FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT APRI L6, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 06- 1266 4 D. C. Docket N o. 05-00094 CR-1- 1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us HOA QUOC TA , D ef en dant- Appe llant. Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia (A pr il 6, 200 7) Before DU BIN A and COX , C ircuit Judg es, and SCHL ES IN GE R,* D istrict Judg e. PE R CU RIA M:

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ *Honora ble Har vey E. Schlesing er, United States District J udg e for the Middle District of Florida , sitti ngby

desig nation.Def endant Hoa Quoc Ta’s motion to stay re- trial pendinginterlocutory appea l was g rante d. 1 Havingonly

the written tra

nscript this C o urt is hampere d in making a prec ise assessment 2 of the ope ning r emar

ks duration, neve rtheless, the C o u rt n otes that the Gove rnment’s ope ning statement spanne d ten pag es of the tr anscr ipt and the Go vernme nt’s objection was ma de af ter defe nse counse l spoke for te n pag es. 2 H oaQ uoc T a ap pe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of the m oti on t o di sm iss the indictm ent on do uble je opardy grounds after

the court declare d a m istrial over de fen se co un se l’s o bjec ti on . The t ria l co ur t, sua spon te , dec lared a m istrial after de fe nse c ouns el r ep eate dly r ef use d to c om

ply w iththe tr ia l j udge ’ s in str uc tio ns r e g a r d i n g o p e n i n g s t a t e men tan da r g u e dwi t h th e ju d g e i n v i e wo f th e ju ry. D e f e n d a n tth e n p e r f

e c t e dth i s ap p e a l . We a f f i rm. 1 I.Background H oaQ uoc T a an d tw o c ode fe ndants w er e ind ic te d f or kidna pin g, in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 12 02, c ar

j ac kin g, in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 21 19, a nd usi ng and c ar

ry ing af ir earm in co nne ct ionw ithac ri m e of vio le nc e, in vio la tio n of 1 8 U.S .C . § 9 2 4 (c ). Th e c o d ef en d an t s p l ed g u i l t y p ri o r t o tri al an dHo a Q u o c T a’s trial started on January

30, 2006. A fter the j ury

wa s em paneled and adm inistered the oath, the G overnm ent m ade its openin g statem ent the following day . Counsel fo r de fe ndant b eg anhis ope nin g st at em en t i m m ed ia te ly a ft er the G ove rn m en t co m ple te d it s r em ar

ks. W el l i nto de fe nse c ouns el ’ s op en ing state m en t, the G ove rn m en t ob

j ec te d to c ouns el ’ s r ec itatio n of ir re le vant f ac ts. A t the ti m e the 2At this point, defe nse counsel’s entire r emar ks spanned some nine teen pa g es, almost twice 3 the amount of pag es used f rom the time the Gove rnment’s objec tion was first ra ised and the time the trial judg e first a dmonished defe nse counse l to wrap up his opening . 3 obj ec tio n w as m ad e, de fe nse c ouns el ha d no t y et a ddr es se d th e fa ct s of

the kidn aping, car

j acking, or the re lated firearm s violatio ns for which defe ndant was ch ar ge d. I n r es pons e to the obj ec tio n, the tr ia l j udge ins tr uc te d de fe nse c ouns el to

“ m ov e o n t o m or e g erm an e fac ts y ou ex pe ctth e ev id en ce t o s ho w.” Af ter H oa Quoc T a’ s counsel cont inued hi s openin g for severa l m ore m inutes withou t addressing th e operative fa cts of the crim es alleged, the trial j udge had th e courtroom

deputy deliver a note to defense counsel stating it was tim e to b eg in wra

ppi ng u p hi s op en ing state m en t. C ouns el a ga in c ont inu ed w ith his ope nin g, and s hortly

the re af te r, the f oll ow ing e xc hange oc curr ed be tw ee n th e tr ia l j udge and d ef

en se c ouns el : 3 Court: Counselo r, I hate to interr upt. Le t’ s bring it to a close. Co unse l: I w ill y our

H onor , thank y ou. Court: Let’ s bring it to a close. Counsel: I will y our Honor. I t’ s a long case, Judge. D ef en se c ouns el r es um ed

de liv er y of his r em ar

ks, w ith out

r ea ch ing the e ve nts ch ar ge d inthe ind ic tm en t, and the c ourt a ga in i nstru ct ed c ouns el to br ing his openin g statem ent to a close:The district judg e to whom the case was subseque ntly transfe rre d listened to the tape of the 4 exchang e and c onfirmed that it was a rgumentative in nature .

