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Filed 5/28/24 P. v. Laine CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSHUA PHILLIP LAINE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164659

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 5-191444-9)

In July 2019, after an advocacy group posted a judge’s home address on

its Facebook page, defendant Joshua Laine posted a reply suggesting the 

judge’s house should be burned down. A jury convicted Laine of threatening 

a public official and criminal threats, both felonies, and he was sentenced to 

two years in prison.

On appeal, Laine raises two claims involving the requirement that 

where, as here, the threat is not directly communicated to the victim, the 

defendant must specifically intend that the threat be conveyed to the victim.

Specifically, he argues that both convictions must be reversed because (1)

there was insufficient evidence of the required intent and (2) the trial court 

failed to instruct the jury on this element. The Attorney General concedes 

that prejudicial instructional error occurred, but he does not address Laine’s 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
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Even though we recognize that the threat was reprehensible and

irresponsible, and understandably caused the judge to fear for her safety, we 

conclude there was no substantial evidence that Laine specifically intended 

for it to be conveyed to the judge. Thus, we reverse both convictions on this 

basis and do not reach the claim of instructional error. (See People v. Wetle

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 375, 388.)

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

California Family Advocacy (CFA) is an organization aggrieved by the 

actions of courts and other agencies in family-law and dependency matters. 

It has conducted protests at courthouses and taken extremist positions, such 

as alleging that judges are “sex trafficking children” and selling their blood.

About a year before the charged crimes, CFA mounted an effort to

recall three Contra Costa County superior court judges, one of whom was the 

Honorable Jill Fannin. Judge Fannin presided over family law cases from 

2011 to 2014, and she also had a juvenile court assignment earlier in her 

career. The recall effort was ultimately unsuccessful because CFA failed to 

gather enough signatures. 

CFA had a group Facebook page that was public, meaning a user did 

not have to be a member to view the page’s posts. The page contained 

various doctored images of judges, including depictions of judges with pigs’ 

features and behind bars. When Laine made the post at issue, the page had 

over 1,600 followers, who would be notified in their newsfeeds of the group’s 

posts. It is unclear from the record whether Laine was a member of the page.

On the night of July 3, 2019, the CFA Facebook page made a post

providing Judge Fannin’s home address, where she lived with her husband,

and a link to her house’s listing on Zillow. The post also stated, “Maybe we 
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should provide residential address information on ALL #CPS judges.” An 

hour later, around 10:30 p.m., Laine posted the following reply (the threat): 

“Did you know . . . prior to the 1930’s, politicians/judges who violated the law 

or made their constituents unhappy got their houses burned down . . . . [¶] 

Just sayin.” CFA’s original post garnered at least 13 reactions (“likes or 

wows”). 

The following day, two other Contra Costa County judges notified a 

county sheriff’s sergeant that Judge Fannin had been threatened on 

Facebook. Using a law-enforcement database, the sergeant was able to verify

Laine was the one who posted the threat. Among other things, Laine’s 

Facebook profile was in his true name, and it referred to his previous 

campaign for mayor of Livermore, where he lived. 

When the sergeant contacted Laine, Laine stated he did not know

whether he was a member of the CFA Facebook group or whether he posted 

the threat. He was familiar with CFA, but he thought its protests were 

“ridiculous.” No evidence was presented that Laine was an official CFA 

member or was involved in any of their actions, including the attempt to 

recall Judge Fannin. 

Eventually, Laine admitted he posted the threat, indicating “he could 

have been drunk” when he did so. He denied knowing Judge Fannin, and he 

attempted to “downplay” the threat as a statement of “historical fact.” When 

the sergeant asked whether Laine was “looking to get some kind of reaction 

out of” the threat, Laine responded, “Probably not, no. . . . [T]hose protesting 

people I consider extremists. You know, that’s not me. I don’t want to spend

time with that stuff.” 

One of the judges who reported the threat to the sheriff’s sergeant 

informed Judge Fannin of it the same day. Judge Fannin then viewed the 
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CFA Facebook post and Laine’s reply to it. Judge Fannin testified that she 

was already familiar with CFA’s Facebook page, which she “would sometimes 

check . . . to see what was happening” with the effort to recall her. She 

remembered seeing Laine’s “name a few times” before on webpages

associated with CFA and the recall effort, but upon viewing the threat she 

realized that she had also seen his name on a lawsuit. 

Specifically, Laine was a named plaintiff in a federal lawsuit against 

several defendants, including Alameda and Contra Costa County family-law 

judges, complaining about the plaintiffs’ treatment in family court. The 

lawsuit was filed while CFA’s effort to recall Judge Fannin was ongoing. 

