IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs February 4, 2020

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES BENNETT

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 18-00215, C1800590 J. Robert Carter, Jr., Judge

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No. W2019-00937-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, James Bennett, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of 

theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to seven years in the 

Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 

conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,

P.J. and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., joined.

Phyllis L. Aluko, District Public Defender; and Barry W. Kuhn (on appeal), and Robert 

Felkner (at trial), Assistant Public Defenders, for the appellant, James Bennett.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jonathan H. Wardle, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Matt McLeod, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

State’s Proof

The Defendant and a codefendant, Angela Stagner, were indicted for theft of 

property valued between $10,000 and $60,000 for stealing a delivery box containing

various items of designer clothing, jewelry, and a handbag from the victim, Suzana 

Lightman’s, porch. 

07/16/2020
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At trial, the victim testified that on October 24, 2016, she received an email 

notification that a package she was anticipating had been delivered, but the package was 

not on her doorstep when she got home. The package contained designer clothing and 

accessories from Celine, a high-end store in New York. She was receiving the items on 

consignment, meaning she was to pay for the items she wanted and return the rest. The 

invoice showed the value of the items contained in the shipment to be $21,143.53. 

The victim called the police and also checked the surveillance footage from the 

cameras installed at her home. The footage showed a man taking a package from her porch, 

but she could not discern his facial characteristics because he was wearing a hooded 

sweatshirt. 

The victim testified that she perused resale sites to see if she could find any of the 

stolen items listed for sale. On the “Letgo” website, the victim saw a handbag that appeared 

to be one of the items sent to her from Celine, and she had the sales representative confirm. 

It was listed at a “drastically reduced” price than its retail price. The victim said that she 

did not know the Defendant and that he did not have permission to take the package from 

her porch. 

Sergeant Thomas Walters with the Memphis Police Department testified concerning 

his investigation of the case. Sergeant Walters found a Celine handbag on the “Letgo” 

website the day after the theft. The handbag’s sales tag was visible in the pictures and the 

serial number matched the serial number listed on the victim’s invoice. Sergeant Walters 

investigated the “Letgo” user account, coined “the man,” that had posted the item for sale, 

and the phone number listed for that account was associated with the Defendant and Ms. 

Stagner.

Detective Jesus Perea with the Memphis Police Department executed a search 

warrant at 3413 Bowen Avenue in Memphis. When he arrived, an unidentified white male 

informed him that the Defendant and Ms. Stagner lived there, and Detective Perea saw 

mail addressed to both individuals inside the residence. Additionally, there were 

photographs of the Defendant and Ms. Stagner, men’s clothing that appeared to be of the 

Defendant’s size, and other items bearing the Defendant’s name inside the home. In their 

search of the residence, officers found several Celine items, including a brown handbag,

two pairs of trousers, a dress, a sweater, a jacket, and a pair of gold earrings in a box. On 

cross-examination, Detective Perea acknowledged that he did not determine who owned

the house, in whose name the utilities were registered or, if there was a home phone, in 

whose name it was registered.
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Detective Trace Rice with the Memphis Police Department took a statement from 

the Defendant. At first, the Defendant denied having any knowledge about the stolen items. 

However, as Detective Rice confronted the Defendant about the evidence against him, the 

Defendant eventually admitted that he knew about the items. The Defendant admitted that 

the “Letgo” account was registered to him. The Defendant told the police that an individual 

named “Callie” was responsible for the theft and that he did not learn about the theft until 

two days later. The Defendant admitted that he had committed three or four package thefts 

in the past but said that he had stopped committing them because he did not want to 

jeopardize his relationship with his son. Detective Rice said that the thief on the security 

footage did not look like the Defendant. However, the Defendant told the officer that the 

person on the security footage looked like “Callie.” Officers were not able to locate 

“Callie.”

Defendant’s Proof

Angela Stagner testified that she had been friends with the Defendant for twenty 

years and had periods of romantic involvement during that time. Ms. Stagner recalled that 

a neighbor’s cousin or friend brought a box of items to her house to see if she wanted to 

purchase anything. She did not know the man’s name. The box contained trousers, 

sweaters, a dress, gold earrings, and a handbag. The man left the box and never came back 

for it. Ms. Stagner testified that she took photographs of the items and listed them for sale 

on an online resale site, but no one was interested. She also took the handbag and earrings 

to a local resale store and a pawnshop but was told the items were not real. 

Ms. Stagner acknowledged that she originally told the police that the Defendant was 

involved with helping her try to sell the stolen items. However, she clarified that he was 

just present with her; “[She is] the smart one. He’s just the muscle[.]” Ms. Stagner said 

that she was not able to provide the police with much information about the man who 

brought the items to her house. Ms. Stagner acknowledged that she pled guilty to theft in 

this case but claimed that she did so to protect her sentence of diversion in another case.

The Defendant testified that he did not steal the package from the victim’s residence, 

that the brother of his neighbor, Callie, took it. He said that Callie and his brother brought 

a milk crate of “female stuff” to the house on Bowen where he was staying. The Defendant

and Ms. Stagner got into an altercation in front of Callie and his brother, and the two men 

left the items and never came back for them. 

The Defendant testified that he did not take photographs of the items or even know

that the items had been advertised for sale online. He said that the “Letgo” account was on 

a phone that he had given Ms. Stagner. The Defendant stated that he gave a statement to 
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the police in which he told them about Callie’s brother but also admitted to “some 

misdemeanor charges” to help Ms. Stagner. 

Following the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted the Defendant as charged.

ANALYSIS

I. Prior Bad Acts

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he told the 

police that he had committed package thefts in the past. 

At the beginning of trial, the Defendant made a motion seeking to exclude a portion 

of his statement to police in which he referred to being a sex offender and also admitted to 

committing prior thefts. The State agreed to redact the Defendant’s mention of being a sex 

offender. However, with regard to the reference to prior thefts, the State asserted that “over 

the course of [the interview,] . . . his story changed multiple times, and . . . the State is not 

offering this for proof of prior crimes, but as a pattern of dishonesty and attempting to 

deceive the investigators about his role in this crime.” The trial court reviewed the 

Defendant’s statement and noted that the Defendant essentially alleged that “this was all a 

big mistake, and I didn’t have anything to do with it.” The court concluded, “For that 

limited reason, I think that it would be relevant if the jury wants to consider it in believing 

his assertion that he didn’t have anything criminal to do with the offense for which he’s 

charged.” The court determined that evidence of the prior thefts was clear and convincing 

as it came from the Defendant’s own admission, and that the danger of unfair prejudice did 

not outweigh the probative value of the evidence. 

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “evidence of other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 

in conformity with the character trait.” Such evidence may, however, be admitted for other 

purposes if the following conditions are met prior to admission of this type of proof:

(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence;

(2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other than conduct 

conforming with a character trait and must upon request state on the record 

the material issue, the ruling, and the reasons for admitting the evidence;

(3) The court must find proof of the other crime, wrong, or act to be clear and 

convincing; and
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(4) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). “Other purposes” have been defined to include the defendant’s 

motive, intent, guilty knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, a common 

scheme or plan, completion of the story, opportunity, and preparation. See State v. Berry, 

141 S.W.3d 549, 582 (Tenn. 2004). If the trial court substantially complies with the 

procedural requirements, its decision will only be reversed if it “applie[d] an incorrect legal 

standard or its decision is illogical or unreasonable, is based on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence, or utilizes reasoning that results in an injustice to the 

complaining party.” Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tenn. 2012).

The Defendant argues that he never specifically asserted that the situation was an 

accident or a mistake, and that the State could not introduce evidence of other crimes unless 

he put forth accident or mistake as a defense. However, the trial court interpreted the 

Defendant’s statement as essentially an assertion that “this was all a big mistake,” that “he 

didn’t have anything criminal to do with the offense[,]” and determined that the evidence 

was admissible for that non-propensity purpose. Given the Defendant’s confusing and hard 

to believe depiction of the events in his statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in allowing this evidence which shows the Defendant knew what package thefts entailed. 

