alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 301
Editorial Note: In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations. References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

§ 301.7507-4 Unsegregated assets. ( a ) *Depositors' claims against assets.* ( 1 ) Claims of depositors, to the extent that they are to be satisfied out of segregated assets, will not be considered in determining the availability of unsegregated assets for tax collection. If depositors have agreed to accept payment out of segregated assets only, collection of tax from unsegregated assets will not diminish the assets available and necessary for payment of the depositors' claims. Thus, it may be possible to collect taxes from the unsegregated assets of a bank although the segregated assets are immune under the section.
( 2 ) If the unsegregated assets of the bank are subject to any portion of the depositors' claims, such unsegregated assets will be within the immunity of the section only to the extent necessary to satisfy the claims to which such assets are subject. Taxes will still be collectible from the unsegregated assets to the extent of the amount by which the total value of such assets exceeds the liability to depositors to be satisfied therefrom. Therefore, if, for example, in the case of a bank having a tax liability, not previously immune under the section, of $50,000, the deposit claims against the bank are in the amount of $75,000, and the assets available for satisfaction of deposit claims amount to $100,000, the $50,000 tax is collectible to the extent of the $25,000 excess of assets over deposit claims. Collection is not to be postponed until the full amount of the tax is collectible.
( b ) *Depositors' claims against earnings.* Even though under a bona fide agreement a bank has been released from depositors' claims as to unsegregated assets, if all or a portion of its earnings are subject to depositors' claims, all assets the earnings from which, in whole or part, are charged with the payment of depositors' claims, will be immune from tax collection. But see paragraph (a) of § 301.7507-5.
#### § 101.1 Purpose and scope.

The purpose of this part is to establish a policy whereby certain purchasers or holders of gold coins who have forfeited them to the United States because they were counterfeit may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, recover the gold bullion from the coins. This part sets forth the procedures to be followed in implementing this policy.
www.gpo.gov

### §262g–2. Establishment of guidelines for international financial institutions

#### (a) Consultation with representatives of member countries

The Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with representatives of other member countries of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the African Development Bank (if the United States becomes a member of that Bank), for the purpose of establishing guidelines within each of those institutions which specify that, in a manner consistent with the purposes and charters of those institutions, a specified proportion of the annual lending by each institution shall be designed to benefit needy people, primarily by financing sound, efficient, productive, self-sustaining projects designed to benefit needy people in developing countries, thus helping poor people improve their conditions of life.

#### (b) Congressional findings regarding implementation of objectives

The Congress finds that projects to construct basic infrastructure, to expand productive capacity (including private enterprise), and to address social problems can all meet the objectives of this section if they are designed and implemented properly. For the purposes of this title, “needy people” means those people living in “absolute” or “relative” poverty as determined under the standards employed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association.

(Pub. L. 95–118, title XI, §1102, as added Pub. L. 97–35, title XIII, §1361(b), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 745.)

#### References in Text

This title, referred to in subsec. (b), is title XI (§§1101–1103) of Pub. L. 95–118, as added by Pub. L. 97–35, title XIII, §1361(b), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 745, which enacted sections 262g–1 and 262g–2 of this title and enacted a provision set out as a note below. For complete classification of title XI to the Code, see Tables.

#### Effective Date

Section effective Aug. 13, 1981, see section 1372 of Pub. L. 97–35, set out as a note under section 290i of this title.

