2015 IL App (3d) 140369

Opinion filed April 1, 2015

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2015

THE COUNTY OF TAZEWELL AND 

TAZEWELL COUNTY SHERIFF, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ILLINOIS FRATERNAL ORDER OF 

POLICE LABOR COUNCIL,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Tazewell County, Illinois.

Appeal No. 3-14-0369

Circuit No. 13-L-68

The Honorable

Paul P. Gilfillan,

Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Holdridge and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.

______________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, the County of Tazewell and the Tazewell County sheriff (collectively, the 

Employer), brought an action in the trial court to vacate an arbitrator's decision sustaining a 

grievance that defendant, the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (the Union), had 

filed over the creation of two non-bargaining-unit supervisory positions within the county 

sheriff's department. The trial court upheld the arbitrator's decision, sustaining the union's 

grievance. The Employer appeals. We affirm the trial court's judgment. 

¶ 2 FACTS
2

¶ 3 The material facts in this case are not in dispute. The Union represented certain 

employees of the corrections division of the county sheriff's department. As the representative of 

those employees, the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Employer. 

The agreement addressed several different subject areas, including the scope of coverage, the 

creation of new positions, and the grievance procedure. As to the scope of coverage, the 

collective bargaining agreement provided:

"ARTICLE 1 – RECOGNITION

Section 1.1 – Unit Description

The Employer hereby recognizes [the Union] as the sole and exclusive 

collective bargaining representative for the purpose of collective bargaining on 

any and all matters relating to wages, hours, and all other provisions of this 

Agreement of employment of all officers in the bargaining unit. The bargaining 

unit shall include:

All correction officers below the rank of Jail Superintendent.

Exclusions: All other Employees of the Tazewell County Sheriff's 

Department and any others excluded by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. 

[Citations].

Section 1.2 – Supervisors

Non-bargaining unit Supervisors may continue to perform bargaining unit 

work. Such work by supervisors shall not cause any layoff of the bargaining unit 

employees."1

 1 The actual formatting of the agreement has been changed in some instances to aid the reader.
3

Regarding the creation of new positions, of relevance to this appeal, the collective bargaining 

agreement provided:

"ARTICLE 2 – MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

Except as specifically limited by the express provisions of this Agreement, 

the Employer retains traditional rights to manage all affairs of the Sheriff's Office, 

as well as those rights set forth in the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. Such 

management rights shall include, but are not limited to, the following:

A. to plan, direct, control and determine all operations and services of 

the County Sheriff's Office;

***

C. to establish the qualifications for employment and to decide which 

applicants will be employed;

***

E. to hire, promote, transfer, schedule and assign employees to 

positions and to create, combine, modify and eliminate positions within the 

County Sheriff's Office;

* * *

I. to maintain efficiency of County Sheriff's Office operations and 

services;

J. to determine methods, means, organization and number of 

personnel by which such operations and services shall be provided[.]"

Finally, as to the grievance procedure, of relevance to this appeal, the collective bargaining 

agreement provided:
4

"ARTICLE 11 – DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

* * *

Section 11.5 – Time Limitations

Grievances may be withdrawn at any step of the grievance procedure 

without precedent. Grievances not appealed within the designated time limits will 

be treated as withdrawn grievances with prejudice.

The Employer's failure to respond within the time limits shall not find in 

favor of the grievant, but shall automatically advance the grievance to the next 

step, except Step 2; however, in no case shall the time between Step 2 and Step 3 

exceed forty-five (45) days. Time limits may be extended by mutual agreement.

* * *

Section 11.8 – Steps in Procedure

Disputes arising under this Agreement shall be resolved as follows:

Step 1. If no agreement is reached between the employee and the 

Supervisor, as provided in Section 11.2 – Dispute Resolution, the grievant may 

prepare a written grievance on a form mutually agreed to (see Grievance Form 

Appendix B) and present the same to the Jail Superintendent which shall not be 

more than fifteen (15) business days from the date of the event or occurrence 

giving rise to the grievance regardless of the limitation periods provided for in 

Section 11.2. The Jail Superintendent will respond to [the Union] Rep or the 

employee in writing within five (5) business days."