In any event, any error in allowing the Defendant’s admission to police in his 

statement that he had committed prior package thefts was harmless. The trial court gave 

the jury two instructions regarding the proper consideration of any evidence of prior crimes 

the Defendant might have committed. We presume that the jury followed the trial court’s 

instructions. See State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 111 (Tenn. 2006). Additionally, the 

Defendant admitted in his own testimony at trial on direct examination that he told the 

police about committing prior thefts, although he claimed that he only told them because 

it would somehow convince the police to let Ms. Stagner go. The Defendant’s 

contradictory and unbelievable testimony at trial did far more damage than the brief 

admission in his police statement. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

II. Sufficiency

The Defendant also argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. 

He asserts that the State did not prove that the victim was the owner of the stolen property, 

and that he was not directly involved in the receipt of and attempted sale of the stolen 

property.

In considering this issue, we apply the rule that where sufficiency of the convicting 

evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the reviewing court is “whether, after 
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viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings 

of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence 

is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 

S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The same standard applies whether the finding 

of guilt is predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of 

direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1990).

A criminal offense may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence. State v. 

Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010). It is for the jury to determine the weight to be 

given the circumstantial evidence and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent 

with the guilt of the defendant and inconsistent with his innocence. State v. James, 315 

S.W.3d 440, 456 (Tenn. 2010). In addition, the State does not have the duty to exclude 

every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt in order to obtain a 

conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence. See State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 

370, 380-81 (Tenn. 2011) (adopting the federal standard of review for cases in which the 

evidence is entirely circumstantial).

All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given 

the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 

754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by 

the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all 

conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 

1973). Our supreme court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523, 

527 (Tenn. 1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which 

a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a 

convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.”

State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
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“A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, 

the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s 

effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103(a). Theft of property valued at $10,000 

or more but less than $60,000 is a Class C felony. Id. § 39-14-105(a)(4).

The Defendant asserts that it was not proven that the victim was the owner of the 

property. He alleges that the items were sent to the victim on consignment and that she 

never took control of the property or purchased an interest in it before it was taken from 

her doorstep. “Owner” is defined as “a person, other than the defendant, who has 

possession of or any interest other than a mortgage, deed of trust or security interest in 

property[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(28). “[E]vidence of possession is ordinarily 

sufficient proof of ownership; and this is true although the one in possession may have held 

the property as bailee, trustee, or otherwise having only a special interest, and not a general 

ownership of the property.” State v. Rafael A. Bush, No. M2002-02390-CCA-R3-CD, 

2004 WL 794755, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2004) (quoting Jones v. State, 59 

S.W.2d 501, 501 (1933)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2004). This court “has 

interpreted the definition of ‘owner’ within the meaning of the theft statute to extend to a 

variety of interests ‘broader than its commonly understood meaning.’” State v. Darren 

Eugene Fleshman, Alias, No. E2013-00557-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2804183, at *5 (Tenn.

Crim. App. June 18, 2014) (quoting State v. Joel Christian Parker, No. M2001-00773-

CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31852850, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2002), perm. app. 

denied (Tenn. May 5, 2003)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2014). Moreover, “an 

owner’s possession of the property may be actual or constructive.” State v. March, 293 

S.W.3d 576, 592 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). In this case, the victim constructively 

possessed the package – it was addressed to her and left on the doorstep of her home; thus, 

the victim qualified as “owner” within the terms of the statute.

Relying on his own testimony at trial, the Defendant also asserts that it was Ms. 

Stagner who received the goods that had been stolen off the victim’s porch and that he was 

not the one who posted the goods for sale online. However, the jury was presented with 

the Defendant’s statement to police in which he said that Callie and his brother brought the 

items to him, not Ms. Stagner. The jury was also presented with evidence that the items 

were posted for sale under the Defendant’s “Letgo” account, and contrary to her trial 

testimony, Ms. Stagner originally told the police that the Defendant participated in trying 

to sell the stolen goods. It was the prerogative of the jury to not accredit the Defendant’s 

and Ms. Stagner’s testimony at trial. Possession of recently stolen property, unless 

satisfactorily explained, creates a permissible inference that the defendant gained 

possession through theft or had knowledge that the property had been stolen. State v.

James, 315 S.W.3d 440, 450 (Tenn. 2010). In the light most favorable to the State, the

evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. 
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

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 ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE