alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
###### Editorial Note on Part 301

#### Editorial Note:

In the text of this part, integral section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; decimal section references are to the Code of Federal Regulations.

References in the text to the “Code” are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

#### § 301.6016-1 Declarations of estimated income tax by corporations.

For provisions concerning the requirement of declarations of estimated income tax by corporations, see §§ 1.6016-1 to 1.6016-4, inclusive, of this chapter (Income Tax Regulations).
IA

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 93

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to provide

that no person born in the United States will be a United States

citizen unless a parent is a United States citizen, is lawfully in the

United States, or has a lawful immigration status at the time of the

birth.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 25, 1995

Mr. FOLEY (for himself, Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. BAKER of California, Mr.

ROHRABACHER, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. EWING,

Mr. STUMP, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mrs. CHENOWETH, Mrs. MEYERS of

Kansas, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. CHRYSLER, Mr. WILSON, Mr. MCKEON, Mr.

CALVERT, Mr. KLUG, Mr. BAKER of Louisiana, and Mr. METCALF) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee

on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States to provide that no person born in the United

States will be a United States citizen unless a parent

is a United States citizen, is lawfully in the United

States, or has a lawful immigration status at the time

of the birth.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two3 thirds of each House concurring therein), That the follow-
2

•HJ 93 IH

1 ing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu2 tion of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents

3 and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by

4 the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States with5 in seven years after the date of its submission for ratifica6 tion:

7 ‘‘ARTICLE —

8 ‘‘SECTION 1. No person born in the United States

9 after the date of the ratification of this article shall be

10 a citizen of the United States, or of any State, on account

11 of birth in the United States unless the mother or father

12 of the person is a citizen of the United States, is lawfully

13 in the United States, or has a lawful status under the im14 migration laws of the United States, at the time of the

15 birth.

16 ‘‘SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to en17 force this article by appropriate legislation.’’.

Æ
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Hassan Stevens, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 262]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Tomei, J.), rendered October 27, 2003, convicting him of sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of the crimes of sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Hines,*97 NY2d 56 [2001]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10 [1995]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]). Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ., concur.
Acknowledgment And Release



 Exhibit 4.17 

 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND RELEASE 

Reference is made to the Credit Agreement dated as of November 18, 2011 (the “Credit Agreement”) among Health
Management Associates, Inc. (the “Borrower”), the lenders listed on the signature pages thereof (the “Lenders”), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as L/C Issuer and as Swingline Lender and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as
Administrative Agent (the “Administrative Agent”). 
 The undersigned in its capacity as Administrative Agent
hereby releases pursuant to Section 9.11(b) of the Credit Agreement and pursuant to Section 11.4(c) of the Security Agreement each Unrestricted Subsidiary listed in Exhibit A hereto from its Guaranty and the Liens created by the Security
Agreement in the assets of each Unrestricted Subsidiary listed in Exhibit A hereto. 
 As provided in the penultimate paragraph
of Section 9.11 of the Credit Agreement and Section 11.4(e) of the Security Agreement the Administrative Agent will, at the Borrower’s expense, execute and deliver such documents as the Borrower may reasonably request to evidence the
release of such Guarantees and Liens. 
 Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings given to such terms in
the Credit Agreement. 
  

							
	WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
		 	ASSOCIATION,
		 	as Administrative Agent
			
	By:	 		 	 /s/ Monique Gasque

		 		 	Name:	 	
		 		 	Title:	 	
		 		 		 	 Monique Gasque

		 		 		 	 Vice President



  
 July 30, 2012 







 Exhibit A 

 
 Knoxville HMA Holdings, LLC 

Campbell County HMA, LLC 
 Cocke County HMA, LLC

 Jefferson County HMA, LLC 
 Metro
Knoxville HMA, LLC 

  
 2
#### In the Matter of Lucy G., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 242]

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Alma Cordova, J.), entered on or about June 30, 2004, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding determination that she had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of assault in the third degree and menacing in the third degree, and placed her on probation for a period of 18 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court’s finding was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490 [1987]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s determinations concerning credibility *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). The credible evidence disproved the defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. Concur— Saxe, J.P., Marlow, Ellerin, Gonzalez and McGuire, JJ.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-20-00467-CV

Phillip Rodriguez

v.

