.

The a naly sis accompany

ing the letter listed add i tional mitig ation measures that were recommended “to responsibly
manag e the safety and security risks” of the project, while acknowledg ing that the specifics o f each sug g ested mitig ation

measure would require “ f urther development throug h the creation of an Emerg ency Response Plan as well as a Transit Manag ement Plan.”

On May 2 2
, 2009, Riverkeeper and other intervenors requested reconsideration of the letter of reco m m en dation under 33 C.F .R. § 127.015(a) (2009), on the g r ound that the Co a s t Guard had failed to comply with NEPA and theC O L U M B I A R I V E R

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Endang e red Species Act (ESA), 5 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44. The captain of the port denied the motion f or reconsideration on J uly 9, 2009, and Riverkeeper filed a n administrative appeal,

see 3 3 C.F .R. § 127.015 ( b ) ( 1 ) (2009), w hich was denied b y a district commander on December 2, 2010.

T h e r e a f t e r , a n a s s i s t a n t c o m m a n d a n t d e n i e d Riverkeeper’s second a dministrative appeal, see 33 C.F .R. § 1 27.015(c), on A u gu s t 25, 2 012. I n his Aug ust 25th decision letter, the assistant commandant stated that issuance of the letter o f r ecommendation w as not an ag ency action under the ESA or Administrative Procedure Act (APA), or a “major feder a l action” u nder N EPA, because its issuance “carries no leg al sig nif

i cance in and of itself,” The letter o f recommendation was “not a condition precedent for a nd does
not bar F ERC” from a

uthoriz ing t h e E ast Skipanon L N G
t erminal w ithout adopting the captain of the por t ’s recommendations or incorporating any of the mitig ation

measures. The letter does not “impose any leg al r equirement

on any party to comply with” its recomm e n d a t ions; it is not leg ally binding on the Coast Guard, any other g overnment ag ency , or Oreg on L

NG. Nor does the letter have an impact

on vessel traffic, because “ [ t ] h e issuance of an L OR neither authoriz es, nor prohibits, a n L NG carrier from conducting a transit of the waterway

” and vessels a

re not required to obtain Coast Guard transit permits. Rather, the issuance of a captain of the p o rt letter “ i s s e p arate and distinct from the

5 T h e ESA req u ires each f ed eral ag en cy t o “ in s u r e t h a t an y actio n

au th orized

, f

u n d ed

, o r c a r r ied o u t b y su ch ag en cy

. . . is n o t lik ely to j eo p ard i z e th e co n tin

u ed ex isten ce o f an y en d an g ered sp ecies or th reaten ed sp ecies o r resu lt in th e d estru ctio n

o r ad v erse m o d if

icatio n o f h ab itat of su ch sp ecies w

h ich is d eterm in ed b y th e Secretary .” 1 6 U.S.C. § 1 5 3 6(2 ).C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 15

recommendations provided in a n L OR, which a re not enforceable, and the [ captain of the p ort] is not bound by the recommendations contained in the L OR.”

Riverkeeper then filed a pe t i t i o n for review h ere, challeng ing the letter of recommendation and the Aug ust 25, 2012 d ecision pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1) of the Natural Gas A ct. Oreg o n L N G intervened in the proceeding s.

I I I

As a threshold matter, w e must det e r m i n e whether § 717r(d)(1) g ives us jurisdiction to review R i v e r keeper’s challeng e to the l e t t e r of recommendation and the Coast Guard’s final denial o f Riverkeeper’s administrative appeal. Riverkeeper contends that in enacting § 717r(d)(1), Cong ress intended to create an e x ception t o the g eneral rule that

“ r e v i ew of ag ency action is ty pically located in the district
courts under the APA absent a specific statutory provision to the c ontra ry , ” Cal. Energy Comm’n v

. Dep’t of Energy
, 585 F .3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). W e r ev iew questions
reg arding o ur jurisdiction d e n o vo. Sandoval-Luna v

. Mukasey , 526 F

. 3 d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). “I t is to be presumed that a c a u se lies outside [ of federal courts’] lim i t e d jurisdiction, and the b urden of establishing the contrary rests upon the part y a s s erting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. o f A m

. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).