The agreement further provided that the question of arbitrability was to be decided by the 

arbitrator; that the decision of the arbitrator was final and binding upon the Employer, the Union, 
5

and the employees involved; and that the arbitrator had "no power to amend, modify, nullify, 

ignore, add to or subtract from the provisions of the Agreement."

¶ 4 In early October 2011, the sheriff notified all of the department's correctional employees 

that he was considering establishing one or more non-bargaining-unit supervisory positions and

that he was requesting that anyone who wanted to apply for the positions do so in writing by a

certain date later that month. Eventually, two such positions were created, assistant/deputy jail 

superintendent (AJS) and jail operations supervisor (JOS). Both of the positions were below the 

rank of jail superintendent. The sheriff believed, after consulting with the county board, the 

State's Attorney's office, and with his own attorney, that he had the authority under the collective 

bargaining agreement to create the two new positions and to do so as non-bargaining-unit 

supervisory positions. By resolution of the county board, the county approved the creation of, 

and the hiring for, the two new positions. Several people applied for the positions from within 

the department, and five of the department's current employees were promoted to the positions 

(one as AJS and four as JOSs, one or more for each work shift). The positions took effect on 

January 29, 2012. Because the positions were created as non-bargaining-unit positions, union 

dues were not deducted from the five employees' paychecks. 

¶ 5 On March 6, 2012, the Union filed a grievance claiming that the sheriff had failed to 

recognize the two new positions as being in the bargaining unit and had failed to collect union 

dues from those five employees. The specific grievance procedure, which required that the 

grievance be filed with the jail superintendent within 15 days of the event that gave rise to the 

grievance and that the jail superintendent respond within 5 days, was not followed. Instead, 

based upon previous instructions from the sheriff and the informal practice of the parties, the 

Union sent a copy of the grievance to the sheriff's attorney.
6

¶ 6 The grievance proceeded to arbitration in April 2013. Before the arbitrator, the Employer 

argued, among other things, that the grievance should be dismissed or rejected because it was not 

timely filed. The Employer also argued that under the agreement, the sheriff had the power to 

create the positions in question and to do so as non-bargaining-unit positions. The Union 

disagreed. After considering the evidence presented, the arbitrator found that the Employer had 

waived its claim that the grievance had not been timely filed because the Employer did not raise 

that claim prior to the arbitration hearing. The arbitrator found further that any failure by the 

Union to strictly follow the grievance procedure did not deprive the arbitrator of jurisdiction to 

rule on the matters presented for arbitration. In reaching those conclusions, the arbitrator stated 

in the written order:

"The Employers' first arbitrability objection is that the grievance was not 

filed in a timely manner. Arbitrators disagree over whether a failure to raise a 

timeliness objection prior to the arbitration hearing waives the objection. See 

Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 5-11 (7th ed. Kenneth May ed. 2012) 

(observing that under such circumstances 'some arbitrators hold that the party 

waives the objection'). Cleveland Transit Auth., 99 LA 75 (Feldman 1992), cited 

by the Employers, exemplifies the view that a party may raise a timeliness 

objection for the first time at the hearing. In Cleveland Transit, Marvin Feldman, 

a highly respected member of the National Academy of Arbitrators, opined that 

compliance with contractual time limits is a jurisdictional requirement and, 

accordingly, may be raised at any time.

Throughout my career as an arbitrator, I have adhered to the opposite 

view. Absent evidence that the parties intend compliance with contractual time 
7

limits as a jurisdictional requirement, I have consistently held that contractual 

time limits are more appropriately analogized to a statute of limitations and failure 

to raise a timeliness objection prior to the hearing waives the objection. I reiterate 

that view. Moreover, I find that the Sheriff's instruction that grievances be sent 

directly to Mr. Beal [the sheriff's attorney], an instruction to which the Union 

apparently has acquiesced, does not change the result. It appears that Sheriff 

Huston has appointed Mr. Beal as the Employers' agent for receipt of grievances 

at step 1. This, however, does not relieve the Employers, acting directly or 

[through] their agent[,] Mr. Beal, from the contractual obligation to respond at 

step 1 and, more precisely, of the obligation to raise a timeliness objection prior to 

the hearing. Accordingly, I find that the Employers have waived their timeliness 

objection."