H.E. Butt Grocery Company, L.P., Jointly and Severally; William Tate, Jointly and 

Severally and as employee of H.E. Butt Grocery Company; Stephen Martinez, Jointly 

and Severally and as employee of H.E. Butt Grocery Company; Meredith Reid, as 

employee of H.E. Butt Grocery Company, Jointly and Severally; Debra Ann Godoy, as 

employee of H.E. Butt Grocery Company, Jointly and Severally

On Appeal from the

285th District Court of Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2020-CI-12089

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. The Court orders the 

judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. No costs are assessed as appellant filed an 

affidavit of inability to pay costs.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

October 7, 2021
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
   PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

     The undersigned Chief Executive Officer of First Keystone Financial, Inc.
(the "Registrant") hereby certifies that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended March 31, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Registrant.


                                        /s/ Thomas M. Kelly
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Name: Thomas M. Kelly
                                        Title: President and Chief Executive
                                               Officer

Date: May 15, 2007

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been provided to First Keystone Financial, Inc. and will
be retained by First Keystone Financial, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Gina Young et al., Respondents, v Johnson Tseng et al., Appellants. (Action No. 1.) L&Y Development, LLC, et al., Respondents, v T.C. Foods Import & Export, Inc., et al., Appellants. (Action No. 2.)

[805 NYS2d 556]

In two related actions, inter alia, to recover the proceeds of a loan (action No. 1) and for specific performance of a contract for *378the sale of real property (action No. 2), the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated December 6, 2004, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (2) to vacate, based upon newly discovered evidence, two prior orders of the same court, dated August 15, 2001, and August 20, 2001, respectively, which, among other things, directed the defendants to specifically perform the contract of sale.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants, the seller of the subject real property and its principal, contend that the orders dated August 15, 2001, and August 20, 2001, respectively, inter alia, directing them to specifically perform a contract for the sale of the subject real property *(see L&Y Dev. v T.C. Foods Import & Export Co.,*300 AD2d 476), should have been vacated based upon “newly discovered evidence” (CPLR 5015 [a] [2]). The alleged newly-discovered evidence was the March 5, 2004, deposition testimony of David Lien, one of the principals of the purchaser of the property, the plaintiff L&Y Development, LLC. The defendants contend that Lien’s testimony was that the purchaser agreed to pay an additional $700,000 in cash for the subject property “under the table.” At his deposition, Lien specifically denied that there was “under-the-table” money but acknowledged that $100,000 was paid to the defendants.

The plaintiffs claimed that the $100,000 was part of a loan and sought to recover the loan proceeds in action No. 1. The defendants claimed that the $100,000 was “under-the-table” money for the property.

Thereafter, in October 2004, the defendants defaulted in appearing at the trial of action No. 1. The Supreme Court authorized entry of judgment against the defendant Johnson Tseng in the principal sum of $397,000, with interest from October 24, 1999. Pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, that determination precludes the defendants from contending that those payments did not constitute a loan but rather constituted additional consideration for the property *(see Rosendale v Citibank,*262 AD2d 628 [1999]).

Accordingly, the order appealed from is affirmed. Florio, J.P., Goldstein, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
| (logo) WELLS  FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon Street  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

** **

Reference is herebymade to that certain Trust and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 17, 2016,by and among BANC OF AMERICA MERRILL LYNCH LARGE LOAN, INC., as Depositor,WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Servicer, AEGON USA REALTY ADVISORS,LLC, as Special Servicer, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, asCertificate Administrator and Custodian, and WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONALASSOCIATION, as Trustee, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-ThroughCertificates, Series 2016-ISQR (the "Agreement"). Capitalized termsused herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in theAgreement.

 

Pursuant to Section13.7 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of CommercialMortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1. A review of the activitiesof the Servicer during the period from Janauary, 2017 through December 31,2017, the (“Reporting Period”) and of its performance per the Agreement duringsuch period has been made under my supervision, and

 

2. To the best ofmy knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer, has fulfilled all of itsobligations under this Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February2018. 

 

 

/s/ Daniel Bober 

Daniel Bober

Executive VicePresident 

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank,  N.A. | (logo)  Together we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### Lake Garda Company, Incorporated *v.*George LeWitt.

Maltbie, C. J., Avery, Brown, Jennings and Ells, Js.

*589Argued April 3

decided May 1, 1940.

*597
      *M. J. Blumenfeld,*with whom, on the brief, was *DeLancey Pelgrift,*for the appellant (defendant).

*Samuel Rosenthal,*for the appellee (plaintiff).

Per Curiam.

For the reasons stated in the memorandum of decision quoted above, we find correct the conclusion reached, that Cumulative Supplement 1939, § 1364e, repealed by implication the right of appeal provided by statute, Special Acts, 1917, page 1119, from the City Court of New Britain.

There is no error.
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Re:          Annual Statement of Compliance for J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial MortgageSecurities Trust 2016-NINE Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,Series 2016-NINE

 

Per the Trust and ServicingAgreement dated as of September 26, 2016 (the "Agreement"), theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asCertificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies asfollows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "ReportingPeriod"):

 

(a)           A review of Wells Fargo's activities during the Reporting Period and of itsperformance under the Agreement has been made under such officer's supervision;and

 

(b)          To the best of such officer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo hasfulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

February 27, 2017

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President 

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### § 31.6413(b)-1 Overpayments of certain employment taxes.

For provisions relating to the adjustment of overpayments of tax imposed by section 3101, 3111, 3201, 3221, or 3402, see § 31.6413(a)-2. For provisions relating to refunds of tax imposed by section 3101, 3111, 3201, or 3221, see §§ 31.6402(a)-1 and 31.6402(a)-2. For provisions relating to refunds of tax imposed by section 3402, see §§ 31.6402(a)-1 and 31.6414-1.
#### Pepi Schafler, Formerly Known as Pepi Summer, Respondent, v HSBC Bank USA, Formerly Known as Marine Midland Bank, N.A., Appellant, and Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., Respondent.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[803 NYS2d 500]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Patrick H. NeMoyer, J.), entered July 12, 2004. The judgment awarded plaintiff $239,273 against defendants.

It is hereby ordered that said appeal be and the same hereby is unanimously dismissed without costs *(see Matter of Eric D.*[appeal No. 1], 162 AD2d 1051 [1990]). Present—Scudder, J.P., Martoche, Pine, Lawton and Hayes, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>5
       
<S>                                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                         9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                     DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                          SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                                    3531887
<SECURITIES>                                                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                                              375954
<ALLOWANCES>                                                    0
<INVENTORY>                                                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                0
<PP&E>                                                   29439200
<DEPRECIATION>                                           14706200
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           18640841
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                           0
<BONDS>                                                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                           0
<PREFERRED>                                                     0
<COMMON>                                                        0
<OTHER-SE>                                               18530076
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             18640841
<SALES>                                                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                          1612555
<CGS>                                                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                   0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          1371155
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                            241400
<INCOME-TAX>                                                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        241400
<DISCONTINUED>                                                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                 0
<CHANGES>                                                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                               241400
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                2.49
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                   0
        

</TABLE>
#### Sean M. MULCAHEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EURO GEN. CONTRACTORS, a corporation registered under the laws of the State of Washington; Ludvik Stribney, individually, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 00-36039.

D.C. No. CV-99-05506-RJB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 12, 2002.

Decided June 20, 2002.

Before BROWNING, B. FLETCHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Sean M. Mulcahey filed a complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201*et seq.,*and Washington state law, Rev.Code Wash. § 49.46, seeking unpaid overtime compensation from his former employer, Euro General Contractors (“Euro”), for the period between 1992 and 1999. Mulcahey appeals the district court’s summary judgment orders that: (1) limited his claims pursuant to the statute of limitations; and (2) dismissed the bulk of his claims for *944overtime compensation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

At the threshold, we reject Euro’s argument that Mulcahey’s appeal should be dismissed as untimely under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The rule is clearly established that the time for appeal does not begin to run “until a judgment is entered in compliance with Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that is, until [the judgment] is set forth in a separate document and properly entered by the clerk of the court.” *McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n,*955 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir.1990). *See also Venon v. Heckler,*811 F.2d 1274, 1276 (9th Cir.1987) (“Absent compliance with [Rules 58 and 79(a) ] a party will not ordinarily be found to have exceeded any of the time periods set forth in Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)”). Here, the district court did not enter a formal judgment on a separate document until November 21, 2000, and the time for appeal did not begin to run until then. Because Mulcahey filed his Notice of Appeal one day later, his appeal was timely under Fed. RApp. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

We reject Mulcahey’s contentions that: (1) he was entitled to more than the forty-three hours of overtime compensation to which the defendants conceded; and (2) that overtime compensation was wilfully withheld. We agree with the district court that Mulcahey did not support these claims with probative evidence showing that there was a genuine issue of material fact for trial. *See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,*477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“[T]he plaintiff could not rest on his allegations ... to get to a jury without any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint”). The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Euro on these claims.

Because we find Mulcahey’s claim that he is entitled to additional overtime pay for work performed during the years 1992-1999 to be without merit, we need not address the statute of limitations question.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.