A

W e beg in with the tex t o f the jurisdictional statute, which provides in relevant part:C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 16

T h e United States Court of Appeals for th e circuit in which a f

ac i l ity subject to section 717b of this title

. . . i s p r oposed to be constructed, ex p anded, or operated shall have

o rig inal and ex clusive jurisdiction over a n y civil action for the review of an o r d e r o r action of a F ederal ag e n c y (other than the Commission) o r State administrative ag ency acting pursuant to F e d eral law to issue, condition, or den y a n y permit, license,

c o n c u r r e n c e , o r a p p r o v a l ( h e r e i n a f t e r collectively referred t o as “permit”) r equired under F ederal law . . . .

15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1).

The statute does not define the terms “order or action” o r “permit, license, concurrence, or approv al,” and so we interpret these w ords a c c o rding to “their ordinary

, contempora r y , common meaning .” Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 1 7

. 1 9 Acres of Prop. Located in Maricopa Cnty.
, 627 F .3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). I n making this interpretat i o n , we g ive d ue consideration to the contex t o f t hese words “with a view to their place i n t he overall statutory scheme.” Satterfield v

. Simon & Schuster, Inc.
, 569 F .3d 946, 953 (9t h C i r

. 2 009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Neither w e nor our sister circuits have defined the phrase “order or action” in § 717r(d)(1). I n interpreting statutes authoriz ing judicial review of ag ency d ecisions, h owever, the Supreme Court has held that “ [ t] he strong presumption is that judicial r eview will be available only when ag ency a c tion becomes f

inal.” Bell v. New Jersey
, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983)C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 17

(holding that a statute allowing judicial review of “any

a c t i on” by the Secretary o f Education g ives federal cour t s jurisdiction only over orders or actions tha t are final); see also FPC v

. Metro. Edison Co.
, 304 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1938) ( h o l ding that the word “order” in a section of the F e d e ra l Power Act substantially i d entical to § 717r(b) refers only to final orders). This long -standing r ule of construction reflects the Supreme Court’s inference that Cong ress g enerally does not intend to “afford[ ] opportunity for constant delay s in the

course of the a dministrative proceeding ,” such as w ould arise if courts could review ever y interim ag e ncy order or action. Metro. Edison , 304 U.S. at 383.

Nothing in § 717r(d)(1) overcomes this “strong presumption.” Bell

, 461 U.S. at 778. Cong ress’s inte nt to authoriz e judicial review ov e r o n ly final orders or actions is strong ly supported b y the lang u ag e of § 717r(d)(1), which l imits judicial review to those a g ency decisions that “ issue, condition, or deny any p ermit, license, co n currence, o r approval,” the sort of final decisions tha t occur at the conclusion of an a dministrative proce s s

. F urther, r eading § 717r(d)(1) as limiting judicial review to fina l ag ency decisions is consistent wi th the long -standing interpretation of § 717r(b), a

related section of the same statute. Althoug h § 717r(b) permits federal court review of “an order” issued b y F ERC, the Supreme Cou r t ( a s well as o u r sister circuits a nd

our own precedents) read this lang uag e as authoriz ing judicial review o nly over final o rders. See Consol. Gas Supply Corp.

v. FERC
, 611 F .2d 951, 9 58 (4th Cir. 1 9 7 9 ) (considering § 717r(b)); A tlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC
, 476 F

. 2d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); cf. M etro. E dison Co.
, 304 U .S. at 383–84 (considering lang uag e in the F ederal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825 l (b), whic h is substantially identical to § 717r(b)); The Stea m b o a ters v. FERC
, 759 F .2d 1382,C O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 18

1387–88 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v

. FERC
, 628 F .2d 235, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same). I n a dding § 7 1 7 r (d)(1) to § 717r when it enacted the EPAct, Cong re s s did not g ive any sig n it intended federal courts to ex ercise a broader scope of review over n on-F ERC decisions than over F ERC decisions. F inally