#### Reports to Congress

Section 1103 of Pub. L. 95–118, as added by Pub. L. 97–35, title XIII, §1361(b), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 746, required reports on the progress being made toward achieving the goals of this section, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 101–240, title V, §541(d)(4), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2518.
§ 53.4965-2 Covered tax-exempt entities. ( a ) *In general.* Under section 4965(c), the term “tax-exempt entity” refers to entities that are described in sections 501(c), 501(d), or 170(c) (other than the United States), Indian tribal governments (within the meaning of section 7701(a)(40)), and tax-qualified pension plans, individual retirement arrangements and similar tax-favored savings arrangements that are described in sections 4979(e)(1), (2) or (3), 529, 457(b), or 4973(a). The tax-exempt entities referred to in section 4965(c) are divided into two broad categories, non-plan entities and plan entities.
( b ) *Non-plan entities.* Non-plan entities are— ( 1 ) Entities described in section 501(c);
( 2 ) Religious or apostolic associations or corporations described in section 501(d);
( 3 ) Entities described in section 170(c), including states, possessions of the United States, the District of Columbia, political subdivisions of states and political subdivisions of possessions of the United States (but not including the United States); and
( 4 ) Indian tribal governments within the meaning of section 7701(a)(40).
( c ) *Plan entities.* Plan entities are— ( 1 ) Entities described in section 4979(e)(1) (qualified plans under section 401(a), including qualified cash or deferred arrangements under section 401(k) (including a section 401(k) plan that allows designated Roth contributions));
( 2 ) Entities described in section 4979(e)(2) (annuity plans described in section 403(a));
( 3 ) Entities described in section 4979(e)(3) (annuity contracts described in section 403(b), including a section 403(b) arrangement that allows Roth contributions);
( 4 ) Qualified tuition programs described in section 529;
( 5 ) Eligible deferred compensation plans under section 457(b) that are maintained by a governmental employer as defined in section 457(e)(1)(A);
( 6 ) Arrangements described in section 4973(a) which include— ( i ) Individual retirement plans defined in section 408(a) and (b), including— ( A ) Simplified employee pensions (SEPs) under section 408(k);
( B ) Simple individual retirement accounts (SIMPLEs) under section 408(p);
( C ) Deemed individual retirement accounts or annuities (IRAs) qualified under a qualified plan (deemed IRAs) under section 408(q); and
( D ) Roth IRAs under section 408A.
( ii ) Arrangements described in section 220(d) (Archer Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs));
( iii ) Arrangements described in section 403(b)(7) (custodial accounts treated as annuity contracts);
( iv ) Arrangements described in section 530 (Coverdell education savings accounts); and
( v ) Arrangements described in section 223(d) (health savings accounts (HSAs)).
( d ) *Effective/applicability dates.* See § 53.4965-9 for the discussion of the relevant effective and applicability dates.
[T.D. 9492, 75 FR 38702, July 6, 2010; 75 FR 46844, Aug. 4, 2010]
III

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 41

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 16, 1995

Received

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Providing for an adjournment of the House from Thursday,

March 16, 1995, to Tuesday, March 21, 1995.

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That when the House adjourns on Thursday,

3 March 16, 1995, it stand adjourned until 12:30 p.m. on

4 Tuesday, March 21, 1995.

Passed the House of Representatives March 16,

1995.

Attest: ROBIN H. CARLE,

Clerk.
§ 31.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers. ( a ) *In general.* A person that employs one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code, other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the recordkeeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in § 1.6060-1 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78453, Dec. 22, 2008]
§ 31.3306(c)(14)-1 Services of insurance agent or solicitor. ( a ) Services performed for a person by an employee as an insurance agent or insurance solicitor are excepted from employment, if all such services performed for such person by such individual are performed for remuneration solely by way of commission.
( b ) If all or any part of the remuneration of an employee for services performed as an insurance agent or insurance solicitor for a person is a salary, none of his services performed as an insurance agent or insurance solicitor for such person are excepted from employment, and his total remuneration (for example, salary, or salary and commissions) for such services is included for purposes of computing the tax.
§ 48.6420-5 Applicable laws. ( a ) *Penalties, excessive claims, etc.* All provisions of law, including penalties, applicable in respect of the tax imposed by section 4081 shall, to the extent applicable and consistent with section 6420, apply in respect of the payments provided for in section 6420 to the same extent as if these payments were refunds of overpayments of the tax imposed on the sale of gasoline under section 4081. For special rules applicable to the assessment and collection of amounts constituting excessive payments under section 6420, see section 6206 and the regulations thereunder. For the civil penalty assessable in the case of excessive claims under section 6420, see section 6675 and the regulations thereunder. For the treatment as an overpayment of an amount allowable as an excessive credit under section 39 with respect to amounts payable under section 6420, see section 6401(b).
( b ) *Examination of books and witnesses.* For the purpose of ascertaining ( 1 ) the correctness of any claim made under section 6420 or
( 2 ) the correctness of any credit or payment made in respect of the claim, the Commissioner shall have the same authority granted by paragraphs (1), (2), and
( 3 ) of section 7602, relating to examination of books and witnesses, as if the person claiming credit or payment under section 6420 were the person liable for tax.
( c ) *Fractional part of a dollar.* Section 6420(e)(3) provides that section 7504, relating to fractional parts of a dollar, shall not apply with respect to the allowance of any amount as a credit or payment under section 6420. Accordingly, credits or payments authorized by section 6420 shall be made in the exact amount to which the claimant is entitled and shall not be rounded to the nearest whole dollar amount.
[T.D. 8043, 50 FR 32038, Aug. 8, 1985]
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 110 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 110

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
  Providing for the appointment of Howard H. Baker, Jr. as a citizen 
     regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That, in accordance with 
section 5581 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (20 U.S.C. 
43), the vacancy on the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian 
Institution, in the class other than Members of Congress, occurring by 
reason of the expiration of the term of Jeannine Smith Clark of the 
District of Columbia on August 25, 1995, is filled by the appointment 
of Howard H. Baker, Jr. of the District of Columbia. The appointment is 
for a term of six years and shall take effect on the date on which this 
joint resolution becomes law.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 7, 1995.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
104th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                             H. J. RES. 110

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

  Providing for the appointment of Howard H. Baker, Jr. as a citizen 
     regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.
```
#### In the Matter of M.S.B.A. Corp., Doing Business as Turquoise, Respondent, v Marcia Markowitz et al., Appellants.

[806 NYS2d 77]

In a proceeding pursuant to CFLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent City of Long Beach which denied the petitioner’s application to renew its mercantile license, Marcia Markowitz, as City Clerk of the City of Long Beach, Glen L. Spiritis, as City Manager of the City of Long Beach, and the City of Long Beach appeal (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feinman, J.), entered August 9, 2004, which annulled the determination and (2), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the same court dated December 7, 2004, as granted the petitioner’s cross motion to hold them in contempt to the extent of directing a hearing on their alleged violation of the judgment.

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from the order is deemed to be an application for leave to ap*391peal, and. leave to appeal is granted *(see*CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits; and it is further,

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and the cross motion is denied; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the appellants.

A hearing is required only where a license is to be suspended or revoked and, as case law makes clear, due process does not mandate such a hearing before the denial of a renewal license *(see Matter of Benvenuto v Suffolk County Dept. of Consumer Affairs,*144 AD2d 455, 456 [1988]; *Matter of Active Appliance Corp. v County of Suffolk,*251 AD2d 659 [1998]; *Matter of Richard I, Inc. v Ambach,*90 AD2d 127, 130 [1982], *affd*61 NY2d 784 [1984], *cert denied*469 US 822 [1984]). The appellants’ denial of the petitioner’s application is supported by a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious *(see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,*34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]; *Matter of Wallfor, Inc. v Eaton,*127 AD2d 838, *840*[1987]).

Moreover, it was error for the Supreme Court to grant the petitioner’s cross motion to hold the appellants in contempt to the extent of directing a hearing on their alleged violation of the judgment. The provisions of the judgment directing the appellants to issue a license to the petitioner were automatically stayed upon the appellants’ filing of a notice of appeal *(see*CPLR 5519 [a] [1] ; *Matter of Lombardi v Habicht,*293 AD2d 476, 477 [2002]) which precluded the petitioner from maintaining a contempt proceeding against the appellants during the pendency of this appeal *(see Matter of Hicks v Schoetz,*261 AD2d 944, 945 [1999]). Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Covello, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Kendricks, Appellant.

[805 NYS2d 212]

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John J. Connell, J.), rendered February 7, 2003. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, following a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 220.09 [1]). We reject his contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see *generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). At trial, defendant contended only that accomplice liability should not be charged because that theory was not alleged in the indictment, and thus defendant failed to preserve for our review his present contention that County Court erred in instructing the jury with respect to accomplice liability because the evidence did not support such a charge *(see generally People v Balls,*69 NY2d 641 [1986]). In any event, that contention lacks merit. The evidence at trial was sufficient to establish that defendant “solicit[ed], requested], commanded] . . . [or] importun[ed]” the passenger in his vehicle to take possession of the cocaine later recovered by the police from her (Penal Law § 20.00; *see People v Rosario,*277 AD2d 943, 944 [2000], *affd*96 NY2d 857 [2001]). Defendant also failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in refusing to suppress the drugs seized from him *(see People v Vasquez,*66 NY2d 968, 970 [1985], *cert denied*475 US 1109 [1986]; *People v Mitchell,*303 AD2d 422, 423 [2003], *lv denied*
      *1120100 NY2d 564 [2003]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Kehoe, J.P., Martoche, Pine, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
39016.

#### PERRY v. THE STATE.

Decided September 15, 1961.

*384
      *Phillip Sheffield,*for plaintiff in error.

*Joe M. Ray, Solicitor-General,*contra.

Jordan, Judge.

As stated in *Fallon v. State,*5 Ga. App. 659 (1) (63 SE 806): “A person is guilty of the statutory offense of shooting at another when he, without justification, shoots at another, without the intention of committing murder; and this lack of intention to commit murder may exist from the fact that he shot without any specific intent to kill, or from the fact that if death had ensued from the wound, the homicide, under circumstances surrounding it, would not have been murder, but would have been manslaughter in one of its grades, (a) If death ensues from a wound inflicted by a deadly weapon used in a deadly manner, the law presumes that the person killing was possessed of a specific intention to kill; but if death does, not ensue, there is no such presumption, (b) If it appears that the defendant maliciously shot the prosecutor, it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether he is guilty of assault with intent to murder, in that he intended to kill, or guilty of the statutory offense of shooting at another, in that he intended to inflict a lesser injury.”

“The offense of shooting at another may be committed by a defendant who is acting under fears, although they are not.the fears of a reasonable man as defined in *Code*§ 26-1012, and that an unreasonable or delusory fear, while not that of a reasonable man and therefore not sufficient to constitute justification, may negative the idea of malicious and intentional wrongdoing. The effect of such finding on the part of a jury would be acquittal of the charge of assault with intent to murder, since the element of *385malicious intent to kill would not be present.” *Saylor v. State,*93 Ga. App. 895, 898 (93 SE2d 196). “While a conviction of the offense of shooting at another is not legal where the evidence as a whole shows that the defendant deliberately shot the prosecutor, either maliciously or else justifiably, yet this is not true where, under any phase of the evidence, a shooting unlawful but not malicious can be inferred.” *Chester v. State,*3 Ga. App. 332 (59 SE 843).

Under the defendant’s statement and the evidence adduced in his behalf, the jury was clearly authorized to find that the defendant shot Tommy Styles without justification and without the intention of committing murder. Accordingly, the verdict is amply supported by the evidence, and the trial judge did not err in denying the motion for new trial on the general grounds.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Townsend, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
exv10w72



 





Exhibit 10.72




NELNET, INC.

AMENDED SHARE RETENTION POLICY

(Effective 3/29/2005)





	1.	 	COVERED OFFICERS





     This Nelnet, Inc. Share Retention Policy applies to all of the Executive Officers of Nelnet,
Inc. (“Nelnet”) as designated by the Board of Directors of Nelnet from time to time (the “Covered
Officers”).




	2.	 	SHARE RETENTION REQUIREMENTS





     No Covered Officer may sell or dispose of a number of shares of Nelnet common stock in
any calendar year in excess of one-third of the number of shares of Nelnet common stock
beneficially owned by the Covered Officer on the first day of the calendar year. The share
retention requirements under this policy apply to Covered Officers during and following their
employment by Nelnet; provided, however, that after five years from the closing date of Nelnet’s
initial public offering, Covered Officers will be free to sell or otherwise dispose of all or any
of their shares of Nelnet common stock.




	3.	 	EXCEPTIONS





          The following exceptions apply to the Share Retention Policy set forth above:




          (a) Transfers to family members and family-owned partnerships or other family-owned entities
will not be prohibited, so long as such transfers are effected only for estate planning purposes
and the transferee(s) agrees to comply with this Share Retention Policy (treating the transferee(s)
as the transferring Covered Officer).




          (b) Any Covered Officer may sell or otherwise dispose of up to five million dollars
($5,000,000) in value of shares of Nelnet common stock during any calendar year.




          (c) All restrictions under the Share Retention Policy shall cease in the event of the death or
retirement at normal retirement age of a Covered Officer. For this purpose normal retirement age
means age 65.




ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND AGREEMENT




     I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand this Nelnet, Inc. Share Retention
Policy, and I hereby agree to be bound by such policy both during my employment with Nelnet and
following my employment, in accordance with the terms set forth above.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Signature	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Printed Name	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Date