[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10918

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WELLEKSON GONÇALVES SILVA, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

versus

ANDRIENE FERREIRA DOS SANTOS, 

Respondent-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03371-ELR

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10918

Before ROSENBAUM, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 

Child Abduction (the “Convention”), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 

11670, and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011, govern 

international child abductions during domestic disputes. The Convention ordinarily mandates a child’s return to their country of habitual residence if the child has been wrongfully removed. But it 

also provides certain exceptions, including one for when a court 

finds that a child’s return would put the child at a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. We refer to this as the “grave risk” exception.

In 2021, Respondent-Appellant Adriene Ferreira dos Santos 

left Brazil with her daughter, Y.F.G., and eventually entered the 

United States. The child’s father, Petitioner-Appellee Wellekson 

Gonçalves Silva, shared custody of Y.F.G., and he petitioned for the 

child’s return to Brazil under the Convention and ICARA. 

Dos Santos believes this case fits within the “grave risk” exception. She has proffered evidence that Silva has repeatedly physically abused her and others, including in front of Y.F.G., and that 

he has emotionally abused Y.F.G. Based on this evidence, dos Santos contends that Y.F.G.’s return to Brazil would impose a significant risk of harm on the child. Meanwhile, Silva denies that he has 

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abused dos Santos or Y.F.G. and argues that there is no significant 

risk of harm to the child in Brazil. 

Following a bench trial at which both parents testified, the 

district court ordered that Y.F.G. be returned to Brazil. The district 

court expressly found Silva not to be credible, but because the district court concluded that dos Santos did not provide independent 

corroboration to support her own testimony, the district court 

found she had not established by clear and convincing evidence a 

“grave risk” of harm to Y.F.G. in Brazil.

After careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in weighing the conflicting testimony. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order 

and remand for further consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Dos Santos and Silva met in 2011 in Brazil. They have one 

child together, their daughter Y.F.G., who was born in 2012 in 

Guanhães, Brazil. The three lived together in Guanhães until April 

2020, when dos Santos and Silva separated. 

Dos Santos submits that her relationship with Silva was 

plagued by frequent abusive incidents, which caused her to fear for 

her own safety and her daughter’s well-being. She testified about 

several of these incidents. On dos Santos’s telling, the abuse began 

during her pregnancy when Silva beat her, dragged her around the 

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house, held her by her neck until she couldn’t breathe, and told her 

that he would remove the baby from her belly with his own hands. 

But the abuse did not end there, dos Santos said. Rather, she 

testified that the beatings continued after Y.F.G. was born, including an incident where Silva tied dos Santos up with an electrical 

cord and told her to say goodbye to the world because it would be 

her last day—all of which occurred in front of a crying Y.F.G. Dos 

Santos also recounted several times when Silva pointed a gun at 

her, which she said happened so often that she “lost [her] count,” 

as well as an incident in which Silva dragged dos Santos by her hair 

in front of Y.F.G., who yelled at Silva to let dos Santos go. Dos 

Santos estimated that she was abused almost every day. 

Dos Santos also testified that she was not the only victim of 

Silva’s violence. She said she observed an incident in which Silva 

told dos Santos’s grandmother that he would “explode her house 

with dynamite,” and after she asked him to leave, Silva pushed dos 

Santos’s grandmother, causing her to fall and break two ribs. 

According to dos Santos, Silva’s abuse reached even the family’s pet kitten. Dos Santos recalled a sadistic incident in which

Silva fed the kitten to a pit bull, and as the kitten neared its death, 

Silva set the kitten on fire. Later, she said, Silva described burning

the family’s kitten to Y.F.G. 

Silva also allegedly inflicted purely psychological harm on 

dos Santos, including an instance in which he used social networks 

to share intimate photos of dos Santos that he had taken when they 

lived together. 

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After dos Santos and Silva separated in 2020, Y.F.G. initially 

lived with dos Santos. Later that year, dos Santos obtained a restraining order against Silva, prohibiting him from, among other 

things, coming within 100 meters of dos Santos. Brazilian records 

indicate that Silva repeatedly violated the restraining order and that 

he was arrested and imprisoned under the “decree of preventative 

imprisonment.”1 Following his release, Silva filed a lawsuit to confirm his custodial rights, and in June 2021, a Brazilian judge ordered 

that dos Santos and Silva share custody of Y.F.G. 

In August 2021, dos Santos left Brazil with Y.F.G. and traveled to the United States. She did so without Silva’s consent to 

move Y.F.G. to the United States. After Silva learned that Y.F.G. 

was in the United States, he filed an application with the Brazilian 

government for the return of Y.F.G. under the Convention. The 

Brazilian government referred the matter to the United States Department of State—the United States’s central authority under the 

Convention.

B. Procedural Background

In August 2022, in federal district court, Silva filed a Petition 

under the Convention seeking Y.F.G.’s return to Brazil. 

1 After the arrest, Y.F.G. pressured dos Santos to help secure Silva’s release, 

and dos Santos withdrew the restraining order. The withdrawal certificate 

suggests that Silva’s absence had “caus[ed] suffering” to Y.F.G. and that Silva 

“d[id] not constitute a danger to the minor.” 

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Consistent with the Convention’s directive to “use the most 

expeditious procedures available,” Convention, Art. 2, the district 

court conducted a bench trial in February 2023. Several witnesses 

testified at trial, including both Silva and dos Santos. 

In his testimony, Silva largely denied dos Santos’s allegations 

of abuse. Specifically, he testified that he never hit or threatened 

her and that he did not push dos Santos’s grandmother or kill the 

family’s pet kitten. Although Silva acknowledged that he had been 

arrested in Brazil for crimes involving his sales business and for an 

incident in which in damaged dos Santos’s car, he maintained that 

he had not been arrested for violence involving his daughter. 

When asked about the intimate photos of dos Santos that were

posted online, Silva testified that his computer was taken during a 

robbery at his store, after which the photos ended up online.2 

After Silva testified and before dos Santos took the stand, the 

district judge said, “I want to know whether anyone actually witnessed these so-called incidents on which [dos Santos] is relying to 

establish an affirmative defense. That’s really all I’m interested in.” 

Dos Santos then testified and recounted the many instances 

of alleged abuse and violence, as we’ve mentioned. Besides discussing these incidents, dos Santos’s testimony also included a 

2 Besides Silva, Silva’s brother and Silva’s grandmother provided brief testimony. Silva’s brother said he had seen Silva get angry with dos Santos but had 

not seen physical violence. Both witnesses testified that they had not seen 

Silva abuse Y.F.G. 

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description of an altercation between Silva and dos Santos’s subsequent boyfriend and an incident in which Silva damaged dos Santos’s car. According to dos Santos, a neighbor captured the cardamage incident on video. But neither the boyfriend nor the neighbor testified during the bench trial, nor did dos Santos offer the 

video recording into evidence.3

Dos Santos’s counsel called two other witnesses to testify at 

trial. One was Roberta Campos, who was a friend of dos Santos’s 

grandmother, has known dos Santos for many years, and traveled 

from Brazil to the United States with dos Santos and Y.F.G. Campos testified about having observed dos Santos with bruises and 

about an incident in which Y.F.G. screamed while Silva beat dos 

Santos.4 The other witness was Lucas Pimenta, dos Santos’s fiancé. He testified about threatening social media messages that he 

received that he believed came from Silva.5 

The district court then presented its factual findings. It began by expressly discrediting Silva’stestimony. As the district court 

explained, Silva did not deny some of the allegations, instead 

3 Another potential witness, dos Santos’s grandmother, passed away.

4 During cross-examination, Silva’s counsel sought to impeach Campos with 

evidence that she had been arrested for trafficking drugs with dos Santos 

5 Dos Santos’s counsel sought to call two more witnesses who were physically 

located in Brazil—Arlene Campos and Bianca Camargo, who were identified 

as dos Santos’s friend and niece, respectively. But because of technical difficulties, they could not testify. 

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arguing that there were no documents to help prove them. The 

district court also pointed to specific defects in Silva’s testimony including, for example, that Silva’s story about his computer being 

stolen “ma[de] no sense to [the district court],” and that Silva 

“would not even acknowledge that there were any disagreements 

or any tumultuous relationship between himself and [dos Santos].” 

So the court “d[id not] find that [Silva] has credibility,” and reiterated that “he’s not very credible at all.” 

Despite expressly discrediting Silva’s testimony, the district 

court found that dos Santos had not met her burden to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that Y.F.G. is at grave risk. While 

dos Santos testified about several distinct incidents, “on many of 

the points,” the district court explained, dos Santos “was the only 

one who testified to these points.” The court found that it was 

“curious” that she presented no documents to corroborate allegations of broken ribs nor were there police reports that supported 

any of these incidents. And the district court noted that many of 

the alleged incidents occurred several years before dos Santos and 

Y.F.G. came to the United States. 

To sum up its findings, the court said,

[D]espite the court’s concerns about the child being 

returned to Brazil and being with her father because 

I do—it does sound like there are some issues with the 

father; I cannot deny that that is my impression based 

on what I’ve heard in terms of possible anger management issues, and, and terms of making threats to 

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people—but, still, the court’s hands are tied in the absence of the respondent meeting her burden of proof 

by clear and convincing evidence. And, again, I find 

that she has not.

The district court therefore granted Silva’s petition for return of the child under the Convention and ICARA. It also denied 

dos Santos’s motion to stay its order pending appeal. In denying 

the stay, the district court concluded, among other things, that the 

Brown line of cases, which holds that “a statement by a [criminal] 

defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt,” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 

312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original), has no application 

in civil cases. This Court then granted dos Santos’s emergency motion to stay the district court’s order pending appeal. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In a proceeding under the Convention, we review a district 

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de 

novo. Gomez v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir. 2016). 

The clear-error standard is “highly deferential,” and we uphold the 

district court’s factual determinations “so long as they are plausible 

in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 1007–08 (citation 

omitted). “Whether a grave risk of harm to a child exists under the 

terms of the Hague Convention is a mixed question of law and fact, 

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which we review de novo.” Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1345 

(11th Cir. 2008).6

III. DISCUSSION

We first discuss the Convention and ICARA’s legal framework as well as the Supreme Court’s and our precedent applying 

it. We then turn to the facts here and explain the legal standard 

that governs the determination here. 

A. We have applied the “grave-risk” exception in cases with 

severe allegations of abuse.

The Hague Convention “was adopted in 1980 in response to 

the problem of international child abductions during domestic disputes.” Golan v. Saada, 142 S. Ct. 1880, 1888 (2022) (quoting Abbott 

v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010)). The United States and Brazil are 

both signatories. See Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Convention of 25 Oct. 1980 on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, Status Table.7 In 1988, Congress implemented the Convention through ICARA. The International Child Abduction 

6 In Golan v. Saada, the Supreme Court held that, within the grave-risk analysis, an appellate court reviews a district court’s consideration of potential ameliorative measures for abuse of discretion. 142 S. Ct. 1880, 1895 (2022). Because our decision is based on the district court’s misunderstanding of the controlling legal standards, which we continue to review de novo (even after Golan), we need not determine whether Golan impacts our standard of review 

when a district court applies the correct legal standards in a grave-risk analysis.

7 https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24

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Remedies Act, 102 Stat. 437 (1988), as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–

9011; Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1889. ICARA permits a person seeking 

relief under the Convention “to file a petition for return of a child 

in state or federal court,” and directs reviewing courts to “‘decide 

the[se] case[s] in accordance with the Convention.’” Golan, 142 S. 

Ct. at 1889 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 9003(d)) (alterations in original).

The Convention’s “core premise” is that children’s interests 

in custody matters “are best served when custody decisions are 

made in the child’s country of ‘habitual residence.’” Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020) (quoting Convention Preamble). 

For that reason, the Convention “ordinarily requires the prompt 

return of a child wrongfully removed or retained away from the 

country in which she habitually resides.” Id. 

But that general rule has certain exceptions, including Article 13(b) of the Convention, which applies when “‘there is a grave 

risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or 

psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 

situation.’” Convention, Art. 13(b); see also Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1888 

n.2 (describing Convention’s other exceptions). The Supreme 

Court has referred to the “grave risk” exception as the Convention’s “[p]rime” exception. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 723. After all, the 

Convention “is designed to protect the interests of children and 

their parents, and children’s interests may point against return in 

some circumstances.” Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1893 (citation omitted). 

Ordinarily, ICARA first requires that the party petitioning 

for a child’s return establish by a preponderance of the evidence 

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that the child was “wrongfully removed or retained within the 

meaning of the Convention.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1). Here, 

though, no one disputes that Silva has established his prima facie 

case that dos Santos wrongfully removed Y.F.G. from Brazil. 

