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i 

82–464 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–49] 

REBALANCING TO THE ASIA–PACIFIC 

REGION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 24, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KIMBERLY SHAW, Professional Staff Member 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 24, 2013, Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific Region and Implications for U.S. National Security ...................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 24, 2013 ....................................................................................... 39 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2013 

REBALANCING TO THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION AND IMPLICATIONS 

FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Auslin, Dr. Michael R., Resident Scholar, Asian Studies and Director, Japanese Studies, American Enterprise Institute ..................................................... 3 

Cronin, Dr. Patrick M., Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia Program, Center for a New American Security ....................................................... 6 

Roughead, ADM Gary, USN (Ret.), Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow, 

Hoover Institution ................................................................................................ 8 

Shinn, Dr. James, Lecturer, School of Engineering, Princeton University ........ 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Auslin, Dr. Michael R. ...................................................................................... 46 

Cronin, Dr. Patrick M. ..................................................................................... 65 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 43 

Roughead, ADM Gary ...................................................................................... 83 

Shinn, Dr. James .............................................................................................. 93 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 44 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 103 

(1) 

REBALANCING TO THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION AND 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 24, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the rebalancing strategy to the Asia-Pacific region and implications for U.S. 

national security. This is an important topic for the committee and 

we have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us here today. 

Since the President’s Defense Strategic Guidance was released a 

year and a half ago, this committee has worked to understand the 

details. The key pieces appear to be the rotational deployment of 

U.S. Marines to northern Australia and the first deployment of the 

Navy’s littoral combat ship to Singapore. But we are still missing 

a good understanding of what the U.S. military is and should be 

doing in the region. 

Let me be clear. I don’t think there is any disagreement on the 

goodness of rebalancing to Asia. I hope our witnesses today will 

give us their insight to some very important questions. What 

should a robust strategy look like? What are the regional security 

concerns of the U.S., including and beyond the issue of China? 

What opportunities are we missing? Can the rebalancing be effective without additional resources? How will sequestration impact 

the capabilities and capacity of the U.S. military to rebalance to 

Asia, especially when we are still drawn to respond to crises in 

other regions? And if the U.S. can’t effectively and fully execute the 

strategy, how will the region’s militaries view us? 

To testify before the committee today, we have Dr. Michael 

Auslin, resident scholar of Asian studies and director of Japanese 

studies at the American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Patrick Cronin, 

senior adviser and senior director of the Asia Program at the Center for a New American Security; Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. 

Navy, retired. 

And you said your wife is giving you an ‘‘F’’ on your retirement? 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are glad to have you back. 
2 

Annenberg distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. 

Dr. James Shinn, lecturer at the School of Engineering at Princeton University and former assistant secretary of defense for Asia 

from 2007 to 2008. 

Very distinguished panel. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for this hearing, and I thank our witnesses for appearing before us, and look 

forward to their testimony and the questions. 

Obviously, the Asia-Pacific region is of critical importance to the 

United States and growing importance economically, politically, a 

number of different countries that we have complex relationships 

there. And I think it is perfectly appropriate to focus more attention on that region, build more relationships, and figure out how 

we can be more effective in that area. 

But as the chairman said, the devil is always in the details. 

What does that mean, particularly within the Department of Defense? What does that mean in terms of how we shift our assets? 

What assets are critical for us to be successful in this? And also, 

the rest of the world has not stopped being an issue, obviously, 

with Syria and Egypt and many other places. So as we rebalance, 

how do we keep our eyes on some of the other challenges that we 

have in other parts of the world? 

And then the most interesting question is, of course, how this affects our relationship with China. How do we do this in a way that 

does not make this look confrontational, but really makes it look 

like we are, you know, looking for partners throughout the region, 

including China, frankly, to deal with some of the challenges that 

we have in that area and around the world as China increasingly 

has a presence outside of the Asia region. 

So this is, I think, a great opportunity for our country to make 

this pivot, to make this shift to a greater focus on Asia, but figuring out exactly what it means and what the best policies are to 

implement it effectively is critically important for this committee 

and for this Congress. 

I am very pleased to have four such experts here who can help 

us work our way through that. And I look forward to this hearing. 

And again, I thank the chairman for holding it, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Auslin. 
3 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL R. AUSLIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, 

ASIAN STUDIES AND DIRECTOR, JAPANESE STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Dr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of 

the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify 

today about the administration’s rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and its implications for national security for the U.S. It is an 

honor to be here and to sit beside my distinguished co-panelists. 

I have testimony that I have submitted for the record, so if you 

will permit me, I will just make a few comments. 

The CHAIRMAN. All of your testimonies will be included in the 

record, without objection. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, could you move that mike just a little? 

Dr. AUSLIN. I am happy to. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Let me just make a few comments, maybe set the 

stage for answering some of the questions, Mr. Chairman, that you 

raise. 

I think that there are probably three questions that are most 

useful to try to answer when we are thinking about the rebalance 

or, as it was initially called, the pivot. The first is, do we need it? 

Do we need a rebalance to Asia? The second is, what is it as the 

administration has articulated it? And the third is, can it achieve 

its goals as the administration has outlined them? 

I would say that actually I am agnostic on the first question. I 

think that if we phrase this in the sense of returning to Asia, it 

is a misnomer. We have 325,000 troops in PACOM [Pacific Command] that have never been out of the region. We do hundreds of 

exercises a year. We have dozens of visits throughout the region for 

a year—throughout the region every year. So, it is not that the 

United States has been absent. 

The question is, what are we trying to do in Asia today in the 

Asia-Pacific region? And also, what are the trends? Do the trends 

indicate that we need some type of rebalancing to the region? 

Well, in order to answer that in terms of the trends, we look at 

the broader security equation, even though the administration will 

talk about this being a whole-of-government approach—that there 

is an economic component; there is a diplomatic component; and 

that there is a security component. 

The administration says repeatedly that this rebalance is not 

about China. It is about the region as a whole. And in general, I 

would argue that is the right approach. What we need to think 

about is what type of Asia do we want to see? What type of Asia 

is best for United States’ interests, for the interests of our friends 

and allies in the region, and for Asians in the region? 

But if it is not about China, then what exactly is the rebalancing 

for if the security component is the main part that our friends and 

allies in the region are looking towards? There is, I would argue, 

on the administration’s part a lack of clarity on what it is trying 

to achieve. It says it is not about China, and yet there is a high 

component or heavy component committed to rebalancing our security forces in the region. It is a traditional question, I would argue, 

of ends and means. 
4 

If you talk to our friends in the region—I know, Mr. Chairman 

and members of the committee, you do that repeatedly through visits—they themselves obviously are concerned about the rise of 

China. They are concerned that as China has become stronger, it 

has become more assertive. They are concerned about their particular sets of territorial disputes and other issues in which they 

feel that there is little chance for each of them alone to resolve 

these on terms that would be most favorable to them. 

Therefore, what we see over the past several years is an increasing tendency on the part of friends and allies to look to the United 

States for backup and support. In part, they do this because the 

administration has stated that it is rebalancing, it is re-engaged, 

it is back in Asia. And yet when we come down to the specifics that 

concern them and interest them, the United States often takes a 

pass. 

We can look at the frustration that the Philippines feels, the 

frustration that Japan feels over territorial issues in both the 

South and East China Seas. And they wonder, as actually a Philippines senator publicly questioned during last year’s problems 

over the Scarborough Shoals, ‘‘What is the use of the alliance with 

the United States if it will not back us up when we need it?’’ 

Now, that is not, I would argue, the same thing as to say that 

we should be involved in the territorial disputes between two nations. But it points out the rhetorical slippage between what the 

United States government is saying and what its actions on the 

ground actually are. That is the lack of clarity that I would argue 

causes problems in terms of understanding what this rebalance is 

supposed to do and whether or not we can redo it. 

Let me turn to the last few points. I mention, Mr. Chairman, 

that my clock is not running, so I do not know how long I have 

talked nor how much more time I have. So I will just take a few 

minutes and you can cut me off at any time, sir. 

What is the rebalance? A lot of us have written and talked about 

the fact that it does seem to be more rhetorical than substantive. 

If you look at the base of it, there is very little change overall in 

the U.S. security posture at whatever end point this rebalance 

would give. There is almost no change in the end-point ground 

strength. We are not going to be increasing Marines. We are not 

going to be increasing the Army. 

In terms of the Navy, Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2012 talked about ultimately shifting 60 percent of U.S. 

global naval assets to the region. The truth is, we are almost already there. We have over 50 percent in terms of everything from 

carriers, cruisers, subs and the like, and of course, Admiral 

Roughead knows that far better than I. It is not a substantive 

change that would cause the calculation on the security end, I 

would argue, of anyone in the region to think that this is some sort 

of new era of United States security presence in the region. 

If it is just, then, rhetorical, how can the United States back up 

what it is saying it wants to do in terms of being more present? 

The administration, again, will talk about a whole-of-government 

approach; that the President, and rightfully so, has gone to the 

East Asian summit; that we have now made TPP, the Trans-Pacific 
5 

Partnership, a major part of our economic engagement with the region. And all of that is appropriate and all of that is right. 

But the rebalancing from a security perspective, which is what 

gets the most attention in Asia, is actually not all that significant. 

So either we are going to do something far more than what the 

administration has already laid out in its plans in order to change 

our presence in the region, or what we are talking about is just 

nibbling around the edges. 

And then, finally, sir, let me question can it achieve its goals? 

Well, I think that that bumps us back to the first question: What 

are those goals? Should the United States be a permanent balancer 

in the region, or do we want ultimately to hand off security concerns to our allies, and have them deal with it? 

Do we want in some way to oppose the rise of China? Do we 

want to counter the rise of China? If not, then why do we need to 

increase our security forces? 

How is sequester and the Budget Control Act going to affect the 

ability of the United States not only to do what the administration 

ostensibly hopes, but to do what we are already doing today? That 

is a question that has not been answered. 

If I could sum it up, I think that the major security challenge we 

face in Asia today is a simple one. It is a—if I could phrase it this 

way, it is a broken windows theory. There is no one that I have 

talked to in Asia who truly fears some major conflict breaking out 

tomorrow, some type of regional systemic war. 

What they fear, though, is that the environment in which they 

operate today, the environment that they know and they understand, is slowly slipping away; it is slowly degrading. It has broken 

windows. And if you accept a broken window on one block, you’ll 

accept a broken window on another block. That is where the influence of the United States is most important, in stressing that we 

will not passively sit by while the security environment degrades 

for the worse and then raises significant questions about stability, 

insecurity and the potential for conflict. 

So I think that the administration, sir, finally, needs to do just 

simply three things. It needs to more clearly articulate the rationale behind the rebalance and the goals, which I would argue it has 

not done. 

Number two, it does need to publicly address how both BCA 

[Budget Control Act] and sequestration will affect our ability to do 

what we are doing today and what they hope to do in the future. 

And then, finally, there needs to be a larger articulation of a U.S. 

strategy in the Asia-Pacific, what role the United States will be 

playing in 20 years or 25 years, what role we expect our allies to 

play, and whether we are able to do it in a world in which we are 

rapidly cutting our defense capabilities today. 

Thank you very much, sir. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Auslin can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Cronin. 
6 

STATEMENT OF DR. PATRICK M. CRONIN, SENIOR ADVISOR 

AND SENIOR DIRECTOR OF THE ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER 

FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Dr. CRONIN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith and other 

distinguished members of the committee, I am deeply honored by 

this opportunity to testify on the trenchant matter of rebalancing 

to the Asia-Pacific region. 

It is in our vital interest to use the past few years as a springboard for widening and deepening our engagement in what is likely 

to be the most important region of this century. 

If we move intelligently and persistently to leverage our considerable power to mold the rising and dynamic Indo-Pacific region, 

then we can preserve and adapt an inclusive rules-based international community that is fundamental to the preservation of 

freedom, peace and prosperity. 

But if we falter in our purpose, if we divert from our long-term 

strategic interest, then fissures and flashpoints that today seem 

manageable may one day overwhelm our capacity to deal with 

them. 

Let me describe in brief what I think rebalancing is. The administration is seeking to shift from war to peace, although taking care 

not to exit so swiftly that it might jeopardize future stability and 

with it perceptions of American resoluteness. 

Rebalancing is about providing a strategic challenge to China, 

but not containing China. Long-term U.S. presence will help 

counter any tendency to steer a re-emerging China into an aggressive hegemon, but stepped-up cooperation with China will seek to 

provide sufficient strategic reassurance to dampen unnecessary 

competition. 

America will be rebalancing to Asia with Europe and the rest of 

the world, not away from Europe and the rest of the world. The 

United States will pivot within Asia as well, away from an almost 

exclusive concentration on Northeast Asia, and toward a much 

wider network of contacts, especially in Southeast Asia. 

Part of the rebalancing will include moving from mostly bilateralism to greater multilateralism, especially by embracing 

ASEAN-centered [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] institutions. This requires long patience, understand, given the region’s 

multilateral security architecture is badly lagging the challenges of 

the region. 

Rebalancing also means building a bridge between the confluence 

of two oceans, the Indian and Pacific, strengthening ties between 

India and East Asia and embracing reform-minded change in a 

government like that of Myanmar. 

And, finally, rebalancing means economic and diplomatic power, 

not just military might. 

Comprehensive power is vital, especially in the context of those 

who would reduce America’s influence in the region to defense 

alone. Even so, I recognize military power is the main instrument 

of insurance. This mostly involves retaining America’s strong existing regional military presence. It also means widening the scope for 

engagement, a concept that is captured by the phrase ‘‘geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable.’’ 
7 

So let me turn briefly to my guiding principles and recommendations. In my lengthy written testimony, I talk about the three military missions of deterrence, and countering coercive diplomacy. 

Those are the short-term, everyday needs that we are facing right 

now. 

And then, over the longer term, we have this growing challenge 

of countering anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Those are 

very centrally military challenges. 

But I have got some broader guiding principles, the first of which 

is that undergirding our policy is that the long-term shift in economic, political and military power to the Indo-Pacific region 

should give urgency to our short- and mid-term decisions. We have 

a limited window of opportunity to influence this region. 

The second guiding principle is that countering coercive diplomacy, averting crises and de-escalating them when they occur, encountering growing A2AD [anti-access area-denial] capabilities over 

time, are at the core of our military mission in the region. 

The third principle to guide our policy is to recognize that this 

enterprise is bigger than any one country. We will increasingly 

have to work with allies and partners. Multilateral security institutions in the Asia-Pacific region are growing by baby steps. 

ASEAN provides legitimacy more than effectiveness. We need to 

build up that effectiveness by working with like-minded states and 

others in the region so that we can mature these institutions. 

And as Asian capabilities continue to grow, there should be more 

opportunities for collaboration, for interoperability, for real effectiveness and burden sharing. In supporting regional cooperation, 

we should increasingly draw on what we have called the emerging 

Asian power web, the constellation of inter-Asian security relations 

that are being built at a quickening pace. These are the building 

blocks for helping Asian nations better defend themselves, to help 

them to help themselves, but also to help us have interoperability 

with these countries. 

A fifth guiding principle is for the United States to constantly 

put forward its positive vision for an inclusive, rules-based region 

to advance peace, freedom and prosperity for all. 

And, finally, our policy rebalancing should be guided by a quest 

for achieving a comprehensive economic, diplomatic and military 

power. 

So, what about recommendations that we can achieve, essentially 

low-cost, cooperative security in the immediate future? 

Well, here are 10 important steps that we might consider. 

One, accelerate an official review of the U.S.-Japan Defense 

Guidelines. We need a common strategic approach to countering 

Chinese coercive diplomacy in the short term and countering Chinese A2AD anti-access/area-denial capabilities in the long run. 

Two, we need to staunch the growing gap in South Korea-Japan 

perceptions through practical defense cooperation that we can help 

facilitate. For instance, we might propose navy-to-navy talks on 

missiles as a way to get at some very, very difficult issues, but 

where there is some common interest. 

Three, we need to initiate a U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] review 

of the alliance’s North Korean strategy to help thwart the deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles and lethal uses of force. 
8 

Four, we need to fully test China’s tolerance for pressuring North 

Korea from deploying or proliferating nuclear weapons and their 

means of delivery. 

Fifth, we need to help Taiwan avoid being coerced into making 

unfair concessions to mainland China. I just returned from Taiwan. 

They are being squeezed more and more, every day. 

Sixth, prevent the Philippines from being isolated by forging a 

tougher ASEAN diplomatic line and advancing the air and maritime capabilities of the Philippines. 

Seventh, propose at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus 

meeting in Brunei next month, where Secretary Hagel will be, 

steps to reinforce a multilateral approach toward both maritime domain awareness and HADR, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, capabilities to deal with inevitable disasters. 

Eight, ensure sufficient support to enable more, not fewer, exercises with India and allies and partners on the other side of the 

Strait of Malacca. 

Nine, encourage historic reforms underway in Myanmar, while 

guarding against a future military intervention, especially as they 

approach the 2015 election. 

And, ten, leverage the emerging Asian power web by supporting 

organic and natural trends for greater inter-Asian bilateral ties 

with countries that really have military capabilities, such as Australia and Indonesia, Australia and Japan, India and Vietnam 

among others. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cronin can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN (RET.), ANNENBERG DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

it is a privilege to be with you today to talk about the Asia-Pacific 

region and particularly the strategic implications of rebalancing. 

This is a region that has been on my mind for a long time. I have 

commanded at sea in the Pacific. I have served twice at the U.S. 

Pacific Command. I have commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet. And 

as the Chief of Naval Operations, when I issued the maritime 

strategy in 2007, Asia was prominent in that strategy. 

When I think about the region, to me it is the Pacific Ocean, Oceania, the Indian Ocean and the increasingly important trade routes 

into Africa that will feed the economies of Asia. 

And in the mid-term, the opening of the Arctic trade routes that 

will become increasingly important to the Asian economy. 

So it really is quite an area that we are talking about. So the 

importance of rebalancing and refocusing, whatever word is used, 

it, to me, is an imperative. 

But I think that our approach in rebalancing must be strategic 

and not superficial. It must be substantive and not marginal. It 

must be realistic and not an illusion. It must be optimistic and not 

pessimistic. 
9 

The real power of Asia is the economy. And so, as we look at our 

strategy as a nation going forward, economic initiatives, trade initiatives need to be there, in the forefront. 

But the fact of the matter is that security in Asia underpins the 

rapid growth that we are seeing. And all in Asia—and I say all in 

Asia—see the United States and particularly the United States 

Armed Forces as the stabilizing force. 

And so, if we look at it, rebalancing is not the strategic objective. 

The strategic objective for us in Asia is to maintain that stability 

and to not allow one country to dominate in Asia. 

And in order to do that, we have to maintain American influence 

and credibility. And that means relevant, competent ready military 

power present in the region and ready power from beyond that can 

rapidly reinforce and respond to events there. And that means, basically, the Navy and the Air Force. And this comes at a challenging time, budgetarily, operationally, and politically. 

But I think our budgets, as we put them forth, must reflect that 

strategic priority. And we have to put in place the appropriate facilities and activities. I think that, as we look at how we resource 

our military into the future, we have to depart from equitable 

shares of budget. It does not mean that any service is valued less. 

It does not mean that we are walking away from jointness, because 

jointness is best achieved by effective budgets, not equitable budgets. 

I would also say that, as we look at the nature of technology and 

military equipment, we can’t simply look at individual line items. 

We have to look at the totality of what we are trying to achieve, 

because an uninformed or even a well-intentioned move on one line 

item may cause that house of cards to be less effective and come 

tumbling down. 

I think what the Navy and the Air Force have done in the AirSea Battle is a positive step. I think it is paying off. And I would 

also say that the other thing that should be done is to bring the 

service chiefs more into the acquisition process from which they 

have been removed for the last couple of decades. 

It will be important, going forward, to maintain in this country 

a robust research and development program and the funding to 

support it. And, as we look to the future, we have to ensure that 

part of our considerations mean that we maintain a viable, flexible, 

and robust industrial base. 

The vastness of the Asia-Pacific region, where we enjoy absolute 

air and maritime superiority, is going to require a new look at increased investments in unmanned systems. We have learned a lot 

in Iraq and Afghanistan with regard to unmanned systems. But I 

will tell you that the Pacific is very different. It is not as benign. 

It will be more challenging. And, accordingly, I believe that as we 

look at our future—and we really are in the lead in this rapidly developing area—we should look at how we do it, what our priorities 

are, what our processes are, and we have to have a greater sense 

of urgency as we move forward with unmanned. 

I will tell you that, having recently come back from the region— 

and I have been there six times in the last, about 14 months—our 

defense budgets are watched in Asia more closely than they are 

watched on the American street. People are questioning whether or 
10 

not we are serious about it. And the actions are going to speak 

louder than any words going forward. 

