[Cite as State v. Patterson, 2013-Ohio-1647.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: 

 

 Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- 

 Case No. 2012CA00098 

JONATHAN T. PATTERSON 

 

 Defendant-Appellant O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 

2011CR1240A 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 22, 2013 

APPEARANCES: 

For Defendant-Appellant: For Plaintiff-Appellee: 

GEORGE URBAN 

116 Cleveland Ave., NW, Suite 808 

Canton, OH 44702 

 

JOHN D. FERRERO 

Prosecuting Attorney 

KATHLEEN TATARSKY 

116 Cleveland Ave. NW, Suite 808 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Canton, OH 44702 110 Central Plaza South – Suite 510 

 Canton, OH 44702-1413 

 
Baldwin, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Jonathan T. Patterson appeals a judgment of the Stark County 

Common Pleas Court convicting him of aggravated murder (R.C. 2903.01(B)) with a 

death penalty specification (R.C. 2929.04(A)(7)) and a firearm specification (R.C. 

2941.145), and aggravated burglary (R.C. 2911.11(A)(1),(2)) with a firearm 

specification. He was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. 

Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

{¶2} On August 14, 2011, seventeen-year-old Chris Reid woke up at his 

home on 10th Street N.W. in Canton, Ohio, when his friends D’Von Saunders and 

appellant, who Reid knew by the street name of “J Pat,” came into his bedroom. 

Appellant was eighteen years old at the time. He and Saunders were driving a blue 

Chrysler Sebring convertible they got the night before at a party. They asked Reid 

where they could “get to lick on some weed.” Reid understood this to mean they 

wanted to rob someone for marijuana. When Reid could not help them, they left. 

{¶3} Myron Roberson called appellant looking for a ride. After picking up 

Roberson, they parked the car and began to walk around the neighborhood near 9th

and 10th Streets with Ronnie Lawson and Jentry Ross. Ross was looking for a ride to 

the Chips Apartments because his “baby mom” and daughter were on their way from 

Columbus. The group discussed robbing someone for marijuana and for gas money 

to get to Chips. 

{¶4} The five boys ended up at the home of Melvin Hope on 11th Street. They 

knocked on the door and when Hope answered, they asked for Hope’s two sons, 

Melvin and Jeremy. He replied that the boys were not home. Saunders smelled weed 
when Hope opened the door. Saunders also told the group that there were “bands in 

the house,” meaning a stack of bills of over $5,000. 

{¶5} The group walked to Westbrook Park frustrated because some of them 

wanted to rob someone for money and drugs, and some did not want to rob anyone. 

Appellant wanted to rob someone and said, “I’m going to get some money.” Saunders 

gave appellant a .22 caliber Heritage Rough Rider revolver with an obliterated serial 

number. 

{¶6} Appellant and Roberson went to Hope’s house and rushed the door. 

Roberson saw the handle of the revolver on appellant’s hip and saw appellant 

wrestling with Hope. He heard a “pop,” followed by two more “pops.” Roberson was 

heading up the stairs at the time, but ran away after hearing the pops. He heard Hope 

screaming for help, saying, “I ain’t got no money. I ain’t got nothing.” 

{¶7} Appellant eventually caught up with Roberson on the street. Appellant 

was carrying a jewelry box and a penny jar. They rejoined Saunders, Ross and 

Lawson. 

{¶8} The group headed to the Chips Apartments in the blue convertible. 

Saunders could tell something had happened. Saunders took the gun which appellant 

had placed under the car seat, wiped it off, wrapped it in his black t-shirt and put it 

under the driver’s seat. In the car, Roberson said, “this shit crazy.” When Lawson 

asked what was crazy, appellant told him to shut up. While the group was at Chips, 

Roberson burned the “beater,” or tank top, appellant was wearing. 

{¶9} Appellant, Saunders, Roberson and DeMarco Wright went to the home 

of Wright’s girlfriend, Davian Jackson, to see Wright’s baby, who was six or seven 
months old. Davian was excited to see Wright as he usually doesn’t come by to visit 

in the summer. Saunders handed her the jewelry box taken from Hope’s home and 

told her to keep it in her room. Several of the boys went in the kitchen where Davian’s 

mother was making dinner, but appellant stayed in the living room. The boys 

eventually left for Chips, taking the baby with them. The boys returned the baby to 

Davian’s house shortly thereafter. 