Instead, this case turns solely on the application of the Convention’s “grave risk” exception. And on that point, as the party 

opposing return, dos Santos bears the burden to establish “by clear 

and convincing evidence” that the exception applies and that 

Y.F.G. should therefore not be returned. Id. § 9003(e)(2). 

Several contemporaneous commentators elaborated on the 

meaning of the Convention’s “grave risk” exception. The Convention’s official commentary, for example, explains that the Convention’s general goal of preventing children’s removal “gives way before the primary interest of any person in not being exposed to 

physical or psychological danger or being placed in an intolerable 

situation.” Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Conference 

on Private International Law, ¶ 29, in 3 Acts and Documents of the 

Fourteenth Session 426 (1980).8 And the U.S. Department of State 

noted that “[t]he person opposing the child’s return must show that 

the risk to the child is grave, not merely serious.” Hague 

8 We have recognized that “Perez-Vera was the official reporter of the Hague 

Conference and her report is recognized ‘as the official history and commentary on the Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of the 

provisions of the Convention.’” Gomez, 812 F.3d at 1011 n.1 (quoting Ruiz v. 

Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1252 n.2 (11th Cir. 2004)). See also Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 

1893 n.8 (relying on Perez-Vera commentary).

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International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986).9 To illustrate this 

principle, the State Department provided a few examples: the exception was not intended to encompass situations in which money 

at home is scarce or where educational opportunities are more limited, but the exception does cover instances in which a parent sexually abuses a child and the court’s denial of the petition “would 

protect the child from being returned to an ‘intolerable situation.’” 

Id.

We have previously considered several cases in which the 

district court found that the “grave risk” exception was satisfied. 

In Baran, we affirmed the district court’s denial of a father’s 

petition to return a child to Australia after the child’s mother had 

fled to the United States to escape the father’s abuse. 526 F.3d at 

1346. The district court found, among other things, that the father 

was emotionally unstable and prone to uncontrolled destructive 

outbursts of rage, was physically and verbally abusive towards the 

child’s mother in the child’s presence, and physically endangered 

the child, both intentionally and unintentionally. Id. at 1345–46. 

We explained that the district court “was not required to find [the 

child] had previously been physically or psychologically harmed” 

to deny return. Id. at 1346. Instead, the district court had to find 

9 “It is well settled that the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty is 

entitled to great weight.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 15 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). See also Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1892 (relying on State Department 

commentary). 

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only that the child’s return “would expose him to a present grave 

risk” of harm. Id. 

We likewise affirmed a district court’s denial of a mother’s 

petition to return a child to Venezuela in Gomez. 812 F.3d at 1015. 

There, the district court found that the father endured repeated 

threats on his life from the child’s mother and her new partner, and 

that the child’s mother had likely been responsible for several incidents including a shooting of the father’s girlfriend and the planting 

of drugs in the child’s paternal grandmother’s car. Id. at 1008–09, 

1012. We affirmed the district court’s findings and rejected the petitioning mother’s arguments that the child should be returned because the risks the child’s father faced were irrelevant to the child. 

Id. at 1012–13. We explained that the “grave risk” exception may 

apply “where violence is directed at a parent that may threaten the 

well-being of a child.” Id. at 1013. This rule is justified by “the 

powerful effect that a pattern of serious violence directed at a parent may have on his children.” Id. at 1014. After all, “it requires no 

stretch of the imagination to conclude that serious, violent domestic abuse repeatedly directed at a parent can easily be turned against 

a child.” Id.

B. The district court made two legal errors.

Turning to this case, the district court expressed “concerns 

about the child being returned to Brazil and being with her father” 

because, in the court’s view, “there are some issues with the father,” including “possible anger management issues” and “making 

threats to people.” But the district court felt its “hands [were] tied”

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because the only evidence of the incidents dos Santos described 

was dos Santos’s testimony. Indeed, even before dos Santos testified and the court could evaluate her credibility on the stand, the 

district court emphasized that “really all [it was] interested in” was 

“whether anyone actually witnessed these so-called incidents on 

which [dos Santos] is relying to establish an affirmative defense.” 

So even though the district court expressly found that Silva’s testimony was not credible and did not make a similar finding as to dos 

Santos, it concluded that dos Santos did not meet her burden to 

establish the harm Y.F.G. faced in Brazil. 

We believe this reasoning reflects two legal errors. Cf. Walsh 

v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000) (correcting district court’s 

legal analysis after district court “raised the article 13(b) bar higher 

than the Convention requires”). First, given that Silva testified 

about the alleged abuse and the district court expressly did not believe him, under our precedent, it’s not necessarily the case that dos 

Santos’s testimony was uncorroborated. And second, even without independent corroboration, a factfinder’s belief in a single witness’s testimony alone can be sufficient to satisfy a party’s burden 

to prove a fact by clear and convincing evidence.

Either error alone requires us to vacate and remand for further consideration under the correct standard. And both together 

provide all the more reason that we must remand.

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1. Given the district court’s finding that Silva was not credible, the district court could have chosen to consider Silva’s 

testimony as corroborating evidence that the return of 

Y.F.G. to Brazil represents a “grave risk” to the child.

We begin by observing that, on this record, it is not necessarily the case that dos Santos’s testimony was uncorroborated. As 

we’ve noted, the district court explained several times that it did 

not believe Silva’s testimony, in which he denied committing violent acts. In fact, as the district court saw things, some of Silva’s 

explanations “ma[de] no sense.” Not only that, but the district 

court pointed out that Silva himself did not even bother to deny 

some of the incidents, instead simply responding to the allegations 

by saying that dos Santos did not have documentation to prove 

them.

The Supreme Court has explained that the demeanor of a 

witness “may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness’ testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story.” 

NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A witness’s denial when he

“has a motive to deny,” the Court continued, “may be uttered with 

such h[e]sitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies.” Id.; see also Wright 

v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f the jury 

did disbelieve West, it was further entitled to consider whatever it 

concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of 

guilt.”).

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We have applied this principle many times. For instance, in 

United States v. Eley, we held that “[a] false explanatory statement 

may be viewed by a jury as substantive evidence tending to prove 

guilt.” 723 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984). As we explained there, 

the defendant’s “explanation [was] so implausible that it g[ave] rise 

to positive evidence in favor of the government.” Id. Brown provides another example: we held there that a criminal defendant 

who chooses to take the stand “runs the risk that if disbelieved the 

[factfinder] might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.” 