Although Judge Fannin was not named as a defendant, the body of the 

complaint mentioned her multiple times in connection with a plaintiff other 

than Laine. The allegations specific to Laine involved his experiences in 

Alameda County family court, and Judge Fannin testified that as far as she 

knew, he never appeared before her. The federal lawsuit was ultimately 

dismissed. 

When Judge Fannin viewed the threat, she became “really concerned”

about her safety. Her fear was heightened because CFA’s members were 

“irrational,” making their behavior less predictable. She explained, “It’s the 

4th of July weekend. If you want to firebomb someone’s house, that’s 

probably the best time to do it. It seemed like [Laine] was inviting people, 

who . . . were[n’t] all mentally sound[,] . . . to come to my house, to firebomb it 

on July 4th weekend, and this is a group who proudly says that they think 

I’m . . . sex trafficking children for money.” When asked whether she 

perceived Laine’s words as a threat, Judge Fannin responded, “A hundred 

percent.” 
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As a result of the threat, Judge Fannin alerted her neighbors, and law 

enforcement was stationed by her house. It took several days for Facebook to 

remove CFA’s post with her address, during which time Judge Fannin 

“obsessively” checked CFA’s Facebook page to see whether it was still up. 

Laine was charged with threatening a public official and criminal 

threats, and the jury convicted him of both counts.1 The trial court denied 

probation and sentenced him to the midterm of two years in prison for 

criminal threats. A two-year term for threatening a public official was 

imposed and stayed. 

II.

DISCUSSION

Laine contends that his convictions must be reversed because there was 

insufficient evidence that he specifically intended for his threat to be 

conveyed to Judge Fannin. We agree with the parties that this intent is a 

required element of convictions under both section 422 and section 76, and 

we conclude there was no substantial evidence that Laine harbored such an 

intent. 

A. Both Crimes Require a Specific Intent that the Threat Be 

Conveyed to the Victim.

Under section 422, it is a crime to “willfully threaten[] to commit a 

crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with 

the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means 

of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there 

is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the 

circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, 

1 Laine was convicted under Penal Code sections 76, subdivision (a) 

(threatening a public official), and 422, subdivision (a) (criminal threats). All 

further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of 

purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby 

causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for [the person’s] safety

or for [the person’s] immediate family’s safety.” (§ 422, subd. (a).)

The element of criminal threats at issue is the requirement that “the 

threat was made with the specific intent that it be taken as a threat.” 

(People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 826; see § 422, subd. (a).) “Section 

422 was not enacted to punish emotional outbursts[;] it targets only those 

who try to instill fear in others.” (People v. Felix (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 

913.) This does not mean “that a threat [must] be personally communicated 

to the victim by the person who makes the threat.” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 

100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861 (Ryan D.); In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 

1655, 1659 (David L.).) But if “the threat is conveyed through a third party 

intermediary,” the defendant cannot have “intended the threat to be taken 

seriously by the victim” unless the defendant also “intended it to be 

conveyed.” (David L., at p. 1659.) Thus, where, as here, “the [defendant] did 

not personally communicate a threat to the victim, it must be shown that [the 

defendant] specifically intended that the threat be conveyed to the victim.” 

(Ryan D., at p. 861; People v. Choi (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 753, 762.) 

As relevant here, section 76, subdivision (a), makes it a crime to 

“knowingly and willingly threaten[] the life of, or threaten[] serious bodily 

harm to,” various public officials, including judges, or their “immediate 

family, . . . with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a 

threat, and the apparent ability to carry out that threat by any means.” 

Thus, similar to section 422, section 76 includes as an element that the 

defendant had “ ‘the specific intent that the statement . . . be taken as a 

threat.’ ” (People v. Barrios (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 270, 277.)
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Laine argues, and the Attorney General concedes, that based on the 

textual similarities between section 422 and section 76, the latter statute also 

requires a specific intent that the threat be conveyed to the victim. The 

question of whether the crime of threatening a public official includes this 

element is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. 

(See People v. Sanchez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 907, 915.)

We accept the Attorney General’s concession. Similar to section 422, 

section 76 does not require that the threat be made directly to the victim but 

does require a specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat. Thus, 

based on the same logic, a defendant who does not communicate the threat 

directly to the victim must intend that the threat be conveyed to the victim. 

(See David L., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1659.)

B. There Is Insufficient Evidence that Laine Specifically Intended 

that the Threat Be Conveyed to Judge Fannin.

When determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, 

“ ‘an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] ‘Where, as here, 

the jury’s findings rest to some degree upon circumstantial evidence, we must 

decide whether the circumstances reasonably justify those findings, “but our 

opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a 

contrary finding” does not render the evidence insubstantial.’ ” (People v. 

Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 606.)

We agree with Laine that he must have specifically intended that the 

threat be conveyed to Judge Fannin, not merely known it was possible she 

would learn of it. For example, Ryan D. held that insufficient evidence 

supported the finding that a juvenile committed criminal threats where he 
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gave his art teacher a painting of himself shooting a school police officer. 

(Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 857–858.) Among other things, Ryan 

D. concluded there was no substantial evidence the juvenile intended to 

convey the threat to the officer. (Id. at pp. 863–864.) The court explained, 

“After completing the painting, the minor took it to class and turned it in for 

credit. This would be a rather unconventional and odd means of 

communicating a threat.” (Id. at p. 863.) To be sure, “the minor could have, 

and perhaps even should have, foreseen the possibility that [the officer] 

would learn of and observe the painting,” as in fact occurred once the art 

teacher reported the painting to the school administration. (Id. at pp. 858,

864.) Nonetheless, the foreseeability of the officer’s seeing the painting was 

insufficient to establish that the juvenile specifically intended for the officer 

to do so. (Id. at p. 864.) 

Other decisions reflect the same principle. For example, in Felix, the 

defendant was convicted of criminal threats after he indicated to his 

psychotherapist that he wished to kill his girlfriend. (People v. Felix, supra, 

92 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.) Even though the psychotherapist had a duty to 

warn the intended victim, making it foreseeable she would learn of the 

threat, there was insufficient evidence that the defendant intended that the 

threat be communicated to her. (Id. at pp. 908, 913.) Similarly, in People v. 

Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 935, the appellate court reversed a conviction of 

criminal threats based on the defendant’s threat to kill his wife’s attorney in 

a family-law case. (Id. at pp. 938–939.) The defendant made the threat in a 

voicemail he left for his minor child’s attorney. (Id. at pp. 939–940.) Even 

though the child’s attorney communicated the threat to the wife’s attorney, 

the defendant denied knowing that the two shared information, and there 

was no proof otherwise. (Id. at p. 944.) Without more, this was insufficient 
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to show that he intended the threat to be conveyed to the wife’s attorney. 

(Ibid.)

As Laine points out, the CFA Facebook page “was an online community 

of people who shared a deep distrust of family law judges,” and there is no 

basis to infer that he believed the page was “a conduit to communicate . . . to 

the very people [CFA was] ridiculing.” (Italics omitted.) Thus, similar to the 

situation in Ryan D., posting on CFA’s page was an “odd means” of 

attempting to convey a threat to a judge. (Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 863.) And while it may have been foreseeable that Judge Fannin would 

learn of the threat, there was no evidence that Laine knew she monitored 

CFA’s Facebook page or any other evidence from which to infer he intended 

to communicate the threat to her by posting it there.

Since the Attorney General did not respond to Laine’s insufficientevidence claim, we need not spend much time distinguishing the 

circumstances here from those in decisions holding there was substantial 

evidence of a specific intent that a threat be conveyed to the victim. Most of 

those decisions involved threats conveyed to a third party closely associated 

with the victim. (E.g., People v. Choi, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 762–763 

[threat conveyed to close friend of victims who was about to see victims];

David L., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1657–1658 [minor communicated 

threat to victim’s friend who was also present during incident that gave rise 

to threat].) Another decision, In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, is closer 

to our facts in that it also involved a threat made on social media, but in that 

case there was also a close tie between the threat’s recipients and the target 

who did not directly receive it. (See id. at pp. 656–657 [threat to bring gun to 

school was sent by Snapchat to several students, one of whom informed 

teacher].) Here, in contrast, there was no connection between the natural 
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audience of CFA’s Facebook page and Judge Fannin such that it is reasonable 

to infer Laine intended for any of its members to convey his threat to her. 

In short, there is no substantial evidence that Laine specifically 

intended to communicate the threat to Judge Fannin when he posted it on 

CFA’s Facebook page. Therefore, his convictions cannot stand. We express 

no opinion on whether Laine could have been convicted of another crime for 

his irresponsible and harmful post. 

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed.
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_________________________

Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Banke, J.

_________________________

Siggins, J.*

*Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.

People v. Laine A164659