{¶10} In the car, appellant stated in reference to Hope that he “bodied him,” 

meaning that he killed him. He told Wright that he and Roberson went into a house 

intending to rob the man who lived there and the “dude end up getting shot.” He 

admitted to Wright that he shot Hope. He also told Wright that he left the gun under 

the couch in Davian’s house. 

{¶11} Meanwhile, Chris Reid was playing video games at his house with 

Jeremy and Melvin Collins, who were Hope’s sons. Reid told Melvin to get another 

game controller from his house. Melvin left and then texted Jeremy from his house, 

“dad hurt.” 

{¶12} Canton City Patrolman Scott Fout was dispatched to the Hope home in 

response to a report of a shooting. He noted a sofa table with items knocked off and 

found Hope lying in a pool of blood in an archway between the dining room and living 

room. Hope was conscious, but suffering from gunshot wounds to his chest and leg. 

Fout searched the home and found a blood trail going to the basement and a large 

puddle of blood at the bottom of the basement steps. He found no shell casings, 

leading him to conclude that the gun used was a revolver. He found no signs of 
forced entry. The master bedroom of Hope’s home had been ransacked and 

something square appeared to be missing from a cluttered dresser top. 

{¶13} Hope was transported to Mercy Medical Center where he died. The 

coroner found multiple close range gunshot wounds to Hope’s body. One was found 

on the left upper chest and was partially surrounded by soot and by blackening and 

searing of the skin, indicating that the barrel of the gun was placed close to the skin. 

This shot went through his lungs, filling the lung cavity with blood so he could not 

breathe. Hope’s body was accompanied to the coroner’s office by three containers of 

blood which were pumped from his body in an effort to save him. Another wound was 

found in his back, also bearing signs that it was fired at close range. A third gunshot 

wound was found on his thigh, which broke his right thigh bone. Hope had several 

injuries to his face, possibly caused by a bullet or by impact from falling down a flight 

of steps. 

{¶14} Chris Reid’s mother gave police a description of the car Saunders and 

appellant were driving when they came to her home on the day of the murder. The 

police were able to obtain a license plate number because the car had been reported 

stolen. Canton police officer Victoria Sellers spotted the car at 8:46 p.m. by the 

entrance to Maggiore’s Drive Thru, across the street from a Huntington Bank branch. 

Appellant was in Maggiore’s wearing a white shirt and red shorts. A store clerk told 

Sellers that appellant had arrived in the Sebring. Appellant walked across the street to 

the bank. Appellant and Wright were arrested. 

{¶15} Two days later, a landscaper found appellant’s identification card along 

with a Huntington Bank ATM card belonging to Hope on the bank lawn. 
{¶16} Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with one count of 

aggravated murder with a death penalty specification and a firearm specification, and 

one count of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification. The case proceeded to 

jury trial in the Stark County Common Pleas Court. Appellant was convicted as 

charged, and the case proceeded to a separate penalty trial. 

{¶17} The jury returned with a decision that the aggravating circumstances of 

the killing did not outweigh the mitigating factors and spared appellant from the death 

penalty. The jury recommended a sentenced of life in prison without the possibility of 

parole. The court sentenced appellant to life without parole for aggravated murder 

and three years for the firearm specification. The court sentenced appellant to ten 

years incarceration for aggravated burglary, to be served consecutively. The court 

merged the firearm specification for aggravated burglary into the firearm specification 

for aggravated murder. 

{¶18} Appellant raises five Assignments of Error: 

{¶19} “I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶20} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING 

GRUESOME PHOTOS WHICH WERE INFLAMMATORY AND HIGHLY 

PREJUDICIAL. 

{¶21} “III. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND 

A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 

SECTIONS 10 AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 
ALLOWED THE PROSECUTOR A CONTINUANCE TO SPEAK WITH A WITNESS 

THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN SWORN. 

{¶22} “IV. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND 

OF ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 

ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BECAUSE HIS 

TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 

{¶23} “V. APPELLANT’S SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT 

PAROLE WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

I. 

{¶24} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the judgment 

convicting him of aggravated murder was against the manifest weight and sufficiency 

of the evidence. He specifically argues that the evidence did not demonstrate that he 

acted with purpose because he did not enter the residence intending to kill Hope, that 

the testimony of Roberson that appellant was the principal offender was not credible, 

and that the evidence did not show that he possessed the gun. 

{¶25} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire 

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of 

witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must 

be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 
1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 

485 N.E.2d 717 (1983). 

{¶26} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 

N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). 