53 F.3d at 314 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And 

if the factfinder disbelieves the defendant’s testimony, his statement can be used against him “as substantive evidence of [his] guilt.” 

Id. (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Margarita Garcia, 

906 F.3d 1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a defendant 

who testifies “runs ‘the risk that in so doing he will bolster the Government case enough for it to support a verdict of guilty’” (quoting 

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971)).

We’ve also relied on this straightforward principle outside 

the criminal context. For instance, in Swaters v. Osmus, a presiding 

judge did not believe a testifying litigant’s explanation for his failed 

drug test that resulted in revocation of his pilot certificate. 586 F.3d 

1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2009). We noted the significance of the 

judge’s express finding that the litigant “was not a credible witness,” 

and we explained that “[t]hat determination itself can be regarded 

as substantive evidence in favor of the [judge’s] ultimate conclusion” against that litigant. Id. at 1323 (emphasis in original). We 

added that the judge’s adverse conclusion about the litigant’s 

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credibility served as an “independent source of support” for the decision. Id.

Of course, it makes sense that a factfinder can use a witness’s 

noncredible testimony as corroborating substantive evidence 

against the witness’s interests, regardless of whether the case arises

in the civil or criminal context. Consider a practical example: if a 

witness denies having hit someone and the factfinder does not believe that witness, then necessarily, the factfinder has concluded 

that the witness did hit someone.

Here, that means the district court could consider its lack of 

faith in Silva’s testimony as corroborating substantive evidence 

that dos Santos’s allegations are true. In invoking the “grave risk” 

exception, dos Santos accused Silva of engaging in physical violence and emotional and physical abuse. Silva testified and, for the 

most part, denied that the alleged instances of abuse happened. 

But the district court expressly found that Silva was “not 

very credible at all.” It said that it didn’t find him to be “believable” 

and expressed concerns about his “issues,” including “possible anger management issues” and “making threats to people.” In other 

words, the district court observed Silva’s testimony and determined that he was not trustworthy. 

By testifying, Silva risked that the district court would not 

believe him or find him to be a credible witness. And because the 

district court did not believe him, it could have chosen to consider

Silva’s testimony as corroborating substantive evidence that the alleged abusive incidents did, in fact, occur. In this way, the district 

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court had the option of considering Silva’s testimony as corroborative of dos Santos’s testimony. In other words, dos Santos’s testimony was not necessarily uncorroborated on this record because 

the district court could have found that Silva’s noncredible denials 

and non-denial denials corroborated dos Santos’s assertions about 

the physical violence and physical and emotional abuse.

Our dissenting colleague emphasizes that the district court 

was permitted to—but was not required to—consider Silva’s noncredible testimony as corroborating substantive evidence in dos 

Santos’s favor. That is surely true. But it’s also irrelevant here. 

Rather, the problem here is that the district court did not know 

that, so the district court never considered whether to rely as corroborating substantive evidence on Silva’s denials and non-denial 

denials of burning the family cat, breaking dos Santos’s grandmother’s ribs, and assaulting and emotionally abusing dos Santos. 

We know that the district court did not know that it could 

consider testimony it found noncredible as corroborating substantive evidence because the district court expressly said so. In its order denying dos Santos’s motion for stay pending appeal, the district court acknowledged that dos Santos “cite[d] several criminal 

appeal cases in her motion to support the argument that testimony 

by a litigant, if disbelieved by the trier of fact, may be substantive 

evidence of guilt.” Doc. No. 77 at 4 n.1 (cleaned up). In evaluating 

that argument, the district court said, “[e]ven if [these cases] were 

applicable in this civil context, which they are not, none of [dos Santos’s] citations support that the undersigned . . . was required to 

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find ‘guilt’ based on either Parties’ lack of credibility.” Id. (emphasis added). So we know that the district court was under the mistaken impression that this rule did not apply in the civil context. 

We also know that although the district court observed that the 

rule is permissive, not mandatory, the district court expressed no 

position on whether, had it known the rule applied in the civil context, it would have relied on Silva’s noncredible testimony as corroborating substantive evidence in considering whether dos Santos 

satisfied her clear-and-convincing evidence burden. 

And that is the problem. Because the district court did not 

know that it could consider Silva’s noncredible testimony as corroborating substantive evidence, it had no reason to consider—and 

certainly did not announce—how that information might have affected its decision.

The Dissent disagrees. It says that the district court already 

decided not to view what it found to be the noncredible testimony 

of Silva as corroborating substantive evidence. But the district 

court’s order on which the Dissent relies supports no such conclusion.10 To be sure, if it intended to do so, the district court could 

10 The district court wrote,

Respondent cites several criminal appeal cases in her motion 

to support the argument that “[t]estimony by a litigant, if disbelieved by the trier of fact, may be substantive evidence of 

guilt.” However, it is unclear to the Court how this demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on appeal in this case 

given that, by Respondent’s own characterizations, these cases 

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23-10918 Opinion of the Court 21

have said that even if the corroborating-substantive-evidence rule 

applies outside the criminal context, it would have chosen not to 

apply it. And had the district court done so, we would have respected that. Cf. United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th 

Cir. 2006) (affirming criminal sentence after district court explained 

that it would have applied the same sentence even if it calculated 

sentencing guidelines incorrectly). But that’s not what the district 

court said. 

As the Dissent points out, see Dissent at 12, the district judge 

here is experienced, and she knows how to say what she means. So 

we take her at her word. And her words studiously avoided saying 

that she would not rely on Silva’s denials and non-denial denials as 

substantive evidence. Instead, her words said only that even if the 

rule applies, it’s a permissive, not a mandatory, one. Indeed, the 

district judge stated that she made her observation to explain why 

“it is unclear to the Court how [the non-mandatory, permissive nature of the corroborating-substantive-evidence rule] demonstrates 

a strong likelihood of success on appeal.” In other words, the court 

concluded only that, because nothing required the district court to 

rely on Silva’s statements as substantive evidence, dos Santos could 

only support that the finder of fact may infer guilt in a criminal 

trial based on a litigant’s testimony. Even if they were applicable in the civil context, which they are not, none of Respondent’s citations support that the undersigned—the trier of fact 

at the February 17, 2023 evidentiary hearing—was required to 

find “guilt” based on either Part[y’s] lack of credibility.