¶ 7 Turning to the merits, the arbitrator ultimately found in favor of the Union and sustained 

the grievance. In so doing, the arbitrator stated in his written decision:

"Neither party has filed a unit clarification petition with the Illinois Labor 

Relations Board. Instead, both parties apparently have decided to engage in a 

game of legal chicken, with each arguing that the burden was on the other to file 

the unit clarification petition and that the failure to do so compels a finding in 

support of that party's position. I reject both parties' arguments. As arbitrator, my 

function is to interpret the parties' contract – in this case specifically Section 1.1 

which defines the bargaining unit as all correction officers below the rank of jail 

superintendent, subject to the exclusion of any position excluded under the 

[Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA)]. Certainly, if either party had 
8

petitioned the Illinois Labor Relations Board for unit clarification, I would be 

bound by the Board's decision. However, in the absence of such a petition and 

Board ruling, I find that I have the authority to interpret the parties' contract with 

my interpretation of the IPLRA being merged into my interpretation [of] Section 

1.1. 

***

Article 2(E) clearly gives the Employers the right 'to create, combine, 

modify and eliminate positions within the County Sheriff's Office.' Article 2, 

however, subjects the exercise of that right and all other management rights to 

being 'specifically limited by the express provisions of this Agreement.' One such 

express provision is Section 1.1. Thus, whether a position created by the 

Employers in the exercise of their management rights falls within the bargaining 

unit is governed by Section 1.1. I reject the Employers' argument that they have 

the right to determine unilaterally, or even in the first instance subject to the 

Union filing a unit clarification petition with the Illinois Labor Relations Board, 

whether a newly created position is within the bargaining unit. That argument is 

inconsistent with the plain language of Articles 1 and 2 of the contract.

***

There is no dispute that the Deputy/Assistant Jail Superintendent and the 

Jail Operations Supervisors are correction officers. The critical dispute is over 

whether they are excluded by the IPLRA. The exclusion that the Employers 

argue applies is for supervisors. The IPLRA defines 'supervisor' in relevant part 

as:
9

[']An employee whose principal work is substantially 

different from that of his or her subordinates and who has 

authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, 

lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline 

employees, to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend 

any of those actions, if the exercise of that authority is not of a 

merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the consistent use of 

independent judgment. Except with respect to police employment, 

the term "supervisor" includes only those individuals who devote a 

preponderance of their employment time to exercising that 

authority, State supervisors notwithstanding. Nothing in this 

definition prohibits an individual from also meeting the definition 

of "managerial employee" under subsection (j) of this Section. In 

addition, in determining supervisory status in police employment, 

rank shall not be determinative. The Board shall consider, as 

evidence of bargaining unit inclusion or exclusion, the common 

law enforcement policies and relationships between police officer 

ranks and certification under applicable civil service law, 

ordinances, personnel codes, or Division 2.1 of Article 10 of the 

Illinois Municipal Code, but these factors shall not be the sole or 

predominant factors considered by the Board in determining police 

supervisory status.['] [5 ILCS 315/3(r)(1) (West 2012)].
10

It is readily apparent that whether the Deputy/Assistant Jail 

Superintendent and the Jail Operations Supervisors are supervisors depends on 

their principal work and authority. Rank or job title alone [is] not determinative. 

However, the record before me is devoid of any evidence as to the principal job 

responsibilities and authority of these two positions. At the hearing, Sheriff 

Huston testified that he, with the concurrence of the County Board, had the 

authority, in creating the positions, to determine whether they are in the 

bargaining unit. In their brief, the Employers contend that their determination that 

the positions are exempt from the bargaining unit must stand unless and until 

rejected by the Illinois Labor Relations Board via a unit clarification petition. I 

have rejected these positions as inconsistent with the plain language of Article 2 

and Section 1.1. Accordingly, with no evidence concerning the principal work 

and authority of the Deputy/Assistant Jail Superintendent and Jail Operations

Supervisors, I am unable to find that they are excluded from the bargaining unit 

by the IPLRA. The grievance must be sustained." 

