1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 07 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### LA

### RU E v . D E 

### WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSOCIATES, INC. , ET AL


### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06–8 56. Ar g u ed Nov e mber26, 200 7

—Dec i ded Febr u a r y20, 2008 Petitioner , a par t ic ipant in adefine d contrib u tion pens ion pla n , a lleged

that the plan adminis t r a tor ’ s failur e to fol l ow petitioner ’ s inv e stment dir e c t ions “de p leted” his i n ter e stinth e planbya ppr ox imately $15 0,00 0 an d amou n t ed to abr eac hof fid u c i ar ydu tyun derth e Em

ployee Ret i rem e ntIncom e S e curit yActof 1 9 7 4(ERIS A ). The Dis t rict Court grante d respondents judgme nt o nthe pleadi ngs, and the Fourt hCircui ta ffirm ed. Relying on Mas s achu se tts M u tual Life Ins. Co. v. Ru ss ell, 473 U. S. 134 , th e Cir c u i t held th at ERI S A §502( a)(2 ) provides remedies only for e n tire plans, no t for individua l s. Held: Alth ou gh§502(a)(2) d oes n o t pr ov ide a r e medyforin div i du al in

j u ries dis t inctfrompla ninj u ries , itdoes a u t h orize reco very fo r fidu

ciary breachesthat imp a ir the value of plan asse ts in aparticipant’ s in div i du al ac c o u n t

. Sec t ion502( a)(2) pr ov i d es forsu its t o en for c e th e liab ility

- creati n gprov isions of §409, concerningbreaches of fiduciary duties that harm plans. Th e prin cipal st atutory duties impose d by §409 r e la te to th e pr operman a g e men t , admin i str a tion , an d in v e st

ment of pl an asse ts, with a ney e towar densur i ngthat the benefit s au th or ized byth e planar e u l tim a telyp a idto pl anpar t ic ipan ts. Th e misc onduc tthat pe titionera lleg e s fal l s squ a r e lywithin t h at c a teg o r y , unlike the misconduct in Russ ell

. The r e, the plaintiff r e ceived all of the benefits to whic h she was c o nt ra ctua lly entitled, b u t s o ught con

sequ en tialda mag e s ar i s in gfr om a del a y in the processing of her cla i m . Russell’s emphasis on prot ec tingthe “entir e pl an” r e flec ts th e fac tthat the d i sa bili typlan i n Russ ell, as well as the typical pensio n planatth atti me, pr omised par t ic ipan t s afix e d ben e fit. M i sc on du c t by such a plan’s administr a tors w ill notaffect an individual’s enti

tlement to a d e fined benefit unless itcreates or enhances the ri sk o f2 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC. Sy llabu s default bythe entir e plan. Forde fined co ntrib u tion plans , howeve r, fiduc i ar ymisc onduc tneed not thr e at en the entire plan’s solvency to reduce b e nefit s b e low the amount that pa rticipants would otherwise receive. Whet her afiducia r y b r ea ch dim i nis h es pla nass et s pa yab l e to all p a rticipa n ts or only to partic u l arin div i du als, it c r e ates th e kin d of ha rms tha tcon c erned §4 0 9 ’ s dra f tsmen. T hus , Ru s sell’s “ e nt ire plan” r e fer e n c es, wh ichac cur a telyr e flec t §409’ s oper at i o ninth e de

fined b e nefit context, a r e b e s i de th e point in the defined contribution context. Pp . 4–8. 450 F. 3d 57 0, v a c a ted an d r e man d ed.

