alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Pamela Kozikowski, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 841]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered June 19, 2003. The judgment convicted defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of robbery in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting her upon her plea of guilty of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]), defendant contends that Supreme Court should have suppressed her statement to the police on the ground that it was the fruit of an illegal arrest at her home. We reject that contention. Defendant’s reliance on *Payton v New York*(445 US 573 [1980]) is misplaced because, here, the police had obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit given by an identified civilian known to the police. In any event, the suppression court determined that the police searched defendant’s home with the consent of defendant. Although defendant contends that she did not provide her consent to search her home, the suppression court’s determination that she did provide her consent is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed *(see generally People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]). Because the police were validly in defendant’s home, *Payton*does not apply. We note in addition that defendant mistakenly relies on *People v Blake*(35 NY2d 331 [1974]) for the proposition that, once an *991arrest warrant is issued, a defendant may not be questioned outside the presence of counsel. Here, no arrest warrant was issued, and the mere acquisition of the search warrant did not trigger defendant’s indelible right to counsel prior to arraignment (see *generally People v Dawson,*249 AD2d 977, 978 [1998], *lv denied*93 NY2d 872 [1999]). Finally, defendant failed to preserve for our review her contention that her plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered, and this case does not fall within the narrow exception to the preservation requirement *(see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988]). Present—Scudder, J.P., Martoche, Smith, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
§ 58.6001-1 Notice or regulations requiring records, statements, and special returns. ( a ) *In general.* Any covered corporation (as defined in section 4501(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code)), or any person treated as a covered corporation (as described in section 4501(d)(1)(A) or (d)(2)(A)), that makes a repurchase (as defined in section 4501(c)(1)), or that is treated as making a repurchase under section 4501(c)(2)(A), (d)(1)(B), or (d)(2)(B), must keep such complete and detailed records as are sufficient to establish accurately the amount of repurchases, adjustments, or exceptions required to be shown by the covered corporation or person treated as a covered corporation in any stock repurchase excise tax return (as defined in § 58.6011-1(b)).
( b ) *Notice by IRS requiring returns, statements, or the keeping of records.* The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may require any covered corporation or person treated as a covered corporation, by notice served upon such corporation or person, to make such returns, render such statements, or keep such specific records as will enable the IRS to determine whether or not such corporation or person is liable for tax under chapter 37 of the Code.
( c ) *Retention of records.* The records required by this section must be kept at all times available for inspection by the IRS and must be retained for so long as the contents thereof may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law.
( d ) *Applicability date.* This section applies to repurchases, adjustments, or exceptions required to be shown in any stock repurchase excise tax return required to be filed after June 28, 2024, and during taxable years ending after June 28, 2024.
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                           GTECH HOLDINGS CORPORATION

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
                         PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of GTECH Holdings Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending August 23, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the Date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jaymin
B. Patel, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C section 1350, as adopted pursuant to sections 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.

                                GTECH HOLDINGS CORPORATION

Date:    October 1, 2003        By /s/ Jaymin B. Patel
                                ------------------------------------------------
                                Jaymin B. Patel, Senior Vice President and
                                Chief Financial Officer
§ 47.5000D-1 Introduction. ( a ) *In general.* The regulations in this part are designated the *Designated Drugs Excise Tax Regulations.* The regulations in this part relate to the tax imposed by section 5000D of the Internal Revenue Code. See part 40 of this chapter for regulations relating to returns, payments, and other procedural rules applicable to this part.
( b ) *Applicability date.* This section applies to returns filed for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 2023.
(Superior Court of Cincinnati.)

Special Term, September, 1900.

#### DAVID G. EDWARDS, Administrator, v. JOHN C. DALLER.

A cause of action growing out of undue influence over a weak mind d0es not accrue until after the removal of the baleful influence.

Heard on demurrer to petition on two grounds,that more than four years have elapsed since cause of action arose, and that the facts do not constitute a cause of action.

Harlan Cleveland, for demurrer.

Char. W. Baker, contra.

DEMPSEY, J.

As to the first ground, without passing upon the question whether the four years’ limit applies, it is sufficient to say that undue influence exercised over a weak and incapable mind is the charge made, which influence was continued during the lifetime of Mrs. Oskamp.

A cause of action, under such circumstances, it seems to me would not accrue until the cessation or removal of tlie baleful influence,which in this case was not accomplished until death intervened; or to assimilate it to the topic “fraud” provided for in the statute, and consider it a species of fraud, and the statute would not run until discovery made, and the discovery made in this case was not until after the influence ceased, i. e.. by death.