¶ 8 After losing in arbitration, the Employer brought an action in the trial court to vacate the 

arbitrator's decision. Following briefing and oral arguments on the matter, the trial court upheld 

the arbitrator's ruling. The Employer appealed. 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, the Employer argues that arbitrator erred in finding that the two newly created

positions were included in the bargaining unit and in ruling in favor of the Union on its grievance 

on that basis. The Employer asserts first that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated because

it is clear from the face of the decision that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law under 
11

the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2012)) and the law 

on the burden of proof in a grievance-arbitration proceeding. The Employer claims that its 

assertion in that regard is shown by the fact that the arbitrator, after specifically noting in the 

written decision that the Union had the burden of proof and that no evidence had been presented 

as to whether the two newly created positions were truly supervisory positions as defined in the 

IPLRA, went on to conclude that he had to sustain the Union's grievance, in the absence of 

evidence, because he could not find that the two positions were excluded from the bargaining 

unit. According to the Employer, the arbitrator's ruling in that regard does not reflect an 

interpretation of section 1.1 of the agreement, as the Union contends, but, rather, shows that the 

arbitrator ignored the exclusion provision of the IPLRA (that a supervisor cannot be in the same 

bargaining unit with the employees he supervises) and that the arbitrator either ignored or 

incorrectly applied the law on the burden of proof in a grievance proceeding. Second, the 

Employer argues that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated because it is clear from the face 

of the decision that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ignoring the plain language of the 

collective bargaining agreement. The Employer claims that its assertion in that regard is 

evidenced by the fact that the arbitrator found that article one of the collective bargaining 

agreement limited the sheriff's broad powers under article two of the agreement to create 

positions and to manage the affairs of the department, even though that conclusion was contrary 

to the plain language of sections 1.1 and 1.2 of the agreement, which excluded from the 

bargaining unit those employees who were excluded under the IPLRA and recognized the 

possible existence of non-bargaining-unit supervisors. According to the Employer, rather than 

interpret the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator ignored the plain language to reach 

the outcome he desired. Third and finally, the Employer argues that the arbitrator's decision 
12

should be vacated because it did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement 

since the arbitrator exceeded his authority by looking outside of the agreement in ruling upon the 

Employer's timeliness objection. In making that assertion, the Employer contends that the

arbitrator admitted in the written decision that he was looking past the collective bargaining 

agreement, which required that all grievances be filed within 15 days of the occurrence, and 

instead based his decision on his own personal thoughts, feelings, view as an arbitrator, and 

personal past practices. The Employer points out that there is no provision in the collective 

bargaining agreement that required the Employer to make a timeliness objection prior to the 

actual arbitration hearing and that the agreement itself prohibited the arbitrator from amending, 

modifying, nullifying, ignoring, or adding to or subtracting from the agreement. For all of the 

reasons stated, the Employer asks that we reverse the trial court's judgment and that we vacate 

the arbitrator's decision.

¶ 11 The Union argues that the arbitrator's ruling was proper and should be upheld. The 

Union asserts that when the appropriate standard of review is applied, there is no basis upon 

which to vacate the arbitrator's decision. More specifically, as to each of the Employer's 

assertions, the Union contends that: (1) the Employer has failed to show that the arbitrator 

deliberately disregarded the law as is necessary to establish a manifest disregard of the law and 

to justify overturning the arbitrator's decision; (2) the arbitrator's decision clearly drew its 

essence from the collective bargaining agreement in that the arbitrator recognized the connection 

between the terms of the agreement and the IPLRA as to who was a member of the bargaining

unit but found, as a matter of contract interpretation, since no evidence was presented as to 

whether the two newly created positions were truly supervisory in nature, that the two newly

created positions were included in the bargaining unit; (3) the arbitrator found that the 
13

Employer's assertion—that it could unilaterally determine that the two newly created positions 

were outside of the bargaining unit—was contrary to the plain language of articles one and two 

of the collective bargaining agreement and rejected that assertion as a matter of contract 

interpretation; (4) there is no merit to the Employer's contention that the arbitrator ignored 

provisions of the collective bargaining agreement as the arbitrator specifically discussed in his 

decision the sheriff's powers under article two of the agreement and explained why he disagreed 

with the Employer's interpretation of article two; (5) the Employer's contention that the arbitrator 

ignored the law on burden of proof is misplaced—the Union had to show only that the collective 

bargaining agreement had been violated and did not have to present evidence as to whether the 

two newly created positions were truly supervisory in nature; (6) the arbitrator did not exceed his 

authority in ruling in favor of the Union on the grievance but, rather, was well within his rights to 

consider his knowledge, experience, and prior arbitration precedent in deciding the questions that 

had been presented to him, including the question of timeliness/arbitrability; (7) it is "hypocrisy" 

for the Employer to argue that the Union failed to follow the procedure specified in the collective 

bargaining agreement when the sheriff himself instructed the Union not to follow that procedure; 

(8) there is no time limit contained in the collective bargaining agreement for the Union to send 

the grievance to the sheriff's attorney as the Union was instructed to do by the sheriff; (9) even if 

the arbitrator made an error in interpreting the IPLRA, ignored the law on the burden of proof, 

ignored certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, or exceeded his authority, 

those reasons do not provide a sufficient basis upon which to vacate the arbitrator's decision

under the law; and (10) the fact that the Employer disagrees with the arbitrator's interpretation of 

the law or of the contract is not a sufficient basis upon which to overturn the arbitrator's decision. 
14

For all of the reasons stated, the Union asks that we affirm the trial court's judgment and uphold 

the arbitrator's ruling.

¶ 12 Arbitration in a collective bargaining situation is a unique type of arbitration; it is treated 

differently than other types of arbitration and special rules apply. See Board of Trustees of 

Community College District No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 74 

Ill. 2d 412, 418-19 (1979) (District No. 508). Although judicial review of an arbitrator's award 

in general is very limited (Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School District No. 4 v. Illinois 

Educational Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 18 (Griggsville)), it is even more limited 

in collective bargaining cases (District No. 508, 74 Ill. 2d at 418. That standard of limited 

review reflects the intent of the legislature in enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act to provide 

finality for labor disputes submitted to arbitration. See 710 ILCS 5/12 (West 2012); American 

Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management 

Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1996) (AFSCME). When an arbitration award has been entered 

pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting 

the award are only those grounds that existed under the common law—fraud, corruption, 

partiality, misconduct, mistake, or failure to submit the question to arbitration. See 710 ILCS 

5/12(e) (West 2012); AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 304; Board of Education of City of Chicago v. 

Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 86 Ill. 2d 469, 474 (1981) (Chicago Teachers Union); 

Water Pipe Extension, Bureau of Engineering Laborers' Local 1092 v. City of Chicago, 318 Ill. 

App. 3d 628, 635-36 (2000) (Water Pipe); see also White Star Mining Co. of Illinois v. Hultberg, 

220 Ill. 578, 601-03 (1906) (discussing the grounds under the common law for overturning an 

arbitration award). Thus, when the common-law standard applies, a court must enforce a laborarbitration award if the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority and the award drew its 
15

essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement. AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 304-05; 

Water Pipe, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 636. The determination thereof is a question of law that is 

subject to de novo review on appeal. See Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 20.

¶ 13 A presumption exists that an arbitrator did not exceed his authority in making his 

decision. Rauh v. Rockford Products Corp., 143 Ill. 2d 377, 386 (1991) (stating the rule in the 

context of a non-collective-bargaining situation). In a collective bargaining situation, the scope 

of an arbitrator's power and authority is generally determined by the provisions of the agreement 

itself and what the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. See District No. 508, 74 Ill. 2d at 

419; Chicago Teachers Union, 86 Ill. 2d at 474. Typically, the parties provide in the collective 

bargaining agreement that the arbitrator is to decide disputes involving the application and 

interpretation of the agreement. District No. 508, 74 Ill. 2d at 419. "Such a provision is both the 

source and the limit of the arbitrator's power." Id. An arbitrator exceeds his authority when he 

decides matters that were not submitted to him for resolution. Id. If an arbitrator exceeds the 

scope of his authority in making a decision, his award must be vacated. See AFSCME, 173 Ill. 