I would also say that, while we tend to focus on procurement and 

technology, near-term readiness and the near-term readiness budget is extraordinarily important. One can undergo short, rare disruptions to the near-term readiness budget. But I would submit 

that we are beyond that point now. I really do believe that the actions that have had to be taken are beginning to erode, not just the 

short-term readiness, but also will take its toll on long-term readiness and it will be more costly and longer to dig out than had we 

stayed in a more disciplined regime. 

As my colleagues have mentioned, any time you talk of Asia, 

China looms large. And our relationship with China is going to determine the strategic shape and the tenor of the Asia-Pacific region. China’s power is economic. It is not military—yet. What the 

PLA, the People’s Liberation Army, and the People’s Liberation 

Navy have done over the last few years does not surprise me. It 

is what rising economies and rising nations dependent on trade do. 

You can go back in history, Spain, England, the United States, Portugal, Holland—it is the pattern. 

In China, the money is there. The strategy is there. And I think, 

equally important, is the coupling of that budget to a strategy and 

the coupling of an industrial policy to the strategy, which is making it a very effective initiative. 

Our relationship with China requires cooperation on economics 

and trade. And the militaries, I believe, will cooperate where our 

interests intersect. And we see that in counter-piracy operations, 

humanitarian assistance. I think we should welcome those opportunities for cooperation confidently and expand them when it is in 

our interest to do so. 

We will continue to compete with China militarily in the coming 

years. That is what militaries do, particularly militaries that are 

rising. China is doing it well. But I would submit that they see 

more than just a U.S.-China competition. If you look at some of 

their recent strategic writings, they see competition with Russia, 

with India, and with some of the countries that surround them. 

China’s future is extraordinarily complex. And I would say that 

it is still uncertain. So it is important that we refocus, rebalance. 

And I will tell you that all in the region are watching. And what 

they are watching for is whether there was a coherent approach 

going forward that we have the structure and the discipline and 

the predictability in how we are backing up this initiative to reemphasize the Asia-Pacific region. 

If we can achieve that structure, coherency, and stability, then 

the United States will remain the stabilizing force in Asia, and we 

will achieve our strategic objectives and we will assure our prosperity well into the future. But if we don’t do that, we are going 

to cede the region to others and our place in the world. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in 

the Appendix on page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Shinn. 
11 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES SHINN, LECTURER, SCHOOL OF 

ENGINEERING, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 

Dr. SHINN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of 

the committee, thanks for having us. 

I was chatting with Admiral Roughead before the hearing about 

how much more pleasant it is to be here as a private citizen than 

as the Pentagon representative in the hot seat. But this chair feels 

considerably cooler than I remember it from a couple of years ago. 

So, very briefly, I would submit for you three points on the topic 

of the hearing. First, that the rebalancing with the pivot, or whatever we call it, is a good idea. Secondly, that announcing that strategy but not applying enough resources to it is an extremely bad 

idea for reasons that we can discuss. And then, third, just how bad 

an idea it is depends upon the difference between the resources required to implement that strategy and the resources that are likely 

to emerge from the debate on sequestration and then the long-term 

QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] recommendations for the Pacific. 

So, very briefly, the first point, as Dr. Auslin said, there is a lot 

of consistency between the rebalancing logic and the Bush administration and, for the that matter, the latter part of the Clinton administration, and because the underlying logic is the same, the 

simple logic being that we hope that China has a peaceful rise, but 

that the purpose of forward-deployed forces and our alliance network is to deter China and its allies from any kind of aggressive, 

military expansion. Now, that is the logic of what you might call 

‘‘conditional engagement’’ or ‘‘conditional containment.’’ None of the 

phrases are particularly apt. But, at the end of the day, that is the 

test. 

The second point, and I think we have heard references to this 

from all previous three testimonies, to put forth a strategy of rebalancing to Asia and not follow through with the resources is a really 

bad idea. You may want to get into the reasons for this, for why 

there may be a gap between the resources required to implement 

a conditional engagement strategy, and what we can actually put 

out into the field. 

But, at the end of the day, without strong guidance from the Secretary of Defense and from the White House, the natural inertia 

of the services and the natural conservatism of the Pentagon to redeploy resources in a radical way will operate against achieving 

that. And you are more familiar than I am with the parameters of 

sequestration and the effect this could have on the ability to put 

the resources in place. 

So I would just add that when I was at the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], I was a fairly close observer of Chinese decisionmakers, both public and think tank observers. And there has been 

a long line of argument within Chinese decisionmaking that, ultimately, the U.S. will have to withdraw from its forward posture in 

Asia due to fiscal constraints. 

This was a line of argument that became particularly common in 

Beijing around the financial crisis. But it has continued up to the 

present day. And, as Admiral Roughead said, budgetary decisions 

here are watched more carefully in Asia than, perhaps, they are in 

New York. And they are watched particularly carefully in Beijing. 
12 

So the third and final point, and I make this in all humility since 

I don’t have the answer, but I suspect that this hearing and your 

deliberations are aimed, in part, to help answer this. The third 

question is, how many resources are actually required to support 

a rebalancing strategy? 

Much of the debate over whether 1,000 Marines to Australia or 

a couple of ships to Singapore or wherever you put the MAGTF 

[Marine Air-Ground Task Force], the Marine Forces, really begs 

the underlying question, which I think is the important one, which 

is how many resources are really required to deter Chinese military expansion and to increase the probability that we have a 

peaceful rise? 

You know, I would submit to you that there are probably two 

ways to get at that question. And you may have already received 

answers to these in classified briefings or in another engagement 

with our former colleagues at the Pentagon or the Intelligence 

Community that answer this. And if that has been the case, then 

you could ignore this. 

But it seems to me that the first point is that we have a great 

deal of military training, a great deal of military simulations, a 

great deal of military exercises across a whole range of conflicts of 

different intensity that do provide us and should provide you with 

enough empirical evidence to judge just how effective our forces 

and the forces of our allies in the region will be faced with a variety of military expansion activities or provocations from the PRC 

[People’s Republic of China] and its allies, whether it is the areadenial or whether it is Air-Sea Battle. There are a lot of ways to 

get at this, but it is a knowable problem. 

And I think the second part, the harder part of that question 

that you publicly want to have answered for you is continued analysis of the calculus of the decisionmakers in China themselves. 

How do they view the deterrent effect of U.S. and our allies in East 

Asia? How do they weigh the possible changes in the composition 

and the size of those forces over time, in terms of their calculus? 

And I think if you combine those two with the kind of frank, milto-mil communication, the kind of official discourse, trying to elicit 

information on Chinese intent as well as capability, that this committee and, for that matter the Obama administration, would go a 

long way, I think, to assessing just how big the risk is posed by 

setting forth the strategy of rebalancing but failing to apply the resources necessary to execute it. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Shinn can be found in the Appendix on page 93.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Many nations in the region are concerned about the military 

buildup of certain countries such as China and North Korea. China’s military modernization has continued unabated for 10 years 

while North Korea recently announced that they will restart their 

nuclear weapons program. 

We are tending to see increased nationalism and military spending by traditional allies, as well. Yet, history has taught us that 

provocative actions, hawkish rhetoric and political nationalism can 

easily lead to misunderstandings and armed conflict. How would 

you assess the threat of a regional arms race and the militarization 
13 

of the region? How would this affect regional and global political 

and economic stability? And will the U.S. decision to rebalance to 

the region tend to accelerate or dampen further militarization? 

To all of you. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. First, Mr. Chairman, I would say that the— 

Asia is becoming the largest market for arms, high-technology systems. You talked about the growth in China, and we have been seeing that. But I think that you will continue to see sophistication 

of weapons systems and acquisition of those weapons systems as 

we go forward. 

I think the greatest risk—and my sense is, as my colleagues have 

also mentioned, that the Asian engine does not want a conflict, because that would be extraordinarily disruptive. 

Tensions will remain. My greatest concern is for a misstep, particularly in the areas where there are maritime disputes. I think, 

particularly in Northeast Asia that has the highest probability of 

happening. And the consequences, because of the sophistication of 

their militaries, because of the historical animosity that exists, that 

that is something that must be very carefully watched, and we 

should influence in every way we can to have protocols, policies, 

procedures in place so that these tensions can be defused. 

I really do believe, as I said in my statement, that it is the U.S. 

presence, credible U.S. presence, and the relationships that we 

have with the countries in the region and the current trust that 

they have in our ability to be an honest broker and a mediator that 

that is something that is extraordinarily important. 

If the countries in the region do not sense that we are there, that 

we are willing to remain engaged, I think the probability of misstep 

increases markedly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? 

Dr. SHINN. To your question, Mr. Chairman, about an arms race, 

I think that if you look closely at the information that I think was 

provided this committee—just recently you had a hearing on the 

China military power report, which is an interesting document; but 

remarkably consistent over time from when I worked on it in the 

intelligence world and then when my office prepared it at the Pentagon in the second Bush administration. 

And I think what probably struck all of you when you look at 

this, this report, the chairman himself has seen a number of these 

over the years, is just how sustained the expenditure is over time 

in the PRC. And it is like it is hard to make the case that this is 

a response to a perceived arms race from the outside. I mean, this 

has been going on for decades. So I think it would be—I think it 

is very hard to attribute this to what academics call a security dilemma. I think there is an internal logic and a long-term calculus 

in the PRC for their conventional, and for that matter their nuclear 

policy buildup, just as we see a persistent growth in the threats 

presented by North Korea and, for that matter, by Pakistan, who 

are, after all, the closest allies China has in the region and are 

both formal treaty allies to the PRC. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, to your question, I think we should 

actually be very worried and should ask ourselves a question, why 

is the region, everyone who can afford it, buying more weapons? 

What does that say, that as Asia has gotten far richer over the past 
14 

two decades, it has also become more democratic; hundreds of millions of people in countries ranging from China to Vietnam, Southeast Asia, India throughout the entire region have been lifted out 

of poverty, the middle class has grown. At the same time that that 

has happened, every nation that can afford it is buying more weapons. 

Now, they also well understand China, probably better than we 

do—their neighbor. They know that when the Chinese government 

began this buildup, which is on the range of 20 years ago actually, 

it was a 1950s army at best. They had no navy. They had no navy 

that could sail out far. It was a coastal navy. It was a coastal defense force. They had no air force that could fly out of sight of land. 

They had an army that was basically 1950s surplus Mao-era material. 

So no one I think would have initially begrudged—if I can put 

it that way—the Chinese building up a modernized defense force. 

Every nation does that. They, however, clearly understand something that gets right at the heart of the debate here in the United 

States, which is, what is China’s intent. 

Now, none of us know that intent. I certainly don’t know that intent. 

Is China intending ultimately to become, not only assertive but 

aggressive? Is it—have a goal at some point of unilaterally changing borders or settling the historical disputes, that Admiral 

Roughead indicated or mentioned, in its favor and not in the type 

of peaceful, benign negotiating way that we would like? 

So the intent question, I think, Mr. Chairman, gets very much 

to your question, what does the militarization and the regional 

arms race mean? Why is Asia doing this? What does it say about 

the tenor of the overall geostrategic equilibrium in Asia that the 

richest or most dynamic region on Earth is also the one where you 

see the greatest investment in arms? 

Now, for the United States I think we have to ask then a secondary question. I think—and I will be honest, I am not in government. I think it is a very hard question we need to ask. 

It is a variant of the credibility question, which is to say, what 

do our Asian partners—first of all, our allies, secondly those countries we work with, and third those countries that we have friendly 

relations with—what do they really expect from the United States 

in a worst-case scenario? 

Now, we can, I think, intuit some of this by looking at how Japan 

and the Philippines have reacted over the past 18 months to the 

stepped up confrontational face-to-face incidents with China over 

the territorial issues. 

When we talk about the United States as a security guarantor, 

you know, we use insurance language; you know, we are the underwriter of security. It is an insurance policy that the United States 

is in the region. And I have absolutely no disagreements with Admiral Roughead that we are a stabilizing influence. But at the end 

of the day, what does that really mean? Does that mean that we 

would step in and stop a regional war from happening? We have 

treaty commitments that say that we would basically undertake 

that role. 
15 

But there is, I would submit, a huge terrain between the types 

of incidents that we see happening daily in the Asia-Pacific and the 

type of full-out war for which our 1950s-era security treaties and 

alliances were signed. 

So what role do they truly expect us to play? That we step in at 

the last second—to use a very American expression, the cavalry 

rides in? Do they want us early on in this process where we have 

indicated we won’t be doing it? 

It is that uncertainty and, perhaps I would argue in some degree 

our unclarity, as to ultimately what role we will play that fuels the 

very question that you asked, sir, which is the militarization and 

the arms race. 

If there were no questions about this, then I don’t think you 

would see these nations buying as expensive and sophisticated and 

modernized weapons systems as they could. 

So for us I think it is to go back to a first principles question and 

try to understand the role that we play to help them have clarity 

on this issue. 

Thank you. 

Dr. CRONIN. Mr. Chairman, I have been looking at this military 

balance for more than 30 years, and I think it is fair to say that 

Asia is moving from an arms walk to an arms trot. 

There are particular systems such as undersea systems, also 

paramilitary systems—coast guard forces, civilian law enforcement 

forces—that have to be watched, as well as cyber and space that 

need to be integrated into our thinking about the long-term defense. So we have to consider the balance between our near-term 

readiness that Admiral Roughead talked about, which is indeed important, to make sure that we can run the long race as well; that 

we can invest in the systems that we are going to need to counter 

this much more complex set of systems that we summarize as antiaccess and area-denial capabilities. 

And we are operating in this middle gray zone of essentially confrontation, coercive diplomacy that makes it very difficult. And perceptions will be shifting. Budgets will be shifting on the basis of 

how well the U.S. plays this role. 

To answer Dr. Auslin’s question, ‘‘Why Asia is arms trotting?’’ 

The answer is because not only are their economies larger, but they 

are hedging. They are hedging a rising China and its capabilities. 

And they are hedging also, to varying degrees, because they are not 

sure that America will have the staying power and commitment. 

So it is very important that everything we do balances the near 

term with the long term, reinforces our long-standing commitments, projects a positive, inclusive vision for all countries in the 

region to try to dampen down unnecessary arms competition, but 

that we don’t give up our very strong, capable military preeminence. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Just a quick followup on that point. I mean, it occurs 

to me that the ‘‘arms trot,’’ as you describe in Asia, has probably 

less to do with us and much more to do with where those countries 
16 

are at. They have grown economically into a position to be able to 

afford this. 

It is not—I wouldn’t put it so much on whether or not they think 

our commitment is any less now than it was in the 1960s or 1970s. 

They are just in a better position to not be completely vulnerable 

and reliant on somebody else. And just about 100 out of 100 countries in that situation would choose the path that makes them less 

completely reliant on somebody else. And that is just sort of peer 

logic. And you add that in with the fact, you know, the territorial 

disputes that are, you know, not just between China and other 

countries, but Japan and South Korea, Japan and the Philippines. 

I mean, there are a lot of different things that they are sort of disputing over in terms of primarily land, mineral rights and all of 

that. And they would prefer to be at least in some position to defend themselves. 

Now, I continue to be optimistic, as I look at it, that what they 

have in common over there, that the economic growth, that the 

lack of actual conflict that has arisen out of this points to the fact 

that it will, long term, be more peaceful than I think some of the 

more paranoid among us might think. And I think that is the perspective that we should take as we engage is primarily on the diplomatic side, to be someone who can work with our economic 

power, with our soft power, with our diplomacy to work out some 

of these conflicts. 

My question is, you know, what risk do you see of some of these 

lower-level conflicts? Obviously, we know about North Korea and 

South Korea, and we can analyze where that might go. And I don’t 

think anybody knows. And there is clearly a risk there. But putting 

that one aside for the moment, when you look at some of the territorial disputes that exist between China and the Philippines and 

Vietnam and Japan; the territorial disputes between Japan and 

South Korea; obviously the ongoing India-Pakistan issue; what 

risks do you see out of any of those that there would be a real conflict arise that would require military action, either locally or by 

us? Or is it more likely that these things will be able to be resolved 

in a more diplomatic way? 

And all four of you don’t have to answer, because I want to get 

to some of the other questions. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. In my mind, the area that I think is the 

most sensitive right now, Congressman Smith, is the area of the 

Senkaku-Diaoyutai Islands between China and Japan. The activity 

that is taking place there is perhaps the most aggressive. And as 

I mentioned before, the problem is that there are no means and 

methods to share perspectives, to defuse, to de-escalate. So if you 

get a clash, you don’t have the mechanisms to bring it down. That 

is the area that I think about the most. 

Mr. SMITH. And just quickly, now, what mechanisms do you 

think we should try to be put in place so that we could have that 

option? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, first off, it is between China and 

Japan. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. But I think that we can encourage mechanisms that allow at the tactical level, at the operational level, and 
17 

even at the strategic level, for information to be shared; that there 

should be communication protocols that are used to clarify activities and intentions. That is not happening and I think that is 

something that really needs to be done. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Dr. Cronin, do you want to—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes, Representative Smith, thank you. To your first 

point, the trend that is driving Asian militaries has a lot to do with 

their own economic success, absolutely. We want to keep pushing 

that economic success. These countries should be, first and foremost, responsible for their self-defense. So this is a positive trend, 

I agree with you, in general. It is not necessarily a nefarious trend 

by any means. 

The risks of maritime disputes growing up, I agree with Admiral 

Roughead, that there is no doubt the East China Sea is the more 

serious of the two because you are dealing with two large militarily 

capable countries in China and Japan, and we have a very hard 

treaty commitment with Japan. 

China thought that it could get away with what it did to the 

Philippines last spring in Scarborough Shoal, namely that they 

could use extended coercive diplomacy on Washington to pressure 

our ally in Manila to back off out of Scarborough Shoal, and then 

China didn’t back off. And they thought maybe they could do this 

with Japan if they could make our Japanese ally appear to be the 

irresponsible and reckless power. 

We mustn’t let that happen. That is not war. That is this coercive diplomacy, gray-zone area. But there are some very serious 

triggers here. If you look at the latest defense of Japan white 

paper, the Japanese Ministry of Defense for the very first time outlines what is in effect a four-step doctrine. And it says that if the 

Japanese islands are occupied, force will have to be used. 

So we have to manage this very closely. And I think we hug our 

Japanese ally closely. If we work with China and try to come up 

with risk reduction measures, we can all work this out. This is not 

going to lead to war, but we have to be present and actively engaged. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to thank you and the ranking member for having this hearing. 

It would be very easy for us to put all the grease on the squeaky 

wheels, and you have refused to do that, and look at a problem 

that I think we need to be addressing. 

And I think as you look at all four of you, who bring such great 

expertise to this committee, you would probably agree with Admiral Roughead when he said that our armed forces are probably the 

largest stabilizing factor in this region. And the success of that stabilizing factor depends on their capability. And the capability we 

are looking at primarily is going to be Navy and Air Force. 

Admiral, my question for you, if you would take a couple minutes 

to respond to this, would be, what additional capabilities do we 

need? Do we need more of what we have? Do we need different ca-
18 

pabilities, more modern capabilities? Do we need to look at basing 

posture options? What do you think we need? 

And then Dr. Auslin, if you could address the Air Force specifically and what you believe General Carlisle needs as the commander of the Pacific Air Forces. Does he have what he needs? Or 

does he need something different? 

And Admiral, if you would go first. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. And I would say 

the—we have to look at the vastness of the region. And you can 

talk about capabilities, but capacity in the Pacific matters a lot. 

That is why I believe that a very, very thoughtful approach to our 

unmanned strategy in the Pacific, both air and sub-surface, is required because that will be the game-changer for the coming decades, in my view. And we have the lead in that technology and our 

operational experience. And we should jump on that and move as 

quickly as we possibly can. 

There is no question that we should look at our communication 

architectures that are in place because in the nature of high-end 

conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, that is where the initial battles 

are going to be fought. So how hard are they? How robust are they? 

How redundant are they? And so, the command and control and 

how we move forces I think is absolutely key. 

The other point I would say, getting to the capacity piece, is that 

we have to be seen in the region. We can’t simply say we care a 

lot about it and it is very important to us. We have to be seen. And 

that is why I think the initiative to move the littoral combat ships 

into Southeast Asia is absolutely spot-on. It is a perfect ship for 

that environment and the types of activities that will be there, but 

they have to be there in numbers. And that gives you an opportunity to be seen and that credibility goes up. 