{¶27} Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 

2903.01(B): 

{¶28} “(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful 

termination of another's pregnancy while committing or attempting to commit, or while 

fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit, kidnapping, rape, 

aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, 

trespass in a habitation when a person is present or likely to be present, terrorism, or 

escape.” 

{¶29} The jury also found that appellant was the principal offender pursuant to 

the death penalty specification found in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7): 

{¶30} “The offense was committed while the offender was committing, 

attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit 

kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and 

either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated 

murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior 

calculation and design.” 
{¶31} Appellant was also convicted of a firearm specification in violation of 

R.C. 2941.145(A), which provides in pertinent part: 

{¶32} “(A) Imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an offender 

under division (B)(1)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code is precluded unless 

the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense specifies 

that the offender had a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the 

offender's control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished 

the firearm, indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate 

the offense.” 

{¶33} Appellant first argues that the evidence does not support a finding that 

he purposely caused the death of Hope. Purposely is defined by R.C. 2901.22(A): 

{¶34} “(A) A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a 

certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a 

certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his 

specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” 

{¶35} Appellant argues that there is no evidence that when he entered the Hope 

residence, he intended to kill Mr. Hope. However, the definition of purposely does not 

require that he have intended to kill Hope when he entered the residence. There is 

evidence that supports the jury’s finding that appellant pulled the trigger of the gun 

intending to kill Mr. Hope. Larry Mackey of the Stark County Crime Laboratory tested 

the gun and testified that it was a single action revolver, meaning the shooter would 

have to pull the hammer of the gun and then pull the trigger each time to expel a bullet. 

Three bullets were removed from Hope’s body. There was evidence that the gunshot 
wound to Hope’s left upper chest was partially surrounded by soot and the skin was 

somewhat seared and blackened in the area, which demonstrated that the barrel of the 

gun was placed close to the skin. The bullet wound on Hope’s back also had 

gunpowder surrounding it, which demonstrated that it was a very close gunshot wound. 

From this evidence, the jury could conclude that appellant purposely caused the death 

of Hope, and the jury’s finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶36} Appellant next argues that there was no credible evidence to prove that he 

was the principal offender. He argues that Roberson’s testimony is not credible 

because his charge of complicity to aggravated murder was amended to complicity to 

murder in exchange for his testimony against appellant. He argues Roberson had 

previously lied to police, that he was the only one who heard appellant say he “bodied” 

Hope, and that Roberson’s behavior in burning appellant’s shirt and his nervousness on 

the day of the shooting is consistent with Roberson being the principal offender. 

{¶37} Roberson testified that when he and appellant entered the Hope 

residence, he could see a gun handle on appellant’s hip. While in the residence, 

Roberson testified that he heard several “pops” and then he fled the home. Roberson 

testified that appellant later said he “bodied” Hope, meaning he killed him. 

{¶38} While there are inconsistencies between the testimony of the witnesses 

concerning what happened on the day in question, Roberson’s testimony is not the only 

testimony supporting the jury’s finding that appellant was the principal offender. 

DeMarco Wright testified that appellant admitted to him that he shot Hope. D’Von 

Saunders testified that he gave appellant the gun and that appellant planned to rob 

someone to get some money. Further, appellant’s shorts were tested. Lead residue 
was found in the right front pocket and Hope’s blood was found in several areas of 

appellant’s shorts. 

{¶39} Roberson testified concerning his plea agreement with the state and 

admitted to lying to the police in a previous statement. However, the jury had the 

opportunity to assess Roberson’s credibility on the stand and apparently determined he 

was telling the truth at trial. Based on the evidence presented, the finding that appellant 

was the principal offender is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

{¶40} Finally, appellant argues the evidence does not demonstrate that he 

possessed the gun. Saunders testified that he gave appellant the gun. Roberson 

testified that he saw the handle sticking out of appellant’s shorts. Appellant admitted to 

Wright that he hid the gun under Davian’s couch, where police eventually recovered the 

gun. Lead residue was found in the right front pocket of appellant’s shorts. The finding 

that appellant possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense is not against 

the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence. 