4 Co urt: Co unse l, I ’ m

goi ng t o gi ve y ou tw o m inu te s and d on’ t arg ue y our ca se . Y ou c ante ll the j ur y w ha t y ou anti ci pa te the e vid en ce w ill sho w . Y ou ha ve j ust tw o m inu te s, tw o m inu te s. Af ter this instructio n from

the court, def

ense counsel began to argue with the trial 4 ju d g e i n th e p r e s e n c e o f

th e ju ry: Counsel: Ju dge – Co urt: T w o m inu te s. Co unse l: I ne ed

m or e than tw o m inu te s. Co ur t: I’m

no t g oi ng to gi ve y ou m or e th an two m in ut es , Cou ns el , go ah ead . Sum it . . . up i n tw o m inu te s. Court: May

I approach, sir? Co urt: N o, y ou m ay

not appr oa ch . G o ahe ad

a nd d o a s I dir ec te d, br ing thi s ope nin g st at em en t t o ac onc lus ion . Co unse l: Judg e, y ou d idn ’ t gi ve m e a tim e lim it. Co urt: Y ou kne wit

w as 30 m inu te s. Co u n s el : No , I d o n ’t [ s i c]. Co urt: I w an t y ou t o do it . G o ahe ad , I ’ m giv ing y ou tw o a ddi tio na l m inu te s, I’ ve giv eny ou m or e. G o ahe ad a nd b ri ng y our

. . . ope nin g st at em en t t o a co nc lus ion . Co unse l: W ill y ou g ive m e te n – Co urt: N o. Co unse l: – so I c an

f ini sh? Co urt: N o, I w ill not

giv e y ou t enm inu te s, no. Counsel: I haven’t gotten to the kidn aping, sir. C o u rt : T a k e th e j u ry t o th e j u ry r o o m. A ft er the j ur y w as r em ove d f

ro m the c ourtr oom , the tr ia l j udge a ga in t old de fe nse counsel to fini sh his opening rem arks in two m inutes, to which defense counsel re spon de d th at

he c oul d no t c om

ply w iththe tr ia l j udge ’ s in str uc tio n:5

Co urt: Co unse lor , I w an t y ou t o br ing it to a cl ose in tw o m inu te s. I f y ou can’ t do that – Co unse l: I can’ t do that Ju dge , a nd I ’ d li ke to be he ar d. Court: Let the r ecord re flect that the Court is going to declare a m istrial be ca use c ouns el is not

c oope ratin g w iththe Co urt. Co unse l: Y our

H onor , I w ill a tte m

pt t o do that, but

I c an not – Co ur t: Co ur t wi ll be in rece ss . Cou rt’s i n re ces s. When court resum ed in cham bers the following exchange tookplace: Co ur t: Let t he reco rdrefl ectth atth e Co ur t i s g oi ng to de cl are a m is tri al . Co unse l kn ow s – i f he ’ s no t f am ili ar w iththe ope nin g, he ha d up to 30 m inutes. T he Court sent a w arning telling him to bring hi s closing [sic] ar gum en t t o ac onc lus ion ; he w oul d no t do it . A nd h e pe rs ist ed , he w an ts t o spe nd a s m

uc h ti m e w ithhis ope nin g st at em en t a s he w an ts. H e cannot abide by the Court’ s instructio n; therefore, the Court is goin g to declare a m istrial and have this case ref erre d to som eone else because I cannot work with a lawy er who is no t goin g to coop erate with the Court. L et the rec ord so r ef le ct . Counsel: Your Honor, m ay I be heard, plea se, sir? Court: You can be hear d, m ake it brief. Co unse l: I w ill . Court: Make it brief. Counsel: First, I’ d like to apol ogize. I did no t m ean to show the Court d i s r e s p e c tan ds o I ’dl i k e t o ap o l o g i z e f o r th a t . I h a dn o i d e ai n a n y wa y, sha pe , or f orm , I giv e y ou m