And I am going to come back to near-term readiness, because 

that is the near-term resources that we use are what feed our ability to be out and about; maintain levels of readiness that allow us 

to be reliable and predictable when we are interacting in the region. And quite frankly, it is that near-term readiness money that, 

in my mind, does so much for our alliance relationships because it 

allows our militaries, not just with our allies, but also with likeminded partners, to do things together, whether it is, you know, 

some basic exercises or perhaps even some higher-end ones—humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy. 

It is the near-term money that gives us the means to do that; 

gives us the reliable equipment. And quite frankly, takes a lot of 

work off the backs of the young men and women who are out there 

doing the work. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Dr. Auslin. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Representative, thank you. 

And I agree with, certainly with what Admiral Roughead mentioned in terms of the overall approach we are beginning to take 

on things like Air-Sea Battle. 

If you look at the Defense Strategic Guidance that the President 

released in January of 2012, which called for flexible approaches, 

leaner troops, a different style of engaging militarily with the 

world, while keeping the commitments that we have, I think im-
19 

plicit in that to a large degree was a greater reliance on air power 

than perhaps we have had a public discussion of. 

You know, it is an old phrase, but I think especially when you 

talk about, as Admiral Roughead mentioned, the vastness—— 

Mr. FORBES. Doctor, I have only got 30 seconds. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Oh, I am sorry. 

Mr. FORBES. That is all right. It is just all the time I have got, 

so tell us what you can and then put the rest in the record. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Sure. Absolutely. 

I think what we need is a greater presence in terms of the tactical aircraft that our allies really think is the most important. If 

you look at the fact that we only have nine forward-based fighter 

squadrons in the region, it is a region in which you need to reach 

areas immediately and as quickly as possible. Air power allows you 

to do that, and allows I think the land-based capacity of carrying 

the types of weapons and munitions that would be required that 

give guarantees to our allies of our ability to intervene when necessary. 

So I would certainly say we need more of the F–35s when they 

are ready to be forward-based in the region, more than nine squadrons. 

We need the same with the unmanned, the remotely piloted aircraft that Admiral Roughead mentioned. 

And we need that phase zero presence to be increased. We need, 

if you would call, a little bit of air diplomacy to match the sea diplomacy and naval diplomacy that we have in the region, training 

and education and the like. Because every ally that we have wants 

to be able to cover their air domain—— 

Mr. FORBES. And my time is up. Anything else, we would love 

to have you submit for the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being before us. I kind of chuckle a 

little when people keep talking about rebalance and pivoting to the 

Pacific. I am a Californian. So we think we have always been 

turned towards the Pacific. And certainly I am glad that one of you 

mentioned we have had 325,000 troops in the Pacific for quite a 

while now. 

So my first question is, with respect to your assessment of the 

United States-Chinese military-to-military engagement, because, as 

you know, and some of you as former military, that we work and 

we strive very hard with so many countries to have that. So my 

question is, can the military-to-military engagement with China be 

improved? How would you propose improving the value of such contacts? 

And this comes in the context of an appropriations amendment 

that we have on the House floor today that would prohibit participation by the People’s Republic of China in joint U.S. military exercises. 

So whichever one of you want to take that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I guess I am the former military, so I will 

do that. 
20 

I really do believe that we have an opportunity to expand and 

enhance the mil-to-mil relationships with the PLA. The opportunities are there, as I believe that we will continue when our interests 

intersect to cooperate. 

I do encourage that we seek more opportunities to bring our 

operational forces together. I believe that we should expand some 

of the basic operational skill demonstrations. 

Our commanders and those on the ground are going to be very, 

very mindful of the technologies and the procedures and the processes that are key to us. But I think that we can do more. I believe 

there is a window currently to be able to do more. 

And I am very much in favor, for example, of the Chinese participation in the Rim of the Pacific exercise. I think that is a step forward. 

Now, China has to reciprocate. And they have to start bringing 

us into their activities as well. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes? 

Dr. SHINN. If I could weigh in, very briefly, you know I would 

agree with, emphatically, with Admiral Roughead. I mean the—I 

think the more mil-to-mil exposure we have on both sides, the better. 

If you believe—I know this is an unorthodox view from a conservative Republican here, but if you believe that deterrence is the 

underlying strategy here, then an accurate assessment of your respective capabilities is an extremely important part of that. And 

who better than the respective militaries? 

I also think, from personal experience, that our senior military 

officers are thoughtful, cautious people. They don’t need to be 

micromanaged, either by—you know, by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] or, necessarily, I think a lot of oversight to do 

the right thing and to be careful of the risks associated with Chinese intelligence, which of course is very active. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. My next question is about the role of 

the U.S. military in the event that something might happen in the 

East Sea or the South Sea, and I mention those names; I picked 

them very carefully. I represent the largest Vietnamese population 

outside of Vietnam in the world back in California. They would 

abhor calling the East Sea the East China Sea. I think that sort 

of tips the hand to a particular direction. 

But my real question is, what do you think the U.S. role would 

be if there would be a fight over some of these islands, a true fight; 

I mean maybe a military presence type of a situation. 

And I will leave, again, that open to whomever would like to answer it. 

Dr. CRONIN. Representative Sanchez, thank you very much. 

Growing up in California, I share your view about the long-standing importance of the Pacific to the country. 

And I am heading to Vietnam this weekend, as well as to Manila. And so it is very important that we signal clarity about our 

intention, not over whose sovereignty, but how sovereignty is decided. It is not decided through the arbitrary use of force. 

So any war, if you will, in inverted commas, that is likely to 

erupt in those seas would likely be very short. It is positional. It 

is coercive. 
21 

So we have to be ready to think ahead, several steps ahead, 

about how we make sure that countries like Vietnam and the Philippines are not isolated. 

We have a treaty alliance with the Philippines. Of course we 

have just a growing partnership with Vietnam. We have to grow 

that partnership with Vietnam. We have to help the Philippines be 

in a better position to defend itself. And that means not signaling 

war will erupt if something happens, but rather that we are determined that no one country should unilaterally be allowed to use 

force to change the status quo over disputed areas. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank the lady for her comments. 

And the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Nugent, you are recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. [Off mike.] 

I appreciate the comments made by the panel. It is obviously an 

interesting concept in regards to rebalancing. And some of the comments made the fact that we are not really sure on the clarity of 

the administration as to what that means. And I think that is what 

this hearing is all about is to try to clarify exactly what is the administration—what is the end-game that the administration has in 

place? And I think it is important to our allies in that region to 

really have a comprehensive idea as to where we are in regards to 

helping them protect their interests as regional allies in the area. 

But just—and I am sure one of you or all of you could answer 

this—what do you see as the—and I think you may have touched 

on this, Admiral—but probably the two biggest flashpoints in that 

region that we could ultimately be drawn into, to protect or at 

least, as you said, try to get ahead of the issue, so you have a way 

to—you know, to add some stabilization to the area. 

What two areas do you see as the biggest flashpoints for us? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As I mentioned, the East China Sea, because of the nature of the activity that has taken place and what 

could spin off there. And then, simply, because of the unpredictability and the consequences of North Korea becoming, let me just 

say ‘‘problematic’’ again, I think those are the two that have the 

greatest potential, not simply from high probability, but consequence because of the forces that are involved and what would 

be unleashed if it can’t be de-escalated. 

And because of the countries that are involved, that really is the 

real economic engine in Asia. 

I think it is important that, as we look at those two problems, 

our relationship with China and how those two problems are addressed will become critically important. 

Mr. NUGENT. Is it your estimation that we have the proper resources in place to, I guess, help influence the decisions of China 

that, you know, we also have, you know, it is always great, you 

know, in conversation when you have negotiations on any level, but 

that has to be backed up by the sword at some point, to make it 

credible. 

Do you believe that we have the proper resources in the proper 

locations that do what this administration is proposing that we do? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Proposing with regard to rebalancing? 

Mr. NUGENT. Yes. 
22 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, I think there are things that we need 

to do. One, as we look to the future, looking at the new technologies that are going to be brought to bear, making sure that we 

are not shorting the current readiness, because readiness, as you 

know, declines very rapidly. I have been there before, as a young 

officer. 

And if we don’t pay attention to that, you may have shiny things 

on runways and on ships, but if you have not been investing in current readiness, you are not going to get out of them what you expect. And you will not have prepared the young men and women 

who operate them properly and rightfully to do the job that we are 

gonna ask of them. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I am sure that China in particular, but our allies are hearing, you know, comments back here in regards to folks 

wanting us to reduce our footprint of our military overseas. 

What kind of impact do you think that has on our allies, Doctor? 

I will just go back to you and leave the admiral off the hook for 

a second. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Congressman, very briefly, I think it is very difficult 

for us to remain credible if we don’t, as the phrase goes, have skin 

in the game. 

The people in the region know the distances. It is why I think 

that the admiral’s point on readiness is crucial. We cannot be credible if they have questions as to whether or not we are going to 

have a political debate here in the U.S. about bringing forces forward, if they are not already forward based. And that is the worries that you hear most often in the region. 

Mr. NUGENT. I want to thank the panel for your comments. It 

is enlightening. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Carson is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This question is for all the panelists. Some people might perceive 

our rebalancing to the Pacific as a way of rebalancing away from 

the Middle East and our focus on terrorism and extremist groups. 

However, some may also see it as an extension of our war on terror, which many around the world as well as a few people in the 

U.S. have labeled a war on Islam. 

We know that there is no such thing, but the idea is still very 

pervasive. 

With three of the world’s largest Muslim populations—in Indonesia, India and Bangladesh—located in this region, what steps 

could we take to assure these countries that our pivot is not just 

refocusing our war on terror? And how can we counter these perceptions and maintain public support if we do end up pursuing extremist threats in these countries? 

Dr. CRONIN. Representative Carson, thank you for your excellent 

question. 

I was in Indonesia on 9/11 working for the government, in fact, 

and it seems to me that it should be obvious to the governments 

in Asia right now that the United States has considerably diversified our interest in dealing with them, beyond the immediate need 

to respond to the 9/11 crisis. 
23 

And so I think this is a good development. They understand that 

rebalancing is part of this. 

It is very important that everybody understand the United 

States has important global interests in the Middle East. We are 

not pivoting away from those interests, but we are trying to do 

them much more cost-effectively, strategically and intelligently so 

we can defend our global interests, and that is important. 

And finally, terrorism and political violence are going to continue 

to be part of the rest of our lives. Everything we can do to work 

with the law enforcement, judicial capacity of these countries; help 

the democratic movement in countries like Indonesia, which faces 

a crucial election next year. This is something that can go a long 

way toward self, sort of, provision of defense from these countries. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say that as you look at the countries 

that you mentioned, the relationship that we have there is very 

positive. I do not believe that it is seen at all as a shifting of our 

war on terror into that region. And I think it is largely due to the 

fact that our presence and our influence and our activities tend to 

be largely off-shore, and therefore there is not a sense that America 

is coming to stay; that America is there to help but not coming to 

stay. 

Mr. CARSON. Dr. Shinn, you are in deep thought over there, sir. 

Any—— 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SHINN. Only because I am not sure, I am not confident of my 

ability to answer that question. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Thank you. Mr. Auslin. 

Dr. AUSLIN. I would echo Dr. Shinn’s comment. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. 

Thank you all. Great answers. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here this morning. I have 

enjoyed our members’ questions and your testimony. 

I didn’t expect to make this a China-specific hearing, but it 

seems like from my trip to PACOM back in 2011, all of our allies 

and friends and partners pretty much had China on their minds. 

So they seem to be the 800-pound gorilla in the room. 

So I have a couple questions. I am going to try to stay on track, 

but there are so many things that we could talk about in so limited 

amount of time. Could we go back to why is China investing so 

much money into arms and their space programs? And I would like 

to start with Admiral Roughead. 

If we can just kind of keep it short—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. One, because they can. Two, because they 

have seen the trends in modern warfare, and they are making 

those investments that will preserve options for them, much the 

same as we look at the threat and developments and we invest in 

those things that we believe will give us the best options. That is 

about as short as I can get it. 
24 

Mr. PALAZZO. Anybody else want to add? 

Dr. CRONIN. Back after the first Gulf War I was working with 

a U.S. military PLA exchange. And the PLA said then—PLA general, ‘‘We want to know how to use space so we can leap frog our 

capabilities the way you have done it in the Gulf War.’’ They have 

been working consistently toward this path. They think they will 

get there by the middle of the century. Who knows, their political, 

socioeconomic tumult may prevent that from happening? But I 

think they want to clearly break our superiority in space. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I would have to agree with you, Dr. Cronin, on 

that. I mean, by 2020 they plan on being on the moon. And we 

can’t even launch American astronauts on American rockets from 

American soil. And I wish the American people would wake up to 

that reality, and I think they may have us prioritize, or at least 

try to keep our leadership in space. 

I have heard also the words ‘‘delay,’’ ‘‘deter,’’ and ‘‘deny’’ coming 

from, you know, part of their modernization of their warfare. Who 

are they trying to deny, delay, and deter, and for what reasons? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Obviously, they benchmark against our military. And they know that we are the most formidable force and 

that we have interests and that we will want to support our interests in the Asia-Pacific region and they want to have options 

against that. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Even though we have been pretty much a peacekeeping and stabilizing force in the region. So they have no known 

enemy, I assume. I mean, they are the world’s largest population, 

second largest economy. 

Does anybody—is China, are they fearful of an external threat? 

Does anybody want to take a shot at that? Somebody knocking on 

their door? 

Dr. AUSLIN. Well, I think that looking at what China’s concerns 

are, primarily and overwhelmingly, I think it is internal and it is 

domestic. And I think that is what worries the leadership most 

every day. But that is tied to what they can do abroad, both whether you believe that they use it to let off steam internally or because 

part of what they want to do is increase that sphere of influence, 

as all rising powers do. 

To get back a little bit to your question earlier—and I think this 

may answer part of it—they also want to—if they can deter the 

United States and they can deny other countries in the region from 

their own security objectives. And I think that the Chinese leadership understands, again, that there is a, you know, there is a huge 

terrain between the types of incidents that you have today and the 

United States getting involved. And so the degree to which you can 

complicate the decisionmaking here, is it worth it? Is it too costly? 

That allows you a freer hand in the region, vis-a-vis other nations, 

with which you have current problems, like Japan or like Vietnam. 

Mr. PALAZZO. If the shipping lanes in the Pacific region, and we 

know most trade and commerce, I think, is 80 percent, 90 percent 

of the world’s trade or commerce goes by sea, and a majority of it 

is actually in this region. If the United States of America is no 

longer able to keep the shipping lanes open and free for commerce 

and passage, what kind of implications would that have on the U.S. 

economy? And that may be your best guess. 
25 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. If the shipping lanes are disrupted or unpredictable then it will have a global effect, simply because of where 

the global economy is really being energized. Shipping lanes are 

absolutely key. They have been for centuries and they will continue 

to be. Who controls the shipping lanes will really have the upper 

hand, and that I think, from the perspective of a navy, that is the 

ultimate question, who controls the shipping lanes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, gentlemen. 

My time is expired. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see all of you here. Thank you for your testimony today. 

And particularly, Admiral Roughead, good to see you and your 

wife. 

One of the things in this hearing, I think, centers around the 

question of is this all about China, this rebalancing all about 

China. I think Dr. Shinn, you were pretty clear about saying, yes 

it is, it is absolutely all about China. Am I correct? 

Dr. SHINN. Actually, no. If I—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Oh. 

Dr. SHINN. If I could answer, I think it is as much about China 

and its alliance system in East Asia, particularly the relationship 

between the PRC and North Korea and the PRC and Pakistan, 

that in the long term makes this such a difficult proposition. 

And to tie it to a question from an earlier observation, I think 

the committee would probably agree that the sort of, likelihood of 

the immediate risks to the security of the U.S. on our allies is higher—is greater posed by North Korea or arguably by Pakistan in 

terms of nuclear proliferation, in terms of state-sponsored terrorism, and all the other mischief that they can engage in, and that 

therefore a rebalancing strategy really has to keep that challenge 

very clearly in focus. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that clarification. 

Would any of you like to add to that? And if you could do it really 

quickly? I would like to turn to Japan for a second. We haven’t discussed it. 

And Dr. Auslin, all about China, not necessarily? 

Dr. AUSLIN. No, I think it is not all about China. 

I would also, you know, raise the question, if the rebalance is 

about economics, do we need a rebalance for economics. We just 

need a policy that encourages free trade. If it is about politics, we 

don’t need a rebalance because nobody is going to stop the President from going to the East Asia summit. 

When we talk about the rebalance, I think we really should be 

clear. It really is, I would, argue about security, and then that 

raises the other questions. 

But it is about what type of Asia do we want to see. I think we 

want to see a liberal Asia, and we have seen great strides in that 

over recent decades. It is about how we want to help our allies and 

partners like Japan play the type of role that encourages those developments. 

And the more that we focus on China, I think we do at times 

have the potential of missing the much broader questions, again, 
26 

that go to the fundamental issue of why are we even involved. And 

it is because that it helps us, but it also helps the people of Asia. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

I might just go on, then. I mean, one of the issues, of course, 

around cyber warfare is one way that we focus on China. And I 

think the concerns have often been just about our own education 

system and being certain that we have the capacity that we have 

people in the pipeline, essentially, that are gonna be able to tackle 

these challenges for the future. I think that is something that we 

should be concerned about, and I hope that that is something that 

we are all able to focus on, as well. 

If we could just turn to Japan for a second, because we are very 

aware, of course, that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has focused on 

economic reforms, and yet we also know that there is certainly discussion at least about the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. And what 

would you like to add to that discussion in terms of just really providing an opinion. How likely do you think there might be some 

changes within the policies within Japan? 

Dr. CRONIN. I think it is very likely that we will see them whether we see them under Prime Minister Abe’s watch or whether it is 

his successor, or successors, we don’t know for sure. He is certainly 

going to try. 

The Japanese have been working on this for decades. They are 

taking, step-by-step, more responsibility for their self-defense. That 

is the way it ought to be. It was an unsustainable proposition that 

they would forever be the only country that would be pacifistic and 

yet developed in the world. That was never going to be sustaining. 

So we have an interest in working closely with the Japanese to 

make sure that their improvements in defense are congruent with 

our security interest in the region. And I think that is why we need 

to embrace the defense guidelines. 

I was part of the 1990s review. We need to be very assiduous in 

promoting a review of the defense guidelines over the next year so 

we can make sure their capacity in roles and missions as they 

change are good for the overall region and good for U.S. interests. 

Dr. AUSLIN. If I could just jump in very briefly. I would say, 

though, we have to be very aware of the constraints that Japan 

faces—budgetary constraints which I think will limit the natural 

moves towards modernizing and building up the military, and the 

demographic constraints. Those are going to increasingly weigh on 

Japan in the coming decades. 

And so I don’t think it is—I think the will, certainly, and a clarity of understanding of the challenges that Japan faces, and the 

threats it faces, is there. The means for Japan is even more 

straightened than the means here. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Admiral Roughead, quickly—I think my time just 

ran out. Did you want to say something very quickly? Mil-to-mil 

has obviously been important with Japan. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Absolutely. And I think what my colleagues 

mentioned was the fact that it is time to work closely with Japan 

and shape their way going forward. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mrs. Noem. 
27 

Mrs. NOEM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the panel for being here. 

I want to go back a little bit to Representative Palazzo’s line of 

questioning in regards to China and their modernization of their 

military force, and some of the challenges that we faced as a country as far as fiscally—our budgeting process, our lack of being able 

to pass appropriations bills, operating under CRs [continuing resolutions], the way that our contracts are affected within our military 

in that process, and the lack of our ability to really look forward 

and be visionary in how we invest in our military structure force, 

and the equipment that our men and women need to really go to 

war properly. 

I would like you to speculate for me a little bit on the timeframe 

that you could possibly see where China could be modernized to the 

point where they do have a military force that would be comparable to ours or even a step ahead. 

Admiral, if you would start, and if anyone else would like to 

weigh in, that would be wonderful. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think you almost have to parse it into two 

dimensions. It will be quite some time before China has the means 

to be the global force that we are, because of our global command 

and control capability, our global logistics, and the size and type 

of the force that we have designed to be not only in Asia, but in 

the Middle East and elsewhere. We are the only global force. 

So, I would say that if China were to pursue wanting to take 

over that space, we are talking decades. 

Mrs. NOEM. So size of force would be a challenge—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD [continuing]. Size of force—— 

Mrs. NOEM. But what about technology; the ability with new 

weapons that could be more effective than what we are currently 

using today? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I still think that to be global and to influence globally as we can, it is decades if they decide to pursue that. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The investments that they have put in place 

are really regional. And we have seen over the years where that 

is becoming more challenging and more challenging. And that is 

why, to your earlier point, it is so important to get away from talking about the eaches of systems, and really look at what is it that 

we want to do; how do we get our process in place and functioning 

the way that it was designed to function, and it functioned quite 

well; and to get away from continuing resolutions and sequesters. 

And right now, I don’t know how long it will take, but I think 

that we are doing damage to ourselves. You know, we look at what 

China is doing. I think we need to look at what we are doing. And 

we are damaging ourselves by the short-term, disruptive nature of 

trying to plan for a very, very complex future. 

Mrs. NOEM. I appreciate the candid response. 

Anyone else would like to weigh in? Dr. Shinn. 

Dr. SHINN. Yes, I would maybe echo Admiral Roughead’s observation, but take it even a step further. I mean, it seems to me that, 

to answer your very thoughtful question, you could probably—I 

mean, you probably deserve an explanation from the Obama administration to that question. Namely, what is the range of likely 
28 

contingencies in which there is a risk of a confrontation? Number 

one. For each of those contingencies, what is the trajectory? What 

does it mean in terms of the trajectory of the PLA buildup, which 

you had presented to you I think just last week? 

Number three, what does it take? This goes back to that third 

question. What does it take, as far as we can infer, to deter the 

PRC from actually engaging in expansion in that contingency? 

And then to the critical question, number four, what is the gap? 

What is the gap between what is required to exercise deterrence 

versus what is going to happen between sequestration and all the 

other cutbacks that we are likely to see? 

And then it is up to you, I think, to assess, is that an acceptable 

risk? If that delta is big, then we have a big problem. If that delta 

is small, then, you know, that comes with the territory. 

Mrs. NOEM. Do you think that the administration has the answers to those questions? Or do you believe that that should be 

more guideposts that everyone here should start looking at and 

analyzing and trying to find the answers to? 

Dr. SHINN. Probably both. 

Mrs. NOEM. You do believe that the answers may already be 

there—they have analyzed those and may potentially know what 

the situation is that we are currently facing? 

Dr. SHINN. Actually, that is just supposition on my part, since I 

just teach engineering these days. 

[Laughter.] 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. Well, thank you. 

Anyone else like to weigh in? We are 20 seconds left. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Just very briefly. First to chime onto this point. It 

is why I very much support Representative Forbes’s call for an 

interagency review. We haven’t had a strategy coming out of DOD 

[Department of Defense] since 1998. It is long overdue. We need it. 

Secondly, even if China does develop along the lines we have predicted, they still will be far behind us on the training. They don’t 

have an NCO [non-commissioned officer] corps, the experience. So, 

there is time, I think, that we have before we face. What we don’t 

have time is China vis-a-vis other Asian nations, and that draws 

us in. 

So, one metric, Congresswoman, as you have mentioned, is U.S.- 

China. The other one is China versus the rest of Asia. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. Thank you. Appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the witnesses. Your testimonies were very informative this morning. 

I think my questions would be to the military. This weekend, 

Prime Minister Abe of Japan was able to gain a landslide victory 

for his ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the upper house of the 

Diet. Now, what impact do you see that having on Japan’s role in 

this rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region? Will the Abe administration be able to leverage this victory to press for more progress in 

the development of the Futenma replacement facility in Okinawa? 

And will a more stable government of Japan help the U.S. advance 
29 

other defense- or security-related matters in the bilateral relationship? 

Admiral. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. This may sound like a dodge, Congresswoman Bordallo, but I think it is early. I think as Patrick mentioned, it will change the nature of the debate and the discussion 

within Japan and with a lean more toward enhancing a military 

and changing that military. How quickly that will happen and in 

what form I think is still to be determined. 

On Futenma, I have been watching Futenma since 1994, and I 

am not sure I care to predict what the outcome on that may be. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. We kind of feel that way in 

Guam. 

Was there anybody else that wanted to quickly answer? We have 

so little time up here, so if you would make your answers brief. 

Dr. CRONIN. The Abe administration wants to move forward on 

Futenma. I think as you know, Congresswoman, the situation in 

Okinawa, though, has not changed appreciably. So they still have 

to figure out how to overcome the local opposition. I am looking forward to being in Japan and then in Guam to talk about this basing 

in the next few weeks. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Thank you. 

My next question is, what impact has the delays in the realignment of Marines from Okinawa to Guam had on our political capital and regional credibility? Now, this is an issue that was raised 

in last year’s CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies] 

report on the rebalance of our military to the Asia-Pacific region. 

I am concerned that we are losing credibility by the obstruction 

that we continue to face from the U.S. Senate. And this feeds the 

overall perception that the U.S. is not serious about the rebalance, 

which couldn’t be further from the truth, as you can see from this 

hearing. 

Admiral, would you like to start out on that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say that it is—as I look at it, it is 

probably less about the forces that may be moving around, and 

more about the inability to lock down on a coherent strategy and 

the actions that support a strategy. That is the issue that I think 

people look at and scratch their heads. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Anyone else like to comment? Yes? 

Dr. SHINN. I would just say I think you are absolutely on the 

money. I think you have been involved for a long time in the FRF 

[Futenma Replacement Facility]. And I think you are absolutely 

right that the failure to move forward with this has done a lot of 

damage to our credibility in the past, much less sort of a big test 

point for whether the so-called ‘‘Asia rebalancing’’ is a real strategy 

or whether it is just a speech. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

I have one final question. And that is about how we resource and 

prioritize funding for the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. 

Chairman Forbes, Chairman Wittman, Congresswoman Hanabusa 

and I sent a letter to the National Security Adviser, Susan Rice, 

about the need to develop an implementation plan so that departments and agencies have a clear road map for how to prioritize resources to this strategic imperative. 
30 

Is there some example that we could use as a template for developing guidance for the current rebalance? 

Yes, Doctor. 

Dr. CRONIN. We did three reports out of the Department of Defense in the 1990s. We need to do a fourth one. And it needs to 

be more detailed. There can be a classified one for government purposes and there can be an unclassified one for public purposes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Anybody else want to comment on 

that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The only thing I would add is that it needs 

to take into account more than just the Department of Defense because of the many, many interests that are at play—economic, 

trade, diplomatic. And I think there are real opportunities, but it 

is a question of can, you know, if rebalance in the strategic objectives we have in Asia are the real thing, then how do we come together as a nation, apply the appropriate resources to achieve the 

ends that we seek for a prosperous Asia. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you very much for 

your answers. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

our panel of experts for their testimony today. Your insights are 

clearly invaluable as we look to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. 

Admiral Roughead, if I could start with you, I want to talk about 

UUVs [unmanned undersea vehicles] for a moment. During the 

February 26, 2013, hearing on the future of seapower, you remarked that the Virginia class submarine will be the mothership 

for what you believe to be an extraordinary potential in unmanned 

systems in the undersea. 

Can you expand on this? I know you spoke about it earlier today, 

but in terms of UUVs, but can you expand upon this in terms of 

the challenges that we face as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region since, as you know, the current Navy shipbuilding plan allows 

the existing fleet of dedicated SSGNs [nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines] to retire, and, in its place, relies on the Virginia 

payload module. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I really do believe that the Virginia class 

with payload modules has the potential to become the mothership 

of networks of unmanned systems that would operate in large 

ocean areas, in denied areas and very challenging areas. Because 

of the size of the modules, you can put the vehicles in there. You 

can bring them back in. You can husband them. 

And I believe that with more submarines with that capability, we 

actually expand our reach and our effectiveness. But it does require 

a companion aggressive approach to where do we want to go with 

unmanned underwater vehicles and taking on the challenges of the 

technology that it imposes. But I really do believe that the future, 

if we designed it right, Virginias with payload modules and UUVs 

will dominate the undersea. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 
31 

Dr. Cronin, can I turn to you about one of the areas that you 

commented on within your prepared remarks. You stated that a 

third military mission is to counter anti-access area-denial capabilities, more specifically, you highlighted that one of the steps to 

counter A2AD future capabilities is to look at a new theater antisubmarine warfare and undersea warfare capability. 

Given the very interesting developments in USB [undersea 

battlespace] and UUV technologies, can you elaborate for us on 

what this new capability, as well as the new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture you mentioned might look 

like, and, in particular, how might allied nations interface with 

such networks? 

Dr. CRONIN. Thank you, Congressman. If you think of a pyramid 

and at the top of the pyramid is the very most difficult warfighting 

activities that we must be prepared to do, even if they are not likely to happen in the near term, and you think about the foundation 

as the kind of intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance that can be 

widely shared with many partners, we need to start building that 

foundation, for instance, for operations—such as disaster response 

with countries in the region. We need to increase interoperability 

with key allies with undersea assets like Japan, Australia, India, 

so that we could stitch together, essentially, a theater ASW [antisubmarine warfare] plan for the longer term. 

And then we need to figure out how to make our unmanned vehicles truly autonomous. That is the next step. And when we do that, 

we will be able to cover a much greater security sphere in line with 

allies and partners so that we can make sure that the shipping 

lanes stay open, so that we can make sure there is no coercive use 

of force or untoward intelligence that is going on because of the 

growing submarine and undersea capabilities in the region. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Cronin. 

Well, my time—still have time on the clock. Let me turn to another topic of concern to me, and that is cyber. I have long been 

concerned about our ability to—of our basing and infrastructure to 

withstand cyber attacks that could reasonably be expected in any 

conflict scenario, especially a contingency in such areas as the Korean peninsula—the East China Sea or South China Sea. 

What is your assessment of the ability of our domestic and overseas base infrastructure, particularly the external inputs that, such 

as electricity, that may not be protected by DOD’s expertise, to 

withstand a cyber attack and continue to enable our military to actually function. 

Dr. CRONIN. Congressman, just briefly, when there was an earlier discussion on China and PLA capabilities, it is not just the 

Chinese. It is the Russians. It is the North Koreans and others. 

When you deal with cyber, we are vulnerable. And while there may 

be uncertainty about the long-term military buildup, there is no 

uncertainty about the vulnerability to our cyber networks and our 

allies’ and partners’ cyber networks. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, you want to—— 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, I would just say that we will never be 

able to take cyber security for granted. And you have touched on 

some very significant points. The infrastructure, power, all of that 

has to have an integrated approach. And it needs to be just beyond 
32 

our base structure. Because of the way that we operate as a nation, 

we have to have more of a national view and national policy and 

national confidence in cyber if we are going to be effective. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Panelists, thank you so much for joining us today. As you can 

imagine, lots of questions about what is developing before us there 

in the Asia-Pacific. I appreciate getting your perspective. Having 

recently travelled to the Asia-Pacific, lots of concerns there, obviously, with the relationship they have, that we have with our allies. There are concerns, too, about China’s behavior in the region. 

I wanted to get your perspective on where our relationships with 

our allies need to be going in that area to make sure that this is 

a collective effort as far as the actions of China in that region. Obviously, they are continuing to build a presence, continue to be 

somewhat belligerent in the area, expanding their presence into 

other areas of the Pacific where we haven’t seen them before. 

So I just want to get your perspective on where you believe our 

relationships need to be building with allies in the area and what 

we need to be doing to working, not only in our relationships with 

individual countries, but also relationships there with the collective 

groups of countries in that region. 

Admiral Roughead, I will begin with you. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. 

I think our relationships with our allies are good. And I would 

also say that, as we look at the region, we should talk about our 

allies and our like-minded partners. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And we really need to think anew about 

some of the emerging countries that are there. The, as I said, relationship is good. Activities, I believe, are appropriate to the time 

and what our interests are. 

But there are some areas where I really think that we need to 

look into. One is on how we elect to, and then how we move quickly 

through technical transfer. You know, we will always protect what 

we need, but our system is almost designed to make it difficult to 

share with like-minded partners and allies on some of the things 

that will really make a difference if we come together. 

The other is our ability for the people that we have who serve 

and the countries with whom we want to have relationships. How 

can we mix the—I don’t like to use the word ‘‘exchange’’ because 

our current system is a one-for-one. And that can be very hidebound for countries that may not have the resources. So I would 

look at, how do we want to expose and inform the people—the U.S. 

military. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And then how do we bring others from other 

countries? And we should redesign the means and the system for 

doing that. Because I think that is huge. When young people serve 

and work together, that relationship is going to last a lifetime. And 

we just make it too hard. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Absolutely. 
33 

Dr. Auslin. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Congressman, thank you. 

I think you have raised an absolutely crucial point. And I think 

we have to have a serious discussion about how we extend or think 

about going beyond the hub and the spoke, which does not mean 

getting rid of our current treaty commitments. But how do we get 

our allies to work better together? That, to me, is crucial. 

Relations between Japan and South Korea are very poor right 

now, probably the worst that most of us have seen in a long time. 

They are not getting any better. We need to think much more creatively. Number one, as I said, how do we get them to work better 

together and with us? 

Secondly, how do we get allies such as Japan, for example, in the 

northeast or Australia in the southeast, how do we get them to 

play a larger role, vis-a-vis the smaller partners that we want to 

work with and have a sort of leading, guiding mentorship type of 

role in terms of things like public goods and general security within 

the region. Those are areas I think we should focus a lot more on, 

in which I think we would get buy-in from all of our partners. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Gotcha. Very good. 

Dr. Cronin. 

Dr. CRONIN. A couple of points that I would add to my testimony. 

One was we need to think broadly globally, even about other countries that can help our Asian allies and partners, so—NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization] partnerships with Asian countries. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Dr. CRONIN. It may seem symbolic, but they bring great expertise, doctrine, inter-operability, know-how. That is the kind of 

thing, as we think about next year’s NATO summit in 2014 and 

NATO draws down on ISAF [International Security Assistance 

Force] we could look more at, but as well as India and other countries that are not allies. But as they look east, we need to help 

India play a bigger role in East Asia and in the Pacific. 

Japan is—its course of diplomacy right now. Korea, as Dr. Auslin 

said, it is the Japan-Korea relationship that we really can work on. 

Australia, we can do more to push our Australian allies to spend 

a little more money on defense, even while we work with them on 

inter-operability. Philippines, we need to build their capacity. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Dr. CRONIN. Thailand, we need to make sure that they are using 

ground forces to, not just influence their own campaign in the 

south, but also—against extremism—but also to influence 

Myanmar, where the army has played a dominant role. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Dr. Shinn, any perspective? Okay. 

Dr. SHINN. Nothing to add, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay, very good. 

Mr. Chairman, it looks like my time is at end. So I will yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome. And, Admiral Roughead, it is good to see 

you again. 
34 

Dr. Auslin, I want to sort of go back to what you were talking 

about. You know, I was struck in your testimony where you talk 

about what is the U.S. role. Are we going to be the cop on the beat? 

Are we there to mediate disputes between the Japanese and the 

Koreans? Are we there to help the Vietnamese fisherman when the 

Chinese push further? Are we there to help a territorial dispute? 

Or are there other things that we should be doing? You—in a previous answer, you spoke about coordination between different agencies within the U.S. government, State and DOD, for example. 

You know, I grew up in Southeast Asia. And I was struck after 

I had not been to the Philippines in a long time and went back to 

the Philippines how pervasive the South Korean presence was. And 

in Thailand, you know, the fact that the South Korean presence, 

the Japanese presence, we had really thought in the 1990s that the 

Chinese were just going to come in, and in the early 2000s and 

dominate everything. But I sort of feel like, in my travels throughout Southeast Asia, specifically, that that has really not happened 

as much, almost as if some of the Chinese have overstayed their 

welcome or have not acted in a way that was well received 

Could you speak a little bit to how we leverage some of these 

other strengths, partnerships, ASEAN, for example, or economic relationships that we have to, you know, promote American presence 

or influence? 

Dr. AUSLIN. Ms. Congresswoman, thank you. 

I think that the first question we have to ask, and I am not sure 

we ask it all the time, is what do those countries want? What are 

their concerns? What are their needs? We look at it often from a 

security perspective because we have these commitments. And that 

is proper and right. But in terms of building relationships, it does 

have to be a two-way relationship. It does have to be a give and 

take, as always. 

The great development we have seen of democracy and free market systems throughout Asia over the past generation is something 

that we should be encouraging. It is something that I think our allies and closer partners also have been a central part of, and, 

therefore, can work to inculcate those norms to help, you know, 

help with expertise and the like. 

That, to me, is part of a rebalance. And it is part of saying that 

what we are looking at is the long-term development of this region. 

Japan has extraordinary expertise in this. South Korea has expertise. Australia, obviously. I am not sure that we do leverage 

that in the same way, partly because we are focused so much on 

near-term concerns, and partly because, as we have talked about 

before, we do think of this in a one-point to one-point hub and 

spoke set of relationships. 

We need to work more with ASEAN and encourage it. But what 

I think we should be doing probably is working with those nations 

that share those same values and have the same interests. As you 

have said, Japan and South Korea are already in the region, and 

therefore look for ways that you get a group of willing nations to 

come together and move the entire region forward. 

Thank you. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Admiral, I just wanted to talk to you a little 

bit, sort of building on those. I think that there are relationships 
35 

that the U.S., especially our military, has in the Asia-Pacific region 

that perhaps Americans are not as well aware of and even other 

allies. 

For example, I think of Indonesia specifically. I think most Americans are surprised to find out we have been conducting Operation 

Garuda Shield in partnership with the Indonesian military for 

quite a while now. 

Is there any other types of those types of partnerships, the State 

Partnership Programs? You know, I think of the—I think it is Oregon works with Indonesia and Hawaii works with Thailand. And 

sort of look at, are there any other relationships like that—you are 

talking about people who grow up together in different militaries 

and work together, that we should be leveraging? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think that one of the things that needs to 

be done as we look at the security is exactly what you have referenced, that you have to look at the entire spectrum of things that 

are taking place. 

The one area that I know many have talked about before is this 

whole issue of IMET, International Military Education and Training. The amount of money that goes into IMET and many of the 

programs that are outside of your authority because they reside in 

foreign affairs and what have you, it is really, I think, a bit incoherent. 

And there should be a rationalization of how are we applying 

these various programs. 

The other thing I would say is that we can’t be too quick on the 

switch to shut them off because of something that happens, because even though we may be fairly callous in doing that, that is 

never forgotten. 

And I think that there has to be a longer term, more moderated 

approach on how do we develop these very important personal relationships. 

The CHAIRMAN. There appears to be no more questions from 

members. 

Well, I really appreciate you being here today. This I think there 

are some very important points brought out in your testimony and 

in your response to the questions. 

This is something that has been coming up before me quite often. 

I have met with ambassadors from the region. I have met with legislators. My counterpart in the Japanese legislature came by a couple weeks ago, and he was concerned. He said there are everincreasing flights by the Chinese that encroach or come closer to 

their airspace. And he said they had to scramble their jets 300 

times last year. And he said it is increasing at a faster rate this 

year. 

So those kind of tensions I think will be building as we are pulling back. And if we don’t keep a forward presence—I know Admiral 

Locklear testified recently. 

He said, you know, the uprising or the, you know the problem 

that came up in Korea not too long ago, he said usually when that 

happens, he sends a carrier. He says I don’t have a carrier to send. 

And he said then a backup is when it happens I send a B–2 or 

some F–22s, and I don’t—you know, we are not flying them now, 

so I don’t have them. 
36 

So I think I hear this from this region, I hear it from everywhere 

around the world, people are very concerned. As you said, they are 

watching our budgets and they are watching what we are doing. 

And I kind of liken nations to individuals. There are just more 

of them. And the temperaments the same, the personalities. And 

I think we all remember the schoolyard bully that unless somebody 

bloodied his nose, he kept pushing. 

And I see that happening. And if nobody bothers the bully, then 

people kind of want to make friends with the bully. 

And when we pull back, if we leave a vacuum, somebody else is 

going to fill it. 

And I think these people from these other regions understand 

that we are not of a nature to want to come in and dominate. We 

don’t want to come in and take over. We just want to keep the sea 

lanes open. We want to make sure that we can have commerce 

around the world. 

We would like to have peace around the world. And it is becoming ever more difficult, as we are having to cut back our military. 

People talk about sequestration. They forget the $487 billion that 

we cut before that that is just beginning to be felt, the roughly 

$150 billion a year of OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] 

funds, some of that, I am sure, was money that was coming that 

would have helped the base budget. And we have cut that back, in 

half this year. 

I know we are out of Iraq, but it is going to be more expensive 

this year in Afghanistan as we pull down bases and come out. 

So the cuts to our military are going to have significant impact 

around the world. 

And I really appreciate the points you brought out about—okay, 

a speech says we are going to change our focus. What does that 

mean? What have we actually done? What can we do? 

Again, Admiral Locklear pointed out—and I am sure, Admiral, 

you lived this—but if we take the whole Pacific area, they could 

put every bit of landmass on the Earth in that area plus room left 

over for another Africa and Australia. 

And you know, we are talking about this shift when we are taking our Navy down to very low numbers. And we all know that the 

ships are much more powerful than they were in World War I, but 

we yet haven’t figured out how to have them in two places at the 

same time. 