2d at 304-05; Water Pipe, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 634.

¶ 14 An arbitration award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, when 

the arbitrator, in making his decision, limits himself to interpreting and applying the agreement. 

See Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 19; Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 v. Chicago 

Transit Authority, 342 Ill. App. 3d 176, 180 (2003) (Amalgamated). An arbitrator may not, 

under either the common law or the statutory approach (not discussed here), change or alter the 

terms of the collective bargaining agreement (Water Pipe, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 634); nor is it the 

arbitrator's function to dispense his own brand of industrial justice (Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, 

¶ 19). Although an arbitrator may look to many sources for guidance in making his 
16

determination, if his award is based upon a body of thought, feeling, policy, or law outside of the 

collective bargaining agreement, the award will be overturned as not being drawn from the 

essence of the agreement. See Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 19; Amalgamated, 342 Ill. App. 

3d at 180.

¶ 15 Questions as to the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement are for the 

arbitrator to decide, not the court, since that is what was bargained for by the parties. AFSCME, 

173 Ill. 2d at 305. A court will inquire into the merits of the arbitrator's interpretation of the 

agreement only to the extent necessary to determine if the award drew its essence from the 

agreement so as to prevent a manifest disregard of the parties' agreement from occurring. See 

District No. 508, 74 Ill. 2d at 421; Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 18 (stating that when the 

parties have contracted to have their disputes settled by an arbitrator, rather than a judge, the 

parties have agreed to accept the arbitrator's view of the facts and interpretation of the contract, 

and a court has no business weighing the merits of the grievance). An arbitrator's award is 

presumed to be valid (Amalgamated, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 179) and, whenever possible, must be 

construed in such a manner as to uphold its validity (Chicago Teachers Union, 86 Ill. 2d at 477). 

Therefore, establishing that an arbitrator has failed to interpret the collective bargaining 

agreement and has, instead, imposed his own personal view of right and wrong on the labor 

dispute is a high hurdle. Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 20. It is not enough to show that the 

arbitrator committed an error, even a serious one. Id. Rather, it must be shown that there is no 

interpretive route to the award, so that a noncontractual basis can be inferred as the basis for the 

arbitrator's decision. Id. If the arbitrator's award is derived from the language of the agreement, 

the court may not overturn the award, even if the court disagrees with the arbitrator's 
17

interpretation or believes that the arbitrator misread the agreement. See AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 

305; Water Pipe, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 637-40; Amalgamated, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 180. 

¶ 16 In the present case, after having reviewed the record and the arbitrator's decision, we find 

that the Employer's claims, to the extent that they apply, must be rejected for the reasons that 

follow. First, despite the Employer's assertions to the contrary, it is clear from the written ruling 

of the arbitrator that the arbitrator did not commit a manifest disregard of the law or of the 

collective bargaining agreement in making his decision. In ruling in favor of the Union on the 

grievance, the arbitrator specifically discussed the definition of "supervisor" as set forth under 

the IPLRA and also discussed the burden of proof that was on the Union to establish that a 

violation of the collective bargaining agreement had occurred. In the context of that applicable 

law, the arbitrator interpreted the relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, 

which he found to be articles one and two. According to the arbitrator, although the sheriff had 

broad management powers under article two of the agreement, those powers were limited by the 

provisions of article one. Reading the two articles together, the arbitrator interpreted articles one 

and two of the agreement to mean that any newly created positions below that of jail supervisor, 

such as the ones in the present case, were included in the bargaining unit, unless they were 

shown to be excluded therefrom under the IPLRA. In reaching that conclusion, the arbitrator 

rejected the Employer's contention that it had the power to unilaterally determine that the two 

newly-created positions would be non-bargaining-unit positions. The arbitrator found that the 

Employer's contention in that regard was contrary to the plain language of articles one and two 

of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's decision in that regard was not a result of 

the arbitrator ignoring the IPLRA or the law on the burden of proof or the provisions of the 

collective bargaining agreement, as the Employer asserts, but was, instead, the arbitrator's 
18

interpretation of the language of the agreement within the context of what he understood to be 

the law. Thus, the Employer's manifest disregard of the law/agreement claim must be rejected. 

See Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 19; Chicago Teachers Union, 86 Ill. 2d at 477 (stating that an 

error of judgment in law is not a ground for vacating an arbitrator's award when the 

interpretation of the law is entrusted to the arbitrator and that a court may review the legal 

reasoning behind an arbitrator's decision only when it appears on the face of the award that the 

arbitrator was so mistaken about the law, that the award would have been different had the 

arbitrator been apprised of the mistake); Amalgamated, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 180; Tim Huey Corp. 

v. Global Boiler & Mechanical, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 100, 106-07 (1995) (stating in the context 

of a non-collective-bargaining situation that an arbitration award will not be vacated for a 

manifest disregard of the law unless it has been shown that the arbitrator deliberately disregarded 

the law; a mere error in the law or a failure by the arbitrator to understand or apply the law is 

insufficient).

2

¶ 17 Second, it also clear from the arbitrator's written decision that his interpretation of the 

collective bargaining agreement was taken directly from the language of the agreement itself and 

from his reading of the interaction between article two (the sheriff's management powers) and 

article one (the members of the collective bargaining unit). It is not for this court to determine 

whether that interpretation was correct. See District No. 508, 74 Ill. 2d at 421; Griggsville, 2013 

IL 113721, ¶ 18. Because the arbitrator's decision was clearly based upon the language of the 

collective bargaining agreement, the Employer's assertion—that the arbitrator exceeded his 

 2 We take no position on whether the rule from Tim Huey Corp. would apply under the common law 

approach in a collective bargaining situation and only cite the rule here, while assuming for argument's sake that it 

applies, because the Employer in this appeal has argued a manifest disregard of the law.
19

authority by going beyond the agreement—must be rejected. See Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, 

¶ 19; Amalgamated, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 180.

¶ 18 Even as to the issue of the timeliness of the grievance, we are not persuaded by the 

Employer's argument to reach the opposite conclusion. There is no dispute in this case that the 

Employer instructed the Union to follow a procedure for filing the grievance that was different 

than the grievance process that was provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. In 

addition, the agreement itself specifically allowed the applicable time deadlines to be extended 

by mutual agreement of the parties. The agreement was silent, however, as to when any 

objection to the timeliness of a grievance had to be made. Thus, the matter was left to the 

determination of the arbitrator. See AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 306 (stating that where the 

collective bargaining agreement did not delineate the time frames within which disciplinary 

action had to be commenced and was silent as to the remedies that were available once an 

infraction was found, those matters were left for the arbitrator to determine). Under the

circumstances of the present case, we find that the arbitrator's decision drew its essence from the 

collective bargaining agreement, even on the issue of the timeliness of the grievance. See

Griggsville, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 19; AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 306. In short, the parties bargained 

for the arbitrator's expertise and experience on the issues that were presented, and that was 

exactly what the parties received. See AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 305; American Federation of 

State, County & Municipal Employees v. State, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 254 (1988)

(" '[w]hen an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining 

agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a 

problem' " (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 

593, 597 (1960))).
20

¶ 19 Third and finally, we are also not persuaded by the Employer's assertion that the 

arbitrator exceeded his authority in making his ruling. To the contrary, it is abundantly clear 

from the arbitrator's written decision that the arbitrator interpreted the relevant sections of the 

agreement, as he was specifically authorized to do, and determined that the two new positions 

were included in the bargaining unit. As the Union contends, the Employer in this appeal has 

failed to establish a single basis upon which to vacate the arbitrator's decision. See 710 ILCS 

5/12 (West 2012); AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 304-05; Chicago Teachers Union, 86 Ill. 2d at 474; 

Water Pipe, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 635-36. The arbitrator's decision, therefore, must be upheld.

¶ 20 CONCLUSION

¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell 

County, which denied the Employer's motion to vacate and confirmed the arbitrator's decision.

¶ 22 Affirmed.