y w or d, that I w as li m ite d to 30 m inu te s. A nd w he n y ou s en t m e the not e I tr ie d to spe ed up b ut I ha d to ge t t o th e cr im e in o u r d e f e n s e . T h s i s ac o mp l i c a t e dc a s e , i t ’s g o i n g t o l a s to v e r aw e e k , my cl ie nt’ s f ac ing li fe in pr iso n. A nd s o I do w an t t o a pol ogi ze to y ou and I want to m ake one thing v ery clear , that I did no t intentio nally in any way hoard m ore tim e than I w as allowed. I have never been before y ou before. It d i dn o td a w n o n me th a ti n ac a s e o f th i s ma g n i tu d e th a tyo uw o u l dl i mi tme to 3 0 m inu te s inan op en ing . Court: Did y ou ask the Court for additio nal tim e in which to m ake an ope nin g st at em en t? Co unse l: I didn’ t kn owto, y our H onor . I didn’ t kn owy our r ule w as 30 m inu te s. A s y ou know , the re is no r ule , a nd y our

r ule , I und er stand –6

Co urt: H owm

uc h ti m e did

y ou s pe nd? G ove rn m en t: Y our

H onor , the pr ac tic e, a s I und er stand i t, in fe de ra l c ourt i s, y ou know , y our

ope nin g st at em en t i s f

ai rl y sho rt . A nd I kno w[ de fe nse co unse l] ha s tr ie d othe r ca se s inf ed er al c ourt. I have ne ve r he ar d su cha lon g op en ing state m en t i n ac as e lik e thi s. Co urt: W el l, I j ust

don ’ t l ike w ha t ha s ha

ppe ne d. Co unse l: Judg e – Co urt: I thi nk i t’ s be st w e j ust c le anit up and – Counsel: May

I m ake a r equest, Judge – Court: – be assign ed to another judge. Co unse l: May

I m ak e a re que st? Co urt: Wha t’ s th at ? Co unse l: I thi nk i t w oul d be am ist ak e to c ont inu e w itham istri al in thi s ca se , and h er e’ s th e re as on: W e ha ve a ll of our w itn es se s f

ro m out of town. Co urt: I unde rs tand tha t, but – Co unse l: I know , and m

y c lie nt – Co urt: A nd the Co urt – Co unse l: A nd, Y our

H onor – Court: – specifically

asked y ou in a not e to y ou to b ring it to a close. Co unse l: A nd I w ill do tha t . . . I j ust thi nk i t’ s am ist ak e to c om m it – de cl ar e a m istri al . Co urt: I’ m

sor ry about that, but in fa ct the gov er

nm en t i s be ar ing thi s expe nse , any

w ay . Bu t any

w ay , I ’ m goi ng t o de cl ar e a m istri al , e xc use the ju ry, a n dth i s c a s e wi l l b e r e a s s i g n e d . Th a n kyo ua n dg o o dd a y. T he part ie s th enr et

ur ne d to ope n c ourt, a nd the c ourt m ad e the f oll ow ing state m en t f

or the r ec or d: Co urt: L et

the r ec or d r ef

le ct that the Co urt f

ound it ne ce ssary

to de cl ar e a m istri al in thi s c as e be ca use c ouns el f

or the de fe ndant w oul d no t f

oll owthe Co urt’ s in str

uc tio ns t o br ing his ope nin g statem ent to a close after

being tol d to do so on two or three oc ca sio ns. T he f

ir st o cc as ionw as in w ri tin g, w ri tin g su bm itt ed to co un se l b y

th e Co ur t’s d ep ut y

cle rk , and th e Co ur t m ad e I t hi nktwo or three r epeated re quests th at counsel bring h is closin g [sic] ar gum en t t o ac los e w ith in tw o m inu te s. C ouns el r ef use d to f oll owWhil e the tra nscript indicates that the court stated in the pr esenc e of the “cour t,” it appea

rs 5 f r o mth e c o n t e x tth atth e c o urtw a s r e f e r r i n gt o th e e x c h an g e th at o c c ur r e d i n th e p r e s e n c e o f

th e j ur y. “[C] ounsel for Defe ndant would not follow the C ourt’s i nstructions to bringhis opening 6 state me nt t o a

c los e a ft e r b e ingtol d to do so on mul tip le oc c a sio ns . . . a

nd the n b e g an to argue wi th the Court about the additional time he nee ded to conc lude his openingstatement, notwithstanding the jury beingprese nt to witness defense counsel’s obstinanc e.” 7 the Co urt’ s in str

uc tio n and an arg um en t be tw ee n th e Co urt and co unse l e nsue d inthe pr es en ce of the [ j ur y ] . F or tho se r ea sons the 5 Court declare d a m istrial and I am going to have this case reassigned to anoth er j udge. T he ne xt d ay

the tr ia l j udge iss ue d aw ri tte n or de r re ite ratin g th e re as ons fo r the m istri al , r ec usi ng h im se lf f ro m the c as e, a nd r ef

er ri ng the c as e fo r 6 re as sig nm en t t o th e ne xt d istri ct j udge in the r otatio n. D ef en dant the n m ove d to dis m iss the ind ic tm en t and b ar r etri al on d oubl e j eo pardy gr ound s, a rg uin g th at

the tr ia l c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n by

de cl ar ing am istri al in the abse nc e of m an if es t necessity or prej udice. D efendant also argued that the trial court fa iled to consi der al te rn at iv es be fo re d ecl ari ng a m is tri al . T he G ove rn m en t r es pond ed that di sm iss al w as not

w ar rante d be ca

use the tr ia l c ourt pr ope rl y

de cl ar ed am istri al , a s th er e w as m an if es t ne ce ssi ty . A cc or din g to the Governm ent, def

ense counsel’ s refusal to com ply with the trial j udge’s order an d th e ar gum en t be tw ee n th e j udge a nd c ouns el in the pr es en ce of the j ur y li ke ly cr eate d j ur or

bia s a ga ins t de fe nse c ouns el . T hus, the m istri al pr ote ct ed the de fe ndant f

ro m pr ej udi ce . T he G ove rn m en t a lso dis put ed that do ubl e j eo pardy8

pr ec lud ed it f ro m r etry ing the de fe ndant, not ing that de fe nse c ouns el did not r ai se the argum ent before the tria l court; defense counsel onlyargued that it would be a m ist ak e to g rant a

m istri al in thi s c as e be ca use “ w e ha ve a ll of

our w itn es se s f

ro m out of town.” Th e s ec o n dd i s t ri ct ju d g e r ea s s i g n ed t o th e c as e d en i ed th e d ef en d an t ’s mo t i o n t o d i s mi s s . I n c o n c l u d i n g th a tth e e x c h a n g e r e s u l t e di n man i f e s tn e c e s s i t y, the dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th at the tr ia l c ourt’ s e va luatio n of pr ej udi ce w as e nti tle d to defere nce. Review ing th e re cord, the newj udge conclud ed that the trial court had not a ct ed abr upt ly or e rr at ic al ly

in lig ht o f the te rs e ex ch an ge s th at e sc al at ed to co unse l’ s r ef

usa l t o c om

ply w iththe c ourt’ s or de r. T he ne w ly a ssi gne d j udge not ed that the or igi na l tri al j udge ha d be enon the be nc h f or about 30 y ears a nd ha d ar ep utatio n f

or f ai rn es s and a

tol er an t de m eanor . A ddi tio na lly , the se co nd dis tr ic t j udge r ev ie w ed

the ope nin g st at em en t and f ound it “ bogg ed down in factual details not charac teristic of an opening statem ent” and wa s rather

“ de liv er ed

m or e in the m an ne r of

asum m at ion . ” T he se co nd d istri ct j udge a lso concluded th at the incident created a risk of j uror bias, and that th e m istrial pr ote ct ed de fe ndant f

ro m any pr ej udi ce . T he dis tr ic t j udge f urthe r fo und that, al tho ugh the tr ia l j udge sho uld have c onsi de re d a lte rn at ive s, he re , a ny c ur at ive in st ru ct io n c ou ldha ve m ad e th e si tu at io n wo rs e.9