Doc. No. 77 at 4 n.1 (Citation omitted).

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-10918

not show that this Court would find a substantial likelihood that 

the district court reversibly erred. After all, the district court made 

these remarks to explain why it was denying a stay—and one of the 

“most critical” factors in determining whether to grant a stay is 

whether the movant has shown a substantial likelihood of success 

on the merits. See Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 

1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019).

But one thing the district court’s statement unambiguously 

did not do was indicate that the court already determined how it 

would weigh Silva’s testimony if it could consider that testimony 

as corroborating substantive evidence. And the Dissent’s argument to the contrary reads something into the order that just isn’t 

there.

That said, we do not suggest that, on remand, the district 

court must consider Silva’s testimony as corroborating substantive 

evidence that he presents a “grave risk” to Y.F.G. The district court 

observed Silva testify, and whether to consider that testimony as 

corroborating substantive evidence against Silva is entirely with 

the purview of the district court. See Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1895–96 

(explaining applicable legal standard and allowing district court “to 

apply the proper legal standard in the first instance”). But the district court was mistaken when it concluded that it did not have the 

choice to consider Silva’s noncredible denials as evidence supporting dos Santos’s testimony.

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23-10918 Opinion of the Court 23

2. A single witness’s testimony alone and uncorroborated by 

any other evidence can support a finding by clear and convincing evidence.

The district court’s second error was concluding that a single 

witness’s testimony is necessarily insufficient to satisfy the clearand-convincing-evidence standard. Neither the Convention, 

ICARA, nor governing precedent requires a respondent to provide 

independent corroboration to establish that a child would face a 

“grave risk” of harm if they were returned to theirresident country. 

Instead, ICARA requires that the respondent provide “clear and 

convincing evidence” that the exception applies. 22 U.S.C. 

§ 9003(e)(2). And that standard does not necessarily mandate that 

a witness’s testimony be corroborated to be credited by the fact 

finder.11 

11 Contrary to the Dissent’s suggestion that this argument was not raised, dos 

Santos specifically argued in her brief that “[t]he fact that the trial court did 

not repudiate [dos Santos’s] testimony could support a non-frivolous argument that an appellate court should reverse the trial court altogether and remand for entry of judgment on behalf of [dos Santos].” She further elaborated, 

asserting, 

The fact that appellate courts give substantial deference to a 

district court’s fact-finding doesn’t mean that they accept factfinding that is completely dependent upon credibility determinations that have not been articulated. While a district court’s 

credibility determinations are entitled to deference, district 

courts must still sufficiently explain those credibility determinations to allow for meaningful review by an appellate court. 

In other words, a trial court cannot leave an appellate court in 

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24 Opinion of the Court 23-10918

Returning to the criminal context, we’ve held that a witness’s “uncorroborated testimony” can be “sufficient to support a 

conviction if it is not on its face incredible or otherwise unsubstantial.” United States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006); 

see also United States v. Nerey, 877 F.3d 956, 969 (11th Cir. 2017)

(“[T]estimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, is sufficient to support a conviction.” (citation omitted)). So it’s no surprise that we’ve also said that if a witness’s uncorroborated testimony can be “sufficient to support a conviction,” it can also be “sufficient for purposes of the ‘clear and convincing’ rule.” United States 

v. Trevino, 565 F.2d 1317, 1319 (5th Cir. 1978).12 See also Eleventh 

Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) 3.4 (2022) (“The 

number of witnesses testifying concerning a particular point 

doesn’t necessarily matter.”); Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) B5 (2022) (same). Along those same lines, 

we do not always require corroboration in the immigration context 

because “[i]f an alien’s testimony is credible, it may be sufficient, 

without corroboration, to satisfy his burden of proof in establishing 

the position of speculating as to how the evidence was 

weighed. 

(Citations omitted). These arguments tee up the issues that dos Santos’s testimony was sufficient to result in judgment in her favor and that the district 

court’s explanation for its findings was not sufficient to allow an appellate 

court to determine that the district court understood the legal standards.

12 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are 

binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 

1981) (en banc).

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23-10918 Opinion of the Court 25

his eligibility for relief from removal.” Kueviakoe v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

567 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009). 

These examples illustrate that dos Santos could have satisfied her burden to establish “clear and convincing evidence” based 

on only her own testimony. Unlike with Silva’s testimony, the district court did not discredit dos Santos’s testimony. If the district 

court credited her testimony and believed that Silva was, in fact, 

responsible for the various abusive incidents, the district court 

could have reasonably concluded that dos Santos established that 

Y.F.G.’s return to Brazil risked physical or psychological harm to

the child. See Gomez, 812 F.3d at 1014 (“[I]t requires no stretch of 

the imagination to conclude that serious, violent domestic abuse 

repeatedly directed at a parent can easily be turned against a 

child.”). 

Our dissenting colleague believes that we should assume 

that the district court understood that dos Santos’s testimony alone 

could satisfy her burden because, in the Dissent’s view, the record 

does not “explicitly indicate that the district court did not understand the law.” Dissent at 9. We respectfully disagree.13 

13 The Dissent refers to the district judge’s years of experience on the bench 

to affirm the decision below. To be clear, no one questions the district court’s 

credentials or its ability to discern and apply the correct legal standard in the 

usual case. Nor are we in any way assuming that the district court “do[es]n’t 

know the law.” Dissent at 12. But no judge is infallible or immune from committing error. Cf. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 53 (2016) (“All judges make mistakes. (Even us.)”). And correcting legal errors is what appellate courts do.

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26 Opinion of the Court 23-10918

For starters, before dos Santos even began her testimony—

that is, before the district court had any opportunity to evaluate dos 

Santos’s credibility and determine whether her testimony alone 

might provide clear and convincing evidence—the district court 

said that “all [it was] interested in” was “whether anyone actually 

witnessed these so-called incidents on which [dos Santos] is relying

to establish an affirmative defense.” In other words, the district 

court indicated that it believed that dos Santos’s testimony alone 

could not, under any circumstances, be enough to carry her burden. 

The Dissent says we have taken this statement out of context and that the district court’s use of the word “anyone” referred 

to only the paternal uncle and the paternal great-grandmother. 