, the pr e s u mption that Cong ress intended to a

uthoriz e judicial review over only f i n a l ag ency decisions is sup p o r t ed by the same considerations relied on by the Supreme Court in M e t r o politan Edison Co. : construing § 7 17r(d)(1) a s allow i ng judicial review of every interim action of a state or federal a g ency would “do violence
to t h e manifest p urpose of the provision,” 304 U.S. at 384, which was to e x pedite siting decisions, see Islander E. Pipeline Co.
, 4 82 F .3d at 85. According ly

, we conclude that § 7 17r(d) authoriz es judici a l review only over orders o r actions that a

re “final.” 6 An action or order is “final when it imposes a

n oblig ation, d enies a r ig ht, or f ix es some leg al relationship.” City of Fremont
, 336 F. 3 d at 9 1 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Or. Natural Desert Ass’n

v. U.S. Forest Serv.
, 465 F .3d 977, 98 6

– 8 7 ( 9 t h Cir. 2 006) (same); Atlanta Gas
, 4 7 6 F.2d at 147 (noting an order reviewable under § 717r(b) must b e “ unambig uous i n l eg al effect” and have “some substantial effect on the parties which cannot be altered by

subsequent administrative action”).

6 I n c o n s tru in g th e lan g u ag e o f th e Fed eral P o w er A ct, w h ich i s

su b stan tially id en tical to § 7 1 7 r(b ), Pa p a g o , 6 28 F.2 d at 2 4 5
, w e im po s ed ad d itio n al req u irem en ts f

o r j u d icial rev iew

, h o ld in g th at a FERC o rd er is

su b j ect to j u d icial rev iew u n d er th e F e d e r a l P o w er A ct o n ly if “ (1 ) th e

o rd er is f i n al; (2 ) th e o rd er, if u n rev iew ed

, w o u ld in f lict irrep arab le h arm

o n th e p arty seek in g rev iew ; a n d ( 3 ) j u d icial rev iew at th is stag e of th e p ro cess w o u ld n o t in v ad e th e p ro v in ce r e s e rv ed to th e d iscretio n of th e ag en cy ,” City o

f Fremo n t v. FERC
, 3 3 6 F.3 d 9 1 0
, 9 1 3

– 14 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ). W e n eed n o t ad d ress h ere w h eth er th ese req u irem en ts are also ap p licab le in th e § 7 1 7 r co n tex t.C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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Section 717r(d)(1) limits our review not o nly to final actions and o rders, b ut also to those that “issue, c ondition, o r deny any permit, license, c oncurrence, or appro v al (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘permit’) r equired under F e deral law.” Althoug h the statute does not define “permit, license, concurrence, or approval,” it coll e ctively refers to these ter m s as “permit,” indicating that Cong ress intended to capture the ty pe of ag e ncy determination that
g rants or denies permission to take some action. S ee United States v. S tevens , 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010) (apply ing noscitur

a socii s canon). T he dictionary definition of permit is “a written warrant or license g ranted by one having authority

, ” M e r riam-W ebster’s Colleg iate Dictionary 923 (11th e d. 2003), which is similar to the definitions of the o ther statutory terms. 7 I n deed, the terms are ofte n d e fined by one another. See, e.g. , B lack’s L aw Dict i o n a ry 1176 (8th ed. 2 003) (defining “permit” as “a certificate evidencing permission; a license ” (emphasis added)); id. at 938 (defining “license” as “[ a] permis sion
, usu. revocable, to commit some act” (emphasis added)).

According ly

, Cong ress contemplated that an order o r action reviewable under § 717r(d)(1) would b e ( 1 ) a final
ag ency action or order (2) i s s u i n g , conditioning or deny ing (3) a n ag ency d etermination (of a sort analog ous to a p ermit) that has the leg al effect of g ranting o r deny ing permission to take some action.

7 S ee Merriam

- W eb ster’ s Co lleg i ate D ictio n ary 7 1 7 (1 1 th ed

. 20 0 3) (d ef in in g “ licen se” as “ a p erm issio n to act”; “ a p erm issio n g ran ted b y

co m peten t au t h o rity to en g ag e i n

. . . an activ ity oth erw ise u n law f u l”); id

. at 2 5 9 (d ef

in in g “ co n cu rren ce” as “ an ag reem en t o r u n io n in actio n ”); id

. at 6 1 (d ef

in i n g “ ap p ro v al” as “a n a c t o r in stan ce o f ap p ro v i n g ” an d d ef in i n g “ ap p ro v e” as “ to g iv e f o rm al o r o f

f icial san ctio n

to ”).C O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 20

B

Apply ing this interpretation, the letter of recommendat i o n for the East Skipanon L

NG terminal is not a permitting action or order under § 19 of the Natural Gas Act.

