IV

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 9

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to

negotiate a new base rights agreement with the Government of Panama

to permit the United States Armed Forces to remain in Panama beyond

December 31, 1999, and to permit the United States to act independently

to continue to protect the Panama Canal.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. PICKETT submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was

referred to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President

should seek to negotiate a new base rights agreement

with the Government of Panama to permit the United

States Armed Forces to remain in Panama beyond December 31, 1999, and to permit the United States to

act independently to continue to protect the Panama

Canal.

Whereas the Panama Canal is a vital strategic asset to the

United States and its allies;

Whereas the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality

and Operation of the Panama Canal and the Panama

Canal Treaty, both signed on September 7, 1977, mandates that (1) no United States troops are to remain in
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Panama after December 31, 1999; (2) the Canal Zone is

to be incorporated into Panama; (3) United States Panama-based communications facilities are to be phased

out; (4) all United States training in Panama of Latin

American soldiers is to be halted; and (5) management

and operational control of the Canal is to be turned over

to Panamanian authorities;

Whereas the government of President Guillermo Endara has

demonstrated its determination to restore democracy to

Panama by quickly moving to implement changes in the

nation’s political, economic, and judicial systems;

Whereas friendly cooperative relations currently exist between

the United States and the Republic of Panama;

Whereas the region has a history of unstable governments

which pose a threat to the future operation of the Panama Canal, and the United States must have the discretion and the means to defend the Canal and ensure its

continuous operation and availability to the military and

commercial shipping of the United States and its allies

in times of crisis;

Whereas the Panama Canal is vulnerable to disruption and

closure by unforeseen events in Panama, by terrorist

attack, and by air strikes or other attack by foreign

powers;

Whereas the United States fleet depends upon the Panama

Canal for rapid transit ocean to ocean in times of emergency, as demonstrated during World War II, the Korean

War, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the

Persian Gulf War, thereby saving 13,000 miles and three

weeks steaming effort around Cape Horn;
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Whereas the Republic of Panama has dissolved its defense

forces and has no standing army, or other defense forces,

capable of defending the Panama Canal from aggressors

and, therefore, remains vulnerable to attack from both inside and outside of Panama and this may impair or interrupt the operation and accessibility of the Panama Canal;

Whereas the presence of the United States Armed Forces offers the best defense against sabotage or other threat to

the Panama Canal; and

Whereas the 10,000 United States military personnel now

based in the Canal Zone, including the headquarters of

the United States Southern Command, cannot remain

there beyond December 31, 1999, without a new agreement with Panama: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the

3 President should—

4 (1) negotiate a new base rights agreement with

5 the Government of Panama—

6 (A) to allow the permanent stationing of

7 United States military forces in Panama beyond

8 December 31, 1999, and

9 (B) to ensure that the United States will

10 be able to act independently after December 31,

11 1999, to maintain the security of the Panama

12 Canal and to guarantee its regular operation;

13 and
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1 (2) consult with the Congress throughout the

2 negotiations described in paragraph (1).

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