S TEVENS , J., delivered the opinion of the Cour t, in whic h S OUTER , G IN SB U R G , B RE Y E R , an d ALITO , JJ., joined. R OBERTS , C. J., filed an opin

ion concu rrin gin pa rt a n d concu rrin gin t h e j u dgm e nt , in which K EN

NEDY , J., joined. T HOMAS , J., filed an opi n ion concurri ng in the jud g ment, in whi c h S CALI A , J., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–8 56 

### JAMES LA

### RUE, P E TI TIONE R v. D E 

### WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSOCIATE S , INC. , ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [Febr u ar y20, 200 8] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### delivered the opi n ion of the Court. In Massach usetts Mu t. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134 (1985), we held tha ta pa rticipant in a disability plan that paid a fixed lev e l of benef i ts could not bring suit under §502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 891, 29 U. S. C

. §1132(a)(2), to recover conse quential damages arising from delay in th e processin gof her claim. In this case we con

sider whether that statutory provision authorizes a par

ticipant in a defined contribution pension plan to sue a fiduciary whose allege d misconduct impaired the value of plan assets in the parti cipant’s individual account. 1 

### R e l y ing on our decision in Russell , the Court of Appeals for the

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1 As its name s imply , a “defined c o ntr ibution plan” or“indiv idual account plan” promise s th e particip ant the value of an individual a ccounta tre t i rem e nt , which is la rgely a function o f the amounts c o ntr ibuted to that ac c o unt and th e investment performance of those cont rib u t i ons . A “ d efined b e nefitpla n ,” b ycont ra s t , genera lly prom is es the participan t afixed levelof retirementincome, which is typica lly basedon the employee’s y e ars of s e rvice a n d com p ens a t i on. S e e §§3(34) –(35), 29 U. S. C. §§100 2(34) –( 35); P. Schneider & B. Freedman, ERIS A : A Compr e h e n s iv e Gu ide §3.02 (2d ed. 2003).2 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC. Opinion of theCourt 

### Fourth Circuit held that § 502(a)(2) “provides remedies only for entire plans, not for individuals. . . . Recovery under this subsection must ‘inure [ ] to the b e nefit of the plan as a whole ,’ notto particular persons with right s under the plan.” 450 F. 3d 570, 572–573 (2 006) (quotin g Russell , 47 3 U. S., at 140). While language in our Russell opinion is consistent with thatcon c lusion, the rationale for Russell’s ho lding supports the opposite result in this case. I Petitioner filed this action in 2004 against h i s former employer, DeWolff, Boberg & Associates (D eWolff), a n d the ERISA-regulated 401(k) retirement savings pl an administered by DeWolff (Plan). The Plan permits par

ticipants to direct the investment of their contributions in accordance with specified procedures and requirement s.Petitioner alleged that in 2001 and 2002 he directed DeWolff to make certainchanges to the investments in his individual account, but DeWolff never carri ed out these directions. Petitioner claimed t hat this o m ission “de

pleted” his interest in the Plan by approximately $150,000, and amounted to ab r each of fi duciary du ty under ERI SA. The complaint sought “ ‘mak e-whole’ or other equit able relief a s allowed b y[§502(a)(3)],” as well as “such other and further relief as the court de ems just an d proper.” Civil Action No. 2:04–1747–18 (D. S. C.), p. 4, 2 Record, Doc

. 1. Respondents filed a motion for judgment on the plead

ings, argui n g that the complaint was essentially a claim for monet a ry relief that is not recoverable unde r §502(a)(3). Petitioner counteredth at he “d[id] not wish for the court to award him any money, but .

. . simply want[ed] th e plan to pr operly reflect tha t which would b e his interestin the plan, but for the breach of fiduciary duty.” Reply to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, p. 7, 3 id., Doc. 17. The District C o urt co ncluded, however, that since3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt 

### respondents did not possess an y disputed funds tha t rightly belonged to petition er, hewas seek ing damage s rather tha nequitable relief available under §502(a)(3). Assuming, arguendo, that respondents had beached a fiduciary d u ty, the District Cou rt nonetheless granted their motion. On appeal petitioner argued that he had a cognizable claim for relief under §§502(a)(2) a n d 502(a)(3) of ERISA. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner had raised his §502(a)(2) argument fo r the firs t time on appeal, but nev

ertheless rejected it on the merits. Section 502(a)(2) provi d es for suits to enforce the liabil

ity-creating provisions of §409, concerning breaches of fiduciary duties that harm plans. 2 