That the facts are sufficient to warrant the interference of equity our precedents justify (see, 1 Ohio St., 54; 13 Ohio St., 49; 2 C. C., 498.)

Demurrer overruled.

[Mem. I Since writing the foregoing opinion, an examination of the books confirms the court’s judgment as to the time when the statute begins to run: “Time does not begin to run so as to bar the remedy * * * in cases where the transaction has taken place under pressure or the exercise of undue influence until the aggrieved party is emancipated from the dominion under which he stood at the date of the transaction. * * * The objection of time is removed so long as the dominion or undue influence which vitiated the transaction is in full force.” Kerr on Fraud, 311 and cases; Oldham v. Oldham, 5 John q. Case, N. C., 89 92; Lowland v. DeFaria. 17 Vesey, 25; Sharp v. Leach, 31 Beavan. 491, 503.

(Sed further decision in same case, post, p. 73.)
§ 54.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer. ( a ) *In general.* For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of tax returns or claims for refund of tax under Chapter 43 of subtitle D, see § 1.6694-1 of this chapter.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* Paragraph (a) of this section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78458, Dec. 22, 2008]
EXHIBIT 10.94


 


 


Chelsey Finance, LLC


110 East 59th Street


New York, NY 10016


 


 


March 6, 2007


 


Hanover Direct, Inc.


1500 Harbor Boulevard


Weehawken, NJ 07086


 


Re:  Loan and Security Agreement, dated as of July 8, 2004, as amended (as amended, the “Loan Agreement”)


 


Gentlemen:


 


We refer to the Loan Agreement.  All terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meaning as in the Loan Agreement.


 


You have requested and we have agreed to amend the Loan Agreement to extend the end of the Term from July 8, 2007 until January 2, 2008.  We are willing to do so provided the Loan Agreement is amended to include EBITDA covenants for the third and fourth quarters of 2007.


 





	
             
 	
            1.  Extension.  Section 9.1 of the Loan Agreement is hereby amended to read as follows:
 





 


This Agreement and the other Financing Agreements shall become effective as of the date hereof and this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect for a term ending on January 2, 2008 (the “Term”).


 


2.  EBITDA Covenants.  Section 6.28 (d) of the Loan Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:


 


(d) Hanover and its Subsidiaries shall not, as to any fiscal quarter during the fiscal year 2007 of Hanover and its Subsidiaries, permit EBITDA of Hanover and its Subsidiaries commencing on the first day of such fiscal year and ending on the last day of the applicable fiscal quarter set forth below on a cumulative YTD basis to be less than the respective amount set forth below opposite such fiscal quarter end YTD period:


 


 





	
            Fiscal Quarter 

End YTD Periods

for Fiscal Year 2007
 	
             
 	
            Cumulative

Minimum

EBITDA

 
 
	
            (i)   December 31, 2006 through March 31, 2007
 	
             
 	
            ($1,100,000)
 
	
            (ii)  December 31, 2006 through June 30, 2007
 	
             
 	
            $900,000
 
	
            (iii) December 31, 2006 through September 29, 2007
 	
             
 	
            $1,800,000
 
	
            (iv) December 31, 2006 through December 29, 2007
 	
             
 	
            $4,700,000
 





 


 


 


 








Hanover Direct, Inc.


March 6, 2007


Page 2


 


 


3.  No Further Amendments.  In all respects, the Loan Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.


 


If the foregoing correctly reflects your agreement with the matter provided for above, please sign below and return a fully executed copy to my attention.


 





	
             
 	
            Very truly yours,
 









	
             
 	
            CHELSEY FINANCE, LLC
 





 


 





	
             
 	
            By  /s/ William Wachtel
 









	
             
 	
            William Wachtel, Manager
 





AGREED TO:


HANOVER DIRECT, INC.


 


By:  /s/ Wayne Garten





	
             
 	
            Wayne Garten,
 









	
             
 	
            President & Chief Executive Officer
p130176.eng

INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT 

PMN: 13-0176

Focus Ready Draft 1/10/2013

ENGINEER: El-Zoobi \ AH

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EPA SANITIZED Page 1 of 4
p130176.eng

Consumer Use: No

SAT (concerns) (01/04/2013):

Related Cases and Related Cases and Misc SAT Info:

Migration to groundwater: Negligible

PBT rating: P3B3T1 PMN: P3B1T1. Deg Pdt: P3B3T1.

Health: 1 Not Required

Eco: 1 No releases to Water

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE RATING: 1B

NOTES & KEY ASSUMPTIONS:

Generated by the 06/07/2005 version of ChemSTEER. 

 

 

 

INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT 

PMN: 13-0176

 

 

Page 2

EPA SANITIZED Page 2 of 4
p130176.eng

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 3

EPA SANITIZED Page 3 of 4
EPA SANITIZED Page 4 of 4
#### Mas Vega Baudillo, Respondent, v Pam Car & Truck Rental, Inc., Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[803 NYS2d 922]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Pam Car & Truck Rental, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated January 3, 2005, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Mas Vega Baudillo did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955 [1992]). “Notably, the report of the defendants’ orthopedist specified the degrees of the range of motion in the plaintiffs cervical spine without comparing these findings to the normal range of motion. Thus, the defendants’ proof failed to objectively demonstrate that the plaintiff did not suffer a permanent consequential or significant limitation of use of his cervical spine as a result of the subject accident” *(Aronov v Leybovich,*3 AD3d 511, 512 [2004]; *see Claude v Clements,*301 AD2d 554 [2003]). Since the defendant failed to meet its initial burden of establishing a *421prima facie case, it was unnecessary *“to*consider whether the plaintiffs’ papers in opposition to the defendants’ motion were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact” *(Coscia v 938 Trading Corp.,*283 AD2d 538 [2001]; *see also Facci v Kaminsky,*18 AD3d 806 [2005]; *Lesane v Tejada,*15 AD3d 358 [2005]). Cozier, J.P., Santucci, Luciano, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
GRANT THORNTON LLP

1100 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 1400

Atlanta, GA 30309

 

D +1 404 330 2000

F  +1 404 475 0107

 

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

 

 

Board of Directors of

Fintech Trust Advisors LLC DBA CRED iQ

We have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying Management’s Report on Assessment of Compliance with SEC Regulation AB Servicing Criteria (“Management’s Report”), that Fintech Trust Advisors LLC DBA CRED IQ (the “Company” or “CRED iQ”) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Items 1122(d)(3)(i)(A-B) and 1122(d)(4)(vii) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB for the Operating and/or Trust Advisor Services Platform (the “Platform”) as of and for the year ended December 31, 2023. The Platform consists of the asset-backed transactions and securities in which the Company was named as the Operating and/or Trust Advisor as defined by management in Appendix B of Management’s Report. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion about the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria for the Platform based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria for the Platform and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing selected asset-backed transactions and securities constituting the Platform and evaluating whether the Company performed servicing activities related to those transactions and securities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria for the period covered by this report. Accordingly, our testing may not have included servicing activities related to each asset-backed transaction or security constituting the Platform. Further, our examination was not designed to detect material noncompliance that may have occurred prior to the period covered by this report and that may have affected the Company’s servicing activities during the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria.

We are required to be independent and to meet our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with relevant ethical requirements relating to the engagement.

In our opinion, management’s assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2023, for the Platform is fairly stated, in all material respects.

 

 

 

Atlanta, Georgia March 29, 2024

 

 

----
§ 44.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers. ( a ) *In general.* For rules for claims for credit or refund by a tax return preparer who prepared a return or claim for refund for tax on wagers under sections 4401 or 4411, the rules under § 1.6696-1 of this chapter will apply.
( b ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable to returns and claims for refund filed, and advice provided, after December 31, 2008.
[T.D. 9436, 73 FR 78457, Dec. 22, 2008]
§ 1.31 Sale or rental of mailing lists. ( a ) *In general.* An individual's name and address must not be sold or rented by a component unless such action is specifically authorized by law.
( b ) *Withholding of names and addresses.* This section must not be construed to require the withholding of names and addresses otherwise permitted to be made public. (*See* 5 U.S.C. 552a(n).)
### SAT Report PMN Number: P-13-0018 SAT Date: 10/23/2012 Print Date: 12/6/2012

Related cases : Health related cases : Ecotox related cases:

Concern levels : Type of Concern: Health Eco Comments Level of Concern: 1-2 2

Persistence Bioaccum Toxicity Comments 2 12

Exposure Based Review : Health: N o Ecotox: N o
Routes of exposure : Health: Drinking Water Inhalation Ecotox: All releases to water Fate: ; Keywords : Keywords: CARDIO, BLOOD, BONE, ONCO-BONE, DEVEL, KIDNEY, MUSCLE, AQUATOX-A,C
Summary of Assessment :

Fate : Fate Summary: P-13-0018 FATE: Solid with MP = 348 C (E) log Kow = -14.8 (E) S > 10 g/L at 25 C (E) VP < 1.0E-6 torr at 25 C (E) BP > 400 C (E) H < 1.00E-8 (E) log Koc = 3.57 (E) log Fish BCF = 0.50 (E)log Fish BAF = -0.05 (E) POTW removal (%) = 0-25 via biodeg Time for complete ultimate aerobic biodeg = mo Sorption to soils/sediments = moderate PBT Potential: P2B1 *CEB FATE: Migration to ground water = moderate