Dissent at 9–10. But we are comfortable that our characterization 

accurately reflects what happened. Indeed, we think the record 

speaks for itself in that respect. After all, it’s clear that when the 

district court expressed its concern about “whether anyone actually 

witnessed these so-called incidents on which [dos Santos] is relying,” it meant whether “anyone” (as that inclusive word is commonly understood), other than dos Santos (who hadn’t yet testified) witnessed the events—not just whether “the paternal uncle 

and the paternal great-grandmother” did, as the Dissent urges. No 

other interpretation makes sense. In fact, the paternal uncle and 

the paternal great-grandmother were witnesses for Silva, so the district court had no reason to have expected them to offer testimony 

indicting him. Nor does the Dissent offer any reasonable 

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23-10918 Opinion of the Court 27

explanation as to why we should read an artificial limit into the district court’s plain words.

The record also contains another indication that the district 

court did not know that it could rely solely on dos Santos’s testimony to find clear and convincing evidence if it was so moved. At 

the end of the hearing, when the district court explained its findings, it again emphasized that, in its view, the record contained no 

independent corroboration to support dos Santos’s testimony. The 

court found that dos Santos did not meet her burden because she 

“was the only one who testified” to the allegations and because 

there were no documents or video evidence to support dos Santos’s testimony. Based on these “explicit indications in the record,” 

Dissent at 9, we must conclude that the district court erroneously 

believed that dos Santos’s testimony alone was insufficient to meet 

the clear-and-convincing standard. 

The Dissent suggests that the district court’s comments on 

dos Santos’s inability to recall specifically when violent incidents 

occurred or Y.F.G.’s age at the times of these incidents shows that 

the district court knew it could consider dos Santos’s testimony 

alone in determining whether dos Santos established clear and convincing evidence of “grave risk.” Once again, we must disagree 

with the Dissent’s view of the record. While the district court 

noted dos Santos’s inability to provide precise timeframes, it also 

showed that it believed dos Santos’s testimony about the threat 

Silva posed. Indeed, the district court voiced its “concerns about 

the child being returned to Brazil and being with her father” 

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28 Opinion of the Court 23-10918

because the court believed “there are some issues with the father,” 

including “anger management issues” and “making threats to people.” Yet the district court felt its “hands [were] tied” because dos 

Santos did not meet her burden—and it thought she did not meet 

her burden because she did not provide corroborating substantive 

evidence. On this record, we cannot be sure how the district court 

would evaluate the testimony if it knew its hands were not tied and 

that dos Santos’s testimony alone could fulfill her burden. 

Of course, as with the question of whether to treat Silva’s 

discredited testimony as corroborating substantive evidence that 

he presents a “grave risk” of harm to Y.F.G., we do not decide 

whether, on this record, dos Santos met the requisite standard and 

satisfied her ultimate burden. That determination remains for the 

district court to decide on remand. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, when a factfinder does not believe an interested witness’s testimony, it may—but is not required to—consider that witness’s discredited testimony as corroborating substantive evidence

that the opposite of the testimony is true. And when a single witness provides the only evidence on some point, that testimony, 

without corroboration, can still meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence if the factfinder concludes that it is credible. Because the district court’s reasoning did not account for these principles, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further 

consideration in light of this opinion. 

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23-10918 Opinion of the Court 29

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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23-10918 LUCK, J., dissenting 1

LUCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 

Child Abduction “was adopted in 1980 in response to the problem 

of international child abductions during domestic disputes.” Golan 

v. Saada, 142 S. Ct. 1880, 1888 (2022) (quotation omitted). “[T]he 

Convention generally requires the ‘prompt return’ of a child to the 

child’s country of habitual residence when the child has been 

wrongfully removed to or retained in another country.” Id. This 

general rule is based on the “core premise” that “the interests of 

children in matters relating to their custody are best served when 

custody decisions are made in the child’s country of habitual residence.” Id. (cleaned up). 

But the Convention has exceptions. Return, for example, “is 

not required if there is a grave risk that return would expose the 

child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child 

in an intolerable situation.” Id. (cleaned up). This grave-risk exception is “narrowly construed,” Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1345 

(11th Cir. 2008), and the parent opposing removal has the burden 

of showing by clear and convincing evidence “that return would 

expose the child to a grave risk of harm,” Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1889. 

Adriene Ferreira dos Santos wrongly removed her daughter 

from the girl’s habitual residence in Brazil and from the lawful joint 

custody of her father, Wellekson Gonçalves Silva, and abducted 

her to the United States. No one disputes this. Normally, that 

would mean the child would be promptly returned to Brazil. See

id. But the mother claimed that the grave-risk exception applied. 

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2 LUCK, J., dissenting 23-10918

So the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the 

grave-risk exception. It heard from the child’s father, her paternal 

uncle, her paternal great-grandmother, her mother, her mother’s 

family friend, and her mother’s fiancé. After considering the evidence, the district court found that the mother had “failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the child will face a grave 

risk of physical or psychological harm should she be returned to 

Brazil.” Without an established exception, the district court 

granted the father’s petition for return of the child.

The mother asks us to reverse the return order, arguing that 

the district court failed to: (1) explain its credibility determinations; 

(2) make a specific finding on the mother’s testimony describing 

abuse; and (3) use its disbelief of the father as corroborating substantive evidence of abuse. The majority opinion picks up on this 

last point and adds (4) that the district court also erred by “concluding that a single witness’s testimony is necessarily insufficient to 

satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard.” I respectfully dissent.

First, the mother contends that the district court’s “one paragraph order directing the return of the child to Brazil provides no 

explanation whatsoever regarding its credibility determinations.” 

The district court, the mother maintains, did not “sufficiently explain [its] credibility determinations to allow for meaningful review 

by an appellate court.” 

I disagree. Before issuing its written order, the district court 

sufficiently explained its credibility determinations—and the basis 

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23-10918 LUCK, J., dissenting 3

for them—at the evidentiary hearing. The district court began by 

explaining why it found the father “not very credible at all”:

I don’t find that the [father] was believable. He didn’t 

even deny certain incidents but, instead, pretty much 

hinted at that nobody could prove them because there 

were no lawsuits filed, there were no medical documents, and he kept saying that over and over again.

And this story about the computer being stolen 

makes no sense to me, that a computer is stolen, no 

indication that anyone had any access to his password 

or anything, and then somehow, some way, photos 

from that computer start appearing on social media. 

So I don’t find that [the father] has credibility.

And as [the mother] just pointed out, the [father] would not even acknowledge that there were 

any disagreements or any tumultuous relationship 

between himself and the [mother].

The district court then explained that, despite the father’s 

lack of credibility, the mother “did not” meet her burden of showing by “clear and convincing evidence” that the child would be in 

grave danger if returned:

[The mother] came in and testified to many incidents that happened. But on many of the points, 

she was the only one who testified to these points. 

Wasn’t brought out until the court asked that her 

grandmother was deceased, so that may explain why 

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4 LUCK, J., dissenting 23-10918

her grandmother was not present to testify or available.

Still, the court finds that it’s curious that, with 

injuries as serious as broken ribs, there isn’t some kind 

of documentation or some other witness that could 

corroborate that.

The court didn’t see any police reports, at least 

none presented at trial—we heard mention of 

them—that corroborated any of these reports. A witness, Ricardo, was brought up by [the mother] that 

witnessed some of this. We didn’t hear any from 

him—anything from him. . . . 

He could certainly have testified by Zoom, 

even if he couldn’t get to our courtroom to testify in 

person.

We heard of a witness named Monique who 

supposedly witnessed some of this. Nothing from 

her during this trial did we hear, either. We only 

heard about her and what she witnessed from [the 

mother].

We heard about a video of some car vandalism 

that was committed by the [father]. And I think, unless I’m remembering this incorrectly, that he 

acknowledged some portion of something being 

done to the car. There was some issue of slapping a 

car or some kind of term I wasn’t really sure about. 

But, certainly, if there is some kind of video that the 

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23-10918 LUCK, J., dissenting 5

[mother] herself testified about, seems like we would

have seen that at trial. Didn’t see that as well.

Also, the incidents that were described were 

very hazy in the sense that there was no specific time. 

We didn’t even get close to establishing a time for 

many of the incidents. Many of the incidents, it was 

established, were several years ago. We don’t know 

how old the child was. That was fuzzy.

This explanation belies the mother’s second argument, 

which was that the district court “made no specific finding” as to 

her testimony describing “extraordinarily outrageous violence and 

abuse.” But the district court did make findings that the mother 

hadn’t met her burden to prove the grave-risk exception because 

she didn’t present obvious and available corroborating evidence 

and her testimony was hazy and not specific. 

As to the lack of corroboration, the district court found that 

the mother didn’t offer any medical records, police reports, or witness testimony to verify the serious injuries she claimed the father 

inflicted—even though she testified, for example, that he broke her 

grandmother’s ribs. The district court also found that Ricardo “certainly could have testified by Zoom,” but it “didn’t hear . . . anything from him,” even though the mother testified that Ricardo 

witnessed abuse. The district court added that it heard “[n]othing 

from [Monique] during this trial . . . either,” even though the 

mother testified that Monique also witnessed abuse. The district 

court said that it would’ve expected for the video of the father vandalizing the mother’s car to be presented at trial, but it “[d]idn’t see 

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6 LUCK, J., dissenting 23-10918

that as well,” even though the mother claimed a video existed. And 

the district court found it “curious” that the hearing was the first 

time that the father’s alleged abuse had been discussed in a court, 

even though the mother “had the opportunity to raise those old 

incidents in the Brazil court to determine the custody.”

As to the lack of detail in the mother’s testimony, the district 

court found that the mother’s testimony was “very hazy” and 

“no[t] specific.” “[T]he incidents that” the mother “described,” the 

district court explained, “were very hazy in the sense that there was 

no specific time. We didn’t even get close to establishing a time for 

many of the incidents.” 

The mother’s third argument (picked up by the majority 

opinion) is that, because the district court found the father’s testimony “not believable and lack[ing] credibility,” it could and should 

have used its “disbelief of [his] testimony” as corroborating “substantive evidence” that he abused the mother. For its part, the majority opinion adds that the district court “did not know” it could 

use the father’s incredible testimony as corroborating substantive 

evidence because the district court said the legal principle didn’t 

apply to civil cases. 

But, in its order denying the stay motion, the district court 

stressed that, even if it could consider the father’s incredible testimony as corroborating substantive evidence, it wouldn’t be “required” to find for the mother “based on either [p]arties’ lack of 

credibility.” In other words, the district court already conveyed 

that, even assuming it could consider the father’s incredible denials 

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23-10918 LUCK, J., dissenting 7

as corroborating substantive evidence for the mother, it wouldn’t 

do so. (This is why the district court found that the mother was 

not “likely to succeed on appeal.”) The district court heard the father’s testimony but didn’t view it as corroborating substantive evidence supporting the grave-risk exception, and no one has pointed 

to anything requiring the district court to do so. There’s nothing 

new for the district court to decide on remand.

The majority opinion takes a cramped view of the stay order. The district court, the majority opinion says, “studiously 

avoided saying that [it] would not rely on [the father’s] denials and 

non-denial denials as substantive evidence.” But the district court 

did not studiously avoid the issue. The mother sought a stay because the father’s testimony, even “if disbelieved by the trier of fact, 

may be substantive evidence.” The district court addressed that 

issue head-on, explaining that, even assuming it may use incredible 

testimony as corroborating substantive evidence, it was not “required to find ‘guilt’ based on either [p]arties’ lack of credibility,” 

and then found that the mother was not likely to succeed on the 

same argument she makes now. Even under the best of circumstances, we do not require that judicial decisions have the metaphysical precision the majority opinion demands. Cf. Nealy v. 

Warner Chappell Music, Inc., 60 F.4th 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2023) 

(“We cannot read a court’s opinion like we would read words in a 

statute. Instead, when interpreting and applying words in a judicial 

opinion, we must consider the context, such as the question the 

court was answering, the parties’ arguments, and facts of the case.” 

(citations omitted)). And these were not the best of circumstances. 

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8 LUCK, J., dissenting 23-10918

The district court had extra time pressure to issue its stay order because this case was brought under the Convention. See Chafin v. 

Chafin, 742 F.3d 934, 936–37 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court 

has recommended that courts take steps to decide these cases as 

expeditiously as possible, for the sake of the children who find 

themselves in such an unfortunate situation.” (cleaned up)).

Finally, in an argument not raised by the parties, the majority opinion contends that the district court erred by “concluding 

that a single witness’s testimony is necessarily insufficient to satisfy 

the clear-and-convincing evidence standard.”1

 For this, the 

1

Compare that argument to the one the mother makes. She argues that the

fact that the trial court did not repudiate the [mother’s] testimony could support a non-frivolous argument that an appellate court should reverse the trial court altogether and remand 

for entry of judgment on behalf of [the mother]. . . .

The fact that appellate courts give substantial deference to a district court’s fact-finding doesn’t mean that they accept fact-finding that is completely dependent upon credibility 

determinations that have not been articulated. While a district 

court’s credibility determinations are entitled to deference, district courts must still sufficiently explain those credibility determinations to allow for meaningful review by an appellate 

court. In other words, a trial court cannot leave an appellate 

court in the position of speculating as to how the evidence was 

weighed.

The mother’s argument does not tee up the argument the majority opinion 

makes. They are different. The majority opinion argues that the district court 

erred by making a finding that the mother’s testimony was insufficient as a 

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23-10918 LUCK, J., dissenting 9

majority opinion points to two statements the district court made 

at the evidentiary hearing as explicit indications in the record showing it “erroneously believed that [the mother’s] testimony alone 

was insufficient to meet the clear-and-convincing standard”: 

(1) the court’s statement that “I want to know whether anyone actually witnessed these so-called incidents on which [the mother] is 

relying to establish an affirmative defense. That’s really all I’m interested in”; and (2) the statement that, “on many of the points, 

[the mother] was the only one who testified.” But neither of these 

statements explicitly indicate that the district court did not understand the law.

As to the first statement, the majority opinion hyper-focuses 

on the word “anyone” and takes it out of the context in which it 

was used. Here’s the full context:

The Court: Okay. We are back on the record 

following lunch.

We’re going to go with our next witness.

Let me just give you all some parameters here. 

It’s going to be a short witness, as these next witnesses 

are. The court is not interested in hearing testimony 

about the kind of relationship these two had, whether 

matter of law to prove the grave-risk exception. The mother, on the other 

hand, argues that the district court erred by not making findings about the 

mother’s testimony that would allow for meaningful appellate review.

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10 LUCK, J., dissenting 23-10918

they were good people, how much criminal history 

they have.

I want to know whether anyone actually witnessed these so-called incidents on which [the 

mother] is relying to establish an affirmative defense. 

That’s really all I’m interested in.

And the way that I see it, [the father] only 

needs to ask a couple of questions, then we go to [the 

mother] and see what they are going to try to bring 

out, and then, again, I give [the father] the chance to 

redirect if you need to straighten up some stuff. But 

basically you’re just establishing whether they witnessed these things.

So you may proceed with your next witness.

The district court’s reference to “anyone” was to the witnesses taking the stand right after the lunch break: the paternal 

uncle and the paternal great-grandmother. The district court 

wanted to know whether these “short witness[es]” saw the father 

behave abusively. It was trying to focus their brief testimony on 

the issue it had to decide—the grave-risk exception—and to avoid 

the irrelevant testimony that had bogged down the hearing before 

the lunch break. Nothing about the context shows that the district 

court believed that the mother’s testimony was “necessarily insufficient” to satisfy the exception. At worst, the statement, in context, was ambiguous, and we must read “ambiguous oral statements” by the district court “to be consistent (not inconsistent) 

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23-10918 LUCK, J., dissenting 11

with the law.” See United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1259 

(11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that, when we review district judges’ 

“extemporaneous spoken words of explanation,” we don’t “assume that the district judges do not know the law” (quotation 

omitted)). 

As to the statement that the mother was the only witness 

who testified to the abuse, the district court was stating a fact. The 

mother was the only one who testified about “many of the points.” 

But this statement does not mean that the district court believed 

the mother’s testimony was necessarily insufficient to prove the 

grave-risk exception. Not even close. The district court exhaustively ticked through the obvious and available corroborating evidence that the mother did not offer at the evidentiary hearing—

medical and courts records, police reports, Ricardo, Monique, the 

video of the father vandalizing the mother’s car. 

Then, left with the mother’s testimony, the district court 

found that, on certain points, she was “very hazy,” “fuzzy,” and 

“no[t] specific.” If anything, these findings showed that the district 

court knew the mother’s testimony could be used to prove the 

grave-risk exception. Otherwise, if the district court believed that 

the mother’s testimony was necessarily insufficient as a matter of 

law, there wouldn’t have been a need to discuss the quality and 

specificity of her testimony.

The majority opinion brushes the district court’s explicit 

findings aside because, it claims, the district court “believed [the 

mother’s] testimony about the threat [the father] posed” and still 

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12 LUCK, J., dissenting 23-10918

found against the mother. But that part of the majority opinion is 

not in quotes because the district court said no such thing. The 

district court never found the mother’s testimony believable.2

 Instead, it explicitly found that her testimony was, in part, “very 

hazy,” “fuzzy,” and “no[t] specific.” The district court’s “hands 

[we]re tied” because, with only uncorroborated and partially hazy, 

fuzzy, and nonspecific testimony, it could not find by clear and convincing evidence that there would be a grave risk to the child if she 

was returned to her habitual residence. We shouldn’t ignore the 

explicit findings the district court did make for findings it never 

made. See United States v. B. G. G., 53 F.4th 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 

2022) (“We cannot ignore the explicit good-faith finding that the 

district court actually made for an inconsistent implicit finding that 

the district court never made.”).

The majority opinion ends by noting that all judges make 

mistakes. Indeed, we do. But what we don’t do is assume that 

district judges don’t know the law. The district judge in this case 

has been on the bench for twelve years—first as a state trial court 

judge, and then, for the last eight years (and change), as a federal 

district judge. She has presided over countless trials and heard 

countless evidentiary hearings. After “listen[ing] to everything” 

and “tak[ing] everything into consideration” at the evidentiary 

hearing—including the mother’s testimony—the district judge 

found that the mother didn’t meet her burden to show by clear and 

2

Even the mother acknowledged that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt made no specific 

finding” about her testimony. 

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23-10918 LUCK, J., dissenting 13

convincing evidence that there would be a grave risk to the child if 

she were returned to Brazil. We should not assume, without more 

than the majority opinion offers, that the district judge did not understand that the mother’s testimony alone could satisfy the clearand-convincing-evidence standard.

While we may have made different findings and reached different conclusions after hearing the same evidence, “[a]ssessing the 

weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses is reserved for the 

trier of fact.” Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1559 

(11th Cir. 1988). “It is emphatically not within the province of an 

appellate court to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses at trial.” United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d 1042, 1052 

(11th Cir. 1998). Because weight and credibility are reserved for 

the factfinder, and the mother hasn’t shown any legal errors, I 

would affirm the district court’s order.

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