### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe bruary9, 200 5 S es sio n CRAIG ALAN DUNN v. MATRI X EXHI BI TS, I NC. Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 99-3205-III Ellen Hobb s Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2003- 02725-COA-R 3-CV - F iled October 13, 2005

I n th is s uit

by a n e mpl oy e e , Cr a ig Du nn , a g a ins t hi s f orme r corporate e mpl oy e r, Matrix Exhib its , I nc., for brea ch of w ritten employ ment contra ct, the trial c ourt enter ed judg ment fo r Du nn based upon a finding Matrix anticipatorily brea ched the employ ment ag ree ment. The trial c ourt awa rded Dunn three of six cate g ories of damag es he soug ht but denied the other claimed damag es base d upon a finding Dunn’s proof

of the a mount of such damag es wa s speculati v e. Both pa rties appe aled. Finding Matrix i n actua l brea ch of the employ ment cont ra ct , we a ffirm the a war d of dama g es for moving e x penses, c ar a llowance , and sala ry , but reve rse the finding that Dunn’s proof of damag es for 5% of Matrix’ value wa s too spe culative, and aw ard D unn an additional $282,500. We af firm thetria l c ou rt

in a ll o the r r e sp e c ts.

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed in Par t and Rever sed and Modif ied in Part
F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., joined.
C. Benne tt Harrison, Jr. and Brian W. Holmes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Craig A lan Dunn.
Paul W. Ambr os ius a nd W. J us tin Ad a ms, Na sh vil le , Te nn e sse e , f or theapp e lle e , M a trix Exhib its , I nc. OP IN ION Craig Dunn was Direc tor of Oper ations for CDA I ndustries in Duluth, Georg ia, a c ompetitor of Matrix Exhib its , Inc . o f B re ntw oo d, Te nn e sse e , w he n h e wa s r e c ru ite d by Matrix t o be c omeits Direc tor of Ope rations. Following neg otiations with L ouis Tapia, owne r and CEO of Matrix, andD o u g H u g h e s w a s a lso a fo rm e r e m p lo ye e o f C D A in D u luth

. A t C D A , h e w a s D u n n ’s su p e rv iso r. M a trix 1 f i r s t r ecr ui t ed H ug hes t o s er ve as i t s P r es i dent , and t hen T api a and H ug hes r ecr ui t ed D un n. H ug hes ex peri enc ed a s i mi l ar si t uat i o n as D unn regardi ng t he b reach o f hi s em p l o y m ent co nt ract , and hi s case agai nst M at ri x was at one po i nt co nsol i d at ed wi t h D unn’ s. P res ent l y , how ever, t hi s case i s o nl y be t ween D unn and M at ri x.

P e r th e e m p lo ym e n t c o n tra c t, a d e fer re d c o m p e n sa tio n u n it m e a n t, “a u n it w ith rig h t to a sh a re o f t h e e q u ity 2 of M a t r i x Ex h i bi t s , I n c
. , e qu a l t o 1 %

. ” Tap i a h a d r e c r u i t e d H u g h e s t o c om e t o w or k f or M a t r i x u n de r a s i mi l a r s c h e me wh er eby H u g h es, w ho b ecame Pr es i den t of M at r i x , w ou l d a cqu i r e, a s de fer r ed compe n s at i on , 15% ow n er s h i p. T hr ough out t hi s opi ni on, we wi l l occas i onal l y r ef er t o t he val ue of

5% of M at r i x s i mp l y as “ defer r ed comp ens at i on”.

P e r the e m p lo ym e n t c o n tra c t, re c a st e a rn ing s m e a n t, “N e t P ro fit a s d e fine d he re in, p lus d e p re c ia tio n , i n te re st, 3

c u rr e n t sha re h o ld e rs c o m p e n sa tio n a n d b e n e fit s.” T h e ne t p ro fit w a s to b e d e te rm ine d b y c o m b inin g the p ro fit s o f M a trix and a not her cor po r at i on, P y r ami d E xh i bi t M ana gemen t , I nc. , al s o owned by Loui s T api a.

P er t he empl oy ment co nt r act , var i abl e rec as t earn i ng s m ean t , “t he act ual r eca s t ea r ni ng s for e ach y ear or ot her 4

a p p lica b le p e rio d , l e ss th e sta n d a rd re c a st e a rn ing s.” -2- Doug Hug hes, Matrix ’ t hen P resident, Dunn and Matrix entered into a formal written employment 1 contra ct for an initial term of three y ear s. Pursuant to the contra ct, Dunn joined Matrix in November of 19 97 se rv ing a s it s D ir e c tor of Op e ratio ns
. The e mp l o y m en t contra ct provided six categ ories of c ompensation that arerele vant to the issues. The contr act provided that at t he end of t he three-y ear term, Dunn would acquir e, as de fer red compensation, 5% owner ship of the corpor ation, Matrix Ex hibits, I nc. The c ontrac t also aff orded 2 Dunn an annual starting salary of $75,000, a 3% commission on sales of all retail banking or similar pr od uc tio n inwh ic h D un n a c tiv ely pa rt ic ipate d, a

1% bo nu s o n th e fi rs t $1 ,0 00 ,0 00 of re c a st earnings, and a 5% bonus on the variable re cast e arning s. Dunn contends his primary motivation 3 4 fo r a c c e pti ng e mpl oyme nt w ithMatrix wa s th e pr omi se of own e rs hip , w hic h w a s n ot a vaila bleto Dunn at CDA.
Whil e Dunn se rved a s Direc tor of Ope rations for Matrix , the cor poration experi en ced an inc re a se in p ro fi ts. Du nn , how e ve r, be g a n to e xpe ri e nc e pr ob le ms w ithTa pia . D un n c on te nd s T apia had represe nted t hat he intended to remove himself from the day -to-day operations of the c ompany so that he and h i s wi fe , J an, who wa s actively involved in the operation of Matrix , could “r etire.” Howeve r, contra

ry to his repre sentations to Dunn, neither Tapia nor his w ife re moved themselves fr om the op e ratio n of the bu sin e ss. To the c on tr ary , both c on tin ue d to main ta in a ve ry a c tiv e ro le in the day -t o- day