And it does take time. Somebody pointed out to me the other 

day, if you take all of that landmass, you know, if any of you are 

Texans, you know Texas is really big. But when you compare it to 

all of the landmass, it is not that large. 

And how long would it take, Admiral, a destroyer to—30 miles 

an hour, roughly. How long would it take to cross Texas? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I am not a Texan. But I can tell you, it 

takes an awful long time, just to go from Guam to Hawaii. And I 

think that when you look east, you really have a distorted view of 

distance. Out there, you know, to get across the Pacific is about a 

3-week, unless you are absolutely going at flank speed. 

So the idea of not being there and being able to respond quickly 

to the pace with which events will unfold—if you are not there, you 

are not there. 
37 

And I think that is just the nature of the Pacific. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the point was well-made that if you give a 

speech and say you are going to do something and then don’t do 

it, again, people around the world are watching. And our credibility 

is at stake. Setting red lines and then pulling away from them, our 

credibility is at stake. 

So, anyway, these kind of hearings are very important for the 

committee to focus in on where we are and what we are doing and 

what our responsibilities are. 

Meanwhile, over on the floor, we are trying to get an appropriations bill passed for defense to try to see how we can get through 

the year. 

Thank you very much. 

This hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 24, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 24, 2013 

(43) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon 

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific Region and Implications for U.S. 

National Security" 

July 24, 2013 

I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the rebalancing strategy to the 

Asia-Pacific region and implications for U.S. national security. This is an 

important topic for the committee and we have a distinguished panel of witnesses 

before us today. 

Since the President's defense strategic guidance was released a year and a half ago, 

this committee has worked to understand the details. The key pieces appear to be 

the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines to northern Australia and the first 

deployment of the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship to Singapore. 

But we are still missing a good understanding of what the U.S. military is and 

should be doing in the region. Let me be clear-l don't think there is any 

disagreement on the goodness of rebalancing to Asia.l hope our witnesses today 

will give us their insight to some very important questions. What should a robust 

strategy look like? What are the regional security concerns of the U.S., including 

and beyond the issue of China? What opportunities are we missing? Can the 

rebalancing be effective without additional resources? How will sequestration 

impact the capabilities and capacity of the U.S. military to rebalance to Asia, 

especially when we are still drawn to respond to crises in other regions? And, if 

the U.S. can't effectively and fully execute the strategy, how will the region's 

militaries view us? 
44 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific Region and Implications for U.S. 

National Security" 

July 24, 2013 

I would like to welcome our witnesses and to thank them for being here with us 

this morning. I look forward to their testimony on this important topic. 

The diverse Asia-Pacific region is vital to our national interests, and it includes 

many allies and partners that are essential to those interests. Without question, 

U.S. service men and women play crucial roles in maintaining these relationships 

and in promoting peace in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Current strategic guidance emphasizes a renewed focus on the region. It is both 

timely and appropriate for the United States to reevaluate and to carefully hone its 

Asian-Pacific strategy as that dynamic region continues to flourish. Strategic 

rebalancing will undoubtedly affirm the critical roles played by the U.S. military in 

support of, and in concert with, broad U.S. diplomatic, economic, and assistance 

goals and other efforts in the region. 

Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region will require the United States to weigh a 

wide variety of risks and to establish and implement numerous national and 

regional priorities and objectives. This is, and will continue to be, a significant 

undertaking, especially in the immediate context of sequestration. 

As it rebalances, the United States should continue to promote shared interests, to 

mitigate concerns, and to perpetuate multi-lateral cooperation in the region. We 

should: work to cultivate a secure and mutually beneficial relationship with China, 

continue to contain and marginalize the recalcitrant North Korean regime, continue 

to develop our relationship with India, and endeavor to strengthen enduring 

relationships with partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and 

Singapore. 
45 

Transnational threats, such as violent extremism, cyber-threats, and illicit 

trafficking in persons, narcotics, and weapons continue to menace the region. 

Unfortunately, disease, malnourishment, environmental degradation, resource 

scarcity, and natural disaster also persist. The more we can do to defuse tensions 

through cooperative efforts with our many allies and strategic partners in the 

region, the more we can help to realize the immense potential for growth and 

prosperity in the region. 

The United States will continue to lead in the Asia-Pacific and to offer assurances 

through our forward military presence in the region, because the United States will 

continue to playa fundamental role in surmounting security challenges now and in 

the future. 

r look forward to receiving our witnesses' testimony and to expanding our 

dialogue on these and other important issues. I would especially appreciate our 

witnesses' views on how the United States might effect a rebalance to the AsiaPacific region in this era of fiscal constraint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
46 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 1 

Hearing on "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific Region and Implications for u.s. 

National Security" 

Michael R. Auslin, PhD 

Resident Scholar, Asian Studies and Director, Japan Studies 

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 

Wednesday, July 24, 2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the Administration's 

rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and its implications for U.S. national security. 

It is an honor to sit beside my distinguished co-panelists. Today, I would like first to 

discuss whether the trends in the Asia-Pacific justify a "rebalance" to the region; 

next, analyze what we know of the policy itself; and finally question whether or not 

the Administration's goals can be met by the resources it intends to commit to the 

policy. 

The question of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific is part of a larger debate over 

America's role in the post-war on terror era. Since the September 11 terror attacks, 

America's security community has been largely focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, 

with good reason. Yet as the Administration draws down its presence in 
47 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 2 

Afghanistan, after ending military operations in Iraq, and attempts to limit its future 

military activities in the Middle East, there is vigorous public discussion over the 

future of America's global military posture. In many ways, this policy debate mirrors 

the one that occurred at the end of the Cold War, just over two decades ago, and pits 

the same sets of competing preferences against each other. 

One the one hand are those who believe the United States can or should no longer 

play the same type of dominant role in the world. Some analysts, like Richard Haass, 

would like to dramatically reduce America's military presence abroad and instead 

focus on problems at home. Similarly, Charles Kupchan and others believe that a 

new international order of rising nations, such as China, Turkey, Brazil, and the like, 

will spontaneously coalesce to uphold the liberal norms of the post-World War II 

world. On the other side ofthe spectrum, conservative internationalists, like Charles 

Krauthammer, argue that America must remain engaged in the world, continuing to 

provide military and security guarantees to allies, and attempting to limit the 

disruptive impact of powers like China and Russia. Robert Kagan has also written on 

the return of authoritarianism and the risk it portends for continued stability 

around the globe. For conservative internationalists, American power retains its 

central role and is the basis for our ongoing global influence. 

For the past decade, our war against Islamic extremism had the perhaps 

unintentional effect of relegating much of the rest of the world to a second-tier 

security concern, despite continued evolution in various security environments. 
48 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 3 

Because we have maintained our permanent forward-based military presence in 

East Asia, however, and due to the rise of China and the continued North Korean 

nuclear and ballistic missile threat, the Asia-Pacific region has been kept somewhat 

higher on Washington's priority list than might otherwise have been the case. 

Without those conditions, it is likely that fewer resources, whether material or 

intellectual, would have been committed to upholding America's role in the region. 

Of course, those two trends - our military presence and the specter of instability 

from China and North Korea - were mutually reinforcing, in the sense that the 

rationale for keeping hundreds of thousands of military personnel in the Pacific was 

strengthened by concerns over China and fears of North Korea. 

The question is, then, does today's security environment in the Asia-Pacific mandate 

a rebalancing. That question actually has two parts: the first, are there new or 

qualitatively different threats to the Asia-Pacific than in the past; and second, is the 

current U.S. military posture inadequate for the tasks set it, in light of those 

changes? 

The Asia-Pacific presents a unique challenge to security analysts. On the one hand, 

there seems little doubt that it has become a more unstable, even more 

unpredictable, place. The security environment that held throughout the Cold War 

has been upended in just twenty years, thanks primarily to the unprecedented rise 

to power of China and the continued threat to stability posed by the totalitarian 

government of Kim Jong Un, in North Korea. For the past two decades, China has 
49 

Austin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 4 

increased its defense budget by double digits every year, and now spends over $100 

billion per year, and perhaps several times that amount. In doing so, it has 

developed modern weapons systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

attack and ballistic missile submarines, advanced fighter jets, and more recently its 

first aircraft carrier. North Korea, of course, has developed a nuclear weapons 

program at the same time it has attempted to perfect ballistic missile capability. 

Pyongyang has violated every norm of international law and conduct, in the face of 

U.N. sanctions and international opprobrium, attacking its neighbor South Korea 

twice in 2010 and continuing to test missiles and set off nuclear explosion. 

These facts alone would lend credence to the belief that Asia is changing for the 

worse, and that threats to stability are growing. Yet it is in addition a region riven by 

territorial disputes among all its major nations. These disputes are both land-based 

and maritime in nature. Beyond the major divisions of the Korean peninsula and 

across the Taiwan Strait, these disputes pit giant nations like China against smaller 

nations in Southeast Asia, as well as against large states like India and Japan. Indeed, 

as China has developed its military capabilities, it has adopted over the past several 

years an increasingly assertive, some would say aggressive, stance over contested 

territory with its neighbors, particularly Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. China 

is not alone, however, in having seemingly irreconcilable disputes with nations 

around it. Japan, too, is set against all its neighbors, primarily Russia, China, and 

South Korea, while smaller nations have their own disagreements. These disputes 
50 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 

are one reason, among others, why the Asia-Pacific region has never developed a 

political community even remotely resembling the European Union. 

5 

In light of these facts, the Asia-Pacific has become for the Administration its 

internationalist cause. While remaining committed to multilateral mechanisms and 

dialogue, the Administration has also figuratively drawn a line in the waters of the 

western Pacific, asserting not merely a continued role for the United States in the 

world's most populous and dynamic region, but an increased one. On the face of it, 

there is good reason for the Administration's stance, given Asia's importance. Asia of 

course contains two of the world's three largest economies, the world's two most 

populous nations, the world's largest militaries, and some of its most stable 

democracies. It is a region crucial to American and global prosperity, and it is one in 

which tens of millions of people have moved from authoritarianism to democracy in 

the past generation. 

It is too early to say, however, that Asia today faces qualitatively different challenges 

or threats. For all the talk of China attempting to rewrite rules of international 

behavior in the South and East China Seas, there are counterarguments that other 

nations have also attempted to change the status quo. Of course those states, such as 

Japan or Vietnam, argue that it is Chinese actions that have undermined the status 

quo and raised their fears of losing control over long-claimed territory. Such is the 

level of distrust and animosity rampant in Asia. Despite this, no Asian state has 
51 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 

attempted seriously to interfere with regional and global trade, whether in crucial 

waterways such as the Strait of Malacca or larger bodies of water, such as the South 

China Sea. North Korea, while unpredictable and dangerous, remains a fragile state 

whose foreign policy is largely bluster and quick backing down from the brink. Few 

respectable analysts would claim that conflict is imminent or even likely to break 

out, except due to miscalculation or accident. 

6 

That then raises the second part of this first question: is the current U.S. military 

posture and policy in the Asia-Pacific sufficient to influence the outcome of events 

and continue to maintain stability? For the most part, I would argue the answer is 

yes, if only because our alliance guarantees are still taken seriously by the region's 

states and only because no other nation in Asia can yet qualitatively challenge U.S. 

military strength. The 325,000 military personnel of U.S. Pacific Command and their 

ships, planes, subs, and the like remain a credible deterrent in today's environment. 

The continued U.S. commitment to our five treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, 

Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand) largely precludes the possibility of major 

war breaking out, and both China and North Korea continue to take seriously 

Republican and Democratic Administrations' repeated assertions that the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella remains in force. Moreover, as allies such as Japan and South 

Korea slowly but steadily build up their own defensive capabilities, the calculus for 

any potential aggressor is further complicated. 
52 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 7 

A further, yet potentially more debatable, reason that our current military posture is 

sufficient is due to the fact that there is little evidence that any power in Asia wants 

unilaterally to change uncontested borders or to control vital trade routes. Beijing's 

claim that the entire South China Sea is Chinese territory is not only unenforceable, 

it is dismissed by every other nation in the region. As of yet, there is little 

acquiescence by Asian nations in China's attempts to intimidate them over 

contested territory, despite their fears of Beijing's military strength. It is always easy 

to claim that one's current military strength is sufficient in largely benign 

conditions, but the current environment does not support more dire interpretations 

of the dangers to peace and prosperity in Asia. 

That is not to say, however, that we should be dismissive of the potential for a 

significant deterioration in Asia's security environment. Indeed, America's military 

presence in Asia is often likened to an "insurance policy," with Washington 

"underwriting" regional security through its alliances and other vague guarantees. 

That means that Washington must be acutely sensitive to the actuarial tables of 

international relations (to continue with the insurance analogy). Older international 

systems are a greater risk of breaking down than younger ones. Rising challengers 

introduce a level of instability and often danger into areas where they are more 

powerful than other states. Exhaustion on the part of the regional security 

guarantor both emboldens those who seek to challenge the existing rule set of 

regional or international norms, and introduces an element of uncertainty 

regardless ofthe intentions of the guarantor. 
53 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 8 

From one perspective, the key role the United States plays in Asia is akin to a 

"broken windows" approach. The more that regional security norms are chipped 

away, the more uncertain and unstable the environment becomes. There is an 

enormous terrain between maritime bullying and full-scale war, but the gradual 

erosion of a sense of stability and security often leads into a spiral of greater tension 

and worsening relations. Indeed, it is fair to say that the Asia-Pacific is currently in 

the early stages of that spiral. While I have found few in the region who seriously 

fear the outbreak of war, they are nonetheless concerned that the region today is 

less stable than yesterday and that tomorrow it will be worse. Thus, while they push 

themselves to spend ever more amounts of money on defense, what they expect 

from the United States is a constant presence and a clear response to those acts that 

serve to undermine general security. Here, they are concerned, as am I, that what 

the United States lacks in Asia is not capacity, but political will. The past decade has 

seen ongoing attempts by China to test the boundaries of acceptable behavior, and 

to probe the response of Washington and its allies to outlandish claims, provocative 

actions, and support for rogue regimes. The perceived lack of response by 

Washington, and certainly public response, raises concerns in their minds that our 

commitment to stability is wavering, despite our continued presence. 

In particular there is deep concern over Washington's refusal to take a stronger 

stand on the region's maritime disputes. Both Japan and the Philippines have 

explicitly requested greater U.S. support in the spirit of our alliances, and other 
54 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 

nations wonder why Washington refuses to make clearer its opposition to China's 

intimidation of smaller states, if not actually move to help them with greater shows 

of U.S. naval presence, information sharing, joint training, and the like. Limited step 

such as the recent U.S.-Vietnam maritime exercises send short-term signals that do 

not alleviate fears that Washington's policy is all words and little action. 

9 

The same goes for North Korea, perhaps even more so. While the North Korean 

threat may be limited largely to South Korea and Japan, the fact that successive U.S. 

administrations have regularly returned to the negotiating table, and have 

repeatedly failed to impose any type of cost on North Korea for its aggression, has 

undermined the credibility of Washington in the eyes of many in Asia. All 

understand that there are few good options for reining in Pyongyang, but America's 

diplomatic failure to denuclearize the North as well as punish it for past actions 

leaves Asian nations fearful of an unending and growing threat from the 

unpredictable Kim regime. 

The second question I would like to discuss naturally follows from the first: if the 

Administration has concluded that security conditions in the Asia-Pacific warrant a 

rebalance, what does that policy look like? The Administration's rebalance, initially 

labeled the "pivot," is generally dated to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 

July 2010 speech at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, in which she announced 

that peaceful, multilateral settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea 

was in America's national interest. While the Administration has repeatedly 
55 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 10 

attempted to describe the evolution of the rebalance as a whole-of-government 

approach, it is the military component of that rebalance that has received the most 

attention. 

President Obama's November 2011 visit to Asia is seen as the formal codification of 

the rebalance, particularly his speech in Darwin, Australia, where he announced that 

up to 2,500 U.S. Marines would be rotationally deployed for training purposes at a 

base there. This was followed by news that the Singapore would allow four new 

Littoral Combat Ships to be rotationally ported at Changi Naval Base, and that 

Washington was actively exploring the possibility of temporary basing access in the 

Philippines, which would mark a return of U.S. forces to the islands after having 

been ejected in 1992. Finally, at the 2012 Shangri-la security conference in 

Singapore, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta attempted to more fully explain 

the rebalancing strategy. He noted that, in addition to the moves noted above, the 

U.S. Navy would move 60 percent of its global assets to the region, and would 

embark on more exchanges and visits throughout the area, including in the Indian 

Ocean. 

These military moves were supplemented by a diplomatic and economic push by the 

White House ostensibly to increase American engagement with the Asia-Pacific 

region. The President attended the East Asia Summit in both 2011 and 2012, 

becoming the first president to do so since the summit was inaugurated in 2005. In 

addition, the Administration belatedly embraced the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a 
56 

Austin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 

major free trade initiative, and moved to expand it by encouraging the addition of 

members such as Japan, Canada, and Mexico. Taken together, these efforts were 

labeled the 'rebalance: and portrayed as a new commitment on the part of the 

United States to maintain and expand its role and influence in the world's most 

dynamic region. 

11 

This brief review of the Administration's stated rebalancing policy raises a third, 

and final question: can the policy achieve the goals set for it by the Administration? 

This naturally raises a subsidiary question of just what the Administration hopes to 

achieve. There has been no clear answer provided to this question. Is the rebalance 

to counter China's rise? The Administration assures observers such is not the case, 

but that is disbelieved by most nations in the region. Is it to forge a community of 

liberal interests? There is no evidence of such a desire. To argue that "America is 

back," as many Administration officials have put it, is not a particularly compelling 

policy goal, just as it is to ignore the constant engagement with Asia by the Bush 

Administration, at least at a par with the attention paid by the Obama White House. 

Thus, we are left without a clear rationale for the rebalancing policy, though 

countering China's growing influence is obviously the most parsimonious 

explanation. 

That returns us to the main question: can it be achieved? From what we know of the 

security-oriented aspects of the rebalance, it would seem to be more of a rhetorical 

change than a substantive one. While Secretary Panetta touted the fact that 60 
57 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 12 

percent of the U.S. Navy's assets would be moved to the Asia-Pacific region, in 

reality, the Navy had already repositioned to the region. Given that half of America's 

aircraft carriers and over 50 percent of the Navy's cruisers, destroyers, and 

submarines (both attack and ballistic missile) are already in the Pacific, the 

announced move is not what could be considered a major increase in force posture. 

Similarly, the U.S. Air Force already rotates F-22s, B-52s and B-2s throughout the 

region, primarily in Guam and Okinawa, and there are few more planes that can be 

sent on a regular basis. Moreover, it will be years before the F-35 is operational in 

sufficient numbers to forward-base enough squadrons to make a qualitative 

difference in the air domain. None of the Administration's plans call for increasing 

the number of U.S. Marines or Army troops in the region, despite the elevation of the 

commander of U.S. Army Forces Pacific to a four-star rank. If, then, the 

Administration is concerned both about the size and assertive nature of China's 

armed forces, the rebalance as currently planned is not likely to make much of a 

difference in either operational terms or in sending strategic messages over the 

long-term. 

From a budgetary standpoint, moreover, it would appear that the Administration is 

attempting to eat its cake and have it too. The significant cuts to the U.S. defense 

budget are hard to square with a policy that relies on an increased military presence 

for much of its credibility. According to the Department of Defense Comptroller, cuts 

to the Navy and Air Force's operations and maintenance accounts and to 

procurement accounts average eight percent. While those have yet to be translated 
58 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 

into specific cuts for Pacific-based forces, there will undoubtedly be an effect over 

time. In March, Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, 

testified before this Committee that sequestration had already forced him to cut 

back travel by 50 percent, and reduce both ship deployment and flight training 

hours. In a recent visit to Honolulu, I talked with senior uniformed officers who 

indicated their concern that in any contingency in the Pacific, there would not be 

support forces from CONUS available to allow them to sustain operations. This 

dynamic will only become more apparent as sequestration deepens and tougher 

trade-offs have to be made to keep within budget limits. 

13 

All this matters if quantity is assumed to have a quality of its own, as uniformed 

leaders like to say. The quality of U.S. forces is undisputed, though in some manner 

will be affected by reduced training and maintenance schedules. Yet with fewer than 

ten combat air squadrons in Asia, and with only 23 ships of the 7th Fleet forward 

deployed to Japan and Guam, America's daily presence is coming under increased 

pressure as China increases its activities in the East and South China Seas, as Russia 

rebuilds its strength in the northern Pacific Ocean, and as North Korea continues to 

keep tensions on a hair-trigger. Further cuts to O&M accounts, as well as declining 

acquisition trends in the out decades, means that America's margin of error for 

maintaining a credible military posture in the vast Asia-Pacific region is steadily 

shrinking. 
59 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 14 

What, then can be done? First, the Administration needs to more clearly articulate 

both the rationale behind the rebalance and its goals. Once it is clear what it wants 

to accomplish, and why it feels it cannot do it with today's force posture, a rational 

plan of increasing America's military presence in Asia can then be crafted. 

Alternately, such an exercise may reveal that our current forces are sufficient for the 

goals the Administration prefers. 

Second, the Administration needs to publicly address how projected defense 

spending cuts under both the Budget Control Act and sequestration are likely to 

affect America's military readiness and capacity in the Asia-Pacific. What are 

realistic projections of force strength in 2020 and beyond? Can a smaller U.S. 

military carry out the missions assigned to it in the Pacific, or is it likely that those 

mission sets will have to be redefined and reduced? 

Finally, the rebalance must be understood as part of a larger U.S. strategy in the 

Asia-Pacific. Does the Administration see our role in Asia as a perpetual balancer? 

Or, does it envisage a gradual hand-off of security responsibilities to allies and 

partners? Should America play more of a cop-on-the-beat role than it does today, or 

is it better to remain the ultimate guarantor of stability? Does it desire the 

emergence of a functional community of liberal interests that can uphold freedom of 

navigation and the like, or does it trust in the development of pan-Asian multilateral 

mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asia Summit, to 
60 

Auslin, "Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific" 

maintain stability through dialogue, confidence building measures, and eventually 

some type of cooperative security architecture? 

15 

While China's linear growth cannot be predicted with certainty, especially in light of 

its current economic slowdown, clearly it will remain the largest Asian power for 

the next generation. It will likely seek to play an ever-larger role in the region's 

commons and attempt to increase its influence, as all rising powers do. It has so far 

shown little inclination to provide public goods in Asia or bear any burdens that do 

not have as their end the extension of Chinese power. It has become more assertive 

as it has become more powerful, and appears to continue to view the world with 

suspicion. As China and its neighbors continue to tussle over disputed islands, the 

chances of miscalculation or accident leading to conflict rise. 

All of this will challenge America's conception of its role in the Asia-Pacific region, 

and even may have a negative impact on our interests. International relations never 

take place in a vacuum, and today, Washington must grapple with rapid changes in 

the Asian security environment that may well call into question its credibility as a 

Pacific power. Lacking a clear set of goals and reducing the means available to 

achieve them, the Administration risks winding up with the worst of all outcomes: a 

policy adrift in a sea of change and few resources available to draw on to correct the 

situation. 

I look forward to any questions you may have. 
61 

MICHAEL R. AUSLIN, PhD 

Michael Auslin is a columnist for the Wall Street Jour!LC!l, writing about Asia and global 

security. He is also a senior fellow at the Arme!illmJt;;nJ~2!t~l!:!2.U!lili'-!ill:.f!&lk!.'QLi.£y 

Research in Washington, D.C., where he is concurrently a Resident Scholar in Asian 

Studies and the Director of Japan Studies. He specializes in U.S. defense and foreign 

policy, security and political relations in the Indo-Pacific region, and global airpower and 

maritime issues. 

Dr. Auslin was Associate Professor of History at Yale University prior to joining AEI. 

He also has been a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo. He received the 

Nakasone Yasuhiro Award for Excellence in 2010, and has been named a Young Global 

Leader by the World Economic Forum, a Marshall Memorial Fellow by the German 

Marshall Fund, and an Asia 21 Fellow by the Asia Society, in addition to being a former 

Fulbright and Japan Foundation Scholar. 

Dr. Auslin is a prolific author and his books include the new release, 

i&!!JJlQJ2!W1gJLU~J:J!1Y!1?1.liJliJ'2Ll01t.Jd~:d!dl!.f!J.'1Ji§J.frJ]Q!1!i (Harvard U ni v ersity Press, 

2011). In addition to his Wall Street Journal column, his writing appears in leading 

publications and he comments regularly for U.S. and foreign broadcast media, including 

BBC and Fox News. He is currently writing a book entitled Pivotal: How America's 

Turn to Asia Will Shape the Future. He received a BSc from Georgetown University's 

School of Foreign Service and his PhD in History from the University of Illinois at 

Urbana-Champaign. He lives outside of Washington, D.C., with his family. 

Contact Information: 

Michael R. Auslin, PhD 

Resident Scholar in Asian and Security Studies 

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 

1150 17th St., N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

(202) 862-5848 

michael.auslin@aei.org 

http://www.aei.org/auslin 

Twitter: @michaelauslin 
62 

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65 

tE({)IIIGRESS I ctN 1Il1ll 

1'1ESmlllllll)til1!'i 

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 

Prepared Statement of Dr. Patrick AI. Cronin 

Senior Advisor and Sellior Director a/the Asia-Paqjic Security Program, 

Center/or a New American Security 

July 24, 2013 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and other distinguished memhers orihe Committee, T 

sincerdy appreciate this opportunity to testify on the trenchant matter of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific 

region. 1 say trenchant because I believe it is in the vital interest of the United Statcs to usc the past fe\\' 

years as a springboard deepening our strategic engagement in the most important region 

o1'1he 21'1 century. Ifwc move and doggedly to leverage our considerable po\vcrto mold the 

rising and dynamic Indo~Pacitic, then Vlre can preserve and adapt an inclusive. rules~based international 

community that is fundamental to the preservation of freedom. peace and prosperity. But if\ve falter in 

our purpose and vigilance and divert from our long~term strategic interests. then rissurcs and flashpoints 

that seem manageable today may one day overwhelm our capacity to deal with them. 

Achieving strategic balance in the Asia~Pacitic requires a clear understanding of U.S. interests. regional 

and global trends, and a realistic plan for linking our finite means to our ambitious objectives. Ifwe are 

to succeed. \vc \vill have to adapt our armed forces to balance existing capacity while investing in future 

capability in what is largely a maritime and air (and cyber and outer space) domain. Equally. \ve \/oliB 

have to rebalance our finances through tough trade-offs at home and greater economic competitiveness 

,md expanded international trade. And even as we maintain a defense second to none and a global~ 

leading free market. we \vin have to rely more on allies and partners to shoulder more shared 

responsibility for the maintenance of regional and global order. 

The Search for Strategic Balance 

Every government searches for strategic balance. After all. strategy involves aligning policy oQjcctives 

\vith available means. When the environment in which one is crafting a strategy is in constant flux. there 

is a persistent need for recalibration. As the United States prepares to hand responsibility for 

Afghanistan's secW'ity to Afghans next year. officials in Washington. D.C. continue to search for a new 

strategic balance. one that responsibly weighs shOlt~term against long-term risk. and one that a~sesses the 

proper weight to place on military pO\ver as opposed to diplomacy. development, and other levers of 

power. 

The search for strategic bahmce and coherence is hardly new. The Obama administration entered office 

in 2009 determined to address a heavy "inheritance" of tViO protracted ground \vm·s. a global counter~ 

terrorism campaign. Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation, and mounting debt and deepening 

economic recession. The 20lO Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) kept the focus on \vinning the 

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current wars, but also signaled growing conccm about the potential Jong-tcnTI decline in America's 

military preeminence, as the diffusion of modern technology complicated the ability oftha U.S. armed 

forces to operate fOf\vard in defense of allies and partners.] 

Less than t\',:o years later. the administration adjusted its strategic course. With combat operations 

concluded in Iraq and winding dov"," in Afghanistan. the Department of Detense issued new strategic 

guidance in JanuaI}' of 20 12 that called for minimizing the cost of stabili~'ltion operations in the Middle 

East and South\vest Asia in favor of enhancing engagement in the Asia-Pacific Anticipating hmv 

to reduce defense budget by nearly $500 billion over the next decade, to the Rudget Control 

Act of2011. the guidance switched defense priorities from \vaging counterinsurgency to countering antiaccess capabilities, Ground forces \vould be reduced, \vhile preserving and building agile and mobile 

forces to help defend the global commons, Future defense procurement "winners" v,rould include 

technologies for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (lSR). robotic and autonomous unmanned 

sensors tmd systems, and cyberspace. as \vell as Special Operations Forces (SOF), 

This combination of cutting defense spending and changing the technological and geographical focus of 

defense remains a major balandng act today. The United States is attempting to pivot to the Asia-Pacific 

region at a time of great tumult and w1certainty. Near-term budgetary constraints are real. evcn as the 

long-term direction of Asia and China remains murky and distant. Let me begin by discussing Ameriea"s 

strategic approach to the region. something that is now often reduced to a single \vord, "rebalancing." 

Rebalancing 

Before "rebalancing" became synonymous for U.S. policy to the Asia-Pacific region, it was more broadly 

a description of a global phenomenon. 3 For decades past and future, the steady shift in power from West 

to East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. requires a global recognition of rising 

economic. politicaL technological. and military power of a dynamic Asia-Pacific region. Japan. South 

Korea. Singapore and Tai\van were at the vanguard of this trend a fcvv decades ago as the Asian tigers. 

Today the swift rise of China is at the vanguard of this trend, as the expansion of China's \vealth and 

growing middle class is happening on an unprecedented scale and pacc. Despite widely varying forecasts 

about the future, few analysts doubt that in the future China ,vill overtake the United States as the world's 

largest economy~a position the United States has held since the Gilded Era aner the American Civil 

War. M<:my forecast that China and other Asian-Pacific countries will increasingly determinc peace and 

prosperity in the twenty-first century. a<; the education. wealth, and capability of this region a<;cends even 

further in the decades ahead, Military capabilities are follO\ving these largely economic trends, This is 

I Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washinh'10n. D.C: Depattment of Defense. February 2010). 

D.C.: Department of 

December20J2). 

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evident in our recent study on an "emerging Asian power \vch" of thickening bilateral intra-Asian security 

ties.4 Consider. too, lane's latest forecast. "Balance of Trade:' \yhieh predicts that w-capons spending in 

China and other Asian-Pacific nations will surpa<;s lhat oflhe United States and Canada by 2021.~ 

While the Ohama administration. and its predecessors. have responded to long-tenn global trends. the 

wrrent U.s, government has also sought to address tV,IO short-term developments. One immediate driver 

has been the unsustainability of waging two simultaneous ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether 

because of grmving exhaustion or a grO\ving recognition of the diminishing returns of protracted 

stabilization operations or both. the Obama administration decided U.S. interests would be bettcr served 

by ending major combat operations and shifting more attention to a rising Asia~Pacific region, The pivot 

\vas meant to help the United States shiH emphasis from \-\'ar to peace and prosperity. from the \vo1r at the 

door to future opportunities and challenges. 

A second immediate development accelerated this shift: namely. grO\ving Chinese assertiveness, 

pm-ticularly in China's ncar seas. An increasingly confident China opted not to "hide and bide" capability 

so much as to probe hO\v to tlex newfound muscle in the South and East China Seas. Vietnamese 

fishermen \-vere perhaps the first to feel the brunt of this more coercive Chinese policy. By 2010 Chinese 

assertiveness in contesting administrative control and sovereignty over the Senkaku/Oiao)u islands 

contributed to a Chinese fishing trawler ramming a Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessel. The tensions 

aroused by this incident galvanized public opinion in both countries, but it proved to be an important 

turning point in Japanese public opinion. 

The perception of growing Chinese maritime assertiveness \vas reinforced by Chinese diplomacy in 20 I O. 

A tough. rising China stilTed widespread concern in the region. Speaking at the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in HanoL Secretary or State I HIlary Clinton sought to reassure 

allies and partners in the region that "unimpeded commerce" and the peaceful resolution of maritime 

disputes were to regional stability:' Suhsequent annual gatherings of Chiefs of Defense in Seoul 

and Ifawaii in and 2011. respectively, provided substantial and widespread concern about China's 

growing willingness to use coercion to achieve its maritime territorial and resource claims. 

It was in Novt::mber 2011 that the rhetorical rebalance to Asia reached its apogee. Between hosting the 

Asian-Pacitlc Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and being the tlrst U.S, president to attend the East 

Asia Summit in Indonesia. President Ohama traveled to Australia. Despite drmving down two wars. the 

President pledged increased focus on the region during a speech to Parliament in Canberra. "As 

President," he said, "I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision-as a Pacific nation. the 

United States will playa larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future." The fullest 

articulation of U.S. rebalancing policy- remains a single article in Foreign Policy magazine. published in 

November 2011, entitled. "America's Pacific Century:' In that article. Secretary Clinton enumerated 

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U.S. interests and America's dctcmlination to retain comprehensive power focused on long~tcrm strategic 

priorities in a rising Indo-Pacific region. 

Between the summit!)" and the policy narrative. the Obarna administration's concerted move to rebalance 

U.S. strategic priorities to the Asia~Pacific engendered a reaction. Nc\vton's third 1m\! tells us that. at 

least in physics. for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. In international relations. 

however. for every great-power policy initiative there is perhaps an inevitable blO\vback. Clearly China 

has pushed back on the notion of the United States strengthening its regional posture. Many Chinese 

commentators and ofIicials have sought to portray rebalancing as tantamount to containment. Riding a 

grO\ving tide of public nationalism, moreover, Chinese leaders have used rebalancing to justifY further 

assertiveness, as in assuming de facto control over Scarborough Shoal in the spring 0[2012 and later 

sending vmrships to the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands. [11 the run up to the 2013 

ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei. tensions remained high, although China used cooperation with 

Vietnam to soften its hardline policy toward the Philippines. Chinese naval maneuvers were occurring at 

the same time the Cnited States and the Philippines \vere conducting military exercises close to 

Scarborough Shoal. and Japan's defense minister was in Manila avowing Japanese support for the 

Philippines in its territorial disputes with China.6 Meanwhile, C.S. allies and parlncrs~·-the same vvho 

wanted more reassurance-stili \vdcomed a long-term U.S. presence but also sought assurances that the 

United States ·would not stir up instability. Virtually all cOlmtries in the region, including the United 

States, have a strong interest in preserving growing economic tics with China and need China's 

cooperation on an an-ay of important global issues. Even so, this pushback helped to catalyze a 

rebalancing of rebalancing. 

Rebalancing RebaJancing 

Even before budgetary pressures started to influence strategy, the pushback on rebalancing forced the 

administration to clarify precisely and to and \vhy. The administration V'las 

seeking to shift from \var to peace, although exit so swiftly that it might jeopardize 

future stability and with it perceptions of American resoluteness. Rebalancing \vas also about providing a 

strategic challenge to China hut not containing China, I,ong-tenn U,S. presence would help to counter 

any tendency Chinese leaders might have to steer a reemerging China into an aggressive hegemon: but 

stepped up dialogue and cooperation with China \votild seek to provide sutIicient strategic reassurance to 

dampen unnecessary military arms racing and competition. Arne-rica would be rebalancing to Asia with 

Europe and the rest of'the world, not U\vay from Europe and the rest of the \vorId. The Cnited States 

\vould pivot \vithin Asia, as away from an almost exclusive concentration on Northeast Asia and 

toward a much \vider network especially in Southeast Asia. Part of this rebalancing w-ould 

include moving from mostly bilateralism to greater multilateralism, especially by embracing ASEANsea-rov.. 

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centered institutions: would require patience. given that the region's multilateral 

security architecture badly lags challenges and dynamics of the region. Rebahmcing also 

meant building a bridge hetween the confluence of two oceans~·the Indian and the Paci(ic~ 

strengthening tics between India and East Asia and embracing the reform-minded ne\v government orthc 

geographical s\ving state of Myanmar. Finally, rebalancing meant economic and diplomatic power. and 

not just military might. In these and other ways, the resistance the United States sometimes received 

tmvard its rebalancing policy enabled U.S. officials to amplify \,,-hat rebalancing meant and did not mean. 

Comprehensive power is vital. especially in the context of those who would reduce America's 

involvement and innuence in the region to defense forces and defense budgets. Even so. military power 

would remain the instrument of insurance. But that would not necessarily break the bank. because it 

mostly im .. -olved retaining America's strong existing regional military presence. But it also meant 

widening the scope for engagement. a concept captured by the phra<;e "'geographically distributed, 

operationally resilient and politically sustainable." Redistributing presence was a good idea for a number 

of reasons. but in the ca<;e of Japan it \vas a requirement in light of the disproportionate burden placed on 

the people ofOkinmva. 7 Building on a 2006 base realignment plan. the United States continues to reduce 

its footprint on Okinawa, in part by moving up to 9.000 Mm'incs from Okinawa to Guam as a Futcnma 

Replacement Facility is established, With the announcement in November 2011 that the United States 

would also begin rotational deployments of 250 Marines in DarVo,!in. Northern Territory. gradually 

enlarging the number of Marines rotating through to up to moving up to 2,500, the Marine Corps ·was 

spreading its first-to-thc-fight capabilities around the region. from l-Iawaii to Guam and Okinmva down to 

Australia. Irs wotih noting that this effort to train and exercise more U.S. forces in Australia \vas 

followed by an Australia move to work more closely vvith the United States. For instance. as the U.s. 

Army \vas announcing that it would upgrade oflicer in the Pacific (U.S. Anny Pacific or 

USARPAC) ti'om a thrce- to four-star position, announced that the Deputy ARPAC would for now 

on be an Australian officer. Canberra also dispatched a naval combatant to work with the U,S. Fleet 

out ofYokosuka. Japan. Meanwhile, Singapore agreed to host up to four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). 

ships designed for local engagement in and around the South China Sea. for example: the tirst LCS. USS 

Freedom, arrived in Singapore in April. The United States continues to negotiate possible ways to 

strengthen defense cooperation with the Philippines, but political. legaL and Hnancial constraints probably 

mean this cooperation \vill be in the form of more visits, exercises, and troop rotations, rather than a 

return to permanent U.S. ba<>ing at Subic Bay. The idea of suppOliing ASEAN and region-wide attempts 

to build a greater Humanitarian Assistant and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) could also lead to 

prepositioning supplies for future HAIDR operations in Southeast Asia. States would 

probably also be prepared to help support the building of greater infonl1ation sharing to ensure a common 

peacetime domain a\varcncss in the region. Finally. strategic dialogue widened and deepened. \vith the 

United States spending more time cultivating relatively ne\v defense partners, from Myanmar and 

Vietnam, to Indonesia. Brunei and Malaysia. 

7 See Patrick M. Cronin. "Okinawa and the Burden of Strategy." in Rehalancc fo Asiu, 

Okinml'o's Role in an EvolvinR [},8.-Japan Alliance (Okinawa Prefecture: 

2013). pp. 16·31. 

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Military po\yer is a means to an end and its impoliancc is derived fi'om its ability to efTectively support 

political and economic goals. Thus, the decision by the Obama administration to increac;c the tempo of 

diplomatic engagement signaled America's determination to remain a Pacific power by putting its 

diplomacy behind its rhetoric. The United States acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and 

thereby joined the East Asia Summit process. The United States made sure it shmvcd up 10 every 

ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial. including the one this past month in Brunei Darussalam. And the 

United States put more diplomatic support behind both military cooperation (such as the ADMM plus 

process. for which Secretary I (agel will find himsc!fin Brunei in late August) and economic cooperation 

(such as completing a framework agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP). It also devoted 

great time to finding a chieny constructive relationship with China. using summit meetings to reinforce 

that overall goal. even while simultaneously raising contentious issues such as cybcr intellcctual theft and 

maritime disputes. While some may express concern ahout whetl1cr the second-tenn Obama 

administration will [oIlO\v-through with what it began during the first term. 1 believe that the basic 

strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific should and \vilI endure for ycars to comc. So let me talk briefly 

about the principles that should guide the future rebalancing. the specific military challenges. and my 

rccommendations for advancing a serious agenda for preserving U.S. intcrests and expanding cooperative 

security. 

Guiding Principles for Achieving Strategic Balance 

we have a for maximizing our current position to shape 

in a manner congruent with our interests and values. Engaging rising Asian nations is the \vay 

for the l!nited States to capitalize on expanding trade and democracy, as 'vvel! as dealing for effectively 

with a host of traditional and non-traditional security issues. But is also a result of the grovving 

challenge we face to manage confrontation in the global commons. leads me to a second principle. 

at the core of 

to preserve and adapt a rules-hosed, inclusive 

Vle live in an f'nlly at war. It is instead a 

in the Asia-Pacific region, marked by grey areas of coercive diplomacy, crisis 

management. confrontation short of\\ar. We must leam to adapt our armed forces to this grey-area 

battlefield, even while \ve endeavor to integrate aU instrwnents of policy to advance our interests and 

values and protect the common good. 