{¶41} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶42} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the court abused 

its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibit 18F into evidence, which is an autopsy 

photograph showing plastic containers of blood withdrawn at the hospital in an effort to 

save Hope’s life. Appellant argues the photo has no probative value and its only 

purpose was to inflame the emotions of the jury. 
{¶43} The admission of photographic evidence is left to the discretion of the 

trial court. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264, 473 N.E.2d 768, 791 (1984); 

State v. Morales, 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267, 273 (1987). In order to find 

an abuse of that discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was 

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 

217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶44} Relevant, non-repetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible 

if the probative value of each photograph exceeds the prejudicial impact to the 

accused. Maurer, supra, at paragraph seven of the syllabus; Morales, supra, at 257. 

{¶45} The photograph in question shows three plastic hospital containers 

sitting on the autopsy table near the lower half of Hope’s body. In overruling 

appellant’s objection to this photo, the trial court stated: 

{¶46} “And I would include in that that Exhibit 18F is probably the least 

gruesome of all the photos in the entire array because it doesn’t show anything other 

than the fact that it shows some vials on a table of some type. I can’t even tell what 

they are.” 

{¶47} Having viewed the photograph, we agree with the court’s description of 

the photograph. Further, the coroner testified that the containers of blood depicted in 

the photograph were important to his determination as to the cause of death, because 

the amount of blood pumped out of Hope supported the fact that he probably bled to 

death from his lungs and other wounds. Tr. 1167-1168. 
{¶48} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 

probative value of Exhibit 18F outweighed its prejudicial effect. The second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶49} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the court erred in 

allowing the State to have a continuance to talk to Roberson after he had been sworn 

as a witness. 

{¶50} After Roberson had been sworn in as a witness, he answered questions 

concerning how long he had known appellant and the details of his plea agreement. 

The State asked him to explain where he was and what he was doing at the beginning 

of the day of the murder. Roberson said, “I don’t want to talk.” Tr. 877. The court 

gave the State a short recess to talk to Roberson. The record reflects that the court 

recessed at 1:28 p.m. and reconvened at 1:38 p.m. Later in the trial, the State put on 

the record what occurred during this recess. The State represented that Roberson 

was reminded that the terms of his plea agreement required his truthful testimony. His 

mother did most of the talking, and urged him to “be a man” and do the right thing. Tr. 

1147. She further told Roberson not to look at appellant while testifying, and that she 

wanted him to do the right thing for the sake of the victim’s family and so he would 

have a chance to get out of prison when he is 36 or 37 years old. Tr. 1148. The State 

further noted that the conversation took about six minutes and Roberson was crying 

while his mother talked to him. 

{¶51} We first note that appellant did not object to the recess to allow the State 

to talk to Roberson. Because appellant failed to object, we must find plain error in 
order to reverse. To prevail under a plain error analysis, appellant bears the burden of 

demonstrating that the outcome of the trial clearly would have been different but for 

the error. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). Notice of plain 

error “is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and 

only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at paragraph three of the 

syllabus. 

{¶52} While appellant argues that this was a continuance, the record reflects 

that the State was not given a continuance, but rather the court recessed for ten 

minutes to allow the State to talk to Roberson. In State v. Heiberger, 6th Dist. No. E84-54, 1985 WL 7544 (July 19, 1985), the court granted the state a recess to allow the 

fourteen-year-old victim-witness to talk to her caseworker to calm the witness down. 

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District found that the conduct of trial proceedings 

is largely discretionary with the trial court. Id. The court held that the record reflected 

that the witness was very nervous, the defendant was permitted to cross-examine her 

concerning what happened during the recess, and the record did not reflect that the 

witness had been coached; therefore, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

Id. 

{¶53} In the instant case, appellant cross-examined Roberson about what 

occurred during the recess. Tr. 903-905. The record reflects that Roberson was 

merely reminded of his plea agreement and his mother urged him to follow through 

with his agreement to testify truthfully against appellant. Appellant has not 

demonstrated plain error in this ten-minute recess. 

{¶54} The third assignment of error is overruled. 
IV. 

{¶55} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions on R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) which omitted 

the element of prior calculation and design, and for failing to object to the State’s 

amendment of the indictment for aggravated burglary which eliminated the “aid and 

abet” language. He argues that the combination of these errors gave the jury no 

opportunity to find that appellant was not the principal offender, and the jury was faced 

with a choice of finding him not guilty or finding that he was the principal offender. 

{¶56} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 

37 Ohio St.3d 153, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show counsel's performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, 

the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 

136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). In other words, appellant must show that counsel’s 

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. 