op e rat ion s o f M a trix, a ndDu nn c on te nd s th e ir inv olv e me nt i nte rf

e re d w ithhis eff orts to do his job and neg atively impacted e mploy ee mor ale.
Th ou g h T apia ’s c on tin ue d in vo lve me nt i n M a trix pr ov ide d s ome c on ste rn a tio n to Du nn , it did not init ially

interfe re w ith Dunn’s fulfillme n t o f his duties to Matrix . Howeve r, that chang ed dr a matic a lly

fo llo wi ng a

me e tin g be tw e e n D un n andTa pia on Au g us t 11 , 1 99 8. On that day , T apia c a lle d D un n to a

me e tin g a t hi s h ou se du ri ng wh ic h h e inf orme d Du nn that he wante d to re ne g oti a te thee mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t w ithDu nn so a s to re mov e Du nn ’s de fe rr e d c omp e ns a tio n, theow ne rs hip opportunity . After

taking some time to think i t over, Dunn de cli n ed to reneg otiate the contr actM a trix w a s a n e x h ib it c o m p a n y. It p re p a re d e x h ib its a n d a d v e rtising d isp la ys, a n d it s e m p lo ye e s tra v e le d to 5 vari o us shows t o set up t hese exhi b i t s and ad vert i si ng d i spl ays fo r t hei r cl i ent s. T he p aymast er fo r a show carri ed al l t he
cas h t o pay t he ven do r s an d work men t hat woul d work on- s i t e a t t he s how. As p aymas t er , D un n w oul d hav e been
re sp o n sib le fo r c a rr ying a n d a llo c a ting tho u sa n d s o f d o llar s in c a sh to p a y tem p o ra ry l a b o r f o r t h e ir se rv ic e s to a sse m b le
an d d i sasse m b l e M atri x’ exh i b i t s.

T ap i a w as ini t i all y a co
- d efen d an t , ho w ev er, d uring t rial , P l ainti f f an no un ce d a no nsuit o f i t s claim s aga i nst 6 T a p ia ind ivid u a lly, lea v ing o n ly M a trix E x h ib its, In c . as a d e fen d a n t.

A s fo r t he co unt ercl ai m by M at ri x, t he co urt fo und t hat D unn al so b reached t he em p l o y m ent c o n tract but 7 det er mi ned t hat D un n’ s bre ach occu r r ed af t er M at r i x com mi t t ed t he ant i ci pat ory bre ach

. T he cour t det er mi ned t hat D u n n ’s b re a c h w o u ld no t se rv e a s a b a r to his r e c o v e ry o f d a m a g e s. -3- ins ist ing that it

be ho no re d, that hec on tin ue in h is c ur re nt p os iti on , andre a lize the5% ow ne rs hip of Matrix at the end of the thr ee- y ear period. Following this discussion, t he re lationship between Ta pia and Dunn det er i orate d dramatically . Dunn contends Tapia took various ac tions ag ainst him, which included re moving Dunn’s Rolodex from his office, ha ving D unn’s mail revie wed prior to Dunn s eeing his mail, and chang ing the security code to D unn’s voice mail thereby preve nting Dunn f

rom retrieving his phone me ssa g e s, a ll o f w hic h impa ir e d Dun n’ s abi lit y to pe rf orm hi s jo b. As there latio ns hip c on tin ue d to deteriorate and Dunn bec ame more p ar an oid of Tapia’ s actions and motives, Tapia order ed Dunn to travel to Franc e to serveas “ p ay m as t er” for Matrix at an e x hibit show. Knowing that the 5 previous paymaster ha d been a ccuse d of embe zz lement by Tapia and then fire d, Dunn re fused to go. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, on or

abo ut S e pte mbe r 1 , 1 99 8, Ta pia te rm inate d D un n’s e mpl oyme nt w ith Matrix.
Dunn fil ed t h i s action ag ainst Matrix for br eac h of the e mploy ment contra ct see king 6 compensatory

and punitive damag es. Matrix answe red and counter claimed for bre ach of contra ct and unjust enrichme nt. The trial cour t found that Matrix had anticipatorily brea ch e d the employment contra ct and a war ded Dunn c ompensatory damag es fo r m oving e x penses, c ar a llotment, and a portion of his salary , totaling $85,559.16. The court denied Dunn’s other claims for c ompensatory da ma g e s a ndhis c la im f

or pu nit iveda ma g e s. 7

S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
Th e stand ardof

re vie w o f a

tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t is de novo, and we presume that the fi nd ing s o f f

a c t a rec or re c t un le ss the pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); Rawlings v. John Hancoc k Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 78 S.W .3 d 2 9 1 , 2 9 6 (T enn. Ct. App. 2001). For th e e v id e n c e to p r e p o n d e r a tea g a in s t a tria l c o u rt’ s f

in d in g o f f a c t, it mu s t s u p p o rt an o the r finding of fa ct with g reater c onvincing eff ect. W alke r v . S idn ey Gi lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W .3d 66, 71 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ); The Realty Shop, Inc . v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc ., 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Wher e the tria l court does not makefin d i n gs o f fa ct , there is no pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss, a ndwe “ mus t c on du c t our own inde pe nd e nt r e vie w o f the re c or d to determine wher e the preponder anceof the e vidence lies.” Brooks v. Brook s , 992 S.W .2d 403, 405-4-

(T e nn . 1 99 9) . We a lso g iveg re a t w e ig ht t o a tria l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns of c re dib ili ty of

wi tne sse s. Estate of W

alton v. Y oung , 9 50 S.W .2 d 95 6, 95 9 (Tenn . 1 99 7) ; B & G Con str ., In c . v . P olk , 37 S.W .3d 462, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I ssues of law ar e re viewed de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. Nelson v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999)