D ef en se c ouns el the n m ove d f or a n in te rl oc uto ry

appe al and t o st ay

the pr oc ee din gs p en din g th e out co m e of the appe al . T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e st ay . II.Stan dard of R eview This Court review s the district court’ s denial of a m otion to dism iss an ind ic tm en t f

or abuse of dis cr et ion . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Q uia la , 19 F . 3d 5 69, 570 ( 11th Cir. 1994 ); U nited States v. Chica , 14 F. 3d 15 27, 1530 (11t h Cir. 1994 ). An order declaring a m istrial is review ed by this Court “ to determ ine whether it was m anifestly

necessary , taking into cons ideration all circum stances.” United State s v. Be rr oa , 374 F . 3d 1 053, 105 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) , c er t. de nie d, 543 U . S. 107 6 (2 005) ( ci tin g U nit ed

S ta te s v. P er ez , 22 U . S. ( 9 Whe at . ) 579, 580 , 6 L . E d. 165 (1 824) ). T his Co urt gi ve s de fe re nc e to the tr ia l j udge ’ s f ind ing of m an if es t necessity , but the defer ence “ varies acc ording to the circum stances, which ci rc u m s t an ce s i n cl u d e t h e b as i s fo r t h e o rd ero f mis t ri al an dth e t ri al ju d g e’s ex er ci se of

sound d isc re tio n inm ak ing the de ci sio n. ” I d. ( ci tin g A ri zo nav. W as hi ng to n, 4 34 U.S. 49 7, 5 09 -1 0, n .28 , 98 S. Ct. 8 24 , 54 L. Ed. 2d71 7 (1 97 8) ). Whether a m istrial is a m anifest necessity is a fac t-intensiv e inquiry and, there fore, is not s usceptible to a m echanical for m ulation . Chica, 14 F.3d at 1531. Moreover, thi s C ourt r ev ie w s “ the e nti re r ec or d inthe c as e w ith out li m iti ng [ its el f] to the10

ac tua l f ind ing s of

the tr ia l c ourt. ” I d. ; a cc or d Abdi v. G eo rg ia , 744 F . 2d 1 500, 1503 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) . T he gov er nm en t be ar s th e he av y

bur de n of

e sta bli shi ng m an if es t ne ce ssi ty . C hic a, 14 F . 3d at 15 31 ( ci tin g W as hin gto n, 434 U . S. a t 50 5, 98 S. C t. at 830). III . D isc us sio n The D oubl e Jeopardy

Clause of the Fif

th Am endm ent protects a crim inal de fe ndant f

ro m be ing sub

j ec te d to r ep eate d pr ose cu tio ns o r m ult ipl e puni shm en ts fo r the sam e of

fe nse . U . S. Co nst . a m en d. V ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. D ini tz , 424 U. S. 600, 606 96 S. Ct. 1075 , 1079, 47 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1976). Jeopardy attaches onc e the j ur

y is em pane le d; o nc e j eo pardy

ha s a tta ch ed , the de fe ndant h as ar igh t to ha ve th e cas e d eci de d b y th atjury, ex cep t u nd er v ery li m it edcir cu m st an ces . Cri st v. Br et z, 43 7 U.S. 2 8, 3 5, 9 8 S . Ct. 2 15 6, 2 16 1, 5 7 L. Ed. 2 d 2 4 (1 97 8) . When a j udge grants a m istrial without the defendant’s c onsent, the defendant m ay have been deprived of the “ valued right to have his trial com pleted by a particular tr ibuna l. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Jor

n, 400 U . S. 470 , 484 , 91 S . Ct . 547 , 557 , 27 L . E d. 2d 5 43 ( 1971 ) (c iti ng W ad e v. H unt er , 336 U . S. 684 , 689 , 69 S . Ct . 834 , 837 , 93 L. Ed. 97 4 (1 94 9) ); Qu ia la , 19 F.3d at 5 70 . The C onsti tutio n protects the defendant’ s valued right to have the trial com pleted by a particular