On its face, the Coast Guard’s letter o f recommendation for this terminal is not an ag ency determination g ranting o r deny ing permission to take some action. As early a s 1986, the Coast Guard recog niz ed that its siting authority was limited and retreated from its position that it was authoriz ed
to i s sue a “use permit” for L NG terminal facilities. I nstead, it promulg ated reg u lations allowing it to issue only a letter o f recommendati o n. Cong ress’s ex press g rant of ex clusive siting authority to F ERC, see 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1), f urther clarified that the Coast Guard lacks autho r i t y over siting decisions. Cong ress is assumed to k n o w ex isting law, a nd Cong r ess d id not require F ERC to obtain or comply with the Coast Guard’s letter of recommendation, even thoug h the Coast Guard had beg un issuing such let t e rs long before the EPAct was enacted. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v

. M i l ler

, 48 6 U .S. 174, 184–85 (1988) (“W e g enerally p resume that Cong r ess is knowledg eable about ex isting law pertinent to the leg islation it enacts.”).

Cong r ess subsequently confirmed that the Coast Guard’s only oblig ation was to “ make a recommendation” to F ERC a s to the suitability o f the waterway

. Pub. L

. No

. 1 1 1

- 2 81, § 813, 124 Stat. at 2999. 8 B ecause “recommendation” is not

8 Co n g ress p assed th e 2 0 1 0 C o ast G u a r d A u t h o rizatio n A ct af

ter th e Co ast Gu ard issu ed th e letter o f reco m m en d atio n f

o r th e East S ki p a n on L NG term in al b u t b ef

o re t h e fi n al ad m i n istrativ e ap p eal den ial. T h e p arties d o n o t d i sp u te th at th e 2 0 1 0 statu te ap plies h ere.C O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 21

defined, we assume Cong ress adopted the common meaning of the term “ recommendation,” which i s a sug g estion o r advisement without decisive authority

, see MerriamW eb ster’s Colleg iate Dictionary 1039 (11th ed. 2 003) (defining “recommendation” as “ the act of recommending ”); id. (defining “recommend” a s “to present as worthy o f acceptance . .

. . ; to endorse as fit worthy or competent . . . ; advise”). B ecause nothing in the EPAct or the Coa s t Guard Authoriz ation A ct sug g ests tha t the Coast Guard’s “recommendation” is any

thing more than ex pert ad

v i c e w h i ch F ERC will use to inform its decision of whether to approve the proposed facility

, we conclude the Coast Guard’s letter o f

recom m e n d a tion for the East Skipanon L NG terminal does
not have a

ny conclusive leg al effect. 9 Cf. Revision of L N G and L H G W aterfront F acility General Requirements, 7 5 F ed. Reg

. 29420, 29423 (May 2 6, 2010) (“Recomme n d a tions

ex p ressed in the [ letter of r ecommen d a t i on] represent the Coast G uard’s professional input and are provided in the
contex t of the F ederal, State, or local jurisdictional ag e ncy ’s proceeding s, which provide for participation and public comments.”). B ecause a letter is not a “p e r m it, license, concurrence, or approval,” for purposes of § 717r(d)(1), it is therefore not subject to judicial review.

9 T o t h e ex ten t Riv erk ee p e r arg u es th at th e f in al ad m i n istrativ e ap p eal d en ial w as a “ f

in al ag en cy actio n ” b ased o n lan g u ag e in 3 3 C

. F

. R

. § 1 2 7 .0 15 (d ) (2 0 0 9 ), w e rej ect th is arg u m en t, b ecau se n o th i n g in th e

r e c o rd i n d icates th at th e Co ast Gu ard ’ s f in al d ecisio n h ad th e ef

f ect o f issu in g , co n ditio n in g , o r d en y in g a perm it, s ee 1 5 U.S.C. § 7 1 7 r(d )(1 ). B ecau se Riv erk eep er did n o t ap p eal th e actio n in d i s trict co u rt assertin g j u risd ictio n u n d er th e A P A
, w h i ch p ro v id es f

o r j u d icial rev i ew o f fi n a l
ag en cy act i o ns, see 5 U.S.C. § 70 4
, w e n eed n o t ad d ress w h eth er Riv erk eep er co u ld h av e asserted a claim f o r relief in th at co n tex t.C O L U M B I A R I V E R

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Riverkeeper raises several arg uments ag ai n st this interpretation. F irst, Riverkeeper sug g ests that if § 717r(d)(1) applies only to final actions relating to permits, and does not ap p ly to the Coast G uard’s letter of r ecommendation, it will do no work in the statutory r eg ime. Since we are to interpret
statutes to avoid making any provision superfluous, Corley v

. United States
, 556 U .S. 303, 314 (2009), Riverkeeper arg ues that such a

n interpretation cannot be correct. W e disag ree. The main purpose of § 7 17r(d)(1 ) was to a llow judicial review of state ag encies’ denial of c ertifications r equired under f e d e r a l e nvironmental laws. See Islander E. Pipeline Co.
, 482 F .3d a t 85–88 (reviewing state orde r d en y ing petitioner’s application for a Water Quality C e rtificate). Moreover, the NGA itself makes cl e a r that certain federal
ag ency actions are subject t o j u dicial review under this section; for instance, F E RC must “obtain the concurrence o f the Secretary of Defense b efore a u t h oriz ing the siting

, construction, ex p ansion, o r operation of liquefied natural g a s facilities a ffecting the training or activities o f a n active military installation.” 1 5 U.S.C. § 71 7 b (f)(3) (emphasis added).

Second, Riverkeeper arg u e s t h at the term “letter o f recommendation” is misleading

, and as a pra c tical matter, such a le tter constitutes a final ag ency action or order under § 717r(d)(1). W e ag ree that an a g ency ’s characteriz ation o f its action as being p rovisional or advisory is not n e c e s s arily dispositive, and courts consider whether the p ractical effects of an ag e n c y ’ s d ecision make it a final ag e ncy action,
reg ardless of how it is labeled. Under the APA, for instance,

even i f the ag ency does not label its decision or action a s fin a l, it may be reviewable if it “has the status of law o r comparable leg al force” or if “immediate compliance with its
terms is ex p ected.” Or. N a tural Desert Ass’n
, 465 F .3d atC O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 23

987. I n Bennett v. Spear , 520 U .S. 154 (1997), the Supreme Court concluded that a biolog ical opinion issued by the F ish and W ildlife Service pursuant to the E SA was an appealable final ag e ncy action under the APA because it effectively authoriz ed a federal ag ency to take endang ered species if i t

c o m p l ied with the prescribed conditions. Id. at 177–78. W h ile sty led as an “opinion,” the biolog ical o p inion h ad “direct and appreciable legal consequences.” I d. at 178. L ikewise, a document sty led as a “g

u idance document” may
amount to a final a g e ncy action when it “reflect[ s] a se ttled
ag ency p o s i tion which has leg al consequences.” Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA
, 208 F .3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2 000). B y contrast, an a gency d etermination that certain property contains wetlands subject to the C l e an W a ter Act is not a reviewable action under the APA, because that decision does
not determine rig hts or oblig a t i o n s from which leg al consequences will flow. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of

Eng’rs
, 543 F

. 3d 586, 593–94 (9th Cir. 2008). W e have f

ollowed the same approach in the NEPA and ESA
contex ts a s well. See Ramsey v. Kantor
, 96 F .3d 434, 444 (9th Cir. 1 9 96) (concluding an ag ency ’s incidental t a ke
st a t e ment was the f

u nctional equivalent of a permit a nd therefore constituted a “major F ederal act i o n ” trig g ering NEPA oblig ations); cf. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v

. U .S. F orest Serv.
, 681 F .3d 1 0 0 6
, 1021–23 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (concluding the F ores t Service’s decision authoriz ed rather than advised proposed mining activity and therefore trig g ers ESA requirements), cert. denied , 133 S. Ct. 1579 (2013).