. B R EA C H O F C ONT RACT
Th is ap pe a l con c e rn s whe the r Ma trix br e a c he d the e mpl oyme nt co ntr a c t a ndtheapp ro priate me a su reof

da ma g e s st e mmi ng fr om that br e a c h, if a ny
. W e fi rs t a dd re ss the br e a c h o f c on tr a c t. Ea c h pa rty a lle g e s that the oth e r br e a c he d the c on tr a c t. Th e tria l c ou rt fo un d that Mat ri x anticipatorily

brea ched theemploy ment contra ct. We aff irm the finding that M at rix brea ched the c o n tr a c tb u tf

i n d i t s b r e a c h w a s a c t u a l i n s t e a d o f a n t i c i p a t o r y.
To se rv e a s a n a nti c ipatory br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, the wo rd s a ndc on du c t of thec on tr a c tin g pa

rty must amount to a total and unqual i fi ed re fu s al to perf orm the contra ct. W

right v. W

right , 832 S

. W

. 2 d 5 4 2 , 5 4 5 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g Brady v. O liver , 147 S.W . 1135 (1911) and Kentucky Ho me Mu tua l Lif

e In s. Co. v . R og e rs , 270 S.W .2d 188 (1954). The trial court found that Tapia “ was not that expl icit,” re fer

ring to t h e m an n er b y which he e x presse d his intentions t o perf orm, or not pe rf orm pu rs ua nt t o th e e mpl oyme nt co ntr a c t. Wh ile we a g re e that T apia wa s n ot that e xplic it, Matrix, t hroug h an ac cumulation of Tapia ’s ac tions, breac hed the duty of good faith and fair de aling in the perf

ormanc e of the employ ment contra ct, and Matrix , there fore , was in ac tual brea ch of c on tr a c t.
I n T e nn e sse e , “ the reis i mpl ie d ine ve ry c on tr a c t a duty of g oo d fa ith a ndfair de a lin g in i ts perf ormanc e and enfor ceme nt. . . .” TSC I nd us tri e s, In c . v . To mp lin , 743 S.W .2d 169, 173 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 87 ). Th is duty e xten ds to the pe rf orma nc e a nde nf

or c e me nt o f e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c ts. See H ooks v. G ibson , 842, S.W .2d 625, 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Parties to a contra ct ar e bound “to ac t in word and de ed, in a r esponsible manner .” W illiams v. Maremont Corporation , 776 S.W .2d 78 , 8 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) (c iti ng Gi bs on ’s Sui ts in Chanc e ry , 6th Ed iti on , § 34 ). Th us , M a trix and Dunn we re bound to c onduct themselves in a manner c onsistent with the obligations they a ssu me d. Mo re ov e r, the y imp lic itl y un de rt oo k a g oo d faith du ty to no t int e nti on a lly or pu rp os e fu lly do a ny th in g t hat woul d h a ve thee ff e c t of “ de str oying or

inj uring theri g ht o f the oth e r p arty to rec eive the f

ruits of the contra ct.” W

infree v. Educ ators Credit Union , 900 S.W .2d 285, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 17 A M .J UR .2 D C O N T RACT S § 256 (1964))

. Th e tria l c ou rt

fo un d th a t Matrix, th ro ug h T apia , f orme d th e int e nti on no t to pe rf orm it s obligation to provide Dunn an owne rship interest in Matri x , which intention Matrix m anife sted throug h Tapia’ s purposeful inter feren ce with Dunn’s per formanc e of his duties. Specific ally , the trial court f

ound that M atrix m anife sted its intention not to perform its contract oblig ations at the Aug ust 11, 1998, meeting at Tapia’ s home and that Tapia the rea fter “ acte d on his determination not to provide the plaintiff an owner ship opportunityin MATRIX.”T h e pr ev i ou s pa y mas t er for t h e t r ade s h ow i n Fr an ce w as a cc u s ed of a n d t er mi n at ed for embez zl i n g a por t i on 8

o f t h e c a sh tha t he ha d b e e n giv e n , an d D u n n fea re d tha t T a p ia ’s insiste n c e tha t h e g o to F ra n c e w a s a n e ff o rt to se t him
u p fo r e m b e z z le m e n t. T h e tria l c o u rt fo u n d the re w a s ins u ff ic ie n t e v id e n c e to p ro v e a se t-up

. W e d o no t d isa g re e w ith t he f i nd i ng; nevert hel ess , we reco gni ze t hi s t o be D unn’ s reason f o r not going t o France as pa y m ast er. -5- Mr. Tapia interfe red w ith the plaintiff’s performan ce of the job: Mr. Tapia ha d the plaintiff’s mail opene d, the plaintiff’s Rolodex with client contac ts were [si c] taken from his office at M r. Tapia’s direc tion, the plaintiff’s Day Timer with client inf ormatio n w a s r e mov e d f

ro m hi s o ff

ic e at Mr . T apia ’s dire c tio n .
. . . M r. Ta pia had no intenti on of performing his obligation to allow the plaintiff to e arn an owner ship interest in the company and Mr. Ta

pia ac ted to thwart the pla intiff from a c hie vin g su c h a n in te re st.
These a ctions constituted intentional efforts to obstruc t Dunn’s opportunity to “re ceive the fruits of the c ontrac t.” See W infree, 90 0 S.W. 2d a t 28 9. Th e se a c tio ns , c ou ple d w ithTa pia ’s e xpre ss de sir e a t th e Au g us t 11 , 19 98 , me e tin g to re ne g oti a te Du nn ’s c on tr a c t by re mov ing theow ne rs hip provision, constituted an ac tual and material brea ch of c ontrac t by Matrix t hroug h Tapia.
Matrix’ a c tua l br e a c h o f the e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t pr e c e de d th e fi na l c on fl ic t be tw e e n T apia and Dunn, whic h involved a trade show in Franc e for which Matrix was responsible. Ta pia orde red Du n n t o go t o t h e s h o w i n Fr an ce an d s er v e a s p ay m as t erfo r t h e s h o w. T ap i a i n s i s t ed t h atDu n n go even thoug h, as found by

the trial court, “Mr. Tapia knew [Dunn] did not like g oing to Franc e,” and “Mr. Ta pia knew [Dunn] did not want to be charged wi t h t h e t ask of pay master a fter the rec ent em b ez z l em en t

. ” Du n n re fu s ed t o go t o Fr an ce d u e t o T ap i a’ s p o o rl y d i s gu i s ed ef fo rt s t o s ab o t age 8 Dunn. The tria l court saw the paymaster incide nt as more “ evidenc e that Mr. Ta pia was making the plaintiff’s perf

ormanc e of his job as difficult as possible to thwa rt the plaintiff e arning owner ship.” The trial c ourt cha

rac terized Dunn’s re fusal to g o to Fr ance as a brea ch of the employ ment contra ct by Du nn ; ho we ve r, it f

ou nd that Dun n’ s bre a c h did not se rv e a s a bar be c aus e Matrix ha d p re vio us ly br e a c he d th e c on tr a c t.

“ I n c a se s w he rebo th par ti es hav e no t f ull y pe rf orme d, it i s n e c e ssa

ry fo r the c ou rt s to determine which party

is charg eable with the first uncure d materia l brea ch.” McClain v. Kimbrough Construction C ompany, I

nc. , 806 S.W .2d 194, 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A pa rty to a contra ct may be excused from perf

orming its rema ining obligations by a pre vious, uncured material bre ach of the other pa rty

. See generally McClain; see also United Brake Systems, Inc. v. American Env ironmental Protection, Inc ., 963 S.W .2d 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
Dunn’s re fusal to g o to France to se rve a s paymaster was subsequent to the m aterial brea ch of thee mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t by Matrix. Mo reov er, tho ug h D un n’ s r e fu sa l to g o to F ranc e c ou ld c on sti tut e a br e a c h, it wa s su bs ta nti a lly le ss sig nif ic a nt than thebr e a c h b y

Matrix an d u nd e rs ta nd able g iven Tapia ’s eg reg ious conduct. Whether Dunn’ s ref usal to g o to France c onstitut ed a br eac h of thee mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t, D un n’ s b re a c h w a s e xcu se d b e c aus e it w a s su bs e qu e nt, a ndit p a le d inD u n n ’ s c on t r ac t pr ov i ded for a s al ar y of $75, 000 t h at wou l d be i n cr ea s ed t o $85, 000 i f t h e combi n ed s al es of 9 M at r i x a nd P y r ami d exc eeded $7 , 25 0, 00 0. T he t r i al cour t found t he evi dence of a $7, 25 0, 00 0 val ue for t hos e c om pani es t oo s pec u l at i v e an d a wa r ded D u n n l os t s al ar y f or Sept embe r 1, 1998, t h r ou g h N ov embe r 30, 2000, a t a r at e of $75, 000 p e r ye a r le ss th e sa la ry h e w a s e a rn ing a t his n e w jo b . D u n n a rg u e s o n a p p e a l he w a s e n tit le d to the $ 8 5 ,0 0 0 sa la ry. -6- comparison to Matrix ’ pre vious, uncured material bre ach of the employ ment contra ct. Thus, we now turn to theiss ue of

da ma g e s.
D A M A GES
Given th e mate r ia l b r e a c h b y M a trix, D u n n is e n ti tl e d to r e c o v e r h is d a ma g e s
. T he e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t a ff

or de d D un n a n a nn ua l sa lary , mo vin g e xpe ns e s, c ar a llo tme nt, bo nu se s, commissions and defer

red c ompensation of 5% of the equ i t y o f M atrix afte r threey ear s. Dunn’s salary for the f irst y ear of emp l o y ment was $75,000, whic h was to be inc rea sed to $85,000 if the combined sale s of Matrix and a sister company , Pyramid Exhibi t Manag em en t C o m p any , I nc., e x c e e d e d $ 7 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0

. T h e tr i a l c o u rt a w ar d e d D u n n a t o t a l o f $ 8 5 , 5 5 9

. 1 6 a s d a m a g e s f

o r h i s s a l ar y, mov ing e xpe ns e s and c ar al lot me nt but de nie d Dun n’ s c la im f or de fe rr e d c omp e ns a tio n, bo nu se s, and commissions, finding the pr oof of suc h damag es too speculative. 9
Du nn c on te nd s th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d by de nying da ma g e s f

or de fe rr e d c omp e ns a tio n, bo nu se s, and commissions. We a ffirm the awa rd of $85,559.16 as damag es for Dunn’s s al ar y , m o ving expenses and ca

r allotment. We also aff

irm the trial court’s denial of damag es for commissions and bonuses. We, howeve r, rev er s e t h e d ecision to deny Dunn’s claim for def

err ed compe nsation, finding the proof D unn prese nted suffic ient evidenc e to justify an additional aw ard of

$282,500.
D EF ER R ED C OMPE NS ATI ON

- 5% E Q U I T Y O F M A T R IX
Th e e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t pr ov ide d th re e c a te g orie s of co mpe ns a tio n f or Du nn ’s se rv ic e s to Matrix, one of which was in the form of deferr ed compensation. Section 4(c) provided: “A t the end of th r e e y e ar s , D u n n w il l b e g iv e n , a t n o c o s t, f iv e D e f e rr e d Co mp e n s a ti o n U n it s
. ” I n Section 4( c )( 1) (F ), thete rm

“ De fe rr e d Co mpe ns a tio n U nit ” is d e fi ne d a s: [A] unit with rig ht to a share of the equity of Matrix Ex hibits, I nc., equal to 1%. The holder of e ach D efe rre d Compensation Unit will get a 1% share of t he net pr ocee ds and/or other

proper ty of any sale or o t h er disposi tion of the corpor ate business or o w n e r s h ip o f

M a trix.
The trial c ourt dec lined to awar d Dunn damag es for t h e value of the five defe rre d compensation units “bec ause of the spec ulative value of

the company .” Speculative damag es may not be rec overe d wher e the fac t of damag e is uncertain, continge nt or spec ulative. See Pinson & Associates Insurance Agency, In c. v. Kr eal , 800 S.W .2d 486, 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) ( citing Maple Manor H otel, In c. v. M

etropolitan Govt. of Nashvill e andB e n e fit s ins u ra n c e w a s a sp e c ifi c typ e o f i n su ra n c e so ld b y the b ro k e r in this c a se
. 10
-7- Da v ids on Cou nty , 543 S

. W

. 2d 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976)) . Howeve r, while unc erta in and speculative damag es ar e prohibited whe n the existenc e of dama g e i s u n ce rt ain, they are not nece ssarily

prohibited when the amount is uncertain. Cum mi ns v . B ro die , 667 S

. W

. 2 d 7 5 9 , 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) ( emphasis adde d). When the ex istence of damag e is ce rtain “mathematical certainty is not required.” Id . (quotin g C o ve rd el l v. Mid-South Farm Equipme nt Assoc., Inc ., 335 F.2d 9, 14 ( 6th Cir. 1964).
The c ourts will allow rec overy even if it is impossibl e to pr ove the exact amount of da ma g e s f

ro m th e br e a c h o f cont rac t. O the rw ise , inc e rt a in i ns ta nc e s, thec ou rt s w o u l d b e p o w e r l e s s t o h e l p s o m e w r o n g e d p art i e s
. " E x a c tj u s t i c e i s n o ta l w a ys attained, and the l aw does not require exactness of c omputation in sui ts that involve qu est io ns of d ama ges growi ng ou t o f con tr actof t ort ." Provident Life and Acc ident Ins. Co. v. Globe I

ndemnity Co. , 1 5 6 T e n n
. 5 7 1 , 5 7 6 , 3 S

. W

. 2 d 1 0 5 7 ( 1 9 2 8 )

. In Coverdell v. Mid-South Farm Equipment Assoc., I nc ., 335 F.2d 9 ( 6th Cir. 1964), the court applied Tenne ssee law to determine that an insuranc e company ag ent who wa s inform ed b y

trustees of the defe ndant cor poration that he ha d been hir ed under a persona l service co n t ra ct to org anize their g roup insuranc e, wor ked an e ntire wee kend on the projec t, and cancelled an appointment in Texas was damag ed whe n the trustees g ave the contra ct to another ag ent. Unce rtain and speculative damag es are prohibited only when the exis tence of damag e is unc erta in, not when the amount is u nc e rt a in. Whe n th e reis s ub stanti a l e vid e nc e in the reco rd a ndre a so na ble infere nces may

be draw n from that evidenc e mathematica l c erta inty is not re quired. Id . at 14.
Cummins , 667 S.W .2d at 765. The f ac t Du n n sustained def

err ed compe nsation damag es is not speculative. The e mploy ment contra ct expressly provided for

Dunn t o be g iven, at no cost, five d ef erre d co m p en s at i o n u n i t s att h e e n d o f t h e t h re e- y ea r t er m
. W i t h th e e x i s t en ce o f D u n n ’s d am age certain, the question bec omes whethe r the proof in this case is s u ff

i ci ent to “make a fair and rea sonable a ssessment of dama g es.” Pinson 8 0 0 S

. W

. 2 d at4 8 8 (c i t i n g W ilson v. Farmer’s Chem ical Association , 444 S.W .2d 185, 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).
I n Pinson , evidenc e that t h e re newa l rate f or bene fits insurance was a pproxi mately

90% 10 annually , and evidenc e showing the amount of commissions an ag ent earned in one y ear was de emed by the trial court sufficie nt evidenceto awar d damag es for “amounts that could be expected to ac crue over the next ten y ear s.” This court affirmed that decision over the def endant’ s arg ument that “any or a ll o f the po licies ma y

be c a nc e lle d at a ny

tim e ,” a nd“ [i]f that ha

pp e ns , th e plaintif

f w ill g e t a windfall and [the def

endant] will have paid a judg ment for whic h he should not have be en liable.” 800 S.W .2d at 488. This court found the evidenc e suff icient re asoning “the unc erta inty in arriving a t th e pr op e r amou nt o f the jud g me nt i n th is c a se is n o g re a te r than th e un c e rt a inty that e xists in many case s involving future events or lost opportunities.” Id

.T h e con t r ac t pr ov i ded t h at t h e c on t r ac t t er m wa s f or t h r ee y ea r s c ommen ci n g D ec embe r 1, 1997, w h i ch ma de 11
t h e en di n g da t e N ov embe r 30, 2000.

T he t ri al co urt fo und t hat de sp ite h a vi ng Lo ui s T ap i a’ s nam e o n i t , t he l et t er was act ual l y s ent by D o ug 12 H ughes. W e f

i nd t hi s d i scr ep ancy i rr el evant gi ven t hat at t he d at e o f t he l et t er, D o ug H ughes was P res i d ent o f M at ri x, thu s m a k ing this a re p re se n ta tio n b y M a trix r e g a rd le ss o f wh e the r T a p ia o r H u g h e s se n t i t.

T hi s was t he t es t i mo ny of Loui s T api a. 13
-8- The proof in the rec ord is sufficie nt to make a r easona ble assessment of

the value of

the five defe rre d compensation units in N ovember of 2000. I n the inducement letter to D unn in the fall of 11 19 97 , M a trix repr e se nte d it s v a lueto b e $5 ,6 50 ,0 00 , andthe“ pr e se nt v a lueof the5% sh are s is $282,500.00.” Further, at some time afte r Dunn joined Matrix in 1997, the share s of Matrix owned

12 by Ed dieTa

pia , w ho ow ne d 10% of Mat ri x’ sh are s, we rere de e me d b y Matrix fo r “ a t le a st” $5 00 ,0 00 , if

no t mo re
. I n 1 99 8, Ta

pia re pr e se nte d that Matri x ha d “a ba se of abo ut $ 5, 00 0, 00 0 in 13
sa le s p e r y e ar w itha n a ve ra g e pr of it o f o ver $1 ,100 ,0 00 ." Ad dition a lly , th e fi nanc ia l st a te me nts provided by

outside acc ountants for the fiscal y ear ending J une 30, 1998, showe d earned re venues for Matrix of $5,471,603. F or the y ear s subsequent to 1998, the evide nce pr esente d at trial included various valuations and project i o n s
. I n a letter dated Aug ust 12, 1998, from Tapia to a potential purcha ser of Matrix, he projected y ear -end sales of $8,000,000 for 1999, $10,000,000 for 2000, and $14,000,000 for 2001. He we nt on to repre sent that Dunn and D oug Hug hes we re “ highly respe cted within the exhi bit and reta il environment industry with proven tra ck re cords” an d claimed they would “add ove r $2,000,000 in sales to M at ri x /Pyramid and should add a bout $700,000 to the bottom li ne.” Matrix challeng ed the r eliability of the value projec tions contending , as t he trial c ourt found, that they “reflec t the plan that Mr. Hug hes and [Dunn] would grow Matrix.” W e do not disag ree with this assessment; howe ver, the finding does not r ender the evidenc e speculative. The proje ctions ref lect the expected value of Matrix taking into a ccount the added value of Dunn continuing to work at Matrix as the employ ment co n t ract require d. Admittedly , once D unn left Matrix, the actual numbers for