tribunal “ by

requiring that a trial j udge declare a m istrial11

w ith out the c onse nt o f the de fe ndant o nly a ft er it de te rm ine s th at

m istri al is a m anifest necessity .” Abdi v. Ge orgia, 744 F. 2d 15 00, 1503 (11t h Cir. 1984 ); see al so P er ez , 22 U . S. ( 9 Whe at . ) at 580 ; I lli noi s v. S om er

vil le , 410 U . S. 458 , 461 , 93 S. Ct . 106 6, 106 9, 35 L . E d. 2d 4 25 ( 1973 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. Br ad le y , 905 F . 2d 1482 , 148 6 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) . Whil e “ m an if es t ne ce ssi ty ” is n ot s ubj ec t t o pr ec ise fo rm ulatio n, it is de sc ri be d a s a“ hig h de gr ee of ne ce ssi ty . ” A ri zo nav. W ashingt on, 434 U. S. 497, 506-07, 98 S. Ct. 824, 831, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978); Abdi, 744 F. 2d at 150 3. I n determ ining the existence of m anifest necessity for a m istri al , atr ia l c ourt m

ust e xe rc ise it s so und dis cr et ion . A ri zo na , 434 U . S. a t 50 6- 07, 98 S. Ct. at 831; Venson v. Ge orgia, 74 F. 3d 11 40, 1145 (11t h Cir. 1996 ). In ex er ci sin g th is d isc re tio n, “ unqu es tio nably a n im portant f ac tor to be c onsi de re d is the need to hold litigants on bot h sides to standards of responsib le professional co nduc t i n th e cl as h of

an a dve rs ar

y c ri m ina l pr oc es s. ” Jor

n, 400 U . S. a t 48 5- 86, 91 S . Ct . a t 55 7. Appe llant H oaQ uoc T a ar gue s th at the m istri al w as not

sup porte d by m an ife st ne ces si ty, an d, t he refo re, an y ret ria l wo ul d v io la te do ub le jeop ard y . A cc or din g to Appe llant, the r ec or d do es not sup port any

f ind ing of m an if es t ne ce ssi ty be ca use the m istri al w as not

to his be ne fi t, the tr ia l j udge f ai le d to co ns id er al te rn at iv es , and th e jud ge act edab rupt ly andwit ho utde li be rat io n.12

Appe llant a lso arg ue s th at the tr ia l j udge ’ s f

ru str at ionw ithc ouns el w as not a sufficient rea son to declare a m istrial. F urther he asserts that the second district j udge erred by

defer ring to the trial judge’ s determ ination s because the rec ord was de voi d of any e vid en ce , and tha t de fe nse c ouns el ne ith er e nga ge d ina ny m is co nd uc t n orrefu se d t o o be y th e tr ia l ju dg e’s or de r. T he G ove rn m en t r es pond s th at the m istri al w as sup porte d by am an if es t n ec es s i t y b ec au s e o f d ef

en s e c o u n s el ’s re p ea t ed re fu s al t o h ee dth e t ri al ju d g e’s ins tr uc tio ns, c ouns el ’ s arg um en t w iththe tr ia l j udge in the j ur y ’ s pr es en ce , a nd the tr ia l j udge ’ s ob vio us f

ru str at ionw ithc ouns el , w hic h li ke ly c au se d pr ej udi ce to the defendant. Mor eover, the Governm ent contends that the trial j udge did not act ab ru ptl y , but r athe r ex cu se d th e j ur

y a nd m ove d th e part ie s to c ha m be rs to dis cu ss the m istri al . T he G ove rn m en t no te s th at de fe nse c ouns el ne ve r re que ste d a curativ e ins tr

uc tio n or any oth er a lte rn at ive m ea sur e, but

it c ont en ds tha t a

c ur at ive instructio n would not have relieved the potential prej udice. R eviewing the rec ord in this c as e, w e co nc lud e that the tr ia l c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n in di sc ha rg in g t he jury. See J orn, 4 00 U.S. at 4 86 -8 7, 9 1 S . Ct. at 55 8. T he tr ia l j udge c le ar ly

ind ic at ed that the m istri al w as de cl ar ed be ca use de fe nse c ouns el w ill fu lly r ef use d to c om

ply w iththe j udge ’ s r ep eate d a dm oni tio n to b ri ng h is o pe nin g st at em en t t o ac los e, a nd tha t he the n pr oc ee de d to a rg ue w ith13

the j udge in the pr es en ce of the j ur y . T he se co nd d istri ct

j udge de fe rr ed

to the or igi na l tri al j udge ’ s de te rm inatio n th at the a rg um en t be tw ee n th e co urt and co unse l i n th e pr es en ce of the j ur y c re at ed ar isk of bia s and p re

j udi ce a ga ins t defense counsel. T here w as a significant risk that a j uror m ight b elieve that defense counsel was not acting professionallytowar d the trial j udge. In this case, the j ury heard the trial j udge and defense couns el engaged in an exchange that show ed both th e j udge ’ s f

ru str at ionw ithc ouns el a nd c ouns el ’ s r ef usa l t o ob ey

the j udge ’ s in str

uc tio ns. T he se co nd d istri ct j udge w ho l ist en ed

to the ta pe of the pr oc ee din g no te d th at

it w as ind ee d arg um en ta tiv e in n at ur e. I n li ght

of thi s, the original trial judge could have reasonably believed that the jury

thoug ht that defense counsel was incom petent or unscrupu lous. See W ashingt on, 434 U. S. at 512-13 . Moreover, based on defense counsel’s c ondu ct display ed before the j ury at the beginnin g of trial, the trial j udge had no assurances that counsel would obey an y f urthe r ins tr

uc tio ns and r

uli ngs dur ing the r em ai nde r of the tr ia l. G ivi ng d

ue de fe re nc e to the tr ia l j udge ’ s de te rm inatio n, it appe ar s to thi s C ourt tha t the m istri al w as to Appe llant’ s be ne fi t. Whil e it is f

av or ed that the tr ia l c ourt m ak e m an if es t ne ce ssi ty determ ination s explicit in th e re cord, the tr ial court is not required to m ake such statem ents. Se e id. at 516-17 ; Ve nson , 74 F. 3d at 114 6. I t would not h ave been14

anabuse of

dis cr et ionf

or the tr ia l j udge to co nc lud e that the a rg um en t, a nd the j udge’s c omm ents and adm oniti ons to defense counsel, c omm unicated to the jury that the tr ia l j udge c onsi de re d de fe nse c ouns el ine pt o r inc om pe te nt, the re by discoun ting d efense c ouns el’ s credibility and effe ctiveness before the j ury . Ther e w as asig nif

ic an t r isk that the j ur

y c oul d have de ve lop ed

abia s a ga ins t de fe nse co unse l du e to h is arg um en t w iththe tr ia l j udge , a nd this bia s a ga ins t de fe nse counsel coul d have transferr ed to Appellant Hoa Q uoc Ta. G enerally , the tr ial court is in the best po sition to gauge pot ential bias and, theref ore, special de fere nc e is du e whe n t he gro un ds forth e m is tri al rel at e to jury pr ejud ic e. W ashingt on, 434 U. S. at 510-14, 98 S.C t. at 832-83 4; Abdi, 744 F.2d at 1503. In suc h in stanc es the tr ia l j udge is in a pr im e posi tio n to obs er

ve the j ur or s, the wit ne ss es , and th e at to rn ey s s o a s t o e va lu at e th e sc op e o f th e p reju di ce. Re vie w ing the r ec or d, w e ar e co nf ide nt tha t the tr ia l j udge did not abuse his discretion in con cluding that the argum ent that transpired in view of the j ury m ay ha ve pr ej udi ce d ho waj ur y w oul d pe rc ei ve a nd e va luate H oaQ uoc T a at tr ia l, th ereb y res ul ti ng in a m an ife st ne ces si ty for a m is tri al . G en er al ly the tr ia l c ourt sh oul d c onsi de r al te rn at ive s be fo re de cl ar ing a m istri al , y et

m an if es t ne ce ssi ty

m ay be pr es en t e ve n w he n ale ss s ev er e al te rn at ive ex ist s. Abdi , 744 F . 2d at 15 03. A t no ti m e did de fe nse c ouns el of

fe r an yIn Bonne r v. City of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), this cour

t 7 held that all dec isions handed down by the old Fifth Circuit bef ore the close of business on Se pte mbe r 3 0, 19 81 , a

re bin din gpr e c e de nt i n th e El e ve nth Cir c uit . 15 alternatives; nor did th e trial c ourt discus s any alternatives. Although th e trial co urt i s no t r equir ed

to ch oose apart ic ular al te rn at ive , V en son, 74 F . 3d at 11 45, it is required to consid er a lternatives. Q uiala, 19 F. 3d at 572 . A f ailure to consider al te rn at ive s “ subj ec ts the [ tr ia l] c ourt’ s a br upt de cl ar at ionof

am istri al to cl ose ap pe llate sc ru tin y . ” Q uia la , 19 F . 3d at 57 2; s ee a lso G randbe rr y v. Bo nne r, 653 F. 2d 1 010, 101 4 ( 5thCi r. U nit A , 198 1) . H er e, in ru lin g onthe m oti on t o

7 dis m iss the ind ic tm en t, the dis tr ic t j udge c onc lud ed that any c ur at ive ins tr

uc tio n could have increased the chance of bias and prej udice. R eviewing the entire re co rd w e fi nd the dis tr ic t j udge did not abuse his dis cr et ionin m ak ing suc h a de te rm inatio n. A tr ial court also abuses its d iscretion when it acts “ irrationally ” or in an

“ ab ru pt, pr ec ipi tou s or

e rr at ic m an ne r” in gr an tin g am istri al . W as hin gto n, 434 U. S. at 514; Bradley , 905 F. 2d at 148 8. T he trial court’ s failure to consider al te rn at iv es to a m is tri al is ev id en ce o f ab rupt ne ss . Qui al a, 19 F.3d at 5 72 . Although quick decisio ns do n ot necessarily indicate abruptness, Abdi, 744 F.2d at 1504 , the pa ce of

the de ci sio n m ay

“ re inf or ce the im

pr es sio n of

a n a br upt de ci sio n. ” I d. ( ci tin g G randbe rr y , 653 F . 2d at 10 14) . Ade ci sio n is abr upt w he n it16

is “ ina ppr opr ia te ly

f as t. ” I d. ( co nc lud ing that a qui ck de ci sio n w as not

abr upt b e c au s e th e mi s c o n du c tw a s p a rt i c u l a r l y f l a g r a n t ) . A n o t h e r

j u d g e i n th i s s a me situatio n m ight h ave re spon ded to defense counsel’s c ondu ct differ ently or stated hi s co ns id erat io n o f al te rn at iv es to a m is tri al m or e d ire ct ly on t he reco rd . N ev er the le ss, the tr ia l j udge w ho w as pr es en t i n th e co urtr oom obs er ve d th e j ur or s, as se sse d th e lik el iho od o f pr ej udi ci al e ff ec t, a nd m ad e the sw if

t bu t de lib er at e d e c i s i o n th a tth e mi s t r i a l wa s t o d e f e n d a n t ’s b e n e f

i ta n dman i f

e s t l y n e c e s s a ry. Abdi , 744 F . 2d at 15 04. T he se co nd d istri ct j udge w ho r ea d th e tr an sc ri pt and lis te ne d to the pr oc ee din g, and who w as able to at le as t di sc er

n to ne a nd i nf

le ct ion , w hic h are unava ila

ble f ro m the w ri tte n tr an sc ri pt, sim ilarl y de te rm ine d th at

the m istri al w as in the de fe ndant’ s in te re st. F or thi s de te rm inatio n w e fi nd n o a buse of di sc ret io n. Upon care ful reviewof the rec ord we find that the declaration of a m istrial w as not an a buse of dis cr et ionand the re fo re r etri al of de fe ndant H oaQ uoc T a is not barr ed . A cc or din gly , w e af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n de ny ing the m oti on t o di sm iss . AFFIRMED.