### The Cour t of Appeals cited language from our opinion in Russell su g g esting tha t that these provisions “protect the entire plan, rather tha n the rights of an individual beneficiary.” 473 U. S., at 14 2. It then characterized t h e remedy sought by petitioner as “personal” because he “desires re covery to be paid into his plan account, an instrument that exists specifically for his benefit,” and concluded: “We are therefore sk eptica l that plaintiff’s individ

ual remedial interest can serve a s a legitimate prox y for the plan in its en tirety, as [§502(a)(2)] requires. To be sure, the recovery pl aintiff seeks couldbe s een

——————

2 Sec t ion409(a) pr ov ides: “Any person who is a fiduciary wi th r e sp ec t to a pl an who breaches any of the res p onsibil i tie s , obligation s , or duties impo se d upon fiduciar

ies byth i s ti tl e sh all be per s on allylia ble t o make g ood t o su c hplanan y losse s to th e planr e su ltin gfr om ea ch s u ch b r ea ch, a n d t o rest ore to su c hplanany pr ofits of su chfidu c i ar y wh ic h h av e beenmade th r o ugh u s e of asse ts of th e planbyth e fidu c i ar y , an d sh all be su bjec t to su c h other equitabl e or remedial relief as the cour t maydeem appr opr i ate , including rem o va l of s u ch fi ducia r y. A fiducia r y m a y a l s o b e rem o ved fora v i olationof sec t ion4 11 of th is Ac t

. ” 88 Sta t . 8 86, 29 U. S. C

. §110 9(a).4 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC. Opinion of theCourt 

### as accruingto the plan in the narrow sense that it would be paid into plaintiff’s plan account , which is part of the plan. But such a view finds no license in the statuto r y text, an d threatens to undermine the careful limitations Congress has placed on th e scope of ERISA re lief.” 450 F. 3d, at 574. The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioner’s argumen t that the make-whole relief he sought was “equitable” within the meaning of §502(a)(3). Although our grant of certiorari, 551 U. S.

___ (2 007), encompassed the §502(a)(3) issue, we do not address it because we conclude that the Co urt of Appe als misread§502(a)(2). II As the case comes to us we mustassume that respon

dents breached fiduci ary obligati o ns defined in §409(a), and that those breac h es had anadverse impact on the value of the plan assets in petitioner’s individual account. Whether petitioner can prove those all e gations and whether respondents may have valid defenses to the claim are matters not before us. 3

### Although the reco rd does not reveal the relative size of pe titioner’s accou n t, the legal issue under §502(a)(2) is the same whether his account includes 1% or 99% of the total assets in the plan. As we explained in Russell , and in more detail in our later opinion in Varity Corp. v. Ho we, 516 U. S. 489, 508– 512 (1996), §502(a) of ERISA identifies six t y pes of civil actions that may be brought byvarious parties. The second, which is at issue in this cas e , authorizes the Secre

tary of Lab o r as well as plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries, to bring actions on behalf of a plan to

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3 For e x ample, we do not de cide whether pe titioner made the alleged inves t m e ntdirect ions in a c c o rda n ce with t h e requirements specified by the Plan, whetherhe was r e quir ed to ex ha ust r e medie s s e t for t h in the Planbefor e seekin gr e lief i nfeder a l c o urt pu r s u a n tto §502(a)( 2 ), or whether he a s s e rted his righ ts in atimely fa s h ion.5 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt 

### recover for violations of the ob ligations defined in §409(a)

. The princip a l statutory duties imposed on fiduciaries by that section “relate to the proper management, admini

stration, and investm e nt of fund assets,” with an eye toward ensuring tha t“the benefits authorized by the plan” are ultima tely paid to participants and beneficiaries. Russell , 473 U. S., at 142; see also Varity , 516 U. S., at 511–512 (n oting that §409’s fiduciary obligations “relat[e] to the plan’s financial integrity” and “reflec[t] a special congressional concern about pla nasset management”). The misconduct alleged by the petitioner in this case falls squarely within that ca tegory. 4 