Rely ing o n these precedents, Riverkeeper maintains that the Coast Guard’s letter of r ecommendation for the E a st S k ipanon L

N G terminal is the functional e quivalent o f a permit because either (1) the letter o f recommendation is in practice a n e c e s sary prerequisite for siting o f a facility o rC O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

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( 2 ) the letter of recommendation w ill effectively reg u lat e vessel traffic along the waterway af t e r the facility ’s construction. W e disag ree with both assertions.

F irst, the record does not e s t ablish that obtaining the Coast G uar d ’s a

pproval of the proposed site for an L N G terminal is a necessary prerequisite for siting an L NG facility

. Here, the Coast Guard has no enforcement a u t h o rity over F E R C ’s siting decision, and its letter o f recommendation does
not produce leg al consequences. I n Bennett and Appalachian Power
, by contrast, the ag ency a ction had a “virtually determinative effect” on the p roject proponent. Bennett
, 520 U

. S

. a t 1 6 9; see also id. at 178 (stating that the F ish a nd W ildlife Service’s biolog ical opinion “alter [ e d ] the leg al
reg ime” to which the federal ag ency was subject and had the
po we r to preclude the federal a g ency ’s ability to g o forward with its w ater reclamation p r oject); Appalachian Power
, 208 F .3d at 1023 (stating that “throu gh t h e Guidance, EPA has g iven the States their ‘marching orders’”).

Nor does the record support Riverkeeper’s a rg ument that,

as a practical matter, F ERC alway s c o m plies with the Coast Guard’s letter of recommendation, which effectively g ives it the force of law. I n makin g t h i s claim, Riverkeeper relies primarily on the F irst Circuit’s decision in City o f F a ll River

v. FERC
, 507 F .3d 1 (1 s t Cir. 2007). B ut Riverkeeper’s reliance o n Fall River is misplaced because in that case F E RC
g ave the person seeking to construct a n L NG terminal facility

a conditional approval that was subject to the Coast Guard’s approval of a v essel transportation pl a n

. Id. a t 3 –5. Under these circumstances

, the Coast Guard’s approval did have binding effect, because F ERC had the plenary author ity to

ma k e a siting order subject to such a requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 17b(e). B ut nothing in Fall River sug g e sts thatC O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 25

F ERC has a firm inte r n a l p olicy to condition its approval
upon the Coast Guard’s decision, and there is no evidence in the record befor e u s sug g e sting that F ERC h as such an entrenched policy g enerally or imposed such a condition h ere.

Second, we reject Riverk e e p e r’s claim that the Coast Guard’s letter of recommendation will effectively r e gu l ate vessel traffic along the w a t erway after the facility ’s
construct i on. F or this claim, Riverkeeper relies on the captain of the port’s statement in the lette r o f

re c ommendation that “ should an L N G transit be attempted alon g t h i s waterway without full implementation of the risk mitig ation measures” t h e Coast Guard would reference the letter of recommendation’s “deter m i nations, analy sis, a

nd ultimate recommend a tion as to the suitability o f this waterway ” in a “Captain of the Port Order.” On its face, this lang uag e sug g e sts that the Coast G uard intends to prevent the East Skipananon L

NG facility from receiving vessels unless the project proponent complies with the letter’s requirements. B ut the record establishes that the Coast Guard has not taken this position. Most important, the Coast Guard’s fi nal administrative decision, dated Au gu s t 2 5, 2012, states that mitig ation measures in the let t er of r ecommendation are not binding on the captain o f t he port, and that as a practical matter, the Coast Guard d o es n ot and could not reg ulate the waterway s by preventing vessel transit to L NG terminals that failed to obtain an approval letter. I n consider i n g t h e effect of the letter of recommendatio n , w e are bound by the final determinatio n a t t h e hig her level of the ag e ncy

. Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of H

ome Builders v. Defenders of W ildlife

, 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007) (“[ T ]he fact that a preliminary determination by a local ag ency representative is later o verruled at a hig her level w ithin the ag ency d o e s n o t render the d ecisionmaking
process arbitrary and c a

pricious.”); Bechtel v

. Admin. ReviewC O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 26

B d

. , U

. S

. Dep’t o

f Labor

, 710 F

. 3 d 443, 449 (2d Cir. 2013 ) (concluding AL J ’s error was “ b eside the poin t” where the Administrative Review B oard recog niz ed the error a nd

ex p lained that it did n ot affect the case’s outcome). 1 0 According ly

, we conclude that the letter of recommendation is not in practice a final ag e n cy action. 1 1

C

Althoug h the record does not establish that the Coast Guard’s l etter of recommendation is a final ag ency order o r action “to issue, condition, o r d eny a ny permit, license,

c o ncurrence, or approval” required under F ederal law, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1), this does n o t m e an that the Coast Guard’s recommendations are immune from judicial review.

10 T h e Co ast G u ard p ress release an d pu b lic relatio n s d o cu m en ts, w h ich also state th at Oreg o n L

NG m u s t im p lem en t th e risk m itig atio n m easu res in th e Co ast Gu ard ’ s letter of reco m m en d atio n , m erely track th e l an g u ag e

o f th e letter, an d so do n o t p ro v id e an y ad d itio n al s u p p o r t f

or Riv erk eep er’ s in terp retatio n

. T h e A p ril 13
, 2 0 0 9 “ Ex ecu tiv e Brief ”cited in Riv erk eep er’ s rep ly

su f f ers f ro m th e sam e in f

irm ity

.

11 Riv erk eep er p o in ts to tw o o th er d o cu m en ts to su p p o rt its i n terp retatio n

o f th e im p o rt o f th e letter o f reco m m en d atio n , b u t its arg u m e n t s a r e

m eritless. F irst, Riv erk eep er claim s th at lan g u ag e in th e B rad w o o d
p ro j ect’ s f in al en v iro n m en t al im

p act s tatem en t in d icates th at L NG tan k ers

m u st co m p ly w ith m itig atio n m easu res set f o rth in th e Co ast Gu ard ’ s letter

o f reco m m en d atio n

. Ev en i f w e in terp reted th e Brad w o o d en v iro n m en t al d o cu m en ts as Riv erk eep er u rg es, t h e Co ast Gu ard an aly zed th e B rad w o o d
p ro j ect u n d er its p re- EP A ct g u id an ce d o cu m en t (NVIC 0 5

- 0 5 ), w

h ich is

n o lo n g er ap plicab le h ere. Riv erk eep er’ s relian ce o n a May 2 0 0 9 l e t ter f ro m th e Co a s t G u ard to FERC is lik ew i se m isp laced ; t h at letter m erely

ex p lain s t h at th e Co ast G u ard

, n ot FERC, h as j u risd ictio n o v er d esig n an d
eq u ip m en t

req u irem en ts o n v essels. No th in g in th e C o ast Gu ard ’ s letter in d icates th at t

h e ad v i c e c o n t ain ed in a letter o f reco m m en d atio n is b in d in g

.C O L U M B I A R I V E R

K E E P E R V

. U.S. C O A S T G U A R D 27

Rather, any Coast G uard recommendation a dopted b y F E RC in its final order, or any failu r e t o a dopt such a recommendation, wou l d be reviewable under 15 U .S.C. § 7 1 7r(b). I n addition, a ny final orders reg arding ve s s el traffic issued by the Coast Guard pursuant to its o wn independent authority will be subject to judicial review a s final ag e ncy a ction. See, e.g. , W ong v

. Bush

, 542 F .3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering c h a l l eng es to rule establishing security z one); W ilmina S hipping AS v. U

.S. Dep’t of Hom el a n d S

e c. , 9 34 F

. Supp. 2d 1, 4, 19 (D.D.C. 2013) (considering challeng e to a captain of the p ort’s order). B ut because Riverkeeper has not carried its b u r d e n o f showi n g t hat the letter of recommendation for the E a st Skipanon L

NG terminal is a final ag ency orde r o r a c t ion to issue a permit we lack jurisdiction to consider it or the Aug ust 25, 2012 decision affirming the letter.

DISMISSED.