Health : Health Summary: N ot absorbed from the skin, absorbed from the lung, absorbed from the GI tract ( p che m ). Concern for blood toxicity, cardio toxicity, inhibited muscle functioning, bone toxicity, bone cancer, developmental toxicity, and kidney toxicity based on chelation potential and analogs, such as, Low moderate concern. Test Data: (-) Salmonella with and without activation; (-) E. coli with and without activation; no skin sensitization in guinea pigs using the Magnusson-Kligman assay

rat developmental toxicity test via the oral route with doses = 1000, 400, and 100 mg/kg/d with N OEL = 100 mg/kg/d based on no reported effects at this dose; LOEL = 400 mg/kg/d based on skeletal retardation; more severe and significant effects at 1000 mg/kg/d;

Ecotox :
Test Organism Test Type Test End Point Predicted Measured Comments

fish 96-h LC50 >100 daphnid 48-h LC50 >100 green algal 96-h EC50 5.2 fish

_ chronic value >10 daphnid

_ chronic value >10

algal

_ chronic value 2.0

Sewage Sludge 3-h EC50

_ Sewage Sludge

_ Chronic Value _

Ecotox Values Comments: Predictions are based on SAR-nearest analog method for MW 459; solid (P) with mp = unk °C (P); S > 450 g/L at 20 C (M); p H7; effective concentrations based on 100% active ingredients and nominal concentrations; DWhardness <150.0 mg/L as CaCO3; and DWTOC <2.0 mg/L;Factors Values Comments Assessment Factor 10 Concentration of Concern ( p pb) 200

SARs SAR Class Ecotox Category

Ecotox Factors Comments:

SAT Chair: Becky Jones
#### § 601.205 Tort claims.

Claims for property loss or damage, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Service, acting within the scope of his office or employment, filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended, must be prepared and filed in accordance with Treasury Department regulations entitled “Central Office Procedures” and “Claims Regulations” (31 CFR Parts 1 and 3). Such regulations contain the procedural and substantive requirements relative to such claims, and set forth the manner in which they are handled. The claims should be filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Washington, DC 20224, and must be filed within 2 years after the accident or incident occurred.
#### Maryana Makagon, Appellant, v Toyota Motor Credit Corp. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[808 NYS2d 120]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated *444November 3, 2004, as granted the cross motion of the defendants Toyota Motor Credit Corp., Greta Elman, and Elena Elman for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the cross motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as asserted against the defendants Toyota Motor Credit Corp., Greta Elman, and Elena Elman.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants Toyota Motor Credit Corp., Greta Elman, and Elena Elman (hereinafter the respondents) acknowledged that the accident occurred when their vehicle moved from the left southbound lane on the FDR Drive “over the divider into the middle of oncoming traffic” in the northbound lane. The fact that the vehicle crossed over into the opposing lane of traffic constituted proof of negligence *(see Tomaselli v Goldstein,*104 AD2d 872 [1984]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1120 [c]).

The respondents’ claim is that the defendant driver Greta Elman was confronted with an emergency not of her own making when her vehicle was struck by an unidentified red sedan. As a general rule, the questions of the existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of the response to it is an issue for the trier of fact *(see Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City,*12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]; *Davey v Ohler,*188 AD2d 726, 727 [1992]), although “they may in appropriate circumstances be determined as a matter of law” *(Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, supra*at 60; *Huggins v Figueroa,*305 AD2d 460 [2003]). The only evidence in the record of the existence of the unidentified red sedan is Greta Elman’s testimony. The photographs of damage to the vehicle she was driving to which she referred in her deposition testimony are not part of the record. Under the circumstances, the respondents failed to establish as a matter of law that Greta Elman was confronted with an emergency *(see Foster v Sanchez,*17 AD3d 312, 313 [2005]).

In any event, the observations of a police officer who responded to the scene, which were memorialized in a police report, that Greta Elman “ha[d] no memory of the accident,” and his testimony in a related proceeding that there was no evidence that any third vehicle was involved, established the existence of a triable issue of fact which precluded summary judgment *(see Holliday v Hudson Armored Car & Courier Serv.,*301 AD2d 392, 396 [2003]; *Ajlouny v Town of Huntington,*184 AD2d 486, 487 [1992]; *Carter v County of Erie,*98 AD2d 963 [1983]). Florio, J.P., Goldstein, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.