### The misconduct alleged in Russell , by co ntrast, fell outside this category. The plaintiff in Russell received all of the benefits to whichshe was contractually entitled, but sought consequential d a mages arising from a delay in th e processing of her claim. 473 U. S., at 136–137. In holding that §502(a)(2) does n o t provide a remedy for this type of injury, we stressed that the text of §409(a) c haracterize s the relevant fiduciary relationship as one “with respect to a plan,” an d repeatedl yidentifies the “plan” as the victim of any fiduciary breach and the reci pient of any relief. See id. , at 140. The legislative hi story likewise re vealed that “the cru cible of congressional concern was misuse and

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4 Th e r e c o r ddoes n o t r e v e al wh eth e rth e alleg e d $1 50 ,000 in ju r y represents a decline in the value of as se ts tha tDeWol ff should hav e sold or an increase in the value of asset s th at D e Wolf f sh ou ld h av e pu r c h ased. Con t r a r yto respon den t s’ a r g u men t , h o wev e r , §502(a)(2) encom p a s s e s a ppropria t e cla i m s for “lost profits.” See Brief for R e spondents 12

– 13. Underthe c o mmon law of trus ts , whi c h info rms our inter p r e tationof ERISA’ s fiduc i ar yduties, see Varity , 516 U. S., at 496–4 97, tr u s t ees ar e “c h a r g eable wi th

. . . an ypr ofit wh ic hwou l d h av e a ccrued t o t h e t r us test a t e if t h ere ha d b e en no b r ea ch of t r us t , ” includ

ing profits fo rgonebecause the trus tee “fails to pu rchase specific pr oper tywhi c h it is his du tyto purchase.” 1 Restate m ent (Second) Tr usts §20 5 , and Comment i , §211 (19 57); see also 3 A. Scott, Law on Tr u s ts §§205, 211 (3d ed. 19 67).6 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC. Opinion of theCourt 

### mismanagement of plan assets b yplan administrators.” Id. , at 141, n. 8. Fina lly, our review of ERISA as awhole confirmed that §§502(a)(2) and 409 protect “the financia l integrity of the plan,” id., at 142, n. 9, whereas other provisions s p ecifically address claims for benefits. See id. , at 143–144 (discussing §§502(a)(1)( B) and 503). We there

fore concluded: “A fair contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misu se of plan a ssets, and with remedies that would prot ect the entire plan, rather thanwith the rights of an individual benefici

ary.” Id. , at 142. Russell ’s emphasis on protecting the “entire plan” fro m fiduciary misconductreflects t h e formerlandscape of employee b e nefit plans

. That landscape has changed. Defined contribution plans dominate the retirement plan scene today. 5 

### In c o ntrast, wh en ERISA was enacted, and when Russell was decided, “the [defined benefit] plan was the norm of American pension practice.” J. Langbein, S. Stabile, & B. Wolk, Pension an d Employee Benefit Law 58 (4th ed. 2006); see a l so Zelinsky, The Defined Contribu

tion Paradi gm, 114 Ya le L. J. 451, 471 (2004 ) (discussing the “significant reve rsal of historic patterns under whic h the traditi onal defined benefit plan was the domina nt paradigm f o r the provision of retir e ment income”). Unlike the defined contribution plan in this case, the disability plan at iss u e in Russell did not h a ve individual accounts;

——————

5 See, e.g. , D. Rajnes , An Evolving Pens ion S y s t em: Trends in Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, Employ ee Be nefit Rese arch Institute (E B R I) Issue Brie f No. 249 (Se p t. 2002), http://www.ebri.org/ pdf/br i efspdf/0 902i b.pdf (all In ter n et mater i als as v i s i te d Jan . 28, 200 8, and av aila ble in Clerk of Court’s ca se file); Facts from EBRI: Reti re ment Trends in the Unit ed St ate s Over the Past Quarter-Cent ury (June 2007), http://www.ebri

. org/pdf/pub lications/facts/0607fact.pdf.7 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt 