{¶57} The death penalty specification found in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) provides, 

“The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, 

or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, 

aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the offender 

was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the 

principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and 
design.” However, the indictment charged appellant solely with being the principal 

offender and did not include the statutory language concerning prior calculation and 

design. The trial court’s instruction used the language in the indictment and required 

the jury to find that appellant was the principal offender to find him guilty of the 

specification. Presenting the jury with the language concerning prior calculation and 

design would have created confusion, as the State’s theory of the case was that 

appellant was the principal offender, and appellant’s theory of the case was that he 

was not the principal offender. 

{¶58} Further, appellant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the 

State’s amendment to the indictment to remove the “aid and abet” element of 

aggravated burglary. If the jury accepted appellant’s defense that he was not the 

principal offender, the jury would have had no choice but to acquit appellant. The 

removal of the aid and abet language thus aided appellant’s defense. 

{¶59} The instructions squarely set before the jury the issue presented at trial: 

whether appellant was the principal offender. Appellant has not demonstrated that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instructions. 

{¶60} The fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

V. 

{¶61} In his final assignment of error, appellant argues that the sentence of life 

imprisonment without parole is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶62} Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole pursuant 

to R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), which provides in pertinent part: 
{¶63} “(2) Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the 

testimony, other evidence, statement of the offender, arguments of counsel, and, if 

applicable, the reports submitted pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section, the trial jury, 

if the offender was tried by a jury, shall determine whether the aggravating 

circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the 

mitigating factors present in the case. If the trial jury unanimously finds, by proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found 

guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to 

the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender. Absent such a finding, 

the jury shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to one of the following: 

{¶64} “(a) Except as provided in division (D)(2)(b) or (c) of this section, to life 

imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 

twenty-five full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 

serving thirty full years of imprisonment *** 

{¶65} “If the trial jury recommends that the offender be sentenced to life 

imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 

twenty-five full years of imprisonment, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 

serving thirty full years of imprisonment, or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum 

term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment to be imposed pursuant 

to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose the 

sentence recommended by the jury upon the offender.” 
{¶66} Pursuant to this section, the court has no discretion in imposing the 

sentence recommended by the jury; the statute expressly states that the court shall 

impose the sentence recommended by the jury. 

{¶67} R.C. 2953.08(D) governs review of felony sentencing. R.C. 

2953.08(D)(3) provides, “A sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder 

pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to review 

under this section.” The Ohio Supreme Court has held that this is unambiguous: a 

sentence for aggravated murder imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.02 to R.C. 2929.06 

cannot be reviewed. State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St. 3d 5, 829 N.E.2d 690, 2005-

Ohio-3095, ¶17. Therefore, evidentiary review of a sentence imposed by a trial court 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) is precluded. State v. McDowell, 10th Dist. No. 03AP1187, 2005-Ohio-6959, ¶73, overruled on other grounds, In re Ohio Criminal 

Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 411, 848 N.E.2d 809, 2006-Ohio-2394 . 

{¶68} The Court of Appeals for the 8th District discussed the longstanding 

history of treating aggravated murder sentencing differently from other felony 

sentencing in concluding that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed 

by a three-judge panel pursuant to R.C. 2929.03 is not reviewable by the appellate 

court: 

{¶69} “The General Assembly's practice of treating sentencing for aggravated 

murder and murder convictions differently from other felonies is longstanding. Before 

the 1996 Senate Bill 2 felony sentencing amendments, the courts likewise held that the 

general felony sentencing requirements did not apply in aggravated murder cases. 

E.g., State v. Richards (Dec. 15, 1997), Clermont App. No. CA97-06-059, unreported, 
1997 WL 779084. Defendant has shown nothing to indicate that the General Assembly 

intended to change this well-established sentencing practice and the comprehensive 

sentencing scheme in aggravated murder and murder cases.” State v. Hollingsworth, 

143 Ohio App. 3d 562, 569, 758 N.E.2d 713 (8th Dist. 2001). 

{¶70} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) and case law interpreting this statute, 

this Court is without statutory authority to review appellant’s sentence on an 

evidentiary basis. The fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶71} The judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

Costs assessed to appellant. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

CRB/rad 

 

 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 

 Plaintiff - Appellee 

 

-vsJONATHAN T. PATTERSON 

 Defendant - Appellant 

 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 Case No. 2012CA0098 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion on file, the judgment of the 

Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed to Appellant. 

 

HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY