alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[801 NYS2d 579]

#### In the Matter of Sophia A. Sedlis (Admitted as Sophia Anna Sedlis), an Attorney, Respondent. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner.

First Department,

September 29, 2005

*2APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Thomas J. Cahill, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee,*New York City *(Vitaly Lipkansky*of counsel), for petitioner.

*Mischel, Neuman & Horn (Richard Mischel*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Respondent Sophia A. Sedlis was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on October 18, 1993, under the name Sophia Anna Sedlis. At all times relevant to these proceedings, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.

Respondent has submitted her resignation. The Departmental Disciplinary Committee now moves for an order pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.11 accepting respondent’s resignation and striking her name from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice law in the State of New York.

Respondent’s affidavit of resignation, dated June 9, 2005, fully conforms to the requirements of 22 NYCRR 603.11. She acknowledges that there is a pending disciplinary investigation against her, centering around her escrow account, which she closed in 1999. Respondent submitted her bank records to the Committee, which show that during 1998-1999, she allowed nonattorneys working in her office to make deposits and withdrawals from her escrow account without her oversight. She acknowledges that it was her duty to safeguard these funds, and that she is responsible for their misappropriation. While re*3spondent was unaware of, and did not personally benefit from the misconduct, the Committee’s accounting reveals that approximately $171,887.70 was disbursed from the account, an amount in excess of the deposits made during the time period in question.

Respondent acknowledges that if formal disciplinary charges were brought against her, she could not successfully defend herself. She also sets forth that her resignation is freely and voluntarily rendered, she is not being subject to coercion or duress, she is represented by counsel and has consulted with him as to her resignation, and is aware of the implications of submitting her resignation. Respondent states that she has closed her office, does not have any of her own clients, and is currently working on a per diem basis. The Committee adds that there are no outstanding claims against the respondent and there are currently no claims against her pending before the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection.

Accordingly, as the proffered resignation complies with all pertinent Court rules, the motion should be granted, respondent’s resignation accepted, and her name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law in the State of New York.

Buckley, P.J., Tom, Mazzarelli, Saxe and Friedman, JJ., concur.

Respondent’s resignation accepted and her name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, nunc pro tunc to June 9, 2005.
#### Elena Vichnevskaia et al., Appellants, v 200 West 86th Apartment Corp., Respondent.

[806 NYS2d 474]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold B. Beeler, J., and a jury), entered August 23, 2004, dismissing the complaint in an action for personal injuries sustained in a fall on steps leading out of defendant’s building, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered on or about July 20, 2004, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the aforesaid judgment.

The jury’s finding that defendant was negligent in its maintenance of the steps but that such negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs fall is supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence *(see Ohdan v City of New York,*268 AD2d 86, 88-89 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 769 [2000]), including plaintiffs expert’s testimony that he could not say which one or combination of the six separate defects he found on the steps caused plaintiff to fall, and indeed that it was possible that none of the defects caused the fall. Tending to support the latter possibility was plaintiffs testimony that she did not know what caused her to fall, and was hurrying and looking not at the steps but *315forward. Given this latter testimony, the trial court properly permitted defendant’s attorney to cross-examine plaintiff’s expert as to the possibility that the fall was caused not by one or more of the six defects he had identified, but by plaintiffs own misstep *(cf. Bitterman v Grotyohann,*295 AD2d 383 [2002]). The trial court correctly ruled that sections 153 and 154 of the 1916 Building Code, claimed by plaintiff to be the applicable code, do not require that the steps in question have handrails. In any event, even if the lack of handrails were the defect, or one of the defects, found by the jury, the jury could also have fairly found that handrails would not have prevented the fall, given its sudden nature and backward direction. We have considered plaintiff’s other arguments and find them to be unavailing. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sullivan, Nardelli, Williams and Sweeny, JJ.
| (logo) WELLS  FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

** **

** **

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

** **

Referenceis hereby made to that certain Trust and Servicing Agreement dated as of August6, 2016, by and among DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE & ASSET RECEIVING CORPORATION,asDepositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, AEGONUSA REALTY ADVISORS, LLC, as Special Servicer, WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,as Trustee, and WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, asCertificateAdministrator, Paying Agent and Custodian with respect to Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates, Hudson Yards 2016-10HY Mortgage Trust (the"Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise definedshall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuantto Section 11.07 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice Presidentof Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.       Areview of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and

 

2.       Tothe best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer hasfulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28thday of February 2018.

 

/s/Daniel Bober

DanielBober

ExecutiveVice President 

WellsFargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank,  N.A. | (logo)  Together we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.25

                                FOURTH AMENDMENT
                                       TO
       THE ST. JOE COMPANY 1999 EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN ("JOESHARE")

      This FOURTH AMENDMENT (the "Amendment") to The St. Joe Company 1999
Employee Stock Purchase Plan (the "Plan") is made pursuant to Sections 4 and 15
thereof, and shall be effective January 1, 2004.

      Section 14 is hereby amended in full to read as follows:

      "14. RETIREMENT, TERMINATION AND DEATH. In the event of a Participant's
      retirement, termination of active employment, or death, certificates will
      be issued or shares will be sold as provided in Section 11, provided,
      however, that the Company may adopt deadlines for any such elections to be
      made and default procedures. In the event of a Participant's death, the
      beneficiary designated by the Participant in a writing filed with the
      Company shall have the rights described above. If a named beneficiary does
      not survive the Participant, such beneficiary's share shall be delivered
      as described above to the Participant's remaining named beneficiaries
      according to their percentages. If there are no surviving beneficiaries or
      the Participant has not designated a beneficiary under this Plan, the
      Participant's Investment Account shall be delivered as described above to
      the Participant's surviving spouse; or if there is no surviving eligible
      spouse, in equal shares to any surviving children of the Participant; or
      if neither of the above survive the Participant, to the Participant's
      estate."

Except as expressly modified by this Amendment, the terms, provisions, and
conditions of the Plan shall remain unchanged and are hereby ratified and
confirmed as being in full force and effect.

Executed as of this 31st day of December, 2003, by the duly authorized officer
of the Company.

                                               THE ST. JOE COMPANY

                                               By: /s/ Rachelle Gottlieb
                                                   -----------------------------
                                               Rachelle Gottlieb
                                               Vice President - Human Resources
#### Neil B. Webb et al., Respondents, v Torrington Industries, Inc., Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[803 NYS2d 487]

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Oswego County (James W. McCarthy, J.), entered June 14, 2004 in a breach of contract action. The order and judgment awarded plaintiffs additional security.

It is hereby ordered that the order and judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs for the reasons stated at Supreme Court. Present—Kehoe, J.P., Martoche, Pine, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-7216

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

WESLEY HODGE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief

District Judge. (CR-96-54-BO, CA-99-178-4-BO)

Submitted: January 14, 2002 Decided: February 4, 2002

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Wesley Hodge, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* We note that the district court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Hodge’s motions to amend his § 2255 motion as such

amendments would have been futile. See United States v. Pittman,

209 F.3d 314, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2000), and United States v. Sanders,

247 F.3d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 2001).

2

PER CURIAM:

Wesley Hodge seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001).

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.* See United States v. Hodge, Nos. CR-96-54-BO, CA-99-

178-4-BO (E.D.N.C. June 14, 2001). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D22-712

_____________________________

KENNETH LAND,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON 

OFFENDER REVIEW,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

September 23, 2022

PER CURIAM.

The Court denies the petition for writ of certiorari on the 

merits. 

KELSEY, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Kenneth Land, pro se, Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.
#### § 7.465-3 Allocation of loss for different taxable years.

If the taxable year of the entity conducting the activity differs from that of the taxpayer, the loss attributable to the activity for the first taxable year of the entity ending after the beginning of the first taxable year of the taxpayer beginning after December 31, 1975, shall be allocated in the following manner. That portion of the loss from the activity for such taxable year of the entity which bears the same ratio as the number of days in such taxable year before January 1, 1976, divided by the total number of days in the taxable year, shall be attributable to taxable years of the taxpayer beginning before January 1, 1976. Consequently, that portion shall be treated in accordance with § 7.465-2.

[T.D. 7504, 42 FR 42198, Aug. 22, 1977]
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 72 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 72

 Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States with 
                     respect to the right to life.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 1, 1995

   Mr. Oberstar (for himself, Mr. Burton, Mr. Lipinski, Mr. Young of 
  Alaska, and Mr. Smith of New Jersey) introduced the following joint 
    resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
 Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States with 
                     respect to the right to life.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein, That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be valid only if 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years after the date of final passage of this joint 
resolution:

                              ``Article--

    ``Section 1. With respect to the right to life, the word `person' 
as used in this article and in the fifth and fourteenth articles of 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies to all human 
beings irrespective of age, health, function, or condition of 
dependency, including their unborn offspring at every stage of their 
biological development.
    ``Section 2. No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any 
person: Provided, however, That nothing in this article shall prohibit 
a law permitting only those medical procedures required to prevent the 
death of the mother.
    ``Section 3. The Congress and the several States shall have power 
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.''.
                                 <all>
```
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

DAVID PILAR RODRIGUEZ,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 16

- 00112

- CR

Appeal from

120th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC # 20140D01101 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David Pilar Rodriguez attempts to appeal his conviction of indecency with a child,

enhanced by two prior felony convictions

. A ppellant waived his right to a jury and entered a

negotiated guilty plea

. The trial court followed the plea bargain and assessed Appellant’s

punishme nt in accordance with the plea agreement at imprisonment for a term of forty years.

We dismiss the appeal because the trial court’s certification reflects that Appellant waived his

right to appeal.

An appeal must be dismissed unless a trial court ’ s ce rtification showing that the

defendant has the right of appeal has been made part of the record. T EX .R.A PP .P. 25.2(d). The

trial court’s certification states that “ the defendant has waived the right of appeal

. ” We notified

A ppellant ’s counsel that the trial court's certification showed that Appellant waived his right of

appeal and asked him to file a response. Counsel filed a detailed response explaining that- 2

-

Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea and waived the right of appeal . We have r evie wed the

record and find that the record supports the trial court’s certification that Appellant waived the

right of appeal. Consequently, we are required to dismiss this appeal. See T EX .R.A PP

. P. 25.2(d);

Chavez v. State , 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex.Crim .App. 2006). The appeal is dismissed.

January 25, 2017

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.

Hughes, J., not participating

(Do Not Publish)
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30439 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus GLENN METZ, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 92-469

- - - - - - - - - - April 2, 1998 Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Glenn Metz, federal inmate #28118-048, appeals the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion requesting the return of property. We have carefully reviewed the arguments and appellate record. We construe his Rule 41(e) motion as a civil complaint seeking equitable relief and treat the district court’s denial of the motion as a summary judgment. See United States v. Robinson , 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996). We conclude that Metz failed to meet his summary-judgment burden inNo. 97-30439 -2- demonstrating ownership of specified property. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
   PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

     The undersigned Chief Financial Officer of First Keystone Financial, Inc.
(the "Registrant") hereby certify that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Registrant.

                                                 /s/ Rose M. DiMarco
                                                 -------------------------------
                                                 Name: Rose M. DiMarco
                                                 Title: Chief Financial Officer

Date: August 13, 2004

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been provided to First Keystone Financial, Inc. and will
be retained by First Keystone Financial, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### In the Matter of Shelly L. Bjork, Appellant, v Erik T. Bjork, Respondent.

[803 NYS2d 759]

Spain, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of St. Lawrence County (Potter, J.), entered June 1, 2004, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody.

*785The parties were divorced in 1999 and have one child, born in 1996. In 2001, respondent successfully moved to modify the judgment of divorce and secured sole legal custody of the child following a hearing during which several witnesses testified as to petitioner’s financial instability and parental unfitness. Thereafter, petitioner commenced a proceeding seeking to modify the custody order, alleging that respondent intended to relocate downstate due to downsizing at his present place of employment, leaving the child in the custody of his fiancée. Family Court dismissed the petition without a hearing, prompting this appeal.

During the pendency of this appeal, petitioner commenced another modification proceeding, alleging essentially the same facts as the petition before us. Although that petition was also summarily dismissed without prejudice by Family Court, we decline respondent’s invitation to treat the instant appeal as moot under the particular circumstances presented *(see Matter of Shaw v Antes,*274 AD2d 679, 681 [2000]; *compare Matter of Laurie BB. v Larry BB.,*280 AD2d 709, 710 [2001]; *Matter of Coakley v Sanders,*247 AD2d 648 [1998]).

Turning to the merits, we disagree with petitioner’s contention that she demonstrated a change in circumstances in her petition and supporting papers sufficient to warrant a hearing on the matter. “A petition to modify an existing custody arrangement must allege facts which, if established, would afford a basis for relief” and “the party seeking such a modification must make a sufficient evidentiary showing in order to warrant a hearing” *(Matter of Bryant-Bosshold v Bosshold,*273 AD2d 717, 718 [2000] [citations omitted]). That evidentiary showing must indicate “changed circumstances demonstrating a real need for a change to ensure the child’s best interest” *(Matter of Oddy v Oddy,*296 AD2d 616, 617 [2002]).

Here, petitioner’s remote, conclusory and unsubstantiated allegation that respondent may soon relocate does not constitute changed circumstances evidencing any infirmity in the present custody arrangement *(see Matter of Audrey K. v Carolyn L.,*294 AD2d 624, 625 [2002]; *Matter of Brennan v Anesi,*279 AD2d 840, 841 [2001]). Nor are we persuaded that petitioner’s additional assertion that her relationship with the child has improved since respondent was awarded custody compels a finding that the child’s welfare will be substantially enhanced in her custody. As petitioner has therefore not made the required evidentiary proffer, no hearing was required and Family Court’s dismissal of the petition upon consideration of petitioner’s papers alone was proper.

*786Mercure, J.P., Peters, Mugglin and. Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Krupp Government Income Trust (the
"Trust") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter
F. Donovan, Chief Executive Officer of the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Trust as of March 31, 2004 (the last date of the period
            covered by the Report).


/s/ Peter F. Donovan
-------------------------
Peter F. Donovan,
Chief Executive Officer

Date: May 5, 2004


                                      -15-