The that this enterprise is bigger than anyone countl)!, 

increa<;ingly have to work v-lith allies and partners. 

in the Asia-Pacific region are grmving by bahy steps; ASEAN provides 

critical legitimacy for an inclusive venue. but that legitimacy is not yet matched by effectiveness. Thus. 

the United States must continue to work from the inside out tirst building on our strong net\\-ork of 

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allianct:s, and then advancing meaningful partnerships with like-minded states and others as the region's 

institutions continue to mature. And as capabilities continue to grow in Asia. there should be even more 

new opportunities ror collaboration and burdensharing in the years ahead, 

Unifl?d States to constantly putforward its positive vision/or an 

and prosperity/or all. We must not allow others 

legitimizing their expanded fights w-hi1e reducing 

our permanent Pacific presence, up their military- capabilities \vhi1e seeking 10 eclipse ours, or 

by mobilizing and influencing some key actors in order to marginalize our allies and partners. 

Sixth and final/v. 

economic, diplomatic. biggest for 

miscalculation that comes from errant assumptions that the United States cannot or vlill not playa strong 

role in the Asia~Pacit1c region in the years ahead. We don't \vant or a potential adversary to think 

that the United States would shirk from defending liberty and fuUilling commitments in a moment of 

crisis. 

Even as the United States must remain rcady for glohal challenges. including in the Arabian Gulf and 

greater Middle East there are three principally military challenges in the Asia-PaciJic or, more precisely. 

Indo-Pnci1ic region. 

is to maintain deterrence. In dynamic, shifting Asia this \vill require more than 

White deterrence \vill probably be maintained, the United States can reduce the risk of 

maintaining actively, urgently and etTectively postured vis-a-vis a North Korea that resorts 

an ahility to strike the United States and its allies with nUclear-tipped missiles. The 

United States must also not allow U.S. allies to potential adversaries to think that the U.S. extended 

nuclear umbrella is an empty gesture. 

Rupert Smith got it at least half right \vhen 

moved warfare lo "war amongst the people" in which 

political and military elements of pmver are inseparable and \vhere confrontation rather than all-out 

warfare prevails.s In the Asian-Pacific context. there is above all a concern about confrontation and 

{he Afodern IYorld (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2007); e.g., 

hut I would not go so far as Smith does on page 3 in 

"Wars no !onxl!/' exist. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all around the 

world ... and states still have armed forces \\hich they use as a symbol of power. Nonetheless. war as cognitively 

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coercion a1 sea. Gunboat diplomacy is not new, but it represents a departure from our recent operating 

assumptions, doctrine and planning. As stated above, we must use our militar;,: presence to shape an 

inclusive, rules-based architecture so that no one country can unilaterally use military and paramilitary 

muscle to fixec its agenda on others incapable of defending themselves. T lere the United States elm 

leverage its alliances and partnerships into a thickening netv·mrk of security cooperation. 

The third is to counter anti-access and area-denial capabilities. This must be done in peacetime, 

including by expanding basic capabilities for interoperability: and, in preparation for possible \vartime, it 

must lead to an ability to defeat an adversary determined to use force against the United States or its allies 

and close partners. This will require many steps. but forging a new intelligence. surveillance and 

reconnaissance architecture. a ne\v theater antisubmarine warfare and undersea \varfare capability. and 

finding cheaper ways to preserve our naval and air power. must be combined ¥lith diplomacy to reduce 

the costs of competition v.lith China. We should he pressing China to test North Korea regarding its 

tolerance for sanctions and 'willingness to forego lethal uses of force and the deployment of nuclear 

\veapons: and \ve should be seeking areas where China's leadership might agree to avert unnecessary 

anns competition. such as in the realm of strategic \veapons, from nuclear weapons to outer space. 

Recommendations for Achieving Strategic Balance through Cooperative Security 

There is no one activity or investment that needs to be made to keep up the momentum behind U.S. 

rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. It \vould also be unrealistic to assume anything better than the 

current sequestration numbers as the new top line of the defense budget in the next couple years. 

Despite these constraints. is an rngent need to double dow1l on rebalancing through relatively 100vcost cooperative security steps that deal with the sh01t- and long-term security opportunities and 

challenges mentioned abovc. This list is not exhaustive, but here are ten important steps that should be 

taken. 

1. Ernbrace the Japanese request for an offlcial review of the Guidelines in 

common strategic approach to Chinese East and South 

an(/, over the 

capabilities. The secrnity cmrire,nm;ent changcd corlsidleraiblv 

i 990·s. as ha<; the Japanese political will to contribute more defense of Japan and 

surrounding areas. Roles. missions and capabilities need to be adjusted. as does force posture. to 

reflect a more halanced division of labor and create a more resilient and sustainable alliancc. 

2. cooperation 

has a strong interest improving ties between 

in Northeast Asia, and yet at present Seoul and Tokyo are experiencing strained 

relations. That strain prevents greater rcadiness for common missions involving a range of 

known to most non-combatants. war as hattie in afield hehl'een men and machinery, war as a massive deciding 

event in a di,\]Jufe in international aI/airs: such war flO longer exists. " 

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scenarios on the Korean Peninsula., with perhaps Ballistic Missile Defense being the most. 

prominent among them. To bridge this potential chasm between our allies. the United States. for 

instance. might propose Navy~to~Navy talks on missiles. Such talks \vould allow South Korea to 

indirectly \veigh in with Japan as Tokyo considers adding a tactical offensive capability. and 

Japan could reassure Seoul that any additional capability \vould reinforce deterrence against 

North Korea's unpredictable leadership. 

3. strategJ'to 

4. 

5. 

6. 

afforce. \Vhilc many w~mt 

wartime control (OPCON). \ve should remind our publics about the political 

objectives or the alliance rather than the mere means by which we secure those interests. Our 

frec-market democracies must work together to build a greater regional peace. That will require 

interopcrahility and tight command and control \vell beyond OPCON reversion. but \vhat is 

needed now is an airtight 1 i.S.-South Korean strategy to halt North Korea's dangerous nuclear 

programs. 

support for Pyongyang, and even if"ve China's basic strategic 

posture it may be possible to convince China to resist helping North Korea the next time it resorts 

to dangerous provocations. 

recent reduction 

is OCCUlTing at the same time the military balance of power 

to shift in Beijing's favor. Given Tahvan's limited defense budget and the constraints 

of selling Tahvan front-line otfensive Taipei and ·Washington should focus on 

systems that are dual-usc. defensive. Thus, cyber. autonomous unmanned 

systems (both for undersea and the air) could be important vvays to improve maritime domain 

awareness. air defense. and counter-intervention capabilities. Meamvhile. the United States needs 

to help Taiwan break out orits increasing isolation by supporting free-trade arrangements and 

helping Taiv,:anjoin transnational security initiatives to deal with disasters, pandemics and other 

non~traditional security challenges. 

and 

ASEAN may not be a strong 

the security is best protected by having its 

10 members stick together. China would with ASEAN members. especially other 

c!mmant states in the South China Sea. on a strictly bilateral basis. It employed extended 

coercive diplomacy last spring to compel the United States to convince the Philippines to back off 

Scarborough ShoaL only to stay in de facto control of the disputed maritime area. More recently, 

China struck a bargain with Vietnam to double the size of its joint energy development area, a 

seemingly conciliatory move. but one that further isolated the Philippines from its other ASEAN 

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7. 

members as Manila pursued an intcrnationallcgal ruling on such matters as China's indefensible 

nine-dashed-line claim over 80 percent of the South China Sea. The United Nations arbitration 

panel is considering consider the contemporary legal basis of this and other issues. and Beijing 

will continue to use carrots and sticks to halt the process. The United States is neutral over 

specific telTitorial sovereignty. but it is not neutral \vhen it comes to aggressive behavior. 

humanitarian assistance 

most of self-defense and interoperabiEty. the 

United States might include working with selected ASEAN partners to erect an lSR regime for 

domain mvarencss and command and controL while consider prcpositioning I lA/DR supplies in 

the Philippines or Thailand that would be ready to help ASEAN help itself in a disaster. Not just 

Singapore, but countries like Indonesia, Malaysia. Brunei and others can play an important role in 

regionallSR. 

8. The U.S. needs to 

9. 

10. 

of ;\1alacca. a vital strategic partner but 

remains preoccupied v.ith intemal challenges; to ensure that India's 'Look East' policy 

remains viable. the United States needs to support exercises with Southeast Asian partners. such 

as Singapore. fndonesia and Malaysia as well as other regional maritime powers such as 

Australia and Japan. 

However. on the military 

directly and indirectly engage military leaders, senior and junior. to try to avert but at a minimum 

stay ahead of any potential military crackdown that could foHnw the 2015 election. 

Australia and 

As 1 have argued along with my CNAS colleagues 

in a recent report, U.S. policymakers our alliances to facilitate intra-Asian security 

cooperation, leverage capable partners to build third-party capacity. and focus on strategically 

important and political viable areas security cooperation (including IIA/DR. 

maritime domain a\~'arencss. and civil law cnforccmcnt}.9 

Concluding Thoughts on Strategic Balance in a Shifting Strategic Enyironmcnt 

') Patrick M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, 

Sullivan, Web: 

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We live in a period of a diffusion of economic power, of rapid technological change, and of continuing 

high costs for those \vho engage in inter~state \varfare. This volatility has been retlected in the constant 

shift in strategic focus of the United States over the past 25 years or so. Looking back just six years ago, 

the United States \vas focused on a surge in the counterinsurgency in Iraq: six years before that the United 

State was focused on crafting a global war on terrorism in response to 9111; six years before that the 

Lnitcd States \vas engaged in a conflict in the Balkans; six years before that the United States \vas 

focused on the end of the Cold War and changing relations with former Soviet states. It makes one 

ponder just how certain we arc about \vhat \vill engage our military forces and national security interests 

in even the relatively near-term future. 

One of the assumptions that the lJnited States can and should make is to accept greater near-term risk in 

order to make long-ternl investments in leading-edge teclmologics. This involves strategic force 

balancing, but it compels U.S, defense planners to think more about which technologies and platfonns are 

most ""anti fragile," to use the term used by Nassim ~icho!as TaIeb to refer to systems that benent rather 

than are hurt by volatility and "black swans:' IU 

This requires adjusting to the major trends, It means maintaining the current rebalance to the Asia-Paci tic 

region. This is a marathon. not a sprint. and thus it makes sense to pursue a graduaL long-tern1 shift to 

respond to the dynamism and rise of the region. As \vith the defense guidance of January 2012. this 

entails continued engagement in the Middle East. but hopefully a far more peaceful engagement than in 

the past decade. If w-e arc thrust back into open conflict. then let it be switl strikes rather than protracted 

cowlterinsurgency. Of course. the enemy has a vote, so this is a statement ofU,S. interests and objectives 

even while we must remain open to a wider range of contingencies. Given the high and growing cost of 

interstate warfare, lower level competition and occasional conrrontation is far more likely thrill high-end 

conventional "var. 'Ihis is not a pennanent or ironclad guarantee. but once again it suggests that the 

enited States can accept for the near-to-mid term. at the high-end of conventional 

TIle difhlsion of guided munitions net\vorked capabillties. especially in states with 

makes direct power projection against well-anned adversaries highly problematic. This 

requires investment in leading areas for research and development: 3-D printing and additive 

manufacturing, big data. nano-technology, autonomous systems, and life sciences. among others. These 

are areas that require greater investment in basic and applied science and technology. because they could 

usher in a completely new military and strategic paradigm for which our industrial-era platforms are il1-

prepared and sui::ject to sudden defeat. 

To make this technological paradigm shift \vill not come about simply because austere budgets force 

change (in fact across-the-board budget cuts make it harder to be prepared for the long-term). But there 

must be an accompanying political awareness ofpotentiai change. a political \vill to accept more shortterm risk. and a political consensus on the need to invest more in maintaining preeminence in leadingedge technologies. As the CNAS hudget team recently put it we have to be prepared to "shift to\vard a 

new warfighting regime" C'20YY") in which "the U.S, faces adversaJies with guided munitions-battle 

10 Nassim Nicholas Talch. Antifragile: Thblf!.S That Gainfrom Disorder (New York: Random House, 2012). 

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network parity." cyber warfare is integral to \vartighting. and "rohotic and autonomous unmanned 

platforms, sensors. and systems arc ubiquitous in all operating domains:'I! "Ibis is 

reversing the recent trend in which defense h)fces get more 

better. 

A word of caution is in order. We cannot predict the future and thus we must retain a degree of balance 

in our forces. A recent and eloquent reminder of this can be fOlmd in the York Times, where U.S. 

Army Major General H. R. Me.Master underscored the enduring reality that \Vaf is a political. human and 

uncertain endeavorY He channeled Sir Michael HO\\'ard. inter alia. in wanting to see war in the round, as 

more than just warfhre. At a time ,vhen budgets rather than strategy are looming large in shaping our 

assumptions about the cont1icts we ·will fight it is prudent to remember these guiding principles, 

principles the General has learned from his experience as a soldier and his research as a historian. Even 

so. guidelines should not be straitjackets. The notion of 'uncertainty' admonishes us to understand not just 

the continuities in war, but also the potential discontinuities. If the Revolution in Military Affairs was 

indeed what he has called a 'fantastical' notion of war, a future reliance on autonomous unmanned. c)'ber 

and space systems seems probable. If our history of Afghanistan and Iraq \vas found \vtll1ting. it may be 

other areas \vhere our history \vill be found wanting tomorrow. If the assumption that Asian coercive 

diplomacy, crisis management and confrontation \vill not escalate proves wrong (that an actor drinks 

poison to slake his thirst). then it may be that the ultimate future challenge is not that Americans but 

rather some other people have bought into the notion of easy war. Despite all these caveats, we would be 

remiss not to be privileging advanced systems that can operate flexibly in what is predominantly a 

maritime theater of operations. 

Politically. this means practicing greater restraint about \\lhen and where the United States uses forceY 

Not only does this mean trying to have more years of peace than conflict, but it also requires prevention 

and engagement in a vital region such as the Asia~Pacitic, A recent team from the National Defense 

University titled this over~arching strategy. "discriminate power:' and 

shared burdens among our allies. They prefer less escalatory and less expensive forms 

operational intervention. for instance. including a concept dubbed "offshore control" concept 

focused on projecting oHcnsive pmver on the Asian mainland (something they arguably incorrectly 

a<;cribe to the Air-Sea Battle Concept).14 U.S. of seeking to preserve an open. rules-based system 

would remain constant, but the authors undenvriting these goals with an 

increasingly discriminate, targeted and shared approach to leadership and concepts of deploying power:,j5 

This theme is consistent with other recent \vork focusing on greater reliance on "strategic partnering"" and 

II Robert Work, Shawn Brimley, 

12 H. R. McMaster, "The Pipe Dream 

Ii I have made this case in a 2010 

Mazarr and the NDli Strategy 

tVafional Security Posture. The Philadelphia Papers No. 

2013). 

15 Ibid .. p. 9. 

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"leading from behind." among other competitive strategies. But as defense budget refonn 

change in mindset over hovv to spend defense dollars more "visely in the future. the authors 

discriminate deterrence call for officials to embrace "the practice of sustainable global leadership through 

more collaborative. tailored and selective mcans:'16 This is sensible strategic advice and worth heeding, 

albeit with care. After all. more countries and non-state actors are determined to pursue their 0\"11 goals 

and think that it is both more desirable and possible to do so given the relative decline of the United 

States and the diffusion of technology. At the end of the day. U.S. inf1uCllce is tied to our ability to deter 

aggression, honor our commitments, and reassure our friends. Sustainable leadership is framed by the 

perceived capacity to generate those ends. 

In summation, if this analysis offers broad guidance on the direction of U.S. 

sequestration. it seems consistent to suggest several fundamental points. First. the States needs to 

retlect on it~ grand strategy strategic empha'lis on the Asia-Pacific region. Second. as part of that grand 

the United States wilL can and must continue to place as much emphasis on trade and diplomacy 

as Third. the United States will be seeking to retain forces to engage partners as they seek to 

build up their own counter-intervention forces. something that will be more conceivahle because of the 

maturing of the guided-munitions regime, cybcr warfare. and robotics and autonomous unmanned s('nsors 

and systems. Fourth. the United States will seek to advance risk reduction and connict avoidance 

measures, \vhether across the Taiwan Strait. or in the Ea'lt and South China Seas, or on the Korean 

Peninsula. Fifth, the United States will continue the difficult quest, not for the slogan of a new great 

power relationship with China, but for concretc. specific steps that can be takcn to advance mutual 

opportunity and avoid unnecessar~y and dangerous competition. Finally. the United States must not retreat 

politically even \vhilc it exercises greater restraint. This \vi11 require active diplomacy. continued 

presence, and supporting collaborative approaches to security. 'The emergence of an Asian pO\ver web. 

for instance. is a trend that is generally favorable for a United States seeking to lower the cost of its 

leadership and provision of security public goods. But there will be times when only the United States 

can lead on an important issue on \vhich regional and global security depend. Achieving strategic balance 

will necessarily require a persistent process ofrecalibrating our strategy. policy, forces and engagement 

but not our interests or principles. 

16 Ibid .. p. 10. 

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Dr. Patrick M. Cronin 

Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific SecUlity Program 

Patrick M. Cronin is a Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security 

Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously, he was the 

Seuior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National 

Defense University, where he simultaneously oversaw the Center for the Study of 

Chinese Military Affairs. 

Dr. Cronin has a rich and diverse background in both Asian-Pacific security and U.S. 

defense, foreign and development policy. Prior to leading INSS, Dr. Cronin served as 

the Director of Stndies at the London-based Intcrnatioual Institute for Strategic Studies 

(!ISS). At the !ISS, he also served as Editor of the Adelphi Papers and as the Executive 

Director of the Armed Conflict Database. Before joining !ISS, Dr. Cronin was Senior 

Vice President and Director of Research at the Center for Strategic and Internatioual 

Studies (CSIS). 

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In 2001, Dr. Cronin was confirmed by the United States Senate to the third-ranking 

position at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). vVhile serving as 

Assistant Administrator for Policy and Program Coordination, Dr. Cronin also led the 

interagency task force that helped design the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). 

From 1998 until 2001, Dr. Cronin served as Director of Research at the U.S. Institute of 

Peace. Prior to that, he spent seven years at the National Defense University, first 

arriving at INSS in 1990 as a Senior Research Professor covering Asian and long-range 

security issues. He was the fonnding Executive Editor of .Joint Force Quarterly, and 

subsequently became both Deputy Director and Director of Research at the 

Institute. He received the Army's Meritorious Civilian Service Award upon his 

departure from NDU in 1997. 

He has also been a senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, a U.S. Naval Reserve 

Intelligence officer, and an analyst ,,~th the Congressional Research Service and SRI 

International. He was Associate Editor of Strategic Review and worked as an 

undergraduate at the Miami Herald and the Fort Lauderdale News. 

Dr. Cronin has taught at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, The Johns 

Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SMS), 

and the University ofVirginia's Woodrow Wilson Department of Government. 

He readlntemational Relations at SI Antony's College, University of Oxford, where he 

received both his M.Phi!. and D.Phil. degrees, and graduated "ith high honors from the 

University of Florida. He regularly pnblishes essays in leading pnblications and 

frequently conducts television and radio interviews. In addition to many CNAS reports 

and numerous articles, his major publications include: Global Strategic Assessment, 

2009: America's Security Role in a Changing World; Civilian Surge: Key to Complex 

Operations (co-editor); The impenetrable Fog "fWar: R~f1ections on Modern Ww:fare 

and Strategic Surprise; The Evolution of Strategic Thought: Adelphi Paper Classics; 

and Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security. 
80 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U,S. 

House of Representatives for the 1 I 3th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

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(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

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intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

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3 
83 

24 JULY 2013 

REBALANCING TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.s. 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, Members of the Committee, I am 

pleased to appear before this Committee to offer my perspectives on 

rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and the implications for national 

security. 

In the latter half of my nearly 40 year career in the Navy, it was my privilege 

and good fortune to have served in the Pacific to include command at sea, 

two assignments at the u.s. Pacific Command, and Command of the U.S. 

Pacific Fleet. As the Chief of Naval Operations, even while engaged in the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Asia-Pacific region was always on my mind 

and remained a priority. Accordingly, the maritime strategy I issued in 

2007, A Cooperative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower, is clear on the 

importance I placed on the Asia-Pacific region and our national security 

interests there. As a point of reference, I consider the Asia- Pacific region to 

be the Pacific Ocean; Oceania; and the Indian Ocean, encompassing 

increasingly vital trade routes to East Africa. Soon, the area of interest will 

expand as the Arctic Ocean opens and polar Asian trade routes and 

associated security considerations emerge. 

Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region is imperative. The importance of the 

region to the United States and the global economy, the rapid changes taking 

place there and the indispensible role the United States can, and must, 

continue to play make the Asia-Pacific region our strategic priority. Whether 

we really rebalance and how we rebalance will have profound effect on the 

future prosperity and security of our country. Our rebalance must be 

strategic, not superficial; substantive, not marginal; realistic, not illusion; and 

optimistic, not pessimistic. 
84 

The emerging real power of Asia is economic, and economics and trade must 

lead our strategic approach to the region. That said, the stability and security 

provided by United States' armed forces in the region have enabled and 

continue to underpin the unprecedented growth the region has enjoyed in 

recent years. United States' armed forces and activities in the region are 

viewed by all as a stabilizing force. Our objective must be to maintain that 

stability and to not let one nation dominate all of Asia. To do that, we must 

maintain American influence and credibility. From a security perspective 

that means relevant, competent, and ready military power predictably 

present in the region; and, trained and ready forces beyond the region 

prepared to react and reinforce rapidly and decisively. Because of the vast 

expanse of the Asia-Pacific region, sensitivities regarding sovereignty and the 

increasing military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, this responsibility 

falls primarily on our naval and air forces. How we shape those forces comes 

at a challenging time; budgetarily, operationally, and politically. 

No region is advancing in military capability and capacity faster. Our defense 

budget should reflect our strategic priority. It should be biased to naval and 

air forces and appropriate facilities and activities to support them in the 

region, whether forward deployed or as an augmenting force. That is a 

departure from our norm of equitable shares among the services. To do so 

does not imply all services are not important nor valued, but budgets must 

follow strategy not drive it. Nor does it mean walking away from our 

extraordinary strength as a joint force. Jointness is best achieved by budget 

effectiveness not budget equity. Budgets, especially procurement and 

research and development budgets, must be considered with an eye toward 

total effect produced and not by individual programs. This is increasingly 

important in the area of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 

cyber, network enabled weapons, and counters to counter intervention 

strategies. Budget assessments must consider total system capability and 
85 

effectiveness, not individual program attributes where a well meaning but 

uninformed adjustment in one program can negate the total effect we seek. 

applaud the work the Navy and Air Force have done under the Air-Sea Battle 

initiative to do just that. Such a rigorous, systemic approach should be the 

norm throughout the entire budget process. Restoring the authority of 

service chiefs in the acquisition process is the right first step on that path. 

After the great young men and women who serve, it is our nation's 

innovative spirit and industrial competence which set our military apart. 

Focusing, enhancing and sustaining robust research and development and 

maintaining a healthy industrial base must be a clear budget priority going 

forward. 

The size and military complexity of the Pacific area of operations demands 

more unmanned capability - air and undersea. Although early on, we 

currently enjoy technical, operational and professional superiority in this 

area. We learned much in Iraq or Afghanistan, but the Pacific is far different. 

Complex area denial challenges are greater and will become more so. Our 

existing procurement processes and sense of urgency are inadequate to this 

challenge and will erode our budget flexibility further. 

The importance of our relationships and our unique alliances in the region 

cannot be overstated. Our persistent presence, interoperability with others 

and level of activity are not possible without the access we enjoy in the 

region. These relationships must not be taken for granted and we should 

continue to enhance cooperation and compatibility with those special 

countries and their militaries. The inconvenient truth is that many in the 

region, while mindful and respectful of what we have done for their security, 

prosperity and stability, are doubtful of our staying power - actions will 

speak louder than words. As the real force in Asia is economic, much will 

depend on how we resolve our economic circumstance at home. Stability, 
86 

predictability, and the real consequences of defense budgets are watched 

more closely in Asia than on the American street - again, actions rather than 

words are what matter. To improve our relationships in the Asia-Pacific 

region our technology transfer process must be reformed rapidly for our 

time. Technology disclosure and release must be disciplined, yet it must be 

thoughtful, efficient and expeditious. We appear to be making it harder for 

our closest allies and like-minded partners to become more aligned with us 

through an extraordinarily layered and protracted technology transfer 

process. We must make it easier and more trustful. Similarly, our 

professional personnel development programs must reflect the rise of Asia. 

Heretofore, how we sought to expand our military leaders regional 

awareness has been by rigid exchange programs, largely in Europe. The 

process must be revised rapidly to move away from one -for- one personnel 

exchanges to a more focused and flexible professional development process 

with Asia as a priority. 

Procurement decisions will likely be viewed as the indicator of meaningful 

rebalancing, but what we do regarding near term readiness is key to 

rebalancing. It maintains operational competence and response, enhances 

cooperation and interoperability with allies and partners, and will be used as 

an early indicator of the reality of rebalancing by those in the region. Very 

short and occasional disruptions to near term readiness accounts are 

disruptive and need not unduly alarm, but we are now well beyond that point 

and are affecting not only near term readiness but long -term readiness and 

our credibility. Moreover, the ongoing absence of a coherent, structured and 

predictable budget process will continue to compound with recovery more 

difficult and costly to undertake. 

After strategy, budgets, alliances and our own house, China looms large. 

More than any other factor, our relationship with China will determine the 

strategic shape and tenor of the region. China's power is its economy, not its 
87 

military - yet. I have witnessed first hand the rise of the Chinese military, 

especially its Navy, and it does not surprise me. Throughout history, as 

nations' economies based on trade grow, so do their militaries, especially 

their navies. Such is the case of China; the money is there, the strategy is 

there; and, importantly, the coupling of budgets and industrial policy to that 

strategy is there. More than money, the latter two factors, which are being 

carried out reasonably well, have the potential to greatly advantage China in 

the coming decades. 

Our unique economic and trade relationship with China requires 

cooperation, and we will find ourselves cooperating militarily where 

interests intersect, as we do today in counter piracy operations and in 

enhancing humanitarian assistance response. We should welcome that 

cooperation confidently, with a willingness to expand that cooperation when 

it is our interest to do so. But we will also compete with a rising China in 

several areas and on many levels in the coming decades, to include 

competing for influence in the region and beyond. Military capability will be 

a factor in that competition and China is making effective investments. That 

is not likely to change; it is the nature of military competition as nations rise. 

Recent Chinese strategic documents also reveal a Chinese view of competing 

with more than the U.s.; proximate Asian nations, to include some of our 

allies, and Russia, and India. The internal challenges of transforming such a 

large country cannot be discounted. So as China may loom large to us, 

China's future is far more complex and uncertain. 

In conclusion, rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region is right if we maintain 

our strategic focus. More resources will surely help, but most important, for 

our men and women who serve and for those in the region who are watching, 

is to return to coherency, structure and predictability in providing for our 

national defense. If we adhere to a clearly articulated strategy, and adjust 

policies and procedures for our time we can move forward effectively, 
88 

dissuade confrontation and conflict, and remain the stabilizing force in the 

Asia-Pacific region thus assuring our security and prosperity for decades. If 

we do not, we risk ceding that important region to others, and with it, our 

place in the world. 
89 

Long Bio: 

Admiral Gary Roughead (USN Ret.), the Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover 

Institution, graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1973. In September 2007, Admiral Roughead 

became the twenty-ninth chief of naval operations after holding six operational commands and is one of 

only two officers in the navy's history to have commanded both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. 

Ashore he served as the commandant at the US Naval Academy, during which time he led the strategic 

planning effort that underpinned that institution's first capital campaign. He was also the navy's chief of 

legislative affairs, responsible for the Department of the Navy's interaction with Congress, and the 

deputy commander of the US Pacific Command during the massive relief effort following the 2004 

tsunami in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. 

As chief of naval operations, Admiral Roughead successfully guided the navy through a challenging 

period of transition in fiscal, security, and personnel matters. He stabilized and accelerated ship and 

aircraft procurement plans, accelerated the navy's capability and capacity in ballistic missile defense and 

unmanned air and underwater systems, and directed the service's investigation of climate change and 

alternative energy. He reestablished the Fourth and Tenth Fleets to better focus on the Western 

Hemisphere and cyber operations, respectively. Admiral Roughead introduced bold programs to prepare 

for the primacy of information in warfare and the use of social media within the navy. He also led the 

navy through changes in law and personnel policy to draw more inclusively than ever on the navy's 

greatest strength, its sailors. 

Admiral Roughead is the recipient of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Navy Distinguished 

Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy 

Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, and various unit and service awards. He has also 

received awards from several foreign governments. 
90 

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93 

[Draft Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on "Rebalancing to the 

Asia Pacific Region and implications for u.s. National Security" on Wednesday, July 24, 

2013.J 

Mr. Chairman, ranking member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to comment on the policy question of Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific 

region and its broader implications for US national security. 

I would like to submit three pOints for your consideration. The first is the continuity of 

rebalancing with Bush administration strategy in Asia. The second point is a brief 

observation about the conditional nature of engagement with China and its two Asian 

allies, North Korea and Pakistan. The third and final point is about the risks inherent in a 

rebalancing strategy, especially with regard to resource allocation. 

These observations are purely my own and reflect no institutional affiliation, past or 

present. May I also say what a pleasure it is to be here with you as a concerned private 

citizen rather than as a Pentagon official in the hot seat. 

On the first point, I've read various speeches by Obama administration officials on socalled rebalancing in Asia or the Pacific pivot, and am struck by the continuity of both 

the means and ends of Asian security strategy with what we pursued in the Bush 

administration. I confess I have trouble identifying significant differences. 

A study by the Congressional research service last year called "Pivot to the Pacific" 

(dated March 28, 2012) suggested there were three features of the pivot that might be 

"new" -- a set of new military priorities and deployments, an integrated and region-wide 

approach to the Asia-Pacific, and the vision of the region's geography to include the 

Indian Ocean. 

As to the first feature, the scale of new military deployments and arrangements that 

have been linked to the pivot so far appear modest to me, when set against the scale of 

both US forces in the theatre and the broad ambitions of the strategy it is meant to 

support. As to the second and third "new" features, evidence of greater policy 

coordination or greater integration of U.S. government activities in the Pacific, 

Southeast Asian, and Indian Ocean that rises to the threshold of a new strategy isn't 

obvious to me, although I defer to closer observers of Obama administration activity, 

such as the members of this committee and the experts testifying here today. 

I raise this continuity point not out of any partisan animus or defensiveness of former 

administration officials, but rather because there is a big risk to announcing a strategy 

like rebalancing in the Pacific without applying the resources to actually execute it. 

The second point I submit for the committee's consideration as it evaluates the Pacific 

pivot is the importance of viewing it in context of the our broader strategy towards the 

1 
94 

People's Republic of China and, crucially, China's two allies in Asia, North Korea and the 

Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 

I believe an integrated view of the PRC and its allies is important in executing a strategy 

predicated on the assumption that actions by China and its two allies will either 

ameliorate security tensions in the region, or these actions will coalesce a network of 

Asian neighbors to resist military threats or coercion by China. This strategy is 

sometimes referred to as conditional engagement, conditional containment, or 

sometimes even "constrainment," although these are harsh terms and are rarely used in 

official speeches or in dialogue with the PRC, for obvious reasons. 

As National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon said in a speech to the Asia Society on 

March 11, 2013, " ... the perception among many that the "rebalancing" is targeted 

against China could strengthen the hand of Chinese hard-liners. Such an impression 

could also potentially make it more difficult for the United States to gain China's 

cooperation on a range of issues." As he also said in that speech, and I agree with him, 

"The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China. We do not want 

our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation. And I disagree with 

the premise put forward by some historians and theorists that a rising power and an 

established power are somehow destined for conflict. There is nothing preordained 

about such an outcome." 

The point here is that conditional engagement, or whatever you call it, involves two 

parallel activities, both of which are adduced to the Pacific Pivot. The first seeks to 

dissuade the PRC from aggressive expansion or coercion in the region, while containing 

the threats of WMD proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism by North Korea and 

Pakistan. The other activity is strengthening the network of alliances in the region 

through military, intelligence, and diplomatic cooperation which includes, crucially the 

forward deployment of US military forces in the region. 

As an aside, if the Pacific Pivot is really meant to view Asia in an integrated framework, 

then the assessment of the potential threats associated with China's sustained military 

build-up, for example as estimated by the Annual Report to Congress on "Military and 

Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China," must incorporate the 

potential threats of its two treaty allies, both of whom have engaged in the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction and state-sponsored terrorism. References to North 

Korea and Pakistan in China's security calculus and military modernization in the 2013 

report are scarce, and the chapter that purports to set forth understanding China's 

strategy makes few references to the role of North Korea and Pakistan. At least in my 

reading, this Report assigns the PRC virtually no responsibility and infers Beijing with 

little control over the threats to the United States and its Asian allies that are posed by 

both North Korea and Pakistan. 

2 
95 

This brings me to my third and final point, the risks of a Pacific pivot strategy, one of the 

key subjects of this Hearing, which were raised clearly and succinctly in the same CRS 

report. As the CRS warned, "In an era of constrained u.s. defense resources, an 

increased u.s. military emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region might result in a reduction in 

U.S. military capacity in other parts of the world. Another budgetary consideration is 

that plans to restructure u.s. military deployments in Asia and minimize cuts in the Navy 

may run up against more restrictive funding constraints than plans yet assume. 

Additionally, the perception among many that the "rebalancing" is targeted against 

China could strengthen the hand of Chinese hard-liners. Such an impression could also 

potentially make it more difficult for the United States to gain China's cooperation on a 

range of issues. Additionally, the prominence the Obama Administration has given to 

the initiative has raised the costs to the United States if it or successor administrations 

fail to follow through on public pledges made, particularly in the military realm." 

I would like to underscore this last risk for the Committee, against the backdrop of 

Sequestration. America-watchers in Beijing and in the Chinese government have long 

believed that economic constraints will ultimately undermine U.S. military deployment 

and our alliance structure in Asia, a line of argument that became particularly salient 

after the 2007~08 financial crisis. If the Pacific Pivot turns out to be mere speechifying, 

then conditional engagement and our long-term strategy in Asia are in trouble. 

How much risk is inherent in a Pacific pivot? I think the answer turns on a deeper 

question, to which I don't have the answer, but which I believe this Committee, 

Congress, and the American people at large deserve some sort of explanation by the 

architects of this strategy in the Obama Administration. 

The deeper question is, how much additional military, intelligence, and diplomatic 

resources must be pivoted to Asia in order to significantly increase the probability that 

China will follow a trajectory of "peaceful rise" rather than aggressive expansion? If we 

apply these additional resources, or adopt a radically different posture in Asia, to shape 

Chinese behavior by deterring Beijing from aggressive expansion, while containing the 

threats posed by North Korea and Pakistan, how do we know if this pivot is working? 

What are the key indicators and what are the key milestones to watch to see if this 

strategy is having the desired effect in Beijing, Pyongyang, and Islamabad? 

These are hard intelligence questions. The answers depend, among other things, on 

how the Chinese government makes national security decisions: how Beijing calculates 

the risk and return of expansion, of coercion versus persuasion; the dynamics of elite 

decision-making processes and bureaucratic infighting between the party, the military, 

and the Chinese state apparatus: the changes in the security relationship between 

China, North Korea, and Pakistan; and what Signals the Chinese government and the PLA 

monitor as they make their national security decisions. 

These assessments may already have been made by the Obama Administration and 

3 
96 

communicated to Congress, as part of its oversight of u.s. security policy making in 

general and of the Asia Rebalancing strategy in particular. If not, perhaps they should 

be. 

Thank you. 

James Shinn is Lecturer at Princeton University's School of Engineering and Applied 

Science. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and then Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Asia in the Bush Administration. 

4 
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3 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 24, 2013 

(103) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have long been concerned about the ability of our basing and infrastructure to withstand the cyber attacks that could reasonably be expected in any 

conflict scenario, especially a contingency in areas such as the Korean peninsula, 

East China Sea, or South China Sea. What is your assessment of the ability of our 

domestic and overseas base infrastructure, particularly the external inputs such as 

electricity that may not be protected by DOD’s expertise, to withstand a cyber attack and continue to enable our military? How are our Japanese and Korean allies 

faring in their own cybersecurity resiliency efforts? 

Dr. AUSLIN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The strategic guidance emphasizes the presence of U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) in the Asia-Pacific region. What roles do you think the 

SOF forces should play within the Pacific theater? 

Dr. AUSLIN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have long been concerned about the ability of our basing and infrastructure to withstand the cyber attacks that could reasonably be expected in any 

conflict scenario, especially a contingency in areas such as the Korean peninsula, 

East China Sea, or South China Sea. What is your assessment of the ability of our 

domestic and overseas base infrastructure, particularly the external inputs such as 

electricity that may not be protected by DOD’s expertise, to withstand a cyber attack and continue to enable our military? How are our Japanese and Korean allies 

faring in their own cybersecurity resiliency efforts? 

Dr. CRONIN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The strategic guidance emphasizes the presence of U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) in the Asia-Pacific region. What roles do you think the 

SOF forces should play within the Pacific theater? 

Dr. CRONIN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have long been concerned about the ability of our basing and infrastructure to withstand the cyber attacks that could reasonably be expected in any 

conflict scenario, especially a contingency in areas such as the Korean peninsula, 

East China Sea, or South China Sea. What is your assessment of the ability of our 

domestic and overseas base infrastructure, particularly the external inputs such as 

electricity that may not be protected by DOD’s expertise, to withstand a cyber attack and continue to enable our military? How are our Japanese and Korean allies 

faring in their own cybersecurity resiliency efforts? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I believe the external inputs to base infrastructure (domestic 

and overseas) have improved markedly in recent years. Improvements in 

robustness, resiliency and redundancy have been driven by an awareness that the 

inputs are key to maintaining information technology (IT) and command and control 

networks. That said, we must not become complacent or short the necessary resources in this area. Continued attention, testing and resources must be dedicated 

to ensuring improvements continue to made to stay ahead of threats and potential 

adverse conditions that undermine continuity of operations. 

Regarding allies in the region, I am confident Australia is approaching cyber security and the importance of the reliability of associated support infrastructure with 

the same discipline and standards as the U.S. I am impressed with Australian 

standards and commitment in that regard. I believe high levels of resiliency are 

being pursued on installations we share with our Japanese and Korean allies, and 

my experience has been that continuity of operations can be maintained. I believe 

resiliency on shared bases is more robust than on host nation only installations and 

facilities. 

I am less confident our allies in South East Asia are approaching cyber and cyber 

support infrastructure in as disciplined and structured manner as are we and those 

countries mentioned above. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The strategic guidance emphasizes the presence of U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) in the Asia-Pacific region. What roles do you think the 

SOF forces should play within the Pacific theater? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will play an important role 

throughout the Asia-Pacific region and globally. A properly trained and resourced 
104 

SOF will remain the force with the most rapid response to a range of contingencies. 

SOF will remain the most responsive and lethal counterterrorism option the United 

States has. In more conventional scenarios, SOF will be highly valuable in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions and in precursor and behind-the–lines operations. Language and regional familiarity of SOF forces will continue to be a tremendous asset in developing the skills of similar allied forces and 

those of like-minded partners. 

To maximize the value of SOF forces, appropriate investments must be made in 

enablers, i.e. responsive and agile air and maritime lift, ISR, unmanned systems 

and flexible and reliable command and control. Similarly, appropriate training investments must be made for SOF to maintain unequalled proficiency in the range 

of tasks likely to be assigned. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have long been concerned about the ability of our basing and infrastructure to withstand the cyber attacks that could reasonably be expected in any 

conflict scenario, especially a contingency in areas such as the Korean peninsula, 

East China Sea, or South China Sea. What is your assessment of the ability of our 

domestic and overseas base infrastructure, particularly the external inputs such as 

electricity that may not be protected by DOD’s expertise, to withstand a cyber attack and continue to enable our military? How are our Japanese and Korean allies 

faring in their own cybersecurity resiliency efforts? 

Dr. SHINN. This is a legitimate concern, especially since the PLA intends to use 

cyber attacks as a tactic of offensive operations, according to the latest DOD China 

Military Power Report. Unfortunately I don’t know the current state of play, nor do 

I have any insights into the resiliency of either our Korean or Japanese allies 

against cyber intrusion operations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The strategic guidance emphasizes the presence of U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) in the Asia-Pacific region. What roles do you think the 

SOF forces should play within the Pacific theater? 

Dr. SHINN. SOF forces in the Pacific theatre should be subordinate to PACOM 

plans and operations, in my view, and their activities in the region should be carefully synchronized with broader U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military strategy, 

on a country-by-country and regional basis. I think it particularly important that 

U.S. SOF not be drawn into local CT or COIN operations without explicit rules of 

engagement and clear political objectives, with complete visibility up the chain of 

command—political, intelligence, and military commands. There should be, therefore, a clear exit strategy from activities in the Southern Philippines. 

SOF activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan are another issue entirely, a complex 

topic that I can’t address here. 

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