### it paid a fi xed benefit based on a percentage of the em

ployee’s sal a ry. See Russell v. Massa chuse tts Mu t. Life Ins. Co. , 722 F. 2d 482, 486 (CA9 1983). The “entire plan” lan guage in Russellspeaks to th e impact of §409 on pla n s that pay defined benefits. Mis

conduct bythe administrators of a defined benefit pla n will not affect an individual’s entitlement to a defined benefit unless it creates or enhanc es the risk of default b y the entire plan. It w a s that default risk that prompt ed Congress to require defined be nefitplans (but not defined contribution plans) to satisfy complex minimum funding requirements, and to make pre m ium payments to the Pension Benefit Guara n ty Co rporation for plan termina

tion insurance. See Zelinsky, 114 Yale L. J., a t475–478. For defined contribution pl ans, however, fidu ciary mis

conduct need not threaten the solvency of the entire plan to reduce benefits below th e amount that participan t s would otherwise receive. Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants a n d beneficiaries, or only t o persons tied to pa rtic u lar individ

ual accounts, it creates the kind of harms th at concerne d the drafts men of §40 9

. Conseq uently, our references to the “entire plan” in Russell, whic h accurately reflect the operation of §409 in the defined benefit context, are beside the point in the defined contribution context. Other sections of ERISA confirm that the “entire plan” language from Russell , which appears nowhere in §409 or §502(a)(2), does not a p ply to defined contribution plan s. Most significant is §404(c), which e x empts fidu ciaries from liability forlosses caus ed by parti cipants’ exe rcise of con

trol over assets in their individual accounts. See also 29 CFR §2550. 404c–1 (20 07). This provision would serve n o real purpose if, as respondents argue, fiduci aries never had any liability for los s es in an in dividual account. We therefore hold th at although §502(a)(2 ) does n o t provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct fro m8 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC. Opinion of theCourt 

### plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery f o r fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a partic i pant’s indi vidual acco unt. Acco rdingly, th e judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for f u rther p r oc eedings consistent wit h this opinion

. 6 

### It is so orde red.

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6 Aft e r our gra n tof cert iora r ires p ondent s filed am o tion t o dis m iss the writ, contending that the case is moot because p e titioner is no longer a participant in th e Plan

. Wh ile h i s with dr awal of fu n d s fr om the Plan may have relevance to the proce e dings on rem a nd, we denie d theirmotion bec a use the c a se i s notmo ot. A plan “ p ar tic i pant,” a s defin e d by§3( 7 ) of E R ISA, 29 U. S. C. §1 002( 7), mayi n c l u d e a for m er employee with a colorable claim for benefits. See, e.g . , Harze w sk i v. Guidan t Corp. , 489 F. 3d 799 (CA7 20 07)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–8 56 

### JAMES LA

### RUE, P E TI TIONE R v. D E 

### WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSOCIATE S , INC. , ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [Febr u ar y20, 200 8] 

### C HIEF 

### J UST I CE 

### R OBER T S 

### , with whom J USTICE 

### K ENN E DY 

### joins, concurring in part and concu rring in the judgment. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit conc luded that the loss to LaRue’s individual plan account did not perm it him to “serve as a legitimate proxy for the plan in its entirety,” thus barring him from relief under §502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Securit yAct of 1 974 (ERISA), 2 9 U. S. C. §1132(a)(2). 450 F. 3d 570, 574 (2006). The Court today rejects that reasoning. See ante , at 4, 7–8. I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circui t ’s analysis was flawed, and join the Court’s opinion to tha t extent. The Court, however, go es on to conclude that §502(a)(2) does authorize recover yin cases such as the present one. See ante , a t7–8. It is not at all clear that this is true. LaRue’s righ t to direct the investment of his contributions was a right granted an d governed by the plan

. See ante , at 2. Inthis action, he seeks the benef i ts that would otherwise be due him if, as alleged, the plan carried ou t his investm e nt instruction. LaRue’s claim, therefore, is a claim for benefits that turns on th e application and inter

pretation of the plan terms, specifically those governing investment options and how to exercise them. It is at leas t arguable that a claim of this n a ture prop

erly lies only under §502(a)(1 )(B) of ERISA. That provi

-2 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC. Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. 

### sion allows a plan participantorbeneficiary “to recov e r benefits du e to him un der the terms of his plan, to enfor c e his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefit s underthe terms of t h e plan.” 29 U. S. C. §1 132(a)(1)(B). It is difficult to imagine a more accurate de scription of LaRue’s cl aim. And in fact clai m ants have filed suit u n der §502(a)(1)(B) alleging similar benefit denials in violat ion of plan t e rms. See, e.g., Hessv. Reg-Ell e n Machine Tool Corp. , 423 F. 3d 6 53, 657 (CA7 2005) (allegation made under §5 02(a)(1)(B) that a plan administrat o r wron gf ully denied instruc t ion to move retirement funds from employer’s stockto a diversified investment account). If LaRue may bring his claim under §502(a)(1)(B), it is not clear that he may do so under §502(a)(2) as well. Section 502(a)(2) provi d es for “appropriate” relief. Con

struing the same term in a parall el ERISA p r ovision, we have held that relief is not “appro priate” under §502(a)(3) if another provision, such as §502(a)(1)(B), offers an ade

quate remedy. See Varity Corp. v. Ho w e , 516 U. S. 489, 515 (1996). Applying the same rationale to aninterpreta

tion of “appropriate” i n§502(a)(2) would accord with o u r usual preference for construing th e “same terms [to] have the same meaning indifferent sections of t h e same st at

ute,” Barnh ill v. Johnson , 503 U. S. 393, 406 (1992), and with the vi ew that ERISA in particular is a “ ‘ comprehen

sive and reticulated statute’ ” with “carefully integrat ed civil enforcement provis ions,” Mass achuse t ts M u t. LifeIns. Co. v. Russell , 473 U. S. 134, 146(1985) (qu o ting Nach

man Corp. v. Pen s ion Benefi t Gu aranty Corporation , 4 46 U. S. 359, 361 (1980)). In a va riety of co ntexts, some Courts of Appeals have accordin gly pre v ented plaintiffs from recasting what a r e in essen c e plan-derived benefit claims that should b e brought under §502(a)(1)(B) as claims for fiduciary breaches under §502(a)(2). See, e. g., Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cros s & Blu eSh ield of Va .,3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. 

### Inc. , 102 F. 3d 712, 714 (CA4 1996). Oth e r Courts of Appeals have disagreed with this approach. See, e.g. , Grad env. Conexant S y stems Inc. , 496 F. 3d 2 91, 301 (CA3 2007). The significance of the dis t inction between a §502(a)(1)(B) claim an d one under §502(a)(2) is not merely a matter of pickin g th e right p r ovision to cit e in the com

plaint. Allowing a§502(a)(1)(B) a ction to be recast as o n e under §502(a)(2) migh t permit plaintiffs to circum v ent safeguards for plan ad ministrators that have developed under §502(a)(1)(B). Among the s e safeguards is the re

quirement, recognized by almost all the Courts of Appeals, see Fallickv. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. , 1 62 F. 3d 4 10, 418, n. 4 (CA6 1998) (citing ca ses), that a participa nt exhaust the administra tive remedies mandated by ERISA §503, 29U. S. C. §1133, before filing suit under §502(a)(1)(B).* Equally significan t, this Cou rt has held that ERISA plans may grant admi nistrators and fiduciar

ies discretion in deter m inin g ben e fit eligibi l i t y and the meaning of plan terms, decisions that courts may revie w only for anabuse of d i scretion. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruc h , 489 U. S. 101, 115 (1 989). These safe guards encourage em ployers and others to undertake the voluntary step of providing medical and retirement benefits to plan participants, see Aetna Heal th Inc. v. Dav ila , 542 U. S. 200, 215 (2004), a n d have no doubt engendered substantial reliance inter e sts on th e part of plans and fiduciaries. Allowing what is really a claim for benefits under a plan to be brought as a claim f o r breach of fiduciary duty under §50 2 (a)(2), rather than as a claim for benefits due “underthe terms of [the] plan, ” §502(a)(1)(B), may result in circumventin gsuch pl an

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* Sensibly, the Court leaves open the question whether exhaustion may be requi r ed of a clai mant who se eks recovery for a breach of fidu c i ar ydu ty u n d er§502(a)(2). See ante , a t4, n. 3.4 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC. Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. 

### terms. I do not mean to suggest that these are settled ques

tions. They are not. Nor are we in a position to answ e r them. LaRue did not rely on §502(a)(1)(B) a s a source of relief, and t h e courts below had no occasion to address the argument, raised by an amicus in this Court, that t h e availability of relief un der §502(a)(1)(B) precludes LaRue’s fiduciary b r each clai m. See B r ief for ER ISA Indust r y Committee as Amicus Curiae 13– 30. I simply highlight the fact th at the Court’s determi nation that the present claim may be brought under §502(a)(2) is reached without considering whether the possibl e availabili ty of relief under §502(a)(1)(B) alters that conclusion

. See, e.g., UnitedPa r cel Servi ce, Inc. v. Mitchell , 451 U. S. 56, 60, n

. 2 (1981) (n oting general reluctance to consider arguments raised only by an amicusand not considered by the courts below). In matters o f statutor yinterpreta tion, where principles of sta re de ci sishave th eir greatesteffect, it is important that we not seem to decide more th an we do. I see nothing in today’s opinion precluding the lower courts on remand, if they determine that the argu ment is prop

erly before them, fro m considering the co ntention that LaRue’s cla i m may proceed only u n der §502(a)(1)(B). I n any event, other courts in other c a ses remain free to con

sider what we have not—what effect the availability of relief under§502(a)(1)( B) may have ona plan participant’s ability to proceed under §502(a)(2)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
T HOMAS , J

. , co ncu rrin gin j u dgm e nt 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–8 56 

### JAMES LA

### RUE, P E TI TIONE R v. D E 

### WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSOCIATE S , INC. , ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [Febr u ar y20, 200 8] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMAS 

### , wi th whom J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### joins, concurring i nthe judgm e nt. I agree with the Court that petitioner alleges a cogniza

ble claim under §502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. §1132(a)(2), but it is ERISA’s text and not “the kind of harms that concerned [ERISA’s ] draftsmen” that compels my decision

. Ante , at 7. In Massachuse t ts Mut. Life Ins

. Co. v. Ru ss ell , 473 U. S. 134 (198 5), the Cou rt held tha t §409 of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. §1 109, read together with §502(a)(2), authorizes recovery on ly by “the plan as an entity,” 473 U. S., at 140, and does not permit individuals to bring suit when they do not se ekrelief on behalf of the plan, id. , at 139–144. The ma jority acce pts Russell ’s fundamental holding, but reins in the Court’s fu rther suggestion in Russell that suits under §502(a)(2) are meant to “protect the entire plan,” rather than “the rights of an indivi dual benef i ciary.” Ante , at 4–8; see Russell , supra, at 1 42. The m a jority sta t es that emphasizing the “entire plan” was a sensible application of §§409 and 502(a)(2) in the histori c al context of defined benefit plans, but that th e subsequent prolifera t ion of defined contrib u tion plans has rendered Russell’s dictum inapplicable to most modern cases. Ante , a t6– 7. In concl u ding that a loss suffered by a pa rticipant’s de fined contribution plan2 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC.
T HOMAS , J

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### account because of a fiduciary b r each “c reates the kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of §409,” the majority holds that §502(a)(2) authorizes recovery for plan partici

pants such as petitioner. Ante , at 7–8. Although I agree wit hthe majority’s holding, I write separately because my reading of §§409 and502(a)(2) is not contingent on trends in the pension plan market. Nor does it dep e nd on theostensib le“concerns” of ERISA’s drafters. Rather, my conclusion t hat petitioner has stated a cognizable claim flows from th e unambiguous text of §§409 and502(a)(2) as appliedto defin e d contribution plans. Section 502(a)(2 ) states that “[a] civil a ction may be brought” b ya plan “pa rticipant, b e neficiary or fiduciary, ” or by the Secretary of Labor, to obtain “appr o priate relief ” under §409. 29 U. S. C. §1132(a)(2). Sectio n409(a) pro

vides that “ [ a]ny perso nwho is a f i duciary with respect t o a plan

. . . s hall be p e rsonally liab l e to make good to such planany losses to the planresulting from each [fiduciary] breach, and to restore to suchplanany profits of su ch fiduciary which have been made t h rough use of assets of the planby the fiduciary

. . . .” 29 U. S. C. §1109(a) (em

phasis added). The plain text of §409 (a), which uses the term “plan” five times, leaves no doubt tha t§502(a)(2) authorizes recovery on ly for the plan. Likewise, Congress’ repeated use of the word “an y” in §409(a) clarifies that the ke y factor is whether the alleged loss es can be saidto be losses “to the plan,” not whether theyare otherwise of a particu

lar nature or kind. See, e.g. , Ali v. Fed eralBureau of Prisons , an te, at 4 (n oting that the natural reading of “any” is “o ne or some indiscriminately of whatever kin d” (internal q u otation m a rks omitted)). On their face, §§409(a) an d 502(a)(2) permit recovery of all plan losses caused by a fiduciary b r each. The questio n presented here, then, is whether the losses to petitioner’s individu al 401(k) a ccount res u lting from3 Cite as: 55 2 U

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T HOMAS , J

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### respondents’ alleged breach of th eir fiduciar y du ties we re losses “to the plan.” In my view they were, because the assets allocated to petitioner ’s individual account were plan assets. ERISA re quires the assets of a defined con

tribution plan (including “gains and losses” and legal recoveries) to be allocated for book k eeping purposes to individual accounts within the plan for the beneficial interest of t h e particip ants, whose benefits in turn depen d on the alloc a ted amounts. See 29 U. S. C. §1002(34) (de

fining a “defined contribution plan” as a “planwhich pro

vides for an individual account for each partici pant and for benefits based solely upon the am ount contri buted to th e participant’s account, and any i n come, expenses, gain s and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other pa r ticipants which may be allocated to such participant ’s account”). Thus, when a defined contribution plan sus

tains losses, those losses are reflected in the balances in the plan ac counts of the affected participants, and a recov

ery of those losses wou l d be alloca ted to one o rmore indi

vidual accounts. The allocation of a plan’s assets to individual accounts for bookkeeping purpos es does n o t change the fact that all the assets in the plan remain plan assets. A defined con

tribution plan is not merely a collection of unrelated ac

counts. Ra ther, ERI SA requires a plan’s co mbined assets to be held in trust and legally owned by the plan trustees. See 29 U. S. C. §1103(a) (providi ng that “all assets of an employee b e nefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees”). In short, t h e assets of a definedcontributio n plan under ERISA cons titute, atth e veryleast, the sum of all the assets allocated for bookkeeping pu rposes to t h e participants’ individual accounts. Because a defined contribution plan is es sentially th e sum of its parts, loss es attributable to the acco unt of an individual participant a r e necessarily “losses to the plan” for purposes of §409(a). Accordin gly , when a participantsustains losses to his4 LARUE v. D E WOLFF, BOBERG & ASSO CIATE S , INC.
T HOMAS , J

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### individual account as a result of a fiduciary breach, th e plan’s aggregate asset s are likewise dimin i shed by the same amou nt, and §502(a)(2) permits that participant to recover suc hlosses on behalf of the plan.*

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* Of cou r s e , apa rt icipa n tsuing t oreco ve r b e nefit s on b e ha lf of t h e plan is not entitled to monetar yr e lief pay able dir e c t lyt o him; r a ther , an yr e c o v e ry mu st be paid t o th e plan

.