1999 and 2000, whatever th ey m ay have be en, would not have included the c on tribu tio ns of

Du nn a nd

thu s w ou ld no t ha ve re fl e c te d a n in c re a se in M a trix’ s a le s attribu ta bleto Dunn. The a

bsence of the a dded value of Dunn’s se rvice s, howeve r, wa s not the fault of Dunn. To the contra ry , it was due to the mate rial bre ach by Matrix. Thi s point is i mportant bec ause “ [t ]he purpose of

assessing damag es in a bre ach of contra ct suit is to pl acethe p l ai n t i ff , as nearly as p o s s i b le, in the same position he would havehad if the c ontrac t had bee n perf ormed.” W

il h ite v. Brownsville Concr et e C o
. , Inc. , 798 S.W .2d 772, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). If Matrix had not brea ched the contra ct, Dunn would havecontinued to work f or Matrix through Nove mber 30, 2000. Thus, the projec tions made by Matrix and offer ed into evidenc e by Du n n , constitute sufficient e v id e n c e to c a lc u lateD u n n ’ s d e f e rr e d c o mp e n s a ti o n in th e f o r m o f a 5 % e q u ity

o w n e r s h ip o f

M a trix.
Matrix failed to introduce evide nce of its value for 1999 or 2000. Ther efor e, Dunn’ s e vid e nc e , w hic h ir on ic a lly is M a trix’ o wnre pr e se ntatio ns of its va luethr ow n b a c k inits fa ce, is uncontra dicted. The uncontra dicted evidenc e includes the following : Eddie Tapia’ s 10% sharewasT hi s r ang e c om es f r om L oui s T api a’ s t es t i mo ny t hat hi s b r ot her ’ s 1 0% sh ar e i n t he comp any was wo r t h a t 14 l eas t $50 0, 00 0, Loui s T api a’ s l et t er t o D un n t hat M at r i x’ val ue was approxi mat el y $5 , 65 0, 00 0, an d Lo ui s T api a’ s l et t er to a p o te n tial b u ye r o f t h e c o m p a n y tha t t h e va lue o f t h e c o m p a n y w o u ld b e $ 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 9 9 a n d $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 2000.

M at r i x a pp eal ed cont endi ng t he t r i al cour t i ncor r ect l y ca l cul at ed bo nu s es f or 19 97 and 19 98

. D un n a pp eal ed

15

con t en di n g h e wa s a ddi t i on al l y e n t i t l ed t o bon u s es for 1999 a n d 2000.

M at ri x al so co nt end s D unn’ s b o nus shoul d b e p rorat ed si nce he o nl y w o rked si x m o nt hs o f t he y ear. W e f

i nd 16 this a rg u m e n t wh o lly w itho u t m e rit d u e to M a trix’ b re a c h o f t h e c o n tra c t. -9- worth “at least” $500,000 in 1997; Matrix repr esente d to Dunn, as an inducement for Dunn to enter int o th e e mpl oyme nt co ntr a c t at is su e , th a t it s v a luewa s $ 5, 65 0, 00 0 in19 97 ; a ndba se d u po n L ou is Ta pia ’s le tte r t o a

po te nti a l bu y e r i n 1 99 8, sa le s f or 20 00 we repr oje c te d to be $1 0,00 0, 00 0 w ith profits for 2000 pr ojected to be $2,000,000.
There fore , the evidenc e in the record of the value of Matrix from 1997 is at least $5,650,000 14 wi t h s al es an d p ro fi t s o f t h e t wo co m p an i es p ro j ec t ed t o i n cr ea s e s t ea d i l y an d s i gn i fi ca n t l y

t h ro u gh 2001. We rec og nize the values stated in Tapia’s A ug ust 12, 1998, letter wer e proje ctions, howeve r, the re cord c ontains actua l values for 1997 and 1998 and projec ted values for 1999, 2000 and 2001. As of 19 98 , w he n th e late st p ro je c tio ns we rema de , M atr ix had be e n inbu sin e ss f or e le ve n y e ars , wh ic h pro vid e d a re a so na

ble ba sis fo r Ma trix to make on e a ndtw o y e ar p ro je c tio ns wi th a

re a so na ble deg ree of re liability . Thus, we are not fashioning an aw ard that require s a cry stal ball to see into the future. Mor eover , Pinson de mon str a te s the e xten t to wh ic h th e c ou rt s may g o to make a

re a so na bly certain awa

rd. 800 S.W.2d 486.
Wit hout c redible evidenc e from Matrix to contra dict that prese nted by Dunn, we h ave con c lu d e d th a t M a trix h a d a v a lu e o f a t l e a s t $ 5 , 6 5 0 , 0 0 0 a s o f N o v e mb e r

3 0 , 2 0 0 0 , w h e n D unn wo uldha ve be e n e nti tle d to 5% of thee qu ity

of Matrix as de fe rr e d c ompens atio n. Th us , D un n is entitled to an additional awa rd of $282,500 as compensatory damag es for the deferr ed compe nsation units provided for in Section 4(c ) of the e mploy ment contra ct.
B ONU S ES
The trial c ourt fo u n d t he re cast e arning s for the nine months Dunn was at Matrix were $1,963,761.58. Ba sed on this number, the trial court awarde d Dunn 1% on the first million and 5% on the re mainder, w hich was c onsistent with the provisions of Dun n ’s co n t rac t. The trial court found, however, that this number was not sufficie nt to make an awa rd for bonuses in 1999 or 2000 on the grounds that such award would be too speculative. We affirm the trial court’ s calc ulations and aw ard of

bonuses for 1997 and 1998. We also aff irm the trial court’s finding that the evidenc e was insuffic ient to justi fy an aw ard f

or bonuses for

the following y ear s, 1999 or 2000. 15
Matrix contends the trial court miscalc ulated the 19 9 7 an d 1 9 9 8 bonuses. Howeve r, a 16
c los e r e xami natio n o f the re c or d r e ve a ls that it s r e a l c omp la int is that t he tria l c ou rt

su bs ta nti a llyM at r i x pr i n ci pal l y arg u ed t h at t h e t r i al c ou r t s h ou l d h av e pl ac ed g r ea t er e mph as i s on e x h i bi t s 37 a n d 46. 17 E xhi b i t 37 was l i t t l e m o re t han a l et t er f rom M at ri x’ p res i d ent t o P l ast i

- Line, Inc. exp l ai ni ng t hat M at ri x was “ get t i ng our f i nan ci al r eport s back i n or der” wh i ch had a one- page “ f i nan ci al r eport ” f

or M ay 31, 199 8 at t ach ed. Exhi bi t 46 was
a c om pi l at i on of

i ncome s t at ement s for t he mo nt hs D ece mb er 1, 1 9 9 7 t hr ough Ju ne 30 , 199 8, i n one format , an d t wo a d d iti o n a l m o n ths o f i n c o m e sta te m e n ts, Ju ly an d A u g u st 1 9 9 8 , i n a d iff e re n t f o rm a t.

D unn chal l enges t he val i d i t y of M at ri x’ m et ho d o l o gy and f i nanci al f

i gures , n o ti ng M at ri x’ recast earni ngs 18 woul d b e i n t he n eigh b o r hood of a $3, 86 0, 00 0 l oss bas ed upon ex hi bi t 37 and M at r i x’ met hodo l ogy
. D un n f ur t her chal l enges M at ri x’ f

i nanci al evi d ence not i ng, i n p art , t hat exhi b i t 3 7 f ai l ed t o i ncl ud e t he ent i re f i scal y ear end i ng June 30, 1998, a n d i t f ai l ed t o i n cl u de t h e mon t h s of Ju l y an d A u g u s t 1998 for wh i ch D u n n was en t i t l ed t o be c ompen s at ed. -10- relied on e x hibit 24 to award bonuses instea d o f fi n an ci al ev idence relied upon by Matrix. L ike much of the e vidence in the rec ord, exhibit24 was ba sed upon financ ial information provided by Matrix. Matrix, how e ve r, c omp la ins that th e fi nanc ia l in fo rm a tio n ine xhibi t 24 wa s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y reliable beca

use it was subjec t to further r eview. It also contends the tria l court should have g iven mor e c on sid e ratio n to oth e r e xhibi ts. 17
The trial c ourt was in the be st positi on to determine the sufficie ncy and reliabilityof the e vid e nc e , e sp e c ia lly

sin c e there lia

bil ity of muc h of the fi nanc ia l e vid e nc e hin g e d o n w he the r M a trix should be ex cused from earlier represe ntations of i ts financ ial succe ss. The court specific ally found:

“ Th e re is re a so na

bly c e rt a in p ro of

of Matrix’ e arn ing s f

or 19 98 thr ou g h A ug us t of

19 98

. . . . " It a lso fo un d “ e xhibi t 24

. . . co ntains inf ormatio n on ea

rn ing s for 19 98 ob ta ine d fr om Ma trix’ a c c ou ntant. Thus, beca

use thereis reasona

bly certain proo f o f ea rn i n g s for 1998, bonuses f or that y ear

can be calc ulated.”
Matrix contends that ex hibit 24 failed to include “the cos t side of the e quation” for determining re cast e arning s. Dunn disputes this contenti o n and cha lleng es Matrix’ relianc e on exhibi ts 37 and 46. I n his brief, Dunn states t hat i f t he amount in exhibi t 24, upon which the tria l co u rt re l i ed , re p re s en t ed o n l y re v en u es t h en t h e c al cu l at ed re v en u es b as ed o n M at ri x ’ m et h o d o l o gy wo uldbe “ ov e r $ 4. 5 mi lli on le ss tha n M a trix now a g re e s th at th ey were in M a y of 19 98 .” It is

18 signific ant that Dunn conte nded at tri al that exhibit 46 was not re liable and the trial court made a finding consistent with Dunn’s assertion. Th e t ri al court found: “ [Dunn] disputes Mr. Tapia’ s testimonyand trial e x hibit 46 as numbers not verifie d by acc ounting principles. The Court ag ree s that the reco rds are not reliable in terms of proving the exact dollar loss of the c ompany .” The evidenc e in the re cord doe s not preponder ate a g ainst the trial court’s finding s as to the re lative reliability of the e x hibits and financ ial evidenc e. There fore , we affirm the tria l court’s c alculations and the a war d of bonuses for 1997 and 1998.
As for D unn’s issue, which pe rtains to bonuses for 199 9 an d 2 0 00, we r ecog nize the sim ila ri tie s inthee vid e nc e pr ov ide d r e g ard ing the de fe rr e d c omp e ns a tio n a ndthebo nu se s f or the se two y ear s, but the distinction l ies in the lang uag e of the contra ct. Dunn’s e ntitlement to the defer red compensa tion w a s c e rtain

. T h e c o n tr a c t d idn o t p la c e a n y c o n d it io n s o n D u n n ’ s r e c e ip t o f the defe rre d compe n s at i o n other than the expiration of the contra ct term, whic h was set at November 30, 2000. I f the c ontract h ad n o t b ee n brea ched, D unn would have r ece ived the def err edD u n n w a s fo rtu n a te to m iti g a te his d a m a g e s b y fi n d ing su itab le e m p lo ym e n t. 19

S e c tio n 4 (a ) o f t h e c o n tra c t p ro v id e d in p e rtine n t p a rt: 20 B as e Sa l ar y
. D u r i ng t h e f i r s t y ea r s of

t h i s Ag r ee men t , M at r i x s h al l pa y D u n n a ba s e s al ar y of $ 7 5 ,0 0 0 a ye a r, . . . In s u b se q u e n t yea rs , w h e n the c o m b ine d sa le s o f M a tr ix a n d P yra m id E x h ib it M anagem ent exceed $7 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 , t he b ase sal ary wi l l b e i ncreased t o $8 5 , 0 0 0 a y ear. I f a co nsecut i ve six m o n th sa le s a v e ra g e e x c e e d s $ 6 0 4 ,1 6 6 , D u n n ’s sa la ry w ill b e inc re a se d to $ 8 5 ,0 0 0 a n n u a lly. -11- compensati o n r e g a

r d le s s o f th e v a lu e o f M a trix. T h u s , th e r e w a s ab s o lu te c e rtain ty a s to the exis tence of dama g e sustained by Dunn. The pr ovision for bonuses, howe ver, ma de Dunn’ s entitlement to bonuses condi t ional. Bonuse s wereconditional on the re cast e arning s exceeding $1 ,0 00 ,0 00 . Wh ile thee vid e nc e pr e se nte d in c lud e d p ro je c tio ns that t he recas t earn ing s w ou ld exceed $1,000,000, t h o s e projections do not serve the same purpose he re a s they did with the defe rre d compensation awar d. The projections in this situation are ne cessa ry to show the existenc e of dama g e and not mer ely the amount. Tenne ssee law does not permit an awa rd of damag es whe re both the exis tence and amount of damag e is uncertain. “[S ]peculative dama g es cannot be re cover ed in the s ense that the fact of damag e is uncertain, conting ent or speculative.

. . .” Pinson, 800 S.W .2d at 488 (c i t i n g Ma

ple Ma no r H

ote l, I nc . v . M e tro po lit an Go v t. o

f Na sh v ill e an d D av ids on Cou nty , 543 S.W .2d 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976))

. S A LARY
D u n n t ak e s e x c e p t i o n w i t h t h e a w ar d o f $ 3 4 , 2 5 0

. 1 0 a s c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s f o r h i s s a l ar y, contending he wa s entitled to more

. His only complaint is that the trial court based this award upon an annua l salary

of $75,000, i nstead of an annual salary of $85,000 Dunn contends he would have been paid had his employ ment with Matrix not been wr ong fully terminated.
Dunn was awa

rded damag es throug h the end of the term of the contra ct base d upon an annua l salary of $75,000, re duced by

his actual income for that period from his new employ er. The trial 19
c ou rt ma de thefo llo wi ng fi ndin g of f a c t r e le vant t o th is i ssu e : “ Th e Cou rt fi nd s th a t th e reis insufficient proof

and that it is merely

speculation whether Matrix ’ ea rning s . . . would have be en sufficie nt to awar d [Dunn] . . . an $85,000 base salary .”
Th e e mpl oyme nt c on tr a c t pr ov ide d th a t D un n’ s sa lary wo uldinc reas e fr om $ 75 ,0 00 to $85,000 if a c ondition prece dent occ urre d, that being if the combined sa les of Matrix and its sis ter co mp a n y , Py

r a mi d E xh ib it M a n a g e me n t, e xc e e d e d $ 7 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0

. D u n n ’ s ar g u me n t th a t he was 20 entitled to damag es base d on a sala ry o f $85,000 was based upon on a five-y ear earnings history Ta pia pr ov ide d to him

du ri ng his e mpl oyme nt n e g oti a tio ns
. Th a t histo ry re fl e c te d ea rn ing s ine xce ss of $7,250,000 for three of five y ear s from 1993-1997. Dunn also relied on the projec tions provided by Tapia to a

potential purcha ser in 199 8, showing expected sale s of $8,000,000 in 1999 and $10,000,000 in 2000.
The c o n tr a c t e xp r essly

provided that Dunn w as entitled to rec eive an annual sa lary of $75,000 thr ou g ho ut the thr e e -y e ar t e rm . T hu s, it w a s c e rt a in D un n w a s e nti tle d to c omp e ns a tio n o f n o le ss-12-

than $75,000 annua lly

provided he fulfilled his part of the contra ct, which he did. Whether Dunn would have be en entitl ed to t he incr ease d salary of $85,000 wa s never

certain, beca

use it was subjec t to a condition prec edent tha t n ever occ urre d. Moreove r, the trial c ourt found Dunn’ s evidenc e insufficient for

it to determine whe ther Matrix ’ ea rning s would have been sufficient for it to award Du nn theinc re a se d s a lary of $8 5, 00 0. We h a ve c on c lud e d th e re c or d d oe s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t the trial court’s finding . There fore , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de cision to awar d damag es base d upon an annua l salary

of $75,000.
C OMMI S S I ONS
F ina lly , D un n a

rg ue s th a t th e tria l cou rt e rr e d by re fu sin g to a wa rddama g e s f

or c omm iss ion s. Dunn’s employment contra ct provided f or “c ommissi ons of 3% on sale s of all re tail banking or sim ila r p roduct io n re late d p ro je c ts. ” Th e tria l c ou rt

de c lin e d to a wa

rddama g e s f

or the se commissions because the y wer e too spec ulative. We find no err or with this decision.
Dunn asserted that he ha d plans for e ighty to one-hundred m o re display s with Financ ial Supermarke ts that he would have seen throug h to fruition had his contrac t with Ma t ri x not been brea ched. The t rial court found Dunn’s evidenc e ins ufficie nt principally beca use therewas proof of on ly on e c on tr a c t w ithF inanc ia l Su pe rm ark e ts fo r ab ou t $50, 00 0. Th e rewa s si mpl y no pr oo f t o support Dunn’s claim for future commissions because, as the t rial court found, therewas no e vidence of a c o n t ra ct wi th Financ ial Supermarke ts, nor a letter of intent for morestores. Thus, Dunn’s assertions that such contrac ts would have c ome into exi stence wer e mer ely speculative.
I N C ONCL US I ON
We affirm the finding that Matrix was in material bre ach of the employ m en t co ntrac t and aff irm the awa

rd of $85,559.16 a s compensatory damag es for Dunn’s sala ry , his car a llotment and moving e x penses. We re verse the denial of compensation f

or defe rre d compensation units, finding that Dunn is entitled to an additional awa rd of $282,500 as compensatory damag es for

the def err ed compensation units. We a ffirm the trial court in all other respe cts. This matter is remanded to the trial court f

or the e ntry

of a judg ment consistent with this opi nion. Costs of appeal ar e asse ssed ag ainst Appellee Matrix Ex hibits, I nc.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE